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dc.contributor.supervisor Shao, Pei
dc.contributor.author Han, Yunhui
dc.contributor.author University of Lethbridge. Faculty of Management
dc.date.accessioned 2017-09-21T16:40:44Z
dc.date.available 2017-09-21T16:40:44Z
dc.date.issued 2017
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10133/4912
dc.description.abstract This thesis analyzes the impact of shareholder rights on non-price loan contract terms. Using a large sample of syndicated loans borrowed by U.S. firms between 1991 and 2006, I find that stronger shareholder rights significantly enhance the stringency of loan contract design. The likelihood of having collateral significantly increases with the strength of shareholder rights. Loan maturity of firms with strongest shareholder rights is 13.1% shorter. The loan size of the same borrowing firms is 8.4% smaller. These results are robust to different proxies of shareholder rights and are robust to the instrumental variable approach controlling for simultaneous determination of loan contract terms, such as collateral and maturity. This study complements the existing literature on the impact of shareholder rights on loan pricing and has important implications for understanding the impact of companies' governance structure on loan contract design. en_US
dc.language.iso en_CA en_US
dc.publisher Lethbridge, Alta. ;University of Lethbridge, Faculty of Management
dc.relation.ispartofseries Thesis (University of Lethbridge. Faculty of Management)
dc.subject collateral requirements
dc.subject loan contract design
dc.subject loan maturity
dc.subject loan pricing
dc.subject loan size
dc.subject shareholder rights
dc.title Shareholder rights and non-price loan contract terms en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
dc.publisher.faculty Management en_US
dc.degree.level Masters en_US
dc.proquest.subject 0770
dc.proquest.subject 0508
dc.proquestyes Yes en_US
dc.embargo No en_US


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