TYPES OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARTY COMPETITION STRUCTURES IN DEMOCRACIES: THE CASES OF PORTUGAL AND PERU

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the influence that the semi-presidential form of government has on the degree of closure of party competition structures. Thus, using part of the axioms of the so-called Neo-Madisonian theory of party behavior and Mair's theoretical approach to party systems, the behavior of parties in government in Portugal (1976-2019) and Peru (1980-1991 and 2001-2019) is analyzed. The working hypotheses propose that the president-parliamentary form of government promotes a decrease in the degree of closure of party competition structures, whereas the premier-presidential form of government promotes either an increase or a decrease in the closure levels of said structures. The investigation results corroborate that apart from the system of government, the degree of closure depends on the combined effect of the following factors: whether the president's party controls Parliament, the concurrence or not of presidential and legislative elections, and whether the party competition is bipolar or multipolar.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND PARTY ACRONYMS

AFM	Armed Forces Movement
APRA	American Popular Revolutionary Alliance
AR	Assembly of the Republic
CC	Constitutional Court
CDS	Social Democratic Center *(Centro Democratico e Social*)
CONFIEP	Confederation of Private Business Institutions (*Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas)*
CR	Council of the Revolution
DA	Democratic Alliance
DP	Democratic Party
ENPP	Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties
FIM	Independent Moralizing Front *(Frente Independiente Moralizador)*
FREMO	Democratic Front *(Frente Democrático)*
IC	Index of Closure
IU	United Left (*Izquierda Unida*)
NLP	National Liberal Party
LB	Left Bloc
ONU	Odriist National Union
PA	Popular Action
PCM	President of Council of Ministers
PCP	Portuguese Communist Party
PHP	Peruvian Humanist Party
PNP	Nationalist Peruvian Party *(Partido Nacionalista Peruano)*
PP	Possible Peru
PPK	Peruvians for Change *(Peruanos por el Kambio)*
PPM	People's Monarchist Party *(Partido Popular Monárquico*)
PRD	Democratic Renewal Party *(Partido Renovador Democrático*)
PS	Socialist Party *(Partido Socialista*)
PSD	Social Democratic Party (*Partido Social Democrata*)
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization

INTRODUCTION

The two topics addressed in this research —party systems and systems of government— are at the core of Political Science, certainly comparative politics. Political parties and forms of government have been studied extensively from various perspectives, some of which are currently considered "classics" due to their significant contribution to our understanding of these topics. Thus, for instance, if one speaks about political parties and party systems, Sartori (2005 [1976]) emerges as one of the essential references. However, one could also cite previous studies by authors such as Duverger (1959), Downs (1957), or Burke (1981[1766-1774]). In the same way, if one refers to systems of government, the contemporary debate over the virtues of parliamentarism or presidentialism stands out, where authors such as Linz (1990), Lijphart (1994), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) or the same Sartori (1994a) have become essential references. However, similar to the case of political parties, one can find reflections on the strengths or weaknesses of forms of government in thinkers such as De Tocqueville (2008), Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (2008) or even —following the path of political philosophy— in the works of Plato or Aristotle (Bates, 2018).

Why then should one approach topics that have been widely studied? Or better yet, how does one contribute to the knowledge of these "objects of study"? A broad assessment of research on party systems and forms of government reveals a lack of studies that systematically link these phenomena. On the one hand, studies that have addressed the nature, origin, and dynamics of party systems hardly include the form of government as an explanatory variable and predominantly consider it as a contextual or marginal variable. On the other hand, studies that address the virtues of differing forms of government have not analyzed in-depth the effects that these would have on party systems. What one finds in the literature are assumptions that claim that certain forms of

government would operate better with consolidated party systems —that is, those when the set of party interactions is institutionalized or predictable[1]— than other forms of government (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2007, p. 540). However, despite the existence of these propositions, comparative studies that seek to understand how forms of government affect parties or party systems are still quite scarce.[2] The present research will bridge this gap.

Delimiting the specific problem and research question

Having identified this gap in the literature, I decided to formulate a specific research question to guide this research. Thus, based on the bibliographic review, I delimit my research problem in two ways. On the one hand, I choose the form of government called semi-presidentialism, while, on the other hand, I adopt Peter Mair's definition of a "party system". The following paragraphs outline each of my choices briefly.

a) What is semi-presidentialism? Regarding this concept, I follow Robert Elgie's definition: "… Semi-presidentialism is the situation where a constitution makes provision for both a directly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the legislature…" (Elgie, 1999, p. 13). However, as I discuss in detail in section 1.1, I complement this definition with David Samuels and Matthew Shugart's approach that proposes two sub-types of semi-presidentialism based on the role that the

[1] It should be noted that I explain in detail in section 1.2 below the equivalence between consolidated, institutionalized, and closed party systems as well as the sense of the word "predictable" in this last case.

[2] I could only find a study that addresses how government forms influence the behavior of parties: Samuels and Shugart (2010). Likewise, I have only been able to find one comparative and systematic study dedicated to evaluating the impact that forms of government have on party systems: Croissant and Merkel (2001).

elected fixed-term president plays regarding cabinet members (prime minister and ministers). In specific terms, the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism would be defined as follows:

a.1 In premier-presidential systems, the prime minister and cabinet are formally accountable exclusively to the assembly majority – and thus not to the president.

a.2 In president-parliamentary systems, *the prime minister and cabinet are dually accountable to the president and the assembly majority* [emphasis in the original] (Samuels and Shugart 2010, p. 30; Shugart 2005, p. 333)

b) What is a party system? Regarding this concept, I assume the perspective of Giovanni Sartori, who draws a line between political parties —as units of the "system"— and the "party system," defining the latter as the set of interactions regularly conducted between these units (Sartori, 2005, p. 111). This approach directs the focus of this research not towards political parties but to the party system; that is, to the set of regular interactions that these units establish in political competition. It should be noted that this distinction has been gaining increasing acceptance within the discipline (Randall and Svåsand, 2002).

That said, and as I explain in-depth in section 1.2, it should be noted that there are different perspectives addressing the various aspects or characteristics of the "party system." Again, the Sartorian approach and its typology of party systems —based on their number and ideological differences— and his argument in favor of the existence of "structurally consolidated party systems" (Sartori, 2005, p. 111) became predominant in Political Science. However, there are other analytical perspectives on party systems, such as those of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) that prefer to speak of "institutionalized" party systems or that of Mair (1996), who calls party systems

"structures of party competition", and instead of characterizing them as consolidated or institutionalized, he prefers to classify them according to their "level of closure." Given that in this research I use Mair's approach, it is useful to explain what the author refers to when he talks about a "closed competition structure." According to Mair (1995, 2002), this kind of structure of party competition should have the following features:

b.1 A wholesale alternation in government or no alternation at all. That is, when it happens after an election or a reconfiguration of party relations in parliament, I expect the party composition of cabinets to experience a total change or conversely maintain the same party composition. As an illustration, I can note the Canadian case where both these features of a closed competition structure emerged in the elections of 2015 and 2019. After the 2015 election, a Conservative government was completely replaced by a Liberal government. After the 2019 election, the government maintained the same partisan composition (Liberal Party), and the hung parliament in 2019 did not change this.

b.2 A lack of innovation in government formulas. That is, what characterizes this kind of structure is that it does not produce unexpected party alliances or cooperative relations. For example, using the Canadian case as an illustration: a government formed by NDP and Conservative members could hardly occur. In that way, it could be possible to talk about the "predictability" of the closed structures that is a crucial feature of Mair's approach.

b.3 The limited access to government of new parties or parties that despite having had parliamentary experience never partake in government. In the Canadian federal case, the New Democratic Party (NDP) is the most important party in this regard.

After explaining key definitions, the specific research topic seeks to analyze whether the semi-presidential design influences or impacts the level of closure of party competition structures. Posed in question form, my research problem is: *How do types of semi-presidentialism impact the level of closure of party competition structures in a democracy?*

Finally, the reader might ask: why focus on this form of government? Or why analyze party interaction from Mair's perspective? Those choices respond to my interest in exploring how an institutional configuration (government systems) influences the nature of party interactions. In other words, I choose not to follow the prevailing perspective within the discipline, which assumes that the pattern of party competition is fundamentally defined by social divisions (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). My view does not deny the role social cleavages play in the emergence of a pattern of party competition; but I am more interested in highlighting the role that institutions play, especially in countries whose democratization has been recent and have not followed the European pattern of party system.

It is precisely because of this latter interest that I limit the analysis to the so-called semi-presidential form of government. The argument is simple: studies on this form of government have found that this constitutional design was predominantly adopted after the second World War Two, thus becoming the most popular form of government among the so-called "new" or "young" democracies (Moestrup, 2007). Additionally, relying on the findings of Mainwaring (1988a, p.68) on the almost irrelevant role that social cleavages would have played in the emergence of party competition in new democracies (especially since the processes of "modernization" in these countries have not necessarily followed the European pattern), I seek to analyze the role that

government systems play in the consolidation of the structures of party competition in new or regained democracies.

The interpretative model: parties in government and the formation of governments

After defining a focused research question, the second methodological step is to identify a theoretical model or framework that helps to set up a preliminary answer (that is, a working hypothesis). Therefore, I build a theoretical scheme combining some axioms of neo-Madisonian theory and Mair's approach. However, what are the main assumptions or axioms of neo-Madisonian theory? Put simply, this theory explains how a system of government based on separation of powers influences the behavior of parties during three core organizational tasks: *selecting candidates, contesting an election, and governing.* In other words, this theory's main assumptions rely on the systemic preeminence of parliament or the presidency and how this institutional context may influence these crucial party actions (Samuels and Shugart, 2010).

However, could the neo-Madisonian theory's axioms be compatible with Mair's approach on structures of party competition? As I explain in detail in section 2.3, it is possible to offer a combined analytical perspective on party behavior during *the formation of governments*; that is, *during the process that concludes with the members' appointment of a governmental cabinet (prime minister and ministers).* Indeed, part of the neo-Madisonian theory fully addresses the "government dilemmas" faced by parties according to the form of government (see section 2.1.2), whereas Mair's approach analyses how the composition of cabinets could indicate the degree of closure of given structures of party competition.

That said, it should be stated that the explanatory power of Mair's perspective enables to use mainly the axioms of neo-Madisonian theory regarding party behavior in the *governmental* arena. Therefore, considering V. O. Key Jr. 's classic perspective (Key, 1964), which argues that political parties are organized around three core activities (party-in-the-electorate, party-in-government, and party-as-organization), it should be indicated that this research focuses fundamentally on parties-in-government. In other words, I want to emphasize that my analysis is focused on how parties-in-government organize the legislature and cabinet—or attempt to do so—and coordinate actions across the national government's various institutions, especially in parliaments (Aldrich, 2011).

Hence, now that it has been indicated that I am interested in the behavior that parties show towards their peers in the parliament, I can ask how semi-presidential types (premier-presidential and presidential-parliamentary) could influence party behavior during cabinet formation. Following the Neo-Madisonian theory's assumptions, the answer would depend on which institution (parliament or presidency) has a more significant systemic influence in each of these semi-presidential sub-types. Considering this key institutional distinction, the question is: Which institution matters in the *formation of governments*? If the answer is that *the parliament matters*, the following tendencies or behaviors would be expected:

- Parties try to be politically/ideologically consistent over time in order to keep their constituencies.
- If the Parliament is predominant in government formation, it reinforces the political (or ideological) positions of parties in parliament. That means that parties will put effort into

building stable relations of cooperation or antagonism beyond the electoral periods because they know that they could eventually partake of government despite not gaining the majority of seats in Parliament.

Conversely, if *the presidency matters,* the following tendencies would be expected:

- Parties are focused on getting the major prize of the system: the presidency. Indeed, during the selection of their candidates or during the electoral competition, the party dynamic is focused on the presidential candidate (even to the point that the presidential candidate could sacrifice part of the party identity or shift some points of the party agenda in order to gain more votes).
- There are no incentives to create or forge parliamentary alliances or coalitions (these are not critical for governing) because these could be dispensable in government.[3]

Therefore, based in the axioms of neo-Madisonian theory, as well as Mair's approach to structures of party competition, I pose a preliminary answer to my research question: considering which institution is favored by the form of government during the formation of the ministerial cabinets, I can affirm that the premier-presidential system encourages the emergence of both party competition tendencies: more and less closed competition structures, while the president-parliamentary one encourages just less closed competition structures, and sometimes can lead to regime crisis and breakdown.

[3] I carried out the axioms of this theory in detail in section 2.1.

However, how can the emergence of these trends be explained? As I pointed out, logic suggests to explore which system (president-parliamentary / premier-presidential) promotes the importance of parliament or presidency during the government formation. Therefore, I expect that depending on who controls parliament, there would be different results, especially in the premier-presidential system. Indeed, in the premier-presidential system, if the president's party does not gain a majority in parliament, then parliament will gain systemic importance because that institution has the power to remove cabinets. In contrast, in the president-parliamentary system, if the president's party does not reach a majority, then I will expect confrontation. Lastly, if the president's party obtains the parliamentary majority, I will expect that the presidency gains more systemic importance in both systems.

Therefore, considering the assumptions previously explained, I can formulate the working hypotheses in this way:

H1: Premier-presidential forms of government could promote high or low levels of closure. If "cohabitation" (the coexistence of a president of one party with a government led by a prime minister of an opposing party) continuously emerges, then the structures will tend to be more closed. Conversely, if the president's party repeatedly controls parliament, then the structures will tend to be less closed.

H2: President-parliamentary forms of government encourage low levels of closure, regardless of who controls the parliament. However, if a hostile opposition to the president controls Congress, the result will not be a tendency towards closed structures, but to the Congress's dissolution or democratic breakdown.

Nonetheless, how to corroborate these working hypotheses? Following the case study method, the ideal countries are those where a government system change occurred between these sub-types: a shift from a president-parliamentary system to a premier-presidential one (hypothesis 1) and vice versa (hypothesis 2). Why? Because these ideal cases allow to analyze whether under constant conditions (the same country) the government system change affects the structures of party competition in the sense that the theoretical model predicts.

Regarding the first hypothesis, I have an ideal case (Portugal) where a change did occur from a president-parliamentary system to a premier-presidential one. However, I do not have a postwar contrary case (that is, a change from premier-presidential to president-parliamentary). Therefore, I decided to analyze a country where a president-parliamentary design has existed for a long time to examine the typical tendencies or nature of its structures on party competition. In that way, such as I explain in section 2.3.3, I choose Peru as a control case.

The organization of the argument: Chapters and their contents

Having outlined the core aspects of this research (in methodological terms), starting with the definition of the research problem, the working hypotheses, and the chosen case studies, it is time to describe in detail how I have organized the presentation of my research and findings. In the first chapter, I carry out a critical assessment of the main perspectives used in the study of both party systems and systems of government. The main goal is to show precisely the "scarcity" of studies that address the effects of semi-presidentialism on party systems. Thus, this first chapter concludes by highlighting not only the relevance of contributing to studies on semi-presidentialism and party systems but also claiming the advantages of approaching party systems as "structures of

competition." The second chapter takes on the challenge of building a theoretical framework seeking to explain the research problem: How do the types of semi-presidentialism impact the level of closure of party competition structures? Therefore, this chapter begins by critically examining the axioms of the neo-Madisonian model and then, after considering some of them and the postulates of Mair's perspective, proposes an interpretative framework about the effects that forms of government have over the trajectory of structures of competition. Then, the second chapter concludes by describing the two hypotheses (one for each type of semi-presidentialism), variables, indicators, and case studies of the present investigation. Next, Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted exclusively to testing and verifying the observable implications derived from the model of interpretation being applied to each case: Portugal and Peru. In each chapter, the corroboration process follows a similar structure. The analysis begins by describing the form of government (and its variations) from a formal perspective. Then, I analyze the dynamics of the relationship between actors (presidents and parliaments) according to the constitutional design described in order to identify the effects of the systemic preeminence of the presidency or the legislature on the formation of governments. Likewise, as a final section of the analysis of each case, I evaluate the direction of the structures of party competition using the modified Index of Closure proposed by Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2016), and the previous findings on the president-parliament dynamics and other additional indicators (such as parliamentary fragmentation). Finally, in the concluding chapter, I include the results of this comparative study, the implications of the findings for the analytical perspectives used, and the limits of the present investigation, and I also pose some possible future research routes and questions.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL APPROACHES ON SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARTY SYSTEMS

This chapter offers a brief assessment of the main analytical or theoretical approaches on semi-presidentialism and on party systems.[4] The overall goal is to show the existence of a shared deficit within both approaches on a specific topic: the relationship between the type of government system and party systems. To this end, the first section describes the debate within Political Science on the existence of semi-presidentialism as a distinct system of government; it also presents a brief review of studies on this topic. The section concludes by pointing out the utility of Samuels and Shugart's (2010) perspective on semi-presidentialism as well as the little attention paid thus far to the connection between such system of government and political parties. The second and final section of this chapter discusses the main theoretical perspectives about the origin, institutionalization and change of party systems. The overall conclusion of this assessment is that system type has been an underestimated factor in the extant literature on the institutionalization of party systems. Lastly, as a way of closing the gap between the literatures on type of government system and party systems, this section concludes by showing the usefulness of Mair's analytical framework (1996) to establish a link between the system of government and structures of party competition — as Mair labelled party systems.

[4] As I noted later, I define the party system as the pattern of interactions regularly carry out by political parties in a given scenario (Sartori, 2005, pp. 38-41). Additionally, it should be noted that I consider semi-presidentialism as a form of government, which is also called in this thesis alternatively a system of government. Lastly, I define form of government as the organizational model of constitutional power adopted by a state based on the power relationship between the different actors.

1.1 SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM AS A TYPE OF GOVERNMENT: ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

One of the most significant theoretical debates on the types of political systems arose in the early 1980s with the publication of an article by Maurice Duverger in which he defended the existence of a different political system from those already known: presidentialism and parliamentarism. Duverger labelled this type as "semi-presidential" and added that it had three minimal characteristics: (1) the president is elected through universal suffrage, (2) has considerable executive powers (3) and faces a prime minister —and ministers— who also have certain executive powers but whose post depends on parliament (Duverger, 1980).

Later, Sartori (1994a) reformulated Duverger's perspective and incorporated additional conditions to classify a system as semi-presidential. Specifically, for that author, not only should the head of the state (president) —who should also be elected through the popular vote directly or indirectly— share executive powers with the prime minister, but such dual authority structure should also meet three essential criteria:

1. The president is independent of parliament but cannot govern alone or directly and therefore his will must be conveyed and processed via his government.
2. Conversely, the prime minister and his cabinet are president-independent in that they are parliament-dependent: they are subject to either parliamentary confidence or no-confidence (or both), and in either case, need the support of a parliamentary majority.

3. The dual authority structure of semi-presidentialism allows for multiple balances and also for shifting shares of power within the executive, under the strict condition that the 'autonomy potential' of each component unit of the executive does subsist (Sartori, 1994a).

Elgie (2016) proposed a third influential perspective on the definition of semi-presidentialism. Unlike Sartori's proposal, Elgie elaborated his definition by criticizing one of the most controversial aspects of Duverger's scheme, that is, "that the president has considerable powers." In line with Elgie, Alan Siaroff too argued that Duverger's second criterion was problematic for comparative analysis because it categorized equally countries with powerful presidents that fit the criterion (e.g., France) and ones with much weaker leaders that did not (Austria, Ireland, Iceland) (Siaroff, 2003, p. 291).

Elgie also argued that the core problem with the ambiguity of said criterion was that it had misled researchers to conclude that semi-presidentialism was harmful to political stability. Indeed, to him this conclusion rests on a circular fallacy, as countries classified as semi-presidential are precisely those with active or dynamic presidents. In sum, these studies mistakenly concluded that excessive power of presidents in semi-presidentialism was the key factor facilitating political conflicts (Elgie, 2016, p. 51).

After considering the criticisms of Duverger's proposal—which until well into the 1990s was the predominant definition—Elgie proposed to remove presidential power as a major criterion for classifying a system as semi-presidential. Instead, he defined it as: "… Semi-presidentialism is the situation where a constitution makes provision for both a directly elected fixed-term president

and a prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the legislature…" (Elgie, 1999, p. 13).

By the end of the 1990s, Elgie's definition became the predominant one used by researchers (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2010). However, although this definition distinguished semi-presidential countries from classical types (parliamentarian and presidential), it could not discern between countries classified as semi-presidential but with varying degrees of presidential executive power. Elgie recognized this limitation, but assured that when the type of form of government was considered a dependent variable —in methodological terms— the researchers had solved the problem through two logical steps:

> 1) First, based on certain constitutional norms, countries that had a directly elected president and a prime minister and cabinet that collectively were accountable to parliament, were classified as semi-presidential.
> 2) Then, as a second logical step, these countries were differentiated according to their presidential powers (Elgie, 2016, p. 52).

In that way, the main theoretical debate changed from how to identify a semi-presidential system —as Elgie's perspective replaced Duverger's— to how to differentiate sub-types of semi-presidentialism. Empirical studies on this last topic reveal that there are two predominant strategies to classify semi-presidential systems according to the degree of presidential powers. The first is to elaborate a metric of presidential powers, while the second assumes that the best way to classify these sub-types is to consider an additional but significant constitutional rule.

Regarding the first solution, researchers have proposed several ways to create an index of presidential powers. Most of them are based on the prerogatives attributed to the president that are formally included in the legal system of a country—such as the constitution or other laws. Undoubtedly, the refusal to consider informal aspects of presidential power is primarily because that would make indices harder to compare (Elgie, 2016, pp. 52-53; Fortin, 2013, p. 92). Furthermore, the latter would lead one back to the initial problem: a somewhat ambiguous or subjective criterion, similar to Duverger's "considerable presidential powers."

In terms of the methods required to measure the powers of a popularly elected president, Fortin (2013) points out that most of them propose two slightly different strategies. First, those who measure the power of a president through ten different discrete categories each using a scale from 1 to 4. Generally, these categories correspond to two types of powers that a president possesses: legislative and non-legislative. The result is an addition of the scores obtained in both dimensions, where one can identify the weight of each of them in each country analyzed. This strategy was initially proposed and used by Shugart and Carey (1992, pp. 148-166) and then modified by Metcalf (2000).

The second measurement strategy assumes that each power formally granted to a president can be treated as a dichotomous variable. Thus, in the comparative analysis when the constitution of a country includes a presidential power it obtains the value of 1, while when not the value is 0. The degree of final presidential powers would be, as in the previous case, the total sum of all the values assigned by each presidential power considered. As one can readily notice, in this case, the difference between the various indexes proposed lie in how many presidential powers are included in the elaboration of the index. However, there is no consensus on this point, and one can find

studies that use indexes based on 38 (Lucky, 1994), 27 (Frye, 1997) or 9 (Siaroff, 2003) presidential powers.

On the other hand, regarding the call to distinguish between sub-types of semi-presidentialism based on an additional formal rule and not an index of presidential power, Matthew Shugart and John Carey proposed the existence of two sub-types: president-parliamentary and premier-presidential, a distinction now predominant in comparative studies. However, the typology proposed by these authors has not been consistent over time. Indeed, since its first mention in 1992, their classification has changed from considering a presidential-parliamentary system as a "type of system of government" to a "sub-type of semi-presidentialism".

Indeed, in their study *Presidencies and Assemblies* (1992), Shugart and Carey pointed out that "…what Duverger refers to as semi-presidential, we designate premier-presidential" (1992, p. 23). In that sense, implicitly both authors assumed that there were four types of government system: presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism (called by Shugart and Carey premier-presidential) and a hybrid system —different from semi-presidentialism— called president-parliamentary. Specifically, for Shugart and Carey, this last "hybrid system" had the following characteristics:

1. President elected by popular vote;
2. The president appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers;
3. Cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence;
4. The president has the power to dissolve parliament or legislative powers, or both (1992, p. 24).

However, according to Elgie, years after Shugart reformulated his original typology and he not only eliminated the fourth feature about presidential powers, but also focused his perspective on the predominant relationship between cabinets, presidents and assemblies. By doing so, the president-parliamentary system came to be considered a "sub-type" of semi-presidentialism together with premier-presidential system. For that reason, one could affirm that there would be an original formulation on semi-presidentialism (1992) and a mature reformulation which was introduced by Shugart (2005) and later developed by Samuels and Shugart (Elgie, 2019, pp. 5-8). In this context, the standard definitions of these two terms would be now as follows:

1. In premier-presidential systems, the prime minister and cabinet are formally accountable exclusively to the assembly majority – and thus not to the president.
2. In president-parliamentary systems, *the prime minister and cabinet are dually accountable to the president and the assembly majority* [emphasis in the original] (Samuels and Shugart 2010, p 30; Shugart 2005, p. 333)

The main advantage of these sub-types of semi-presidentialism is that they rest fundamentally on the rules established in constitutions; therefore, it is a parsimonious typology, handy for comparative investigations. Thomas Sedelius and Jonas Linde's scheme (see Figure 1.1) clearly and precisely summarizes —following the criteria of Samuels and Shugart— the structural differences of the four forms of government.



Figure 1.1 ***Four Government Systems***
Source: Sedelius and Linde (2018, p. 139)

However, notice that such semi-presidential subtypes have certain limitations. Researchers such as Siaroff, and Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg (2014), although they do not criticize directly the typology of Samuels and Shugart, consider semi-presidentialism —and, therefore, implicitly its subtypes— unnecessary as a category of analysis. In Siaroff's view: "…there is really no such thing as a semi-presidential system when viewed through the prism of presidential powers…" (2003, p. 307). Under this perspective, the crucial distinction between government systems should be in the overall powers of the presidential figure and not so much in the formation or dependence of governments. Likewise, because the distinction between modes of government is merely formal, the existence of non-formal rules or the post-electoral power correlations that could alter in practice

the relations between the executive and legislature are overlooked by Samuels and Shugart's proposal.[5]

1.1.1 BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM'S STUDIES

Besides the debate on semi-presidentialism's definition, another issue addressed by researchers has been the relationship between system of government type and democratization processes. As Elgie and Sophia Moestrup point out, this topic became predominant during the 1990s because semi-presidentialism became widespread in new democracies (Elgie and Moestrup, 2008, p. 30). Therefore, researchers asked whether the institutional structure of this type of government was favorable to democratic consolidation or, on the contrary, hindered this process.

The first stage of this debate appeared as an extension of the classic discussion between presidentialism and parliamentarism disregarded by Linz (1990) a few years earlier. Indeed, the studies by Shugart and Carey (1992), Linz (1997), Sartori (1994a, 1994b) and Duverger showed the advantages or disadvantages of semi-presidentialism for democracy. Shugart and Carey were among the first to propose that not all directly elected presidents were detrimental to democracy. Specifically, they argued that while premier-presidentialism could benefit democracy, the institutional design of president-parliamentary system was potentially harmful and should be avoided (Shugart and Carey, 1992, p. 287).

[5] Thus, for example, it would be a mistake to consider Austria or Iceland —following only their constitutional rules— as cases of president-parliamentary as in practice, they have had quite weak presidents. This debate will be resumed in the next chapter when I addressed the behavioral imperatives derivate of semi-presidential systems.

In turn, Linz (1997) basically attributed to semi-presidentialism the same adverse effects he found in presidentialism. Indeed, said author argued that the low flexibility of the system (that is to say, the fact that both the president and parliament are elected for a fixed period) could breed instability, especially when both prime minister and parliament form a coalition opposed to the president: cohabitation. However, his reflections are questionable if one considers that Linz based them solely on a few historical cases (i.e., France and Germany) and did not distinguish between the sub-types of semi-presidentialism.

On the other hand, Sartori proposed a different look at cohabitation. Based on the French case, he argued that such situation could be favorable to the extent that the semi-presidential system offered a solution to the problem of divided majorities. In other words, unlike of the institutional rigidity of presidentialism, where the president does not have significant support in parliament, the semi-presidential institutional design allows governments to function in practice as a system similar to parliamentarism; that is to say, with a more influential prime minister in regards to governmental decisions, given the support of parliament — and a president with a limited field of action (Sartori, 1994b: 125).

Sartori's positive assessment on the institutional flexibility of semi-presidentialism was applied to cases where democracy was in the process of consolidation. In this way, the possibility that two politically represented majorities coexist (the president and the parliament) was interpreted as beneficial for democratic affirmation, especially in divided societies or where there is more than one relevant social group. The logic is simple: the social legitimacy towards a political system increases when more relevant social groups obtain political representation (Elgie and Moestrup, 2008, p. 32). Thus, the advantages of the semi-presidential system —the dual power structure, as

well as the institutional flexibility— were also highlighted by other authors such as Blondel (1992, p. 167) and Duverger (1997, p. 137), especially in the democratic transitions of Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union.

All of these studies offered a set of interesting findings on the advantages of semi-presidentialism for democratic consolidation, especially in the so-called third wave democracies. However, most of them presented at least two significant limitations. The first is methodological, while the second one is an omission of one of the sub-types of semi-presidentialism. On this last limitation, one can notice that the reflections of Sartori and Duverger are focused on the premier-presidential subtype since they revolve around the situation known as cohabitation. Thus, they forget that such cases are unfeasible in the president-parliamentary sub-type because under this government form what may happen is that the president —and by extension, his cabinet— does not have majority support in the parliament (minority presidents). Also, regarding the methodological limitation, I agree with Elgie's assessment when he points out that most of these studies were based: "…almost entirely on anecdotal examples or qualitative country studies…" (Elgie, 2016, pp. 55-56). However, since the end of the decade of 1990, some studies have attempted to overcome those limitations. As part of this second phase, I could include the works of Roper (2002), Moestrup (2007), Sedelius and Linde (2018), and Cheibub and Chernykh (2009).

Moestrup (2007) focuses her analysis on countries that are considered young democracies —although she excludes Portugal, Spain and Greece— and seeks to assess whether semi-presidentialism has impact on democratic performance or the number of democratic breakdowns. Their findings reveal that the impact of semi-presidential institutional design on democratic performance varies depending on the region analyzed. In their own terms: "… while semi-

presidential systems have performed better in terms of average Freedom House scores than parliamentary systems in Eastern Europe, they have performed worse than other systems in Latin America and Asia and just as poorly as presidential systems in the former Soviet Union and Africa…" (Moestrup, 2007, p. 43). In turn, limiting the analysis to the sub-types of semi-presidentialism, she finds that the existence of a divided government in new democracies could be more damaging on president-parliamentary systems than on premier-presidential ones.

On the other hand, Elgie and Schleiter (2011) find empirical evidence of the differentiated impact that semi-presidentialism sub-types would have on the survival of democratic systems. Nevertheless, unlike Moestrup, they suggest that the literature has overstated the effect divided governments would have on democratic breakdowns. On the contrary, for these authors, the incentive structure derived from the institutional design of the president-parliamentary seems to play a decisive role in the collapse of democracies. In their own words: "… Those constitutions that are president-parliamentary and make the government dually accountable to the assembly and the president powerfully reduce the durability of democracy, raising the risk of democratic breakdown by a factor of 5.24 compared to semi-presidential constitutions that make the governments accountable only to the assembly…" (2011, p 55).

In a more extensive study, Sedelius and Lindle (2018) expand the previous findings regarding the negative impact of the president-parliamentary system on democracy. Indeed, these authors, when statistically comparing the four types of government system (Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, premier-presidential system and president-parliamentary system), find that countries with a constitutionally designed president-parliamentary achieve the worst results in democratic performance and government. Also, one of the most outstanding contributions of their

study is that when the statistical analysis is replicated using presidential power levels, the results confirm the previous finding on the reversed correlation between the presidential power index (countries close to president-parliamentary) and the levels of democratic performance and government (2018, pp. 148-49).

On the contrary, Cheibub and Chernykh (2009) quantitative study reaches opposite conclusions about the impact of semi-presidentialism on democratic performance, government stability and the survival of democracies. Although they do not differentiate between the sub-types (president-parliamentary and premier-presidential), their findings reveal that the semi-presidential constitutional design —following Elgie's definition— does not seem to have a causal effect on some aspects of the democratic system. Indeed, they conclude that the electoral system (proportional) and coalition governments better explain the short duration of prime ministers or higher stability of the system. Also, on the survival of the democratic system, Cheibud and Chernykh categorically conclude that: "… it is difficult based on existing evidence to find a causal effect of the type of constitution on democratic breakdown" (2009, p 226).

In sum, studies that attempt to explain the relations between semi-presidentialism and democracy differ not only in methodological terms but also in their findings and conclusions. On the one hand, a series of studies are based on a qualitative approach or case studies, while another group of researchers chooses to analyze n-large cases and rely on statistical or econometric analyses. Likewise, in terms of the contradictory findings, the divergence could be explained if one considers the period of study, the countries that are included in the analysis, the definitions of democracy or democratic breakdown, and, in the case of quantitative studies, variables considered, as well as the proxies used in the operationalization of the concepts (Elgie, 2016, p. 57).

The most recent trends in the analysis of semi-presidentialism revolve around two aspects of its institutional design. The first group of studies focuses on the effects that direct election of the president has on the degree of presidential power or the system's nature; while the second group of investigations analyses how do institutional structures in semi-presidentialism impact the stability of cabinets.

Tavits (2009) was one of the first to wonder if an elected president was a crucial variable to distinguish the semi-presidential system from the parliamentary one. She concluded that the influence exerted by a president on the executive is independent of whether he is elected through the popular vote or not. She statistically proves that there is no significant relationship between presidential dynamism - measured through the number of nonpartisan ministers - and the direct election of a president in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Tavits concludes by stating that more important than the type of presidential election would be the role of constitutional powers since these shapes the structure of opportunities that a president has to influence a given cabinet. However, it should be noted that the sample she uses to reach those conclusions is limited to European democracies and government systems —parliamentary or semi-presidential— with weak presidents.

A recent study by Carsten Anckar (2019) reaches a similar conclusion. He downplays the importance assigned to the direct election of a president to distinguish the semi-presidential system from the parliamentary one. Indeed, based on substantial empirical evidence, Anckar reveals that there is no direct relationship between the type of election of a president and the level of concentration of powers he possesses. In other words, it could be problematic to focuses solely on the mode of selection of a president —without considering the level of presidential powers— to

define what is or not a semi-presidential system. However, he recognizes that empirical evidence reveals that cases of powerful presidents who have not been popularly elected are rare, and when they have existed, their duration has been ephemeral (the most extensive case was Finland, although the president was popularly elected but not directly).

Elgie and Anckar have each pointed out that the debate about the importance of a president's election mode or presidential power levels can be interpreted as a return to the problems provoked by Duverger's definition of semi-presidentialism. In other words, if the mode of election is not assumed as crucial, then what needs to be asked is how many presidential powers turn a parliamentary system into a semi-presidential one. Anckar assumes that the mode of election should be maintained but that this criterion should not be rigid or inflexible. Elgie defends his position —as well as his definition of semi-presidentialism— evoking that the post-Duverger definition poses a taxonomic difference but that this does not necessarily imply empirical differences. In other words, when a direct election of the president is incorporated in a system of government, such system should be classified as semi-presidential, but this does not imply automatic changes in the way in which it operates. This last point would be precisely subject to an analysis where researchers could use the proposals about sub-types described above.

On the other hand, a recent topic of analysis asks to what extent the system of government influences the conformation or survival of the executive—that is, the cabinets. In this case, the studies carried out by Protsyk (2006), Neto and Strøm (2006) Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2010) stand out. One of the main findings is a positive correlation between the level of presidential powers and the president's control over cabinet formation. Also, in the comparative study on semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism conducted by Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2010), these

authors conclude that the level of non-partisan ministers is higher in the first type of government than in the second. Additionally, another of the outstanding conclusions proposed by Neto and Strom (2006) is that a higher party fragmentation in parliament increase the president's control in the formation of cabinet.

In turn, regarding the impacts of systems type on governments' survival (or cabinets), the conclusions are diverse. On the one hand, Sedelius and Ekman (2010) affirm that the design of the president-parliamentary compared to the premier-presidential one, is more destabilizing for cabinets. However, Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2010) point out that the instability of cabinets is not linked to the sub-type of semi-presidentialism, but that this occurs more frequently when the president has the power to dissolve parliament. In this same perspective, I could place the study mentioned above by Cheibub and Chernykh (2009) for whom there is no relationship between cabinet stability and types of government (semi-presidential or parliamentary). According to these authors, the factor that best explains the survival of the cabinet is the electoral system and not the degree of presidential power.

1.1.2 A GAP IN THE LITERATURE: GOVERNMENT SYSTEM AND PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION

An assessment of the existing literature on semi-presidentialism reveals a gap in studies that analyze one aspect or dimension of said system of government: its effects on the nature of political parties or party systems. However, as Samuels and Shugart (2010) point out, this deficit or void also occurs in analyses of other forms of government. In fact, both authors stress that in the vast literature on parties and party systems, there is no reference to the structure of these institutions

in relation to forms of government. This omission is surprising since scholars have traditionally observed that the form of government affects the number of political parties in a system.

Samuels and Shugart provide at least two consistent explanations about the lack of studies linking political parties and constitutional designs. The first has to do with the fact that intellectually, the vast scientific production on political parties has been fundamentally based on the historical experience of Western Europe. In this way, most analyses have assumed that explorations of parties under a parliamentary system —predominant in Western Europe— amount to the study of political parties in general. Therefore, not paying due attention to the variations in the legislative-executive structure (that the notion of type of system of government entails) make the predominant interpretations of party evolution or the emergence of party systems less useful to analyses of countries with non-parliamentary institutional contexts (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 7-8).

