

**CANADA'S IDENTITY CRISIS: PIERRE TRUDEAU AND THE INTRODUCTION OF
MULTICULTURAL POLICY**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis contextualizes the decision to enact official multiculturalism in Canada and argues that it was an expression of themes and desires consistent in Pierre Trudeau's political philosophy from his earliest political writings. It also discusses the way that multiculturalism was an attempt to solve immediate issues of French-Canadian nationalism and assesses the reasons for its failure to do so. Writings on multiculturalism are often nebulous because they are tied to complex and emotional questions of identity, and this thesis offers useful grounding in bringing the discussion back to the context when it was enacted.

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INTRODUCTION

Canada has enjoyed a boost to its reputation due to the political and cultural exportation of multiculturalism since its introduction as an official policy in 1971 by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and his Liberal government. Encouraged by multiculturalism, some Canadians believe that Canada is unique and that it stands out as one of the most multicultural, harmonious, and tolerant societies in the world.¹ In 1991, The Citizens Forum on Canada's Future reinforced the belief that multiculturalism had made Canadian society one of the most tolerant by arguing that Canadians all shared common beliefs such as equality and fairness in a democratic society, the importance of accommodation and dialogue, support for diversity, compassion and generosity, and commitment to global freedom, peace, and non-violent change.² However, multicultural policy has effectively gaslit Canadians into believing their society is more tolerant than it is, as many scholars have pointed out. Himani Bannerji, Stanley Barrett, and Eve Haque, among others, have all provided distinctive critiques of multicultural policy in Canada. Bannerji points out that Canada is an "imagined community" where racialized people "remain an ambiguous presence and their existence a question mark."³ However, they continue to live in Canada as outliers due to the projection of a tolerant multicultural society towards the international community.⁴ Barrett challenges Canadians who believe racial tolerance has become one of the country's hallmarks by highlighting actions and events that point out this self-congratulatory self-image. Barret does this by identifying that racist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) were formally established in Canada during the 1920s, and later during the 1960s and 1970s, neo-Nazis began to operate out of

¹*The Fire Now: Anti-Racist Scholarship in Time of Explicit Racial Violence*, ed. Azeezat Johnson, Remi Joseph-Salisbury, and Beth Kamunge (London: Zed Books, 2018), 166.

² Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future, Report to the People and Government of Canada, 36-44 (Ottawa 1991).

³ Himani Bannerji, *The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism, and Gender* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc, 2000), 91.

⁴ Bannerji, *The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism, and Gender*, 91.

urban centres.⁵ Haque points out that the roots of multiculturalism come from a desire within the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism for an equal partnership between the English and French “founding races.”⁶ Haque also argues that Canadian multiculturalism’s real intention was not to accommodate the growing cultural diversity of the nation but instead provided an opportunity to create a discourse of cultural neutrality, cultural democracy, and colour blindness that appealed many cultural minorities arriving in the country.⁷

Part of this thesis’ intention is to understand the criticisms that Canada’s multicultural policy faced during its implementation and the ones it faced immediately after the policy was constitutionally mandated. As Section 27 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* states: “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”⁸ However, different groups in Canada perceive their rights and responsibilities within a multicultural system differently. Due to their colonial roots, Canada’s white-French and white-British communities have been two of the most influential groups in Canadian society, continuing into the late 1960s and 1970s during the official policy’s implementation.⁹ In the past and present, Canada is a nation that has blatantly let race and culture dictate which immigrants were welcome and which ones were not. The colonization and attempted genocide of vast and diverse Indigenous populations and racist immigration policies have left two distinct and apparent stains on Canada’s history. During the twentieth century, Canada had multiple cultural and racial issues. Initially, multiculturalism was not designed to deal with just these issues.

⁵ Stanley R. Barrett, *Is God a Racist? The Right Wing in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 121.

⁶ Eve Haque, “Language, Race, and the Impossibility of Multiculturalism,” in *Race and Racialization: Essential Readings*, ed. Tania Das Gupta et al. (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2018), 261.

⁷ Haque, “Language, Race, and the Impossibility of Multiculturalism,” 262.

⁸ *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, s 27, Part 1 of the *Constitution Act*, 1982, being Schedule B to the *Canada Act 1982* (UK), 1982, c 11.

⁹ “White-British-Canadian” or “British Canadian” is used throughout this thesis because it was used as a catch-all phrase for white English-speaking Canadians. This phrase was still very exclusionary because many white English speakers in Canada were not British.

Part of its intention was to deal with a growing strain of French-Canadian nationalism in Quebec that threatened Canada's already shaky unity and identity.¹⁰ However, members of Canada's federal government were aware of the cultural issues within Canada and the continuing growth of diversity happening throughout the country. Robert Stanfield summed up Canada's continuing struggle with culture in the House of Commons after Trudeau announced Canada would be pursuing multicultural policy: "the cultural identity of Canada is a pretty complex thing."¹¹ The complexity of Canadian identity remains a consistent national issue and a persistent theme throughout this thesis.

To properly discuss the introduction of official multiculturalism by Pierre Trudeau, we need to understand what Trudeau believed multiculturalism would do for Canada and why 1971 was the correct time for the policy to be implemented nationwide. Defining a basic understanding of culture can be done by tangible things such as music, literature, visual arts, architecture, or language. Seeming endless combinations of these characteristics define different cultures. Anthropologists often point out that shared cultural characteristics allow for collective communities because of the ease of communication and the understanding of practices.¹² Trudeau deviated from the usual understanding of culture in that he believed in a cultural community that would not pursue a distinct culture but instead one that allowed individuals the freedom to pursue the culture they desired. Canadians had the right to cultural freedom, and although Trudeau acknowledged Canada had two official languages, he did not believe Canada had an official culture that took precedence over others.¹³ Furthermore, this understanding of culture by Trudeau

¹⁰ Haque, "Language, Race, and the Impossibility of Multiculturalism," 261.

¹¹ House of Commons Debate Friday October 8th, 1971, 8545 (Canada 1971).

¹² Robert A. LeVine, "Properties of Culture: An Ethnographic View," in *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion*, ed. Richard A. Shweder and Robert A. LeVine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 68.

¹³ House of Commons Debate Friday October 8th, 1971, Short, 8545.

showcases how he believed in the individuality of liberalism, causing his small liberal characteristic to bleed into the policies he pursued and enacted. The pursuit of cultural freedom, sometimes referred to as the multiculturalism hypothesis by scholars such as political scientist Hugh Donald Forbes, was intended to recognize the legitimacy of all cultures regardless of their practices or beliefs and eventually reduce prejudice between cultures.¹⁴ Trudeau wanted multiculturalism to solve the issue of French-Canadian nationalism in Quebec, thus its implementation in 1971, but he also had a vision of Canadian identity and unity that focused on acceptance, communication, and the freedom of all cultural groups within Canada. Trudeau's and multiculturalism's ideal Canadian culture would have created citizens that were not "the zealous patriot ready to fight and die for their nation but, rather, the rational voter and dutiful taxpayer with a 'cooler' relation to the political authorities over them, not completely alienated from them (because they are oppressing his nation) but not identified with them either (since their nation is not *their* nation)."¹⁵ There were two sides to Trudeau's multicultural policy, what it set out to accomplish immediately in terms of a hopeful solution to divisive French-Canadian nationalism and his theoretical vision for the policy in the long term as a catalyst for acceptance and diversity.

To understand Canada's multicultural policy, it is crucial to understand why Trudeau believed it was the proper system to implement in Canada to solve the problem of Canadian unity and identity. October 8th, 1971, marks when Trudeau announced that he and the Liberal government would be pursuing multicultural policy and laid out his explanation for doing so.

A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians. Such a policy should help break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies. National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence

¹⁴ Hugh Donald Forbes, "Trudeau as the First Theorist of Canadian Multiculturalism," in *Multiculturalism and the Canadian Constitution*, ed. Stephen Tierney (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 28.

¹⁵ Forbes, "Trudeau as the First Theorist of Canadian Multiculturalism," 40.

in one's identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions.¹⁶

Trudeau brought in an ideology that encompassed a blend of multiculturalism, anti-ethnonationalism, and liberalism. Furthermore, with this new policy, Trudeau evidenced a belief that a united Canadian identity was possible and that Canada's culture could change using government policy.

Trudeau brought his vision of Canadian culture and identity into the prime minister's office. However, before him, people were trying to solve the same problems, seeking answers to Canada's culture and identity in the form of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Initially, the Commission recommended a policy of biculturalism, but multiculturalism seemed superior in Trudeau's eyes as he believed it would prevent the development of ethnonationalism. While the main priority of the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism was to create equality between French and English Canadians within government institutions, Trudeau outlined four areas of concern that multiculturalism intended to address upon its implementation:

First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the small weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized.

Second, the government will assist all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society.

Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in national unity.

Fourth, the government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages to become full participants in Canadian society.¹⁷

These principles supported British-Canadian cultural rights and the immigrant cultures that were becoming more relevant in Canada. Shifting from the recommendation of biculturalism to

¹⁶ House of Commons Debate Friday October 8th, 1971, Short, 8545.

¹⁷ House of Commons Debate Friday October 8th, 1971, Short, 8546.

multiculturalism was due to motivations from both the government and grassroots forces. Multiculturalism was not a policy necessarily fought for by new immigrants but by already-established ethnic groups who shared the same fear of loss of identity that francophones had.¹⁸ Preservation of one's culture, rather than just accepting assimilation into British-Canadian culture, was a priority for specific groups within Canada who wished to maintain and perhaps grow their culture. Further important context for the decision to implement official multiculturalism was the reaction to the perceived American influence within certain realms, with the most prominent being the media, on the country. The years immediately preceding official multiculturalism involved a frantic search for an authentic Canadian identity as the economic and cultural influence of the United States continued to grow.¹⁹ Within Canada, there were several issues regarding cultural identity, and the separatist movement in Quebec added to the list of issues Trudeau and the Liberals had to address.

Throughout the Trudeau years, the federal Liberals had always enjoyed massive victories in Quebec as they had never averaged less than eighty-four percent of the province's federal seats.²⁰ Trudeau's Liberals had to work hard for the province's support. One of the constant challenges faced by Trudeau and the Canadian government was the issue of nationalism in Quebec and the desire of many Quebecers to become more prominent in Canada or separate from Canada entirely. The Quiet Revolution left a hole once filled by traditional Catholicism in francophone society. During the 1960s, church attendance dropped from over eighty percent to around twenty-

¹⁸ Harold Troper, "An Uncertain Past: Reflections on the History of Multiculturalism," *TESL Talk* 10, no. 3 (1979): 13.

¹⁹ Michael Temelini, "Multicultural Rights, Multicultural Virtues: A History of Multiculturalism in Canada," in *Multiculturalism and the Canadian Constitution*, ed. Stephen Tierney (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 46.

²⁰ Kenneth McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997), 245.

five percent, while the birth rate in Quebec dropped to the lowest in Canada.²¹ In Quebec, the local priest was no longer the community's voice, and the decline of individuals' commitment to Catholicism had left some searching for another method to connect themselves to their community. While some of the province's population carried on, some groups used ethnic nationalism and sometimes militant tactics in a way that some have seen as a surrogate for the Catholic Church.²² Although the transition from committed churchgoers to ethnic nationalists seems like a leap for community connectedness, the Catholic Church was crucial in French-Canadian identity. As most Quebecers moved away from the church, they sought out new identifiers. The growth of nationalism in Quebec was a challenge to the federalist ideology held by Trudeau and the federal Liberals, who had hoped a multicultural policy would dissuade the nationalists.

While multiculturalism was not initially intended to do so, the hope was that it would cool the flames of nationalism among Quebecers and assure them that they had a place in the federal system. Francophone nationalists favoured bilingualism and biculturalism over multiculturalism as it helped preserve the duality of Canada. Many francophones in Quebec believed multiculturalism favoured other minority cultures and Western Canada, where French/English bilingualism was not much of a factor.²³ Trudeau did not agree with any form of regionalism and thus was firmly against Quebec's desire to become a sovereign nation. He regularly pointed out the benefits of being part of Canada that would be lost if Quebec separated. Trudeau believed Quebec's desire for separation was dangerous in theory and groundless in fact. The implementation of the multicultural policy was an attempt to ease the rumblings of separatism in

²¹ E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 166.

²² Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*, 166.

²³ Sarah V. Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," *International Journal of Minority and Group Rights* 5, no. 1 (1997): 47.

Quebec. However, the provincial government rejected it shortly after Trudeau's announcement on October 8th, 1971.²⁴ Even many public supporters of Canadian federalism disapproved of the elevation of multiculturalism over biculturalism.²⁵ Shortly after the announcement of multicultural policy, Quebec began to effectively undermine the federal government's efforts to change Canada's culture and create a unified identity. The opposition to multiculturalism from Quebec begs whether biculturalism or multiculturalism was the better option for Quebec and Canada.

This thesis uses Pierre Trudeau's writings to examine his motivation for enacting official multiculturalism and situates them in the context of the day, especially in terms of their relation to the rising French-Canadian nationalism of the 1960s and 70s. It examines responses and critics of multiculturalism and Trudeau's efforts to enshrine the policy more firmly in Canada's legal structure by including it in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act of 1982. Despite being at apparent odds with Trudeau's focus on liberal individuality, this thesis argues that multiculturalism was not just a pragmatic response to an immediate political problem but a consistent thread in his philosophy and ethics. There is a specific focus on the official federal policy because the Canadian government attempted to use such a policy to deal with the types of nationalism it deemed inappropriate while fostering tolerance in an already diverse nation rather than allowing it to happen solely from grassroots movements. Canada was already very diverse before the official multicultural policy, but multiculturalism shed a spotlight on this characteristic for better in some cases and for worse in others.

This thesis consists of three main chapters, each focusing on a different aspect of Canada's official multicultural policy. Chapter one focuses on Pierre Trudeau's political philosophy. By

²⁴ The provincial government of Quebec at the time was the Quebec Liberal Party led by Premier Robert Bourassa. It is important to note that the Quebec Liberal Party was not a separatist government but was a nationalistic one.

²⁵ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 130.

examining Trudeau's political philosophy, we can see why he believed an official multicultural policy was appropriate for Canada and why he thought the beginning of the 1970s was the right time to institute such a policy. Trudeau used multicultural policy for its short-term benefits in dealing with the nationalist movement in Quebec and as part of his long-term vision of multiculturalism, which he had hoped would make Canada an example of acceptance and diversity for the rest of the world. Chapter two examines the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and its original recommendations from 1965 to 1970 for Canada's approach to culture via an official policy. The chapter then explains why the multicultural policy was eventually opted for over bicultural policy, even though it seemed to be the preferred choice for Canada's French and English colonial cultures. Chapter two concludes by considering the criticisms made of Trudeau's pursuit of multiculturalism and the multicultural policy itself with the understanding that from its implementation multicultural policy was recognized as imperfect and a policy that would require continual adjustment. Furthermore, chapter three concentrates on Quebec's reaction to the multicultural policy since one of the policy's primary intentions was to deal with the sovereignty crisis in Quebec. The chapter also helps us understand Quebec's efforts at independence and why the province had an adverse reaction to the federal policy. The three of these chapters help answer why multiculturalism was pursued as an official policy at this specific moment in history.

An effort to understand the intentions and context behind official multiculturalism in terms of what it intended to accomplish, together with an examination of the issues and solutions that multicultural policy created, will help reveal what the Trudeau administration and its successors intended in terms of the country's development. This research will also create a clearer picture of critiques that multicultural policy has faced. Firstly, we must examine some of the scholarship that

has been written regarding the politics and history of multiculturalism in Canada to gain a deeper understanding of why it was believed to be the policy Canada needed to move forward as a nation and why it has faced criticisms for the implementation of multiculturalism.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Scholarly analysis of themes surrounding Pierre Trudeau, multiculturalism, Canadian identity, and nationalism in Quebec span multiple areas of scholarship. Historians, political scientists, sociologists, and writers all provide different viewpoints of Trudeau's political ideology as prime minister, the immediate context of multicultural policy and its legacy decades after its inception that has influenced Canadian identity, and the reasons for Quebec's pursuit of nationalism. This historiography examines writings from historians and scholars from other fields that have works grounded in historical context. That is why this historiography section is split into sub-sections based on the type of scholarship being discussed. Firstly, primary sources are considered, followed by historical, interdisciplinary, and popular works. Each section addresses themes seen in the scholarship produced regarding the complicated questions of Trudeau's motivations for pursuing multicultural policy, the extent to which the policy was successful, and the ongoing question of Canadian identity.

When it comes to Pierre Trudeau's political philosophy, luckily, for the sake of this thesis, he wrote about his political beliefs before his time as prime minister. By examining Trudeau's early political philosophy, we can see where his desire for multiculturalism comes from. At the same time, we can see his individualist liberalism shine through in his politics, which created some conflict between his desire for an overarching system of multiculturalism, Canadian identity, and his belief in personal freedoms. Trudeau's most well-known work that provides an in-depth look at his political philosophy is an anthology titled *Federalism and the French Canadians*, in which we can see the version of Trudeau that believed he could change Canadian society to become an example of tolerance and progress for the rest of the world.

Primary Sources:

Although this collection of essays that make up *Federalism and the French Canadians* was published in 1968, the essays were written between 1954 and 1967. *Federalism and the French Canadians* provides much of the insight into Trudeau's political philosophy that this thesis requires. An important theme within Trudeau's early essays is that he staunchly defended federalism, which influenced his political ideology. Trudeau believed that the historical factors between French and English Canadians and Quebec's internal history blinded French Canadians to their advantages as part of Canada.²⁶ While provincial governments of Quebec have blamed the constitution for the province's problems, the central government of Canada does indeed deserve some of the blame because of its English Canadian bias. Trudeau disagreed with this in his early writings as he believed Quebec should focus on the powers it did have under federalism instead of its hypothetical ones.²⁷ *Federalism and the French Canadians* reveals Trudeau's ideas of how he would have liked to fashion constitutional law in Canada.

By examining Trudeau's political philosophy, we can see how his enactment of official multiculturalism was more than a response to the crisis of ethnonationalism in Quebec but was part of his political philosophy all along. Throughout the essays in *Federalism and the French Canadians*, Trudeau argues that the federalist system is suitable for Canada and that if French Canadians wish to preserve the qualities that distinguish them from other Canadians, the existing Canadian constitutional arrangement was beneficial for them.²⁸ However, while defending Canada's constitutional system, Trudeau's small l liberal beliefs are also apparent in his writing. This characteristic of Trudeau comes through as he approves of the protective urges of French

²⁶ Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968), 180.

²⁷ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 44.

²⁸ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 177.

Canadians and understands they have the right to individuality when it comes to differentiating their culture from others.

... [T]here is not much to be gained in brushing them aside on the ground that the nation of French Canadians will someday fade from view and that Canada itself will undoubtedly not exist forever ...

... The problem we must face squarely is this: without back-sliding to the ridiculous and reactionary idea of national sovereignty, how can we protect our French-Canadian national qualities?²⁹

Trudeau clarifies throughout his essays that he understands that national groups, such as French Canadians, would rather have control of their own affairs. However, he argues that federalism helps preserve national groups in a world where economics and strategic factors are essential for physical survival. By examining Trudeau's writings alongside secondary sources that break down his policy decisions, we can see the ideal situation that he hoped would come from his pursuit of federalist policies and how his individualistic liberalism often became tangled up with them.

