Sophisms and contempt for autonomy
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Date
2024
Authors
Stevens, Katharina
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Penn State University Press
Abstract
Argumentation theory tends to treat the distinction between intentional and unin-
tentional fallacies—sophisms and paralogisms—as unimportant for the evaluation
of argumentation. The article author believes this is so because argumentation the-
ory tends to be focused on the epistemic functions of argumentation and fallacious
arguments pose the same threat to the production of epistemic goods whether they
are intentional or not, so the distinction is not needed for the epistemic evalua-
tion of argumentation. This article argues that argumentation has a special connec-
tion to respect for autonomy, one that enables it to also produce distinctly moral
goods. Sophisms, but not paralogisms, spoil these goods. Worse—sophisms produce potentially continuing moral harms, while paralogisms do not. Therefore, the paralogism/sophism distinction should be reintegrated into argumentation theory's evaluative toolbox.
duce potentially continuing moral harms, while paralogisms do not. Therefore, the
paralogism/sophism distinction should be reintegrated into argumentation theory’s
Description
Accepted author manuscript
Keywords
Fallacy , Sophism , Paralogism , Ethics of argumentation , Autonomy , Argumentation
Citation
Stevens, K. (2024). Sophisms and contempt for autonomy. Philosophy & Rhetoric, 57(3), 333-346. https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.57.3.0333