Another key reason has been the tensions that emerged from a set of divergent analysis concerning political parties in the United States. Indeed, Shugart and Carey reveal that researchers such as McCormick (1966, 1979), Burnham (1979) and Epstein (1967) stated that parties in the United States have not emerged from social cleavages or legislative factions (the European pattern) but from competition around presidential elections. Their reflections suggest that there would be different incentives depending on the type of election, and therefore the executive or legislative branches of one same party could not be considered as a single actor. In this sense, presidentialism would frustrate the consolidation of responsible party government. However, this debate was overshadowed, and the comparative analysis of political parties in the United States was adjusted

to the standard based on the European experience and the importance of socio-economic structural factors over institutional ones (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 9-11).

Specifically, regarding the studies on party systems and semi presidential systems, Elgie (2019) has empirically evidenced a shortage of studies that consider the sub-types of semi-presidentialism as an explanatory variable of party systems. In fact, based on a meta-analysis of these two concepts (president-parliamentary and premier-presidential) Elgie found that since their introduction into academic literature (with the publication of the Shugart and Carey (1992) — *Presidents and Assemblies*— only four empirical studies out of a total of 96 that have considered these sub-types as an explanatory variable.

Table 1.1
The Outcome Variable in Empirical Studies of Premier-Presidentialism and President-Parliamentarism

Variable	Democratization	Domestic policy	Foreign policy	Parties and party systems	Government and cohabitation
Total	37	14	6	4	35
1992-2009	9	8	4	1	15
2010-	28	6	2	3	20

Source: Elgie (2019, p. 12)

Now, having evidenced a gap in the literature on semi-presidentialism, it is worth asking: what theoretical approaches could be used to analyze semi-presidentialism and its impact on the institutionalization of party systems? There is a clear need for studies that consider the extent to which the strategic factors and incentive structures existing in different institutional contexts (for example, the direct election of a president) exert over the nature of political parties or party systems. But before reflecting on that question, one may first ask: what do existing approaches about party

systems say regarding the causal role of government types? Or do they overlook or dismiss the importance this relationship? The next section answers those questions.

1.2 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PARTY SYSTEMS: FROZEN, INSTITUTIONALIZED OR CLOSED?

Since the late 1970s, the academic literature on the dynamics of party systems has grown significantly. In that sense, it is unsurprising that most of these studies have focused on regions where the establishment or return to democracy occurred shortly after the so-called Carnations Revolution of Portugal (1974). Therefore, a large part of these works not only sought to explore the reasons that would promote the consolidation, institutionalization or freezing of party systems in these regions, but also the impact that this phenomenon would have on democratic strengthening or consolidation.

However, most of those studies adopted one of three main analytical perspectives. The first one was initiated by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in their now-classic work "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In this work, these authors not only proposed a model to explain the emergence of party systems in Europe - the famous freezing hypothesis - but also introduced one of the most innovative concepts of Political Science: "social cleavage."

The second analytical tradition had as its starting point the study *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), which became a classic of Political Science. Indeed, the application of their analytical perspective by various

authors beyond Latin America provoked almost a global dissemination of the studies on the institutionalization of party systems in new democracies. The impact of this work was so significant that the level or degree of institutionalization has been used both as a dependent and independent variable in various studies that have sought to explore phenomena as diverse as democratic quality, the processes to establish public policies and programmatic representation. (Luna, 2014, p. 405).

Finally, a third analytical tradition was inaugurated by Mair (1996) in his famous article "Party Systems and Structures of Competition." In this case, although its publication was almost simultaneous with the study of Mainwaring and Scully, the dissemination or application of his analytical proposal beyond of the European consolidated democracies —specifically in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa— has occurred in recent years. However, his perspective on the dynamics of party systems represents an innovative way of conceptualizing, as well as operationalizing, the institutionalization of party systems. Mair's breaking with the previous tradition is evident when he chooses to speak of predictability instead of stability, or of openness or closure of competition structures rather than levels of institutionalization of party systems. Each of these three analytical traditions on the dynamics of party systems is described in detail in the following sections.

1.2.1 AN EXPLANATION OF THE EMERGENCE OF PARTY SYSTEMS: THE FREEZING HYPOTHESIS

The study of Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan —although based exclusively on the European experience— undoubtedly put forward one of the most influential theories about the emergence and stabilization of party systems. Their proposal, also described as sociological or

structural, was summarized as the freezing hypothesis. The fundamental axiom of Lipset and Rokkan's interpretation was to assume that there is a diversity of conflicting interests within a society, but only some of them are so intense that they end up structuring defined social groups. In their own words:

> [in a given society] "...conflicts and controversies can arise out of a great variety of relationships in the social structure, but only a few of these tend to polarize the politics of any system. There is a hierarchy of cleavages in each system and these orders of political primacy not only vary among policies but also tend to undergo changes over the time..." (1967, p. 6)

In this way, explaining the emergence of party systems equates to identifying, on the one hand, the sources of these tensions in the social structure, as well as the most important conflicts; and on the other hand, the way these tensions translate into the political arena. Regarding the European case, Lipset and Rokkan point out that the essential divisions in the social structure were caused by the French revolution and other national revolutions. These revolutions generated internal reconfigurations in each European society that significantly mobilized certain groups of society towards the political arena. Lipset and Rokkan's analysis point out that these disputes could be located on a bi-dimensional plane of two axes: one territorial axis counterpoising elites with marginal or local groups, and the other, a functional axis, contrasting material interests with ideological interests (1967, pp. 9-13).

The result was that most European societies, with some variations in intensity, were fractured in four ways: churches versus governments, workers vs. employers, primary vs.

secondary economics and central vs. peripheral or local cultures. Then, considering these main lines of conflict that articulated the components of European society, Lipset and Rokkan added some national factors that would have ended up shaping political forces (parties) which created a party system that was stable at least until the end of the sixties (1967, pp. 14-23).

Subsequently, the perspective of social cleavages was applied in other latitudes, especially in the so-called new democracies. However, the consensus that emerged among researchers was that the social conditions that shaped political competition in Western Europe have not occurred in other parts of the world. Indeed, neither the national revolutions nor the industrial revolution experienced in Europe occurred in the same way or intensity outside of that continent. This last assertion does not mean that some societies in the rest of the world have not undergone specific processes of national affirmation or economic modernization, but rather that these processes did not configure deep social divisions that later expressed themselves politically in a stable way during much of the 20th century—the heyday of mass parties in Europe (Bornschier, 2009; Randall, 2001).

Thus, for example, in the case of Latin America, Dix (1989) finds that the weight of the worker-employee cleavage has not manifested itself at the level of parties as much as it did in Western Europe. In fact, according to this author, unlike Europe, where class-mass parties were the main political expression during much of the period of economic development, in Latin America, mass politics were channeled through multiclass parties of rather eclectic pragmatic ideology and populist appeals. In short, if there is a specific connection between party systems and social structures in Latin America, it could be that the majority of Latin American party systems were forged predominantly as a product of more recent processes that redefined their respective

societies, such as economic development, urbanization, and the establishment of universal suffrage (Dix, 1989, pp. 33-34).

1.2.2 THE PARTY SYSTEMS INSTITUTIONALIZATION APPROACH AND ITS LIMITS

Mainwaring and Scully (1995) challenged the traditional perspective proposed by Lipset and Rokkan on the nature of party systems. Indeed, looking exclusively at developing country cases, they asserted that outside Europe the importance of social cleavages was marginal in the configuration of partisan competition patterns. As Mainwaring recognized it years later: "…Most important approaches to party system formation—social cleavage and spatial—have emphasized how society shapes party systems from below. Third-wave cases show that we must be more attentive to examining how the state and political elites have shaped party systems from above…" (Mainwaring, 1998a, p. 68).

Also, another contribution of Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully's was the introduction of the concept of institutionalization to the analysis of party systems. Huntington had previously used it, but in a broader sense and applied to the study of the political system or political parties.[6] Likewise, Sartori, referring to party systems, had chosen to speak of "structurally consolidated" and "non-structurally consolidated" party systems (2005: 217-18). However, it was since the

[6] Huntington's definition is the most widespread in Political Science. For this author, institutionalization is "…the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability…" (1968: 12). However, one must recognize that this concept has a long theoretical tradition in other disciplines, such as sociology or political philosophy. On the different approaches of the concept, it could review Keman (1997).

publication of Mainwaring and Scully's work on the Latin America case that the use of the concept became widespread, especially in research on party systems in new democracies.

Mainwaring and Scully, based on Samuel Huntington and Guillermo O'Donnell, proposed a clear definition of the concept of institutionalization. To them, said concept means a process through which a procedure, a practice, an organization or a pattern of interactions gains stability and become commonly accepted and known (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995: 4). Thereby, if this definition is applied to party systems, it means that the interactions of the system units (political parties) are stable and commonly accepted. Mainwaring and Scully proposed four dimensions to examine the levels of institutionalization of party systems: (a) stability in interparty competition patterns, (b) party roots in society, (c) the legitimacy of parties and elections, and (d) party organization.

Table 1.2
Dimensions and Indicators of the Institutionalization Concept

Dimensions	Indicators
Stability in the pattern of party competition	Pedersen's index of volatility of votes
Stable roots in society	The similarity of voting patterns in both presidential and legislative elections
	Public opinions polls
	Party longevity
Legitimacy of parties and elections	Conceded by elites
Party organization	Not measured

Source: Mainwaring and Scully (1995)

In this way, using different indicators for each aspect mentioned, they classified party systems as a well or weakly(fluid) institutionalized party system. However, although Mainwaring and Scully recognized that a party system could be well institutionalized in one aspect and not in

others, they pointed out that ultimately —in practical terms— all aspects led toward the same direction and hence a weakly institutionalized party system implied also a low performance in the rest of elements. Put otherwise, they assumed a significant interdependence between all aspects. In Mainwaring's terms: "…Party systems characterized by a lower degree of institutionalization can be termed fluid. This implies less regularity in patterns and rules of party competition, weaker party roots in society, less legitimacy accorded to parties and elections, and weaker party organizations which are often dominated by personalistic leaders…" (Mainwaring, 1998b).

However, even though the analytical perspective of Mainwaring and Scully became predominant in the analysis of third-wave democracies worldwide, their proposal began to be critically evaluated. One of the most common criticisms was that two of the dimensions of their definition (stable roots in society and internal partisan organization) referred to parties as a unit and not to the party system as a whole. This would mean that the proposed indicators may be conflating two different phenomena: the institutionalization of party systems and the institutionalization (individual) of political parties (Casal Bértoa, 2018, p. 65; Sanches, 2018, p. 23).[7]

[7] It is worth indicating that behind this distinction is the hegemonic definition on party system within Political Science, which defines such concept as the pattern of interactions regularly developed by political parties in a defined scenario (Sartori, 2005, pp. 38-41). In this way, the party system is conceived as a self-contained "entity" apart from political parties. On the other hand, the marginal perspective defines the party system as merely the sum of its constituent elements: political parties (Janda, 1993, p. 179; Schedler, 1995, pp. 6-7). Be that as it may, both definitions implicitly assume that the existence of the components precedes the whole at the theoretical level. In other words, to be able to speak of a "party system," there must be a minimum of two "political parties" that effectively interact or pre-exist. In this way, the debate is centered on the ontological difference that exists between political parties and other "associations of individuals." Otherwise, for instance, I could instead be in front of a "faction system" and not of a party system (Mansfield, 2016, p. 227). This debate will be resumed in the next chapter when I discuss the ontological nature of political parties under a system of separation of powers.

Randall and Svåsand (2002) demonstrated the problems of using indicators that reflect characteristics of (individual) components of the system and not systemic traits. To them, although the process of individual party institutionalization could boost or ultimately be compatible with party system institutionalization, the relationship was not always positive or linear; it would always be conceptually possible that both individual party and party system institutionalization do not go hand in hand. In this last case, we would be —according to Randall and Svåsand— facing an "uneven party system development." Therefore, according to these authors, the best option is to theoretically differentiate both units of analysis (political parties/party systems) and address the phenomenon separately. This recommendation quickly became the most popular option within the discipline, resulting in a new line of studies centered in the analysis of party institutionalization or the party-building process.

Finally, another significant criticism centers on the theoretical conception of the term institutionalization. Indeed, recently Sanches (2018) and Piñeiro and Rosenblatt (2018) have stressed that institutionalization, understood merely as stability of competitors (political parties) or electoral results —as it is assumed under the Mainwaring and Scully perspective— does not reflect the original definition pointed out by Huntington (1968). These authors, from different perspectives, demonstrate that the operationalization of this concept carried out in various studies obviates a crucial dimension of institutionalization: adaptability. Piñeiro and Rosenblatt (2018) emphasize that, for Huntington, the concept of institutionalization implies the ability to adapt to the social environment continuously. In that sense, such authors and Sanches (2018), when proposing alternatives to measure both dimensions (stability and adaptability), conclude that there would be cases where party systems are “over-institutionalized” or “ossified”, meaning that these kind of

systems are unable to channel the political demands or preferences of a changing society (Piñeiro Rodríguez and Rosenblatt, 2018, pp. 5-6; Sanches, 2018, pp. 43-45).

1.2.3 PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE GOVERNMENTAL ARENA

Mair's proposal is valuable insofar as it is based on a critical review of the previous perspectives. He elaborates a novel analytical framework from an evaluation of the "freezing hypothesis" and an in-depth theoretical analysis of the notions of party system and institutionalization. He begins by noting that the debate over the validity of Lipset and Rokkan's proposal was sterile since these authors acknowledged themselves that they did not seek to characterize party competition beyond 1970. In fact, Mair considered Lipset and Rokkan's cleavages as essential to the emergence of political parties in Europe and, through their rivalry, to the consolidation of a party system that was predictable until the 1960s. But what happened later on? Mair emphasizes that this question exceeds the explanation of Lipset and Rokkan because it focuses on what might happen in institutionalized party systems. In Mair's terms, the answer to the posed question should focus on: "…identifying those factors which might serve to disturb systemic inertia, and which might disrupt the long-prevailing equilibria…" (Mair, 2001, p. 40).

Considering Mair's concerns, one can claim that his perspective seeks to analyze the factors that could explain the distortions or changes in the direction of a frozen —or institutionalized— party system. To Mair, social cleavages matter to explain the emergence of political parties, but once these interact or compete, the dynamics within the created party system acquire significant degrees of autonomy and thus variance. That is because these systems constraint or limit the

actions of both voters and political parties. If this is maintained over time, a “predictable” party system would be observed, which to Mair, in line with Sartori, is equivalent to "frozen", “institutionalized” or, even, “structurally consolidated”. In his terms: “…Predictability then becomes a surrogate of structuration: the more predictable a party system is, the more it is a system as such, and hence the more institutionalized it has become. This is what freezing is all about…” (Mair, 2001, p. 35).

However, what does it mean that a party system is predictable? Mair's notion of predictability is closely linked to that of a system. Therefore, it is crucial to first differentiate when the set of partisan interactions follows a systemic logic and when it does not. In his perspective, there would be two situations that would not qualify as "systems”. The first situation would emerge when parties do not interact or compete, while the second would occur when those parties do not produce a clear pattern of competitive interaction. In the first case, it would not be possible to speak of system because a pattern of segmentation prevails; that is to say, parties do exist but remain anchored to a specific sector of the electorate —encapsulated in "their own universe"— and, therefore refuse to interact actively. In the second situation, because both party identities and electoral alignments have no clear structure, identifying a systemic logic would be impossible (Mair, 2001, p. 34).

This last argument is used by Mair to distinguish his approach from those of Mainwaring and Scully (1995). As I indicated earlier, for these authors, the degree of institutionalization would follow a line whose endpoints are the institutionalized and inchoate systems respectively. However, Mair ponders whether the inchoate type of Mainwaring and Scully has some degree of "systemness," as Sartori would say. In that sense, the fundamental question would be: could an

inchoate party system be considered as really a "system"? For Mair, the answer is negative since it is only possible when there is a minimal degree of institutionalization because: "... as systems, they are by definition frozen and institutionalized; de-freezing…is system failure " (Mair, 2002, p. 101).

After clarifying the boundaries of the notion of party system, Mair defends the idea that this pattern of party interaction is structured primarily around competition for government (ministerial cabinets). Mair does not deny that competition also occurs around other arenas such as the electoral or the legislative, but he stresses the one over government because it is the final stage of the partisan competition (Mair, 2001, p. 35). In that sense, if the nature of a party system hinges on how the government is formed or disputed, predictability becomes a feature of the system. However, Mair does not mean "predicting" the outcome of elections, but the way governments will be formed. Thus, for instance, it is possible to claim a high probability of total alternation in bipartisan systems, and that in moderate pluralist systems, governments will generally be occupied by center parties.

In that way, Mair proposes an alternative model to identify whether a party system is institutionalized or not. In his terms, the more closed the competition structure, the more institutionalized or "frozen" is said system. However, what defines a closed competition structure? Since his seminal article in 1995, Mair has argued that close structures are characterized by:

- A tradition of total alternation in government, that is, if a change in government occurs, this implies a total replacement of the previous ruling coalition or party.
- A lack of innovation in government formulas; that is, that new government formulas or coalitions could hardly emerge.

- Limited access to government for new parties and parties without past experience in government.

Table 1.3
Closed and Open Structures of Competition

Closed Structure of Competition	**Open structure of competition**
Wholesale alternation in office or non-alternation in office	Partial alternation or mix of both partial and wholesale alternation
Familiar governing formulae	Innovative governing formulae
Access to government restricted	Access to government open

Source: Mair (2002, p. 99).

In Mair's model of analysis, competition structures are fundamental to explain the nature of party systems (institutionalized or not) and not so much electoral results. Indeed, this author was one of the first to affirm that change in party systems is not a function, nor a synonym for electoral change (electoral volatility). In his approach, electoral alignments could change without altering competition structures and, likewise, the structure of competition could suddenly change without a previous electoral change. This separation of both processes not only allows us to accept that changes of party systems are due to other factors but: "…it also affords the opportunity to reverse the conventional chain of influence, and to probe the extent to which party system stability (or change) may lead to electoral stability (or change), rather than simply the other way around…" (Mair, 2002, p. 105).

If not electoral changes, then what other factors could explain changes in party systems? In a later article, Mair (2001) answers this question by arguing that changes in a given system could be attributed to decisions of the political elites as well as to their political culture. The reason is simple, and it is because the persistence or not of a given competition structure depends directly on them. Likewise, Mair proposes a couple of factors that might be associated with the

predictability of party systems. These are: (a) social cleavages, and, (b) the stability of the broader institutional order where party systems are inscribed. Regarding the first factor, according to Mair the permanence of social fractures would reinforce the predictability of the party system as a whole. For instance, in an article on the Dutch case, Mair uses this axiom to affirm that political competition in this country during the decades of 1950-60 was predictable, not so much because of the party system —which for him was relatively unfrozen— but because of the cleavages' stability. In his terms: in the Netherlands "... the structure of competition was always open and non-constraining, but the effect of this openness was largely irrelevant as long as the cleavage structure —the pillars— served to anchor the mass electorate in place…" (Mair, 2008, p. 242).

However, Mair also considered that the structure of society could change and therefore the predominant cleavages as well. That is, Mair did not consider that fractures could always remain frozen since it would be tantamount to thinking that societies can freeze, a claim that is: "... an impossible precondition ... class structures change both inevitably and inexorably, while religious identities are also far from fixed or preordained ... " (Mair, 2001, p. 27). However, how could one deny that changes in the social structure do not impinge directly on the stability of the party system? To Mair: "... cleavages can freeze parties, and the freezing of parties can be associated with the freezing of party system, but there is no necessary or inevitable relationship between any of three elements ... " (Mair, 2001, p. 38).

Put differently, in theory, it is possible to conceive various combinations, such as frozen —or institutionalized— party systems with defrosted parties, or unfrozen systems with frozen parties. However, are there empirical examples of each combination? According to Mair, the answer is affirmative. Type I would be the ideal where both the system and individual parties are strongly

institutionalized. Examples of this type would be the UK in the post-war period or Italy during the first republic.

The second type would correspond to the USA during the twentieth century and post-war Ireland. That is because both countries presented a stable party system over time, but with relatively fluid and adaptable parties. Mair recognizes that Type III is less frequent and the typical case could be that of Netherlands during the period of "consociationalism" where, as I have already pointed out, the parties were firmly rooted in their social "pillars." Finally, the best example of type IV would be contemporary Italy or the new post-communist democracies (Mair, 2001, pp. 37-38).

Table 1.4
Types of Freezing

	Parties: Frozen	**Parties: Unfrozen**
Party system: Frozen (equivalent to a closed system)	Post-War UK (I)	USA (II)
Party system: Unfrozen (equivalent to an open system)	Dutch (III)	Italy (IV)
	The social cleavages are stable or frozen	Likely the social cleavages are unstable due to deep social changes
	Social cleavages	

Source: Mair (2001, p. 37)

On the other hand, regarding the role the broader institutional order plays, Mair refers specifically to the electoral system or system of government.[8] That is to say, Mair gives a greater explanatory capacity to specific institutional reforms, thus downplaying the impact that structural changes would have within societies. In his terms: "... the weakening expression of decaying cleavage structures are certainly important, but if party systems are to become more fluid, then it

[8] For instance, on the influence over party systems, Mair points out that bipolarity in the case of the Fifth French Republic was facilitated by the presidential system, or, also the case of the United States where the two-party system is partly due at the restrictive practices in electoral registration and ballot-paper access (Mair, 2001, p. 39).

is at the level of institutions that the key explanations are most likely to be found…" (Mair, 2001, p. 40).

To conclude, this chapter has shown that Mair's perspective presents multiple advantages for the analysis of party systems over those proposed by Mainwaring and Scully. One of the benefits is that it offers a causal theoretical approach to processes of party system institutionalization based not only on social changes —or electoral variations—, but also in institutional designs. However, its main advantage is that it establishes the nature of party systems on the basis of institutional rules for competition in government formation. This novel take allows us to include in Mair's equation the behavioral restrictions that impose the semi-presidential constitutional designs to political parties in the governmental arena. However, will it be possible to join two theoretical traditions of Political Science, one focusing on political parties and the other on constitutional and institutional design? Facing this challenge, the next chapter attempts to establish connections between Mair's approach to the party systems and Shugart and Carey's perspective about the effects of the type of government on the nature and behavior of political parties.

CHAPTER 2

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES AND STRUCTURES OF PARTY COMPETITION

The review of the studies that address semi-presidential systems shows us that there is a gap in the literature on the impact that this form of government may have on the nature of party systems. Similarly, the main approaches to the consolidation or institutionalization of party systems have not directly identified the effects that government structures may have on said processes. Moreover, researchers who have analyzed the relationship between political parties and government systems typically conceive the form of government as a dependent variable.

However, is it possible to establish a causal relationship between the form of government and parties or party systems? Samuels and Shugart (2010), among the first to point out the lack of studies in this field, proposed a theoretical framework to analyze both nature and party behavior according to the system of government. Thus, their theoretical framework, also known as Neo-Madisonian, represents an innovative way of understanding the unique way in which political competition is structured in systems with separation of powers. From their perspective, there is no doubt that presidentialism —as well as semi-presidentialism— encourages the emergence of different political parties. If this were the case, one could also claim that the emergent pattern of competitive relations between them —that is, the party systems— that emerges in political competition (during the electoral campaign or the government formation[9]), would be different from the one generated under parliamentary systems.

[9] As I already have pointed out, I define government formation as the process that concludes with the deputies' appointment of a governmental cabinet: prime minister and ministers.

In this regard, it is worth asking: Could a link be established between Neo-Madisonian theory and any of the analytical frameworks on the dynamics of party systems? Specifically, this chapter seeks to establish a dialogue between Neo-Madisonian principles and Mair's theoretical perspective on structures of party competition. The general objective is to propose a theoretical model on how the systems of separation of powers —especially semi-presidential systems— affect the pattern of inter-party relations that are set during the competition for government formation. Thereby, the first section seeks to introduce the central axioms of the theoretical perspective of Samuels and Shugart (2010). The second part explores the possibility of incorporating the core assumptions of Neo-Madisonian theory into the analysis of structures of party competition. The result of this endeavor is depicted in an interpretative model that explains the relationship between forms of government and structures of party competition. Finally, considering the proposed model as well as its limitations, this chapter concludes with a description of the hypotheses, variables, and indicators of the present inquiry.

2.1 THE EFFECT OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ON THE BEHAVIOR OF POLITICAL PARTIES

One of the fundamental pillars of Neo-Madisonian theory is the axiom about the existence of an ontologically different party: "the presidentialized party." Samuels initially proposed its existence in an article published in 2002, but eight years later, and in co-authorship with Shugart, he developed in detail the argument about how the structure of opportunities derived from the separation of powers defines the nature, organization, and behavior of political parties. Their perspective, based fundamentally on principal-agent theory, assumes that political parties in presidential systems face dilemmas that their peers in parliamentary systems will never face.

Furthermore, according to these authors, these dilemmas would be almost existential as they are linked to the vital processes that justify the existence of a political party: the selection of candidates, electoral competition and government formation. However, before explaining in detail how the solution to each of these existential dilemmas uniquely defines party development in semi-presidential forms of government, it is worth first discussing the definition that Neo-Madisonian theory proposes of the concept of political party.

2.1.1 POLITICAL PARTIES ACCORDING TO NEO-MADISONIAN THEORY

In his initial proposal, Samuels does not directly define the concept of political party but uses Kaare Strom's theory of the behavior of competitive political parties. Without detailing this latter approach, it suffices to realize that an outstanding aspect of this theory is that it conceives political parties as organizational endeavors generated by their leaders. Thus, the analysis of party behavior is equivalent to that of leaders who are additionally conceived as a single rational actor. But why would a group of individuals form an organization? Strom (2013) based on the central principles of the theory of rational choice,[10] assumes that an organization is the most efficient means to achieve the objective that a group of individuals pursues. Therefore, applying this organizational principle to the case of political parties, such author adds that the *raison d'être* of political parties includes three goals that often conflict: earning votes, obtaining public offices, and implementing policies. In this way, party behavior —or that of its leaders— is the result of a

[10] In simple terms, the core assumption of rational choice assumes that the individual or agent tends to maximize their benefits and reduce costs or risks. In other words, the general rule would be that individuals prefer more of the good and less of what causes them evil. The three central types of party behavior proposed from rational choice theory are the vote-seeking party, the office-seeking party, and the policy-seeking party (Strom 2013).

trade-off between said objectives and the restrictions imposed by internal organizational imperatives and external political institutions (Strom, 2013).

The echoes of Strom's approach can be identified in the definition of political parties subsequently offered by Samuels and Shugart. Indeed, these authors firmly state: "… that parties are teams of politicians who (1) cooperate in elections under a common label to recruit candidates that they seek to elect to office and (2) coordinate the process of governing and policymaking between elections …" (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p. 16). Thus, the Neo-Madisonian analytical perspective on political parties, like Strom's rational choice approach, amounts to the analysis of the actions or behavior that party leaders display in each of the vital processes as organizations: nominating, electing, and governing.

The proposed definition, insofar as it is based on the singular interests that this association of individuals pursues is not far from the classic approach of the so-called elitist, procedural, realist, or economic theory of democracy, proposed by Joseph Schumpeter in 1942. Indeed, according to Schumpeter, democracy is only a method to reach power, in his own terms: "… the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote…" (Schumpeter, 2003, p. 269). Thereby, under Schumpeter's perspective, political parties' main goal is to obtain the highest number of votes since that is the only recourse that allows them to enact their government proposals. Also, considering the use of the term “individuals” in Schumpeter's

definition, the only feature that distinguishes a political party from any other groups would be their *raison d'etre*: to reach enough votes to access power (Vidal de la Rosa, 2010, pp. 187-188).[11]

That being said, there are both advantages and limitations to the concept of political party as proposed by Neo-Madisonian theory. One advantage is that it does not establish an intrinsic association between political parties and democracy. Indeed, some contemporary scholars tend to conceive the roles that these organizations should play in a democratic system as the existential objectives of a political party. Thus, for example, there is Alan Ware's (1996) definition, which emphasizes that, in addition to seeking to occupy government positions, political parties must articulate the interests of various groups of a society.[12] Another example is the definition of Klaus von Beyme, who explicitly points out that a political party is an organization that fulfills, or should accomplish , the following functions: seeking its objectives (ideology and programs); articulation and aggregation of social interests; mobilization and socialization of citizens in the system, especially during elections; and recruitment of elites and government formation (von Beyme, 1985, p. 16).

The problem with these definitions is that they have a normative bias to the extent that they incorporate democratic principles and roles as constitutive features of political parties. Perhaps this way of defining political parties derives from the predominant perspective on democracy, which assumes that the democratic system is unfeasible without the existence of political parties that

[11] As part of this perspective, I could also mention the classic Downsian perspective, which affirms that the parties promote public policies only for winning elections (Downs, 1957); or also the so-called "minimal definition" proposed by Sartori, for whom "... A party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office…" (Sartori, 2005, p. 57).

[12] In Ware's terms:"…a political party is an institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government, and (b) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so to some degree attends to 'aggregate interests'… " (Ware, 1996, p. 5).

fulfill a series of functions (Dahl, 1982; Lipset, 2000; Schattschneider, 1942). However, it should be noted that from a historical perspective, parties emerged prior to the consolidation of liberal democracy and that they were also initially secret or clandestine organizations that conspired to take power. Therefore, following this last perspective, it is not surprising that there are some empirical studies that, contrary to academic consensus, identify democracies that operate without parties (D. Anckar and C. Anckar, 2000; Levitsky and Cameron, 2003).

However, a general limitation of perspectives based on rational choice theory —including Neo-Madisonian— is to assume that the behavior of political actors is guided by "political preferences." Harvey Mansfield offers a suggestive criticism about the implications of the use of this term in political analysis, especially in those interpretations that choose to study "voter preferences" as part of electoral competition. The problem is that political competitions cannot be interpreted merely as a game of preferences because the electoral victory of a pseudo-preference means in practice the cancelation of the other one on the way to achieving collective well-being. In this sense, Mansfield's perspective not only allows us to recover the original notion of political competition but also that of a political party. Thus, it should be considered that the *raison d 'être* of a political party is not only to prevail over its opponents —to win an election— but rather to govern society, including its opponents. Putting it in Mansfield's terms: "…A party is a part of the whole that wants to rule the whole…" (Mansfield, 2016, p. 221).

In short, it is convenient to accept the concept of political parties proposed by Samuels and Shugart but with some clarifications. Specifically, I agree that political parties are in empirical terms a collective entrepreneurship whose ultimate objective is access to government. However, I conceive of this "ambition for power" in a positive sense; that is, there would be a desire to orient

society towards a common good. In this sense, the undertakings of individuals who are animated by negative ambitions do not constitute political parties but simply “factions”. Additionally, although three specific goals justify the existence of parties, one of them is fundamental: defining the set of policies of a country.

Therefore, both the search for votes and the political offices are intermediate goals, part of a strategy whose final objective is to define government policies. In other terms, the ultimate goal of any political party is to become a "government party" and maintain that position for as long as possible. I do not believe that political parties only seek votes or that their horizon (vision) ends when they get reach public office. If the latter is empirically confirmed, then their true nature would be revealed: there are factions whose ultimate ambition is the pursuit of private interests. This distinction, which I owe to Mansfield (2016) as will be seen in the next sections, plays a key role in the theoretical proposal to understand the dynamics of political parties under different forms of government.

2.1.2 PARTY DILEMMAS ACCORDING TO FORMS OF GOVERNMENT: THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESIDENTIALIZED PARTY

One of the most important innovations of Neo-Madisonian theory is that it proposes a party typology based on the institutional constraints that political parties face according to the structure of government in which they compete for power. From this perspective, there would be two ideal types of political parties: presidentialized and parliamentarized. The first of these emerges in forms of government based on the separation of powers, and its central feature is that its leaders inherently possess high discretionary power in all the roles that justify the existence of a political party:

nominating, electing, and governing. In turn, in parliamentary systems, a contrary phenomenon occurs: party members limit the behavior of party leaders in each of the party's vital actions, which implies a different organizational structure and culture (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 16-30).

It is also worth mentioning that Samuels and Shugart's perspective does not assume that one type of party is more democratic than the other (presidentialized versus parliamentarized). For Shugart and Carey, both government structures are democratic, with the only difference being that they activate or promote different "chains of representation or political delegation." The parliamentary system, by directly connecting voters-legislators-executive, establishes a clear and consecutive delegation relationship between citizens, parties, and party leaders. In contrast, in the separation of powers system, the connection of delegation or control is more complicated; there are two chains of delegation: electors-legislators and electors-president, which in practice makes delegation between parties (legislators) and the executive (president) expendable since both could be directly linked to citizens (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p. 37).

Now, considering only the case of the systems of separation of powers, how does the presidentialized party arise? The mechanics of how the process of "party presidentialization" — as it is called by Samuels and Shugart—[13] occurs is quite simple: the division of the legislative and executive components of government creates a structure of opportunities radically different from the one generated by the parliamentary system. In this sense, the behavior of ambitious political leaders —in the good sense of the term—, especially when facing the crucial dilemmas of collective

[13] In Samuels and Shugart's terms: "…we define presidentialization as the way the separation of power fundamentally shapes parties' organizational and behavioral characteristics, in ways that are distinct from the organization and behavior of parties a parliamentary…" (2010, p. 6).

action, end up creating a functional entity for the system of separation of powers, which so clearly reflects the division of powers expressed in their constitutions.[14] What are those core dilemmas? And why do they generate different incentives according to the form of government? Samuels and Shugart propose that political parties face three existential dilemmas, whose resolution end up defining not only the internal organization, but their behavior or dynamics: nominating, electing, and governing.

2.1.2.1 ELECTION AND DESELECTION OF CANDIDATES

Once a group of individuals has decided to join forces and seek power, the first collective action dilemma it faces concerns the selection of their leaders (or candidates).[15] According to the principal-agent theory, there is an underlying problem when a principal decides to "choose" an agent to fulfill an assignment: adverse or negative selection, which refers to the risk the principal faces that his agent may not adequately perform the job. According to Samuels and Shugart, in the case of political parties, this problem translates to the probability of choosing a candidate that does not adequately represent the party's vision or platform. This probability in a parliamentary system

[14] The argument in favor of the existence of an ontologically different type of party is held in the perspective of Pierson (2000), who points out that political institutions tend to create a set of incentives that promote the formation of institutions that are complementary or functional to the preceding ones. Thus, Samuels, following this author, explicitly stated that "..we have good reason to suppose that presidential constitutions encourage the development of specifically presidentialized parties.." (Samuels, 2002, p. 462).

[15] Obviously, before this step, there is a whole theory of organizations. In general terms, I could say that people choose to cooperate to the extent that achieving the objectives as an individual exceeds the available resources. In other words, it is less expensive to cooperate than to accomplish the goal individually. However, a limit to this proposal is that there are certain cases, especially in developing countries, where this principle would not apply. In fact, in some countries, there are cases where an individual —possessing the necessary organizational resources— automatically becomes the leader of the organization. Thus, in these contexts, it is commonly heard that some parties have "natural" candidates because they are not only their founders but also the sponsors who maintain the organization. Regardless of whether these candidates reach power and govern, I do not see why their organizations cannot be called parties. The exception would be whether such a venture is deployed to obtain private benefits. If the latter is the case, then it would fit within the proposed definition of faction.

is significantly reduced because there is an effective mechanism of party control over its leaders. Perhaps the most effective control mechanism is that the ruling party within the legislature could withdraw its support for its own prime minister. Likewise, considering the aspirations of party leaders, in a parliamentary system party identification is a fundamental factor in being nominated as a candidate as well as in attracting the votes of party supporters (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 47-48).

In contrast, in a system with separation of powers, especially a presidential one, political parties —as the principal— have less control over the actions that presidents carry out in office. Samuels and Shugart even point out the possibility of facing a moral hazard problem; that is, the candidate could deliberately hide his true intentions during the electoral process and only reveal them once elected to office. In this sense, it is entirely plausible to expect that a candidate who reaches the presidency may implement a different plan or even engage in the pursuit of private ambitions (adopting a factional behavior). Without a doubt, the fact that a candidate's survival in office does not formally depend on parliamentary majority makes such behavior perfectly viable (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 62-65).

In addition, according to Samuels and Shugart, an institutional design based on the separation of powers generates a greater incentive to select candidates weakly identified with the political party. Given that the presidency is the system's biggest prize —from there one can influence or define public policies, the cabinets and appoint key public offices— parties must imperatively obtain a higher proportion of votes. This imperative need encourages parties to accept candidates "without previous political track record" (outsiders) but with a significant electoral attractiveness, thus increasing the risk that once elected, or even on the campaign trail, they do not

completely respond to or reflect the party's original platform or political goals. The most forceful empirical evidence in this regard is the high number and pervasive presence of outsiders that the academic literature has identified, mainly in presidential systems (Barr, 2009; Carreras, 2015).

In sum, the institutional imperatives of the system of separation of powers diminish the party's ability to control the candidate and, at the same time, encourage the selection of candidates with an extra-partisan profile. Samuels and Shugart, following Madison, assume that due to this situation, it becomes quite challenging to find or cultivate leaders who voluntarily adjust to the collective interests of the political party; therefore, the alternative trend towards either the abuse of power within the party or the rapid decline of the party appear as highly probable results. However, if the leader's objective is not only to achieve personal goals but also to pursue the common good, some positive scenarios for the survival of the party may be considered. Thus, for example, a candidate with significant popularity —and one who is not so partisan— could trigger an internal transformation or reinvention of the party in ideological terms, thus ensuring its survival or adaptation to a new social context. That is, the behavior of the leader is undoubtedly more discretionary in a system with separation of powers; however, this feature is not necessarily harmful (or problematic) to democracy.