In an essay titled "New Treason of the Intellectuals," Trudeau was critical of the new nationalistic direction that Quebec was heading. The essay features a section titled "The Future," which opens with the statement, "If in my opinion, the nation were of purely negative value, I would be at such pains to discredit a movement that promises to lead the French-Canadian nation to its ruin."³⁰ While Trudeau is critical of nationalism in his writings, he does acknowledge that there were some positive aspects to it, such as a sense of community instead of becoming individualistic and isolated from others.³¹ However, Trudeau did not see this aspect emerging in Quebec's nationalistic landscape. Trudeau described conversations he had with Quebec nationalists and separatists during the early 1960s. He was critical of their ideological limitations and discussed how he was astounded continuously by the anti-Semitism, the totalitarian outlook

²⁹ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 177.

³⁰ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 177.

³¹ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 177.

of others, and the ignorance of basic economics from all of them.³² Harsh words from Trudeau, yes, but exposing the toxicity of ethnic nationalism was a cause on which Trudeau was unwilling to waver. Trudeau believed the framework used by nationalist governments to be naturally intolerant, discriminatory, and implicitly totalitarian.³³ By engaging with nationalist francophones, Trudeau was able to see these dangerous tendencies festering in Quebec's francophone population. To counteract the dangerous nationalism in Quebec, Trudeau maintained that the only way a government could be genuinely democratic was to disregard nationalism and pursue the good for all its citizens.³⁴

These early years and the ideology that motivated Trudeau during them are worth mentioning because Trudeau not only influenced Canadian society during his tenure as prime minister but was also involved in the world of politics and culture throughout his adult life. Due to Trudeau's published writings, we can examine his political beliefs before becoming prime minister, helping us understand his time as prime minister and the policies he found most important for Canada. Trudeau's pursuit of a policy of official multiculturalism was reasonably consistent with the philosophical themes and positions argued for in his early political writing and examining them is thus valuable for understanding the development of multicultural policy. A critical factor in understanding the themes from Trudeau's ideology is grasping the historical environment in which Trudeau was writing and developing his ideology. During the late 1950s, Trudeau was writing and condemning the Catholic Church and Quebec's conservative provincial government,

³² Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 168.

³³ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 169. Here Trudeau is referring to John Dalberg-Acton's work *Essays on Freedom and Power*. Trudeau notes that Acton was writing in 1862, "The nation is here an ideal unit founded on the race ... It overrules the rights and wishes of the inhabitants, absorbing their divergent interests in a fictitious unity; sacrifices their several inclinations and duties to the higher claim of nationality, and crushes all natural rights and all established liberties to vindicate itself. Wherever a single definite object is made the supreme end of the State- the State becomes for the time being inevitably absolute." John Dalberg-Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power* (Glencoe, 1948), 184

³⁴ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 169.

the Union Nationale, when Quebec was ripe for change and ready to move away from their influence.³⁵

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism also serves as a crucial primary source in this thesis. During the 1960s, the federal government acknowledged a deep divide between French and English culture within Canada. The divide between the two cultures prompted the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963. The Commission was chaired by francophone journalist André Laurendeau and the anglophone president of Carlton University Davidson Dunton. The mandate of the Commission was:

The Commission has been charged with the task of inquiring into 'the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism' and 'the contribution made by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada.' In both cases, it is primarily a question of linguistic and cultural matters of linguistic and cultural aspects of political, socioeconomic matters. Therefore, we shall speak more often to linguistic and cultural groups rather than ethnic groups.³⁶

The report's findings determined that francophones were underrepresented in the nation's political and business communities. The report laid out four main recommendations to alleviate this:

- 1) That bilingual districts were created in regions of Canada where members of the minority community, either French or English, made up to ten percent or more of the local population,
- 2) That parents be able to have their children attend schools in the language of their choice in regions where there is sufficient demand,
- 3) That Ottawa becomes a bilingual city,
- 4) That English and French be declared official languages of Canada.³⁷

The report of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission coincided with the start of Trudeau's prime ministership. When Trudeau entered office, the first legislative push he made was implementing the specific recommendations made by the Royal Commission regarding bilingualism, which

³⁵ Michael D. Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism Versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1985), 82.

³⁶ A. Davidson Dunton et al., *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1967), xxvii.

³⁷ Dunton et al., *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, 147-49.

resulted in the Official Languages Act of 1969. Being both a French-Canadian and a federalist, Trudeau's implementation of bilingualism and the Official Languages Act was significant.

Supporting French-language rights has become an essential issue at the federal level because of the province's power as a voting block and constitutional obligations. Historically Quebec has often voted as a block, meaning at least three-quarters of the population seats in the House of Commons went to the same party. The federal Liberals understood that Quebec paid attention to how the government handled French and English Canada during the nineteenth century. By attempting to appease both sides and bringing in francophone leaders such as Wilfrid Laurier, Louis St. Laurent, and Pierre Trudeau, the Liberals consistently had Quebec's backing at the federal level until the 1980s. This shows that there has been a political strategy at play when federal parties have sought power and needed Quebec to gain it. Quebec's language rights are also protected in the constitution. Section sixteen of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states: "English and French are the official languages of Canada and have the equality of status and equal rights and privileges and their use in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada."³⁸ This section lays out the minimum standard that must be upheld for bilingualism and the protection of the French language at the federal level. French-Canadians may regard the charter as too little too late; they had been fighting to validate their language for decades by the 1980s when the charter was instituted and wanted more than the bare minimum of language rights.

Historical Sources:

Historian Robert F. Harney, who has studied North American immigration, ethnic studies, and multicultural history, has written on some of the themes involved with the shallow aspects of multiculturalism while also examining how the Canadian polity is in constant search of a nation.

³⁸ *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, s 16, Part 1 of the *Constitution Act, 1982*, being Schedule B to the *Canada Act 1982 (UK)*, 1982, c 11.

His article, titled "'So Great a Heritage as Ours': Immigration and the survival of the Canadian Polity," discusses the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bicultural and how it favoured the dualism of Canadian culture in the 1960s. He also argues that, even though the Commission was narrowly focused, it was also trying to create a new identity for Canada. Canadians were in search of an identity that subordinated them from the British metropole, which would deter Quebec's people from separatism, and one that also continued to sustain political, social, and cultural values that Canadians believed distinguished them from the United States.³⁹ The goals of the Commission did align with Trudeau's, but biculturalism focused on the dualism of French and British Canada that had led to mutual antagonism, which was seen as a hindrance for Canadian identity and intended to turn it into a national virtue.⁴⁰ Part of this thesis argues that Trudeau's vision of Canadian identity alongside outside pressure pushed him away from the dualism biculturalism would have created and towards the plurality of multiculturalism. As Harney describes, Trudeau and the Liberal government's policies and programs initiated after 1971 were relatively subtle so as not to fire up the opponents to multiculturalism.⁴¹ He states that, on the other hand, they were inclusive enough to appease cultures that would have been left out of a bicultural identity forcing Trudeau into somewhat of a balancing act between French/British Canadians and the plethora of other cultures in Canada.

Harney also contributes to the conversation about the lack of success of multiculturalism in Canada. His criticisms of Trudeau are consistent with those of other scholars who decry that he did little in terms of providing attention to the issue of multiculturalism after his initial announcement of it in 1971, besides the Multicultural Act brought to the House of Commons in

³⁹ Robert F. Harney, "So Great a Heritage as Ours" Immigration and the Survival of Canadian Polity," *Daedalus* 117, no. 4 (1988): 64.

⁴⁰ Harney, "So Great a Heritage as Ours" Immigration and the Survival of Canadian Polity," 64.

⁴¹ Harney, "So Great a Heritage as Ours" Immigration and the Survival of Canadian Polity," 72.

1987.⁴² Harney's view of multiculturalism also accords with the wide interpretation that multiculturalism has become part of Canadian identity projected outward to paint Canada as a more diverse and tolerant country. Multiculturalism became trivialized as it became more about showcasing specific and easy-to-digest aspects of ethnic cultures instead of acknowledging that they are all unique and contribute to Canadian identity in different ways.⁴³ While Trudeau attempted to achieve pluralism via a multicultural policy, Harney does not think it has been achieved yet. Dualism and assimilation are still overwhelming factors in influencing Canadian identity, in Harney's opinion. However, there is some common ground between his opinion and this thesis as they both believe that multiculturalism and Canadian identity are still a work in progress.

Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (initially published in 1983, with the revised version used here was published in 2016), provides excellent insight into nationalism itself and the idea of an imagined community which applies to not only Quebec but Canada as a whole. Anderson writes about the uncertainty of nationalism in his work. In the original 1983 publication of *Imagined Communities*, Anderson insisted that "the 'end of the era of nationalism,' so long prophesied, was not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time."⁴⁴ While the Soviet Union's crumbling and the growing popularity of globalization may have counteracted this argument, it is hard to deny that nationalism, much like life, finds a way. Anderson has addressed these factors about his work in separate publications and in later editions *Imagined Communities*. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the state's need for loyalty and

⁴² Harney, "So Great a Heritage as Ours" Immigration and the Survival of Canadian Polity," 72.

⁴³ Harney, "So Great a Heritage as Ours" Immigration and the Survival of Canadian Polity," 72.

⁴⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised ed. (London: Verso, 2016), 3.

obedience was shaken post-1991, and Anderson wrote that 'portable nationality, read under the sign of "identity," is on the rapid rise as people everywhere are on the move."⁴⁵ *Imagined Communities* and Canada's situation regarding identity and nationalism are an exciting combination.

Because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear from them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion... in fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even those) are imagined.⁴⁶

Anderson's central argument is an interesting one to apply to Canada because the country is anything but small geographically and has a small population in relation to its vastness. A homogeneous sense of nationalism has not taken firm grasp across the entirety of Canada. However, it has manifested itself regionally especially in Western Canada and Quebec, as well as in smaller settings centred around specific cultural groups scattered throughout the country.

This historiography also provides context on the Quiet Revolution because Quebec's shift from being heavily influenced by the Catholic Church to propounding nationalistic sentiments was a factor in Canada's implementation of multicultural policy. Historian Donald Cuccioletta and Canadian Studies expert Martin Lubin's article published in 2003 titled, "The Quebec Quiet Revolution: A Noisy Evolution" examines the Quiet Revolution and the historiographical question of whether it was "a fundamental rupture of the past or was it an accelerated phase in the evolutionary change of Quebec, already begun years before?"⁴⁷ Cuccioletta and Lubin associate the Quiet Revolution with the rise of the middle class in Quebec. After World War Two, the decline of agricultural life accelerated a social and cultural shift as the people of Quebec began to move to

⁴⁵ Benedict Anderson, "Introduction," in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan and Benedict Anderson (London: Verso Books, 1996), 8.

⁴⁶ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 6.

⁴⁷ Donald Cuccioletta and Martin Lubin, "The Quebec Quiet Revolution: A Noisy Evolution," *Quebec Studies* 36 (2003): 125.

more urban or suburban centres such as Quebec City or Montreal. The shift from a primarily rural population to a more urban one caused significant changes within Quebec. Fewer French Canadians were down on the farm; instead, they were swelling the ranks of two critical social classes, agricultural workers were joining the industrial working class, and urban workers were becoming part of the middle class due to broader access to higher education.⁴⁸ As these two classes grew and became more self-aware, the middle class's expectations for what professions they deserved heightened. The industrial working class began to pursue an agenda of unionization, fair wages, and better working conditions, seemingly creating the societal conditions for a radical break.⁴⁹ However, a change in government would create a natural evolution in Quebec.

The Quiet Revolution in Quebec provides an example, on a smaller, provincial scale, of how grassroots movements could combine with the efforts of a like-minded government to change a nation's culture. In the first thirty days of Premier Jean Lesage's government, the Quebec Liberal Party's actions resembled Franklin D. Roosevelt's first one-hundred days as president of the United States.⁵⁰ The Lesage government promptly reformed education and healthcare in Quebec, including secularizing it from the Catholic Church.⁵¹ Reform under Lesage also did away with archaic government structures held on to by former Union Nationale Premier of Quebec, Maurice Duplessis, such as favouritism when awarding government contracts and the rejection of Canada's Pension Plan and allowing the Catholic Church to manage healthcare and education.⁵² State reform provided the catalyst for the Quiet Revolution. It was successful in many of its aims. Quebec caught up to the rest of North America in terms of social programs. Quebec also began to become

⁴⁸ Cuccioletta and Lubin, "The Quebec Quiet Revolution: A Noisy Evolution," 130.

⁴⁹ Cuccioletta and Lubin, "The Quebec Quiet Revolution: A Noisy Evolution," 132.

⁵⁰ Cuccioletta and Lubin, "The Quebec Quiet Revolution: A Noisy Evolution," 126.

⁵¹ Cuccioletta and Lubin, "The Quebec Quiet Revolution: A Noisy Evolution," 126.

⁵² Cuccioletta and Lubin, "The Quebec Quiet Revolution: A Noisy Evolution," 126-27.

a force in the economic world with the nationalization of its hydroelectric power-producing capabilities, which added a sense of economic independence and stability to the province. Trudeau witnessed society in Quebec change due to provincial government policy and would use federal politics similarly during his time as prime minister, though this time with an end goal of putting a muzzle on what he saw as the toxic parts of this nationalism.

Cuccioletta and Lubin do not deny that the Quiet Revolution occurred, but they frame it as less of a revolution and more of a time of reform. This organic evolution was led not by social forces confronting the government but by the state itself. Reforms came in the form of "the Catholic Church returning to its duty of saving souls" and education becoming the state's responsibility.⁵³ The technocratic class that began to assemble during the post-war era began to find itself in positions of power by the 1960s, and the state was no longer viewed as the enemy but instead, as a tool to aid in the restructuring of Quebec's society, as Cuccioletta and Lubin put it "Keynes just arrived a little later in Quebec."⁵⁴ While the Quiet Revolution created rapid change that may have been jarring for some but welcome for others, its historiographical context for this thesis is valuable because it shows how policy and reform could change Quebec.

Questions about Quebec and its people revived because their identity needed something concrete to define it to replace the diminished role of the Catholic church. Faith became less prominent, but language became more critical with the Official Languages Act. Provincial institutions also became key identifiers as Quebec's government worked to become more independent from the federal government. Quebec's identity was also synonymous with the province's physical territory as the French-Canadians of Quebec began to be more concerned with those within the province instead of the collective of French-Canadians throughout Canada. As

⁵³ Cuccioletta and Lubin, "The Quebec Quiet Revolution: A Noisy Evolution," 135.

⁵⁴ Cuccioletta and Lubin, "The Quebec Quiet Revolution: A Noisy Evolution," 135-36.

Quebec modernized, the state of French-Canadian identity became concerning to many as the birthrate of francophones shrunk and the arrival of non-francophone immigrants, who were opting to speak English over French, continued to increase.⁵⁵ The combination of the Catholic Church's withdrawal and the increasing preference for English over French by immigrants created a hole that needed to be filled, providing French Canadian nationalism with a suitable environment to strengthen itself.

Paul Litt, a historian focusing on late twentieth-century Canada, provides insight on Trudeau and the movement behind him dubbed "Trudeaumania" in his book named after the phenomenon itself, *Trudeaumania*. Litt's book examines the origins and significance of Trudeaumania. He attributes the rise of radicalism, nationalist aspirations, the growth of mass media to Trudeaumania. Much like Trudeau's ambitious goals while in power, the momentum that thrust him into power was more than a product of the 1960s. Trudeaumania was an exercise of national identity that would define Canadians for decades. While this thesis focuses on Trudeau's politics, Litt provides insight into the culture surrounding Trudeau period in politics. Although Trudeau was making a name for himself in Quebec before the mid-1960s, he was especially successful in using the "high politics of mod nationalism" after Expo '67. From here Trudeau "exploited and gratified an emergent Canadian nationalism shaped by the social and cultural changes of the tumultuous sixties."⁵⁶ Much like the 1960s Trudeau: the politician, and Trudeaumania culture: the phenomenon, was exciting and fun while emphasizing freedom and iconoclasm. Litt describes Trudeau's image under Trudeaumania as "an unstable, evolving montage of prominent features of sixties culture and nationalist ambition."⁵⁷ These characteristics

⁵⁵ Rudy Fenwick, "Social Change and Ethnic Nationalism: An Historical Analysis of the Separatist Movement in Quebec," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, no. 2 (1981): 212.

⁵⁶ Paul Litt, *Trudeaumania* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 32.

⁵⁷ Litt, *Trudeaumania*, 181.

can be seen in Trudeau's ideology and writings before he became more involved in the political world. A younger Trudeau might have seemed ready to change society radically, but Litt argues that Trudeaumania was more stylistically than politically rebellious.

Although Litt does focus on the role the media played in engendering and extending Trudeaumania, he also notes how Trudeau's politics genuinely attracted Canadians, including Quebecers. Trudeau connected with the curators and producers of Canadian nationalism, who were developing a closer relationship with the state to help them promote distinctly Canadian culture and identity.⁵⁸ Similar to how Canada's policy of multiculturalism initially catered to white Canadians of European descent, the Canadian media was dominated by white, middle-class, central Canadian nationalists, who were urban, educated, and cosmopolitan, just like Trudeau. The Canadian media saw an opportunity to use Trudeau, a candidate who fit their desire to create a Canadian culture that reflected the previously mentioned values. Trudeau stepped into Canadian politics when there were rumblings of Canadian nationalism anchored in a "decolonization project" that sought to end the country's historic subordination to Britain while defining a new collective identity grounded in pluralism, liberalism, and anti-Americanism.⁵⁹ Litt's work relates to this thesis in that it connects well with Trudeau's early writings, his ambitious goals of creating a solid Canadian identity, and his enthusiasm for radical change within Canadian society. A young Trudeau's excitement was manifested in Trudeaumania, but the spark of Trudeau's ideals dimmed, as did Trudeaumania after his election. Trudeaumania had limited appeal post-1968 as it merely drew in the urban educated middle class.⁶⁰ Similarly, although Trudeau's policy regarding

⁵⁸ Litt, *Trudeaumania*, 36-37.

⁵⁹ Litt, *Trudeaumania*, 41.

⁶⁰ Litt, *Trudeaumania*, 230.

multiculturalism was accepted initially, the extent of its innovation and success was questioned in subsequent decades.

Another work by a Canadian historian is similarly titled to Litt's: *Trudeaumania: The Rise to Power of Pierre Elliott Trudeau*, by Canadian historian Robert A. Wright. Both Wright and Litt focus on Trudeau's rise to power, but they differ in that Litt focuses on the mass media's contribution to Trudeau's popularity. Wright challenges this notion by arguing that Trudeau's popularity came instead from his established intellectual profile and focus on one of Canada's most significant political issues, national unity.⁶¹ Wright's work follows the theme that Trudeau's political philosophy was established before he entered politics, and he carried that philosophy with him throughout his political career. Wright directly challenges what he describes as a myth that Trudeau's success came from the media bolstering his hip image. While television and radio did get Trudeau's ideas into more Canadian minds, Trudeau's writing reflected his ideology and influenced his message to Canadians.⁶² Wright's assertion directly challenges Litt's that Trudeau's success was dependant on the mass media. Although Litt's points are valid, Wright's argument that Trudeau's writings were the significant appeal behind the messages broadcasted to Canadians supports this thesis' unpacking of the ideas of Trudeau's early political philosophy and examining their application to the policies he pursued while prime minister.

