Faculty Research and Publications

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Angelic devil’s advocates and the forms of adversariality
(Springer, 2021) Stevens, Katharina; Cohen, Daniel
Is argumentation essentially adversarial? The concept of a devil's advocate—a cooperative arguer who assumes the role of an opponent for the sake of the argument—serves as a lens to bring into clearer focus the ways that adversarial arguers can be virtuous and adversariality itself can contribute to argumentation's goals. It also shows the different ways arguments can be adversarial and the different ways that argumentation can be said to be "essentially" adversarial.
Asking before arguing? consent in argumentation
(Springer, 2023) Stevens, Katharina; Casey, John
Arguments involve, at minimum, attempts at presenting something that an audience will take to be a reason. Reasons, once understood, affect an addressee’s beliefs in ways that are in some significant sense outside of their direct voluntary control. Since such changes may impact the well-being, life projects, or sense of self of the addressee, they risk infringing upon their autonomy. We call this the “autonomy worry” of argumentation. In light of this worry, this paper asks whether one ought to seek an addressee’s consent before arguing with them. We first consider the view that arguing of any sort and on any topic requires consent. However, such a view is extreme, and we reject the general requirement of consent because argument contains its own internal permission structure. We find, however, that this permission structure is not always operative, and that consent may nonetheless be morally required in certain kinds of cases.
Avoiding toxic charity in argumentation
(Springer, 2025) Stevens, Katharina
The interpersonal argumentative principle of charity is widely regarded as a legitimate norm for argumentation. Still, even a cursory look into the literature on argumentative charity reveals that charitable interpretations can easily become toxic. This means that they generate epistemic and moral losses by leading to distorting interpretations instead of preventing them, as the arguments for charity promise. This paper explores why argumentative charity becomes toxic and offers an attempt at identifying a kind of argumentative charity that fulfills the promises that make argumentative charity attractive. It does so by distinguishing three kinds of charity: Egocentric charity, which interprets the argument as strong from the interpreter’s point of view, emic charity, which interprets it as strong from the arguer’s point of view, and complex charity, which unites the two. Only complex charity can avoid toxicity.
Does rhetoric have a place in Wolhrapp's theory of argument?
(University of Windsor, 2017) Stevens, Katharina
This paper aims to determine whether rhetoric has a place in Wohlrapp's theory of argumentation. Wohlrapp's own attitude towards rhetoric is ambiguous. There are passages in his book where he grants that rhetoric might have a role to play when it comes to the subjective side of argumentation. Overall, however, he views rhetoric with deep suspicion. I argue that in spite of Wohlrapp's negative attitude, his theory of argumentation would benefit from integrating a theory of rhetoric. I take Wohlrapp's concepts of frame and insight as a starting point to make my case.
Fooling the victim: of straw men and those who fall for them
(Penn State University Press, 2021) Stevens, Katharina
This paper contributes to the debate about the strawman fallacy. It is the received view that strawmen are employed to fool not the arguer whose argument they distort, but instead a third party, an audience. I argue that strawmen that fool their victims exist and are an important variation of the strawman fallacy because of their special perniciousness. I show that those who are subject to hermeneutical lacunae or who have since forgotten parts of justifications they have provided earlier are especially vulnerable to falling for strawmen aimed at their own positions or arguments. Adversarial argumentation provides especially fertile ground for strawmen that fool their own victims, but cooperative argumentation is no fail-safe protection from them either.
Sophisms and contempt for autonomy
(Penn State University Press, 2024) Stevens, Katharina
Argumentation theory tends to treat the distinction between intentional and unin- tentional fallacies—sophisms and paralogisms—as unimportant for the evaluation of argumentation. The article author believes this is so because argumentation the- ory tends to be focused on the epistemic functions of argumentation and fallacious arguments pose the same threat to the production of epistemic goods whether they are intentional or not, so the distinction is not needed for the epistemic evalua- tion of argumentation. This article argues that argumentation has a special connec- tion to respect for autonomy, one that enables it to also produce distinctly moral goods. Sophisms, but not paralogisms, spoil these goods. Worse—sophisms produce potentially continuing moral harms, while paralogisms do not. Therefore, the paralogism/sophism distinction should be reintegrated into argumentation theory's evaluative toolbox. duce potentially continuing moral harms, while paralogisms do not. Therefore, the paralogism/sophism distinction should be reintegrated into argumentation theory’s
The attraction of the ideal has no traction on the real: on adversariality and roles in argument
(Taylor & Francis, 2018) Stevens, Katharina; Cohen, Daniel
If circumstances were always simple and all arguers were always exclusively concerned with cognitive improvement, arguments would probably always be cooperative. However, we have other goals and there are other arguers, so in practice the default seems to be adversarial argumentation. We naturally inhabit the heuristically helpful but cooperation-inhibiting roles of proponents and opponents. We can, however, opt for more cooperative roles. The resources of virtue argumentation theory are used to explain when proactive cooperation is permissible, advisable, and even mandatory – and also when it is not.