Islam and Revolution:
Central Asia in Transition, 1905-1928

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During the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Central Asia underwent a series of profound political and cultural changes under Russian colonial rule. From 1865 to 1881, Central Asia was incorporated into the Russian Empire through military conquest, and administered by an explicitly colonial government called the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan from 1867 to 1917. Following the February and October Revolutions of 1917 and the subsequent Russian Civil War from 1917 to 1922, Central Asia would become part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and re-organized into five national republics. These national republics have survived the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and continue into the present day as the Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

During this period of popular revolts and revolution, an Islamic heritage formed a strong collective identity among Central Asians, playing a role in shaping cultural reform, national identity, and the perception of socialism in Imperial and Soviet Central Asia. Central Asia, at least nominally Muslim since the eighth century, had a rich cultural legacy of Sunni Islam which was perpetuated and refined by Central Asian intellectuals and religious scholars into the early twentieth century. Though subject to debate and eventual persecution, Islam remained at the core of Central Asian political consciousness from 1905 to 1928, developing and changing in response to the political climate of revolt, reform, and revolution.

The purpose of this study is to analyze how Central Asian intellectual and religious elites conceived of a shared Islamic identity, and how this Islamic identity remained important in

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1 It is necessary to recognize the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian split within my use of “Islam” and “Islamic identity.” Uzbeks, along with Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen, tend to be Sunni Muslims; many Tajiks, however, are Shi’a Muslims. While events of Sunni-Shi’a violence did occur within the Sunni Emirate of Bukhara, most notably in 1907, I know of no other reports of such violence within other parts of Russian-controlled Central Asia. In addition, the Jadids and Qadimis were all Sunni Muslims. Therefore, by “Islam” and “Islamic identity,” I refer more specifically to Sunni Islam, and argue that Sunni-Shi’a division were not particularly relevant when considering the promotion of Islamic identity among the Jadids, Qadimis, or later Muslim socialists in Central Asia.
shaping their actions and reactions to developing ideologies of nationalism and socialism. The topic of Islamic identity is an area of study that has been explored within Imperial and Soviet historiography; however, few studies have been attempted to link the continuity and changes in Central Asian Muslim perceptions across the 1917 historiographic divide. The development of modernism and nationalism among Central Asian Muslims during this period tend to have greater prominence within Western historiography than the Islamic perspective these concepts were perceived and formulated within. This study will show how an Islamic identity shaped the responses of Central Asian intellectual and religious elites to the various cultural, political, social, and theological revolutions Central Asia experienced during the early-twentieth century. In a sense, the period of 1905-1928 constitutes a Central Asian cultural and religious revolution concurrent with wider nationalist and socialist revolutions engulfing the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.

My study will engage with various themes involved in Imperial Russian, Soviet, and Central Asian historiography. Beginning with foundation work carried out by scholars such as Hélène Carrère D’Encausse and Alexandre Bennigsen in the 1960s, English-speaking Central Asian historiography has remained highly thematic, with a chronic lack of good general surveys. Within the historiography of Imperial Russian Central Asia, there has been a focus on

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2 In Imperial historiography, see Robert Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2006); and Elena I. Campbell, “The Autocracy and the Muslim Clergy in the Russian Empire (1850s-1917),” Russian Studies in History 44 no. 2 (Fall 2005).


investigating the nineteenth century Islamic modernist movement the Jadids, as well as an emerging focus of exploring Edward Said’s concepts of “Orientalism” within a Russian-Central Asian example. For Soviet historiography of Central Asia, the focus has largely anchored on nationalism, with special interest on how the Soviet Union assisted or constructed Central Asian national identity while repressing Islam during the period of NEP (1921-1928) and the Stalinist period. The historiography on the Early Soviet Central Asia is a rich growth area, specifically in the study of how the Soviet administration “constructed” nationhood through mobilizing ethno-linguistic identities either with or without indigenous peoples’ involvement. Due to the specialization of Imperial Russian or Soviet history, there is a relative gap in historical studies engaging with both periods in Central Asia, though several noteworthy specialized studies have been made. This study represents another attempt to bridge the 1917 historiographical divide by

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7 Excellent examples include Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007); and Khalid, Making Uzbekistan.
linking both sets of scholarship to show the commonalities and changes in Central Asian’s Muslim identity and responses in the decades surrounding the 1917 Revolutions.