Wright also focuses on another myth of Trudeau's political career that centres on the idea that the media focused on Trudeau as much as it did because influential media members wanted him to be prime minister. Wright counters this myth by arguing that Trudeau never yearned for power and had to be coaxed into seeking the Liberal leadership. Trudeau became prime minister somewhat because of good political fortune, but more importantly because he had answers to

⁶¹ Robert A. Wright, *Trudeaumania: The Rise to Power of Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Harpercollins, 2016), xiv.

⁶² Wright, *Trudeaumania: The Rise to Power of Pierre Elliott Trudeau*, 24-25.

questions that Canadians were worrying about. Trudeau was appealing because he offered solutions to issues such as how to include French-Canadians in Canada's political order without compromising Confederation. He also presented bilingualism to provide stability to the Canadian federation. Trudeau's policies and ideas surrounding divorce and sexual activity further appealed to the modern liberalism that Canadians wanted, while his desire for cultural freedom drew in those who were not part of the majority culturally.⁶³ Wright paints the media side of Trudeaumania as a strategic advantage that had to be used during the youth-obsessed culture of the 1960s, while Trudeau's intellectual contemporaries, such as historian Ramsey Cook was selling Trudeau as the perfect intellectual candidate to address Canada's issues.⁶⁴

Litt and Wright both contribute to the historiography of Pierre Trudeau and Trudeaumania. The theme that Trudeau was a champion of modern Canada because of his legacy of multiculturalism, bilingualism, and pluralism is present in both works. Litt's arguments that Trudeau's success can be attributed to the mass media's propping him up are no doubt valid, but this seems like more of a political strategy. Wright's arguments surrounding Trudeau's intellectual prowess are interesting because when examining Trudeau's writing, it is apparent that they were the substance behind the messages he presented to the Canadian public.

While Litt and Wright examine Trudeau in terms of his cultural influence and how it manifested, another Canadian historian, Christo Aivalis, provides detailed insight into Trudeau as an intellectual and politician in his work, *The Constant Liberal: Pierre Trudeau, Organized Labour, and the Canadian Social Democratic Left*. Aivalis' work provides insight into Trudeau's liberal tendencies and helps explain how he managed his sometimes-contradictory ideology of collectivism and individual liberalism. While Trudeau had sometimes been perceived as a

⁶³ Wright, *Trudeaumania: The Rise to Power of Pierre Elliott Trudeau*, 81.

⁶⁴ Wright, *Trudeaumania: The Rise to Power of Pierre Elliott Trudeau*, 138.

democratic socialist by the media and other scholars, Aivalis refutes this by describing Trudeau as "vital in bolstering liberal capitalism by absorbing the leftist programs and refashioning them as showcases of benevolent Liberalism."⁶⁵ Aivalis argues that Trudeau's politics changed over time and highlights his shift from being a supporter of the organized labour left during the 1950s to how he grew antagonistic towards organized labour while in power and estranged from his pro-union friends in Quebec such as Michel Chartrand, Madeleine Parent, and Pierre Vadeboncouer.⁶⁶ This thesis challenges some aspects of that argument, showing that other elements of Trudeau's politics remained consistent throughout his adult life. It argues that Trudeau separated himself from unionist groups in Quebec due to their nationalism and eventually separatism, not because of their left-leaning ideology. National unity was Trudeau's priority in office as it had also been during his time as a labour advocate during the 1950s.

Progressives can sometimes view Trudeau as one of their ilk, and this is because he pursued a multicultural policy which he had hoped would create a more tolerant and diverse Canada. Aivalis' work provides context on the Trudeau who joined the Liberal Party to pursue liberalism and capitalism while opposing social democracy.⁶⁷ This theme comes through in Trudeau's greatest political accomplishment, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is highly regarded for its contributions to human rights, but which did not include social and economic rights, specifically workers' rights. The themes in Aivalis' work are important because they help to explain Trudeau's liberal individualism. Although Trudeau was somewhat more to the left politically during the 1950s, his politics regarding national unity did not shift as he leaned towards liberalism during his ascent to power. Trudeau was not bent on destroying capitalism via progressive reform.

⁶⁵ Christo Aivalis, *The Constant Liberal: Pierre Trudeau, Organized Labour, and the Canadian Social Democratic Left* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018), xi.

⁶⁶ Aivalis, *The Constant Liberal: Pierre Trudeau, Organized Labour, and the Canadian Social Democratic Left*, 40,42.

⁶⁷ Aivalis, *The Constant Liberal: Pierre Trudeau, Organized Labour, and the Canadian Social Democratic Left*, 64.

Instead, he wished to make capitalism "stronger, nimbler, and resistant to critique" while trying to absorb the left via progressive policies such as multiculturalism.⁶⁸

Regarding Trudeau and multiculturalism, there are some consistently present themes offered by historians. Trudeau was indeed bolstered by the mass media's presentation of him as a political rock star, but this was not the sole factor in Trudeau's success. As Wright and this thesis similarly argue, Trudeau's intellectual side, which can be seen in his writings, fueled the messages he broadcasted through the media. Canadians welcomed Trudeau's combination of modern liberalism and collective concern for Canada's cultural identity, summed up as governing from the right while absorbing the left. He was a friend of capitalism and liberal freedoms, but progressives supported his views on multiculturalism even though he had drifted away from the labour movement due to differences in the importance of nationalism. To provide further context to scholars, including Robert Harney, who have broken down and criticized multicultural policy from an historian's point of view, the next section of this historiography looks at multiculturalism and Canadian identity through the lens of political scientists while remaining grounded in its historical context.

Interdisciplinary Sources:

Sarah Wayland, a political scientist, wrote an article titled "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," published in 1997. Wayland focuses on the historical circumstances and developments that led Canada to pursue a policy of official multiculturalism. Wayland concentrates on five main points throughout the article: the development of nationhood in Canada; the evolution of immigration policies from exclusionist to being somewhat less exclusionist; the factors leading up to the multicultural policy of 1971; how the policy transformed

⁶⁸ Aivalis, *The Constant Liberal: Pierre Trudeau, Organized Labour, and the Canadian Social Democratic Left*, xi, 90.

into an act in 1988; and the continuities between past and present Canadian attitudes towards immigration and immigrants.⁶⁹ All five of these are compelling topics to explore within the narrative of Canadian multiculturalism, identity, and unity. A theme present throughout Wayland's work is that she believes Canada was making progress in terms of diversity before the multicultural policy was introduced. Nevertheless, Wayland acknowledges that some complications that Canadian identity has faced, including regionalism, language issues, a large foreign-born population, and a weak federal government, have all "hindered the creation of a strong Canadian identity."⁷⁰ These objective facts of Canada are accurate and are themes that do get brought up when discussing Canada's identity because it is hard for Canadians to relate to each other when they are so far apart. Multiculturalism was an attempt to solve this issue; it was supposed to convince Canadians that a part of their identity was diverse.

Wayland points to the significance of immigration reform and the elimination of racial criteria concerning immigrants, central aspects of how Canada's immigration policy was revised in 1962. The new policy implemented a "points system based on occupation, education, language, skills and age for determining eligibility." Even with these new criteria, race still played a factor when accepting immigrants.⁷¹ Although Wayland is correct that Canada's immigration policy did receive some changes, she may be giving it too much credit for its contributions to multiculturalism. Canada was multicultural well before official multiculturalism and before immigration policy reform, and even after this reform, potential immigrants were still discriminated against. This transformation in immigration history and policy prompted Canada to project the image of becoming a rapidly evolving mosaic of multiculturalism, but the national

⁶⁹ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 33.

⁷⁰ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 34.

⁷¹ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 44-45.

characteristics of assimilation and Anglo-conformity remained.⁷² Wayland's stance on multiculturalism is that it is not a temporary situation that will eventually give way to assimilationists. Instead, she argues it is a crucial segment of Canadian identity and is perhaps something that will permeate the rest of the world.⁷³

Peter Russell, another political scientist, who refers to himself as an unlicensed historian, provides a comprehensive book titled *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*. Russel's work is a political history of Canada where he argues that Canada is an incomplete nation-state because "Canadians, all thirty-five million of them, have not agreed they belong to a single "people" whose majority expresses the sovereign will of their nation."⁷⁴ Russel's thesis argues that the three pillars that intersect to create Canada's constitutional experiment are Indigenous peoples, French Canadians, and the English-speaking majority. While this thesis argues that policy has contributed to Canadian identity, Russel argues that policy has made Canadian identity more complex. He describes the constitutional efforts surrounding the Constitution Act of 1982 and the Charlottetown Accord as doing more harm than good. In Russel's opinion, a country as diverse as Canada requires the organic constitutionalism of Edmund Burke as the path for Canadians to develop a harmonious relationship with one another.⁷⁵ While Russell uses historical sources to argue his three-pillar thesis, his assertion that Canada's identity has been primarily influenced by English-Canadian, French Canadian, and Indigenous peoples is somewhat narrow as it does not include other cultures and their influence on constitutional politics and

⁷² Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 46.

⁷³ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 50.

⁷⁴ Peter H. Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 3.

⁷⁵ Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 18.

Canadian identity. Furthermore, Indigenous peoples and scholars may not appreciate being lumped into the same narrative as French and English colonizers.

In the later chapters of *Canada's Odyssey*, it is pointed out that during the second half of the twentieth century, racism was waning in Canada among the "chattering classes" – federal politicians, religious leaders, lawyers, academics, writers, and journalists, although pockets of racism have remained.⁷⁶ Two examples Russel brings forward of how Canada was addressing racism at a legal level include that during the 1970s federal Parliament added a section to the Criminal Code regarding hate propaganda, criminalizing speech intending to create race-hatred. The second is that during the 1980s the Supreme Court of Canada, in one of its early decisions on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, upheld legislation allowing for the restriction of free speech when it concerns the social damage of hatemongering.⁷⁷ Implementing official multiculturalism is one aspect of its history, but its defense and upholding is an integral part of its history.

Canadians are not supposed to think of themselves in grandiose ways - but I do suggest, in closing the book, that what we have learned about living well together could be of value to all of humankind. Multinational, multicultural Canada might offer more helpful guidance for what lies ahead for the peoples of this planet than the tidy model of the single-nation sovereign state. Indeed, Canada might be more like a civilization than a nation-state. As an example of how diverse peoples can live together in freedom and peace, this loose, never-settled alliance of peoples called Canada could replace empire and nation-state as the most attractive model in the twenty-first century.⁷⁸

Russell follows the theme that Canadian identity is incomplete, and its formation is an ongoing process. He does so differently from some other scholars though in acknowledging that there is potential for a unified Canadian identity but that it might not look like the traditional national identity we are used to.

⁷⁶ Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 340.

⁷⁷ Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 340.

⁷⁸ Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 19.

Hugh Donald Forbes is another political scientist who has written works through a historical lens, and his chapter “Trudeau as the First Theorist of Canadian Multiculturalism” is the first in Stephen Tierney’s anthology *Multiculturalism, and the Canadian Constitution* published in 2007. Forbes’ thesis argues that Pierre Trudeau took multiculturalism seriously. To Trudeau, it was not only a political move to fend off attacks on official bilingualism. He had a broad understanding of multiculturalism and intended on it becoming incorporated into Canadian identity.⁷⁹ Much like other scholars who have studied Trudeau, Forbes uses Trudeau’s philosophical writings to show that he brought an already-established political philosophy with him to office. Forbes quotes Trudeau’s work *Federalism and the French Canadians*:

The die is cast in Canada: there are two main ethnic and linguistic groups; each is too strong and too deeply rooted in the past, too firmly bound to a mother culture, to be able to engulf the other. But if the two will collaborate at the hub of a truly pluralistic state, Canada could become the envied seat of a form of federalism that belongs to tomorrow’s world. Better than the American melting-pot, Canada could offer an example to all those new Asian and African states... who must discover how to govern their polyethnic populations with proper regard for justice and liberty. What reason for cold-shouldering the lure of major proportions; it could become a brilliant prototype for the moulding of tomorrow’s civilization.⁸⁰

Forbes argues that Trudeau put multiculturalism on a steady psychological platform by treating it as a new and distinguishing aspect of Canadian identity.⁸¹ Forbes’ arguments in “Trudeau as the First Theorist of Canadian Multiculturalism” are similar to historian Robert A. Wright’s in *Trudeaumania: The Rise to Power of Pierre Elliott Trudeau*. Both scholars believe that Trudeau’s desire to maintain and improve Canadian unity was what appealed to Canadians. The idea that Trudeau’s political philosophy was grounded before he entered politics and that it remained

⁷⁹ Forbes, “Trudeau as the First Theorist of Canadian Multiculturalism,” 27.

⁸⁰ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 178-79.

⁸¹ Forbes, “Trudeau as the First Theorist of Canadian Multiculturalism,” 35.

consistent throughout his career is a common theme between sources, and this thesis further supports that narrative.

Forbes also contributes to the discussion of multiculturalism and its state of being before and after the official policy. In a broad sense, multiculturalism was present before Trudeau's official declaration of it in 1971. What is significant about official multiculturalism is that after this point cultural diversity had the potential to become a more proactive policy. Multiculturalism was designed to promote integration, which should be distinguished from assimilation despite their similarity, by fighting prejudice and discrimination.⁸² The purpose was to increase the possibility of Canadians from all walks of life coexisting in a realm of equality. Rather than creating a country of zealous patriots ready to sacrifice themselves for their nation, instead the ideal citizen under multiculturalism is rational, dutiful, and has a causal relationship with the political authorities above them.⁸³ In states with a powerful sense of nationalism, citizens may claim the nation as their own. This sense of nationalism can create harmful views towards foreign or unfamiliar cultures, but within a post-national and multicultural society, although it may sound somewhat utopian, the nation is not owned by a single group; it is not *theirs*; it is not theirs *ours*. What Forbes does with this essay that is different from other works on Trudeau and multiculturalism is that he takes Trudeau's philosophy and applies it to the theory of multiculturalism rather than following the theme about how it affected his time as prime minister. Forbes separates the candidate Trudeau from the intellectual Trudeau. By removing the historical narrative of Trudeau's relationship with the media, we can focus on what made his politics what they were before and during his time as prime minister.

⁸² Forbes, "Trudeau as the First Theorist of Canadian Multiculturalism," 40.

⁸³ Forbes, "Trudeau as the First Theorist of Canadian Multiculturalism," 40.

Forbes has also recently published a book titled *Multiculturalism in Canada: Constructing a Model Multiculture with Multicultural Values*, in which he places official Canadian multiculturalism and semi-official interculturalism in Quebec in their historical and constitutional contexts. Forbes does this by examining the policies' relationship to liberal democratic values and outlines the practical measures that would make Canada a more open country and a better example of what a better commitment to cultural pluralism now means. Forbes argues that, while some say that Trudeau simply embraced an already multicultural country as a political move to appease different ethnic groups before the 1972 election, it was instead a crucial element in Trudeau's national unity strategy.⁸⁴ Forbes directly comments on how multiculturalism was an attempt to confront the nationalist mobilization in Quebec and describes how, from Quebec's perspective, multiculturalism was a direct attack on the dualism of Canada.⁸⁵ However, when examining Trudeau's writings and other scholars' works on Trudeau, dualism was not a priority for Trudeau. Pluralism was what he believed would foster Canadian unity.

Forbes also provides insight into Trudeau's belief in liberal individualism and why he thought multiculturalism could bolster people's freedoms. "Multiculturalism, although usually associated with appeals to equality, can also be valued for its contribution to freedom."⁸⁶ Trudeau wanted to include multicultural policies with the other systematic constitutional protection of fundamental individual rights in a "free and democratic society."⁸⁷ Forbes points out that while Trudeau's introduction of multicultural policy is remembered as an essential part of Canadian identity, Trudeau's term to describe multiculturalism is often forgotten, "cultural freedom." For

⁸⁴ Hugh Donald Forbes, *Multiculturalism in Canada : Constructing a Model Multiculture with Multicultural Values* (Springer International Publishing AG, 2019), 33-34.

⁸⁵ Forbes, *Multiculturalism in Canada : Constructing a Model Multiculture with Multicultural Values*, 17.

⁸⁶ Forbes, *Multiculturalism in Canada : Constructing a Model Multiculture with Multicultural Values*, 96.

⁸⁷ Forbes, *Multiculturalism in Canada : Constructing a Model Multiculture with Multicultural Values*, 96.

Trudeau, multiculturalism and cultural freedom did not mean adding a bureaucratic process to influence culture, nor did it mean the creation of a self-governing society where the majority ruled.

Cultural freedom to Trudeau was practical but contrasted the previously mentioned methods.

It addresses the needs of the *conforming* members of cultural minorities, particularly recent immigrants who have lost (or abandoned) their original social matrix and who need to be eased into full membership in their adopted society. This requires not the privatization of minority beliefs and practices, but the public acceptance and celebration of all the acceptable ones, to encourage the voluntary abandonment of the unacceptable ones, thereby smoothing integration of the migrants into their new culture and encouraging their wholehearted acceptance of its obligations without lingering resentments.⁸⁸

Perhaps the most complicated theme surrounding the scholarship of Trudeau and multiculturalism is understanding his preference for individual liberalism and how it relates to multiculturalism. His own characterization of it as “cultural freedom” helps link the two and explain how he resolved for himself their apparent inconsistencies. Trudeau’s economics and reforms that affected Canadians’ personal lives draw from with his liberal individualist ideology, while multiculturalism comes across as a collective policy. The two connect through this idea of “cultural freedom” and can be also seen to follow Trudeau’s political tendency to “govern from the right while absorbing the left.”

When it comes to looking forward toward multiculturalism's future in Canada, Forbes has some conventional and hardline ideas that differ from other scholars and this thesis' opinions of how multiculturalism should move forward. He suggests taking some aspects from Quebec's system of interculturalism by incorporating an ethics and religious culture curriculum.⁸⁹ Forbes describes some of his more radical ideas for the future of multiculturalism. One of these is a “social harmony tax” consisting of a “bureau of media management and ethnic relations ... using the latest AI technology and objective algorithms” that would penalize media that contributed to

⁸⁸ Forbes, *Multiculturalism in Canada : Constructing a Model Multiculture with Multicultural Values*, 114.

⁸⁹ Forbes, *Multiculturalism in Canada : Constructing a Model Multiculture with Multicultural Values*, 59.

“overheated political debates.”⁹⁰ Forbes' most radical idea for the future is perhaps that people demonstrating "insensitivity, intolerance, and incipient hatred" could be required to take remedial training, while more severe cases could entail "psychotherapy ... isolation and remedial education in low-security correctional facilities ... located in attractive rural settings."⁹¹ While these ideas do not coincide with any of the present themes that other scholars have discussed, it is interesting that discussions are being had about different methods of implementing changes to the multicultural system, even though some of Forbes' ideas are extreme.