2.1.2.2 DILEMMAS DURING THE ELECTORAL COMPETITION

The divided structure of powers places political parties operating within this system in a situation that parties in parliamentary systems do not face: choosing between electoral strategies focused on the legislature or the presidency. The Neo-Madisonian theory assumes that parties will end up focusing on the presidential election. Not only because this represents the major prize, but

also because competing for the seats of Congress would place them in a secondary position within the political system or could even lead to their disappearance in the medium term. Additionally, I would argue that if a political party that has gained some seats in Congress renounces its role of influencing government policies, then this party is closer to being a faction to the extent that its only objective is to obtain public office.

Therefore, the preference for the presidential race over parliamentary elections forces the party to adopt decisions that end up "presidentializing" its internal organization and electoral strategy. Indeed, concerning the former, it is expected that most of the organizational resources (informational, economic, and human) will be utilized in competition for the presidency. This last preference is understandable because the voters in the constituency of the median party legislator differ substantially from the electorate necessary to win a direct presidential election. Likewise, regarding the electoral strategy, Samuels and Shugart consider that a candidate not totally identified with the party will force the adoption of a vote-seeking strategy, sacrificing thus part of the party's identity. The latter implies in practical terms that promotional or marketing activities during the electoral campaign will revolve mainly around the presidential candidate. This situation is rare in parliamentary systems where the party does not compete in separate elections, where it is not necessary to seek a strategy of maximizing votes, and where the central committees of parties are more likely to retain control over the campaign strategy (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 49-51).

In short, under a system of separation of powers, the electoral campaign reveals that party organizational branding is less important than the candidate's public image. Likewise, not only the party but also its congressional candidates play a subsidiary role during the electoral campaign. In

fact, the literature has identified a phenomenon called "coattail effects"[16] —which rarely emerge in parliamentary systems— that reveals the importance of presidential candidates on parliamentary elections, especially if they are concurrent. Therefore, owing to the crucial role that a presidential candidate plays during the electoral campaign, when he is not formally the party leader, he is perceived as the *de facto* leader of the organization. Because of the above reasons, perhaps Alcántara Sáez (2004) is correct when, in his analysis on the Latin American presidential systems, he characterizes political parties as ideological machines; that is, electoral organizations created as instruments for the political ambition of a leader —generally charismatic— or a group of leaders.

2.1.2.3 GOVERNMENT DILEMMAS

Due to organizational deployment and electoral behavior, once the candidate is elected as president, s/he faces a dilemma: respond to the extra-partisan electoral base forged during the electoral campaign or stick to the platform or positions of the party. In terms of the principal-agent theory, this situation emerges because the separation of origin adds another principal at the governmental level: citizens —or in other words the majority that voted for the candidate. Thus, the president in the policy-making process or the provision of public goods must choose between effectively responding to the demands of the citizen majority or the agenda of the political party. However, opting exclusively for the latter would not only undermine her/his legitimacy but would also affect her/his chances of competing again in the future (assuming that reelection is allowed). Likewise, taking account of the aforementioned distinction between party and faction, a

[16] The coattail effect is a term used to describe the impact that a popular or unpopular presidential candidate has on parliamentary candidates of his/her party in the same election (that is, this effect only appears when the presidential and parliamentary elections are held simultaneously).

government focused exclusively on the interests or demands of certain groups would be harmful to the legitimacy of the presidential institution since it would be perceived as excessively partisan (or factional).

On the other hand, the dynamics of the negotiations between political parties over the nature of public policies are different in presidential systems. Indeed, in parliamentary systems, because survival is mutually dependent, the party and its prime minister have strong incentives to cooperate or support each other. However, in presidential systems, the negotiation between the president, his party, and the other parties represented in Congress is quite complicated. Ultimately, the behavior that each actor adopts depends mainly on the powers that the Constitution grants to each institution. The tendency, since presidents enjoy great autonomous powers, is that presidents have significant governmental discretion, even going so far as to reverse the principal-agent relationship with his political party. The likelihood of this last assertion is higher if one adds the electoral calculation concerning the future; that is, due to coattail effects, the electoral destiny of the party (and its candidates for Congress) in the next elections depends mainly on presidential performance (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p. 52).

Additionally, the influence of the president on the policy process can also be observed in the formation of the ministerial cabinets. Indeed, because the president generally fulfills the role of cabinet *formateur* and his survival does not depend on a parliamentary majority, the cabinets under the separation of powers present two features: multiparty cabinets are a rarity, and they have a significant number of presidential cronies or independent technocrats. On the contrary, in parliamentary systems the cabinets tend to be entirely composed of party ministers and the multiparty cabinets are perfectly viable due to institutional design. Moreover, if a party does not

reach parliamentary majority, political parties must negotiate the formation of a multiparty cabinet, which could result-in the formation of a government led by a party that did not reach the majority of votes. For this reason, Samuels and Shugart, quoting Amorin Neto (2006), point out that the size of the coalition and the number of party ministers are hardly relevant variables for explaining aspects related to the governance of the presidential system: ministerial stability or legislative success (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 52-53).

In sum, the president's existential autonomy from parliament, as well as the power over the formation of ministerial cabinets, grant a wide margin to define government policy. Under such conditions, the president's tendency to develop direct links with citizens increases —that which O'Donell (1994) labelled as "delegative democracy"— thus reducing drastically the possibility of forging political organizations that are impersonal or disassociated from their presidential figures.

2.2 COULD PARTY PRESIDENTIALIZATION OCCUR IN SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM?[17]

By default, the opportunity structures of a presidential system correspond to a system of separation of powers; party presidentialization would be a natural process in such systems. But could Neo-Madisonian theory apply to semi-presidential systems as well? According to Samuels and Shugart, the fact that their constitutional designs consider the election of a president elected through popular vote considerably increases the possibilities of a party presidentialization process in semi-presidential systems. Indeed, they assume that "...given that presidents in both president-

[17] Premier-Presidential system and President-Parliamentary system.

parliamentary and premier-presidential systems enjoy substantial formal and informal political influence over the premier, the cabinet, and the assembly, party presidentialization should be substantial in all semi-presidential systems…" (2010, p. 46).

However, it should be noted that Samuels and Shugart also recognize that the only situation that prevents party presidentialization processes in semi-presidentialisms is the phenomenon known as "cohabitation." But due to the restrictive definition they have of said scenario, Samuels and Shugart affirm that it is relatively infrequent in the premier-presidential system and unknown in the president-parliamentary one. The empirical data confirm their conclusion; in fact, if definitionally cohabitation emerges only when (1) the president and prime minister are from opposing parties and (2) the president's party is not represented in the cabinet, this phenomenon would have occurred around 20% of the time in the premier-presidential type, but less than 1.5% in the president-parliamentary one[18] (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 44-45).

In short, for Samuels and Shugart, in both types of semi-presidentialism a process of party presidentialization will emerge. However, considering the variety of institutional designs that countries classified as semi-presidential possess —especially concerning presidential powers linked to the formation of governments—, my perspective assumes that in semi-presidentialism the party presidentialization process suffers significant variations in intensity and even changes in its orientation. Specifically, the interpretative approach could be summarized in the following statements:

[18] Under this definition, Sri Lanka (during the years 2004-2007) would be the only case of cohabitation in a president-parliamentary type system.

a) Although I accept that presidentialization could occur in both types of semi-presidentialism, I assume that in the premier-presidential type, it is less likely and intense than in the president-parliamentary one.

b) I propose that in the premier-presidential system, a tendency contrary to party presidentialization could potentially arise; that is, a party "parliamentarization" process.

That being said, the question arises: what factors explain the variants of party presidentialization processes? the hypothesis in this regard is that the different courses that this process takes results mainly from the combination of two factors: (a) the powers that parliament and president have to influence the formation of the governments, and (b) the correlation of political forces in the Assembly or parliament. Below, I explain in detail each of these factors and how they affect party presidentialization in semi-presidential systems.

2.2.1 REFLECTIONS ON FORMAL POWERS IN THE FORMATION OF MINISTERIAL CABINETS

It should be noted that Samuels and Shugart recognize the role that presidential powers could play in the process of party presidentialization. However, their approach has a couple of limitations: (a) it equates the formal powers with the informal powers of the president and (b) it does not include the formal powers that parliaments also have in defining governments. In fact, in their terms: "… presidents possess only informal, partisan authority to fire the prime minister in premier-presidential systems. In contrast, in president-parliamentary systems, presidents possess formal constitutional authority to dismiss the premier and/or the cabinet. Still, this means that both

subtypes provide opportunities for presidentialization of parties and the entire political system…" (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 30-31).

As indicated in the previous chapter, Samuels and Shugart distinguish sub-types of semi-presidentialism based on who (president or parliament) has the power to appoint or remove the ministerial cabinet (including the prime minister). However, when they reflect on the effects of semi-presidential designs on party behavior, they implicitly assume that in practice, presidents in both forms of government exert a similar influence over ministerial cabinets. But, is this plausible? First, it is quite complicated to assume that an "informal" power is as effective as a "formal" one; besides that, however, the premise of Samuels and Shugart is incomplete as it does not consider the power of dismissal that parliaments possess in semi-presidential systems. Therefore, there is no doubt that the presidential power of dismissal is quite useful as a criterion for distinguishing between the two types of semi-presidentialism: president-parliamentary and premier-presidential. But, if the goal is to analyze the dynamics of the formation of ministerial cabinets in both forms of government, it is convenient to examine the formal powers that both agents (president and parliament) could use to impose their wills on the nomination of the prime minister and the ministers.

In an earlier book, Shugart and Carey (1992) offered a thought-provoking reflection on the role that formal powers play in shaping governments in semi-presidential systems. One of the most striking conclusions of their analysis about the "appointment-dismissal" game —as they call it—is that the power of dismissal is just as mighty as the power of appointment. An excellent way to confirm that these powers have a similar relevance is to consider a situation where the president's party does not control the parliament. Thus, for example, in a premier-presidential system like the

French one, a president like Mitterrand decides to nominate Jacques Chirac, the leader of the most significant opposition in parliament, since parliament has the power to censure the ministerial cabinet. It would be useless for the president to nominate or appoint a cabinet that does not have the approval of Congress because its members could be removed from office once designated. Of course, the scenario would change radically if the president's party had control of the Legislative Power, because in that case, the French president, without having the formal power to remove the prime minister, could indirectly force him to leave office (Siaroff, 2003, p. 293).

In turn, in the president-parliamentary system, because both agents (president and parliament) have the power to dismiss the prime minister —or members of the cabinet —the scenarios that emerge are more complex and depend on other established rules. Indeed, in a situation where the president's party does not have control of Congress, the power of appointment possessed exclusively by the president could be advantageous. However, in practice, without an arrangement or nomination that satisfies both agents, the formation or stability of the ministerial cabinet would be unfeasible since a vicious circle of appointment-dismissal would emerge. This last scenario confirms that both power of dissolution and of appointment have a similar relevance. Therefore, to avoid a situation of mutual annulment —known in the literature as "deadlocks"—, president-parliamentary designs generally contemplate solution mechanisms based on the granting of certain "additional powers" that would provide a slight systemic advantage to either the president or parliament.

An excellent example of how certain institutional variations benefit the parliament would be the Austrian case. Samuels and Shugart classify this country as president-parliamentary because presidents have the power to discretionally remove the prime minister (chancellor) or the entire

cabinet.[19] Thus, in theory, the president would have some advantage over parliament in the formation of the Executive. However, the dynamics of government formation are more complicated if one considers that Congress has a more advantageous dissolution power than that of the president. Indeed, while the National Council —as parliament is called in Austria— can remove the entire cabinet or a member of the cabinet at any time, the president cannot dismiss cabinet members individually because if he wishes to do it, he needs to get the consent of the chancellor. In this way, the formal design gives the chancellor a slight advantage if he has the support of the majority in parliament. Perhaps this unique combination of powers explains why Austrian presidents follow a convention or unwritten rule when it comes to forming the government: they appoint as chancellor the leader who represents the majority force in parliament, and under his advice, they nominate the rest of cabinet members. Thus, in a situation where the president's party controls the National Council, the parliament's power of dismissal becomes innocuous because it is taken for granted that parliament will support the president's will. However, if a different or opposing majority controls the National Council, the unwritten rule avoids the possibility of triggering a vicious cycle of successive appointments and dismissals.

In turn, a good illustration of a design that gives the president a slight formal advantage over Congress would be the case of Peru. In that country, the Constitution provides the president with the power to dissolve Congress —and call new legislative elections— if it censures twice or denies confidence to the prime minister —and through him to the entire cabinet. In other words, in theory, the president has a slight advantage over Congress. However, because Congress can formally censure other members of the ministerial cabinet an unlimited number of times, a

[19] See countries' list in the Appendix 1.

parliament controlled by political forces hostile to the president could choose to constantly undermine the stability or legitimacy of the ministerial cabinet, by dismissing its individual members one at a time.

On the other hand, the Peruvian case allows a deeper examination of the role that dismissal power of parliament could play in the formation of governments. A good starting point in this respect is to recognize —following Shugart and Carey— that this power is unknown in the presidential system since it is a flagrant violation of the Madisonian axiom on the separation of powers. Therefore, this power is expected to be an exclusive feature of parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. However, the constitutions that consider this power are a minority, and, in all cases, its execution is conditional on a specific event or the consent of other agents (such as the prime minister or the heads of parliament).

Thus, for example, apart from the Peruvian model, among the semi-presidential countries that require a specific event to occur one finds the case of Poland, where the president can only dissolve parliament if it has previously denied the proposed government budget. Similarly, one can mention the Romanian case, where the president can dissolve parliament if the Congress has refused to accept two candidates proposed by the president to be prime minister. In turn, concerning the countries where the dissolution of parliament is not conditioned to a specific event, it must be noted that the execution of said power does not depend entirely on the will of the president. Thus, for example, in France, the president can dissolve parliament only after consulting the prime minister and the presidents of both parliamentary houses. The Austrian constitution is similar in that it states that the president may dissolve the National Council prematurely upon a proposal by

the Federal Government, which is composed of the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, and the ministers.

In sum, it could be affirmed that, regardless of the conditions established to dissolve parliament, this is a "latent" or reserve power. In other words, presidents generally only "threaten" to use it to overcome an extreme situation promoted by a hostile Congress. The interesting thing about this power is that some authors have considered that it would be more effective when the constitution indicates that its execution depends on the judgment of the president (Austria or France). However, if the extremely high political cost of executing it is considered, it is more advantageous for the president to justify the dissolution as a response to an action by parliament than it is to base his decision on personal judgment. The reason being that, depending on specific political situations, the citizenry could perceive the dissolution as an arbitrary act. A good illustration of the political risk of executing this measure without valid justification would be the dissolution of the French National Assembly by Jacques Chirac in 1997. In this case, benefiting from his high popularity, Chirac decided to dissolve parliament to advance legislative elections, to regain a parliamentary majority, and thus to increase his own party’s power in government. However, the French electoral results of that year not only granted the first majority to the Socialist Party but also made viable the formation of a government without the participation of Jacques Chirac's party.

In other words, presidents will be more prone to "threaten" to use their power to dissolve parliament, but they will avoid doing so at all costs. Likewise, it is more likely that this "threat to do so" will be more recurrent in cases where the constitutions indicate a specific cause than in those where its execution depends on the judgment of the president. Maybe these identified tendencies

could explain why since the beginning of the Second Austrian Republic, no president has used this prerogative. However, it should be noted that the Austrian case is unique since the National Council can also, through simple majority, decree its self-dissolution. Thus, in practice, since both congress and president can force early elections, their execution would be permanently blocked.

Finally, in Shugart and Carey's analysis of the appointment-dismissal game, they identify another typical power of semi-presidential parliaments: the approval or disapproval of the ministerial cabinet. In this regard, they conclude that the relevance of said power would be less than the power to initiate the formation of the ministerial cabinet (the authority to appoint). Their argument focuses on the negative or "reactive" nature of this power since, in practice, it is reduced to merely approving or "giving confidence" to a previously designated cabinet (Shugart and Carey, 1992, p. 107). Additionally, as in the case of the previous powers, an alternative way to explore its relevance is to consider the scenarios that could emerge in semi-presidential systems. In this way, when the president's party controls parliament, this power becomes innocuous since the approval —or the vote of confidence— would be a mere act of formalism. Likewise, in a scenario where the president's party does not have a majority, this negative power would take on some relevance given that the president must consider nominating a government that has the consent of the parliamentary majority in order to avoid a confrontational scenario. But Congress's influence will always be indirect, and its effectiveness will depend on other conditions.

In sum, there is no doubt that the president's power of dismissal plays a crucial role in the party presidentialization process. However, to identify the various directions or variants that said process could adopt, it is necessary to consider the degree of systemic influence that the other agent, parliament, could exercise. Thus, one way to identify the variations of party presidentialization is

to analyze the relative importance that both the powers of Congress and the president have in a critical phase of the system: the appointment of the prime minister and members of the cabinet. Precisely, Shugart and Carey proposed a scheme that provides a rough indicator of the level of influence that the presidency would have in semi-presidentialism. My interpretation is that the better positioned the presidential figure is in the formation of the ministerial cabinet, the higher the systemic incentives towards party presidentialization will be. The following paragraphs describe this scheme's application to three emblematic semi-presidentialism systems: Peru, Austria, and France.

Table 2.1
A Schematization of the Appointment-Dismissal Game

					Original Indicator	**Additional Proposed Indicator**
Case	**President**		**Assembly**		**Total**	**Total /Absolute Value/**
	Nominate	**Dismiss**	**Confirm/ Approval**	**Dismiss**		
Peru	2	2	-1	-2	1	7
France	2	0	-1	-2	-1	5
Austria	1*	1**	-1	-2	-1	5
					President's Party < Parliament	**President's Party > Parliament**

Source: Author, based on Shugart and Carey (1992).
* Although the president has the formal authority to appoint, he is not granted with two points because he informally opts to form the cabinet with the advice of the leader of the parliamentary majority.
** One point is awarded to the president because, compared to parliament, his power is limited: he cannot remove individual members of the ministerial cabinet.

Considering that the values do not quantify the real weight of the formal powers but only relative positions among the selected cases, one could conclude that in the Peruvian case —due to the final score favoring presidency (+1)— there would be a systemic incentive for a presidentialization process (as can be seen in the "Original Indicator" column of the table 2.1). Similarly, the results of France and Austria suggest a disadvantageous position of the presidential

figure, so in both cases, there would be a trend contrary to party presidentialization (-1). These results fit perfectly with the Austrian case, but they do not fit the French one, where the president usually plays a predominant role.

Thus, one might ask: what is the downside of this schematization? The issue is that Shugart and Carey's original proposal only represents a situation where both the president and parliament compete to impose their wills (that's why the values are positive and negative). However, there is another logical yet not assessed scenario: a president whose party controls parliament. But how could this scenario be included in that schematization? I propose that the absolute value of all the powers (either of the president or Congress) are an approximate indicator of such an alternative scenario (as you can see in the "Additional Proposed Indicator" column of the table 2.1). The argument behind our indicator is simple: when the president's party achieves a parliamentary majority, the powers of parliament will potentially respond to the presidential will, especially when s/he is the *de facto* leader of the party.

In that way, the results of the schematization are better adjusted to what happens in each of the selected cases. Thus, for example, if the French scenario is analyzed, it can be verified that when the president's party controls parliament, the president effectively becomes predominant (+5). Even as I noted before, relying on a parliamentary majority, the president could take actions up to and including the dismissal of the prime minister. On the contrary, when the opposition controls parliament, this situation reflects precisely the phenomenon known as cohabitation, in which the parliamentary majority imposes its will, and the French president is marginalized from all government matters (-1). In this last scenario, party presidentialization is reverted or prevented, while in the previous one, the institutional conditions favor such process.

Similarly, in the Austrian case, a president with a parliamentary majority would be expected to take on a more significant role (+5). However, it is not possible to corroborate this empirically since the concrete experience in that country has been that different political forces control the presidency and the parliament, which in the medium term would have consolidated a contrary process one could call "party parliamentarization." Finally, the Peruvian case reflects different trends than the French or Austrian cases, but these align very well with reality: the presidential figure acquires a much higher relevance when his party gains control of parliament, which implies an increase in the intensity of its party presidentialization process.

In closing, Samuels and Shugart's conclusion that party presidentialization emerges substantially in semi-presidentialism does not fully reflect reality. Indeed, my analysis suggests that it is possible to identify various scenarios that boost or limit party presidentialization in semi-presidentialism. Likewise, I have argued that the different courses that this process adopts vary according to the president's levels of influence on the formation of the ministerial cabinet. In the same way, I have shown that the significance of the presidential figure is not only a function of the formal powers but also of the composition of parliament. Therefore, having identified how the balance of formal powers and the results of legislative elections condition the party presidentialization process, I can now analyze in detail the prevailing trends in each type of semi-presidentialism: president-parliamentary and premier-presidential.

2.2.2 VARIANTS OF PARTY PRESIDENTIALIZATION IN THE PREMIER-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM

In the case of the premier-presidential system, a president with a parliamentary majority, in spite of lacking the formal authority to dismiss the prime minister —or cabinet members— will enjoy a wide margin to maneuver. In this scenario, party presidentialization will be pronounced, especially when the president is the leader (formal or de facto) of the party or alliance that has the majority in parliament. An example of the situation described is France during the years of 2007-2012 when Nicolás Sarkozy not only maintained the formal leadership of the Union for a Popular Movement during his entire period of government but also, through his Prime Minister François Fillon, exerted a significant influence on the government. Likewise, as already pointed out, although the French president does not have unilateral power to remove a prime minister, he can not only choose a prime minister but also replace him when he wishes as long as he has an allied legislative majority (Siaroff, 2003, p. 293). In this sense, if this situation were to become frequent, this country would present not only presidentialized parties but a pattern of inter-party interaction closer to what occurs in a pure presidential system.

In contrast, when the president's party or party coalition does not reach a majority of Congress' seats, two sub-scenarios arise depending on the position of the political parties that control parliament. If the party or coalition that controls the parliament is only different than, but not opposed to the president's party, the most likely result will be a minority or a coalition government. The likelihood of one type of government over another will depend mainly on the number of seats that the president's party obtains in parliament. Similarly, the influence of the president on the formation of government will be stronger if the president's party is a significant

partner in the ruling coalition. However, if his political party is a junior member of said coalition, the influence of the president will be significantly diminished.

An illustrative case of a president with minimal influence on the government is Romania between 2004-2007. In those years, Traian Băsescu, the leader of the Democratic Party (DP), won the presidency, but his electoral alliance (Justice and Truth Alliance) did not obtain a majority in parliament. Also, one of his electoral allies, the National Liberal Party (NLP), earned a higher number of seats in both houses than the DP. Thus, the logical result of this confluence of forces was the appointment of Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, vice-president of the NLP, as prime minister. In this context, the president's influence on the government is indirect since it occurs only through party ministers who are part of the cabinet or his political group in parliament. Consequently, I can state that when the president's party acquires a significant percentage of seats in parliament, a moderate level of presidentialization is expected, as legislative negotiations broadly define the formation of governments. However, when the president's party is a minor partner in the government coalition, the intensity of party presidentialization drops to a medium-low level, as the president's influence over the government is indirect or limited.

On the other hand, a second sub-scenario emerges when the major party or coalition at parliament is not only different but also opposes the president. In this case, the inevitable result is the formation of a government without the participation of the president's party. However, it should be noted that the origin of this context could be an electoral process or a parliamentary re-negotiation. Romania again offered an example of the latter option when, in April 2007 —after parliament suspended the president— prime minister Popescu-Tăriceanu dismissed all the ministers of the president's party (DP) and formed a minority government with the Democratic

Union of Hungarians and other minor political parties. Likewise, the phenomenon known as *cohabitation* perfectly represents this scenario where, due to electoral results, control of the parliament is in the hands of a political force opposed to the president's party. In this case, the role of the president and his party in the formation of governments is completely nullified. The examples of Poland (1997-2001), Lithuania (1996-1998) or France (1997-2002) demonstrate how the prime minister in this scenario becomes a central actor in shaping the government and public policies, and the popularly elected president is turned into an almost decorative figure.

Table 2.2
Variants of Party Presidentialization in the Premier-Presidential System

Composition of Parliament	**Level of Presidential Figure's Relevance**	**Level of Party Presidentialization**	**Sample**
The president's party has a majority in Congress.	The system could function similarly to pure presidentialism, especially if the president is both the president and de facto leader of the majority party (mostly majority governments).	High	France (2007 2012) or Poland (2001-2004)
The president's party does not have a majority in Congress.	If Executive and Legislative are under the control of different political parties, then presidential powers allow for influence on the cabinet's formation. This could produce a coalition or a minority government, depending on the size of the president's party in the parliament.	Medium or Low	Romania (2004-2007)
	If Executive and Legislative are under the control of opposing political parties, then so-called cohabitation is likely to occur. The system operates, similarly to a pure parliamentary system.	Annulled (possible emergence of a **contrary** process)	Poland (1997-2001) or France (1997-2002)

Source: Author.

In sum, if a different or opposing political force to the president controls parliament, the system operates similarly to a parliamentary system. Likewise, given that this scenario could emerge after an electoral process, the probability that it will occur continuously is latent. So, if this

situation does happen frequently, political parties could adjust their expectations, giving greater importance to legislative elections and party interaction in parliaments. If the latter occurs, not only would the systemic incentives for party presidentialization be nullified, but certain stimuli towards party parliamentarization could emerge.

2.2.3 VARIANTS OF PARTY PRESIDENTIALIZATION IN THE PRESIDENT-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

In the case of the president-parliamentary system, if the party achieves a parliamentary majority, then the president's influence on the formation of government and public policy processes increases. The cases of Mozambique (1994-2019) or Senegal (2001-2019) reveal that-consecutive electoral results in favor of the president and his party consolidate the presidency as the system's top prize. In practice, because the president has the power to appoint and dismiss the ministerial cabinet, the system is neatly presidential. In this sense, all signs indicate that in the medium term political parties will be "presidentialized."

However, when the president's party does not have the parliamentary majority, a couple of different sub-scenarios emerge. The first of them arises when political forces that oppose (party or a coalition) the president control parliament. In this case, due to the president’s formal powers, the appointment of a prime minister or a cabinet without the concurrence of the president's party is quite rare. The likely outcome is a "deadlock" state, which can be resolved through an institutional mechanism (the presidential vacancy or the dissolution of parliament) or, in the worst scenario, a democratic breakdown.

Peru offers an excellent recent illustration of the institutional resolution of such situation. After the general elections in 2016, the party of the elected president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski did not obtain a parliamentary majority. Congress was under the absolute control of Popular Force, whose leader had disputed the presidency in a runoff with Kuczynski. In the following two years, the Peruvian president tried to build a relative majority to make some government measures viable; however, his efforts were futile. On March 20, 2018, Kuczynski resigned from the presidency in order to avoid a second presidential impeachment. His successor, Vice President Martin Vizcarra, was named President of the Republic, but disputes with Popular Force over government control quickly emerged. Vizcarra, who lacked the support of a parliamentary group, was faced with the conditions necessary to exercise his right to dissolve Congress, which effectively happened in September 2019.

In turn, the second sub-scenario occurs when the party or the coalition controlling parliament is only different but not opposed to the president's party. In this case, due to the formal power of the president to appoint and dismiss the prime minister —and the members of the cabinet— he can still significantly influence the formation of cabinets. Most likely, certain alliances will be formed in parliament, which could be ad hoc —based only on ideological affinity or the exchange of "perks"— or of a more permanent character. In the latter case, the most probable outcome would be the nomination of some leaders, sympathizers, or members of these other parties as cabinet ministers. Even if the president's party possesses a small caucus in parliament, he could still negotiate with the other parties on the formation of the government; this also means that the other parties could achieve a stronger presence in the cabinets or other significant public offices. Therefore, due to the central role that the presidency plays in cabinet formation and parliamentary

alliances, the nature of the system in practice provides incentives for the emergence of presidentialized parties.

Table 2.3
Variants of Party Presidentialization in the President-Parliamentary System

Parliamentary Composition	Resulting Institutional Configuration	Level of Party Presidentialization	Samples
The president's political party obtains a majority in Congress	The system operates in practice as a pure presidentialism as the president exerts full influence on the cabinet. Especially, whether the president is both the president and de facto leader of the majority party.	High	Mozambique (1994-2019) Senegal (2001-2019)
The president's party does not obtain a majority in Congress	If Executive and Legislative are under the control of different but not opposing political parties, the president —due to his formal powers— could take control over or at least influence the formation of the cabinets by creating alliances in parliament.	High	Peru (2001-2006)
	If Executive and Legislative are under the control of opposing political parties, presidential powers trigger the confrontation. The result is a phenomenon called "deadlock." This situation could be resolved by institutional mechanisms or the breakdown of democratic institutions.	Not applicable	- Call for new legislative elections: Peru (2016-2018). - Breakdown of democratic institutions, for instance: *"autogolpe."*

Source: Author.

2.3 INCORPORATING THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES INTO STRUCTURES OF PARTY COMPETITION

Chapter 1 concluded by pointing out the different advantages of Mair's perspective on the institutionalization of party systems. Likewise, the previous section explained how semi-presidential forms of government affect the nature, organization, and behavior of political parties.

However, is it possible to find certain connections or affinities between Mair's perspective and the Neo-Madisonian theory? The approach of this research not only assumes that such integration is possible, but also that their conjunction constitutes a valuable and thought-provoking theoretical framework precisely for the analysis of a topic that is rarely addressed in the specialized literature: how different forms of government —in this research, semi-presidentialism— affect the nature of party systems. In the following three sections, I describe this analytical framework in detail. I begin by offering a couple of reasons that justify the convergence between Mair's theoretical perspectives and that of Shugart and Carey. Then, in the second section, I propose a theoretical model that interprets the effects of forms of government on the structures of party competition. Finally, in the third and last section, I describe the operational level of my analytical framework; that is, I explicitly outline its hypotheses, variables, indicators, and cases.

2.3.1 THE POINT OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY STRUCTURES: THE GOVERNMENT ARENA

Mair's theoretical approach to the concept of party systems is limited in part by the Sartorian classical perspective. Sartori draws a line between political parties as units of the system, and the party system as the set of interactions regularly conducted between these units. The Sartorian definition, as well as its typology of party systems —based on their number and ideological distances— became predominant in Political Science. However, as Sartori himself pointed out, the application of this typology was only viable in a system whose interactions were stable over time

(successive elections). Thus, the usefulness of their approach was reserved only for "structurally consolidated party systems," as Sartori himself described them (Sartori, 2005, p. 111).[20]

From a general point of view, it could be said that Mair takes up Sartori's classic distinction between parties and party system, but he departs from it —as well as from other later theoretical traditions— on two key points. The first of these is Mair's preference for the governmental arena —and not the electoral arena— as the dimension where the nature of party systems is defined. Likewise, the second point is his proposal to characterize party systems based on the degree of closure of their structures of competition. Thus, under Mair's perspective, a party system has an open structure when the set of party interactions (opposing, cooperating, allying, etc.) are expressed erratically during political competition, and especially at the time of constituting working governments. Conversely, it could be said that a closed structure of competition has a certain degree of predictability as a central feature, especially in the formation or definition of governments. The latter would be perfectly logical if it is assumed that the behavior of parties towards other parties (for example: to associate or oppose) and towards their constituents or sympathizers (policy proposals) is consistent over time (Mair, 2001, p. 39).

Having explained Mair's approach in general terms, I consider that it is viable to establish a degree of convergence between Mair's perspective and the central axioms of the Neo-Madisonian theory to the extent that the governmental arena is the axis of Mair's analytical proposal.

[20] Sartori also refers to fluid political communities but warns that these would be a different scenario and adds that their typology could hardly be applied to these cases. In this sense, although the literature has established an equivalence between Sartori's structurally consolidated system and the institutionalized party system of Mainwaring and Scully, the same could hardly be done in the case of the fluid communities and the weakly institutionalized system proposed by these last two authors. Regarding fluid political communities and their quasi- parties, read Sartori (2005, pp. 217-242).

Specifically, we claim that such affinity is reasonably feasible, primarily for two reasons. The first of them is that both perspectives agree that the climax of political competition is to control the government. Indeed, while for Samuels and Shugart coming to power (ruling) is one of the central factors explaining party behavior, for Mair, the way that government is defined reveals precisely the nature of party interactions. The second reason would be that at a theoretical level, it is possible to assume that the set of party interactions —that is, the so-called party system— can ultimately be interpreted as the behavior that parties develop towards their peers. Thus, if Samuel and Shugart's analysis explains how forms of government constrain or incentivize the conduct of political parties to some extent, it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that party interactions during the period of government formation also depend on the incentives derived from such forms of government.

2.3.2 FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND STRUCTURES OF COMPETITION: A MODEL OF INTERPRETATION

Given the affinity between both analytical frameworks, it is convenient to point out a couple of considerations before proposing a theoretical model that combines both. The first of them refers to the empirical and theoretical meanings of the "categories" or levels of institutionalization or closure of a given party system. In turn, the second deals with one of the crucial criticisms of Mair's approach. Regarding the first point, in its original version, Mair stated that the competition structures could be classified as "open" or "closed." However, he and other authors later raised the possibility of conceiving "levels of closure" of competition structures. In this sense, considering Mainwaring and Scully's approach, one could establish an equivalence between the "levels of closure" with the "levels of institutionalization" of party systems. However, although this equivalence seems reasonable, where would the "inchoate system" or "an open structure" be

located? Also, as I indicated in Chapter 1, there are recent theoretical developments that have proposed other categories regarding party systems, such as ossified systems or over-institutionalized systems. Regarding these latter categories, the same question arises: to what empirical situations could these apply?

Due to the debate about these existing categories in the literature, it is convenient to specify the limits of the theoretical approach of this research. First, I opt to classify structures of competition according to "closure levels" (continuous variable). Second, regarding the maximum or minimum levels of closure, a situation characterized by the absence of some "level of closure" for an extended period (lack of "systemness"), would reflect what Sánchez (2009) has called political organizations without a system. In turn, concerning maximum values, the situation is more complicated because there are various "categories" proposed in the literature. Following Mair, a completely "closed" system would be equivalent to one characterized by the non-alternation in government, the absence of new political parties, and the non-existence of new government formulas. This scenario would not be problematic per se. However, if it becomes constant, it would be a divergent scenario not only from the democratic canon but also from the original concept of institutionalization (adaptability/stability). In other words, at a theoretical level, I would hardly assume that staying continuously at the maximum level of closure (or institutionalization) is an ideal situation.

Perhaps due to the reasons above, studies based on the theory of the institutionalization of party systems have identified other features of political competition to characterize undesired situations (ossified or over-institutionalized systems). Thus, for example, Sanches considers that the voter turnout and the Freedom index's scores indicate whether a "high institutionalization" has

reached a non-ideal level (2018, p. 43). In the same way, Piñeiro and Rosenblat (2019, p. 255), in their characterizing of "ossified systems," apart from the voter turnout, use other features such as the existence of restrictions on the formation of new parties. Likewise, it is worth remembering that Mair and Katz (2009) consider too this last feature as a typical situation of their “cartel party."

In sum, because there is an open debate about the empirical implications of a "no-system" or a system with a maximum level of institutionalization or closure, the theoretical approach assumes that these are pernicious or inadequate only if they have become "constant". That is, as a third observation, in theory, my approach accepts that reaching the ends of that continuum (see Table 2.4) temporarily or circumstantially is not necessarily negative.

Table 2.4
Types of Structures of Competition and / or Party Systems

<table>
<tr><th>Continuum</th><th>Zero</th><th colspan="2">----------Medium----------></th><th>Maximum</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Proposed Categories</td><td rowspan="3">“Remain Constant”

No-System (Sanchez, 2009)</td><td colspan="2">Levels of Party Institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995)</td><td rowspan="3">“Remain Constant”

Ossified Party System (Piñeiro and Rosenbalt, 2018)?

Over-Institutionalized System (Sanches, 2018)?

Cartelized Party System (Katz and Mair, 2009)?</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Levels of Closure (Casal-Báertoa and Enyedi, 2016)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Inchoate System? (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006)

Open Structure? (Mair, 1996)</td><td></td></tr>
</table>

Source: Author.

Finally, equivalence could be established between the inchoate system and an open structure as long as both possess a minimum level of systemness. Thus, if both reflect situations where the pattern of party interaction is emerging or taking hold, they would be outside the "zero" zone. If so, then it would be entirely feasible to describe such a scenario using the sorting based on "levels." In other words, the inchoate system or the open system would be situations characterized by low or minimal levels of institutionalization or closure. For this reason, as a fourth clarification, my theoretical approach avoids referencing an "open system," to the extent that it is included in the continuous variable: closure levels.

On the other hand, regarding the criticisms of Mair's perspective, the most widespread one revolves around his preference for the governmental arena to characterize structures of competition. Thus, in recent work responding to Mair's approach Mainwaring has pointed out that ultimately the electoral arena is more important because it defines which parties take part in governments (2018, pp. 19-20). Since it is not my intention to go deeper into this debate, I include the parliamentary arena as a complementary dimension of the analysis focused on the "governmental arena." In this sense, the effective number of parties in parliament (ENPP) is included in the theoretical model. However, is it possible to establish a relationship between the number of parties and the level of closure? Fortunately, it is entirely feasible to establish an interaction between both variables since the literature has argued that the degree of parliamentary fragmentation complicates political processes, including the formation of a government (Mainwaring, 1993). Moreover, as Samuel and Shugart (2010) have pointed out, there is also evidence about the effect of forms of government (specifically systems based on the separation of powers) on the number of parties, which is compatible with the objectives of the present investigation. In sum, the theoretical model of this research establishes consistent relationships between the effective number of parties, the

levels of closure of structures, forms of government and the tendencies of party presidentialization. The fundamental axioms that underpin this model of interpretation are explained in detail below.