This study will challenge the existing historical focus on national development within Late Imperial and Early Soviet Central Asia by examining the continued validation and importance of Islam among Central Asian nationalists and socialists. There have been various views on the Soviet Union’s nationalism and the nation, broadly focusing on how the Soviet Union was a “maker of nations” in promoting a multi-national empire, a “breaker of nations” in stifling national development in favour of central authority, and how the nations created by the Soviet Union were artificial and would decay outside of the Soviet Union’s protective embrace.8 The process of nationalization within Soviet Central Asia has a dedicated body of excellent historical literature focusing on the development of each of the modern Central Asian Republics’ national evolution, much of it written within the past two decades.9 This study will contribute to existing literature on nationalism in Soviet Central Asia by highlighting the importance of Islam in these discussions, and revealing the legacies of the Late Imperial Central Asian intellectuals and religious elites among Central Asian nationalists and socialists during the national re-structuring of Soviet Central Asia.

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The development and changes of the Central Asian intellectuals and religious elites, the *Jadids* and the *Qadimis*, will be the focus of my analysis on Late Imperial and Early Soviet Central Asia. The Jadids, who can be simplistically defined as “Islamic modernizers,” have great publicity within Central Asian historiography through scholarship by Hélène Carrère D’Encausse, Edward A. Allworth, and Adeeb Khalid.\(^\text{10}\) However, one of the great problems in studying the Jadids is the issue of their historical importance. Within Soviet scholarship, the Jadids were overstated as a kind of revolutionary modernist vanguard contrasting traditional Oriental despotism, which some Western scholarship has followed.\(^\text{11}\) Other contemporary historians have argued that the Jadids, a minority within a minority, did not have any meaningful effect on modernizing Central Asian society.\(^\text{12}\) While I agree that the Jadids were a small and weak group within Central Asian society before 1917, I argue that the Jadids prominence during the Civil War and among the Early Soviet nationalists and socialists during national delimitation and *korenizatsiia* validate an exploration of their emergence and intellectual, religious, and cultural positions in the Late Imperial period.

In comparison to the modernizing Jadids are the conservative Qadimis, often closely linked to the Muslim “clergy” or religious scholars, the *‘ulema* (sing. *mullah*). The *‘ulema,*


trained in Islamic religious schools called madrasas, occupied important social and intellectual positions in Islamic Central Asia; this prominence continued as the ‘ulema gained greater cultural, social, and even political authority under the Imperial colonial government and the Tashkent Soviet during the Civil War. A historical assumption that the Qadimis served as the antithesis of the Jadids will be explored to reveal the complexity of the relationship between these two groups and the Russian state. Together, the Jadids and Qadimis formed the apex of the religious and intellectual urban elites, and their shared Muslim identity and membership within the urban ‘ulema shaped their debates on Islam, nationalism, and socialism in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet periods.

In analyzing the cultural influence of the Jadids and Qadimis within their Central Asian society, Pierre Bourdieu’s theories of “cultural capital” will be used. The use of cultural capital is not unique to this study, and I am indebted to Adeeb Khalid for first applying Bourdieu’s concepts in the Central Asian context. “Cultural capital,” as defined in Bourdieu’s 1985 essay “The Forms of Capital,” refers to how a person’s education, knowledge, and intellectual skills confer an advantage in achieving a high level of social mobility and status within their society. Bourdieu expands cultural capital into three main types: embodied cultural capital, knowledge actively acquired or passively inherited such as language; objective cultural capital tied to the possession of “cultural goods,” such as books and instruments; and institutional cultural capital in the form of an institution’s recognition of achievement through a degree or award. A fourth form of cultural capital, called social capital, unites these other forms into an aggregate which