Popular Sources:

Two interesting sources regarding multiculturalism and nationalism are Neil Bissoondath's *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*, published in 1994 and Michael Ignatieff's *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*, published in 1994. Although both these works fall under first-person popular history, it is essential to view multiculturalism and nationalism through different lenses to avoid a singular narrative. Bissoondath's work provides a unique perspective on multiculturalism as he was born in Trinidad and Tobago and settled in Canada two years after the federal government had established the official multicultural policy. Bissoondath contributes to the narratives that are critical of multiculturalism. Bissoondath argues that the multicultural approach focuses too much on what makes Canadians different rather than what makes them the same. According to Bissoondath, "multiculturalism has made us fearful of defining acceptable boundaries" and has discouraged everyday discourse.⁹² The theme that Canadians have struggled to find cultural identifiers that connect them continues in Bissoondath's work, as he argues that multiculturalism has "preached tolerance rather than encouraging

⁹⁰ Forbes, *Multiculturalism in Canada : Constructing a Model Multiculture with Multicultural Values*, 60-61.

⁹¹ Forbes, *Multiculturalism in Canada : Constructing a Model Multiculture with Multicultural Values*, 65-66.

⁹² Neil Bissoondath, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1994), 143.

acceptance, and it is leading to divisiveness so entrenched that we face a future of multiple solitudes with no central notion to bind us."⁹³ *Selling Illusions* contributes to the narrative that multiculturalism became a feature of Canada that was projected outward rather than creating more dialogue between cultures internally.

Trudeau's ideology of Canadian identity and Bissoondath's idea of what multiculturalism is connect in that Trudeau believed that Canada did not have one official culture, and Bissoondath believes that culture is not about race but human values instead.⁹⁴ These are both relatively cosmopolitan ideas put forward by Trudeau and Bissoondath, and the idea that shared ethnicity does not guarantee fellowship between people is fascinating. However, proving it would require in-depth questioning and observation of how ethnically different groups with shared values interact compared to similar ethnic groups.⁹⁵ While Bissoondath's work is not officially academic, it actively contributes to the discussions surrounding what is wrong with multiculturalism and what could be done to improve it. Much like many of the solutions suggested by other scholars, Bissoondath's is not perfect, and this thesis does not set out to solve the issues with multiculturalism either. Nevertheless, contributing to discussions on the topic from all directions will improve the system that Pierre Trudeau chose to implement in Canada.

Ignatieff's book *Blood and Belonging* discusses nationalism throughout the world during and after the Cold War. Ignatieff's arguments are similar to Bissoondath's in that they are from a cosmopolitan lens and present ideas about culture that focus on human values over ethnicity. Whether that is a viable form of multiculturalism is debatable. Ignatieff discusses the myth of Canada; he admits to growing up with the belief "that Canada was a partnership between two

⁹³ Bissoondath, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*, 192.

⁹⁴ Bissoondath, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*, 71.

⁹⁵ Bissoondath, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*, 132.

peoples, two languages, two histories, and two traditions.”⁹⁶ Canada's colonial cultures took precedence in Ignatieff's initial understanding of Canada, and he acknowledges that Indigenous peoples of Canada did not factor into his equation of what made up the country when he was younger.⁹⁷ The reason Ignatieff uses the example of Quebec to illustrate the relationship between nationalism and federalism is that, as he states, “if federalism can't work in Canada, it probably can't work anywhere.”⁹⁸ If a balance between ethnic and civil principles could not be achieved in Canada between anglophones and francophones, then perhaps Canada, and the rest of the modern world, was not ready to transcend the grasp of nationalism.

Ignatieff's work is based on discussions he had had with different people from different groups within Quebec. A conversation with a group of Quebecois nationalists including a woman named Nicole, provides valuable insight into the nationalist movement in Quebec. Although the sample size is only two people, we see two differing views of Quebec nationalism during the October Crisis of 1970. Ignatieff viewed the crisis as breaking of the back of one form of Quebec nationalism after Pierre Trudeau ordered the arrest of more than five hundred radical Quebecois intellectuals and militants. However, for some of his nationalist counterparts, the October Crisis meant no longer referring to themselves as Canadian.⁹⁹ “For [Ignatieff], Trudeau remained the champion of that ideal of federalism that [Ignatieff] had wanted to believe in all [Ignatieff's] life. For Nicole, Trudeau was the betrayer, the native son who would stop at nothing to smash the nationalism of his own people.”¹⁰⁰ This small example applies to the mixing of federalism and nationalism in Canada. Ignatieff questions the viability of these two ideas, and his use of small-

⁹⁶ Michael Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1994), 145.

⁹⁷ Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*, 145.

⁹⁸ Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*, 147.

⁹⁹ Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*, 156.

¹⁰⁰ Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*, 156. (Nicole is one of the Quebecois nationalist Ignatieff interviews, their last name is not mentioned.)

scale examples instead of sweeping narratives that lump the entire province's population together provides a better understanding of nationalism in Quebec on a microscale. The importance that Ignatieff's work plays in this historiography draws from his interaction with people, mainly Quebecers, who have their own opinions on the politics of Pierre Trudeau from their firsthand experience. The journalistic approach by Ignatieff raises some good questions about nationalism and how the stability of a country can contribute to if it is civic or ethnic nationalism, and when paired with more in-depth discussions about nationalism and Canadian identity, his anecdotal evidence helps with the understanding of why the issues of nationalism in Quebec was a priority for Pierre Trudeau.

In terms of where this thesis lands among the vast historiography of Pierre Trudeau and multicultural policy, it fits into the era when the origins of multicultural policy and Trudeau's time as prime minister were coming to fruition. This thesis looks to bring the discussion of multiculturalism in Canada back to the context in which it was enacted. Therefore, this thesis examines Trudeau before he became prime minister by examining his long-term vision for multiculturalism. However, it also traces the evolution in Trudeau's ideology as his grandiose idea of using multiculturalism to sow a unified Canadian identity also addressed the immediate concern of nationalism in Quebec, which is an understood theme throughout the scholarship surrounding him. Trudeau's scholarship also helps us understand his complex ideology of modern liberalism combined with some progressive collective influences. Overall, the scholarship surrounding Trudeau, multiculturalism, and Quebec during the 1960s through the early 1970s provides insight into what made Trudeau's intellectual vision appealing to Canadians, and provides an analysis of why it was not the best solution considering Quebec's reaction to multiculturalism.

CHAPTER ONE: PIERRE TRUDEAU'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The Background of Trudeau:

Pierre Elliott Trudeau did not fit the mould of the usual Canadian politician. When Trudeau made his first foray into politics, he was fresh off of a backpacking trip that he began in the summer of 1948 at the age of twenty-eight and had him visit a plethora of countries, including Poland, where he visited Auschwitz, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Pakistan, India, China, and Japan.¹⁰¹ The list of countries that Trudeau visited during his version of a grand tour is interesting not just for its breadth but also because though the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia had all been affected by World War Two differently, they all had essential questions of identity and nationalism that they were dealing with in different ways. After returning to Canada, Trudeau rejected nationalism and was appalled by the nationalism in his home province of Quebec and the authoritarianism of the provincial government. Upon his return to Canada in 1949, Trudeau made his way to Ottawa, searching for a career. Trudeau considered joining the Department of External Affairs, where Secretary of State Marcel Cadieux worked hard to get him an interview. Cadieux seemed put off when Trudeau arrived at the oral examination wearing sandals, a fitting example of Trudeau's stubbornness and uniqueness.¹⁰² As Trudeau began to enter the world of politics, he was more concerned with aiding third-world countries than with the flexing of western might during the Cold War.¹⁰³ Trudeau's ideology and his humanitarian worldliness go hand in hand as he had witnessed the negative aspects of extreme ethnic nationalism

¹⁰¹ John English, *Citizen of the World : The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau Volume One: 1919-1968* (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2006), 176-80.

¹⁰² Brendan Kelly, "The politician and the civil servant: Pierre Trudeau, Marcel Cadieux, and the Department of External Affairs, 1968-1970," *International Journal* 73, no. 1 (2017): 6.

¹⁰³ Kelly, "The politician and the civil servant: Pierre Trudeau, Marcel Cadieux, and the Department of External Affairs, 1968-1970," 6-7.

and the toll it could have on other nations. He did not want to see ethnic nationalism influence Canada internally and hoped it would not define Canada externally.

An effort to categorize his political position was a theme among reporters and journalists. During Trudeau's time in parliament, political journalists often assumed that he was a socialist. On March 16th, 1967, during a television interview on the CBC programme *Twenty Million Questions*, Trudeau was asked flat out if he was a socialist by the show's host Charles Lynch. Trudeau replied by saying that "he was consistent with his ideas." He said, "he had been called a socialist in reactionary Quebec and that while Trudeau felt that a socialistic policy like nationalization was acceptable in a certain time and place, he did not think it appropriate for contemporary Canada."¹⁰⁴ Trudeau was connected to socialism even before his time as prime minister due to his connection to leftist groups.

The media often assumed Trudeau to have ties to socialism and sometimes communism because of his connections to left-leaning labour movements and his alleged visit to Moscow as a delegate at a world economic conference in 1952.¹⁰⁵ In May 1949, during one of his stints back in Quebec from his travels, Trudeau advocated for change during the six-month-long Asbestos miners' strike. Trudeau's connections to the labour movement made him a prominent journalist within the labour movement as the miners fought for higher pay, improved working conditions, and a say in their unions' day-to-day matters.¹⁰⁶ Workers were ready to challenge exploitative work conditions, which meant challenging the Duplessis government's conservative values. Trudeau was part of a moment in Quebec's history when the illusion of Premier Maurice Duplessis', the provincial governments, and the Catholic Church's unbreakable conservative grip

¹⁰⁴ Litt, *Trudeaumania*, 131.

¹⁰⁵ Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism Versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960*, 75.

¹⁰⁶ George Radwanski, *Trudeau* (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1978), 72.

on Quebec was challenged and weakened. The Duplessis regime had supported an ideology of inward-looking nationalism and obedience to establish authority, leaving little room for unions and other groups working for societal change.¹⁰⁷ The Asbestos strike acted as a precursor for the Quiet Revolution in Quebec as it challenged the traditionalist values in the province during the post-war era. The strike concluded in July 1949, and although the miners received far less than what they wanted in the settlement, they had set in motion the wheels of change in Quebec, the form and extent of which only the most draconian forms of repression could stop. The strike was a turning point for Trudeau, who wanted to challenge Duplessis' administration's oppressive nature and support collective change; he supported the labour movement and wished to see Quebec catch up with North America in terms of societal and economic development.¹⁰⁸ However, he could not back the ethnic nationalism that came out of Quebec's rapid transformation over the next twenty-odd years.

Pierre Trudeau came of age politically during the Quiet Revolution, a movement in Quebec that saw the beginning of the end of the "great darkness" engulfed Quebec as the 1960s and 1970s became a period of rapid change. Quebec's Liberal government attempted to modernize the province's institutions to make them relevant in a modern economy.¹⁰⁹ Along with the accelerated change of Quebec's healthcare and education systems, French Canadian identity remained defensive as their birthrate fell and outside immigration increased. Immigration was viewed as suspicious by many French Canadians as they believed it to be a threat to the francophone communities' political and demographic survival within the province of Quebec.¹¹⁰ However,

¹⁰⁷ Radwanski, *Trudeau*, 72.

¹⁰⁸ Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism Versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960*, 65-66.

¹⁰⁹ Fenwick, "Social Change and Ethnic Nationalism: An Historical Analysis of the Separatist Movement in Quebec," 207.

¹¹⁰ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 45.

during the post-war era, Quebec, like the rest of Canada, required economic expansion, including immigrants to the province. Twenty-one percent of immigrants coming to Canada settled in Quebec between 1946 and 1971, and fewer than five percent of foreigners settling in Quebec were francophones.¹¹¹ The diluting of francophone communities weakened the Catholic Church's influence on French Canadian society as less of the population was willing to let the church dictate their way of life.

Immigration combined with the ascent of salaried professionals, who were the products of classical colleges and included doctors, teachers, journalists, engineers, and public administrators, into political power in Quebec City and Ottawa allowed the emergence of a new technocratic elite and an emphasis on territorial identity.¹¹² The rise of salaried professionals was linked to the jump in school attendance between 1950 and 1960, with the percentage of attendees within the population between five and twenty-four rising from fifty-three to sixty-two percent.¹¹³ One interpretation of the Quiet Revolution is that the Catholic Church's dwindling influence created a power vacuum in Quebec that enabled a nationalistic identity to proceed. Until the Quiet Revolution, the Catholic Church had provided French Canadians with leadership, organization, and a means of preserving their identity, but as the church's influence diminished, French Canadians needed another channel to help preserve their identity.¹¹⁴ Although an ancient argument in Quebec, the three pillars of French-Canadian survival still held their own among many Quebecers. The slogan representing the three pillars, *Norte foi, notre langue, nos institutions* (our faith, our language, our institutions), acted as a rallying point for French-Canadians with the

¹¹¹ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 43.

¹¹² Kenneth McRoberts, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999), 90.

¹¹³ Cuccioletta and Lubin, "The Quebec Quiet Revolution: A Noisy Evolution," 131.

¹¹⁴ Fenwick, "Social Change and Ethnic Nationalism: An Historical Analysis of the Separatist Movement in Quebec," 201.

argument that if they remained faithful to these pillars, they could continue to exist as a separate entity within Canada.

Though the Liberal Party of Canada became most closely associated with Trudeau's political career, he was not a lifelong Liberal Party member. Throughout the 1950s and up until 1965, Trudeau was a member of the Social Democratic Party of Quebec, the Quebec wing of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). Nevertheless, as the 1960s moved on, Trudeau began to gravitate towards the Liberal Party and its democracy-first attitude. Trudeau believed the CCF was becoming diluted with French-Canadian angst due to the strong sense of French-Canadian nationalism rising and finding its way into political parties as he explains his reasoning for turning his back on the CCF, "The Quebec State was becoming the French-Canadian State, and was sacrificing true social and economic progress to policies designed to merely promote *bourgeois* prestige."¹¹⁵ As part of an effort to appeal to French Canadians, Lester Pearson's recruitment of Quebec labour leader Jean Marchand to the Liberal party provided Trudeau with a final reason to join the federal Liberals.¹¹⁶ Marchand's condition for joining Pearson's Liberals meant that his two friends and allies, Trudeau and Gérard Pelletier, had to join him. Although social connections may have recruited him to the Liberal party, their pro-federalist thinking went well with Trudeau's opposition to ethnic nationalism, the desire for a just society, and a form of Canadian identity that could fall under the umbrella of multiculturalism.

When Trudeau decided he would pursue becoming Canada's fifteenth prime minister, he represented a new type of politician, the counterculture movement of the late 1960s resonated with Trudeau and the voters who would put him in office. He succeeded in relating to younger voters with his views on political and human rights. When Trudeau would come into town during his

¹¹⁵ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, xx.

¹¹⁶ Litt, *Trudeaumania*, 129.

election tours, it was likened to the entrance of a pop star. Trudeau's popularity among younger Canadian voters created a phenomenon dubbed Trudeaumania; at his rallies, people would jockey for his autograph, a picture, or even touch him before he began his speeches about national unity and destiny.¹¹⁷ However, despite his counterculture appeal, he was also a wealthy man from Montreal who would not take on Bay Street, like his political colleague Tommy Douglas would have wished to do.¹¹⁸ Trudeau's political identity was complicated because of his advocacy for a united Canadian identity via multiculturalism and his support for individual liberalism, a nearly contradictory ideology. Trudeau's effort at reconciling these beliefs in both individual freedom and protection for group identity is a hallmark of his political philosophy. He believed one should have the freedom to pursue the cultural identity they wished or what he referred to as cultural freedom.

Trudeau did not believe big government to be a bad thing, and in fact, he believed it would get bigger, but he did not think it to be a marker of socialism. Before joining the official party, Trudeau described himself as a small-l liberal who held liberal views but was not involved in the official Liberal party. Despite involvement with the CCF and multiple labour movements, his goal was to govern from the centre while absorbing the left. Ultimately Trudeau joined the Liberals because he was seeking out a broad coalition of popular forces. Trudeau's priorities lay in the fight for democratic and political rights, not democratic socialism. As a federalist, he did not agree with the centralizing impulses of the CCF or the New Democratic Party (NDP) and the two nations' views held by the NDP when it came to responding to Quebec's nationalism.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Litt, *Trudeaumania*, 4.

¹¹⁸ Patrice Dutil and Christo Aivalis, *Witness to Yesterday (The Champlain Society)*, podcast audio, Pierre E. Trudeau was not a socialist!2019.

¹¹⁹ Aivalis, *The Constant Liberal: Pierre Trudeau, Organized Labour, and the Canadian Social Democratic Left*, 58.

During the 1968 Liberal Party leadership contest, Trudeau gave a speech regarding Canada as a “just society.” “Canada must be unified, Canada must be one, Canada must be progressive, Canada must be a just society.”¹²⁰ Although an inspiring slogan, it has been difficult to pinpoint from where Trudeau originated this idea. Trudeau studied political philosophy, so perhaps it came from John Stuart Mill's work on utilitarianism in which he asked, “What is a ‘just society’?”, or perhaps it derived from Lyndon Johnson's mid-sixties slogan “the Great Society.”¹²¹ Trudeau would eventually explain his meaning of a “just society” as “a society in which each individual Canadian was put in a position where he can develop himself to the utmost.”¹²² The concept of a just society was clear to Trudeau, but it was not an idea explicitly discussed or planned by the Liberal Party. It is worth paying attention to here because of its consistency with Trudeau's interpretation of multiculturalism, to which it was connected. The idea of a just society is linked to the individual/group relationship in multiculturalism, wherein individuals are given their liberal freedoms under the overarching system of multiculturalism that allows them and others to do so. In another similarity with multiculturalism, the idea increased Trudeau's popularity, but the lack of a clear roadmap to accomplish and maintain a just society fed criticism. Trudeau's philosophy of a “just society” provided an opportunity for Canada to modernize while healing the issues of identity already present in the country, as he stated in his nomination speech.

The world of today stands on the threshold of a golden age. By building a truly just society, this beautiful and rich and energetic country of ours can become a model in which every citizen will enjoy his fundamental rights, in which two great linguistic communities and people of many cultures will live in harmony, and in which every individual will find fulfilment.¹²³

¹²⁰ Litt, *Trudeaumania*, 239.

¹²¹ Litt, *Trudeaumania*, 239-40.

¹²² Litt, *Trudeaumania*, 240.

¹²³ Quoted in Litt, *Trudeaumania*, 268.

Although this flashy rhetoric by Trudeau generated support for him in the federal election, his political policy continued to influence the goals he wished to accomplish as prime minister. Trudeau's philosophy remained consistent before, during, and after his time as prime minister. Trudeau needed to pursue multicultural policy and what he believed to be a just society early in his time as prime minister because it was important to him that society progressed as Canada entered the second half of the twentieth century.¹²⁴

Did Trudeau Dislike Nationalism or Just French-Canadian Nationalism?