In the first place, the model assumes that pure forms of government generate a tendency in the structures of party competition towards high or low values in the continuum variable: levels of closure. Specifically, the institutional incentives of the parliamentary systems promote, in the medium-term, a set of party interaction highly institutionalized (high values) and a lesser number of effective parties. On the contrary, under presidential systems, institutional design induces, in the medium term, party behaviors that configure a pattern of interactions lesser institutionalized and a higher number of effective parties.



Figure 2.1: The Orientation of Institutional Incentives According to Forms of Government*
Source: Author.
*PRE: Presidential, PAR: Parliamentary, P-PRE: Premier-Presidential, P-PAR: President-Parliamentary
← → = Identified Course of Party Presidentialization

Secondly, regarding semi-presidentialism, I claim that president-parliamentary systems — with an even higher intensity than the presidential system— encourage a less closed pattern of party interaction; while in the premier-presidential system, institutional incentives promote trends or impulses both above (high values) and below (low values) in the line of levels of closure. Indeed, because incentives of party behavior may vary periodically depending on election results (or parliamentary re-negotiations), the course of the tendency will depend on the frequency with which the parties win or lose a parliamentary majority. In other words, if the elected president's party frequently wins a majority in Congress, then there could be a prevailing trend toward lower levels of closure. However, if the opposite is more prevalent then the predominant tendency will be towards higher levels of closure. However, since the form of government encompasses both possibilities, I can conclude that the intensity of the trends will be lower than it is for the other systems of government. This is mainly attributable to the calculations of the political leaders defining party behaviors, given that they will always weigh the two feasible options offered by the constitutional design of the premier-presidential system.

2.3.3 STRUCTURES OF COMPETITION IN SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS: HYPOTHESES, VARIABLES, AND INDICATORS

The axioms of the model of interpretation referring to the semi-presidential forms of government could easily become the general hypothesis of the present research. In this way, my main objective is to corroborate whether the structures of competition of semi-presidential systems move in the direction expected by the model of interpretation. Thus, and considering the reflections of the previous sections, the specific hypotheses of this research are stated in the following terms:

H1: *The institutional incentives derived from the premier-presidential form of government promote either a party presidentialization process or a process contrary to it. Thus, in the medium term, the structures of competition of the premier-presidential form of government sometimes tend towards high levels of closure, and others tend towards low levels of closure. The hegemonic tendency will depend on who controls the parliament. If "cohabitation" continuously surges, then the structures will tend to be more closed. Conversely, if the president's party repeatedly controls parliament, then the structures will tend to be less closed.*

H2: *The institutional incentives derived from the president-parliamentary form of government promote an intense party presidentialization process. Thus, in the medium term, the structures of competition of the president-parliamentary form of government tend towards low levels of closure, regardless of who controls the parliament. However, if a hostile opposition to the president controls Congress, the result will not be a tendency towards closed structures, but it would be the Congress's dissolution or a democratic breakdown.*

Having presented the hypotheses that will guide this investigation, the following explains how the variables are operationalized. First, regarding the variable "structures of competition," as it was indicated in the previous section, because the proposed theoretical model foresees situations of lower or higher levels of closure, I will consider this variable as continuous. However, how are the degrees or levels of closure measured? Considering that there are different ways of measuring the level of closure in the literature, in the present research, I take as a reference the proposal of Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi (2016, pp. 268-270) because of two fundamental reasons. The first reason

is that these authors offer indicators that measure each of the components that Mair originally proposed to analyze a structure of competition. Likewise, the second cause is that the proposal of Fernando Casal-Bértoa and Zsolt Enyedi is the only one that allows us to build an aggregate index of closure (IC) of a given structure of competition.

That being said, it is now indispensable to detail some aspects of this IC proposed by Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi, as well as some of its limitations. Regarding the first point, a crucial aspect is to define when "a new government is formed." Traditionally, studies have established that such an event happens when there is: (a) a change in the partisan composition of the government coalition, (b) a change of the head of government, or (c) new elections (Muller and Strom, 2000). However, Mair —one of my main theoretical references— considers that a government changes only when its party composition is altered. Between these two options, the present investigation adopts the intermediate position of Casal-Bértoa and Eneydi (2016), who consider both the new elections and the change in the partisan composition of the government as events that define a change of government. The inclusion of elections is reasonable whether or not they areconsidered events of high political relevance since society can maintain or innovate old government patterns thanks to them. In this sense, as Casal-Bértoa and Eneydi rightly point out, if the former pattern is maintained, it is noticeable since it reflects a feature of the competition structure (closed). Conversely, a change of prime minister, without an election or a coalition breakup, is only a rearrangement of charges within the ruling coalition (or party) decided by a small group of politicians (2016, p. 268).

Additionally, by including the elections, the cases where there was no alternation in government are considered in the measurement, thus correcting the current literature's bias that ignores said scenario. Indeed, it should be recalled that a closed structure is not only one where a

wholesale alternation occurs, but also where there is no alternation. Obviously, this conception demands a transformation in the traditional measurement, as I will see later. Lastly, Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi (2016) also draw attention to the need to incorporate the duration of governments in the index of closure. For them, the tendency in the literature to only average the scores of successive governments to characterize time-spans suppresses the effect of time on the pattern of party competition. As a way of taking the governments' duration into account, a couple of paths are suggested:

a) Multiplying the IC's score of a new government formed (after of a new election or a change in the partisan composition of the government coalition) by the number of years that said government lasted.
b) Only it be calculated the IC the years where occur a new government is formed. In those years when there are not governmental changes the score will be 100.

The advantage of these two ways is that if the average IC score is calculated for a given period, the weight of the time will be included in the final score. In this research, I shall calculate the Index of Closure (IC) following path (b) which is the option that Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi (2016) has used in their work. However, how exactly is the Index of Closure calculated? A detailed explanation of how each ICs component proposed by Mair has been measured is offered below.

a) Alternation in government

Traditionally this component has been measured through the index of ministerial volatility (IVM) which is based on the Pedersen's formula proposed to measure electoral volatility. The issue

with this formula is that it does not capture in the same way the two typical scenarios of a closed structure: wholesale alternation and non-alternation. It is to say; the original IVM measures the ministerial volatility very well when it approaches the complete alternation (100). However, it mistakenly captures the direction of ministerial volatility when it approaches zero. Let me explain, suppose a case where a minimal variation occurs (example: 5% or 10%), according to the original IVM the score would be quite far from the ideal score of a closed structure: 100, which would be incorrect theoretically. Therefore, to correct this bias, I follow the criteria suggested by Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi:

a) If the original IVM value is greater than 50, the IVM is the same value.

b) If the original IVM value is less than 50, the final IVM is the original IVM minus 100.

Finally, it should be noted that the values of the transformed IVM fluctuate between 50 and 100. In this sense, values close to 100 reflect a closed structure, while those close to 50 indicate an open structure. The latter fits very well with Mair's theoretical expectations on closed and open structures of competition.

b) Government formula

The measurement of this component follows the criteria proposed by Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi. If the same combination of parties has been a government in the past, its value is 100. Conversely, if the new government (or cabinet) is a governmental formula that has never been in power, its value is 0. Likewise, if the new government partially replicates a combination of parties

that ruled in the past, the percentage of ministers belonging to that "familiar formula" is the final score. Finally, if I am dealing with a "single government," the following rules apply:

a) If the party has never governed before, its value is 0.

b) If the party was part of a former coalition, the percentage of ministers of its former partner must be subtracted from 100.

Moreover, in all cases, the contrast or comparison must be made with the most recent government formulas. Finally, as can be observed, the values keep the same logic as in the previous case; that is, high scores correspond to a higher level of closure of structures of competition.

c) Access to government

Theoretically, this component reveals the possibility with which new parties could be part of a government (or cabinet) or lead it. To maintain the logic of the previous components (high values indicate closed structures), Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi propose as indicator the reversed percentage of ministers belonging to parties that have never been government. In other words, the indicator is the percentage of ministers belonging to old governing parties. However, one of its limitations would be that it does not ponder the entrance to the government of other new “actors," such as independent ministers.

Indeed, Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi exclude explicitly the called ministers "independents" or "technocrats" from their IC’s estimates (2016, p. 269). However, from my perspective, these should be included because of the increasing importance of these actors in the political process and the

government's orientation. My theoretical assumption is that the inclusion of these actors in the medium term erodes the legitimacy of political parties as a means of political representation. In fact, their inclusion allows to analyze the relative weight that this group has in the formation of cabinets, especially in the presidential-parliamentary system since their survival in office depends on the president exclusively and directly. The theoretical assumption is that the inclusion of these actors not only erodes in the medium term the legitimacy of political parties as vehicles of citizen representation, but also conspire against the institutionalization of a pattern of party competition. In fact, if the citizens vote for a political party, but then it governs with "independents", citizens could see political parties as "meaningless organizations". Likewise, since their appointing and survival in office depends on presidential will directly (especially in the president-parliamentary system), the presence of independent ministers confer a grade of randomness to governmental actions since they are not responsible to president's party.

Therefore, except for Government Formula indicator, the “independents” are incorporated into the other two indicators. Specifically, in the index of ministerial volatility (Alternation of government), the independents are treated as "a political party," and their variation is pondered in the final estimation. Likewise, regarding the component of Access to government, independent ministers are considered as ministers who have never been part of any government in the past.[21]

Finally, considering the measurement of components, it could be said that indicators of “Access to government" and “Government formula" overlap and over time tend to be 100. For instance, the sudden victory of a new political party would be equivalent to "0" in both components.

[21] Put as a mathematical formula, the indicator is calculated as follows: (100 – % ministers belonging to a political party that has not been a government) + (100 – % independent ministers).

But, in the next election, if such party remains in power, it would reach the value of "100" in the same components since it will be considered an "old party." From my perspective, this strong tendency to "100" is compatible with the prevailing concept of "institutionalization." Indeed, a central dimension of this concept is the stability of actors' expectations as well as political parties. Thus, if a new party emerges and can survive beyond an election, it certainly could be considered part of the "stable cast" that characterizes a closed or institutionalized structure.

That being said, table 2.4 specifies in detail how each of the dimensions of a structure of competition is analyzed or measured. Likewise, this table include expected values of indicators according to type of structure of competition (open or closed). Moreover, it is worth noted that the included information is consistent with the specific hypotheses proposed previously. Finally, it only remains to point out that a "composite indicator of closure" can be calculated based on the three indicators (one per each component), which would be the average of the three described indicators (IC). [22]

Table 2.5
Indicators of Components of Structures of Competition

Mair's Components	**Indicators**	**Expected Values**	
		Closed Structures	**Open Structures**
Alternation in office	⇒ MV is above 50% = MV***** ⇒ MV is below 50%= 100% – MV*****	Reformulated Pedersen's index of ministerial volatility (MV) tends to be 100.	Reformulated Pedersen's index of ministerial volatility (MV) tends to be 50.
Governing formulae	⇒ The very same combination = 100%. ⇒ Entirely new combination/new party forms single party government= 0%.	The value tends to be 100.	The value tends to be 0.

[22] To calculate the IC, Reformulated Pedersen's index of ministerial volatility (Alternation of government) —whose values are expressed between 50 to 100— must be previously transformed to a scale from 0 to 100.

	⇒ Part of the new government is familiar = % of the familiar part. ⇒ A party which was earlier in government forms a government on its own = 100 – the previous coalition partners' %.		
Access to government	⇒ (100 – % ministers belonging to a political party that has not been a government) + (100 – % independent ministers).	The percentage tends to be high.	The percentage tends to be low.

* Professionals without party affiliation or technocrats are considered as an "additional group" (independents).
Source: Author, based on Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi (2016).

On the other hand, regarding the dichotomous variable "forms of government," the analysis of its variability turns out to be more complicated. The ideal empirical situation is to identify cases that have undergone a constitutional change of the kind suggested by the hypotheses: a shift from a president-parliamentary system to a premier-presidential one (hypothesis 1) and vice versa (hypothesis 2).[23] In other words, the objectives of this research require empirical cases that allow the analysis of whether under constant conditions (the same country) the constitutional change affects or not the structure of competition in the sense that the theoretical model has foreseen. According to Samuels and Shugart, these types of cases would constitute — using the methodological language — natural experiments or quasi-experiments.

Now, which countries would be the ideal candidates for case studies? If I focus on the countries that have transitioned back and forth between the two semi-presidential systems, there have been only four such cases in the world: Portugal, Ukraine, Armenia, and Madagascar (see Table 2.6). Madagascar is automatically ruled out because it only transitioned temporarily between the semi-presidential sub-types before becoming a purely presidential system. The remaining three

[23] Thus, for example, Samuel and Shugart, in order to test their theory on the emergence of party presidentialization, analyzed the cases of France and Israel, since both countries had transitioned from parliamentary systems to forms of government based on the separation of powers (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, pp. 163-170).

cases could be considered good natural quasi-experiments. However, it is necessary to focus on a fundamental aspect that the proposed empirical analysis requires in order to be viable: variability in the formation of governments (ministerial cabinets) before and after the constitutional change. This feature is crucial in order to corroborate whether the institutional framework influences the variation in structures of competition. Therefore, I will only select those countries that have had simultaneously: (a) a minimum of three competitive legislative elections before and after the constitutional reform, as well as (b) a score of > 5 in the Polity IV Index during the period of analysis (> = 6).[24]

Table 2.6
Reform to the Executive-Legislative Structure of Semi-presidential Countries

Premier-presidential	President-parliamentary	Presidential
Madagascar (1991-93) ⟹	Madagascar (1993-97) ⟹	Madagascar (1997-)
Portugal (1985-) ⟸	Portugal (1978-82)	
Ukraine (2006-2009) ⟸	Ukraine (1992-2005)	
Ukraine (2014-2020) ⟸	Ukraine (2010-2013) *	
Armenia (2006-) ⟸	Armenia (1996-2005)	

*This change occurred due to a resolution of the Constitutional Court that annulled the reform constitutional of 2004.
Source: Samuels and Shugart (2010, p. 258)

Thus, regarding the cases of Ukraine and Armenia, the problem is that their constitutional reforms have been relatively recent (2005), which would prevent me from analyzing the effects of institutional change in the medium term. Moreover, Ukraine has recently returned to its previous institutional design (2014). Besides, the relative instability of the Ukrainian political system and its declining democratic performance in recent years (<6 in the Polity IV index) should also be considered. In the same way, although the Armenian political system has remained stable,

[24] The POLITY score scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

according to the Polity IV index, we could hardly consider that country to be fully democratic (see Figure 2.2).



Figure 2.2: ***Armenia, Portugal and Ukraine According to Polity IV Scores***
Source: Author.

Therefore, for two clear reasons, the ideal selection to corroborate Hypothesis 1 is Portugal. The first reason is that the case of Portugal offers a reasonable number of elections for the analysis of the consequences of constitutional change in the medium term.[25] Likewise, the second reason is that the evolution of Portugal's score in the Polity IV index indicates that before and after its constitutional reform (1982), the Portuguese political system has remained democratic in nature. Even though it is not a direct indicator of my object of study, the slight improvement in the Polity IV index that Portugal presented after its constitutional reform is in line with the expectations outlined in the hypothesis (H1).

[25] If we consider the first legislative elections after the fall of the Estado Novo, Portugal would have had the minimum that we require, which is three parliamentary elections before changing its system of government: 1976, 1979, and 1980.

That said, regarding Hypothesis 2, it is clear that this research faces a problem in identifying an ideal case of analysis. Indeed, an examination of the constitutional changes that occurred in the semi-presidential systems reveals that there are no countries that have transitioned from a premier-presidential form of government to a president-parliamentary one. One case that approximates the scenario that this research seeks to analyze is Sri Lanka, a country that, after almost three decades of having a parliamentary system, transitioned to a president-parliamentary system in 1978. However, as can be seen in the figure 2.3, after the constitutional reform, the country entered a non-democratic state, which prevents me from analyzing the effect that such change would have had on the closure levels of its structures of party competition. Although one could argue that the change in the system of government coincided with the loss of its democracy, it should be noted that the research objective is not to corroborate the effects of government structures on the democratic nature of the system, but instead on structures of competition.



Figure 2.3: ***Sri Lanka According to Polity IV Scores***
Source: Author.

In the same way, expanding this exploration to cases of countries that migrated from the opposite pole, that is, from a presidential system to a president-parliamentary system, one finds the examples of Taiwan and Georgia. A quick examination of the evolution of their Polity IV index scores after their change of government systems reveals contradictory trends to those expected by the interpretive model: while Georgia improved slightly (from 2004), Taiwan managed to consolidate a democratic system (since 1997). However, the tense political ties that they maintain with their respective regional powers, Russia (Georgia) and China (Taiwan), configure a rather particular internal political scenario. Therefore, an analytical approach to these cases should include the role that the geopolitical factor plays in their domestic political competition, a demand that would take away from the objectives of this study. Furthermore, it is worth noting that democratizing processes occurred in these cases in the early 1990s; their trajectories prior to their system changes do not offer enough empirical evidence for the analysis: (a) Taiwan changed its form of government after just five years, and (b) Georgia, prior to opting for a president-parliamentary system, was not a fully democratic country (see Figure 2.4).



Figure 2.4: ***Georgia and Taiwan According to Polity IV Scores***
Source: Author.

Therefore, the only option left for evaluating Hypothesis 2 is to identify a country that not only has a president-parliamentary form of government but also displays certain democratic stability for an adequate period (Polity Index> = 6). Although this is not the ideal scenario as there has not been a change in the system of government, a country with more than three successive elections would allow to assess whether the president-parliamentary system effectively boosts the structures of competition towards an optimal level of closure.

Thus, the question here is: which countries have a president-parliamentary system of government? According to Samuels and Shugart, in addition to those already analyzed, six more countries had this form of government in the year 2007. It is necessary, however, to make some clarifications and exclusions to the list drawn up by these authors. The first of these regards the classification of Austria as a president-parliamentary system. Indeed, due to previously mentioned singularities present in its form of government, the Austrian case is not useful for my investigation to the extent that it does not fully represent a president-parliamentary form of government. Likewise, for the same reasons that Sri Lanka was excluded, Russia and Mozambique are excluded as potential cases due to their poor democratic performance on the Polity IV index (<=6).

Thus, the only three countries with a president-parliamentary form of government that meet the criterion —which is to say, a certain democratic continuity— are Namibia, Peru, and Senegal (see Figure 2.5). Namibia is a quite singular case since the movement that played a central role in its independence process has governed the country without interruption since 1990. Indeed, since its liberation from South Africa, the leaders of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) have indisputably won the six presidential elections that have been carried out up to the year 2019. Therefore, although Namibia is classified as a democracy according to the Polity IV

index, the lack of variability in the formation of governments would undoubtedly prevent me from reaching the research objectives.



Figure 2.5: ***Potential President-Parliamentary Cases***
Source: Author.

Finally, both Senegal and Peru satisfy my criterion on democratic continuity, as both countries have maintained scores above six on the Polity IV index since the year 2000. However, as can be seen in the figure 2.5, in the period from its independence from France in 1960 to the year 2000, Senegal maintained a non-democratic political system. In contrast, throughout the 1980s, Peru not only had democratic governments but also maintained its form of government as a presidenti-parliamentary system, which could provide an advantage for the analysis of the medium-term effects of this form of government. In short, although both countries have certain similarities —such as a unicameral parliament and five-year presidential terms (which were not in effect in

Senegal until the 2007 elections)— I choose the Peruvian case because, in addition to not having changed its form of government since 1980, it has certain similarities with the case selected to corroborate Hypothesis 1 (Portugal). Indeed, according to Gunitsky (2018), Portugal and Peru were part of the so-called third wave of democratization (1974-1988), and, moreover, both countries made their democratic transitions from an authoritarian regime ruled by the military.

CHAPTER 3

PORTUGAL: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND VARIATIONS IN ITS STRUCTURES OF COMPETITION

This chapter explains the variation in structures of competition according to the forms of government in Portugal (1976-2019). The main goal is not to show that the level of closure of the structures of competition depends exclusively on the existing type of semi-presidentialism (president-parliamentary or premier-presidential), but rather to explain how or in what way the form of government influences the level of closure of structures of competition in the medium and long term. In that sense, this chapter offers a comparative analysis of the types of semi-presidentialism that Portugal has experienced since its return to democracy: president-parliamentary (1976-1982) versus premier-presidential (1983-2019).

Thus, drawing on the theoretical model proposed in Chapter 2, this chapter is divided into two main sections. The first one comprises two subsections that address formal and empirical aspects of the Portuguese political dynamic during the analyzed period. In the first subsection, using the appointment-dismissal game —which was explained in Chapter 2— I describe in detail which institution (presidency or parliament) plays a decisive role in the formation of governments according to the constitutions of 1976 and 1982. Then, in the second subsection I explain the dynamics of government formation in both periods (1976-1982 and 1983-2019), with a special emphasis on the parties' behavior, mainly in the scenarios where the phenomenon known as *cohabitation* emerges.

The second main section comprises three subsections seeking to test whether the theoretical model's expectations for the relationship between sub-types of semi-presidentialism and structures of competition are correct. Thereby, in the first sub-section, the course and intensity of the systemic preeminence of the presidency before and after 1982 are identified. Then, in the second sub-section, using the modified Index of Closure (IC), the variations of the level of closure of structures of competition before and after constitutional change are compared. In the third subsection, considering the limitations of the IC, I offer an additional explanation based on the importance that other variables may play in the closure of structures of competition, such as party fragmentation or the increasing of "independents." Finally, this chapter concludes with a general reflection about the IC and the semi-presidential form of government based exclusively on the case of Portugal.

3.1 THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AFTER THE "ESTADO NOVO": THE FORMAL RULES AND THEIR ACTORS

After a singular authoritarian regime that lasted 40 years,[26] Portugal returned to a democratic path with the enactment of a new Constitution on 2 April 1976. Nevertheless, the transition towards democracy had started a couple of years before through a coup d'état perpetrated on 25 April 1974 by a faction of the military elite called the Armed Forces Movement (AFM). The fall of Marcello das Neves Alves Caetano's government (1968-1974) thus ended a long period of Portuguese history characterized by the existence of a dominant prime minister who exercised absolute control of the state. In this manner, the "Estado Novo" —as this regime initiated by

[26] Due to the characteristics of this regime —there were even some regular elections and in some of them there was allowed the existence of critical or independent candidates — one could hardly denominate the Portuguese Estado Novo as a purely military regime. Probably, the best characterization of the regime has been given by Linz, Stephan and Gunther who call it "civilized authoritarian regime with a weak party" (Linz, Stepan, and Gunther, 1995, p. 102).

Antonio de Oliveira Salazar (1933-1967) under the Constitution of 1933 was called— reached an end.

One of the critical events of Portuguese democratization was undoubtedly holding elections for a Constituent Assembly on 25 April 1974. However, although the future constitutional text was arduously discussed in said Assembly, its creation was largely influenced by the AFM. Indeed, in addition to the parliamentary chamber, the Constitution's content was defined simultaneously with said military faction in parallel negotiation spaces. In this way, the so-called "pacts" between this military elite —that had overthrown the authoritarian regime— and the political parties with significant representation in the Assembly[27] shaped the central features of the Constitution of 1976 (C-76). The clearest evidence of the AFM's influence on the constituent process was the incorporation of the Council of the Revolution (CR) as part of the government structure of the nascent Portuguese democratic state (Lobo, 2010, p. 4).[28]

Another outstanding aspect of the Portuguese constitutional process was the adoption of a semi-presidential system. Some authors coincide in pointing out that this preference was due in part to Portugal's constitutional and political trajectory. In fact, the parliamentary system's bad experience during the years of the First Republic (1911-1926) eliminated any option for the political class to consider returning to that form of government.[29] Likewise, although the choice

[27] The more significant parties in the Assembly were: Socialist Party (Partido Socialista – PS) and Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata – PSD), which had 111 and 81 seats, respectively. Considering that Assembly was formed by 250 seats, among parties with a minor relevance also were Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português – PCP), and Social Democratic Center - People's Party (Centro Democratico e Social – Partido Popular, CDS) with 30 and 16 represents, respectively.

[28] Both the institutional design and some aspects of the electoral system were negotiated between the AFM and the parties represented in the Assembly. The content of these agreements or pacts can be seen in Rezola (2012).

[29] During this period Portugal suffered a strong ministerial instability, which was reflected in the 45 cabinets of various types that were conformed: 17 single party, three military and 21 coalition governments. Moreover, tensions and

was to maintain a hybrid form of government, the political forces represented in the Assembly perceived as dangerous having a prime minister with excessive powers, due to the recent past with the Estado Novo (Miranda, 2007, pp. 67-68; Pérez Ayala, 2007). In turn, granting a predominant role to the presidential figure was not perceived as dangerous or undemocratic. Furthermore, as Bayerlein has well pointed out, due to the abolishment of direct presidential elections by Salazar in the last fifteen years of the Estado Novo, a president elected directly by the citizens was conceived as a guarantee of the democratic nature of the new regime (1996: 808).[30]

In conclusion, historical experience significantly marked Portugal's post-authoritarian form of government. On the one hand, the government structure of the Estado Novo was maintained: a two-headed executive (prime minister and president) and a unicameral legislature (Assembly of the Republic). Nevertheless, and as a way of avoiding the previous troubles, political forces initially agreed that the presidency should play a significant role in the political system designed in 1976. However, after some unstable governments, the main political forces opted in 1982 to alter the initial design and grant more influence on parliament. In this sense, following the typology of Samuels and Shugart (2010), the Portuguese model changed from a president-parliamentary to a premier-presidential form of government. In the following sections, I shall describe the formal constitutional changes, as well as the dynamics of the formation of governments before and after the 1982 reforms.

polarization also stirred the extra-parliamentary arena, and there were coup attempts and even a short dictatorial regime between 1917-18 (Pinto, 2000).

[30] In fact, when direct-presidential elections were allowed, there were candidates with strong critical discourse towards the authoritarian regime in 1945, 1949 and 1958 elections (Schmitter, 1978).

3.1.1 FORMAL POWERS AND THE APPOINTMENT-DISMISSAL GAME ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1976

A central feature of the president-parliamentary form of government is the leverage and advantage that the institutional design grants to the president in the formation of ministerial cabinets (governments). In the Portuguese case, this trend is demonstrable if one analyzes the presidential powers of appointment and dismissal. In fact, the Constitution of 1976 (C-76) established that the nomination of the prime minister was an exclusive power of the president but that this should be done: "...taking into account the electoral results and the political forces represented in the AR..." (Article 190, C-76). In the same way, regarding the power of dissolution, the Constitution granted the president such power without any specific condition or limitation. Indeed, the constitutional text only stated that the president could: "...appoint and separate the prime minister, in accordance with the provisions of article 190..." (Article 136, section f, C-76). Additionally, according to the C-76, the president has the power of appointment and dismissal of cabinet members, by the proposal of the prime minister (Article 190, section 2 and Article 136, section g, C-76). Therefore, in practice, if the president appoints a like-minded prime minister, then he can also control the formation of ministerial cabinets.

Regarding the powers of the Assembly of the Republic (AR), the Constitution did not explicitly indicate a parliamentary power of approval or disapproval of the ministerial cabinet. However, one can argue that this power did exist, but as a motion rejecting the government's program. Indeed, the C-76 established that once the ministerial cabinet (government) had been appointed, it had to go —not later than ten days after its nomination — to the AR to present its plan

for government. After this exposition, if an absolute majority of the AR rejected that plan, the ministerial cabinet was dissolved automatically (article 198, paragraph 1.a, C-76).

Likewise, the C-76 established the parliamentary dismissal's power through the mechanism of the "no confidence motion." The constitutional text established that it was possible to initiate said mechanism with the support of only a quarter of the deputies or at the request of a parliamentary group (article 197, numeral 1, C-76). However, it should be noted that the parliamentary dissolution power was less effective than the presidential one since the former was only viable if the AR approved —through an absolute majority— two no confidence motions with a minimum interval of thirty days between them (article 198, 1.c, C-76). Therefore, while the president could dismiss the prime minister or any of the other ministers at any time, the AR could only remove the ministerial cabinet (as a whole) by passing two consecutive no confidence motions.

The institutional advantage of the presidency was reinforced by including the authority to dissolve the Assembly. Indeed, as I indicated in Chapter 2, if an extreme confrontation between the presidency and the parliament takes place, the president-parliamentary design gives a slight advantage to the president. In the Portuguese case, foreseeing that a hostile parliament could initiate a vicious cycle of nomination-dismissal of ministers, the Constitution gave the president the power to dissolve the AR if it rejected a third consecutive ministerial nomination (Article 198, subsection 3, C-76). Additionally, according to Article 136, the president could also dissolve the parliament if he had a favorable opinion from the CR that he chaired. In other words, the president possessed a dissolution power that could be activated either by a "specific event" or by his own initiative through the CR.

Moreover, the Portuguese institutional design gave the ministerial cabinet a pressing mechanism that could eventually help the president to dissolve the AR. Indeed, the Constitution indicated that both the approval of a no confidence motion and the failure of a confidence motion counted as required “events” to dissolve the AR. In that way, the government (prime minister) could request at any time a motion of confidence from the AR "on a declaration of general policy or any relevant matter of national interest" (article 196). If the Assembly denied that motion, the cabinet was automatically dissolved, and this event counted as part of the required number of "events” for the dissolution of the parliament. Thus, in practice, the AR could not dissolve (through the approbation of a no confidence motion or the rejection of a confidence motion) more than three cabinets nominated by the president.[31]

In conclusion, the final balance of the appointment-dismissal game, according to the Constitution of 1976, granted a significant advantage to the presidency. Therefore, using the scheme proposed in the previous chapter, I can affirm that although the parliament was controlled by the opposition, the Portuguese president was able to impose his/her will on the formation of governments (+1). In the same way, my schematization indicates that said influence may grow significantly if the president's party or a coalition loyal to him controls the Assembly of the Republic (see Table 3.1).

[31] Additionally, the president can also dissolve the AR, if it rejects the plan of government three consecutive times (Article 198, section 3, C-76).

Table 3.1
A Schematization of the Appointment-Dismissal Game – Constitution of 1976

					President's Party < Parliament	**President's Party > Parliament**
Case	**President**		**Assembly**		**Total**	**Total /Absolute Value/**
	Nominate	**Dismiss**	**Confirm/ Approval**	**Dismiss**		
Portugal	1*	2	-1	-1**	+1	+5

Source: Author, based on Shugart and Carey (1992).

* Although the president has the formal authority to appoint, he is not granted with two points because according to the Constitution he must form the cabinet after consulting the CR, the parties with seats in the Assembly of the Republic and considering the electoral results as well.

** One point is awarded to the Assembly because, compared to the president, its power is limited: The Assembly must-carry out two consecutive motions of censure.

Finally, it is worth mentioning other complementary features of the Portuguese semi-presidential design. These are the holding of non-concurrent general elections, the varying durations of the presidential (5 years) and the legislative (4 years) term periods, the non-presidential re-election for the third consecutive time, and the existence of a body that conditions the president's actions. The first two aspects responded to the explicit intention of differentiating the origin and legitimacy of both powers of the state (presidency and Legislative). In the same way, the last two elements of the Portuguese government structure responded directly to the need to prevent the emergence of a political leader with Bonapartist ambitions. Indeed, the president was not only prohibited from competing for a third consecutive term, but also some decisions had to be consulted with the so-called Council of the Revolution.[32]

Precisely, the Council of the Revolution's composition and functions have generated a debate about the democratic nature of the system of government established by C-76. The military

[32] For this reason, some jurists points out that the Constitution of 1976 established four political organs of sovereignty: president, Council of the Revolution, Assembly, and the Government (Miranda, 2007, p. 264).

composition of the CR,[33] as well as its a role as a guarantor of the Constitution, were conceived as authoritarian lags. For this reason, some authors such as Duarte Franco (2018, pp. 127-129), have pointed out that between 1976 and 1982 Portugal experienced a "supervised democracy." However, since it is not a research objective to analyze the democratic nature of the Portuguese regime, I follow my selection criterion (Polity IV Index), and conclude that during this period (1976-1982), Portugal effectively had a democratic system to the extent that it reached scores over 6 in the Polity IV Index.

That being said, and considering issues of institutional design, the next section describes how the different governments were defined or formed during this first period (1976-1982). The objective is to identify not only the inter-party dynamics but also how institutional restrictions or limitations may have affected the behavior of the main actors in the system (the president and political parties with representation in the AR).

3.1.2 GOVERNMENTS AND PRESIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1976

The first constitutional government was a minority government appointed on April 25, 1976 which remained in office until the end of 1977. President António Ramalho Eanes, a former military member who was part of the MAF, had refused to appoint a cabinet based on a majority

[33] Although the president chaired the Council of the Revolution, the other members were: the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces; the Chiefs of Staff of the three Armies of the Armed Forces; the Prime Minister, when he is a military man; fourteen officers of whom eight will belong to the Army, three to the Air Force and another three to the Navy, designated by the respective branch of the Armed Forces (Article 143, C-76). However, it should be noted that since 1976 no prime ministers were ever from the Armed Forces.

parliamentary since it would have meant constituting a government entirely dependent on the Assembly. However, after almost one year in office, the Socialist cabinet chaired by Mario Soares presented a motion of confidence intending to strengthen its position at the head of the government. However, this motion was rejected by 159 votes (PSD, CDS, PCP, and Popular Democratic Union —União Democratica Popular); only the Socialist Party (PS) voted in favor of the confidence motion (100 votes).

The fall of the PS minority cabinet marked the beginning of a stage where the president acquired a significant and decisive role in the formation of cabinets. Indeed, after the resignation of the prime minister, the president required the AR to form a government based on a stable and coherent parliamentary majority. In this way, after arduous negotiations, the PS and the CDS, a right-wing party, agreed to create a post-electoral coalition that made possible the formation of a second constitutional government under the leadership of Mario Soares once again. However, ideological discrepancies eroded said coalition to the point that on 24 July 1978, the CDS ministers resigned from the cabinet, breaking the precarious government coalition. Thereby, in a context of political instability, president Eanes dismissed Prime Minister Soares.

However, the prime minister disagreed with this decision and argued that the president should have confirmed first whether his government truly lacked parliamentary support. This event revealed that both the president and the prime minister assumed that the ministerial cabinet depended on either the presidency or the Assembly. In other words, there was a confrontation between two different conceptions of the form of government: Was it presidential or parliamentary? (Gaspar, 1990, p. 18). The reason that may explain this dual conception would be not only the

dismissal powers that both institutions possessed but also the ambiguity of the Constitution of 1974 which did not clearly indicate to whom the government was responsible.[34]

Therefore, in a favorable institutional context for the president, the main parties' inability to constitute a government based on a parliamentary majority allowed him to appoint three successive "atypical" cabinets. In fact, these three governments were made up entirely of civil professionals who did not belong to any political party; these were the cabinets chaired by Nobre da Costa, Mota Pinto, and Maria de Lourdes Pintassilgo (from August 1978 to December 1979). Although the literature calls ministers without party affiliation "independent," in practice, they respond directly to the president, since their stay in office depends exclusively on his will, given that they lack the support of any parliamentary group. In that sense, I can affirm that the Portuguese form of government operated for almost a year and a half under a logic typical of presidential systems. Thereby, president Eanes during that short period: "… decided the major policy issues, without being the political leader of neither government nor parliamentary majority…" (Martins, 2006, p. 87).

As it was expected, the nomination of governments made up entirely of independents was not supported by the Assembly. Therefore, the main political parties openly decided to deepen the confrontation with the presidency. In this way, although they had not been able to form a majority government, they were able to coordinate actions to disrupt cabinets using their only available resource: the no confidence motion. Thus, as a reaction to the appointment of Nobre da Costa's

[34] The Constitution of 1976 indicated in its Article 193 that the "Government" (Council of Ministers) was politically responsible to both the president and the RA. Likewise, in subsection 1 of Article 194, the Constitution added that the prime minister was politically accountable to the President of the Republic and, concerning the governmental responsibility, to the Assembly.

cabinet, the AR responded by rejecting the plan of government, thereby leading to its automatic dissolution on 14 September 1978. Even though the Assembly approved the plan of government proposed by Mota Pinto's cabinet on 4 June 1979, it was only a short time afterwards that the PS and the PCP presented the required two no confidence motions to dismiss the government.

By the first half of 1979, the confrontation between both institutions had escalated considerably, though the constitutional design favored the president since he had the power to dissolve the AR. Thus, after consulting with the CR, President Eanes announced the dissolution of the AR and called for early special elections on 2 December 1979. In this context, the appointment of the last independent cabinet chaired by Pintassilgo (31 July 1979) was purely a formality, since it would remain in office only until the new government was formed. However, the tense relationship between the president and AR was reflected in the voting obtained by Pintassilgo's cabinet after the presentation of the plan of government. Indeed, despite the transitory nature of this ministerial cabinet, the "motion of rejection" proposed by the PPD, PSD, and the CDS obtained 79 votes in favor, 33 votes against, and 125 abstentions (PS, PCP, and UDP). The cabinet was able to continue in office only because the number of votes for dismissal did not reach an absolute majority. However, Pintassilgo's cabinet only effectively obtained 33 supporting votes. In conclusion, I can affirm that by the end of 1979, the AR not only had abdicated its functions but had also ceded effective control of government to the presidency.