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13 Crews, For Prophet and Tsar, 53-59.
14 Khalid, Muslim Cultural Reform, 5-7, 20-21.
provides a “collectively-owned capital” to those who gain membership through acceptable forms of cultural capital. Social capital is created and maintained socially using a common name, such as the name of a family or class, or through material or symbolic exchanges such as the gift of property or badges. Finally, I add my own formulation called *political capital*, derived from Bourdieu’s ideas, which involves the use of political ideological frameworks, such as nationalism or socialism, to assert cultural and social authority over a societal collective.

With regards to the Jadids and Qadimis, contests over the possession of *institutional* and *social cultural capital* through traditional forms of Islamic confessional education and membership within the ‘ulema dominates the Late Imperial period. During the Civil War, the control over *political capital* becomes the focus of the debate between the Jadids and Qadimis, ending with the Jadids victory by the Early Soviet period. After gaining sole control over Central Asian political capital in the Early Soviet period, this contest was effectively over; the emerging focus shifts instead to Central Asian’s collective Islamic retrenchment in the face of the Soviet state’s attack on Islam. This period can be described as the movements towards Islamic cultural and political unity, achieved by the Jadids, matched by the Russian state’s gradual hostility to Central Asia’s collective Muslim character.

The connection between the Central Asian Jadids and Qadimis and their society reveals the strengths and limitations of analyzing an urban elite. Within late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Central Asian society, there was a cultural division between urban Central Asians, including the Jadids and Qadimis, and those who lived as rural agriculturalists or semi-nomadic pastoralists in the hinterland. These rural Central Asian were largely detached from

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18 While this division is dangerous to overemphasize, scholarly studies of this urban-rural split include Elizabeth E. Bacon, *Central Asians Under Russian Rule: A Study in Cultural Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966); Muriel Atkin, “Religious, National, and Other Identities in Central
the debates of cultural capital, religious reform, and political nationalism which occupied the Jadids and Qadimis during the Late Imperial and Early Soviet periods. Rural society, focused on the village (kishlak) or nomadic tribe (ulus) was geographically, ethnically, and culturally localized; leadership and authority was provided by tribal elites (beks or beks) and village mullahs rather than the distant Jadids or Qadimis. However, despite the disconnect between urban and rural Central Asians, this study on the Jadids and Qadimis is important in plotting the eventual success of these explicitly-urban elites in creating Soviet Central Asia along national lines. Rural alternatives to Soviet rule, such as the Basmachi, ultimately failed to construct a new Central Asian society in the Civil War or Early Soviet periods. Inversely, the Qadimis support for the Tashkent Soviet during the Civil War and the Jadids incorporation into the Communist Party during korenizatsiia led to the successful creation of Soviet Central Asia according to their own interests. Studies on Central Asian resistance and cooptation with the Soviet regime should study the urban Jadids and Qadimis and the rural tribal elites and mullahs independently when considering their relative success and failures in achieving very different visions for Central Asia’s future.

My analysis of shifting Muslim identity among the Jadids and Qadimis in Central Asia during the Imperial and Soviet periods will consist of three chapters structured chronologically. The first chapter will address the Late Imperial period, 1905-1914, and will illustrate the development of the Jadids and Qadimis in Central Asia within the wider context of the Russian Empire and the Muslim world. The second chapter will focus on the First World War, the