Although language was a factor in the nationalistic sentiments growing in Quebec, it was not the sole purpose. The new nationalism of Quebec focused on the province rather than French Canada as a whole. It abandoned the large francophone minority populations in New Brunswick and Ontario, countering that Quebec nationalism remained based on language.¹²⁵ While Trudeau would have agreed that Quebec nationalists were abandoning fellow francophones who did not reside in Quebec, he did not believe the French language to be protected, as Hobsbawm would suggest. Trudeau acknowledged that Canada's two main languages, French and English, were being treated unequally. He wrote, "Canada must become a truly bilingual country in which the linguistic majority stops behaving as if it held special and exclusive rights and accepts the country's federal nature with all its implications."¹²⁶ The English speakers of Canada were treating the French-speaking population as an ethnic minority on many levels. English was the language of federal civil service, and federal agencies were treating the country as unilingual. Trudeau pointed out that the Department of External Affairs, the Canadian Armed Forces, the federal capital, and other Crown Corporations were blatantly English and that French Canadians had to overcome

¹²⁴ Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society," in *Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau Years*, ed. Thomas S. Axworthy and Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Markham, Ontario: Viking, 1990), 357.

¹²⁵ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*, 166.

¹²⁶ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 5.

severe hurdles from a linguistic point of view to become involved in these agencies.¹²⁷ Considering the disadvantages, French-Canadians faced merely because of their native tongue. It is easy to understand why their frustration led to a greater sense of nationalism. Trudeau was sympathetic towards French Canadians and their suppressed language, but he did not support the ethnic nationalism produced from their unrest.

Trudeau recognized that groups within Quebec wanted to be perceived as a nation within a nation, or among some French Canadians, a sovereign nation. However, he believed this to be a somewhat selfish and short-sighted act by separatist francophones.

I recognize the right of nations to self-determination. But to claim this is right without taking into consideration the price that will have to be paid and without clearly demonstrating that it is to the advantage of the whole nation is nothing short of a reckless gamble. Men do not exist for states: states are created to make it easier for men to attain some of their common objectives.¹²⁸

Trudeau's federalist values coincide with his criticisms of the sovereignty movement within Quebec. The sovereigntists of Quebec were overlooking the economic and cultural ramifications of separating from Canada. Trudeau was critical of those who believed that sovereignty would end the sense of cultural isolation felt among Quebecers. Francophones who wanted their state did not consider how sovereignty would affect rural workers or people relying on Canada's social safety net.¹²⁹ Quebec's separation from Canada was a short-sighted dream for sovereigntists; Trudeau believed it was more of a symbolic goal than a practical one.¹³⁰

Trudeau and French-Canadian nationalists did not mix well because of Trudeau's opposition to Quebec's ethnic nationalism. Trudeau's stubbornness also came across when it came to interactions with nationalists. His political advisors deemed it political suicide to confront them;

¹²⁷ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 5.

¹²⁸ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 18.

¹²⁹ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 19.

¹³⁰ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 19.

Trudeau did not stand down from their sometimes-violent antipathy to his position. For example, Trudeau was advised not to attend the Montreal St-Jean-Baptiste parade on the eve of the 1968 federal election. St-Jean Baptiste Day is a holiday rife with nationalist sentiment and drew a corresponding crowd. Regardless Trudeau attended, and his staying in public in the face of separatist rock-throwing most likely won him some extra votes for standing up against Quebec nationalists.¹³¹ Before his time as prime minister, during his campaign, and eventually as prime minister, Trudeau's ideology remained reasonably concrete and consistent.

Why Trudeau Believed Multiculturalism Was Suitable for Canada:

Before joining the Liberal party, Pierre Trudeau was an influential editor for a periodical based in Montreal called *Cité Libre*. The publication was the work of Montreal's French-Canadian intellectual and sociopolitical amateur movement, who debuted *Cité Libre* during the summer of 1950.¹³² Although during the summer of 1950, Trudeau's political alignments differed from what he accomplished during his time as prime minister, his colleagues believed he was well ahead of them in terms of understanding the world of politics and that he had already grasped his ideological principles. Examining Trudeau's early writing shows how although he parted ways with the socialist-leaning CCF for the big tent federal Liberal party, his political philosophy remained consistent during his time as prime minister. A section from one of Trudeau's early pieces alludes to his developed political beliefs.

We want to bear witness to the Christian and French fact in America. Agreed, but we must also throw everything else overboard. We must systematically question all political categories bequeathed to us by intervening generation. The strategy of resistance is no longer helpful for the growth and maturation of the city. The time has arrived for us to borrow from architecture the discipline called "functional," to cast aside the thousands of past prejudices which encumber the present, and to build for the new man. Overthrow all

¹³¹ Ramsay Cook, *The Teeth of Time: Remembering Pierre Elliott Trudeau* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 76.

¹³² Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism Versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960*, 61-62.

totems, transgress all taboos. Better still, consider them as dead ends. Without passion, let us be intelligent.¹³³

Trudeau wanted to be as inclusive as possible with his and *Cité Libre*'s philosophy. Attempting to focus on accessibility was a priority and allowed many people to understand what Trudeau believed was Canada's proper societal direction.

Trudeau described what he believed Canadian society should have looked like in an article he wrote for *Cité Libre* in 1962. His aims for Canadian society were very forward-looking and focused on the developments toward a future state.

The die is cast in Canada: there are two main ethnic and linguistic groups; each is too strong and deeply rooted in the past, too firmly bound to a mother culture, to be able to engulf the other. But if the two will collaborate at the hub of a truly pluralistic state, Canada could become the envied seat of a form of federalism that belongs to tomorrow's world. Better than the American melting pot, Canada could offer an example to all those Asian and African states... who must discover how to govern their polyethnic populations with proper regard for justice and liberty... Canadian federalism is an experiment of major proportions; it could become a brilliant prototype for the moulding of tomorrow's civilization.¹³⁴

Cité Libre's article was published nearly a decade before Trudeau would implement an official multicultural policy in Canada. Trudeau believed that change was necessary for Canada: change that did not condone the assimilation of cultures. He advocated for a multicultural policy to allow different ethnicities and cultures to coexist while maintaining their traditions. Trudeau wanted to create a fluid form of multiculturalism that he hoped would become a template for other countries struggling with differing national identities.

Reiterating this consistent vision, one year after becoming prime minister, Trudeau described his vision of multiculturalism and Canadian unity on the international stage while giving a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, on March 23rd, 1969.

If... we are able to accomplish our goals of a better life for Canadians and at the same time demonstrate to our citizens that the social structure *is* capable of change, that it *is*, sensitive

¹³³ Pierre Trudeau, "Politique fonctionnelle I," *Cité Libre* 1 (June 1950): 21.

¹³⁴ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 178-79.

to the needs and demands of individuals, that orderly process *do* exist inside society able to act as a vehicle for the protestation and the challenges of the aggrieved, then we shall have succeeded not only for ourselves, but we shall have illustrated that tribalism and withdrawal are not the answer, that diversity and non-conformity contribute to a more satisfying and culturally enriched life.¹³⁵

Shortly after his speech in Washington, Trudeau laid out three priorities that he wanted the Liberals to accomplish. In terms of the importance of multiculturalism, one stood out, "we will not in this country permit bigotry to replace tolerance, violence to replace dialogue, or discrimination to replace moderation, and excuse it all in the name of freedom of expression."¹³⁶ Trudeau believed a government-mandated multicultural policy was the proper way to dissolve intolerant practices that could have created a chauvinistic state if left unchecked.

Trudeau's ideological principles had remained relatively consistent throughout his political career, and shortly into his time as prime minister, they began to manifest themselves as government policy. October 8th, 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau officially announced that Canada would adopt a multicultural policy.

A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians. Such a policy should help break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies. National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one's identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions.¹³⁷

This announcement by Trudeau was a bold one. Biculturalism and bilingualism had been presented as methods to address the tension between French and English Canadians, but Canada was already very diverse and becoming more so as the 1960s concluded, and the 1970s began. Race and geography began to take a backseat when it came to the eligibility of potential immigrants to

¹³⁵ Pierre Elliot Trudeau, *Conversations with Canadians* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 4.

¹³⁶ Trudeau, *Conversations with Canadians*, 13.

¹³⁷ House of Commons Debate Friday October 8th, 1971, Short, 8545.

Canada and were replaced by a system that focused on an individual's education and skills.¹³⁸ At first, this was not seen as potentially threatening to bilingualism and biculturalism. As Canada moved forward from its racist immigration policies, it was assumed that Canadians of other backgrounds would opt for one of the two firmly rooted colonial cultures and languages.¹³⁹ However, as the diversity of Canada's population began to increase because of multicultural policy, many Canadians from non-colonial backgrounds opted to remain true to their mother cultures and create communities around them. In theory, a multicultural policy intended to create a sense of cultural freedom that could continue as Canada inevitably became more diverse as the years carried on.

These demographic changes were matched by a shifting political context that favoured a non-British identity, especially at the government level. Trudeau's policy announcement was met favourably. Robert Stanfield, the leader of the opposition Progressive Conservatives, responded to Trudeau's speech.

These are excellent words in the Prime Minister's statement. I am sure this declaration by the government of the principle of preserving and enhancing the many cultural traditions which exist within our country will be most welcome. I think it is about this government finally admitted that the cultural identity of Canada is a pretty complex thing.¹⁴⁰

Stanfield's statement still echoes true in contemporary Canada. Annual immigration accounts for one percent of Canada's population of thirty-six million.¹⁴¹ The greater Toronto area has become the most diverse city globally, with half of its population being from outside Canada; other notable

¹³⁸ Eve Haque, *Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework: Language and the Racial Ordering of Difference & Belonging in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 31.

¹³⁹ Haque, *Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework: Language and the Racial Ordering of Difference & Belonging in Canada*, 188.

¹⁴⁰ House of Commons Debate Friday October 8th, 1971, Short, 8546.

¹⁴¹ Charles Foran, "The Canada experiment: is this the world's first 'postnational' country?," *The Guardian* 2017, Para 1, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/04/the-canada-experiment-is-this-the-worlds-first-postnational-country>.

cities such as Vancouver, Calgary, Ottawa, and Montreal were not far behind as of 2016.¹⁴² Canada's cultural identity has maintained its complexity even with the introduction of official multiculturalism. Furthermore, introducing an official multicultural policy was an ongoing project that we still see in development today.

Embracing multiculturalism and ethnic tolerance were crucial aspects of Trudeau's vision of a just society in Canada. This larger philosophical ideal, of which multiculturalism was a vital plank, was an idea he carried throughout his political career.

The just society will be one in which the rights of minorities will be safe from the whims of intolerant majorities. The Just Society will be one in which those regions and groups which have not fully shared in the country's affluence will be given a better opportunity. The Just Society will be one where such urban problems as housing and pollution will be attacked through the application of new knowledge and techniques. The Just Society will be one in which our Indian and Inuit populations will be encouraged to assume the full rights of citizenship through policies that will give them both greater responsibility for their future and more meaningful equality of opportunity. The Just Society will be a united Canada united because all of its citizens will be actively involved in the development of a country where equality of opportunity is ensured, and individuals are permitted to fulfill themselves in the fashion they judge best.¹⁴³

Trudeau made this a part of his political campaign as it encompassed much of what he wanted to accomplish. He understood that Canadian society was changing as it became more diverse, urban, and organized. He believed that Canada was the ideal country to develop policies that would help create a just society because of its relative youth, wealth, multiple languages, and ethnic and religious diversity.¹⁴⁴ When discussing "equal opportunity for all," Trudeau referred to the ability for Canadians old and new to have equal opportunity to pursue and practice their desired cultural heritage.

¹⁴² Foran, "The Canada experiment: is this the world's first 'postnational' country?," Para 1.

¹⁴³ Pierre Trudeau, *The Essential Trudeau*, ed. Ron Graham (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1998), 16-20.

¹⁴⁴ Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society," 359.

Multiculturalism was a vital element of this "just society" and worked best within a federalist framework. Trudeau believed federalism was the political system of the future because it allowed the achievement of political unity without undermining Canadians' already existing cultural, religious, and ethnic identities.¹⁴⁵ Federalism remained Trudeau's idea of top-tier government as it was pluralist rather than monolithic and respected diversity among people and groups.¹⁴⁶ Trudeau knew it was wise to respect the elements of diversity within unitary states, citing language guarantees in Belgium as an example.¹⁴⁷ For Trudeau, federalism created a consensus between the various groups of people that make up a nation.

Federalism is by its very essence a compromise and a pact. It is a compromise in the sense that when national consensus on *all* things is not desirable or cannot be readily obtained, the area of consensus is reduced in order that consensus on *some* things be reached. It is a pact or quasi-treaty in the sense that the terms of that compromise cannot be changed unilaterally. That is not to say that the terms are fixed forever; but only that in changing them, every effort must be made not to destroy the consensus on which the federated nation rests.¹⁴⁸

Trudeau understood Canada's diversity, and he was not blind to the fact that the diversity he was witnessing would only expand in Canada's future. Consensus and compromise are two benefits that Trudeau saw in federalism. Trudeau understood that the plethora of cultures in Canada might wish to pursue their sovereignty but did not believe it to be realistic or attainable during the modern era due to the "insuperable difficulties of living alone and the practical necessity of sharing the state with neighbouring groups were in many cases such to make distinct statehood unattractive."¹⁴⁹ There are parallels between Trudeau's insistence on the benefits of federalism and

¹⁴⁵ Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism Versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960*, 63.

¹⁴⁶ Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society," 360.

¹⁴⁷ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 191.

¹⁴⁸ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 191.

¹⁴⁹ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 192.

his advocacy of multiculturalism. Trudeau suggested that cultures could coexist under federalism while maintaining compromises and consensuses with the federal government to benefit all.

It is essential to understand that Trudeau's political ideologies were consistent throughout his political life before his time as prime minister and during his last term as prime minister. Although the Charter did not come to fruition until later in Trudeau's career, it was something that he believed in and wanted to accomplish from the outset. One section that applies to Trudeau's preference for individual liberalism and exemplifies him as a small l liberal is section 2 of the Charter.

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
 - (a) freedom of the conscience and religion;
 - (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media communication;
 - (c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
 - (d) freedom of association.¹⁵⁰

The keyword to look at in this section of the Charter is "freedom" Trudeau wanted to institute these freedoms or individual rights into Canadian society. Although these freedoms are strongly associated with Trudeau's small l liberalism, they can also be associated with multiculturalism. These four freedoms contribute to Canada's multicultural identity and Canadians' right to pursue and practice how they please culturally and religiously. The Charter provided an opportunity for a new beginning in Canada by creating unity and basing Canadian identity on a set of shared values grounded on the notion of equality among all Canadians.¹⁵¹ The Charter allowed multiculturalism to become further entrenched in Canadian society. First, Trudeau's policy was made official in 1971 and then it was strengthened by its addition to the Charter, which is in the constitution. In

¹⁵⁰ *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, Part I of the *Constitution Act, 1982*, being schedule B to the *Canada Act 1982 (U.K.)*, 1982, c 11, section 2.

¹⁵¹ Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society," 363.

both, the government-implemented policy has been instrumental in introducing and constantly adapting multicultural policy, even during Trudeau's years as prime minister.

Although multiculturalism was an official policy in Canada, it was not one backed by law. The government's support of multiculturalism was often criticized as symbolic as few resources were devoted to the initiative. In 1985 the House of Commons created a standing Committee on Multiculturalism to address these criticisms and hopefully modernize multicultural policy. One of the committee's most significant recommendations was for the government to re-establish the Ministry of Multiculturalism, but few of the recommendations came to fruition. In *The Globe and Mail*, Jeffrey Simpson wrote that "the act creates no new ministry, offers no additional funds for multiculturalism (however defined) and guarantees no rights otherwise already protected."¹⁵² Regardless of addressing the committee's recommendations, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act was passed in 1988, and it enshrined in law the federal government's commitment to promoting and maintaining a diverse and multicultural society. The act set out to:

recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage;¹⁵³

The Canadian Multiculturalism Act did not solve the criticism that multiculturalism was facing in Canada and brought in new ones. Nevertheless, what it did do was affirm Canada's status as a multicultural nation and presented the notion of multiculturalism outwards as a force for positive change moving forward.

Trudeau believed Canada to be the ideal country to implement a multicultural policy. The broad answer to why Trudeau opposed ethnic-nationalism and supported multiculturalism is that he believed Canada would become culturally barren if it tried to formulate a distinct culture rather

¹⁵² Jeffrey Simpson, "Multicultural mist," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto) 1987.

¹⁵³ The Canadian Multiculturalism Act, section 3 (Ottawa RSC 1985).

than embracing the collective of cultures residing within and arriving in the future. A more apt answer could be that Trudeau's experience within Quebec had him witness the angst developing among groups of French-Canadians first-hand. Trudeau had also travelled to countries where nationalism created harmful radical movements to see the early warning signs in his home province. Trudeau believed ethnic nationalism created division and could do so in Canada because of the multitude of ethnicities spread throughout the country. These facts in Trudeau's writings connected to the goals he set out to accomplish as prime minister, but his vision was not immune to critiques. The next chapter goes into greater depth regarding Trudeau's vision of Canadian unity and the importance of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism regarding what recommendations were or were not followed. Trudeau's vision has been subject to criticism since his political career began. Examining some of these criticisms in the next chapter help to understand what multiculturalism meant to accomplish in theory and what it achieved or did not immediately achieve in practice.

CHAPTER TWO: MULTICULTURALISM AS AN ATTEMPT TO SOW CANADIAN UNITY

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism on Paper and in Practice:

On paper, the introduction of official bilingualism in Canada may have seemed like a foolproof idea, but it did not solve the tension between Quebec and the federal government. Demonstrations on Montreal's streets over language education rights prompted the provincial government of Jean-Jacques Bertrand to pass Bill 63; a law introduced to promote the French Language in Quebec. The law gave parents the right to choose the language of education for their children and required high school graduates to have a working knowledge of the French language.¹⁵⁴ Francophones in Quebec were aware of the disappearance of French-speaking francophones outside of Quebec as a study by the federation of francophones outside Quebec conducted in 1977 pointed out that half of the population of 1.4 million francophones that did not live in Quebec no longer spoke French as their primary language and nearly half a million no longer spoke French.¹⁵⁵ Although this pleased Quebecers, it caused outrage among nationalists as they worked to preserve Quebec's French culture further. The Official Languages Act was received well in some cultural circles of Canada, but it did little to appease Quebec nationalists, resulting in radical retaliation by the more extremist sects within the province.

Trudeau continued to maintain the concept of bilingualism that Pearson laid the groundwork for and began to focus on Canada's cultural identity. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism's original suggestion was to pursue biculturalism for Canada. The Commission established that the task at hand was to 'search for that new identity and an amicable

¹⁵⁴ Matthew Hayday, *So They Want Us to Learn French: Promoting and Opposing Bilingualism in English-Speaking Canada* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015), 29.

¹⁵⁵ Jeffrey Simpson, "Francophones vanishing species outside Quebec, study says," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), April 14, 1977, para 2-5.

and more equal sharing of power and culture by the “two founding” races.’¹⁵⁶ The bicultural and bilingual policies suggested by the Commission were a federalist response pushed for by Canada’s two colonial forces. Pursuing a bicultural society would have examined the state of British and French culture in Canada and the opportunities they each had to flourish.¹⁵⁷ Bilingual policy acknowledged the deep divide between French-speaking Canadians and the majority of English-speaking Canadians. The Commission addressed the inferior status of the French language Canada-wide at a linguistic level and the economic and political levels and sought to improve the situation created by the divided languages.¹⁵⁸ Biculturalism and bilingualism supported French-Canadians in and outside of Quebec by allowing them to maintain their language and culture while also favouring the duality of Canada that both British-Canadians and French-Canadians enjoyed. Although bilingualism seemed to meet less resistance, the duality of biculturalism remained something to be challenged due to its static nature.