The 1979 elections set a new scenario. The Democratic Alliance's[35] victory started a phase where the influence of the president in the formation of governments decreased significantly. The

[35] Democratic Alliance was formed by PSD, CDS and the People's Monarchist Party (Partido Popular Monárquico - PPM). In the legislative elections of 1979, AD gained 128 of 250 seats of the National Assembly. The main

Democratic Alliance (DA) not only had control of the AR but also decided to appoint Sá Carneiro, the leader and founder of the PSD —the party with the most seats in the parliament— as prime minister. As a result, he quickly gained prominence at the expense of the president who was seen as an opponent of the prime minister. Indeed, in the presidential elections of 1980, Sá Carneiro had not only lost the presidency to Eanes but also the latter had been re-elected through the support of the opposition left parties (PS and PCP).

The Democratic Alliance's control of government was confirmed by the electoral results of the regular legislative elections of 1980 (5 October). This allowed the coalition of the DA to maintain control of the AR, while Sá Carneiro's cabinet continued in office with minor changes.[36] However, the accidental death of the leader of the PSD in the late 1980s sparked internal tensions for party control that affected the stability of the next two DA governments (1981-1982). The emergent PSD leader, Pinto Balsemão, failed in merging the internal factions of his party and, as prime minister, faced several ministerial resignations. Consequently, aside from the instability of the cabinet, the social protest spurred by the opposition parties —mainly the PCP— caused Balsemão's resignation and two subsequent dissolutions of his cabinets: on 14 August 1981, and 23 December 1982.

In sum, the precarious internal cohesion of the ruling party's main partner during 1981 and 1982, as well as the formal institutional resources of the president, made it possible once again for

opposing/opposition forces were the Socialist Party (74 seats) and the United People Alliance (formed by the Portuguese Communist Party and the Portuguese Democratic Movement) which obtained 47 parliamentary seats.

[36] In the elections of 1980, the Democratic Alliance gained 134 of 250 seats. Likewise, the Republican and Socialist Front (formed by Socialist Party, Leftwing Union for the Socialist Democracy and Independent Social Democratic Action) which was the main opposing/opposition force got 74 seats. The other significant opposing/opposition alliance was the United People Alliance (formed by the Portuguese Communist Party and the Portuguese Democratic Movement) which obtained 42 parliamentary seats.

Eanes to take on a more significant role in the orientation of the government. As a result, and in spite of a lack of official parliamentary support, his formal powers created an environment in which "… disagreements between the president and the government on some important matters, such as foreign or defense policy, were frequently solved in favor of the president…" (Martins, 2006, p. 88).

Table 3.2

Governments and Parliaments under the President-Parliamentary System (1976-1983)

Date of Elections	**Ministerial Cabinets (Governments)**	**Type of government**	**Parliament Support**	**President**
25 April 1976	Mário Soares I July 1976 – December 1977	Minority Government	Socialist Party: 107 (40,7%)	António Ramalho Eanes (Independent) 1976-1980
	Mário Soares II January 1978 – August 1978	Coalition Government (post-electoral)	Socialist Party: 107 + CDS: 42 (56,7%)	
	Nobre da Costa August 1978 – November 1978	Presidential Initiative	None	
	Mota Pinto November 1978 – August 1979		None	
	Maria de Lurdes Pintassilgo August 1979 – December 1980		None	
2 December 1979 (Early elections)	Francisco Sá Carneiro January 1980 – December 1980	Coalition Government (pre-electoral)	AD: PSD 80 + CDS 43 + PPM 5 (51,2%)	
5 October 1980	Francisco Pinto Balsemao January 1981 – August 1981			António Ramalho Eanes was reelected (Independent) 1981-1985
7 December 1980 *(Presidential Elections)*	Francisco Pinto Balsemao September 1981 – June 1983		AD: PSD 82 + CDS 46 + PPM 6 (53,6%)	

Source: Author.

However, in a context characterized by the growing importance of the presidential role, the main parliamentary leaders (PS and PSD) pursued forms of cooperation motivated by a shared need to inhibit the president's influence on the orientation and formation of governments. Thus, the

tacit agreement of both parties to avoid periods of confrontation between the AR and the presidency was materialized in a constitutional reform whose main objective was to redesign the Portuguese form of government. What changed? And how did these changes affect party interaction in the formation of governments? These questions are answered in the following two sections.

3.1.3 FORMAL POWERS AND THE APPOINTMENT-DISMISSAL GAME ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1982

There is a consensus in the literature about the meaning of the constitutional reforms implemented in Portugal in 1982. Thus, for instance, Pérez Ayala (2007, p. 78) and Lucas Pires[37] categorically affirm that the implemented changes generated a "parliamentarization" of the government's form. In the same vein, Lobo (2010,1) and Freire and Pinto (2010, pp. 73-74) indicate that those changes signified a transformation from a president-parliamentary to a premier-presidential system. In simple terms, one could argue that if the institutional design of the Constitution of 1976 favored the figure of the president, the changes of 1982 aimed to deliver certain advantages for the AR in the formation and orientation of government administrations.

One of the fundamental changes that reflect the institutional advantage granted to the Assembly was the greater ability to dismiss a ministerial cabinet. Indeed, thanks to the constitutional changes, it was no longer necessary to reach two consecutive no confidence motions to exercise said power. As a result of the changes made in 1982, the AR gained the ability to dismiss a ministerial cabinet with the approval of only one single no confidence motion. Likewise, by

[37] Quoted by (Bayerlein, 1996, p. 809).

maintaining the authority to approve the plan of government each time that a new cabinet was appointed, in practice the reforms not only ensured the ability of the AR to influence the formation of governments (approval of the plan of government) but also to exercise effective control over the orientation of government (no confidence motion).

In the case of the president, his capacity to dismiss the prime minister or ministers was limited. Indeed, the reforms annulled the discretionary nature by explicitly stating that the president "… may only remove the Government when it becomes necessary to do so in order to ensure the normal functioning of the democratic institutions and after first consulting the Council of State..." (article 195, subsection 2, Constitution 1982). In this way, the presidential removal power became a "reserve or latent power" due to the high political cost involved in carrying it out without clear justification.

Regarding the presidential power to dissolve the AR, the reforms transferred all responsibility of its execution to the president. Moreover, C-82 explicitly indicated that those decisions should be initially commented upon by the political parties represented in the AR and the Council of State (article 132, Constitution 1982). In that sense, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, when there is no explicit cause to dissolve the parliament, the relevance of this presidential power lies in the mere threat of its exercise due to the high political cost of using this power without consistent justification. Therefore, when the AR is controlled by a party or a coalition that disapproves of the president, the presidential powers of dissolution become latent and the appointment-dismissal game schematization favors parliament (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3
A Schematization of the Appointment-Dismissal Game – Constitution of 1982

					President's Party < Parliament	President's Party > Parliament
Case	**President**		**Assembly**		**Total**	**Total /Absolute Value/**
	Nominate	**Dismiss**	**Confirm/ Approval**	**Dismiss**		
Portugal	1*	1**	-1	-2	-1	5

Source: Author, based on Shugart and Carey (1992).
* Although the president has the formal authority to appoint, he is not granted with two points because the Constitution demands that he form the cabinet considering the parliamentary majority.
** One point is awarded to the president because, compared to the Assembly, his power is less effective.

Likewise, a significant reform that took place during the constitutional reforms of 1982 was the elimination of the Council of the Revolution (CR). Indeed, thanks to the cooperation between ideologically different forces, the CR's functions were redistributed in two institutions intentionally created for that purpose: The Council of State and the Constitutional Court. The first of these adopted all the presidential advisory functions, while the second one assumed the defense of the constitutional integrity of the political system (Lobo 2010, p. 7, Perez Ayala pp. 95-96).[38] Additionally, a relevant aspect of this reform was the change in the composition of the presidential advisory body. In fact, the CR —which, according to C-76, was composed entirely of military personnel— was replaced by an institution (Council of State) made up entirely of civilians.[39] Thus, with the elimination of the CR, both the Assembly and the president acquired greater relevance in their functions, especially in the legislative bodies (Pérez Ayala, 2007).[40]

[38] It should be noted that Article 142 of the Constitution of 1976 established that one of the functions of the Council of the Revolution was to be "…guarantor of the regular functioning of democratic institutions and observance of the Constitution...".
[39] Article 142, C-82: The Prime Minister; The President of the Constitutional Court; The Ombudsman; The presidents of regional governments; former presidents of the Republic elected under the Constitution who have not been removed from office; Five citizens appointed by the President of the Republic for the period corresponding to the duration of their term of office; Five citizens elected by the Assembly of the Republic, in accordance with the principle of proportional representation, for the period corresponding to the duration of the legislature.
[40] Indeed, the C-76, in its Article 149, paragraph 3, indicated that in military matters: "...the decree-laws of the Council of the Revolution will have the same value as the laws of the Assembly of the Republic or decree-laws of the Government...". After the reforms, this function was transferred to the AR.

Finally, another relevant change in legal terms was that the constitutional text clarified the ambiguity regarding whether the government was politically responsible to the presidency or the AR. Indeed, the C-82 maintained a general article which states that the government is responsible to both institutions.[41] However, the following article clarified that the governments (or cabinets) are politically responsible only to the AR. Specifically, the Constitution of 1982 explicitly states that the prime minister is accountable to the president, but the government is politically accountable to the Assembly.[42] This significant change was compatible with the fact that the president could no longer remove the government at his own discretion. Therefore, following the reforms of 1982, the cabinet's permanence in office began to depend on the will of the parliamentary majority (Lobo, 2010, p. 7).

3.1.4 GOVERNMENTS AND PRESIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1982

As noted, the constitutional reforms were made possible by cooperation between the two most influential political forces in post-authoritarian Portugal: PS and PSD. However, the approximation between these parties had immediate political effects on the AD government's stability and an unexpected presidential reaction. On the one hand, this rapprochement caused the CDS to abandon the AD in mid-1983, thus eroding the legitimacy of Prime Minister Balsemão; while, on the other hand, President Eanes, harmed by the reforms,[43] took advantage of the

[41] Specifically, the Article 190 point out: "The Government shall be responsible to the President of the Republic and the Assembly of the Republic".
[42] The subsection 1 of the article 191 specifically mention that "the Prime Minister shall be responsible to the President of the Republic and, within the ambit of the Government's political responsibility, to the Assembly of the Republic".
[43] In a message to the nation on 5 November 1982, Eanes indicated explicitly that he did not agree with the constitutional reforms (the limitation of the presidential power to dissolve parliament, that the dissolution of the

government's fissures and dissolved the Parliament —even against the will of the Council of State[44]— as a way to reframe his political strategy.

The results of the early elections of 25 April 1983 gave the PS the first relative majority and placed the PSD as the second political force at the Parliament. However, none of them wanted to revive the polarization that had allowed the president to gain greater relevance (the period before the constitutional reforms of 1982). Thus, considering the previous good results of their cooperation, the leaders of both parties came together to form a broad majority government known as the Central Bloc (73.47% of seats), an alliance which prevented political polarization and relegated President Eanes from governmental affairs for almost two years.

However, as presidential elections were approaching, tensions within the Central Bloc increased. Based on the parliamentary alliance and his performance as prime minister, Mario Soares attempted a run for the presidency in order to consolidate PS's position within the governmental coalition. The new PSD leader Cavaco Silva thereby broke the alliance since he feared that his party would become a minority partner with limited influence in the coalition. Simultaneously, in reaction to the new institutional context, president Eanes organized a party (Democratic Renewal Party – PRD) intending to influence political decisions from the institution where governments were directly defined: the parliament. Therefore, prior to the dissolution of the Central Bloc, Eanes quickly dissolved the AR for the third time (12 July) and called new legislative

government be only to guarantee the regular functioning of the institutions and that the government is only accountable to parliament) (Gaspar, 1990, p. 23).

[44] The Council of State met on January 20, 1983, and, requested by President Eanes, ruled against the dissolution of parliament (eight votes against seven).

elections for 6 October 1985, with the aim that his party (PRD) would form a part of the new parliament (Gaspar, 1990, pp. 22-23).

The party most affected by the PRD's ideological position was the PS, which experienced a significant decrease of its electoral preferences in the early elections (5 October 1985). This new electoral realignment led to the PSD becoming the political party with the most electoral support and also led to the acquisition of 45 seats by the recently created PRD party. The new composition of the parliament once again placed the PS (57 seats) and the Communists (35 seats) in the opposition, while the PRD (45 seats) and the CDS (22 seats) supported the formation of a minority government chaired by Cavaco Silva of the PSD, which entered office in November 1985.

However, a few months after the start of the PSD government, a new electoral context emerged due to the upcoming presidential elections (January 26, 1986). The ruling party decided to support the candidate of its parliamentary ally (CDS) so as not to split the vote of the right, while in the ideological field of the left, the parties with the best possibilities were the PS and the PRD. Eanes's strategy was to retain the presidency, but because he was unable to compete for a third term, the PRD had to find an alternative candidate. In addition to the difficulties that the PRD faced in selecting a candidate, the decision of Eanes' former Prime Minister, María de Lourdes Pintassilgo, to run for the presidency strongly affected the chances of victory for a PRD candidate. Thus, the fragmentation of voting in Eanes' party made it possible for Mario Soares —former Prime Minister and leader of the PS— to compete for the presidency in a run-off with only 25.1% of the votes with the government's candidate Diogo Freitas do Amaral (45.8%). The results of these elections produced Mario Soares as the winner by a narrow margin of only 151,000 votes.

The PS' victory established a scenario that in the past had provoked a confrontation between the presidency and the AR: the president continued without a majority, and the majority remained without a president. However, on this occasion and under a new institutional design, President Soares, without "conventional powers" to effectively influence the formation of governments, opted to strengthen his arbitration or moderation role. Additionally, Cavaco Silva, knowing that Soares wanted to be a model president, sought to establish a peaceful cohabitation (Frain, 1995, pp. 656-657).

Thus, for almost two years, Soares supported structural reforms and the agenda of the minority government. However, Cavaco's relationship with the PRD started to deteriorate as this group demanded specific agreements on every important piece of legislation that the government sought to approve. Thus, on 3 April 1987, as a way of strengthening its limited influence, the PRD presented a no confidence motion that was approved by all the opposition forces (PCP, PS, and the Portuguese Democratic Movement). The PDS immediately demanded the dissolution of the AR, arguing that any other solution would be illegitimate. Soares was not obliged to dissolve the parliament, but after weighing the various options to reconstitute the government, he chose to do it, knowing that public opinion would perceive the PRD as the culprit of political instability (Frain, 1995, p. 659).

The results of the elections of 1987 reconfigured the composition of the AR. The political cost of this extreme solution was effectively assumed by the PRD and the CDS, who did not exceed 5% of votes. Likewise, although the PS emerged as the second most voted party (22.24% votes), the PSD surpassed 50% of votes at the national level, thus becoming the first post-Estado Novo political party in obtaining a parliamentary majority. In this way, between 1987 and 1990, a kind

of peaceful cohabitation was generated between the two most important political forces in Portugal, reinforcing the parliamentary dimension of the system (Frain, 1995, p. 661).

However, as the 1991 presidential elections approached, Soares began to criticize the single party's hegemony in the Executive. Soares explicitly warned citizens that stability should not be confused with the hegemony of a single party. Soares' well-founded fear was that the PSD conquer the presidency and thus gain the total control of the political system. This strained relationship was reflected in the legislative power of veto power that Soares began to use to influence in the government's orientation. As a reaction, the leader of the PSD Cavaco Silva decided against running for president in order to convey a pro-democratic and anti-hegemonic position. This decision, however, did not improve relations between the presidency and the AR. Even Soares in his electoral campaign proposed restructuring the role of the president in the areas of foreign affairs and defense. Soares' criticism of the government was aimed at creating a perception among citizens that his presence in the presidency would guarantee a perfect balance of powers. This strategy was successful; Soares was re-elected with almost 70% of the vote on 13 January 1991.

The resounding victory of the PS in the presidential elections caused Cavaco Silva and the PDS to focus on obtaining the parliamentary majority in the legislative elections of October 1991, an objective that they achieved again by reaching more than 50% of votes. The PS again became the second largest political force in the Assembly, with 29% of the votes. Internally, however, the leadership viewed these results as a clear defeat. Likewise, Soares understood prime minister-president relations as a zero-sum game; that is, when the image of one improved, that of the other worsened proportionally. All these events led Soares to radicalize his opposition towards the prime minister. However, as Soares did not have conventional powers to interfere in government, he

chose to block the government's ability to legislate on specific matters. Thus, although Soares approved 98% of the government's legislation proposed by PSD, the economic bills were either referred to the Constitutional Court or returned to the AR. The exchange of phrases during this period reflects very well their tense relationship. Indeed, while the president pointed out the internal risk of an "institutional disharmony," the prime minister replied that the "president presides and the government governs " (Frain, 1995, p. 669).

Relations between the president and the prime minister were never again harmonious, and their peaceful cohabitation came to an end. Even when the CDS proposed a failed no confidence motion, Cavaco Silva argued that the president had promoted said action. The core concern of political actors asked who would bear the political cost of a new institutional conflict. Finally, Cavaco Silva announced that he would not run again for Secretariat General of his party and, therefore would not be a candidate in the following legislative elections. This strategy ensured the continuity of his government until the next parliamentary elections (October 1995). However, that decision did not prevent the PS from achieving once again the first relative majority in parliament. This result reflected in part the social demand for a renewal in government after ten years PSD's rule.

Nevertheless, the following year (1996) Cavaco Silva run for president, losing by a narrow margin (400,000 votes), to the PS candidate Jorge Sampaio, who had forged a leadership position beyond his own party. In fact, before becoming the Secretary General of the PS, Sampaio had formed a stable alliance with the PCP and other minor leftist groups to conquer the important municipality of Lisbon twice in a row (autarkic elections). Thus, based on this collaborative experience, during the campaign for the presidency, the leaders of the PCP (Jerónimo de Sousa)

and the Popular Democratic Union (Alberto Matos) renounced their presidential candidacies and publicly expressed their support for Sampaio's candidature.

In this way, during the first Guterres government (1995-1999), the PS simultaneously controlled both presidency and government. Although the PS only maintained a relative majority in parliament, their leaders managed to stay in power until the next regular legislative election. Thus, for the first time in post-authoritarian Portugal, three consecutive governments were renewed after staying in office for the whole legislature's extension: 48 months (1987-1991, 1991-1995 and 1995-1999). However, the next government chaired again by Guterres (1999-2002) resigned after only two years in office because of the disastrous performance of the PS in local elections.[45] Guterres' resignation was aimed at preventing opposition parties in the parliament (PSD and CDS-PP) —which had been victorious in the local elections— from initiating a no confidence motion.[46]

In this context, Sampaio, understanding that the distribution of seats in the AR did not favor the PS, chose to dissolve the Assembly and called for early elections on 17 March 2002. This election's results confirmed the trends of local elections since the alliance between PSD and CDS won again. The president had to appoint a government chaired by PSD's leader, José Manuel Durão Barroso, who, two years later, left office to accept his nomination as president of the European Union Commission. The PSD Vice President, Pedro Santana Lopes, assumed the position of prime minister.

[45] The Socialist Party lost the presidency of 14 Municipal Chambers compared to the previous elections (the party went from obtaining 127 of 305 in the year of 1997 to 113 of 308 in the year 2001). In global terms, the PS vote fell four percentage points with respect to the 1997 election. (specifically, its voting fell from 38.07% to 34.12%).

[46] The PSD, alone or ahead of coalitions with the CDS / PP or PPM, won most of the country's chambers and the presidencies of the most important municipalities, including those of Lisbon and Porto (Relvas, 2001).

Lopes' government was marked by a period of economic recession due to the expansion of public spending in previous governments (in 2001, the Portuguese fiscal deficit represented about 4.4% of GDP). Likewise, the ministerial changes produced in the government were not appropriate and generated certain criticism within the PSD. In this context, opposition forces in the AR demanded a solution to political instability and pointed out that Barroso's resignation should have meant a change of government. Consequently, the president called for early elections on February 20, 2005, amid a context characterized by economic crisis. In these elections, for the first time in its history, the PS with Socrates as leader obtained more than 50% of the seats of the AR. In this way, the PS formed a majority government that not only counted with a president of the same political party (Sampaio) for one year, but also remained in office until the following legislature.

The good results of the PSD in the European elections of 2009, as well as the economic crisis of 2008, predicted an adverse outcome for the Socialists in the elections of September 2009. However, the PS led by Socrates managed to obtain a relative majority in the Assembly. The PDS could not improve on its previous electoral results and obtained approximately the same percentage of votes (29%). However, a surprising element of those elections were the 10% votes earned by the CDS, led by Paulo Portas. Likewise, the Left Bloc (LB), compared to the previous election, doubled the number of its MPs, going from 8 to 16 seats in the new parliament. In this way, due in part to the fragmentation of parliamentary representation, the PS was able to form a new government, albeit this time it was a minority one.

However, after approximately a year and a half in office, the major opposition parties (PSD, CDS, LB, PCP, and Ecologist Party "The Greens") rejected the fourth package of measures of the socialist government (Program of Stability and Growth). Because Socrates had previously

indicated that refuting his economic proposals would pose an obstacle to solving Portugal's over-indebtedness problem, he submitted his resignation as prime minister on 23 March 2011. President Cavaco Silva, who led the opposition party PSD, swiftly executed the AR's dissolution and called for new elections on 5 June 2011. Thus, between May and June, Socrates' led government basically became a transitional cabinet, pending results to form a new Assembly.

The electoral results largely favored the PSD, as two consecutive PS governments had damaged the public's favorable perception of the PS party.[47] With new leadership (Pedro Passos Coelho), the PSD won in 19 of the 22 Portuguese electoral constituencies; nevertheless they failed to obtain a parliamentary majority needed to constitute the government by itself. Therefore, Coelho had to build a post-electoral coalition with the CDS, which, once again, under the leadership of Paulo Portas, had improved its electoral performance from the previous election. In this way, the PSD-CDS coalition obtained 134 seats, enough to form a new government chaired by Coelho.

Additionally, as Cavaco Silva was reelected president on January 2011, the PSD single-handedly controlled presidency and government for over four years. The only drawback the PSD-run government faced came from its government partner, CDS. In fact, the need to promote economic dynamism led the prime minister to implement severe austerity measures and fully adopt the indications of International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank. The unpopular nature of the economic measures caused hesitation within the CDS. However, after a renegotiation of the terms of their government agreement (ministerial changes), Coelho and Portas managed to keep the coalition stable until the following legislative elections.

[47] The PS, with José Sócrates as the leader, had its worst electoral result since 1987, and for the first time since 1991, it was lower 30%: only 28.1% which was equivalent to only 74 deputies.

Although the Portuguese economy had shown signs of recovery since the end of 2014, the government coalition (now called Portugal Ahead) could not maintain control of the AR and only won 107 seats in the elections of October 2015. The PS was unable to channel the social discontent provoked by the austerity measures and only won a similar percentage of the than in the previous election (32%). The party that effectively capitalized social discontent was the Left Bloc, which, under the leadership of Catarina Martins, unexpectedly doubled the percentage of votes obtained in the 2011 elections. As a result, the Left Bloc, with 19 MPs, became the third political force at the national level.

This new composition of the AR revealed the limited capacity of the president to dictate the formation of government. Indeed, although the new parliamentary majority opposed the president, Cavaco Silva lobbied for the continuity of a government formed by the PSD-CDS. But without conventional powers and unable to "press" for the dissolution of the Assembly, due to being in the final months of his presidency, the president's aim was unrealized. Thus, as was expected, the government appointed by the president was dismissed —through the disapproval of its government program— by an innovative parliamentary alliance formed by the PS and political organizations ideologically located to its left side: Left Bloc, PCP and "The Greens." Subsequently, a few months before leaving office, Cavaco Silva, despite disagreeing with changes in government, had to appoint a minority cabinet chaired by the socialist Antonio Costa, which remained in power until the next legislative elections.

Finally, the results of the legislative elections of 2019 reinforced the relative majority of the PS in the AR, as the PS grew from having 86 to 108 MPs. Likewise, although the Left Bloc maintained its 19 seats, the coalition formed by the PCP and The Greens lost five seats (its MPs

went from 17 to 12). Moreover, the small eco-socialist People-Animals-Nature party increased its MPs from 1 to 4. However, the most highlighted aspect of these elections occurred at the right side of the political spectrum. Indeed, the CDS, a former ally of the PSD in several previous governments, obtained the worst result in its history, decreasing its parliamentary representation to only five MPs. Additionally, two recently created parties won one representative each: the populist and nationalist party called Enough, and the Liberal Initiative, a party that promotes classical liberalism. Finally, the PSD experienced a decrease in their number of MPs in the AR from 86 to 76 seats.

Table 3.4
Governments and Parliaments under the President-Parliamentary System (1983-2019)

Parliamentary Elections	Ministerial Cabinets (Governments)	Type of government	Parliament Support (%)	President	Presidential Elections
25 April 1983 (EE)	Mário Soares (PS) June 1983 – November 1985	Coalition government (pre-electoral)	Central Bloc (PS + PSD): 169 (73,47%)	António Ramalho Eanes was reelected 1981-1986	(December 1980)
5 October 1985 (EE)	Aníbal Cavaco Silva (PSD)November 1985 – August 1987	Minority Government	PSD: 88 (35,2%)	Mario Soares (PS) 1986-1991	*26 January 1986 (PE) /16 January (run- off election)*
19 July 1987 (EE)	Aníbal Cavaco Silva (PSD) July 1987 – October 1991	Majority Government	PSD: 148 (59,2%)		
6 October 1991	Aníbal Cavaco Silva (PSD) October 1991 – October 1995	Majority Government	PSD: 135 (58,7%)	Mario Soares (PS) (was reelected) 1991-1996	*13 January 1991 (PE)*
1 October 1995	Antonio Guterres (PS) October 1995-October 1999	Minority Government	PS: 112 (48,7%)		
10 October 1999	Antonio Guterres (PS) October 1999 – April 2002	Minority Government	PS: 115 (50%)	Jorge Sampaio (PS) 1996 – 2001	*14 January 1996 (PE)*
17 March 2002 (EE)	Durão Barroso (PSD) March 2002 0 July 2004	Coalition Government	PSD: 105 + CDS: 14 (51,7%)	Jorge Sampaio (PS) 2001 – 2006	*14* January 2001 (PE)
	Santana Lopes (PSD) July 2004 – March 2005				

Parliamentary Elections	Ministerial Cabinets (Governments)	Type of government	Parliament Support (%)	President	Presidential Elections
20 February 2005 (EE)	José Socrates (PS) March 2005 – September 2009	Majority Government	PS: 121 (52.6%)	(was reelected)	
27 September 2009	José Socrates (PS) October 2009 – May 2011	Minority Government	PS: 97 (42.17%)	Aníbal Cavaco Silva (PSD) 2006-2011	*22 January 2006 (PE)*
5 June 2011(EE)	Pedro Passos Coelho (PSD-CDS) July 2011 – October 2015	Coalition Government	PSD: 108 + CDS: 24 (57,4%)	Aníbal Cavaco Silva (PSD) 2011-2016	*23 January 2011 (PE)*
4 October 2015	Pedro Passos Coelho (PSD-CDS) October – November 2015	Minority Government	*Portugal Ahead* (PSD: 89 + CDS: 18): 107 (46,5%)		
	António Costa (PS) November 2015 – October 2019	Minority Government	PS: 86 (37.4%)		
6 October 2019	António Costa (PS) November 2019 – ?	Minority Government	PS:108 46,9%	Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (PSD) 2016-2021	*24 January 2016 (PE)*

Source: Author.
Presidential Elections: PE / Early Elections: EE

3.2 DID THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AFFECT STRUCTURES OF PARTY COMPETITION?

Considering the schemes of the appointment-dismissal game described in the previous sections, the dynamics that the actors followed before and after the constitutional reforms of 1982, as well as the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 2, the Portuguese system should have experienced two opposing tendencies according to their respective systems of government. Specifically, after the democratic return (1976-1982), the system should have been "presidentialized," while, after the constitutional reforms (1983 onwards), the pattern of party interaction should have shown a tendency contrary to "presidentialization;" that is, the actors should have acted based on a logic close to the parliamentary system. The structures of competition after the 1982 reforms may have become more closed and, therefore, the composition of governments, as well as party interaction, more stable.

However, are these trends demonstrable? In the following section, I discuss in detail the dynamics that the party presidentialization process may have followed before and after the changes of 1982. Next, based on these findings and using the IC, I analyze the variation of structures of competition (party system) in each of the research periods. Finally, I complement the previous analysis, highlighting the role that party fragmentation, as well as other variables, may have played in the consolidation of closed structures of competition during the decade of the 1990s.

3.2.1 PARTY PRESIDENTIALIZATION IN PORTUGAL BEFORE AND AFTER CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

The hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2 predict different trends in each type of semi-presidentialism when a distinct political force, or one opposed to the president, controls parliament. Specifically, my theoretical assumptions suggest that under the president-parliamentary system, due to presidential powers, possible combinations will always tend toward high party presidentialization.[48] In contrast, in the premier-presidential system, the research hypotheses assume that there is a combination that could annul the presidentialization and even reverse that process. This last scenario occurs when the presidency and the parliament are under the control of political forces that are not only different but also opposed in political terms.

[48] In simple terms: it doesn't matter whether the president's party controls parliament or not. The president will always have formal mechanisms to impose his will on the orientation or formation of governments. Even in extreme situations where the president faces a hostile parliament, the presidency would have the formal ability to "kick the board" (dissolve parliament).

I first analyze the combinations in Portugal under the presidential-parliamentary system (1976-1983) to verify if there was a party presidentialization process. In this period, there were eight formally constituted governments[49] with an average duration of 9.4 months. However, it should be noted that the variability is quite high since there are governments that lasted one month (Nobre da Costa's government), while others remained in office for up to 20 months (the second government of Balsemão). Likewise, since the president was independent, one could conclude that the presidency and the AR were in control of different political forces throughout this period. However, as was described in section 2.1.2, since the intensity of the confrontation between Antonio Ramalho Eanes and the AR reached such a high level, the combination that best reflects the Portuguese case occurs when the presidency and parliament are under the control of opposing or antagonistic forces; this was especially true after 1978.

What does my theoretical model tell when such a combination emerges in a president-parliamentary system? The model indicates that the confrontation is resolved through some constitutional mechanism (for instance, the dissolution of the parliament) or a democratic breakdown. Precisely, the first solution occurred in Portugal when Eanes decided to dissolve the AR in 1979 due to the successive fall of cabinets made up of professionals who responded directly to his will. Moreover, it is worth noting that due to the independent nature of the president, during this period he had no parliamentary group to support his actions or decisions. Although some political parties had some ideological affinities to the presidential figure (such as the PS or the PCP), President Eanes could not formally lead their parties' decisions or positions. In that way,

[49] I count the number of governments "formally" appointed by President. In that case, it does not matter whether the same prime minister remains in office; the same party coalition remains; or whether the change in government was not the result of a new election.

despite lacking the support of some political party in the AR, the president was able to impose ministerial cabinets for almost two years, thus reinforcing the system's presidential dimension.

In turn, regarding the period when Portugal had a premier-presidential system (1983 onwards), I first consider the scenarios where the same political party controlled presidency and parliament. The cases meeting those criteria occurred only during two short periods: between 1996 and 2000, and 2011 and 2015. In the first one, Socialist leaders Antonio Guterres, as prime minister, and Antonio Sampaio, as President of the Republic, were simultaneously in the office. Likewise, during the second stage, it was instead the Social Democratic leaders Pedro Passos Coelho and Aníbal Cavaco Silva, who simultaneously held the positions of prime minister and president, respectively.

A detailed analysis, however, reveals a couple of singularities of these short periods where, in theory, party behavior should have tended towards a presidential logic. First, it must be considered that the formal and de facto leaders of political parties held the prime minister's position and not the presidential one, which reveals the systemic importance of parliament over presidency. Furthermore, the other no less important feature is that in both cases, the president's political party did not wholly control the AR. Indeed, Guterres' government was a minority one, while the cabinet chaired by Coelho remained in office thanks to a coalition with the CDS. In this way, the probability of a central role of the president was extremely low since the governments' stability depended directly on the AR. An empirical episode that reinforces this last assertion occurred when the PSD-CDS coalition, in the elections of October 2015, lost the parliamentary majority (it went from controlling 57.4% of seats to only 46.5%). The still-President, Cavaco Silva, although he did not have a relative majority in the AR, tried to force the continuity of the government chaired by Coelho.

However, as was pointed out in section 2.1.4, less than two months after his nomination, Coelho's cabinet was dismissed by all the opposition forces of the parliament through the disapproval of its plan of government.

Subsequently, it can be seen that the Portuguese post-reform system of government operated under a parliamentary logic. The hypothesis presented in Chapter 2 maintains that in the premier-presidential system, unlike the president-parliamentary system, when the phenomenon known as cohabitation appears with some frequency, a tendency contrary to party presidentialization emerges. In the case of Portugal, the data indicate that 12 of the 14 governments formally constituted between 1983 and 2019 were chaired by prime ministers whose party affiliation was different from that of the president at the time. In other words, considering the years of government, it can be asserted that in approximately 72% of the years after the constitutional reform of 1982, the Portuguese government experienced a situation similar to the phenomenon known as cohabitation. In that way, one could argue that not only would the presidentialization process have been canceled, but that a contrary process would have emerged, that is, of party "parliamentarization."

Additionally, the dynamics of party interaction after the reforms of 1982 reveal the existence of two complementary factors that may have reinforced the process of "parliamentarization." The first of these is an unwritten rule (non-formal institution) that may have gained legitimacy during the second half of the 1980s. Indeed, after Eanes left the presidency in 1985, Soares' rise to power meant the establishment of a presidential model that was radically different from previous administrations. As was mentioned in section 2.1.4, one of Soares's objectives was to reinforce the arbitration of the presidential figure. In that way, seeking to

accomplish his expressed objective, Soares alienated the presidency from any parliamentary dispute, with the intention that he be perceived by the citizenry as a legitimate arbitrator to resolve any tension or disagreement between the political forces. The resulting subsequent period of political stability revealed that having a president with this type of a profile was beneficial to the operation of the political system. For this reason, all political actors (including citizens) quickly assumed as an unwritten rule that the presidential role as arbitrator may only be legitimate if the president's party does not control the AR.

In turn, a second factor that may have reinforced the unwritten rule's effectiveness is that the Portuguese electoral system adhered to the rule of holding the legislative and presidential elections on different dates. As was noted in Chapter 2, simultaneous elections in systems of government with separation of powers frequently gives the party of the winning presidential candidate a parliamentary majority due to the so-called "coattail effect". In the Portuguese case, this phenomenon was minimized, as presidential and legislative elections have been non-concurrent since the establishment of democracy. Thus, the virtue of this electoral calendar is that it offers a chance to "correct", in the next presidential or legislative election, those scenarios in which the same party holds the presidency and the parliamentary majority.

In sum, the Portuguese case reveals that non-concurrent elections are a useful mechanism to prevent the same party from controlling both the presidency and the parliament. However, that rule increases its effectiveness when the main actors (including citizens) consider that when both parliament and presidency are under the control of the same political force, the political system does not operate correctly operate since the balance of political forces has been disrupted.

3.2.2 STRUCTURES OF COMPETITION AND THE INDEX OF CLOSURE

According to the previous analysis, the party presidentialization process before and after the constitutional reforms of 1982 took divergent directions. In that sense, following the assumptions of this thesis' theoretical model, the pattern of party interaction during the government formation should also have manifested in contrary directions. That is to say, before 1982, the structures of party competition should have been less closed, whereas after the constitutional reforms, said structures should have become more closed or predictable.

In other words, it can be asserted that the formation of governments between 1976 and 1982 was more unpredictable; that is, there was a high probability of the rising of both new political leaders and innovative government formulas. By contrast, after 1982, the structure of competition was becoming increasingly predictable to the extent that political parties and their relations were becoming more stable. In sum, the central actors of the system (citizens, political leaders, parties, etc.) finally adjusted their behavior to the existence of an "almost constant cast of parties" whose interactions (of cooperation or rivalry) were also more stable.

However, is it possible to verify empirically that structures of competition became more closed after the reforms of 1982? The evolution of the IC described in Chapter 2 reveals that the structures of competition certainly behaved differently before and after the constitutional changes of 1982. The score for this Index during the period 1976-1982 was 70.7, while the score from 1983 until 2019 was 92.99. Nevertheless, the IC's variation during the entire period of analysis suggests that the elections of 1987 may have been a turning point. In fact, the IC's scores prior to that year reached very low values (37.5 or 33.24), whereas, in the following period (1987-2019), almost all

the IC's scores were higher than 80.[50] But the adoption of a closed structure of competition did not coincide with the constitutional change, since the IC frequently reached values above 80 following the elections of 1987 (see Figure 3.1).



Figure 3.1: ***Index of Closure in Portugal (1976-2019)***
Elaborated by Author.

How does one explain the lag in the emergence of a closed structure of competition? To some extent, one could argue that the elections of 1983 and 1985 were part of a process of adjustment of the expectations of the main actors to the new institutional context. In other words, one could argue that during the elections following the year of 1982, political leaders and voters had to assimilate to a reality in which the formation of government was no longer mainly decided by the president, but rather by parliament. Nevertheless, is it possible to corroborate the existence

[50] Except in the elections of 2011 and 2015 where the IC in both cases was 66.67.

of an adaptation process? A look at the behavior of political actors following the reforms of 1982 offers some evidence in this regard. Indeed, concerning the behavior of the president, Eanes warned that the power alone to dissolve parliament did not offer any advantage or effective influence on the formation of governments. Therefore, after twice executing this action (1983 and 1985) to resolve a similar political situation, Eanes chose not only to advance the elections but also to constitute a political party to compete in said elections (PRD). Undoubtedly, Eanes understood that after 1982, if one wanted to gain some influence in the formation of governments, one must get seats at parliament. His strategy worked, and the PRD —despite having been formed just four months prior to the elections of 1985— reached 45 seats.