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Revolutions of 1917 and the Russian Civil War, 1917-1922, and analyze how the Jadids and Qadimis reacted to dramatic political changes in Russia through the creation of Central Asian alternatives. The third chapter will address the Early Soviet period from the end of the Russian Civil War till the end of the NEP, 1917-1928, and consider how the Jadids and Qadimis, along with new Muslim Communists, interacted with the new Soviet regime and its polices of *korenizatsiia* and the *hujum*. The existing historiographical themes of the Jadids, nineteenth century Islamic modernism, and Central Asian nationalism will be expanded upon and linked to the concept of Muslim identity to create a more holistic analysis on the responses of Central Asian intellectuals and religious elites to political and cultural changes. Through this study, responses to the development of nationalism, socialism, and the nation in early-twentieth century Central Asia will be shown to be intimately tied to a shared Muslim identity; further research into this period will benefit by recognizing the continued relevance of Islam in understanding Central Asia’s cultural and political responses to reform, revolt, and revolution.
Chapter I: Jadids, Qadimis, and the Late Russian Empire, 1905-1914.

Writing retrospectively in 1932, a Central Asian mullah and qazi (Islamic legal specialist) Muhammad-Sharīf-i Sadr-i Ziyā wrote that the dramatic Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) was a sign from God that the Russian Empire had begun an inevitable decline and fall from power.\(^\text{20}\) Due to a mistreatment of Russia’s Muslim population, Ziyā describes how “the Creator of justice and mercy [i.e. God] raised a blue-blooded king from Japan [Emperor Mikato], who became the cause of that [decline of Russia]… [who] undermined the reputation of Russia, and capsized such a great state.”\(^\text{21}\) Ziyā interprets Tsar Nicholas II’s (r. 1894-1917) defeat by the “Oriental” Japanese Empire as part of God’s divine plan in removing the Tsar from political power; Japan’s victory revealed God’s displeasure, robbing the Tsar of his political and religious legitimacy over his Muslim subjects. The divinely-inspired defeat of Russia in 1905 was directly connected by Ziyā to infringements of Muslim religious freedoms; Russian officials interfered with Islamic sacred law the Shari’ah, and Ziyā saw the Russians as subversive assistants in the permeation of Western ideas and cultural practises into Islamic Central Asia.\(^\text{22}\)

The degradation of the Russian Empire and the need to defend Islam from corruption sets the tone for this period, when a series of cultural, social, political, and religious reforms were enacted to save both the Empire and Islam from seemingly-inevitable decline.


\(^{21}\) Ibid., 220-221.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 224-227.
1905 was a crucial year for the Russian Empire; in many respects, this was the year that the Russian people’s faith in Tsar Nicholas II and autocracy evaporated.\textsuperscript{23} Two events were pivotal; the “Bloody Sunday” massacre of over one hundred Russians outside the Winter Palace on 9 January 1905, and the embarrassing failure of the Russian military to defeat a seemingly-inferior Japanese Empire in the Russo-Japanese War from February 1904 to September 1905. The Bloody Sunday Massacre and the military defeats undercut the Russian people’s support for their Tsar, and led to various civil uprisings, general strikes, and organized political protests throughout Russia.\textsuperscript{24} In addition, the disastrous losses the Russian military sustained in battles such as Port Arthur in Manchuria (February 1904 to January 1905), the Battle of Mukden (20 February 1905), and the Battle of Tsushima (27-28 May 1905) led Russian morale to drop calamitously.\textsuperscript{25} Mutinies among Russian military units, most famously on the battleship \textit{Potemkin} in June 1905, marked one of the greatest crises the Russian Empire had ever faced.\textsuperscript{26}

The October Manifesto, signed by Tsar Nicholas II on 17 October 1905, was created to pacify the various rebellious elements within the Russian Empire by granting some general

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\textsuperscript{24} "Petition Prepared for Presentation to Nicholas II: January 9, 1905 (Bloody Sunday),” Daniel Field trans., Documents in Russian History, 2009, accessed March 17, 2017, \url{http://academic.shu.edu/russianhistory/index.php/Workers%27_Petition,_January_9th,_1905_(Bloody_Sunday)}