Both multicultural policy and the Commission were concentrated efforts to solve the same problem in Canada, but multiculturalism was also a reaction against biculturalism. The Commission was partly a by-product of racism becoming recognized and condemned by the Canadian government during the post-war era. “The Commission provided the ideal public process for transforming the racialized hierarchy embedded in the white settler national narrative onto the terrain of culture – with language as a critical technology for making culture difference.”¹⁵⁹ The intentions of the Commission seemed to be for the benefit of all of Canada, and it failed to recognize the uniqueness of Indigenous cultures and allowed for the continued marginalization of

¹⁵⁶ Harney, "So Great a Heritage as Ours" Immigration and the Survival of Canadian Polity," 64.

¹⁵⁷ Dunton et al., *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, xxxiv.

¹⁵⁸ Dunton et al., *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, xxx.

¹⁵⁹ Eve Haque, "Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework: A Retrospective," *Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal* 46, no. 2 (2014): 120.

racialized communities.¹⁶⁰ Reports issued by the Commission between 1965 and 1968 made recommendations to eradicate the inequalities between white French-speaking and white English-speaking Canadians by promoting bilingualism and biculturalism.

What steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution?¹⁶¹

The Commission created a sense of indifference from other ethnic groups who had contributed to the founding of Canada. "Various ethnic collectivities, led by the Ukrainians, made special presentations to the government relaying their fears that their contributions to Canada were being ignored."¹⁶² These initial presentations led to the government's first response, which was the addition of Book IV to the Royal Commission's report. This edition was titled "The Cultural Contribution of Other Ethnic Groups," It made sixteen recommendations for a government policy of multilingualism and multiculturalism while also providing a model of integration for ethnic groups of immigrant origin.¹⁶³ These recommendations would be adapted into Canada's official multicultural policy but could not appease all ethnic groups in Canada.

Biculturalism was problematic, thus leading to implementing a multicultural policy that would try to appease all ethnic groups residing in Canada. Therefore, administrators created it to be fluid and responsive to change in the country. Multiculturalism is more workable over a longer term than the fixed static categories of biculturalism would have been. It also means that the criticisms of multiculturalism are not its downfall. The policy intended to change over time as a response to criticisms and the changing realities of the country. Multiculturalism, although not

¹⁶⁰ Haque, "Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework: A Retrospective," 121.

¹⁶¹ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 46.

¹⁶² Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 47.

¹⁶³ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 47.

perfect, was more workable than biculturalism which was rooted in the historic dualism of British and French colonial influence within Canada. Although multiculturalism originated as a policy, it has been viewed differently by others. To some, multiculturalism has been viewed as a demographic reality, an ideology or model, or a social movement, and when multiculturalism is viewed as more than just policy, it allows for it to change and adapt to accommodate the diversity of Canada.¹⁶⁴

Multiculturalism substituted for biculturalism, which Trudeau favoured to include more cultures within the identity of Canada. It seemed a way better to solve the problems of cultural identity in Canada at the beginning of the 1970s. In order to distinguish themselves, “Canadians as ‘the other North Americans’ needed an identity that would no longer put them as subordinate to the British metropole, that would dampen the appeal of separatism in Quebec, and that would continue to sustain political, social, and cultural values assumed to be distinct from those of the United States.”¹⁶⁵ There were efforts to tinker with the problematic elements of biculturalism before it was scrapped in favour of multiculturalism. To make biculturalism seem more open to other cultures, the government changed the rhetoric from focusing on “the two founding races” to “linguistic communities” or “francophone and anglophone,” but this suggested that the two core communities were open to other ethnicities, not that they were their distinct communities.¹⁶⁶ Canada was already diverse before policies of biculturalism and multiculturalism, and any policy that intended to sow tolerance and diversity needed to take all cultures into account.

The Trudeau government’s multicultural policy responded to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Its goal was to attempt to solve the

¹⁶⁴ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 47.

¹⁶⁵ Harney, "So Great a Heritage as Ours" Immigration and the Survival of Canadian Polity," 64.

¹⁶⁶ Haque, *Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework: Language and the Racial Ordering of Difference & Belonging in Canada*, 196.

sovereignty crisis in Quebec while also trying to create a workable, fluid, cultural identity for Canadians. Trudeau himself believed this was the right policy for Canada to pursue, which is why on October 8th, 1971, he announced that Canada would be pursuing an official multiculturalism policy. In his statement to the House of Commons, Trudeau said, “there is no official culture in Canada,” he was not wrong in saying this because even today, it is hard to pin down a singular culture representing what it means to be Canadian.¹⁶⁷ Multiculturalism did not intend to designate one culture to represent Canada over another but instead to create cultural fluidity based on values held by all people making Canada their home.

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism’s conclusion went like this: “Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, is passing through the greatest crisis in its history.”¹⁶⁸ The rhetoric there is slightly dramatic, but there was indeed an identity crisis occurring in Canada. Canada was a country in which multiple factors contributed to its lack of a concrete and unifying identity. The disconnect between French and English Canadians can be reattributed because Canadians can reside thousands of kilometres away from each other; they may speak a different language; or a combination of both factors. During Trudeau’s time as prime minister, Canada had also just recently turned one hundred years old. Canada had not had much time to flesh out a clear-cut identity. During the Trudeau years, it was thought that a Canadian identity could be achieved within a multicultural society through a bilingual framework.¹⁶⁹ The multicultural policy takes what is often seen as a barrier to identity, particularly in Canada, a country of immigrants with two colonial languages, and turns that into a national distinctiveness and something to be celebrated. Pierre Trudeau hoped this would be the result of the

¹⁶⁷ House of Commons Debate Friday October 8th, 1971, Short, 8546.

¹⁶⁸ Dunton et al., *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, 13.

¹⁶⁹ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 47.

implementation of a multicultural policy. Trudeau's policies are rightfully criticized, but there was no instruction manual to guide him to Canadian unity, and there still is not one for contemporary Canadians.

Critiques of Trudeau's Vision:

A multicultural policy might seem like one that would create a more tolerant and accepting society. However, this has not been the case, and therefore the policy has not been immune from criticism and debate. Academics such as Emma Ambrose and Cas Mudde point to the successes of multiculturalism, and this has also been the findings of some examinations of Canadians' cultural attitudes at the grassroots level.

Canada has fostered a much more accepting society for immigrants and their culture than other Western countries. For example, Canadians are the most likely to agree with the statement that immigrants make their country a better place to live and that immigrants are good for the economy. They are the least likely to say that there are too many immigrants in their country, that immigration has placed too much pressure on public services, and that immigrants have made it more difficult for natives to find a job.¹⁷⁰

The Canadian government has also engaged in discussion with Canadians to determine collective values, that if only examined at the surface level, would point to Canada being an accepting society. In 1991, The Citizens Forum on Canada's Future, organized by Brian Mulroney's conservative government, hosted town halls across the country to have discussions with Canadians about their values. Some of the takeaways included common beliefs in equality and fairness, the importance of accommodation and dialogue, support for diversity, compassion, and non-violent change.¹⁷¹

Even with the positive views of multiculturalism, others have also pointed out how multicultural policy was mainly incomplete. They argue that cultural minorities who arrived in

¹⁷⁰ Emma Ambrose and Cas Mudde, "Canadian Multiculturalism and the Absence of the Far Right," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 21 (2015): 221-22.

¹⁷¹ Future, Short Report to the People and Government of Canada.

Canada have not necessarily found a new home to express their cultural heritage as they please freely. Hateful groups such as the KKK, neo-Nazis, and modern groups such as the Proud Boys still exist in Canada and vocally oppress the rights of cultural minorities.¹⁷² Because of these hate groups, it is essential to note that multiculturalism is a government policy, and much like other government policies, not all members of society have accepted it. Even though a government may do as much as possible to institute a policy like multiculturalism, there is never a guarantee that one hundred percent of the population will accept it. Multiculturalism has also been criticized for favouring white Europeans, primarily how it has supported French-Canadian culture. As we look at criticisms of multicultural policy, it seems as if multiculturalism acts as a projection of Canadian identity that has convinced both potential immigrants and Canadians themselves that Canadian society is more tolerant than it is.

Sociologist, Himani Bannerji who has been critical of multicultural policy, points out that Canada has become an "imagined community" where racialized people "remain an ambiguous presence and their existence a question mark" and that they continue to live in Canada as outliers due to the projection of a tolerant multicultural society towards the international community.¹⁷³ For many visible minorities, multiculturalism has not allowed them to express themselves culturally once they have arrived in Canada comfortably. It has not just been a problem for immigrants. Bannerji points to the political marginalization of Indigenous peoples by Canadian governments and uses the Oka Crisis and the Canadian government's deployment of armed forces against the Mohawk peoples because of land claims and the demand for self-government/self-determination as examples of how multiculturalism has not benefited all cultures.¹⁷⁴ She argues

¹⁷² Barrett, *Is God a Racist? The Right Wing in Canada*, 121.

¹⁷³ Bannerji, *The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism, and Gender*, 91.

¹⁷⁴ Bannerji, *The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism, and Gender*, 92.

that instead, it has continued to benefit the solidarity of rule by European cultures that they have enjoyed for centuries. Bannerji subverts the image of Canada as a multicultural mosaic and states that to see that non-white minorities are included, one must look past the two monocultures of Canada and examine the dark corners of the mosaic.¹⁷⁵ The intention of the multicultural policy was originally to create tolerance and discourse between cultures. However, it appears that it has instead created more separation of cultures, noticeable minorities, as it is not clear how, when, or when they can express their cultural heritage freely.

Eve Haque, a professor in the department of languages, literature, and linguistics, has similarly criticized the multicultural policy in her works. Haque points out that the roots of multiculturalism came from a desire for an equal partnership between the English and French "founding races."¹⁷⁶ Haque has argued that Canadian multiculturalism's real intention was not to accommodate the growing cultural diversity of the nation but instead provided an opportunity to create discourses of cultural neutrality, cultural democracy, and colour blindness that appeased many cultural minorities arriving in the country.¹⁷⁷ Haque examines the intentions of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and the intentions behind the multicultural policy. The Royal Commission Bilingualism and Biculturalism was tasked with addressing culture within Canada, and Haque argues that it instead built a myth about culture in Canada. The Commission began this myth by focusing on linguistics and culture to organize Canada's culture, and through this, the vision of a pluralist and open nation emerged in the form of multiculturalism in a bilingual framework.¹⁷⁸ Between Bannerji and Haque, there is an overarching critique that multiculturalism

¹⁷⁵ Bannerji, *The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism, and Gender*, 93.

¹⁷⁶ Haque, "Language, Race, and the Impossibility of Multiculturalism," 261.

¹⁷⁷ Haque, "Language, Race, and the Impossibility of Multiculturalism," 262.

¹⁷⁸ Haque, *Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework: Language and the Racial Ordering of Difference & Belonging in Canada*, 240.

has become a part of Canadian nationalism projected outwards. The projection being that Canada is a tolerant multicultural society that allows all cultures to express themselves freely. Nationalism is what causes multiculturalism to become less of an inclusive system because it ultimately requires an "us versus them" mentality,

Nationalism consistently requires some clear demarcation of 'us' in distinction from 'them.' Multiculturalism, on the other hand, purports a discourse that requires 'them' continually to become part of 'us,' as defined by the dominant culture tolerating and choosing to accept, or not, other cultures.¹⁷⁹

In 1971 when Trudeau went forward in instituting a multicultural policy, Canada continued to change radically, making the policy seem outdated before it could be implemented effectively.¹⁸⁰

Although Neil Bissoondath is not an academic writer like Bannerji or Haque, his book *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada* provides context on the beginning of multicultural policy via first-hand experience. Bissoondath's experience with multiculturalism provides exciting insight as he immigrated to Canada from Trinidad and Tobago two years after the official multicultural policy was implemented. Generally, Bissoondath argues that multiculturalism limited the freedom of ethnic minorities by confining them to cultural and geographic ethnic enclaves. Bissoondath attended York University when he came to Canada in 1973 and wished to pursue a degree in the French language. However, he points out that he was assigned to Bethune College at York, which specialized in Third World Studies, by his advisors. Although Bissoondath was welcome to study at York, he was looked at through a stereotypical lens by those in charge of enrollment, and they believed he would be more comfortable "sticking with [his] own."¹⁸¹ "Multiculturalism has made us fearful of defining acceptable boundaries" and

¹⁷⁹ M.A. Lee, "Multiculturalism as Nationalism: A Discussion of Nationalism in Pluralistic Nations," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 30 (2003): 111.

¹⁸⁰ Haque, *Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework: Language and the Racial Ordering of Difference & Belonging in Canada*, 243-44.

¹⁸¹ Bissoondath, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*, 20.

discouraged discourse between cultures.¹⁸² Bissoondath is getting at this example because Canada's multicultural policy focused too much on what made Canadians different rather than what made them the same.

To Bissoondath, it was the oversimplification of multiculturalism by the government that he was critical of. Canadian multiculturalism “preached tolerance rather than encouraging acceptance; and it is leading to divisiveness so entrenched that we face a future of multiple solitudes with no central notion to bind us.”¹⁸³ Bissoondath’s subtle nod to Hugh MacLennan’s novel *Two Solitudes* with his reference to “many solitudes” refers to the lack of communication between French and English Canada, which led to the isolation between the two cultures. When Bissoondath mentions “many solitudes,” he is suggesting that a similar problem was occurring with multiculturalism as there is a lack of communication between all cultures within Canada, thus exacerbating the problem of the dysconnectivity of cultures in Canada instead of solving it—focusing on festivals and cuisine to put minority cultures in a glass case to show them off encouraged stereotypes and more divisiveness, where encouraging discourse and active participation between cultures would have fostered positive relationships and a deeper understanding of other cultures. To improve upon the original multiculturalism policy, it is crucial to view it from multiple lenses, and Bissoondath provides one that exemplifies one first-person experience during the early days of official multiculturalism instead of an academic observation much like Kenneth McRoberts’.

Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity by Kenneth McRoberts is a cornerstone of criticism of multiculturalism. McRoberts acknowledges the grandeur of Trudeau's vision but also points out its flaws. McRoberts' argument can be broken down into several parts.

¹⁸² Bissoondath, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*, 143.

¹⁸³ Bissoondath, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*, 192.

The first is that in Quebec, most of its francophone elites believed in Canada's dualist vision. The second part is critical of Trudeau, arguing that Trudeau's anti-nationalist liberal model replaced Canada's dualism. Canadian unity is a messy concept, and one reason for that is the linguistic challenges, "in the end, the national unity strategy was defeated by the immutability of Canada's linguistic structure."¹⁸⁴ McRoberts' work could infuriate Trudeau adepts but examining the criticism can be used to understand further Trudeau's opposition to ethnic nationalism, support for federalism, and a desire for national unity.

While McRoberts is critical of Trudeau in *Misconceiving Canada*, two heroes come out of the work. McRoberts praises both André Laurendeau and Lester Pearson. Pearson is praised because he recognized Quebec as a nation within a nation. Laurendeau earned his praise from McRoberts because of his role as co-chair of the *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* put in place by Pearson. He helped to establish the French-Canadian view of dualism. McRoberts believed these two figures moved Canada in the right direction, and Trudeau deviated from that path. "After 30 years, it is only too obvious that the Trudeau strategy has failed. In fact, rather than unifying the country, it has left Canada more deeply divided than ever before."¹⁸⁵ Trudeau's strategy was supposed to control the dissatisfaction among francophones and their unhappy relationship with Canada. McRoberts' explanation of Trudeau's failure is that it failed to alter the historical tendency of francophones to view their distinct collectivity, primarily rooted in Quebec.¹⁸⁶ Quebec nationalists were not happy with multicultural policy taking precedence over a bicultural one because they believed it undermined the notion that Quebec was

¹⁸⁴ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 247.

¹⁸⁵ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 245.

¹⁸⁶ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 246.

a nation within a nation. Trudeau's rejection of dualism and pursuit of multiculturalism segregated Quebec further when it came to Canadian identity.

McRoberts suggests that Trudeau's strategy and its vision of what Canada should have become was too entrenched in Canada's institutions and within the lives of English Canadians.¹⁸⁷ McRoberts also harps on Trudeau for his handling of Quebec and French Canadians. A fair critique, but questions of sovereignty in Quebec were complicated. Canada has struggled to unite just the two colonial cultures under one Canadian identity, and when the range of diverse international cultures and indigenous cultures are added to the equation, it becomes infinitely more complicated. Alternatively, as McRoberts likes to put it, "But Canada will not be united; 'national unity' will be little more than a joke."¹⁸⁸ McRoberts' is a less than optimistic view of Canada, but it is understandable as Canada has struggled to unify its diverse and spread-out population. Although it has not been perfect, multiculturalism was a step in the right direction for national unity because of the ever-increasing diversity in Canada. The rejection of duality may have been unpopular but was necessary for the long run.

A final bit of criticism on multiculturalism, Canadian identity, and nationalism comes from historian and former politician Michael Ignatieff. Particularly when it comes to Canada's colonial cultures, Ignatieff discusses the myth of Canada that many English-speaking Canadians have experienced, "that Canada was a partnership between two peoples, two languages, two histories, and two traditions."¹⁸⁹ Canada's colonial cultures remained front of the line in terms of importance during the 1960s and 1970s when multiculturalism began to become a topic of discussion. The duality between French and English Canadians was the dominant way of viewing the cultural

¹⁸⁷ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 268.

¹⁸⁸ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 268.

¹⁸⁹ Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*, 145.

makeup of Canada. As we have discussed previously, French Canadians favoured Canada's duality and wished to use it to bolster their language and culture, and with the introduction of multiculturalism, they believed the federal government undercut their language.

Continuing the theme of duality with Ignatieff, he discusses how he and other English Canadians viewed Trudeau's handling of the October Crisis of 1970 as "the moment when the Canadian government broke the back of radical nationalism in Quebec."¹⁹⁰ However, from the opposing side, it was the moment when many French-Canadians decided that they no longer wanted to be associated with a Canadian identity and looked to pursue a purely French one.¹⁹¹ Favouring multiculturalism over biculturalism seemed to add more insult to French-Canadian nationalism as it reinforced the idea that Quebecois were still a minority. As one of Ignatieff's interviewees exclaims, "we are tired of being a minority in Canada. We want to be a majority in our own place."¹⁹² There was an unmistakable sense of what French Canadians desired, protection for their language and culture. 'The sense of the *Canadiens*' insecurity is indicated by the belief that Canada's now official "multiculturalism" is simply a plot aimed at "crushing *Francophonie*'s special needs under the political weight of multiculturalism."¹⁹³ Historian Robert Harney breaks down the desire of French Canadians to pursue their own identity further by unpacking French Canadian professor Guy Rocher's views on the threat posed to French culture and language.

Rocher saw the policy as a continuation by other means of an Anglophone campaign to define the French Canadians as first among the minorities rather than as a second nation within the Canadian polity. He pointed out that the French language would function within bilingualism as merely an administrative and a government language without biculturalism. Multilingualism would, he believed, eventually appear to be the logical corollary of multiculturalism, and then the uniqueness of the French existing in Canada would be lost.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*, 156.