Additionally, as was indicated in section 2.1.3, the most significant parties on the Portuguese political scene understood that if they wanted to influence the formation of government from the parliament, they should first correct the institutional design bias in favor of the president. Therefore, after the fall of two governments forged in the AR (one of minority type and the other of coalition) and the imposition of three independent cabinets, the PS and PSD chose to cooperate with the strategic objective of reducing the powers of the president. The goal was achieved thanks to the reforms of 1982,[51] which formally gave greater preponderance to the AR in the appointment-dismissal game. But, as a way to strengthen the new institutional structure, the socialist and social-democratic parties —despite their evident ideological distances— decided to form a powerful

[51] The cooperation between the PS and the PSD was not easy. Although the PS always refused to withdraw the economic content of the Constitution, both forces converged on reforming the institutional design of the government structure. Thus, in the absence of a party to defend presidential interests in the parliament, the elimination of the CR, the reduction of president's powers, and the express indication that the government was politically accountable to the parliament were approved in the AR without major obstacles(Gaspar, 1990, pp. 21-22).

government coalition in 1983 (73.5% of seats of the parliament), which served to finally banish any influence of the presidency on the formation of governments.

That being said, an analysis of the presidential role in the period prior to the constitutional reforms of 1982 is necessary. Although the presidential-parliamentary design indeed gives a higher preponderance to the presidency, this analysis is limited because Eanes was the only one to occupy such position during that period. In that sense, it is worth asking whether the presidential dynamism of this first stage derived from institutional incentives or instead stemmed from the president's personality. The latter was because, as Frain has effectively pointed out, presidential intervention in the political arena was always strongly marked by the style and personality of President Eanes (Frain, 1995, pp. 655-656).

However, without denying the influence that the leader's personality may exert on political institutions, it is verifiable that Eanes' role before and after the reforms varied considerably. Indeed, under the president-parliamentary design, the president was decisive and even influenced the formation of governments for almost two years without having the support of any party in the parliament. Conversely, under the premier-presidential system, his participation in the formation of governments (1983 and 1985) was just procedural since the president did not influence either the composition or the renovation of cabinets. Thus, for instance, the fall of Central Bloc (1983) or PS (1985) cabinets did not respond to a presidential initiative but rather to a loss of parliamentary majority. The latter clearly reveals the importance of the AR in the stability of governments, as well as the inability of the president to influence their composition or dismissal, as had happened before 1982.

3.2.3 STRUCTURES OF COMPETITION, PARTY FRAGMENTATION AND THE RISE OF INDEPENDENTS

The previous analysis can be complemented by an analysis of the number of parties that operate in the system. Indeed, as was pointed out in Chapter 2, in the premier-presidential form of government a higher level of party fragmentation increases the complexity of forming or maintaining governments (ministerial cabinets). The basic premise is that a higher number of parties makes the party negotiation process more demanding and complicated, which could affect governments' durability. Likewise, in the case of the president-parliamentary form of government, the party fragmentation indirectly affects the formation of governments. In this case, a significant party fragmentation may further reduce the influence that AR could exert on the government's orientation, thus enhancing the president's field of action.

According to the Laakso-Taagepera index of the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP),[52] during the period when the IC reached medium or low values, Portugal had an average ENPP of 3.9. Even in some conjunctures similar to that of 1985, the party system operated with 4.25 effective parliamentary parties. On the contrary, considering only the period when the IC reached high values (from 1987 onwards), on average the ENPP has been 2.7. In sum, it is evident that there is a reversed proportional relationship between the effective number of parties and the level of closure of the structures of party competition (see Figure 3.2).

[52] In the literature, the Laakso-Taagepera index has been calculated considering the electoral results (percentage of votes) or the number of seats obtained in parliament (percentage of seats). In this study, I use this last modality.



Figure 3.2: ENPP versus IC (only for years when "government change" occurred)
Source: Author.

Additionally, the variation of the ENPP after 1985 reveals a strong relationship between party fragmentation and government stability. Indeed, during the longest period of stability in post-authoritarian Portugal (1987-1999) —it should be kept in mind that three successive governments remained in office for the maximum period of the legislature: 4 years each — the average ENPP was 2.39, which is to say there was almost a bi-partisan system. After this period, other significant breakpoints occurred in the elections of 2009; from that year to 2019, the average number of effective parliamentary parties in Portugal reached a value of 3.06. This recent trend coincides precisely with the decline of the IC, especially after the legislative elections of 2015, when the ENPP was 3.26, and the IC reached a value of 66.67.



Figure 3.3: Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties in Portugal (1976-2019)
Source: Author.

On the other hand, as was indicated in Chapter 2, the IC of Casal-Bertoa and Enyedi presents certain limitations regarding the indicator that captures the openness or access to the government of new political actors (percentage of ministers who were never part of any government administration). As was argued, this component is already partially captured by the indicator that measures the degree of innovation of the government formula. Therefore, I decided to add to the original indicator proposed by Casal-Bertoa and Enyedi the percentage of independent ministers appointed in governments. From my perspective, this sum[53] best reflects the level of openness of the system towards the entry of actors not directly linked to the political parties that are part of the "stable cast" of the parliament.

[53] This refers to the percentage of ministers who have never been part of any government before, plus the percentage of independent ministers.

However, although the IC captures the impact of independents on the formation of governments,[54] it does not tell anything about its importance in other arenas, such as the electoral or presidential contexts. Therefore, intending to have a complementary approach on the role of independents in the political competition, I decided to explore the evolution of two additional indicators: the percentage of independent ministers and the vote obtained by independent candidates in the presidential elections (see Figure 3.3).



Figure 3.4: Independent Ministers and Voting by Presidential Independent Candidates
Source: Author.

The data reveals that the variation of votes for independent presidential candidates has gone through three different periods. The first one started with the election of Ramalho Eanes (1976) and culminated in the presidential election of 1986 with the participation of two independent

[54] Indeed, the IC's values and the values of the indicator of "Access to the government" are highly correlated.

candidates (Francisco Salgado Zenha and Maria de Lourdes Pintassilgo). This period was characterized by a progressive reduction of electoral preferences in favor of this type of candidate. Indeed, the voting for independent presidential candidates went from representing 61.59% to merely 28.26%. Likewise, considering the percentage of independent ministers in governments, it is seen that during this stage —without considering the years of 1978 and 1979 where the cabinets were entirely made up of independents— this percentage also dropped from 16.67% in 1976 to 5.89% in 1990.

Subsequently, the presidential elections of 1991 led to the initiation of the second phase which culminated in the presidential election of 2001. The absence of independent presidential candidates was the central feature of this period. However, despite a lack of this type of candidate, all governments maintained a quota of independent ministers which ranged from 5% to 22% of the total number of ministers. Likewise, it should be noted that this period coincided with the period of the highest durability of cabinets in democratic Portugal.

Finally, the third stage started with the presidential elections of 2006 and may still be ongoing. The central feature of this last period is the progressive increase of electoral preferences towards independent presidential candidates and their rising number. Indeed, independents returned to the political scene with the presidential candidacy of Manuel Alegre, a former militant of the PS who had lost the elections for Secretary-General of his party two years before the presidential elections. Although the independent candidate did not win the presidential elections, he obtained about 20.7% of the votes, surpassing the official PS candidate (Mario Soares). After that electoral experience, Alegre returned to compete in the 2011 elections, obtaining a similar percentage of votes (18.53%). The only difference from the previous experience was that this time

his candidature received the support of the PS, the BE, the Portuguese Workers' Communist Party, and the leadership of the organization that sponsored his candidature in 2006: Intervention and Citizenship Movement. However, the most remarkable thing about this election was that two other independent candidates also raced for the presidency: Fernando Nobre and Defensor Moura, who obtained 13 and 1% of the votes respectively. This trend was maintained in the next elections (2016), where the number of independent candidates increased (seven in total), and they obtained a combined 33.9% of the total votes.

The return to electoral competition for independent presidential candidates coincided temporarily with a more significant presence of independent ministers in government cabinets. Indeed, the independents occupied almost half of ministerial portfolios (47% of all ministers) after the legislative elections of 2005. Likewise, with the government change that occurred due to the parliamentary elections of 2011, the percentage of independent ministers has maintained its significant presence in government (33.25%). In sum, from a historical perspective, the significant percentage of independent ministers in different types of governments (single-party, majority and minority), both from center-left and center-right, indicate that their contribution is valued as a means of increasing both technical competence and political legitimacy but at the same time their inclusion poses challenges to democratic governance, particularly in relation to mechanisms of executive accountability and responsiveness (Pinto and de Almeida, 2018, pp. 131-132).

3.3 BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: AN EXPLANATION OF THE RECENT VARIATION OF THE STRUCTURES OF COMPETITION

The rise of independents on the Portuguese political scene and the increase of the effective number of parliamentary parties in the last legislative elections, temporarily coincide with the decrease in the level of closure of structures of competition. Although it is not possible to establish a direct causal relationship between these three trends, their simultaneity reveals that they are expressions of a significant transformation of the pattern of political competition that characterized Portugal throughout the 1990s. One explanation could be that a growing number of citizens have started to demand the renewal of the established political class (partisan leadership) which may imply that current political parties are not adequately channeling some new demands or social interests.

This explanation has empirical support to the extent that after the most prolonged period of government stability where the IC reached its maximum value (98.4),[55] there were precisely two evident emergent changes in citizens' preferences. At the parliamentary level, the "small" parties located at both ideological poles (left and right) began to capture a higher percentage of votes in each new election. On the left, the BE went from reaching 2.4% in the elections of 2005 to nearly 10% of votes in the elections of 2019. Similarly, on right, the beneficiary was the CDS that went from getting 8% of votes in 1999 to 11.7% in 2015, its best vote historically. However, the government coalition with the PSD between 2011 and 2015, deteriorated its electoral political capital. Consequently, in the elections of 2019, two new parties emerged on the right side, and the

[55] The value of 98.4 corresponds to the period that began in the elections of 1987 and ended in 1998 (before the elections of 1999).

CDS only obtained 4.2% of the total votes. Additionally, to complete this new scenario, one could consider the recent changes in the presidential arena where there was a return of the independent candidates who grew abruptly from one in the 2006 elections to three and seven in 2011 and 2016, respectively.

In this context, characterized by a decline of the IC (94.3),[56] the willingness of leaders (both PS and PSD) of recruiting independent ministers would be a way not only of reinforcing his/her power over the cabinet, but also of strengthening the government's legitimacy. In other words, it is evident that after a long period where the PS and PSD had alternated in power (1987-1999), the citizenry was progressively assuming that said parties were losing their quality of being "responsible." Political leaders have responded by opening the government to a higher percentage of "independents", while citizens reacted in two ways. One sector of the electorate begun seeking political alternatives at the extremes of the ideological fields, whereas another sector chose to augment the traditional Portuguese electoral absenteeism (see Figure 3.4).

[56] Reflects the period from the IC that originated as a result of the elections of 1999 elections to the IC resulting from the elections of 2019.



Figure 3.5: Electoral Turnout in Presidential and Parliamentary Elections (%)
Source: Author

However, returning to the IC, it is evident that the recent decrease in this index is not comparable to the values corresponding to the period under a president-parliamentary system of government. It is enough to recall that during the period 1976 – 1986 (I am including the two elections right after the constitutional changes), the IC was 70.45, the lowest since the return to democracy. Then, when Portugal already had a consolidated premier-presidential system (1987-2019), the IC's scores reached values over 90. In fact, as I already indicated, during the period 1987-1998, the IC reached its maximum value of 98.4; and then, although the IC suffered a slight decrease (94.3), it is quite far from the reported score for the period 1976-1986.

In conclusion, the combination of a premier-presidential system, a quasi-bipartisanship, and frequent scenarios of "cohabitation" may have caused the closure of structures of competition in the medium term (from 1987 onwards). As the Portuguese case shows, this scenario may produce the emergence of a certain social discontent towards the system of representation, if citizens notice

that the "established parties" have begun to respond less effectively to their demands. However, the existence of a two-headed executive allows the social discontent to be channeled primarily through competition for the presidency. Indeed, due to the nature of these elections and the relative importance of said institution in the political system, access to this competition is less demanding but useful for building political-electoral capital.[57]

At the same time, the increasing fragmentation of the electorate in the presidential elections could lead to the adoption of certain measures of internal renewal on behalf of an established parties' leaders (for example, the inclusion of independents in governments) with the aim of regaining citizens' favor. If the internal renovation of the "established parties" is successful, then the IC will tend to rise again in the short term. But, if the established parties fail to synchronize again with the majority of citizens, then the openness of the system will deepen (IC will tend to descend), and the emerging leadership (small or new parties) could progressively co-opt electoral preferences. If the latter occurs and this new leadership manages to maintain citizen support beyond just one electoral juncture, then IC scores will rise again.

To sum up, the Portuguese case reveals that the premier-presidential form of government offers some institutional flexibility for the renovation of the political class (emergence of new parties or the internal renovation of established parties), initially via competition for the presidency. In this sense, it is not pernicious that structures of competition tend to open temporarily since such variation indicates the need for renewal in political leadership. Thereby, if this last process is

[57] In other words, it is entirely feasible that some candidates without a party (that is to say, independent) that gained a certain electoral support in the presidential elections, could then consolidate a new political organization to compete in the legislative elections.

successful (and the structures of competition are closed again in the short term), one would observe an "institutionalized" party system in Huntington's sense. To put it another way, said system would have the capacity to adapt to social changes without the need of a traumatic collapse of the party system or a democratic breakdown. However, what happens in the president-parliamentary systems? Does this system also offer this flexibility for the renovation of the political class? Or, in another sense, does such a form of government also promote the trend towards closed structures? In the next chapter, we offer some answers to these concerns based on the Peruvian case.

CHAPTER 4

PERU: THE COST OF KEEPING THE PRESIDENT-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

This chapter analyzes the dynamics of party competition structures in a president-parliamentary system, that of Peru. For reasons explained in Chapter 2, the study does not attempt to identify the direct impact of a constitutional change, but rather to evaluate the effects in the medium and long term of the president-parliamentary system on structures of party competition. To this end, in the first section, I offer a brief discussion on the type of government adopted by Peru since its return to democracy in 1979. I argue that although Peru has had two constitutions since the fall of the military dictatorship (1968-1979), the systems of government derived from each of these constitutions (1979 and 1993) can well be classified as president-parliamentary. I shall analyze these changes considering the antecedent Constitution of 1933. Then, in the second section, I analyze the formation of ministerial cabinets during the 1980-2018 period with an emphasis on the relations established between the president and parties in parliament. However, as I already mentioned in Chapter 2, this study excludes cabinets formed between 1993 and 2000 years as during that period Peru experienced an autocratic regime.[58] Thereby, my research comprises two periods in empirical terms. The first period runs from the first elections after the implementation of the Constitution of 1979 up to Alberto Fujimori's *autogolpe* (self-coup) in 1992. In turn, the second period begins with the presidential elections of 2001—the first democratic elections held after the fall of Fujimori's regime— and ends in 2019 with the dissolution of

[58] As was mentioned in Chapter 2, I merely use —following the thesis' methodological design— the scores of the Polity IV Index to exclude the period 1992-2000 (< 6 points). In fact, during almost all this period Peru had a score of 1 in said index. The exceptions were the years 1992 and 2000, when the scores were -3 and 5, respectively. Although it is not a research goal to discuss the nature of Fujimori regime, if the reader wishes s/he can review the following studies on that topic: McClintock (1999), Levitsky and Loxton (2013), Fernandes (2015), McClintock (2018).

Congress by President Martin Vizcarra.[59] A careful assessment of these periods seeks to corroborate the expectations of the thesis' theoretical model (Chapter 2) on the predominant role that the presidency plays in the president-parliamentary form of government. In the third section, considering the results of the previous analysis, I explain how this presidential predominance party leads, in the medium term, to the emergence of a less closed structure of party competition. Finally, in the fourth section, as a way to complement the analysis of the Peruvian structures of competition, I conclude by explaining the inexistent relationship between them and party fragmentation in parliament.

4.1 PRESIDENTIAL OR SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL? THE PERUVIAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT SINCE THE 1980S

A quick assessment of the studies conducted on the form of government in Peru reveals that it has been explored mainly by constitutionalists. For instance, in that specialty the works of Espinosa-Saldaña (1997), Guzmán Napurí (2003), Eguiguren (2007) and García (2009) stand out. The consensus in these studies is that, from the early 1980s up to the present day, Peru experienced a hybrid system of government. However, some of them have emphasized that said system would have shifted from an institutional design that was quasi pure-presidential (1980-1992)) to one

[59] The analysis period culminates with the parliament's closing (September 30, 2019) because there was no parliament until the early parliament elections (January 26, 2020). According to the Constitution, until the holding of these new legislative elections, the president was empowered to govern through only decrees. Thus, as one of the central aspects of this research is to characterize the relationship between the parliament and the presidency, analyzing this last period is empirically unfeasible. Moreover, an analysis of the relationship between the president and the newly elected parliament (as a result of the elections of January 2020) would contribute little to the research objectives. Indeed, it should be noted that President Martin Vizcarra (who came to power due to the resignation of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski) was dismissed on November 10, 2020 by the new Congress. Then, after a week of political turmoil, Congress's president (Francisco Sagasti Hochhausler) assumed the presidency for the remaining presidential term (from November 17, 2020 until July 2021). In sum, to analyze this last period would be to study a very short and exceptional period.

"more parliamentary" or also called as "attenuated" or "diminished" presidentialism (1993 onwards) (Eguiguren, 2007, pp. 19-20; García, 2009). Nevertheless, as I show in the following paragraphs, an analysis of the appointment–dismissal game established by the 1979 and 1993 constitutions reveals that the variation has been insignificant.

First of all, considering again the Portuguese case, it could be said that the Peruvian Constitution of 1979, like the Portuguese one of 1976, was a significant milestone in Peru's return to democracy. Likewise, as in Portugal, the institutional design adopted to define relations between the Executive and Legislative built on previous constitutional experiences. In that way, the preponderance granted to Congress by the Constitution of 1933 was corrected in the Constitution of 1979. The result was an institutional design that bolstered the president's position and limited the powers of Congress.

Specifically, the variations of Congress' dismissal powers in Peruvian constitutions (1933 and 1979) illustrate very well these minor changes. According to the Constitution of 1933, the Chamber of Deputies or Senators could dismiss, via a no confidence motion, the whole cabinet or each minister individually. Indeed, this mechanism could be deployed by a single representative (Senator or MP), be voted on the same day it was presented and its approval requires only a simple majority vote.[60] Additionally, said Constitution explicitly stated that if the required votes were

[60] Under this institutional design, a president, without a parliamentary majority, hardly could keep the stability of ministerial cabinets. Thus, for instance, during the first Belaunde's government (1963-1968), the parliament was controlled by a powerful alliance formed by APRA and the Odriist National Union (ONU). As said alliance had 85 of the 140 deputies and 25 of the 50 senators, it not only dismissed easily ten ministers but also blocked essential measures such as the Land Reform Bill. Finally, the paralysis of Belaunde's government as well as some media reports on government corruption acts provoked General Juan Velasco to lead a coup d'état in 1968.

reached, the censured cabinet or minister must resign immediately.[61] This institutional advantage of parliament generated various situations of instability and confrontation, to the point that: "… ningún gobierno electo en procesos inobjetables logró concluir su mandato entre 1933-80…pues el debilitamiento de las potestades presidenciales y el poder de las mayorías parlamentarias opositoras, propiciaron un cuadro político de bloqueo, inestabilidad y relativa ingobernabilidad, que culminó en la producción de golpes militares…" (Eguiguren, 1993, p. 163).[62]

In contrast, and partly due to previous experience, the Constitution of 1979 made it harder to apply the no confidence motion against individual ministers or the whole Council of Ministers. Firstly, said Constitution established that only the Chamber of Deputies had the authority to dismiss ministers or a cabinet. It also determined that initiating a no confidence motion required at least 25% of the legal numbers of MPs, and its approval over half of the total votes. Regardless, although these new requirements made the use of this mechanism more difficult, its application ultimately depended on who controlled the Chamber of Deputies. If the president's party had most seats, a no-confidence motion was unlikely to succeed. However, if an opposing party or coalition controlled the Chamber of Deputies, the required votes to approve a no confidence vote could be easily achieved. Precisely due to this last scenario, the simultaneity of presidential and legislative elections was kept with the goal of reducing the chances of having a president without a parliamentary majority. Indeed, every time that changes from concurrent to non-simultaneous elections were debated, the consensus was that simultaneous elections favored political stability as

[61] The Constitution accepted that the parliament could dismiss the Council of Ministers when a motion of no confidence against the prime minister was requested (Torralba, 2019).

[62] "…no government elected in legitimate elections managed to conclude its mandate between 1933-80… because the weakening of the presidential powers and the power of opposing parliamentary majorities fostered a political context of blockage, instability, and relative ungovernability which culminated through military coups…".

both Congress and parliament should reflect the same electoral preferences (Torralba, 2019, pp. 108-109).[63]

In addition, another novel presidential power granted by the C-93 allowed for the dissolution of parliament. The Constitution of 1979 introduced this mechanism seeking to reduce the likelihood that parliament would frequently alter the ministerial cabinet's composition. Indeed, the C-79 explicitly granted the president's power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies if it censured or denied its confidence to three councils of ministers within a presidential term (Article 227). Finally, both constitutions (1933 and 1979) maintained the presidential authority to appoint and dismiss cabinet members (even individually).

However, despite those constitutional changes, the C-79 proved to be as ineffective as the former C-33 since it did not offer a way to resolve confrontations between Legislative and Executive powers. Firstly, the dismissal by parliament of a minister or cabinet did not necessarily imply a change in the orientation of government policies since the president could appoint a new minister or President of Council of Ministers (PCM)[64] who could continue with the previous policies. Secondly, although the president had the power to dissolve parliament, it was the Chamber of Deputies who had to effectively do it. Thereby, due to a logic of political survival, this last institution could obviously opt to remove ministers individually and avoid the scenario for its own dissolution. Thirdly, although it was legally reasonable that only the Chamber who had the power

[63] It is worth noting that the simultaneity of presidential and legislative elections in Peru has not varied since its establishment in 1920. Additionally, I can affirm that due to this simultaneity, a new presidential period will always start with a new prime minister, and likely he/she keeps changing these until the end of his/her term. In other words, each general election (presidential and legislative) always bring a new prime minister (PCM) but directly as a result of the presidential election.

[64] As is formally called to the "Prime Minister" in the Peruvian legal system.

of ministerial dismissal was dissolved, the partial dissolution power of an opposite and hostile parliament was ineffective. Indeed, if the president dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate remained intact, and opposition forces could still hinder the regular march of government in terms of policies.

Finally, because the institutional design slightly favored the presidency, some authors argued that the system had an almost presidential logic. Likewise, it has been explicitly pointed out that the institutional framework under which political actors operated during the 1980s was not semi-presidential. Thus, for instance, regarding the form of government in the 1979 Constitution, the constitutional expert Francisco Eguiguren stated:

> La débil posición que aún ostenta el Consejo de Ministros y su propio Presidente frente a la autoridad del Presidente de la República, así como su separación del Parlamento, impide que se puede sostener, desde el punto de vista teórico y práctico, que esta existencia de un Consejo de Ministros y su Presidente configuren un régimen parlamentario e incluso de una semi-presidencial. (1993, p. 170)[65]

However, there is a crucial feature that makes it possible to identify the Peruvian system of government as semi-presidential. This attribute is that the ministerial cabinet was formally accountable to parliament. Indeed, as was indicated in Chapter 1, if parliament (in this case, the Chamber of Deputies) has the power to dismiss ministers or PCM, this implies that their survival

[65] [The weak position still held by the Council of Ministers and its own President vis-à-vis the authority of the President of the Republic, as well as his separation from the parliament, prevent that it can be maintained, from a theoretical and practical point of view, that this existence of a Council of Ministers and its President form a parliamentary system and even a semi-presidential one]

depends not only on the president but also on parliament. Thereby, the form of government designed by the Constitution of 1979 fits both Elgie's definition of semi-presidentialism and Samuels and Shugart's sub-type of president-parliamentary.

From my perspective, the characterization of the Peruvian form of government (that is, as president-parliamentary) did not vary with the constitutional change that occurred in the early 1990s. On the contrary, the Constitution of 1993 incorporated some typical mechanisms of parliamentary systems. That is why some authors have argued that the Constituent Assembly of 1993 "parliamentarized" or "attenuated the presidential dimension" of the government system. Indeed, the new Constitution granted parliament the power to influence the ministerial cabinet's formation. In what way? Unlike the Constitution of 1979, the Constitution of 1993 established that the Council of Ministries, within 30 days of being appointed, shall attend Congress to present the main government policies and strategies for their implementation. After that, the PCM must request a "vote of confidence" from parliament (informally called in Peru: "vote of investiture") (Article 130, C-93). If a legal majority of representatives denies the motion of confidence, then a "total crisis of cabinet" occurs, whereby all members of the Council of Ministers must resign immediately.

As the Constitution of 1993 also established, the parliamentary power to dismiss ministers (either individually or collectively through the PCM), post-1993 Peruvian parliaments can influence both the formation of ministerial cabinets (through the called "investiture vote") and the orientation of government policies (through the no confidence motion). Thus, in practice, the constitutional reforms gave the parliament greater leverage in the political process. Thereby, since 1993 when the presidents appoint their ministerial cabinets, they silently seek a sufficient degree of parliamentary support to guarantee the cabinet's viability.

However, considering that a parliament controlled by rivals could set up a scenario of successive ministerial appointments-dismissals, the Constitution of 1993 chose to maintain the slight systemic presidential advantage through an improved power to dissolve parliament. Indeed, because the parliament was transformed into a unicameral body, its dissolution implied the total reconfiguration of the Legislature. Likewise, the Constitution of 1993 lowered the threshold required to apply this mechanism: the president can dissolve parliament if it censures or denies its confidence to only two councils of ministers (Article 134. C-93). In sum, the institutional design of 1993, compared to that of 1979, improved the flexibility of the political system by facilitating the eventual reconfiguration of parliament, giving thus an effective solution to any situation of political confrontation between state branches.

On the other hand, another aspect that reveals the semi-presidential character of the system of government is the importance granted to PCM in the Constitution of 1993. Notice that only two articles in the Constitution of 1979 mention the PCM. The first one indicates that the Council of Ministers has a PCM that is appointed and removed by the president, and that although the Council it has the power to appoint and resign ministers, it must to so at the proposal and in agreement with the PCM (Article 216). The second mention of the PCM occurs in relation to the formal presentation of every newly appointed Council of Ministers in parliament. In this case, Article 224 implicitly assumes that PCM must give such presentation. After these two mentions, there is no other reference to the roles or functions of PCM, also informally called "Premier" or "Prime Minister".[66]

[66] The figure of the prime minister has a long tradition in Peruvian constitutionalism. This position was mentioned for the first time in the Ministers Act of 1856, under the Constitution of the same year. However, the office of the President of the Council of Ministers is mentioned explicitly in the constitutional text as of the Constitution of 1933 (Torralba (2018, pp. 24-25)

In contrast, the Constitution of 1993 explicitly establishes the functions and powers of the PCM. This new Magna Carta points out that the Premier can not only present a "motion of confidence" on behalf of the entire cabinet (Article 133) but can also attend and participate in the parliament's sessions with the same prerogatives' members have, except voting in the plenaries (Article 129). Additionally, Article 123 reinforces the symbolic and procedural significance of the PCM. Symbolic because subsection 1 of said Article indicates that after the president, the PCM is the government's authorized spokesperson. Similarly, the procedural importance of said charge stems from the fact that the PCM must endorse legislative and emergency decrees, as well as other decrees and resolutions that the Constitution and the law indicate.

In sum, based on the described analysis, I can claim that both constitutions (1979 and 1993) fit within the semi-presidential sub-type called president-parliamentary. Moreover, this similarity may be corroborated through the application of the appointment-dismissal game scheme to these two constitutions. Indeed, as you can see in Table 4.1, the difference turns out to be minimal (+1) and is exclusively due to the "reactive" power that the parliament has of approving or confirming the ministerial cabinet appointment made by the president.

Table 4.1

A Schematization of the Appointment-Dismissal Game – Constitutions 1933, 1979 y 1993

					President's Party < Parliament	**President's Party > Parliament**
Constitution in force	**President**		**Congress**		**Total**	**Total /Absolute Value/**
	Nominate	**Dismiss**	**Confirm/ Approval**	**Dismiss**		
Constitution of 1933	2	2	0	-2	+2	+6
Constitution of 1979	2	2	0	-1*	+3	+5
Constitution of 1993	2	2	-1	-2	+1	+7

Elaborated by author based on Shugart and Carey (1992).

*One point is awarded to the bicameral parliament because only the Chamber of Deputies had the authority to remove members of the ministerial cabinet.

4.2 PRESIDENTS, CABINETS AND PARTY PRESIDENTIALIZATION IN PERU

After arguing that the Peruvian government system can be classified as parliamentary-presidential, I analyze the relations between the Legislative and the Executive in the process of forming ministerial cabinets. The central objective is to verify the expectations suggested by the theoretical model described in Chapter 2. Specifically, regardless of who controls parliament, I expect that the president imposes his/her will both in the formation of cabinets and in the orientation of government policies. In the same way, following the theoretical model, it is expected that when the president faces an opposing parliament, the outcome will depend on the feasibility of the mechanism available to reconfigure the parliament (dissolution of parliament and early elections for the legislative). If this presidential power is easy to use, then the probability of Congress' dissolution is high. On the contrary, if it is not, then the most probable solution to political confrontation will be a breakdown of the constitutional order. It is clear then, that under the president-parliamentary institutional design, actors do not contemplate a scenario where the president significantly resigns his ability to influence the formation of cabinets —and therefore the orientation of government policies— to a parliament controlled by rivals.

That being said, it should be noted that the following analysis will only cover the years 1980-1992 and 2011-2018. I exclude the 1993-2000 period because in it Peru obtained scores of less than six in the Polity IV index. In that way, an analysis of the structures of competition would not make sense since, during the nineties, Peru did not have "real party competition" within a democracy but rather a single party monopolizing the system.

4.2.1 FROM THE "ALL-MIGHTY" PRESIDENTS TO THE TRAUMATIC SOLUTION (1980-1992)

The return to democracy in the late 1970s made Peru part of the third wave of democratization. In that sense, it was understood that the following decade would be crucial to define the direction of Peruvian democracy: whether it would consolidate or break down. In terms of party competition, there were favorable expectations. The triumphant return to the political scene of APRA[67] and Popular Action (PA), the two main political forces before the military coup of 1964, revealed that they had popular support and an excellent capacity for political-electoral mobilization. Indeed, Fernando Belaunde, leader and founder of Popular Action, reached the presidency in the elections of 1980, while Alan García, the favorite disciple of the charismatic founder of APRA: Víctor Raúl Haya de La Torre, won the 1985 elections.

These two events led some academics to consider that Peruvian democracy had high chances of consolidation, despite economic crises and the violent rise of both Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement.[68] One of the key factors in considering the scenario for consolidation, was the adequate organizational capabilities shown by parties that had won the presidency, especially APRA. Similarly, another factor were the apparently democratic relations between the ruling party and opposition forces during the 1980s (McClintock, 1989). However, this last factor could owe directly to the fact that both presidents obtained parliamentary majorities. The following paragraphs analyze each of these governments.

[67] American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) or called also Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP).

[68] Despite both organizations defining themselves as "revolutionary movements," the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission considered them as "terrorist organizations" due to their activities infringe human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity (Reátegui Carrillo, Ciurlizza Contreras, and Peralta Ytajashi, 2004).

Table 4.2
Presidents and PCM during the Decade of the 1980s

Date Elections	President	Cabinets (political composition)		Parliament Support (Chamber of Deputies)	
		Prime Ministers – party (start date – end date)	**Coalition Partner**	**President's party and Coalition Partner**	**Ad hoc allies**
1980	Fernando Belaunde Terry (Popular Action)	Manuel Ulloa Elias – **PA** (7/28/80-12/9/82) Fernando Schwalb Lopez Aldana – **AP (**1/1/83-4/9/84) Sandro Mariategui Chiappe – **PA** (4/10/84-10/11/84) Luis Percovich Roca – **PA** (10/12/84-7/28/85)	Christian People's Party	PA: 98 of 180 Christian People's Party: 10 of 180	Not necessary.
1985	Alan García Pérez (APRA)	Luis Alva Castro – **APRA**, 7/28/85-6/22/87) Guillermo Larco Cox – **APRA**, 6/29/87-5/9/88) Armando Villanueva del Campo – **APRA**, 5/11/88-5/7/89) Luis Alberto Sanchez – **APRA**, 5/8/89-10/2/89) Guillermo Larco Cox – **APRA**, 10/3/89-7/28/90)	None.	APRA: 107 of 180 seats.	Not necessary.
1990	Alberto Fujimori (Change 90)	Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller–**AP* (**7/28/90-2/14/91) Carlos Torres y Torres Lara– **Independent** (2/15/91-10/31/91) Alfonso de los Heros– Independent (1/7/91-4/15/92)	1st year: United Left and Socialist Left 2nd year: APRA	Change 90: 32 of 180 seats. United Left: 16 seats. Socialist Left: 4 seats. APRA: 53	Variable.
Autogolpe ("Self-Coup") (5 April 1992)					

*This party did not have MPs.

Source: Author, based on Vera, Carreras, and Incio (2019) and JNE (2015)

Belaunde won the presidency despite not having reached over 50% of votes due to the transitory provision of the Constitution of 1979 that indicated that a simple majority (that is, a plurality) would define the first presidential elections. However, this vote was not negligible at all: 45.2% and thanks to the D'Hondt seat distribution method, his party earned 54% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies despite having reached only 38.9% of valid votes. However, despite having a parliamentary majority, Belaunde decided to form a post-electoral alliance with an ideologically related party: Popular Christian Party, which had ten representatives in the Chamber of Deputies and six in the Senate. Thus, the AP- Popular Christian Party alliance formed a broad majority in the Lower House with 108 representatives of 180, while in the Senate it controlled 32 seats out of 60.

In that way, Belaunde's government had some stability and was able to form ministerial cabinets without problems during the whole term. Proving this last point, one can notice that the four PCMs, as well as the majority of ministers that the president appointed, were members of his party. Furthermore, more evidence of the influence exerted by the president in the political process is that, in practical terms, the parliament's control over the government disappeared. Indeed, although the opposition (led by APRA) attempted three times to pass a no confidence motion against individual ministers, they were easily dismissed with an overwhelming voting.

Table 4.3
No-Confidence Motions during Belaunde's Presidency (1980-1985)

Date	Ministers / Portfolio	Motive	Favorable Votes (Chamber of Deputies)	Result
9 September 1981	Manuel Ulloa Elías / PCM and Minister of Economy	Dissatisfaction with the Minister's presentation	45 votes	Rejected
26 April 1983	Mirko Cuculiza Torre / Minister of Agriculture	Shortage of Sugar	43 votes	Rejected
27 October 1983	Fortunato Quesada Lagarrigue / Minister of Fishing	Dissatisfaction with the responses of the interpellation	35 votes	Rejected

Source: Author, based on García Belaúnde (1988).

In fact, the same dynamic emerged during the following presidential period (1985-1990): Alan García won the presidency with around 45.7% of votes. But this time was not some transitory disposition that prevented the run-off election, but the resignation of the rival, Alfonso Barrantes (United Left, IU), to participate in that run-off election. The reason given by Barrantes was that as the electoral difference between both candidates was significant (24.48) and there was no reason to extend the period of uncertainty, especially in the midst of increasing activity of terrorist groups (Shining Path and Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) in some areas of the Peruvian territory (the high Andean zone and the Peruvian Amazon).

Regarding legislative elections, surprisingly, the APRA candidate list for the Chamber of Deputies obtained 50.1% of votes and thus 107 MPs (59.4% of the total number of seats). In the Senate, thanks to a pre-electoral alliance with two small political parties (Christian Democrat Party and Solidarity and Democracy), APRA managed to obtain 32 of the 60 available seats. In this way, President García controlled both chambers and was able to impose his will both in the composition of cabinets and the orientation of government policies.

However, the presidential election of 1990 created a scenario unseen since democracy's return in 1980. Electoral results favored two newly created political organizations. One of them was a party labelled Change 90, led by a former university chancellor: Alberto Fujimori (26.4%), the other was the Democratic Front (FREDEMO), whose leader and presidential candidate was the novelist Mario Vargas Llosa (27.6%). Because neither of the two candidates reached over 50% of the votes, there was a run-off election between them. However, due to the neo-liberal economic plan promoted by FREDEMO during the run-off electoral campaign, the IU and APRA gave their electoral support to Cambio 90 and Alberto Fujimori became president.

In institutional terms, Fujimori's victory demonstrated that in a run-off election, the result of the first round could be reversed and the second-best voted candidate could win the presidency. Therefore, it was evident that the simultaneity of presidential and legislative elections did not ensured a parliamentary majority for the new president. Similarly, as Samuels and Shugart argued, in forms of government with separation of powers, there is a higher likelihood not only that new parties will enter the competition, but also that they can obtain significant electoral support. In sum, Fujimori's rise to power was atypical for two factors: because he was an "outsider" and because he did not get a parliamentary majority. Notwithstanding, in this unknow context, how did relations

between the Executive and Legislative played out? Did the form of government benefit the president?