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constitutional demands; these included “the essential foundations of civil freedom,” including that of speech and assembly, and creating “an elective, yet purely consultative, constituent assembly” called the State Duma.27 However, in the years following the Tsar continued to oppose and attempt to circumvent the provisions of the October Manifesto. The most famous example of this was through the appointment of the powerful and pragmatic politician Peter Stolypin (1862-1911) as Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister from 1906 until his assassination in 1911. Stolypin advocated a “pragmatic conservative” political course for the Russian Empire, attempting to reform Russian autocracy without removing its teeth.28 Focused on achieving “political stability, economic prosperity, and national solidarity” through a variety of measures, Stolypin instituted martial law to counter rising terrorism in Russian cities while creating generous land purchasing policies to create a supportive and prosperous peasantry.29 However, upon Stolypin’s death and the beginning of the First World War in 1914, the Russian Empire was perhaps beyond hope of salvation. Perhaps too fatalistically, Andrew M. Verner described the failure of the Tsar to accept the changes of 1905-1906 as the moment when Russian autocracy “had doomed itself,” and argues that “the ten years remaining until 1917 were little more than a death rattle.”30

Concurrent with this dramatic political drama in Russia, the colonial Governor-Generalship of Turkestan was experiencing its own bout of popular revolt. The aftermath of

29 Ascher, Stolypin, 395; Charques, Twilight, 175-190.
Bloody Sunday and the October Manifesto led to a general political and social destabilization of Central Asia, with a revolt first among Russians workers and settlers followed by a revolt among rural Central Asians to Russian colonial rule. In October 1905, Russian railway workers engaged in strikes across Central Asia, focused at the colonial capital of Tashkent, to gain more concessions from St. Petersburg including greater regional autonomy.\(^{31}\) Joined in November by Tashkent’s military garrison, this 1905 Russian revolt spread among other Russian troops and workers during 1906. Russian rebels, focusing on the release of political prisoners and gaining great autonomy for the cities’ explicitly-Russian led dumas, eventually backed down following displays of Imperial force and the arrests of key ring-leaders in late 1906.\(^{32}\) Importantly, the revolt of 1905-1906 was that of Russians nationals on the periphery reacting to the developments in the Russian metropole; indeed, Russian colonial officials in 1905 remarked at the “indifference” of the Central Asian population to the events of 1905.\(^{33}\) However, this “indifference” was about to end violently.

In the late months of 1906, what D’Encausse describes as the “second revolution” arose among various segments of the Central Asian rural population, and lasting until 1910.\(^{34}\) Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomads in the Semirech’ye (modern Kyrgyzstan), along with rural Central Asians in the Ferghana and Samarkand (modern Uzbekistan) rose up against Russian colonial rule, burning farmsteads and murdering local Russian officials.\(^{35}\) Possibly derived or diverging from the


politically-inspired Russian revolt of 1905-1906, these Central Asian revolts appear to be linked to the growing economic competition and uncertainty brought about by increasing Russian exploitation of grazing and agricultural land rather than the political changes in Russia.\textsuperscript{36} Though these revolts were brief and small-scale, allowing them to be put down by Russian troops, the 1906-1910 Revolts were just the latest of a long-line of rurally-focused anti-Russian revolts, most notably the 1898 Andijan Revolt, motivated by concerns over subsistence and Russian colonialism.\textsuperscript{37}

Alongside the dramatic armed resistance of rural peasants against Russian colonialism, currents of Islamic reformism and conservatism gripped Central Asian intellectuals and religious elites during the last years of the Russian Empire’s hold over Central Asia; this debate would play an important role in shaping the development of Soviet Central Asia following 1917. Shaking the cultural foundations of Islamic Central Asia, two divergent strands of Muslim thought debated the intersection of the West and traditional Islam. A group of Muslim reformers called the \textit{Jadids}, believing that Islamic Central Asia must be modernized by adopting elements of Western modern society, engaged in a lively debate with their conservative opponents the \textit{Qadimis}, who argued for protecting the unique traditions of Central Asia’s Islamic cultural heritage. While the Qadimis would remain dominant during the last years of the Imperial regime,


the Jadids would lay the foundations for the development of a Muslim nationalism, and would eventually become members of the early Communist Party and Soviet bureaucratic apparatus following 1917.

