Setting precedents without making norms?
| dc.contributor.author | Stevens, Katharina | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-10-24T17:53:40Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-10-24T17:53:40Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.description | Accepted author manuscript | |
| dc.description.abstract | Some authors argue that the rule-of-law ideal gives judges a prima facie duty to provide a determinate formulation of the precedent’s general norm in all their precedent-opinions. I question that claim. I agree that judges have a duty to decide their cases based on reasons and that they should formulate these reasons in their opinions. I also agree that formulations of general norms should be the goal of common-law development and that judges have a duty to contribute to the realization of this goal. However, I argue that judges may sometimes do so better if they do not provide a determinate formulation of a general norm in their opinion. Often, judges may not feel confident that they are able to formulate a good general norm for their precedent decision, even if they believe that their decision is both correct and justifiable through argument. In this case, various reasons speak against providing a determinate formulation of a general norm, including rule-of-law reasons. | |
| dc.description.peer-review | Yes | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Stevens, K. (2020). Setting precedents without making norms? Law and Philosophy, 39(6), 577-616. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-020-09383-6 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10133/7200 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Springer | |
| dc.publisher.department | Department of Philosophy | |
| dc.publisher.faculty | Arts and Science | |
| dc.publisher.institution | University of Lethbridge | |
| dc.publisher.url | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-020-09383-6 | |
| dc.subject | General norm | |
| dc.subject | Precedent | |
| dc.title | Setting precedents without making norms? | |
| dc.type | Article |