The new party, Change 90, had only obtained a weak presence in the parliament (18 out of a total of 180 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 14 out of a total of 60 Senators). In contrast, the main opposition party (FREDEMO) controlled a third of both houses. Theoretically, under this scenario, Fujimori could have generated a post-electoral alliance with the second force in the parliament (APRA) to gain approximately 48% of seats in the Lower House and 50% of seats in the Senate. With these numbers, Fujimori could have easily ensured the stability of his ministerial cabinets, as well as his influence in the orientation of government policies. Indeed, in a premier-presidential system, without a significant ally in parliament, Fujimori would not have nominated a ministerial cabinet.

However, the president-parliamentary institutional design offered an alternative path for Fujimori: to govern without majority support in parliament. The composition of his first cabinet confirms that Fujimori adopted such approach. He chose to designate mainly "independent" ministers, representing approximately 66% of the total number of ministers. The rest of ministries were distributed between two small left-wing parties that had some seats in parliament and a militant of Popular Action, a party that did not have any formal representative in Congress. During his second year as president (1991), this dynamic did not change significantly. Fujimori increased the presence of independent ministers (70%) in the cabinet; he dispensed with the representatives of left-wing parties and appointed a representative from APRA.

Additionally, among the first acts of Fujimori's PCM (simultaneously appointed Minister of Economy) was to implement a neo-liberal economic adjustment program (August 8, 1990). This act wholly distorted the political stance that the parties had adopted during the electoral campaign. In fact, Fujimori had openly criticized FREDEMO's economic adjustment program; in the last presidential debate he even stated that voters had to choose between accepting or refusing an "economic shock". However, once elected and before assuming the presidency, Fujimori announced a radical change in his economic policy. In this way, once the new Congress was installed, the situation was quite peculiar: FREDEMO was willing to support the new economic policies, while APRA, the IU, and Fujimori's party did not know what role to play. In this context, with a cabinet formed mainly by independents, Fujimori imposed a pragmatic, rather than programmatic, logic based on ad hoc alliances for each government policy (Reyna Izaguirre, 2000, pp. 266-270; Tanaka, 1998, p. 211).

However, within APRA, IU, and Change 90, some leaders and MPs began to openly criticize the government's positions on economic matters. In this way, as Fujimori got closer to FREDEMO's liberal economic program, the forces of opposition began to align in parliament. By November and December of 1991, the atmosphere of confrontation escalated when Fujimori criticized parliament in public speeches given to Peru's peak business association (National Confederation of Private Business Institutions, CONFIEP) and the Peruvian exporters association. By way of pushback, parliament censored the Minister of Agriculture through a no-confidence motion promoted by United Left. However, this act did not alter the government's orientation nor its agrarian policy. Nonetheless, the relative success obtained by the still-dispersed opposition groups encouraged various parties' factions to prepare a no confidence motion against the head of the government's economic program: the man who was simultaneously Minister of Economy and

PCM. In tandem, Congress also began blocking several legislative decrees, amended others, and even rejected a presidential request for special powers to legislate in taxation matters (Cameron, 2006, pp. 56-57; Guzmán Napurí, 2003, pp. 177-178).

Thus, with the political opposition getting more organized, a rampant economic crisis, and the bloody arrival of terrorist activities to the Peruvian capital city, Fujimori found support in a military faction wanting to prevent APRA —and Alan García— and the political left from exerting influence in government. Thus, on April 5, 1992, Fujimori gave a public message to the nation, decreeing the dissolution of Congress and establishment in practice of an authoritarian regime. Paradoxically, Fujimori was able to remain in power after making this decision thanks to the support of social sectors who were politically conservative but liberal in economic terms. Indeed, after the self-coup, the group of independent "technicians" or "experts" who were part of FREDEMO actively joined Fujimori's government, enthusiastically implementing a set of neoliberal policies in Peru (Garcia Montero, 2001, pp. 68-70).

In sum, taking up the expectations of the model proposed in Chapter 2, in the first two governments, the systemic preeminence of the president is clear in that the presidents' parties controlled Congress. In this way, Presidents Belaunde and García were able to impose their will. Even García managed to implement a package of heterodox economic measures despite the opposition of a sector of the Peruvian economic and social elite. Additionally, this preeminence of the presidential figure was reinforced since both presidents were also the undisputed leaders of their political parties. Consequently, the absolute presidential control was also reflected in the composition of cabinets: almost all the ministers were members of their parties. In other words,

neither Garcia nor Belaunde had to rely on "independents" to influence the government's orientation directly.

Similarly, President Fujimori's short democratic period shows how institutional design favors the presidential figure even when he lacks parliamentary support. Fujimori —like the Portuguese President Eanes between 1978 and 1979— was able to form ministerial cabinets and directly influence the government's orientation through independent ministers. In Fujimori's case, unlike the ones of Garcia and Belaunde, the appointment of independents with some public acceptance was a strategy to decrease the strength of parliamentary opposition. As well, the pursuit of non-partisan social support reveals the negligible importance of the President's party in the political process. In fact, already before the beginning of the term, Fujimori had decided to change the economic policy, even against a sector of his party ("policy shifting"). Lastly, as the model foresees, and unlike Eanes in Portugal, when Fujimori perceived that a majority opposition was being formed in parliament, he opted for an anti-democratic solution.

4.2.2 FROM MINORITY PRESIDENTS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISSOLUTION OF CONGRESS (2001 – 2019)

The fall of Fujimori's regime after forcing a third presidential election in 2000 marked a new milestone in Peru's political history. Even a couple of years before elections, citizens' demands for a renewed political elite stimulated the rise of alternative political organizations. However, the ruthless state machinery in service of Fujimorism (e.g., Intelligence Services, corrupt mass media —public and private) had effectively blocked the rise of any leadership able to pose a real electoral challenge. However, this scenario changed during the intense political crisis in 2000.

At the time, increasing citizen repulsion at Fujimori's absolute control of the state, the ability of a new leader, Alejandro Toledo, to align all the opposition forces, as well as various corruption scandals committed by high-ranking officials of the regime, forced Fujimori to resign the presidency: a new general election occurred in 2001 (Garcia Montero, 2001, pp. 75-82).

Electoral results gave the first spot to Alejandro Toledo (36.5% of votes) and second place to Alan Garcia (25.8% of votes). Toledo was the candidate of Possible Peru (PP), a party that he had founded; while Alan Garcia competed again for APRA. Also, due to vote fragmentation in the legislative elections, PP obtained the plurality, earning 45 seats (36.5% of the total seats), with only 26.2% of votes. Finally, the run-off election between Garcia and Toledo was arduously disputed, but ultimately Toledo won the presidency.

Once Toledo took office, he understood the need to forge a post-electoral government alliance to guarantee ministerial cabinets' stability and viability. Thus, due to APRA's quick adoption of the role of opposition party, Toledo chose to ally with the Independent Moralizing Front, whose leader was a staunch critic of Alan García's administration. In this way, thanks to said alliance, PP controlled 46.6% of the seats of the parliament (56 out of 120). Though Toledo did not achieve a parliamentary majority, the 56 MPs of its alliance was a sufficiently large number to govern smoothly, especially in light of the high levels of parliamentary fragmentation (11 parties had gained representation in the parliament). Nevertheless, at the end of his term, he faced some problems of governability due to his very low presidential approval rates (an average of 5%); but even in that difficult context parliamentary opponents were never able to influence the government's orientation (Tanaka, 2005, pp. 28-32).

In the following presidential election (2006), Humala, the leader of the Nationalist Peruvian Party (PNP), reached first place (30.62%); García was in second place once again (24.32%). The run-off campaign polarized the country over the fundamental approach to economic policy (so called "neoliberal model"). Humala was accused of being close to Hugo Chávez and of favoring anti-free-market policies, while Garcia offered cautious economic reforms. Finally, unlike the run-off elections of 2001, this time García emerged victorious (Cameron, 2009, pp. 294-297) . However, APRA's position in parliament was not so strong since it had obtained only 36 seats from a total of 120. Moreover, Humala's party, which quickly positioned itself as an opposition force, had earned 45 seats.[69]

However, since Garcia returned to Peru, he promoted an ideological change in APRA. This time, in contrast with the leftist political positions of his first term, Garcia switched to favor economic liberalism. Thus, once in office, he favored the role of extractive industries and the economic regime established by the Constitution of 1993. This political stance was crucial and strategic because both the Alliance for the Future (Fujimorism), and a coalition of right-wing parties called National Unity (PPC and National Renewal) became APRA's allies in parliament. Even in the case of National Unity, its support for the government was secured by appointment of some of its leaders as ministers (Meléndez and León, 2009). In sum, with the explicit support of some right-wing parties and the tacit backing of Fujimorism, APRA, under the leadership of Alan García, managed to maintain control of the cabinets' formation as well as government policies.

[69] Humala was unable to register his PNP party formally. However, he managed to forge an electoral alliance with UPP that officially was enabled to compete in the 2006 elections. Thus, Humala could compete as a "candidate" invited by UPP, and the parliamentary list of candidates had members from both UPP and PNP.

Although the two democratic post-Fujimori governments maintained the same economic policies, during the presidential election of 2011, Ollanta Humala criticized the Constitution of 1993 and openly proposed a major constitutional change, especially in terms of the economic chapter. His proposals for reducing inequality decreasing criminality and nationalizing the exploitation of strategic natural resources (oil, gold, copper) attracted the sympathy of a significant segment of the public. Humala reached the first position (31.7 % of votes), while Keiko Fujimori, the elder daughter of Alberto Fujimori, reached the second spot (23.5%).

As was expected, the contrasting stances of both polarized the country around the economic model. Keiko Fujimori favored the continuity of that model established in the mid-1990s, whereas Humala called for radical change. Some analysts predicted that whoever wins would have to govern a country divided over the legacy of Fujimorism (Fowks, 2011; Santistevan, 2011). The remaining presidential candidates who obtained the third and fourth place publicly voiced their preferences for a given candidate. The leader of the Alliance for the Great Change, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who had the third-best vote share (18.51%), partook in Keiko Fujimori's closing electoral speech ceremony, and paid tribute to the successes of Fujimori's term in the nineties. Likewise, Toledo (PP), who reached the fourth position (15.63%) enthusiastically participated in Humala's closing speech ceremony. The run-off election saw Humala as the winner, reaching 51.45% of the votes (Levitsky, 2011, pp. 89-91).

For its part, the results of the legislative elections —which had been simultaneous with the first round— rewarded Humala's electoral alliance: Peru Wins. This alliance had obtained a significant parliamentary share (47 out of 130). Moreover, Possible Peru, its electoral ally during the run-off campaign, had earned 21 seats. On the opposite side of the political field, Force 2011,

Keiko Fujimori's party, obtained 37 seats, and its electoral ally, the Alliance for the Great Change, twelve more. In this context, Humala decided to appoint as prime minister or PCM a PP member, with the goal of forging a parliamentary coalition.

However, the following year, tensions within the president's party regarding the viability of its economic policies had an unexpected result. Humala, who had even brought up the merits of the Constitution of 1979 when sworn as president, abandoned his proposal to reform the economic chapter of the Constitution of 1993. This political shift diffused a potential direct confrontation with the various political and social sectors that favored the existing economic approach (Avilés and Rosas, 2017, pp. 175-176). For this reason, by his second year in office, Humala chose to form ministerial cabinets mainly with “independents," booking only one or two ministries for his own party. In that way, since the most controversial decisions (constitutional economic approach change) were removed from the government's agenda, political conflict did not escalate neither in parliament nor society, thus establishing a period of macro-political stability.

Considering the dynamics of these three first governments, I can affirm that the predictions of this thesis’ theoretical model have been fulfilled. Indeed, Toledo, García, and Humala, despite not having a parliamentary majority, all managed to influence the composition of ministerial cabinets and the orientation of government policies. However, the strategies that each of them adopted to maintain that kind of leverage rested on the size of the main opposition group and on the general level of fragmentation in parliament. Thus, for instance, Toledo chose to form a stable parliamentary coalition by appointing members of FIM’s to cabinets. Although numerically this coalition did not reach 50% of seats in the parliament, it was sufficiently strong since the main opposition party (APRA) had only around 23.3% of the seats.

In Garcia's case, despite the main opposition party (UPP) having reached approximately 37.5% of seats in parliament, his policies received the support of two important political forces ideologically aligned with him: National Unity and Alliance for the Future. Thus, he dispensed of forging any coalition and opted instead to appoint independent ministers or members of minor parties. Lastly, in Humala's case, during his first year he attempted to form a coalition with Peru Possible. He quickly realized that the main opposition parties in parliament (Force 2011 and Alliance for the Great Change) could potentially establish a significant opposing alliance. Therefore, at the beginning of his second year in office, Humala significantly altered his government plan to more moderate policies and opted to govern with independent ministers. Thus, although "his policy shifting" caused divisions within his parliamentary group (19 MPs resigned), it prevented the rise of a majoritarian parliamentary rival group.

The fragility of parliamentary opposition during these three administrations becomes clear after observing its negligible capacity for political control. Indeed, the scarce use and effectiveness of parliamentary powers between 2001-2016 confirm the limited influence of opposition forces in the political process. Thus, for instance, regarding the "vote of investiture," it was granted to all cabinets designated by presidents, without exception. Similarly, regarding the no confidence motion, parliamentary opposition groups requested this motion a total of twenty times but only three were approved. For instance, during Toledo's presidency, the opposition requested seven times this mechanism but only one was passed, forcing the resignation of the Minister of Interior, after an angry mob in a rural town shockingly murdered the mayor. Throughout García's presidency, the no confidence motion was initiated seven times but none of them obtained the required votes. Conversely, during the presidency of Humala, the parliamentary opposition requested this mechanism six times, but it was effective only three times. In fact, only one motion

reached the required votes and led to the resignation of the Prime Minister due to allegations of illegal espionage of political rivals. On the remaining two occasions the ministers (Health, and Justice and Human Rights) pre-emptively resigned before the formal admission of the no confidence motion by parliament.

In sum, these three governments corroborate the advantageous position of the presidency within the institutional design. Indeed, despite lacking a majority in parliament, presidents played a decisive role in the political process. This presidential limelight was also reinforced by the fact that Toledo, García and Humala were both formal and de facto leaders of their parties. One can see there the subsidiary role that the president's own parties play in parliament, as well as in the orientation of policy. Clear examples of the party's subordination to their leaders are drastic policy or ideology changes carried out by some of them without producing internal conflict or serious critique. Thus, for instance, both Humala after being elected president and Garcia during campaign changed their political positions significantly, and the response of their parties (the majority of leaders and members) was simply to accept those changes.

Table 4.4
Presidents and PCMs (Prime Ministers) since 2001

Date Elections	**President**	**Cabinets (political composition)**		**Parliament Support (Chamber of Deputies)**	
		Prime Ministers – party (start date – end date)	**Coalition Partner**	**President's party and Coalition Partner**	**Ad doc allies**
July 2001	Alejandro Toledo (Possible Peru, PP)	Roberto Dañino Zapata – **Independent** (7/28/01-7/11/02) Luis Maria Solari de la Fuente – **PP** (7/12/02-6/27/03) Beatriz Merino Lucero – **Independent** (6/28/03-12/13/03) Carlos Ferrero Costa – **PP** (12/15/03-8/15/05) Pedro Pablo Kuczynski – **Independent** (8/16/05-7/28/06)	Independent Moralizing Front (FIM)	PP: 45/120 FIM: (11)	We Are Peru: 4 Popular Action: 3

April 2006	Alan García Pérez (APRA)	Jorge del Castillo Gálvez – **APRA** (7/28/06-10/14/08) Yehude Simon Munaro – **PHP** (10/14/08-7/11/09) Javier Velasquez Quesquen – APRA (7/11/09-9/12/10) Jose Antonio Chang – APRA (9/14/10-3/18/11) Rosario Fernandez Figueroa – APRA (3/19/11-7/28/11)	Peruvian Humanist Party(PHP)* National Unity (Christian People's Party and National Renewal)	APRA: 36 / 120 National Unity: 17	Alliance for the Future (13)
April 2011	Ollanta Humala Tasso (Peru Wins-Peruvian Nationalist Party)	Salomon Lerner Ghitis – **Independent** (7/28/11-12/11/11) Oscar Valdes Dancuart – **Let's Recover Tacna (**12/11/11-7/23/12) Juan Jimenez Mayor – **Independent** (7/23/12-10/31/13) Cesar Villanueva – **Nueva Amazonia** (10/31/13-2/24/14) Rene Cornejo Diaz – **Independent** (2/24/14-7/22/14) Ana Jara Velasquez – **Peru Wins (**7/22/14-4/2/15) Pedro Cateriano Bellido – **Independent** (4/2/15-7/28/16)	1st Year: Possible Peru, Socialist Party, National Solidarity and Let's recover Tacna* 3rd Year: Nueva Amazonia*	Peru Wins: 47 of 130 seats. PP: 21 seats (1st Year)	National Solidarity Alliance: 9 seats (mainly during 1st Year) PP: 21 seats (since 2nd Year).
April 2016	Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK)	Fernando Zavala Lombardi – **PPK** (7/28/16-9/15/17) Mercedes Araoz Fernandez – PPK (9/17/17-4/2/18)	1st year: PPC** 3rd Year: Regional Alliance Together for Amazonas*	President's party: only 18 of 130 seats.	Undefined
	Martin Vizcarra Cornejo	César Villanueva Trigoso – Alliance for Progress (4/2/2018- 3/8/2019) Salvador del Solar Labarthe – Independent (3/11/2019 - 09/30/2019	Alliance for Progress, until 3 August, 2019	President's party: 18 /130 Alliance for Progress: 7	Undefined
2019	On 30 September 2019, President Vizcarra appointed his former minister of Justice and Human Rights, Vicente Zeballos, as the new President of the Council of Ministers, then officially he decreed the closing the Congress and the calling of early legislative election for 26 January of 2020.				

*Provincial parties (this type of organizations is not allowed to compete in national elections, therefore they do not representatives at the parliament).
** PPC was part of an alliance called Popular Alliance. Although that alliance got 5 MPs in 2006, none of them was a PPC's member.

However, the electoral conjuncture of 2016 presented an unknown scenario since 2001: a president with a powerful parliamentary opposition counting with a majority of seats. In fact, after leading all public opinion polls for several months before the elections of April, Keiko Fujimori, whose party's name changed to Peruvians for Change (PPK), obtained 39.86% of votes in presidential elections. However, in parliamentary elections, the coattail effects combined with the

method seat distribution[70], left FP, who obtained 73 of the 130 seats (56% of the total), with only 36.34% of the votes. Likewise, voting results gave second place to Kuczynski, candidate of a recently created party called Peruvians for Change (PPK), with 21.05% of electoral preferences.

Paradoxically, the former allies (2011) faced each other in the run-off election of 2016. Kuczynski, who five years before praised the achievements of Alberto Fujimori's government, adopted critical positions on various issues —even economic ones— seeking the vote of the center-left. Keiko Fujimori, recognizing that the main obstacle to her candidacy were widespread militant anti-Fujimori feelings, and seeking to attract centrist votes, presented a self-critical discourse and attempted to disassociate herself from her father's government. Kuczynski's efforts delivered results and near the end of the campaign the leftist candidate Verónica Mendoza publicly asked all her followers to vote for Kuczynski. Whereas, at the same time, her party actively participated in a conglomerate of political and civil organizations called "No to Keiko," which silently supported PPK's candidature. The electoral results were quite close and reversed the first round results. Kuczynski won the election with a voting difference of only around 40,000 votes (approximately 0.2% of the total votes) (Ferrari Haines and Ahumada Angulo, 2016).

Since the return to democracy in 1980, after Fujimori in 1990 and García in 2006, Kuczynski became the third candidate to reach second place in the first round yet manage to win the run-off election. However, neither Garcia nor Fujimori had obtained such a small parliamentary presence. Indeed, APRA in 2016 earned 30% of the seats, while Fujimori in 1990 obtained nearly

[70] Although the Peruvian electoral system is proportional (it uses the D'Hondt method), outside of Lima (37 seats), the districts' magnitude is small. Indeed, the size of nineteen of the 26 electoral districts is equal to or less than 5. What is more, nine of these districts are equal to or less than 2.

17% of the Lower House seats. In contrast, President Kuczynski's party had only won 13% of parliamentary seats. Was this situation a significant problem? According to the theoretical model, the critical factor is the nature of the parliamentary majority: that is to say, whether the majority is just "different" or actually "opposite" to the president. If it is the former, the president has a broad margin of action; but if it is the latter, the most likely scenario is political confrontation.

Therefore, following the implications of the theoretical model, Kuczynski's real problem was that despite the parliamentary fragmentation having decreased a bit (the ENPP was approximately 2.7, when in the last three elections the average was four; see Appendix 5), a single opposition party controlled 56% of the total number of seats. Indeed, due to the attacks carried out during the electoral campaign, Popular Force's leadership had quickly adopted a position openly contrary to the president. Thus, although the first ministerial cabinet appointed by Kuczynski obtained the vote of investiture, Keiko Fujimori, as leader of the opposition —and without a formal public office— made it clear that the final objective was to influence directly the orientation of the government. In other words, FP wanted to control the government from its powerful position in parliament. However, the presidential prerogatives gave Kuczynski leverage to react. Indeed, after nominating his first cabinet, the president sought to expand his support in parliament and even agreed to a meeting with the leader of Popular Force to reach an agreement pact.

In the following months, Popular Force’s parliamentary group deployed an active and persistent control over the ministerial cabinet. Thus, during the first year of government, the Council of Ministers presided by Fernando Zavala (PCM) endured the interpellation and subsequent censorship of the ministers of Education (December 2016) and Transport and Communications (January 2017). The confrontation between the PCM and the parliament escalated

in the next months to the point that Zavala declared to the press that: "... political control is one thing, and the abuse of power is something else, one thing is to control, another one is to simply obstruct...", in an obvious critique of the opposing majority's role (Rocca, 2017) . However, despite the PCM's claims, in the following months Zavala witnessed parliament rejected a motion of confidence requested by the Minister of Economy (June 2017) before the formal acceptation of a no confidence motion that FP had announced against him. Three months after the dismissal of the economy minister, FP publicly announced that it would again censure the new Minister of Education (September 13, 2017). In response, the PCM quickly went to Congress and raised a motion of confidence about the government's educational policy. As expected, Congress did not grant it and the government had to resign, thus causing the first crisis total of the cabinet: all the ministers gave up their portfolios.

The new premier appointed by Kuczynski, Mercedes Araoz, did not improve relations between the Executive and the Legislative. Even more, the parliament started a presidential impeachment process due to the press having denounced certain links between one of the president's consulting companies and the Brazilian company Odebrecht. The high probability that Kuczynski would be dismissed led the president to adopt a desperate bargain: he sought the support of a Popular Force faction in exchange for the presidential pardon of former President Alberto Fujimori, who was serving a prison sentence for violation of human rights. The presidential strategy worked: Kuczynski remained in office thanks to the votes of a dissident group of Popular Force led by Kenji Fujimori, Keiko's youngest brother. However, this action caused a major political crisis in both the presidential party and the opposition party. Although the PCM did not resign, several ministers did, as well as several MPs from the ruling party. In the opposition, Keiko toughened the political position of her party, while Kenyi's group was expulsed from Popular Force.

However, months later, in light of new media reports about Kuczynski's ties to Odebrecht, Popular Force announced that it would again initiate a second impeachment process. This time, as other political parties announced that they would support the request, it was imminent that the impeachment would be approved. Thereby, with a divided cabinet, a diminished parliamentary group, and legitimacy eroded by media reports, Kuczynski resigned from the presidency on March 20, 2018 (EFE, 2018). Consequently, according to the constitutional succession, First Vice-President Martin Vizcarra, former Minister of Transport and Communications, returned from Canada, where he was serving as Peru's ambassador, to assume the presidency.

Vizcarra formally began his term on March 23, 2018, and appointed César Villanueva, congressman of Alliance for Progress, as PCM. Villanueva was seen with a certain sympathy by Popular Force due to him having played an active role during the gestation of the second presidential impeachment. However, after almost a year in office, Vizcarra complained that Popular Force sought to obtain direct control of government (Andina, 2018). Thus, the president decided to replace Villanueva with Salvador del Solar, an independent with a clear anti-Fujimorist position. As might be expected, from the beginning, the relations between the new PCM and the parliament were quite tense. For instance, after his government plan's presentation at the parliament, Salvador del Solar only obtained the vote of confidence of 46 members of the parliament. But, he was able to remain in office thanks to the fact that 21 congressmen abstained from voting. This support contrasts notoriously with the votes that received the cabinet chaired by Cesar Villanueva. Indeed, the latter had been endorsed by 94 of 130 congressmen after the presentation of the plan of government.

President Vizcarra's strategy when appointing a PCM that did not have Fujimorist sympathy was to push the confrontation to the limit and define who finally went to control the exercise of power. Thereby, in the midst of a tense atmosphere, President and Congress inaugurated a new area of conflict, this time concerning the renovation mechanism for the members of the Constitutional Court (CC). The presidency had requested to suspend the selection of said members and to debate instead a bill that proposed reforming the selection procedure. Popular Force opposed such a request because, under the current mechanism, it had the power to elect members of said institution almost unilaterally. [71] Thus, on September 30, using his right to partake in parliament debates as any member of congress can (Article 129), Salvador del Solar joined the beginning of the Plenary Session convoked to address the renovation of CC's members. Following that, the PCM took the floor and presented a "motion of confidence" over the bill on reforming the selection procedure of CC's members submitted by the presidency days before. The plenary session of Congress decided to debate the PCM's request later and continued with the process of choosing new members of the CC. Given this, after approximately five hours, President Vizcarra gave a message to the nation announcing that he was constitutionally dissolving Congress since it had denied "factually" for the second time a PCM's confidence vote (France24, 2019). In this way, a political leader of a small regional (provincial) party and without the decisive support of any parliamentary group, had overpowered one of the strongest political parties of Peru.

[71] The controversy was that since 2012 an exceptional selection modality of CC's members was legally established. This modality is called "selection by invitation," and the Congress entirely controls the process. Specifically, such a method implies that a special Congressional commission "invites" some candidates directly and then vote for each one of them. If invited candidates get the approbation of two-thirds of the legal number of congress members (87 of 130 votes), they are automatically appointed. However, the members of parliament have adopted a practice that is not illegal, but that distorts the "exceptional mechanism." Indeed, the parliament leaders negotiate a list of prospective new magistrates previously and then agreed to vote together for each one of them. On the contrary, the "regular" mechanism implies that a Congressional Commission draws up a list of candidates that should be published in the Official Gazette "El Peruano" with the aim that any citizen (or civil association) can present disqualifications or observations to the "candidates" selected by the Congress. Logically, this procedure takes more time, and it is more transparent since it involved citizen participation.

4.3 PRESIDENTIALIZATION AND STRUCTURES OF PARTY COMPETITION SINCE 1980

What was the dynamic of competition structures during these two periods? The research hypotheses suggest that in the president-parliamentary form of government, structures in the medium term tend to consolidate less closed or less predictable structures. That is to say, the ministerial cabinets should present partial alternation, an innovative composition of the cabinet, and significant participation of new or "unknown" agents. In numerical terms, government change —as defined in the present investigation— should shift the Index of Closure away from 100. Nevertheless, did those trends emerge? Next, I analyze each of those periods individually.

4.3.1 MIRAGE OR REALITY? STRUCTURES OF COMPETITION AND DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN

An analysis of the period 1980-1992 reveals the existence of two different stages. The first period covers the first two governments (Popular Action and APRA), and the second is Fujimori's short-lived democratic government (1990-1992). Likewise, concerning the structures of competition, it is observed that there emerges in the first stage a pattern that fits a closed structure type, whereas during the second period (1990-1992), the structures can be characterized as less closed.

Regarding the first period, the dynamics of the alternation in government correspond to a closed structure. In fact, regarding 1985 election, the IC correctly shows an almost total change in the cabinet's composition. Also, despite the fact that there were changes in 1984 and 1988, they did not profoundly alter the degree of structural closure. The evidence that there was a closed structure is the IC's score thorough out this period: 88.5. Conversely, regarding the short period

1990-1992, due to the events explained in the previous section, the structures of competition was less closed as indicated by the IC's score of 45.1 (See Figure).



Figure 4.1: Structures of Competition 1980-1992
Note: The first post-dictatorship elections were held in 1980. However, said year is considered the base-year or the year of the "Founded Government." Therefore, as the previous year's information is needed for IC's calculation, the first numeric value corresponds to 1981.

Then, did Peru have a closed structure (or an institutionalized party system) during the 1980s? And if this is so, what happened in the 1990 election? First of all, it is not possible to disassociate the election of 1990 from the previous trajectory. In other words, the same party system with a couple of reasonably stable governments is the same one that collapsed in 1990. Secondly, the collapse of Peru's party system has been widely explained from several analytical perspectives. Thus, for example, Arce offers a tight summary of the various explanatory factors that studies have linked to the country's party system crisis. The explanatory factors include: informality, clientelism, and the inability of political leaders to represent new interests (Arce, 1996, p. 311).

Although the research aim was not to explain the collapse of Peru's party system, I consider that this particular interparty pattern deserves an explanation. Thus, being consistent with my theoretical referent (Peter Mair), I admit that the structures of competition during the period in question tended to be closed (1980-1990). But not because the interparty competition pattern was "frozen," but because the parties were "frozen."[72] In other words, both APRA and PA could adequately represent the interests of significant social sectors (social cleavages). This assertation is easily proved not only through electoral results but also because of their significant role in the country's political history.[73] Undoubtedly, before the eighties, both parties were already rooted in wide and enfranchised social sectors.

However, following Mair, in the medium or long term an institutionalized party system — in Huntington's sense— should have the capacity to adapt to crucial economic, social and cultural changes in a given society. But that adaptation of political parties did not happen in Peru. Initially, frozen parties favored the institutionalization of the party system. However, in the medium term, significant change in the composition of the electorate overflowed their capacity to channel new citizen interests. Thus, in the electoral arena, new political forces emerged to replace parties that had previously governed. The relevant aspect of the Peruvian case was that this transformation process was sudden and deep. From my perspective, the replacement process would have occurred in just one election (1990) and would have been facilitated by the form of government. Indeed, following the assumptions of Samuel and Shugart, the systemic importance of the presidency, as

[72] It is worth to note that Mair's approach discussed in Chapter 1, consider the possibility that in specific cases, the "… the freezing of parties can be associated with the freezing of the party system, but there is no necessary or inevitable relationship…".
[73] AP was founded in the 1960s, and APRA had started its activities since the late 1920s.

well as the existence of direct presidential elections, encouraged the rise of new political leaderships based exclusively on charisma or some degree of popularity (outsiders).

The argument advanced rests exclusively on one premise: that the electorate's composition changed significantly between 1980 and 1990. Is it possible to corroborate this? In an interesting article, Del Águila (2009) has proven that the impact of universal suffrage enshrined in the Constitution of 1979 was expressed with clarity in the presidential election of 1990. While it is true that the Constitution of 1979 eliminated the last barrier to obtain the right to vote, illiteracy, its application was not immediate. To vote, Peruvian legislation required every citizen to obtain a national identity document. In this way, since most "illiterates" were Quechua or Aymara speakers, the process of registration of these "new citizens" took time, and their inclusion in the electoral registry shaped the electoral outcome in 1990.

Table 4.5
Growth Rate of Voters versus Population Growth between 1980 and 1993

Regions	Voters in 1980	Voters in 1990	Voters in 1993	Growth rate of Voters (1980-1990)	Growth rate of Voters (1980-1993)	Population growth rate inter-census (1981-1993) *
Amazonas	65,635	107,609	128,240	64.0	95.4	32.10
Áncash	286,855	426,637	497,474	48.7	73.4	14.10
Apurímac	85,260	133,412	153,110	56.5	79.6	15.50
Arequipa	312,254	459,340	535,971	47.1	71.6	2.00
Ayacucho	144,800	223,321	245,167	54.2	69.3	–2.20
Cajamarca	267,226	418,776	478,756	56.7	79.2	0.20
Callao	223,939	321,750	372,037	43.7	66.1	3.00
Cusco	258,113	413,625	490,714	60.2	90.1	22.00
Huancavelica	102,767	159,517	179,523	55.2	74.7	10.70
Huánuco	135,045	253,747	286,673	87.9	112.3	36.00
Ica	201,633	288,968	340,450	43.3	68.8	21.60
Junín	326,712	501,333	569,600	53.4	74.3	21.90

Regions	Voters in 1980	Voters in 1990	Voters in 1993	Growth rate of Voters (1980-1990)	Growth rate of Voters (1980-1993)	Population growth rate inter-census (1981-1993) *
La Libertad	367,502	575,915	678,161	56.7	84.5	2.00
Lambayeque	240,101	398,287	469,439	65.9	95.5	34.10
Lima	2,347,809	3,438,081	3,981,527	46.4	69.6	33.10
Loreto	125,960	214,038	252,996	69.9	100.9	42.60
Madre de Dios	8,734	22,004	26,328	151.9	201.4	95.20
Moquegua	37,780	59,233	70,452	56.8	86.5	26.10
Pasco	68,199	100,338	114,287	47.1	67.6	4.10
Piura	321,908	525,696	615,431	63.3	91.2	21.90
Puno	284,950	447,092	508,540	56.9	78.5	21.20
San Martín	84,590	191,494	226,747	126.4	168.1	72.60
Tacna	55,557	86,041	105,873	54.9	90.6	51.50
Tumbes	34,798	52,419	61,947	50.6	78.0	46.70
Ucayali	43,528	105,289	129,226	141.9	196.9	86.30
	6,431,655	**9,923,962**	**11,518,669**	**54.3**	**79.1**	**27.5**

* The population growth rate corresponds to the period 1981 - 1993 as these years Peru carried out its official periodic censuses.

Source: Elaborated by Author, based on Del Águila (2009, pp. 51-52) and INFOGOB - Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (2017).

Indeed, as one can see in Table 4.5, the increase in population between the censuses of 1981 and 1993 was approximately 27.5%. But, variation in the electoral registry between the elections of 1980 and 1990 elections was 54.3%. However, in some Peruvian regions such as Madre, Ucayali, and San Martin, the number of voters more than doubled. Additionally, if the growth rate of voters between 1980 and 1993 (the year of the census) is considered, then a rapid increase of new voters can be observed. Thus, territorial regions such as Madre de Dios and Ucayali tripled their number of voters, and in eight regions that number doubled or nearly doubled of voters (Growth rates of voters > 90%). These trends reveal that at the start of the nineties, Peru was experiencing a quick and profound change in its electoral context.

In sum, it seems that the closed structures of competition registered by the IC during the 1980s were a “mirage” since they were based not on the pattern of interaction, but rather on the social roots of parties with long historical trajectories. However, the problem was that both parties had achieved their support based on a "fictitious” (limited) citizenship. Therefore, when the real composition of the electorate became manifest, party’s capacity of electoral representation and mobilization was considerably reduced. Could these parties have adapted to this new context? Perhaps the political leadership of both parties could have tried to incorporate these new demands or interests. However, this is impossible to verify since party renewal was rapid, and soon after, the democratic cycle begun in 1980 was canceled. In conclusion, while the existence of direct presidential elections promoted the renewal of the political class, the institutional design was not able to resolve the political confrontation between the Executive and the Legislative branches. The end result was the democratic breakdown of 1992.

4.3.2 DID A LESS CLOSED STRUCTURE OF PARTY COMPETITION EMERGE?

Regarding the period 2001-2018, the expectations of the theoretical model fully fit in the dynamics of structures of competition since the IC for that period reaches a score of 60 points. Even more, if the first presidential term after the democratic return of 2001 —due to the same cabinet composition remained for almost three years— is withdrawn, the IC of the period 2006-2018 reaches a score of 49. Thereby, the numerical score reflects very well the situation of the components that define less closed structures of competition: (a) an innovative composition of cabinets, (b) easy access to the government of "new" actors, and (c) partial renovation of the

cabinets. The following paragraphs discuss each of these features or trends registered for the Peruvian case.



Figure 4.2: ***Structures of Competition 2001-2018***

Note: The first elections after Fujimori's dictatorship were held in 2001. However, said year is considered the base-year or the year of the "Founded Government." Therefore, as the previous year's information is needed for IC's calculation, the first numeric value corresponds to 2002.

Firstly, regarding the composition of cabinets, a key feature of the Peruvian structure of competition is the innovation in the cabinets' composition and the frequency with which it occurred in this period (2001-2018). In fact, there were thirteen different cabinet combinations —either by election or by political reconfiguration of the cabinet— in approximately eighteen years. One way to emphasize this high frequency of changes would be to consider what ideally could have happened if Peru had had a purely presidential system. Indeed, if the latter had been the case, each president would have implemented a single way to form the cabinet; that is, there would have been only four "real changes" in the cabinet's composition, one per presidential election.

Secondly, regarding the entry of new actors into government (or cabinets). In the Peruvian case, this trend is not mainly driven by institutional design but by the "non-formal" rule of convening independent ministers to reinforce the presidential predominance. However, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, independents' appointment not only enhances the president's influence on the government but also erodes party support. Indeed, if the president at the end relies on "independent" ministers, partisan membership proves to be futile. Likewise, regarding institutional design, following Samuels and Shugart, the systemic importance of the presidency, and the fact that there are direct elections to control it, motivate diverse social leaders (any who a certain social recognition) to try to get this "major prize." This last assertion is empirically verifiable through the considerable number of presidential candidates who have taken part in Peruvian presidential elections. Thus, for instance, in 2001 eight candidates competed for the presidency, while the elections of 2006 had a surprising number of twenty presidential candidates. In the following two elections (2011 and 2016), the number of candidates decreased but remained high (ten presidential candidates competed per election).