The Jadids were a small group of Islamic intellectuals advocating the reforming and modernizing of Central Asian society along Western lines, focusing on the development of a new educational system called the “new method” schools (*usul i-jadid*), and promoting new forms of modern communication such as the theatre and newspaper publication.38 Many of these Jadids were members of the ‘ulema, thereby possessing a degree of Islamic cultural capital within Central Asian urban society. The term “Jadid” is a scholarly construction; within their publications these Central Asian modernizers referred to themselves as *ziyālidar* (intellectuals), *taraqqiparwarlar* (progressives, root word *taraqqi* = progress), or *usul-i jadidchilar* (“proponent of the new method”).39 However, within their own society the Jadids were referred to as *yāshlar* (“youth”); this was both a reflection of their age, as some were only their teens or twenties when the movement began in 1905, and a critique on their lack of wisdom or experience.40 These terms used to describe the Jadids are revealing; the Jadids saw themselves as intellectual progressives and possessors of new forms of knowledge, while Central Asian society saw them as young and lacking real authority on account of their inexperience.

Once the modernizing Jadids emerged in 1905, some individuals among the ‘ulema assembled in opposition. These individuals have been defined as the “*usul-i qadimchilar*” or “proponents of the old method” by their Jadid opponents, referring to their defence of the old-

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39 Khalid, *Muslim Cultural Reform*, 93
40 Khalid, *Muslim Cultural Reform*, 93, 105; Edgar, *Tribal Nation*, 16.
method of Islamic maktab and madrasa education rivaling the Jadids new method.\textsuperscript{41} The maktab, a kind of primary school for children aged 6-14, was focused on the learning of specific Islamic texts in Arabic through oral memorization, while the madrasa was a higher level of education, however more akin to a religious seminary then a university.\textsuperscript{42} Defining who these Qadimis were, and what their position was, is more difficult than with the Jadids. Scholars focusing perhaps too heavily on the Jadids have argued that the Qadimis were nothing more than a “residual category,” the natural inverse of the Jadids in the split of the ‘ulema which generalized into “the Jadids and what were left.”\textsuperscript{43} This presentation of the Qadimis lacks an important nuance. While some Qadimis were reactionary conservatives, others advocated changes to Islamic society within the acceptable theological limits of traditional Islamic renewal and societal purification. Both the Jadids and Qadimis offered dynamic responses to the issues confronting Central Asian society in the early-twentieth century from within an shared Islamic elite identity.

Primarily, the crux of the debate between the Jadids and Qadimis was over the possession of Islamic institutional cultural capital in a Bourdieuan sense, focusing on how Muslim children and potential ‘ulema should be trained, with the final goal of controlling the social capital of becoming the recognized religious specialists within Central Asia. Bourdieu’s cultural capital, referring to the social replication of forms of knowledge used to claim authority for creating and interpreting culture and identity within society, was produced and maintained through the traditional Islamic educational institutions, the maktab and madrasa, which granted degrees upon

