Charity for moral reasons? – A defense of the principle of charity in argumentation
| dc.contributor.author | Stevens, Katharina | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-10-23T20:17:59Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-10-23T20:17:59Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.description | Accepted author manuscript | |
| dc.description.abstract | In this paper I argue for a pro tanto moral duty to be charitable in argument. Further, I argue that the amount of charitable effort required varies depending on the type of dialogue arguers are engaged in. In non-institutionalized contexts, arguers have influence over the type of dialogue that will be adopted. Arguers are therefore responsible with respect to charity on two levels: First, they need to take reasons for charity into account when determining the dialogue-type. Second, they need to invest the amount of effort towards charity required by the dialogue-type. | |
| dc.description.peer-review | Yes | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Stevens, K. (2021). Charity for moral reasons? – A defense of the principle of charity in argumentation. Argumentation and Advocacy, 57(2), 67-84. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511431.2021.1897327 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10133/7197 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis | |
| dc.publisher.department | Department of Philosophy | |
| dc.publisher.faculty | Arts and Science | |
| dc.publisher.institution | University of Lethbridge | |
| dc.publisher.url | https://doi.org/10.1080/10511431.2021.1897327 | |
| dc.subject | Principle of charity | |
| dc.subject | Ethics of argumentation | |
| dc.subject | Adversarial argumentation | |
| dc.subject | Strawman | |
| dc.subject | Arguers | |
| dc.subject | Argument | |
| dc.title | Charity for moral reasons? – A defense of the principle of charity in argumentation | |
| dc.type | Article |