¹⁹¹ Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*, 156.

¹⁹² Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*, 157.

¹⁹³ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*, 166.

¹⁹⁴ Harney, "So Great a Heritage as Ours" *Immigration and the Survival of Canadian Polity*, 76.

Ignatieff's point of view helps to point out the duality French Canadians desired. Whether it was achievable or not is debatable, but multiculturalism quashed any chance of it happening and favouring French Canadians.

These critiques were and still are necessary, as the multicultural policy would not remain static; it had to continually remain fluid to accommodate Canada as a diverse nation and defend against resistance to such diversity. In the beginning, multiculturalism seemed shallow as it merely sought to present minority cultures to English Canadians in what seemed like a cultural showcase showdown. "Come on down to Caribana, try some new cuisine, listen to some new music, don't be afraid, this is multiculturalism, and it is fun." That type of multiculturalism is all well and good, but it does not necessarily create tolerance of diversity or engage a dialogue between cultures to create a sense of understanding between them. As Bissoondath explained, early multiculturalism sorted minority cultures into the groups they already belonged to, ultimately reinforcing stereotypes instead of diversity. He quotes journalist Laura Sabia, who addressed the Empire Club of Canada in October 1978.

I was born and bred in this great land. I've always considered myself a Canadian, nothing more, nothing less, even though my parents were immigrants from Italy. How come... we have all acquired a hyphen? We have allowed ourselves to become divided along with ethnic origins under the pretext of the "Great Mosaic." A dastardly deed has been perpetrated upon Canadians by politicians whose motto is "divide and rule." I, for one, refuse to be hyphenated. I am Canadian, first and foremost. Don't hyphenate me.¹⁹⁵

Bissoondath also supported the point Sabia brought forward in her speech. Multiculturalism should not have been about preserving differences; instead, it should have encouraged inherent differences and similarities to blend to create a new sense of "Canadianness," where no one is differentiated because of a hyphen.¹⁹⁶ Perhaps the official multicultural policy implemented in 1971 intended to

¹⁹⁵ Laura Sabia in Bissoondath, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*, 223-24.

¹⁹⁶ Bissoondath, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*, 224.

accomplish a similar goal for Canadian identity, but it could not do so at the time due to French Canadian reluctance and a growing immigrant culture. As we will see next, Quebec had an adverse reaction to how multiculturalism was enacted.

CHAPTER THREE: QUEBEC'S REACTION TO MULTICULTURALISM

Ideology was not the only motivator for Trudeau and the Liberals regarding multiculturalism, bilingualism, and French Canada. Practical political motives were also at play. Traditionally a Liberal-leaning province, Quebec was changing as seen by the Parti Quebecois' (PQ) creation in 1968. Bilingualism had struck a chord with the French-Canadian community and allowed the federal Liberals to maintain a certain level of appeal with them despite the PQ's separatist agenda. However, some of the francophone community saw multiculturalism favour minority cultures and Western Canadians, among whom bilingualism met little enthusiasm.¹⁹⁷ Trudeau's original intention of multiculturalism was to curb the unwanted nationalistic and separatist tendencies in Quebec while also generally creating good cultural and community relationships in the country. However, Quebec's leaders tended to view multicultural policy with suspicion, fearing that francophones would be regulated to "other ethnic group" status.¹⁹⁸ Quebec nationalists believed Quebec was a nation within a nation and that multicultural policy undermined this belief. On paper, multiculturalism did not intend to raise any culture above another, but nationalist groups within Quebec believed that there should have been a policy to raise their culture over others rather than making all cultures equal.

Quebec nationalists had believed that they should be more concerned about their province's economic and cultural progress to strengthen their language and culture instead of trying to establish their culture throughout English-speaking Canada.¹⁹⁹

The transition of capitalism into a monopolistic and advanced stage is associated with increased levels of education in the population which saw the increasing complexity of industrial tasks, the expanding need for specialized jobs, the growth of the human service sector, and so on all levels of formal training. It took Quebec Francophones a decade or

¹⁹⁷ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 47.

¹⁹⁸ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 47.

¹⁹⁹ Michel Brunet, "The French Canadians' Search for a Fatherland," in *Nationalism in Canada*, ed. Peter Russell (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Limited, 1966), 56.

two longer than Anglophones to realize this. Partly because their low-level jobs did not require many years of schooling; also because it was culturally assumed that academic studies were valuable only to those who wished to become priests, doctors, or lawyers; and because of the extreme elitist structure of the Church-controlled educational system.²⁰⁰

The Quiet Revolution had shown Quebec nationalists that it was possible to organize and prompt change within the province. No province was more opposed to the federalist policies of the federal government during the first half of the 1960s than Quebec, and under Jean Lesage's Liberal government, the province began to opt-out of shared cost programs with the federal government. Although it was not a shocking move by Quebec, it was significant when in 1966, the Lesage government rolled out the Quebec Pension Plan, intended to take the place of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP). The Quebec Pension Plan provided better benefits than the plan offered by Ottawa and provided Quebec with a lucrative source of investment income that stayed with the provincial government.²⁰¹ The nationalistic state-building in Quebec concerned the federal government, and these actions began to create questions about the strength of the Canadian confederation began to rise.

As provincial politics in Quebec shifted from Daniel Johnson and the Union Nationale government to a robust Liberal government in 1970, federal-provincial diplomacy between Trudeau's and Robert Bourassa's Liberals was quietly at work. This work came to a stop in October 1970 as the Front de Liberation du Québec made their last-ditch effort to change Canada via terrorist actions. As the October Crisis played out, the world saw news coverage of the kidnapping of James Cross, the United Kingdom's trade commissioner; the kidnapping and murder of Pierre Laporte, labour minister in the Bourassa government; the federal government's invocation of the War Measures Act; the calling for the Canadian military by the Quebec premier; and Cross's

²⁰⁰ Marc Renaud, "Quebec's New Middle Class in Search of Social Hegemony: Causes and Political Consequences," in *Quebec Since 1945: Selected Readings*, ed. Michael D. Behiels (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987), 65.

²⁰¹ Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 280.

kidnappers running away to Cuba while negotiating their freedom in exchange for the British diplomat's release.²⁰² During the crisis, police imprisoned 436 citizens without charging them on any offence, a majority of whom only had a vague connection to the Quebec nationalist movement; this action was approved of by eighty-seven percent of Canadians but would create an unbreakable sense of distrust from others.²⁰³

René Lévesque, leader of the PQ, responded to the October Crisis with disgust because of the unnecessary violence, but he also joined the liberally-minded Quebecers in their disapproval of Trudeau's use of force. Ultimately the October Crisis benefited Lévesque and the PQ by reining in support of "separatist minded *Québécois* for the non-violent democratic route to Quebec independence."²⁰⁴ Consolidating the separatist demographic did draw the attention of the RCMP, who did not distinguish between the violent actions of separatists and non-violent methods of the PQ, which put the legitimacy of the non-violent and democratic movement in question from the federal government.²⁰⁵ Even so, after the October Crisis, the federal government resumed constitutional discussions.

In 1971 Trudeau was pushing for the acceptance of the Victoria Charter, a failed attempt to patriate the Constitution, which would have seen the addition of a Bill of Rights to the Canadian Constitution and entrench English and French as Canada's official languages.²⁰⁶ After meeting with the federal government about the Victoria Charter, Robert Bourassa was met with a flurry of criticisms. There was a general feeling among francophones that if Quebec were to accept the Victoria Charter, it would return Quebec to the days of the Conscription Crisis when French-

²⁰² Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 302.

²⁰³ Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 302.

²⁰⁴ Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 302.

²⁰⁵ Canada, Royal Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Second Report, 919-20 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1981).

²⁰⁶ Pierre Trudeau was looking to add to the Bill of Rights that former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker introduced in 1960, known as the *Canadian Bill of Rights*.

Canadians in Quebec realized that English Canadians held most of the power to make decisions that affected the entire population.²⁰⁷ This feeling coming from francophones was not because they did not want the French language entrenched in Canadian culture. It was a feeling of distrust towards the federal government due to past decision-making that did not consider the interests of Quebecers. Headlines proclaimed, "the answer must be NO to Ottawa's ultimatum ... There must be a general mobilization of the people of Quebec."²⁰⁸ The ultimatum was that if Quebec did not accept the Victoria Charter as proposed, it would fall apart entirely. Bourassa received the message loud and clear and informed Trudeau and the federal government that Quebec rejected the Victoria Charter because it did not do enough to recognize the province's unique status as a homeland of a founding people.²⁰⁹ Ultimately this led to the federal government abandoning constitutional changes for the time being as it did not seem like a good idea to pursue changes without the support of Quebec.

Multiculturalism dulled the duality that francophones favoured in Canada. The hope was that multicultural policy would give francophones a different understanding of Canada, but the multicultural programs favoured predominantly white, organized, second- and third-generation Canadians of non-British, non-French descent.²¹⁰ Initially favoured, these groups were by the resources distributed by Multicultural Projects Grants to groups and organizations "for such cultural activities as festivals, television programs, Saturday schools, literary clubs, and art exhibits."²¹¹ The multicultural policy remained consistent with Trudeau's belief that Quebec did not need special status to solve the province's issues of isolation and insecurity. Much of English-

²⁰⁷ Brunet, "The French Canadians' Search for a Fatherland," 58.

²⁰⁸ Richard Simeon, *Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 120.

²⁰⁹ Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 305.

²¹⁰ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 126-27.

²¹¹ Raymond Breton, "Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation-Building," in *The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity and Language in Canada*, ed. A. Cairns and C. Williams (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 53.

speaking Canada seemed to agree with him on this. Before the policy, Trudeau's election itself represented, as explained by the *Calgary Herald* in 1968:

a mood of conciliation on the part of English-speaking Canadians – a readiness to accept Mr. Trudeau's basic thesis that French-speaking Canadians, particularly those in Quebec, must break forth from their traditional, self-imposed isolation and insularity and play a full and meaningful part in the life of the nation as a whole.²¹²

Although there seemed to support from English-speaking Canadians for Trudeau's stance on Quebec's status, it was not easy to curb Quebec's demands.

Enacting official bilingualism did appease Quebec somewhat, and Trudeau believed that it could have been the tool he would use to resist Quebec's demands of autonomy and pursue the system that he believed would benefit Canadian unity, official multicultural policy.²¹³ Nevertheless, convincing Quebecers that multiculturalism was not trying to make them less significant in Canada was an ongoing task for Trudeau and the Liberals. Liberal Senator Peter Bosa said that "Canadians should recognize Quebecers as the leaders in cultural identity."²¹⁴ Residents of Quebec continued to believe that multiculturalism intended to promote other languages over French and English, but Bosa, former chair of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, continued to promote the message that "multiculturalism is not in contrast with the official languages; it adds to them," and that multiculturalism was influential in developing national unity.²¹⁵ Nevertheless, the message of trying to promote national unity was often scoffed at by the Quebec government. In 1980 when the federal government wanted to pass a motion to bring the constitution home from Britain, but Premier of Quebec, Rene Levesque,

²¹² "The Nation," *Calgary Herald*, 27 June 1968, 4.

²¹³ José E. Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 221.

²¹⁴ "Multiculturalism promotes unity, senator says in maiden speech," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), May 27, 1977, para 1.

²¹⁵ "Multiculturalism promotes unity, senator says in maiden speech," para 3-6.

rejected the motion as he said it would "force the province back to a survival stance, in which it would have to fight to hold on to its powers."²¹⁶ The implication that multiculturalism was the answer to national unity was not resonating with Quebec, and Levesque accused Trudeau of "treating Quebec like an ethnic minority more or less drowned in Canada's climate of multiculturalism."²¹⁷ Quebec's view of multiculturalism and federalism as a system that allowed other to profiteer while Quebec was out of the national identity that the federalist were trying to create.

The federalists within Canada's federal government hoped that official multiculturalism would create a seemingly counterintuitive form of nationalism for Canada, multicultural nationalism. Multiculturalism was instituted further in 1988 with the passing of Canadian Multiculturalism. With multiculturalism encouraged the embrace of diversity and nationalism as a quest for unity and identity, these are contradictory ideas.²¹⁸ Multiculturalism was instituted further in 1988 with the passing of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, which encouraged the use of other languages while reassuring French Canadians that their language was still a priority.

Whereas the Constitution of Canada and the Official Languages Act provide that English and French are the official languages of Canada and neither abrogates nor derogates from any rights or privileges acquired or enjoyed concerning any other language [which commits the government to] preserve and enhance the use of languages other than English and French. At the same time, it strengthened the status of and use of the official languages of Canada.²¹⁹

To achieve such a system of unity, each Canadian province needed to buy in; even if Quebec, for example, pursued its form of multiculturalism, that would be enough to poke a hole in Canadian

²¹⁶ Julia Turner, "Ottawa 'playing' in proposal on constitution, Quebec says," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), May 10, 1980, para 4.

²¹⁷ Turner, "Ottawa 'playing' in proposal on constitution, Quebec says," para 10.

²¹⁸ Gerald Kernerman, *Multicultural Nationalism: Civilizing Difference, Constituting Community* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 5.

²¹⁹ Canada, Canadian Multiculturalism Act, (Ottawa 1988).

unity. For English Canadians who wanted to enjoy a sense of unity, pan-Canadian policies such as multicultural policy, bilingualism, and eventually the Charter of Rights and Freedoms were about embracing Quebec for some and containing it for others, the dualism of Canada continued to dull.²²⁰ Political scientist Will Kymlicka unpacks the shift away from dualism with what he refers to as the "Canadian model."

1. multicultural citizenship (to accommodate ethnic communities formed by immigration);
2. bilingual federalism (to accommodate the major substate national[ist] group in Quebec); and
3. self-government rights and treaty relationships (to accommodate indigenous peoples).²²¹

Although bilingualism accommodated Quebec to a certain extent, the lack of special status within the multicultural policy would continue to be an issue of contention. The policy seemed to favour minority immigrants instead of those of the French colonial founding nation.

Anyone who believed multiculturalism would be readily accepted within Quebec was overly optimistic because multiculturalism was immediately denounced in Quebec. In November 1971, the Premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa, wrote to Prime Minister Trudeau in protest. Bourassa suggested that the new policy contradicted the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism's mandate, dissociated culture and language, and disregarded the statement of the equality of two founding peoples.²²² Bourassa informed Trudeau that Quebec would not adopt the federal multicultural policy due to the province's responsibility to preserve the French language and culture. Abandoning biculturalism and pursuing multiculturalism amplified Quebec's insecurities, as Guy Rocher explains:

French Canadians have struggled for generations to have bilingualism accepted – bilingualism is defined not simply as the acceptance of French as an official language in Canada but recognition of French Canadians as partners with the English-speaking

²²⁰ Kernerman, *Multicultural Nationalism: Civilizing Difference, Constituting Community*, 59.

²²¹ Will Kymlicka, "The Canadian Model of Multiculturalism in a Comparative Perspective," in *Multiculturalism and the Canadian Constitution*, ed. Stephen Tierney (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 67.

²²² McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 129.

community in the country's sociological structure. By separating bilingualism from biculturalism, the Trudeau government is betraying all hopes French Canadians might have placed in bilingualism, as they conceived it – that is, clearly tied to its symbol and essential condition, biculturalism.²²³

This idea challenged the dominant school of thought in French Canada that two languages, two people, and two societies gave Canada its distinctive cultural shape.²²⁴

The typical Quebec nationalist attitude towards the federalist policies of the Trudeau government was reactionary. The nationalists of Quebec were grasping to preserve what made their culture and society distinct when it was beginning to lose that very distinctiveness that it had enjoyed.²²⁵

What lies behind the fear and insecurity of French Canadians is patently a social cataclysm which is indicated by the dramatically sudden collapse of the Catholic Church in what had been a conservative, Catholic, clerical, child-producing society not only among the farmers but among townspeople.²²⁶

The nationalistic strive for a distinctive society led the province to isolate itself from the rest of Canada. One consequence of this focus on associating French-Canadian culture with Quebec and using the provincial government to protect it was left out. Quebec nationalism left the significant francophone minorities in New Brunswick, and Ontario abandoned to pursue a separatist ideology rooted in Quebec nationalism.²²⁷

Trudeau believed the nationalism within Quebec to be a revolt against modernity because of the totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, and lousy economics he saw rooted in the movement.²²⁸ While Michael Ignatieff argues that Trudeau's view of Quebec nationalism was correct up until

²²³ Guy Rocher, "Multiculturalism: The Doubts of a Francophone," in *Multiculturalism as State Policy: Conference Report*, ed. Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (Ottawa: Dept. of Supply and Services, 1976), 52.

²²⁴ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 129.

²²⁵ Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*, 153.

²²⁶ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*, 166.

²²⁷ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*, 165-66.

²²⁸ Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, 168.

the 1960s, modern Quebec nationalists argue they had sped up the modernity of Quebec by reforming the secular state: "attacking the power of the Church in education and moral life, advancing women's rights and sexual freedom, seeking to give Quebec a secure place at the very heart of the North American economy."²²⁹ Trudeau's view of the nationalist of Quebec makes sense as he was a federalist and wanted Quebec to become a regular part of Canada, rather than consistently worrying and fighting to dull the voice of separatism. However, Quebec nationalists believed that they were progressive and fighting to achieve the status of French North Americans, which is why many believed separation from Canada was required, especially if federalist governments were not willing to elevate French culture but instead tried to silence their movement via multicultural policy.

During the decade before the enactment of official multiculturalism, Quebec's provincial government had committed to policies and programs separate from similar federal policies and programs and intended to benefit the people of Quebec solely. The nationalization of Quebec's hydroelectric resources in 1962 is an example of taking economic action to become a state within a state and prove that the province had confidence in becoming independent.²³⁰ The creation of its own Quebec pension plan instead of joining Canada's CPP, as mentioned previously, was also a move to economically and symbolically differentiate Quebec from Canada.²³¹ However successful they were, and despite the economic clout they gave the provincial government, actions such as these did not protect the French language and culture that nationalists were trying to defend. The defence was not just against British Canada; Quebecers were aware of the increased immigration to their province from regions such as Latin America, the West Indies, Southeast Asia, the Middle

²²⁹ Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*, 154.

²³⁰ Ignatieff, *Blood & Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism*, 149-50.

²³¹ Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 280.

East, and Africa, all of which provided Quebec with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds. French-Canadian nationalists viewed this as a threat to the survival of the French on North American soil, and many believed the only way for their culture to survive was to redouble the efforts to improve the socioeconomic status of French-Canada in relation to English-Canada by adding a certain degree of flexibility to French-Canadian culture.²³²

Although Quebec had rejected the proposed federal policy of multiculturalism, it did not mean that Quebec wanted to regress into a monocultural province devoid of diversity. Like the mimicking of other policies and programs, Quebec's provincial government began developing its form of multicultural policy. Premier Bourassa insisted that Quebec was already moving in the direction of Ottawa was pushing the rest of Canada, and Quebec's evolution towards multiculturalism seemed to follow the federal rubric closely in terms of trying to foster openness and diversity but differed in its insistence on French-Canadian culture undeniably remaining the majority culture.²³³ Quebec began to present itself with more openness to the rest of the world, separately from Canada. The Ministry of International Relations and Ministry of International Commerce played an essential role in this openness through Quebec's twenty-two foreign delegations (seven in the United States, eight in Europe, four in Latin America, and three in Asia).²³⁴ From the late 1970s onward, these delegates were tasked with "presenting Quebecers not as a nation of malcontents forever complaining of their misfortunes – as they too often used to see themselves – but as world citizens for whom nothing human is foreign."²³⁵ Quebec was never opposed to being a pluralistic society, and the province would eventually institute what it believed to be the proper form of integration for the province.