Finally, regarding the component of government alternation, Mair indicated that an open structure of competition is characterized mainly by partial alternation. This trait is clearly present in the Peruvian case since 2001. Indeed, the index of alternation after being almost total in 2006 (25 on the scale from 0 to 100) was 55.56 and 52.64 in 2011 and 2018 respectively. But why does alternation tend to be partial? In the Peruvian case, the factor that explains partial variation after an electoral process is the consistent quota of independent ministers in successive presidential periods, especially since 2016. Thus, in a more pronounced way than in the Portuguese case, in Peru the "independents ministers" not only gain quick access to the Executive Branch but have also presented themselves as extra-partisan representatives of interest groups or some segments of

society. However, this feature also erodes the parties' perception as vehicles of citizen representation, but above all, prevent the consolidation of a stable pattern of party interaction (it is to say, of a party system).

In closing, the Peruvian president-parliamentary constitutional design has undoubtedly bolstered a more open structure of competition over the years. However, the empirical analysis also reveals that "independents" play a significant role in fostering this trend. Indeed, said actors not only reinforce the systemic discretional power of the president, but also make interparty interaction in parliament unimportant. The problem is that the increasing openness of Peruvian structures of competition occurs at the cost of a progressive loss of trust in parties as true vehicles of citizens' representation. It is clear that this has occurred because their interactions in parliament are not decisive and the president governs mainly with independents.

4.3.3 DOES PARLIAMENTARY FRAGMENTATION IN THE TREND OF STRUCTURES OF COMPETITION MATTER?

What other aspects of the pattern of inter-party interaction could help to explain the Peruvian trend? In the previous chapter, as a way to complement the analysis of Portuguese structures of competition, the degree of party fragmentation in parliament was analyzed. The result was the identification of an inverse correlation between the ENPP and the Index of Closure. This finding corroborated the systemic importance of parliament in the Portuguese case as the structure of competition reflected the complexity of negotiations or alliances that took place. However, will it be possible to find such a relationship in the Peruvian case? Or put otherwise, what kind of

relationship exists between parliamentary fragmentation and the level of closure of the structure of competition?

Unlike the Portuguese case, the results of this exploration show that in the Peruvian case the relationship between the ENPP and IC is inexistent or erratic. Indeed, the descriptive analysis carried out for these two variables (see Appendix 3) did not show any pattern or link between party fragmentation in parliament and the level of closure of structures of competition. However, is it possible to reach a conclusion based on this finding? I think it is possible, and that the disconnection between cabinets and parliaments confirms the subsidiary or nonexistent role that parliament plays in shaping ministerial cabinets. In other words, it confirms the privileged position the Peruvian president has in forming ministerial cabinets. Be that as it may, this finding shows that regarding cabinets' formation, the parliamentary and presidential arenas are disconnected.

In the same way, a phenomenon that reveals this lack of connection between the governmental and parliamentary levels is that the interparty power relations carried out in the parliament are, to a certain extent, independent of the dynamics that define the composition of ministerial cabinets. In fact, in the Peruvian case, Congress's composition derived from the electoral results have never been maintained until the end of the presidential term. Thus, for instance, Toledo's party (2001-2006) during the first year had 39.1% of the total seats, but only 23% by the end of the term. The same thing happened with Humala's party, which began with 36.1% of the members of Congress, but by last year (2019) had gone down to 20% of the seats. Likewise, opposition parties have experienced the same trend. In this regard, one can mention that Popular Force (Keiko Fujimori's party) went from having 73 seats in 2016 to 46 in 2019, the year Vizcarra closed parliament (García Marín, 2019, pp. 146-147).

As has been shown, political competition in Peru is marked by systemic volatility, a feature that cuts across all political arenas: electoral, partisan, and parliamentary. Indeed, party variation in parliament is quite noticeable if the Pedersen volatility index is applied to “parliamentary groups" that originate each year in Congress, mainly due to defections and new coalitions that congressmen create once elected. Thus, for instance, in some years the number of "parliamentary groups” in Congress almost reach the number that Sartori pointed out as a feature of extreme pluralism: more than six parties (years 2006 or 2008, see Appendix 5).

Finally, in addition to the above, the "non-formal" practice of dividing and forming new parliamentary groups would demonstrate a "shifting political position." In other words, it could be said that in the Peruvian case, it is possible not only to identify significant policy shifts at the presidential level (Humala, Fujimori, or Garcia) but also at the level of parliament. Nevertheless, the impact of these dynamics is completely detrimental to the consolidation of a party system (that is, a tendency towards closed structures of competition) since such behaviors erode trust and support in political parties and the legitimacy of the system of representation as a whole.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of this research allow me to answer the research questions directly, but also to formulate some additional academic and practical considerations. Regarding the validity of the research hypotheses (Chapter 2) which proposed a type of relationship between structures of party competition (or party systems) and semi-presidential forms of government, I can conclude that when the ministerial cabinets are both accountable to Congress and the presidency (a president-parliamentary type of government), competition structures tend to be less closed; while when they are only responsible to the parliament (a premier-presidential form of government), structures tend to be more closed. These identified trends mean that premier-presidential countries, compared to president-parliamentary ones, possess a pattern of inter-party interaction more predictable in Mair's sense which will contribute not only to governability but also to strengthening the political system's legitimacy.

However, how do these trends emerge in each type of semi-presidentialism? The analysis carried out corroborates that after an election, the main actors (president and parties with parliamentary representation) in every kind of semi-presidentialism adopt different behaviors depending on the nature of the party —or group of parties— that controls the parliament. Specifically, following the interpretation model (Chapter 2), there are two possible post-electoral scenarios: the president's party (or its supporting coalition) gets or keeps a majority in Congress or alternatively does not gain or keep said majority. The first scenario provokes a similar trend in both types of semi-presidentialism: it reinforces the systemic importance of the presidency, especially when the president is the party's formal or de facto leader, thus causing structures of competition to tend to be less closed.

Nevertheless, my research's most significant scenario emerges when the president's party does not obtain a parliamentary majority. To better understand said scenario, the emergence of several different sub-scenarios according to both the form of government and the ideological dispersion of the parties represented in parliament must be considered. So, what would happen in scenarios with a premier-presidential system of government? The answer would depend on the central feature of the ideological-political field —whether it is bipolar or multipolar. In the first case, it is observed that it does not matter whether the party (or parties) that obtains the majority in parliament belong or not to the same ideological field as the president's party. In both sub-scenarios, the systemic importance of parliament is maintained, and the emergence of a more closed structure is promoted. Portugal illustrates these trends very well. Thus, in 2009 and 2015, the opposition forces formed the government (cohabitation). Still, in 1995 and 2019, the president's party was able to form a minority government (thanks to the co-operation of akin parties in ideological terms). Be that as it may, the political process is defined mainly in the inter-party interaction in parliament.

However, what happens in the multipolar premier-presidential forms of government? Based on the axioms of the theoretical model, governments are expected to be short-lived or unstable for two reasons: (a) because of the cost of negotiations between political parties represented in parliament and (b) because of the fragility of any cooperation or alliance pacts that are established. Although the exploration of this scenario was not a central objective of this research, it could be affirmed that Tunisia very well exemplifies the difficulties faced by a multipolar (and highly fragmented) premier-presidential system to constitute a government (ministerial cabinet). In this case, it is possible to appreciate how the ideological dispersion even leads the political parties to accept as a solution the appointment of an "independent" prime minister (such as Hichem Mechichi who is the current PM) or a political leader without representation in parliament (for example Elyes

Fakhfakh who was PM from 27 February to 2 September 2020). Precisely this way of forming a government reinforces the open character of party competition structures in the medium term.

Political Scenarios according to the Premier-presidential Government System



On the other hand, what happens in president-parliamentary systems when the president's party does not obtain a parliamentary majority? Similarly, to the premier-presidential case, it is expected that two sub-types of scenarios emerge according to the predominant political-ideological dispersion in parliament and the parties' ideological position in relation to the president's party. In a bipolar political field, the model foresees that if a party opposed to the president controls the parliament, the president-parliamentary design configures a favorable scenario for these institutions to experience confrontation. Indeed, since both institutions are controlled by opposing

forces in political terms and have the power to dismiss the ministerial cabinet (or cabinet members), the probability of negotiation or agreement between them is almost non-existent. What predominates is a fight between the president and Congress for controlling the cabinet's formation or the government's orientation. The resolution of this deadlock depends on the degree of the feasibility of undertaking constitutional mechanisms to eliminate one's adversary: the dissolution of parliament (and the calling of new legislative elections) or presidential impeachment. If these mechanisms are difficult to implement (due to formal requirements), the most likely way out is breakdown of the constitutional order.

The recent closure of the Peruvian parliament in September 2019 exemplifies how, in a polarized scenario, the confrontation between the presidency and the parliament ends in the Congress' dissolution. However, the same case also illustrates how a parliament controlled by a majority opposed to the president seeks to remove him through presidential impeachment (December 2017 and March 2018). Indeed, as was analyzed in chapter 4, after the 2016 elections the Peruvian political field remained polarized between a parliament controlled by Fujimori's party and a president with a tiny parliamentary group but who had won in the run-off election with the support of anti-Fujimorist parties. In that way, the clash between both institutions was inevitable, and Kuczynski had to resign to avoid being "removed" in a second impeachment process. His successor, Vizcarra, quickly realized that Fujimori's party wanted to control the government's orientation and chose to polarize the political field (by appointing an anti-Fujimorist PM) and thus create favorable conditions for closing the Congress and calling for new elections.

Moreover, what happens in a bipolar scenario when parties (or the party) with a parliamentary majority belong to the same political-ideological field as the president? In this case,

the presidency maintains its systemic preeminence in the political process. Indeed, due to the presidential powers and the parliamentary majority's ideological affinity, the president may choose to forge alliances ad hoc (or temporary) or to establish a coalition government. Similarly, in a multipolar political field, the president has even more options to ensure control of the cabinet's makeup and the government's orientation.

Consequently, unlike the case of multipolar premier-presidential systems, in multipolar presidential-parliamentarism the ideological dispersion (and the party fragmentation in parliament) significantly widens the president's political influence. In other words, with a parliament without a predominant political position, the president (who has the power to appoint and remove ministers) can maintain almost absolute control of the government only with some ideologically akin parties' occasional support. The Peruvian case between 2006 and 2010 exemplifies precisely this last scenario. Alan García, despite his party having only 30% of the seats (36 out of 120), could maintain his preeminence in the government process thanks to akin parties' tacit support. However, although, in this case, ideological dispersion (and party fragmentation) favors governability, following the interpretation model it is pertinent to remember that the presidentialization of the political process causes the emergence of less closed competition structures in the medium term.

Political Scenarios according to the President-parliamentary Government System



That said, the analysis developed has also allowed me to identify a complementary finding linked to an electoral rule: the non-concurrence of presidential and parliamentary elections. Indeed, since the simultaneity of these elections increases the likelihood that the president obtains a parliamentary majority (due to the coattail effect, see Chapter 2), the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections on different dates seems essential in the emergence of closed competition structures in countries with a premier-presidential system. Conversely, in countries with a president-parliamentary system, the non-simultaneity of said elections boosts the rise of

confrontation situations between the presidency and the parliament because it potentially increases the emergence of presidents without parliamentary majorities. [74]

Additionally, the research findings also allow me to raise three critical considerations about the approaches of my theoretical referents: Mair (2001, 2002) and Samuels and Shugart (2010). Firstly, the analysis corroborates the utility of considering that the institutionalization of party systems does not depend exclusively on the institutionalization of political parties, but also on other factors such as social cleavages (structuralist approach) or political institutions (forms of government, electoral system). Thus, when I explained the closed structure of competition in the Peru of the eighties, one of the combinations contemplated by Mair's model allowed me to propose an explanation compatible with the collapse of the party system that occurred in the early nineties.[75] Specifically, the argument held that the pattern of party interaction depended mainly on the links that political parties established with specific sectors of society (social cleavages). Thus, when the social composition of the electorate changed drastically and quickly, the Peruvian party system was unable to adapt to this new social context —precisely because it was not institutionalized[76]— and collapsed. In conclusion, returning to the Mair model's interpretative capacity, it can be

[74] It is worth mentioning that simultaneous elections strengthen the presidency's systemic role because it increases the chance that the elected president gains a parliamentary majority. However, I must recognize that concurrent elections are rare in both types of semi-presidentialism. Of president-parliamentary countries, only Peru and Namibia have always had simultaneous elections, though Taiwan has recently joined this group (2012). Similarly, of premier-presidential countries, only Romania between 1992 and 2004 held simultaneous elections (four in total). Though, I can also include Macedonia and Madagascar partially in this group because they each had one simultaneous election recently (although these elections were concurrent with the second round of the presidential election).

[75] It should be remembered that Mair's model contemplates the existence of four probable combinations: (a) institutionalized parties in an institutionalized party system, (b) non-institutionalized parties in a non-institutionalized party system, (c) non-institutionalized parties in an institutionalized party system, and (d) institutionalized parties in a non-institutionalized party system (see Chapter 1).

[76] It should be remembered that the capacity of "adaptation" is one of the dimensions of the concept of institutionalization (Huntington, 1968).

affirmed that said model has the virtue of integrating the postulates of other analytical perspectives (structural and institutional), as it demonstrated with the Peruvian case of the eighties.

Secondly, considering that Mair's approach has been predominantly applied to consolidated European democracies —which mostly have a parliamentary government type— the findings of this research shed some light on the validity of Mair's assumptions in semi-presidential democracies. Indeed, I can conclude that Mair's perspective applied to premier-presidential systems (such as the Portuguese one) tends to reveal a pattern of party interaction equivalent to those that develop at the parliamentary (or electoral) level. However, in president-parliamentary systems (such as the Peruvian one), Mair's analytical approach enriches the analysis of the pattern of party interaction (or party systems) to the extent that it explains nonexistent dynamics in the electoral or parliamentary arena. Thus, based on this comparative finding, I can affirm that in president-parliamentary systems the interparty interaction carried out in the governmental, parliamentary, and electoral levels are disconnected or weakly integrated.

Thirdly, the previous conclusion allows me to reflect on the assumptions of Samuels and Shugart's approach regarding the central features of systems of government based on the separation of powers. Indeed, these authors claim that the systemic preeminence of the presidency in these systems generates a quite similar partisan dynamics in both types of semi-presidentialism, being it only different when the phenomenon known as cohabitation emerges in the premier-presidential system. My research emphasizes the difference between these two types of semi-presidentialism, and it allow me to affirm that in premier-presidential systems, the existence of a presidential center of power is not enough of a condition for the emergence of open structures of competition and/or "presidentialized" parties. In other words, I can claim that the frequent appearance of cohabitation

and the presidential incapability of dismissing cabinet members increase the systemic importance of parliament and consolidate the relations of antagonism or cooperation that political parties establish in their struggle for power (party system).

Regarding the practical utility of the research findings, I consider that my research results contribute to the debate on the political reforms that must be implemented to improve political representation in semi-presidential countries. Peru is an excellent example of the latter as an official commission of experts[77] has recently suggested changing certain aspects of the form of government as part of the set of measures to improve the operating of the political system. Specifically, said Commission suggested to temper the "parliamentary component" of the Peruvian form of government to reduce potential conflicts between the executive and control bodies, and also those that occur around the formation of parliamentary majorities.[78] However, considering the research findings, the suggested changes would certainly guarantee the stability of cabinets or governments; but, they would go against another of the objectives of the reforms: to have representative parties and an institutionalized party system (Tuesta et al., 2019, p. 38). In that way, from my perspective, if the main objective is to strengthen a party system, then the possibility of moving towards a

[77] The called High-Level Commission for Political Reform was created by Supreme Resolution No. 228-2018-PCM, given on December 21, 2018. Their final report was delivered to the Peruvian Executive on March 4, 2019 and was subsequently published with the title of "Towards democracy of the Bicentennial" (Tuesta, Bensa, Campos, Muñoz, and Tanaka, 2019).

[78] Indeed, among the suggested measures, the Commission proposes to eliminate the "vote of investiture" and the holding of the parliamentary elections five weeks after the presidential elections and, simultaneously, with the second electoral round, if the results of the presidential elections warrant it.[see question above] Additionally, the Commission also proposes the returning to a bicameral parliament and the renovation of half of the Chamber of Deputies by midterm elections. The general objective is to reduce parliamentary fragmentation and concentrate the vote in two main political forces (2019, p. 147). However, these measures do not deal with the main problem of the system: the potential conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, mainly because they keep Congress's power to censure the cabinet as a whole. In that way, it would be more effective (both to increase the probability that the president has a parliamentary majority and avoid the vote dispersion) holding legislative elections after the second turn as in France and having no midterms. On the set of measures in this regard, you can see the section of Commission's report: "Towards the attenuation of the parliamentary component of presidentialism" and "Renovation of the Chamber of Deputies" (Tuesta, Bensa, Campos, Muñoz, and Tanaka, 2019, pp. 111-113).

premier-presidential type of government should be considered. The main reason is that the president-parliamentary institutional design discourages the inter-party relations (of cooperation or antagonism) expressed during the electoral campaigns from being maintained until the next electoral process. Undoubtedly, the lack of interest of political parties in keeping such relations is because party interactions in the parliament become irrelevant in the orientation or direction of government policies (that is, a disconnect persists between the parliamentary and governmental arenas). On the contrary, increasing the importance of the parliamentary arena in the formation of ministerial cabinets (or in the orientation of government policies) promotes the establishment of inter-party relations (cooperation, hostility, etc.) beyond electoral junctures, thus generating in the long term a "predictable" pattern of interparty interaction. Moreover, a premier-presidential system would also be positive for the functioning of the Peruvian political system to the extent that it would avoid the emergence of confrontation scenarios between the executive and the legislature, which is another of the concerns that the Commission sought to resolve.

Finally, as part of the research conclusions, I consider it appropriate to list three limitations or concerns result from this investigation that should be answered in future research. Firstly, because this study was restricted to semi-presidential types of government, it is necessary to conduct a more extensive comparative research that includes parliamentary and/or presidential cases. However, the analysis of the competition structures in countries with this last type of government would be useless. In fact, theoretically in presidential systems, the cabinets are formed exclusively by the party or the alliance that won the elections. Be that as it may, it is evident that it is necessary to empirically analyze the relationship between the type of government and party systems under other institutional designs, especially in parliamentary systems.

Secondly, taking into account that the research results suggest that the premier-presidential system is better than the president-parliamentary one for consolidating a party system, it is convenient to recognize that there is a popular axiom in the literature which assumes that changing from a system based on the separation of powers towards a parliamentary one is not empirically viable without stable parties / a stable party system. The evidence of this assertion is that historically the implementation of a parliamentary system has been after the consolidation of a party system (mainly in European democracies). Thus, in the cases where a parliamentary system was established without a stable pattern of inter-party interaction (for instance, France before the Fifth Republic), the political system suffered a significant instability and finally collapsed. Some scholars have even affirmed that the emergence of the semi-presidential paradigmatic models (the Weimar Republic and the Fifth French Republic) was motivated by the fear of the party instability and parliamentary fragmentation that would paralyze the government under a parliamentary system (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2007, p. 515). Moreover, regarding the region where presidentialism is hegemonic —Latin America— some scholars have pointed out that in the Brazilian and Peruvian cases a parliamentary system would definitely not thrive due to their weakly institutionalized party systems (Tanaka, 2005, pp. 91-92).[79]

[79] Besides this argument, there is a historical fact on the transit from a government based on the separation of powers towards a parliamentary one: "...once adopted, separate executive elections are almost never abandoned…" (Samuels and Shugart 2010, p. 259). Excellent illustrations about this affirmation would be cases of Brazil and Moldova. In the first country, after the resignation of president Quadros (1961) and as a way to overcome the political crisis, the vice president Goulart negotiated with the parliament the establishment of a parliamentary system, but one on condition that a referendum confirmed that constitutional change. The parliamentary system was overwhelmingly rejected in the referendum of 1963, and Brazil thus came back to the presidential system. Years after, the Brazilian parliament again to discuss the change of type of government set by Constitution 1988. Consequently, the Brazilians again rejected adopting a parliamentary system through a referendum held in 1993. In turn, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moldova adopted a premier-presidential system (1991), though, as a way to increase the systemic influence of Legislative Power, since 2001, the direct presidential elections were annulled, and the parliament started to elect the president. Nevertheless, in 2016 the Constitutional Court declared said change unconstitutional, thus reverting the president's election method to a direct popular election. In that way, Israel would be the only case where the change from a separation of powers system to parliamentary one is keeping. However, it is worth noting that Israel "returned" to a parliamentary system after only a short period with direct presidential elections (1996-2001).

Consequently, although I have not directly addressed the change from a separation of powers system to a parliamentary one, the previous reflections are an invitation to explore the viability of transiting from a presidential or president-parliamentary type towards a premier-presidential one without a consolidated party system. In other words, though my research methodologically has raised a relationship contrary to the predominant one (the party system is the dependent variable and the form of government the independent variable), I consider it pertinent to explore whether a premier-presidential system can operate adequately without an institutionalized party system. In that sense, the question to be answered empirically may be: are institutionalized party systems a necessary condition for preventing governability or instability issues in countries with premier-presidential systems?

Finally, I recognize that this study, being limited to democratic periods, does not offer any reflections about relationships between structures of competition (closed or open), democratic quality, and democratic survival. Therefore, I consider it necessary to inquire specifically about the closure or openness levels that would be correlated with optimal levels of democratic quality. Taking account of the growing literature that has identified the existence of "excessive" levels of party institutionalization in some countries (Piñeiro Rodríguez and Rosenblatt, 2018), the research of this topic is urgent and necessary.

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APPENDIX 1: POST WAR SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL COUNTRIES

1.1 Post War Premier-Presidential Countries

	Country	Start Year	End Year	Type of Regime end-2020[3]
1	Czech Republic	2013	At Present	Liberal Democracy
2	Finland*[1]	1945	At Present	Liberal Democracy
3	France*	1963	At Present	Liberal Democracy
4	Ireland[2]	1945	At Present	Liberal Democracy
5	Lithuania	1993	At Present	Liberal Democracy
6	Portugal	1983	At Present	Liberal Democracy
7	Slovenia	1992	At Present	Liberal Democracy
8	Armenia	2006	At Present	Electoral Democracy
9	Bulgaria	1992	At Present	Electoral Democracy
10	Croatia	2001	At Present	Electoral Democracy
11	Macedonia, North	1992	At Present	Electoral Democracy
12	Mongolia	1992	At Present	Electoral Democracy
13	Montenegro	2008	At Present	Electoral Democracy
14	Poland	1991	At Present	Electoral Democracy
15	Romania	1992	At Present	Electoral Democracy
16	São Tomé e Príncipe	2003	At Present	Electoral Democracy
17	Slovakia	1999	At Present	Electoral Democracy
18	Timor-Leste (East Timor)	2002	At Present	Electoral Democracy
19	Tunisia	2014	At Present	Electoral Democracy
20	Ukraine	2014	At Present	Electoral Democracy
21	Congo, DR (Kinshasa)	2006	At Present	Semi-Open Autocracy
22	Georgia	2013	At Present	Semi-Open Autocracy
23	Haiti	1990	At Present	Semi-Open Autocracy
24	Kyrgyzstan	2008	At Present	Semi-Open Autocracy
25	Moldova	2016	At Present	Semi-Open Autocracy
26	Niger	2011	At Present	Semi-Open Autocracy
27	Serbia	2007	At Present	Semi-Open Autocracy
28	Turkey	2008	At Present	Semi-Open Autocracy
29	Chad	1996	At Present	Closed Autocracy
30	Egypt	2014	At Present	Closed Autocracy
31	Burkina Faso	1970	1974	Not Applicable
32	Congo, DR (Kinshasa)	1991	1993	Not Applicable
33	Congo, R (Brazzaville)	1992	1997	Not Applicable
34	Haiti	1987	1988	Not Applicable

	Country	Start Year	End Year	Type of Regime end-2020[3]
35	Kenya	2008	2010	Not Applicable
36	Kyrgyzstan	1993	1995	Not Applicable
37	Madagascar	1993	1995	Not Applicable
38	Moldova	1995	2001	Not Applicable
39	Niger	1993	1996	Not Applicable
40	Niger	2000	2009	Not Applicable
41	Serbia	2001	2003	Not Applicable
42	Ukraine	2006	2009	Not Applicable

Source: Author, based om Samuel and Shugart (2010, 32-33) and Elgie (2018).

* According to the presidential prerogatives established by the Constitution. However, in practice, the Executive-Legislative relationship may vary due to non-formal rules.

[1] The form of government started at 1920.

[2] The form of government started at 1938.

[3] Alan Siaroff (forthcoming).

1.2 Post War President-Parliamentary Countries

	Country	Start Year	End Year	Type of Regime end-2020[2]
1	Austria* [1]	1945	At present	Liberal Democracy
2	Iceland	1944	At present	Liberal Democracy
3	Taiwan	1998	At present	Liberal Democracy
4	Burkina Faso	1991	At present	Electoral Democracy
5	Namibia	1990	At present	Electoral Democracy
6	Peru	1994	At present	Electoral Democracy
7	Sri Lanka	1979	At present	Electoral Democracy
8	Mauritania	2007	At present	Semi-Open Autocracy
9	Mozambique	1991	At present	Semi-Open Autocracy
10	Russia	1994	At present	Semi-Open Autocracy
11	Senegal	1992	At present	Semi-Open Autocracy
12	Tanzania	1996	At present	Semi-Open Autocracy
13	Azerbaijan	1996	At present	Closed Autocracy
14	Belarus	1997	At present	Closed Autocracy
15	Gabon	1991	At present	Closed Autocracy
16	Syria	2012	At present	Closed Autocracy
17	Angola	1993	2010	Not Applicable
18	Armenia	1996	2005	Not Applicable
19	Central African Republic	1981	1981	Not Applicable
20	Central African Republic	1993	2003	Not Applicable
21	Central African Republic	2005	2013	Not Applicable
22	Comoros	1979	1985	Not Applicable

	Country	Start Year	End Year	Type of Regime end-2020[2]
23	Comoros	1992	1999	Not Applicable
24	Croatia	1991	2000	Not Applicable
25	Cuba	1945**	1952	Not Applicable
26	Cuba	1955	1959	Not Applicable
27	Georgia	2004	2012	Not Applicable
28	Guinea-Bissau	1993	2012	Not Applicable
29	Mauritania	1992	2005	Not Applicable
30	Peru	1980	1992	Not Applicable
31	Portugal	1976	1982	Not Applicable
32	Rwanda	1991	1993	Not Applicable
33	Senegal	1970	1983	Not Applicable
34	São Tomé e Príncipe	1991	2002	Not Applicable
35	Tunisia	2002	2011	Not Applicable
36	Ukraine	1996	2005	Not Applicable
37	Ukraine	2010	2013	Not Applicable
38	Yemen	1995	2011	Not Applicable

Source: Author, based om Samuel and Shugart (2010, 32-33) and Elgie (2018).

*Austria also had the same form of government during years 1930-1934.

**The form of government started at 1941.

[1] According to the presidential prerogatives established by the Constitution. However, in practice, the Executive-Legislative relationship may vary due to non-formal rules.

[2] Alan Siaroff (forthcoming).

Note: Considering Elgie's suggestion, in both tables semi-presidentialism is defined as the situation where a country's constitution establishes both a directly (or popularly) elected president and a prime minister and cabinet that are collectively responsible to the legislature by no more than a vote of an absolute majority of one or more houses of the legislature. In other words, this coding excludes cases where the PM and government can be held collectively accountable only through a super-majority vote in the legislature. Specifically, the countries excluded were: Algeria (all years), Burkina Faso (1977-80), Burundi (1992-96), Cameroon (all years), Central African Republic (2016), Egypt (2007-11), Kyrgyzstan (1996-2007), Madagascar (all SP years since 1996), Mali (all years), Republic of Congo (2016), Rwanda (all years since 2003), Togo (all years), Tunisia (1989-2001), and Vietnam (all years).

APPENDIX 2: VOTES PERCENTAGES OF PORTUGUESE ELECTIONS FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC, 1975-2019

Election	PCP	MDP	PS	PSD	CDS	UDP	APU	AD	FRS	PRD	CDU	PSN	BE	PAN	L	PàF	IL	CH	O/I*	Turnout
1975*	12.5	4.1	37.9	26.4	7.6	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.7	91.7
1976	14.4	-	34.9	24.4	16.0	1.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.6	83.5
1979	-	-	27.3	2.4	0.4	2.2	18.8	42.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.2	82.9
1980	-	-	1.1	2.5	0.2	1.4	16.8	44.9	26.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.4	83.9
1983	-	-	36.1	27.2	12.6	0.5	18.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.5	77.8
1985	-	-	20.8	29.9	10.0	1.3	15.5	-	-	17.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.6	74.2
1987	-	0.6	22.2	50.2	4.4	0.9	-	-	-	4.9	12.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.7	71.6
1991	-	-	29.1	50.6	4.4	0.1	-	-	-	0.6	8.8	1.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.7	67.8
1995	-	-	43.8	34.1	9.1	0.6	-	-	-	-	8.6	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.6	66.3
1999	-	-	44.1	32.3	8.3	-	-	-	-	-	9.0	0.2	2.4	-	-	-	-	-	3.7	61.1
2002	-	-	37.8	40.2	8.7	-	-	-	-	-	6.9	0.0	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	3.7	61.5
2005	-	-	45.0	28.8	7.2	-	-	-	-	-	7.5	-	6.4	-	-	-	-	-	5.1	64.3
2009	-	-	36.6	29.1	10.4	-	-	-	-	-	7.9	-	9.8	-	-	-	-	-	6.2	59.7
2011	-	-	28.1	38.7	11.4	-	-	-	-	-	7.9	-	5.2	1.0	-	-	-	-	7.5	58.0
2015	-	-	32.3	1.5	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	8.3	-	10.2	1.4	0.7	36.9	-	-	8.5	55.8
2019	-	-	36.4	27.8	4.2	-	-	-	-	-	6.3	-	9.5	3.3	1.1	-	1.3	1.3	8.8	48.6

*The 1975 election was for the Constituent Assembly; O/I: Other parties and Invalid/Blank votes.
Source: Comissão Nacional de Eleições

Significant parties

PCP: Portuguese Communist Party (from 1979 has formed alliances with AP, CDU and others) // **MDP:** The Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral (It was founded in 1969 as an electoral coalition meant to run in the non-democratic and widely manipulated parliamentary election) // **PS:** The Socialist Party // **PSD:** Social Democratic Party (officially PPD/PSD, with the first three letters coming from the party's original name, the Democratic Peoples' Party) // **CDS:** CDS – People's Party // **UDP:** The Popular Democratic Union // APU: The United People Alliance // **CDU:** Unitary Democratic Coalition // BE: Left Bloc.

New parties

CH: Chega (English translation: "Enough") is a Portuguese political party that has been described as right-wing/far-right and populist.

PAN: People–Animals–Nature (Portuguese: Pessoas-Animais-Natureza, PAN) is a Portuguese political party, founded in 2009. In 2015, they won one seat in the Assembly of the Republic.

APPENDIX 3: PARTY FRAGMENTATION VERSUS INDEX OF CLOSURE IN PERU



Note: IC's values only when occurred a change of government provoked by elections.

Figure 3.1: Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties versus IC, 2001-2016



Note: IC's values both when occurred a change of government provoked by elections and political reconfiguration of cabinets.

Figure 3.2: Effective Number of Parliamentary Groups versus IC, 2001-2016

APPENDIX 4: PERUVIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL ALLIANCES

4.1 Significant Political Parties, 1980 – 2018

Acronym (Spanish name)	**English Name**	**Political Position (predominant ideology)**	**Years active**
C90 (Cambio 90)	Change 90	Right (fujimorism)	It was founded by Alberto Fujimori in 1989. Then, in 2004, from Tokyo (Japan) he resigned to the party's presidency. Finally, C90 was dissolved in 2010.
FREDEMO (Frente Democrático)	Democratic Front	Centre-right (economic liberalism)	It was founded in 1989 and then it was dissolved in 1990.
PP (Perú Posible)	Possible Peru	Center-left (liberalism)	It was founded at 1994. But, it was legally registered at the National Electoral Court from 14 march 2005 to 13 July 2017.
FIM (Frente Independiente Moralizador)	Independent Moralizing Front	Center (reformism)	It was founded at 1990. But, it was legally registered at the National Electoral Court from 21 march 2005 to 27 august 2007.
PS (Partido Socialista)	Socialist Party	Left (socialism and Peruvian Marxism: Jose Carlos Mariategui).	It was legally registered at the National Electoral Court from 6 November of 2008 to 27 august of 2007.
APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana)	American Popular Revolutionary Alliance	From center-left to center (Social democracy)	It was founded at 1924 and since 31 March of 2005 is registered legally at the National Electoral Court.
Partido Renovación Nacional	National Renewal	Right (conservatism and fujimorism	It was founded at 1992. But, it was legally registered at the National Electoral Court from 21 June 2005 to 30 July 2012.
PPC (Partido Popular Cristiano)	Christian People's Party	Center Right (Christian democracy and Conservatism)	It was founded in 1966 and since 29 November 2004 is registered legally at the National Electoral Court.
ATP (Arequipa, Tradición, y Futuro)	Arequipa, Tradition and Future	Provincial Party**	Since 25 November 2005 is registered legally at the National Electoral Court.
PHP (Partido Humanista Peruano)	Peruvian Humanist Party	Center Left (humanism)	It was founded at 2001 and since 5 December 2005 is registered legally at the National Electoral Court, although, in November 2009, it changed its name to "Juntos Por el Perú".
PNP (Partido Nacionalista Peruano)	Peruvian Nationalist Party	Center Left (nationalism and social democracy)	It was founded at 2003 and since 4 January 2006 is registered legally at the National Electoral Court.
PSN (Partido Solidaridad Nacional)	National Solidarity Party	Right to far right (ultraconservatism and anticommunism)	It was founded at 1998 and since 7 December 2004 is registered legally at the National Electoral Court.
Nueva Amazonia	New Amazonia	Provincial Party**	Since 17 March 2005 is registered legally at the National Electoral Court.
Recuperemos Tacna	Let's recover Tacna	Provincial Party**	It was legally registered at the National Electoral Court from 17 May of 2010 to 18 February of 2015.
Alianza Regional Juntos Por Amazonas	Regional Alliance Together for Amazonas	Provincial Party**	It was legally registered at the National Electoral Court from 25 June of 2010 to 25 June of 2014.
FP (Fuerza Popular)	Popular Force	Right to far-right (fujimorism and anticommunism)	Since 9 March 2010 is registered legally at the National Electoral Court. Initially its name was "Force 2011", but it was changed to FP before the elections of 2016.

Acronym (Spanish name)	English Name	Political Position (predominant ideology)	Years active
FS (Partido Descentralista Fuerza Social)	Decentralist Social Force Party	Center Left (social democracy)	It was legally registered at the National Electoral Court from 30 June of 2010 to 2 July of 2012.
PPK (Peruanos Por el Kambio_	Peruvians for Change	Center Right (economic liberalism)	It was registered legally in the National Electoral Court in, although, in November 2009, it changed its name to "Juntos Por el Perú".
UPP (Unión Por el Perú)	Union for Peru	Far Left (economic issues) / Far Right (social issues)	It was founded at 1994 and since 7 March 2005 is registered legally at the National Electoral Court.
AP (Acción Popular)	Popular Action	Center to Center Right (reformism)	It was founded at 1956 and since 4 August 2004 is registered legally at the National Electoral Court.
FA (Frente Amplio)	Broad Front	Left (democratic socialism)	Since 16 March 2012 is registered legally at the National Electoral Court.

**In Peru this type of organization is legally called "Regional Movement".

Note that with the enactment of Law of Parties (Law N° 28094) in November of 2003, the National Electoral Court created the Register of Political Organizations to conduct the formal registration of political parties, regional movements, local political organizations, and electoral alliances. Thus, according to the Law of Parties, this administrative unity declares legally which political organizations can compete in electoral processes.

4.2 Main Electoral Alliances, 2001 – 2016

Spanish name (English name) – Duration	Members (in bold and underlined the major members)	Elections where the alliance competed
Unidad Nacional (National Unity) – **2000-2008**	**PPC,** PSN, National Renewal (until 2006) and Radical Change (until 2005)	Elections 2001, 2006
Alianza por el Futuro (Alliance for Future)	**Change 90,** New Majority	Elections 2006
Gana Perú (Peru Wins) **– 2010 - 2012**	**PNP**, PS, Peruvian Communist Party, Revolutionary Socialist Party, Political Movement Socialist Voice	Elections 2011
Alianza por el Gran Cambio (Alliance for the Great Change) – **2010- 2013**	PHP, **PPC, Alliance for Progress**, National Restoration	Elections 2011
Alianza Solidaridad Nacional (National Solidarity Alliance) **– 2010-2012**	Change 90, **PSN**, Always Together and Union for Peru	Elections 2011

APPENDIX 5: EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF "PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS" IN PERU (2001-2016)

Years	Effective Number
2001	4.37
2006	6.06
2006-2007	3.99
2007-2008	5.37
2008-2009	6.01
2009-2010	5.99
2010-2011	5.76
2011-2012	3.41
2012-2013	3.80
2013-2014	4.02
2014-2015	4.02
2015-2016	5.81
2016-2017	2.73*

Source: García Marín (2019, p. 148).
*This value was calculated by Author.