²³² Léon Dion, "The Mystery of Quebec," *Daedalus* 117, no. 4 (1988): 286.

²³³ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 130.

²³⁴ Dion, "The Mystery of Quebec," 298.

²³⁵ Dion, "The Mystery of Quebec," 298.

From 1971 onwards, every Quebec government has officially rejected multiculturalism because it has been viewed as an ideology devised by Trudeau that nationalist thinkers believe was designed to destroy Quebec nationalism. Instead, Quebec would later pursue something different known as interculturalism, which differs from multiculturalism in recognizing a majority culture. Interculturalism refers to the support of cross-cultural dialogue and the challenging of self-segregation tendencies within the culture.²³⁶ Interculturalism was introduced to Quebec in 1981 in response to the criticism of multiculturalism, especially the argument that it created separation between cultures rather than the inclusion of cultures. The policy of interculturalism is officially defined as such:

The policy is mainly concerned with the acceptance of and communication and interaction between culturally diverse groups (cultural communities) without implying any intrinsic equality among them. Diversity is tolerated and encouraged, but only within a framework that establishes the unquestioned supremacy of French in the language and culture of Quebec.²³⁷

Quebec has done an excellent job of constantly adapting and refining its system of interculturalism, which should be a mandatory requirement when it comes to policy that deals with people and their cultures. Comparatively, the original strategic objectives of interculturalism in 1981 included:

- develop cultural communities and ensure that their uniqueness is maintained;
- sensitize francophones to the contribution of cultural communities to Quebec's heritage and cultural development; and
- Facilitate the integration of cultural communities into Quebec society, especially those sectors historically excluded or under-represented within institutional settings.²³⁸

The original objectives of interculturalism were centred around Quebec, avoiding doing what the federal government had done to francophones in the past, which meant allowing cultural

²³⁶ John Nagle, *Multiculturalism's Double Bind: Creating Inclusivity, Cosmopolitanism and Difference* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), 169.

²³⁷ Laurence Brosseau and Michael Dewing, Canadian Multiculturalism Background Paper, 15-16 (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2009, revised 2018).

²³⁸ Brosseau and Dewing, Short Canadian Multiculturalism Background Paper, 16.

communities to participate in institutional settings while maintaining their cultural uniqueness.

Whereas Quebec's action plan for interculturalism in 2016 addressed immigration.

- Harnessing the strategic benefits of permanent and temporary immigration;
- Making it possible for immigrants to quickly and effectively complete the immigration process;
- Strengthening trust and solidarity among people of all origins; and
- Striving for substantive equality through cooperation with economic leaders, local community partners, and departments and agencies.²³⁹

While Quebec maintained the diversity and uniqueness that interculturalism fostered, the provincial government understood that it needed to encourage people to tolerate the diversity and build equality and trust between the different cultural communities of the province.

Proponents argue that diversity is strongly encouraged in Quebec. However, diversity is encouraged under a framework that establishes French as a public language, including immigrant children required to attend French-language schools and a ban on most English-only signage, although bilingual signage is typical.²⁴⁰ In 1990 the provincial government of Quebec released a White Paper titled *Let's Build Quebec Together: A Policy Statement on Integration and Immigration*, which reinforced three main points:

- Quebec is a French-speaking society.
- Quebec is a democratic society in which everyone is expected to contribute to public life.
- Quebec is a pluralistic society that respects the diversity of various cultures within a democratic framework.²⁴¹

Pluralism was the cultural goal within Quebec. Cultures could coexist, but French-Canadian culture remained the majority culture and remained the central aspect of Quebec's society.

Interculturalism deviates from Trudeau's original concept in which he desired to separate culture

²³⁹ Brosseau and Dewing, Short Canadian Multiculturalism Background Paper, 17-18.

²⁴⁰ Alain G. Gagnon and Raffaele Locovino, *Federalism, Citizenship and Quebec* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 165-66.

²⁴¹ Brosseau and Dewing, Short Canadian Multiculturalism Background Paper, 16.

and language. However, for Quebecers speaking a different language is what has helped them understand what their identity is.

Only 90s Kids Remember:

The 1990s did not mean that Quebec's dissatisfaction with its place within Canada's federal system had come to an end. After the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1987, Quebec shifted from quiet constitutional discussions behind closed doors to wide open, one-hundred percent public and democratic actions focused on Quebec's future.²⁴² A committee was created by the Quebec Liberal Party and headed by former Quebec City mayor Jean Allaire and a partnership with the Parti Québécois, led by Jacques Parizeau and Premier Robert Bourassa. Allaire's committee held meetings in every constituency of Quebec and consulted businesses, unions, and academics about Quebec's future. At the same time, Parizeau and Bourassa established their commission, which was chaired by two prominent francophone businessmen, Michel Bélanger and Jean Campeau, within the National Assembly and maintained the mandate to consult with all estates of the province on Quebec's future.²⁴³ The Allaire Committee and the Bélanger-Campeau commission worked in harmony with each other. Both created an ultimatum for Canada's federal government. At the same time, Allaire's Committee called for a massive restructuring of Canada that would have merely left Ottawa as the manager of the economic union. Bélanger and Campeau laid out a path where Quebec would choose its future and pursue a referendum on Quebec sovereignty or examine any new offer of a new constitutional partnership put forward by the Canadian government.²⁴⁴ Brian Mulroney's government could not afford to ignore the ultimatum

²⁴² Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 406.

²⁴³ Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 406-07.

²⁴⁴ Russell, *Canada's Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests*, 407.

put forward by Quebec as the Progressive Conservatives' popularity began to wane in the early 90s.

The failed negotiations of the Meech lake accord caused outrage among Quebec francophones and prompted Bourassa to proclaim that a referendum would occur in 1992, which would result in either sovereignty or a new constitutional agreement.²⁴⁵ Both Bourassa and Mulroney would have little time to address Quebec's ultimatum from their respective sides as Jean Chrétien, and a majority Liberal government would take power in 1993. While the following year, the Quebec provincial election would bring to power the sovereigntist, Parti Québécois, led by Jacques Parizeau, who promised to hold a referendum of sovereignty during his term in office as premier.²⁴⁶ By 1994 when Parizeau was in power, the support for sovereignty had slipped from its post-Meech height, when by some polls had measured at sixty percent for sovereignty, but it remained higher than before Meech.²⁴⁷ Parizeau and the Parti Québécois proceeded onwards with the ambitious goal of holding a referendum within the first six months of being elected and circulate a series of consultations around Quebec in which the results would be presented to the National Assembly. The data was collected and examined by the National Assembly, a final version of the Bill was drafted on whether the government would hold a referendum. These steps were all completed in a matter of months.²⁴⁸ The Parizeau government's goal was to hold the referendum in May or June of 1995 if it was able to win and while the numbers were in favour of sovereignty.

The ambitious goal of holding a referendum in the summer of 1995 was not met. A date was set for October 30th, 1995. The referendum asked this question "Do you agree that Quebec

²⁴⁵ Mario Cardinal, *Breaking Point: Quebec, Canada, The 1995 Referendum* (Montreal: Bayard Canada Books, 2005), 31.

²⁴⁶ Peter Benesh, "As Quebec goes, so goes Canada," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* September 12, 1994.

²⁴⁷ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 222.

²⁴⁸ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 224.

should become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the Future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on 12 June 1995?"²⁴⁹ As the date of the referendum vote drew closer, the main concern by Quebecers was the economy if the province was to become sovereign. Leaders against sovereignty warned that Quebec's economy would take a heavy hit if sovereignty were pursued. Laurent Beaudoin, the head of Bombardier, announced that his firm might move factories out of Quebec if the province became sovereign.²⁵⁰ While Paul Martin, who was Finance Minister at the time, warned that up to one million jobs would be threatened by sovereignty.²⁵¹ Nevertheless, these threats of economic ruin seemed to cause a surge in the "Yes" numbers due to the promise of sovereignty coupled with the economic association and the view that comments by anti-sovereigntists were mere hollow threats.²⁵² Sovereigntist leadership had effectively dispelled Quebecers' fear of any potential economic consequences. During the final week of the referendum campaign, a survey found that half the francophone respondents believed that there would be no short-term economic costs caused by sovereignty and fifty-five percent believed that Quebec's economic state would improve over the long term.²⁵³ With the concerns of the economic ramifications of sovereignty addressed, voters in the referendum had the opportunity to base their decision on identity and their connection to Quebec.

The voter turnout for the referendum was high at 93.52% of the Quebec electorate, and the results were very close, with 49.4% voting "Yes" and 50.58% voting "No." Compared to the 1980

²⁴⁹ The Bill referred to in the Question was Bill 1, *An Act Respecting the Future of Quebec*, which included a declaration of sovereignty in its preamble and the agreement of 12 June 1995, was the text of the agreement between the Parti Québécois and the Action démocratique du Québec (ADQ) ratified by Premier Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard (leader of the Bloc Québécois) and Mario Dumont (the leader of the ADQ).

²⁵⁰ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 227.

²⁵¹ É Coultier, "The Quebec Referendum: From polls to ballots," *Canada Watch* 4, no. 2 (Nov./Dec. 1995): 39.

²⁵² McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 227.

²⁵³ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 227.

referendum, this increased the "Yes" side by nine percent.²⁵⁴ Such a small margin between the two sides created more tension, with Parizeau stating that the "Yes" side was hindered by "money and the ethnic vote" and that if another referendum were held, the "Yes" side would be successful with a few more French speakers onside.²⁵⁵ These somewhat unhinged comments by Parizeau led to his resignation. They sparked anger within the "Yes" side as the movement had maintained a reasonable effort to disown ethnic nationalism as they knew that backsliding into the territory of ethnic nationalism would not do Quebec any favours in constitutional negotiations.²⁵⁶ However, the results of the 1995 referendum had made it clear that Quebec sovereignty was possible and that Quebecers were willing to vote in favour of it to protect their identity. With such a narrow margin of victory by the "No" side, the rest of Canada had to acknowledge that sovereignty was possible no matter how hard future governments tried to avoid the discussion.

The 1995 Quebec referendum can be linked back to Pierre Trudeau's strategy of national unity had yet to take hold and showed many signs of success. Sovereignists were even able to use aspects of his strategy to their advantage by arguing that Quebecers and their identity would not be recognized within the federalist vision of Canada.²⁵⁷ by forcing Quebecers to choose between Quebec and Canada. A key component of Trudeau's strategy for national unity was to transform Quebec's identity into one where Quebecers viewed themselves as Canadians who happened to speak French, which is not a realistic concept for Quebecers.²⁵⁸ Furthermore, the introduction of multiculturalism denied francophones the cultural dualism that had defined the basic structure of Canada, and the opinion of multiculturalism from francophones was that the imposing of national

²⁵⁴ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 230.

²⁵⁵ Cardinal, *Breaking Point: Quebec, Canada, The 1995 Referendum* 398.

²⁵⁶ Cardinal, *Breaking Point: Quebec, Canada, The 1995 Referendum* 398-400.

²⁵⁷ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 244.

²⁵⁸ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 248.

standards denied the status of a historic francophone community prompting the creation of Quebec's policy of interculturalism.²⁵⁹

Upon examining the federal concept of multiculturalism and the provincial attitude towards multiculturalism, specifically in Quebec, there is a crucial difference: Quebec maintained an emphasis on language. Quebec has preserved its mandate to maintain the French language and culture, but the sense of inequality to English-Canada remained. Biculturalism was viewed as an equalizer between the two colonial cultures. In the eyes of French Canadians, if the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism remained true to its initial mandate, both French and English Canadians would have been recognized equally as the founding peoples of Canada.

However, biculturalism also could be problematic because its premise that Canada has just two founding peoples is wrong. Yes, the French and English colonized Canada, but they arrived in a place with vibrant Indigenous cultures throughout the land. Furthermore, many other cultures have contributed to Canada's development throughout pre-and post-colonial history. Concerns raised by minority cultures were warranted as biculturalism would have undermined their contributions. Multiculturalism was not perfect either, but it was an attempt to be an inclusive policy, and it is a policy that has evolved in significant ways since its introduction in 1971. Multiculturalism did not create a cohesive unity, or did it succeed in soothing the nationalistic movement in Quebec at the time, as examples of Quebec's resistance shows. However, the multicultural policy did create more unity than biculturalism would have. The exclusion of non-colonial cultures by biculturalism would have created division, as minority cultures would be left to debate who contributed to Canada's history more significantly alongside French and English

²⁵⁹ McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity*, 248-49.

Canadians while also leaving less of a chance to create a sense of acceptance and diversity that multiculturalism had hoped to create.

CONCLUSION

Opinions by scholars, writers, and the media on the multicultural policy that Trudeau enacted have changed throughout the years. Of course, they have; when a government institutes a policy, even one that may not be controversial in terms of its end goal, there are always criticism and adaptations—and successfully implementing a policy as expansive as official multiculturalism was a massive undertaking. This size of the undertaking is part of where criticism of the policy stems from. Responding and adapting to the plethora of cultures within Canada sometimes feels impossible and has begged the question of whether true multiculturalism is even possible, not only in Canada but anywhere. Furthermore, this may be the opportune time to state that true multiculturalism was not achieved after the policy was instituted and still has not been today.

Although die-hard monarchists might disagree, one positive effect of the incomplete multiculturalism that has taken place is that it has caused Canada to move away from privileging denizens of the former empire and provided the hope that people of many histories, cultures, and faiths could co-exist.²⁶⁰ Although this idea of co-existence has not come to fruition in modern Canada, it has become part of the identity projected outward by Canadians. This "imagined community" or imagined identity of diversity and acceptance has been projected to the international community and used as a tool for nation-building within Canada. The surface level of Canadian multiculturalism has been systematically built into mass media, the educational system, and administrative regulations, effectively creating a sense of nationalism in Canada that has many Canadians believing Canada is more accepting of diversity than it is.²⁶¹ Nevertheless, as Himani Bannerji has pointed out, where non-white cultures belong in Canadian identity has

²⁶⁰ Foran, "The Canada experiment: is this the world's first 'postnational' country?," Para 19.

²⁶¹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 114.

historically been brushed aside by the Canadian media and government.²⁶² Because of this, it is hard to argue that multiculturalism has been as successful as Trudeau had hoped it would be in the long term.

Pierre Trudeau's political philosophy was very influential in the pursuit of multiculturalism and the unity of Canada. Although the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism laid the groundwork for multiculturalism by pinpointing Canada's cultural issues and offered solutions to said issues, Trudeau's politics bled into the final decisions. If the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was followed to a tee, biculturalism would have been the policy pursued by parliament, making French and English Canadians happy as they cemented themselves atop the pedestal of Canadian culture. However, Trudeau understood that Canada was already diverse and was continually becoming more so. He was also aware and frustrated with the state of nationalism within Quebec, and his distrust of ethnic nationalism meant Trudeau was determined to rein Quebec into the federalist vision. Quebec's angst acted as the primary catalyst for the implementation of multicultural policy. Although an optimistic outcome, implementing a policy that was supposed to create more understanding and acceptance in Canada's diversity does not have a wrong time to be pursued. Nevertheless, Quebec's overt nationalism during the 1960s and 1970s provided the optimal time to institute a multicultural policy that Trudeau and the Canadian government had hoped would help create a solid Canadian identity, including the French-Canadians of Quebec.

In terms of immediate impact and practicality, Trudeau wanted multiculturalism to solve the Quebec crisis. However, this federalist approach was not very successful as Quebec flat-out rejected the federal policy while drafting its version of multiculturalism. Even though the

²⁶² Bannerji, *The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism, and Gender*, 91.

multicultural policy was meant to calm down Quebec's separatist and nationalistic movement, it was not as successful as the Canadian government hoped. In the eyes of Quebec, multiculturalism gave them minority status, which was a drastic move away from the special status that biculturalism would have accorded them.²⁶³ Both English and French Canadians planned to enjoy the duality of Canada that biculturalism would have provided them, but Trudeau knew it was time to acknowledge the diversity and complexity of Canada's identity. Politically Canada was ready for multiculturalism, there was no notable political fight, and the other parties were behind the idea because it fit with the nationalism of the day. However, just because it was decided at the federal level that 1971 was the right time to institute a policy of official multiculturalism that aimed to change Canadian culture and foster unity did not mean there would be zero push back from grassroots movements and the provincial government of Quebec, where nationalists were trying their hardest to hold on to defining aspects of French-Canadian identity.

There is so much to cover when it comes to multiculturalism in Canada, and there could be work done from every ethnicity's perspective on the policy and what it has done. However, here, we are trying to understand the motivations of Trudeau and his Liberal government specifically. Although part of the implementation of multiculturalism was to address the immediate problem of nationalism in Quebec, Trudeau had a long-term vision for Canada that extended past his multiple terms as prime minister. There is no real opportune time to change society via one government policy drastically. However, during the 1970s, Trudeau did have a suitable environment to try because all the political parties favoured multiculturalism, and he was coming off an election that had many Canadians immediately excited about Trudeau and the policies he wanted to implement. Although an already diverse country, Canada was becoming more so, and globally people

²⁶³ Wayland, "Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada," 47.

continued to become more connected as the latter half of the twentieth century carried forward. The best way to describe this vision would be as optimistic. Trudeau wanted Canada to become the primary example of how a nation can be created and maintained without a ruling culture that engulfed all others. This goal was not achieved and is still yet to be as Canada continually struggles to step up and address its horrible history with the colonized population of Indigenous peoples and the acts of hatred that visible minorities must face. However, this has not stopped Canadians from projecting the imagined identity that multiculturalism has made Canada a more accepting place than the international community. This paper has not set out to say outright that multiculturalism cannot be worked on, and the hollow identity of Canadian acceptance cannot be turned into a concrete national identity. However, to do so will require much work that would involve adapting multicultural policy moving forward and a willingness to look back and address past mistakes in terms of culture and race in Canadian history. Much like Trudeau's long-term vision for Canadian identity, mine is also optimistic.

One of the multicultural policy's priorities was to create a sense of national unity in Canada, but that goal has yet to be achieved and remains one that is rooted in optimism. Although a flawed idea, multiculturalism did provide the opportunity for minority cultures to contribute further to Canada's identity, instead of French and English Canadians being the dominant cultures under a bicultural system. Canadian collective identity is still questionable. However, there are core values among Canadians, and ultimately the acceptance of a fluid identity among Canadians would be unifying. Trudeau's policies are something that Canadians can build on in this sense. Canadians must revise and extend what Trudeau set out to accomplish as Canada changes, but to dismiss Trudeau for trying to accomplish a nearly impossible goal almost seems defeatist. Criticisms of Trudeau and multicultural policy are valid because there is always room to improve, but Canada

is not even two hundred years old. There is time to flesh out what Canadian unity and identity should look like.

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