\textsuperscript{41} D’Encausse, \textit{Islam and the Russian Empire}, 114-115.
\textsuperscript{42} Williams, “The Traditional Muslim Schools,” 341-344.
completion.\footnote{Khalid, Muslim Cultural Reform, 5; Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford, 1990): 108-110.} Intellectual exploration was not necessary to an proper Islamic education; instead, Michael Chamberlain and Dale F. Eickelman have argued that the creation of a shared Islamic habitus, a set of predispositions and habits of mind that manifested in the transmission of knowledge and cultivation of proper modes of behaviour and values, was the maktabs and madrasas’ implicit purpose.\footnote{Michael Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190-1350 (Cambridge, 1994); Dale F. Eickelman, “The Art of Memory: Islamic Knowledge and Its Social Reproduction,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 20 (1978); Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. N. Nice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977): 72.} Khalid sees this habitus reflected as the basis of a common Islamic identity within the ‘ulema and wider Central Asian society through the reproduction of explicitly-Islamic cultural capital by the now-divided ‘ulema.\footnote{Khalid, Muslim Cultural Reform, 20; See also Ira M. Lapidus, “Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: The Classical Muslim Conception of Adab and the Nature of Religious Fulfillment in Islam,” in Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place of Adab in South Asia Islam, Barbara Daly Metcalf ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).} The social reproduction of Islamic predispositions and habits was as important as textual knowledge in claiming Islamic cultural and social capital.

The possession of cultural and social capital was at the core of the ‘ulema. Islam was more than a religious system of textual and oral scriptures; it is also a cultural system of acting, living, and thinking. This cultural system of an Islamic habitus, addressed above, is created through the systems of Islamic institutional and social cultural capital, notably the maktabs and madrasas.\footnote{Khalid, Muslim Cultural Reform, 70.} From with these systems, an Islamic religious elite is created who must engage in the “social reproduction” of Islam to the rest of their society. Trained religious scholars, i.e. the ‘ulema, would create sets of “true” interpretations on Islamic theology and jurisprudence in order to “set forth general legal and ethical principles that are to guide and govern Muslim [social]
life,” thereby replicating their learnt Islamic *habitus* among the non-‘ulema Muslim population.\(^{48}\)

The ‘ulema were responsible for the correct conduct of Muslims within their society because of their institutional and social cultural capital. Islam, “embedded in the social practises of transmission and interpretation,” created the need for the ‘ulema in creating Islamic cultural and social capital which was both exclusively possessed, yet socially invasive.\(^{49}\) This Islamic social authority would lead to claims by the ‘ulema, both Jadid and Qadimis, that each were the only true representatives of Islamic Central Asian society.

This institutional cultural and social capital was urbanized; the *madrasas* which produced the ‘ulema were in the largest cities such as Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkent, making these the sites where the ‘ulema’s power crystalized. This urban ‘ulema, divided between Jadids and Qadimis, were primarily concerned with debates on the possession of Islamic cultural and social capital within their own limited urban milieu, and so lacked direct influence beyond urban Central Asian society.\(^{50}\) As a contrast, locally-trained *mullahs* among the rural villages and nomadic tribes often did not have degrees from a *madrasa* yet enjoyed religious authority through *embodied cultural capital*, the acquiring of expressions of Islamic knowledge such as the reciting a few *suras* (verses) of the Qur’an in Arabic and medicinal knowledge.\(^{51}\) Yet despite their limited reach before 1917, the debate over Islamic cultural and social capital by the Jadids and Qadimis in the Imperial period would set the stage for their contest over political capital.


\(^{49}\) Khalid, *Muslim Cultural Reform*, 33.


during the 1917 Revolutions, and even extending to the creation of Muslim national identity in Soviet Central Asia. This makes understanding the Jadids and Qadimis within the Russian Empire essential in understanding Soviet Central Asia.

Focused on the contestation of Islamic cultural and social capital, the Jadids and Qadimis both saw themselves as operating within the arena of acceptable Islamic theology; theirs was a theological debate on the proper nature of Islam, whether Islam should adapt to greet the new modernizing world or turn into itself and harken back to a renewal of an imagined “Golden Age.” Therefore, to understand the Central Asian Islamic identity contested in this debate, it is necessary to briefly address the theological currents of Islamic renewal, reform, and modernism emerging in the mid-nineteenth century.

Islam, like other religions, changes over time as it is used and adapted within local religious and cultural traditions. Within Islam, Franz Rosenthal has identified a noticeable theological construction he describes as “an inherited sense of theological dissatisfaction” with the current expression of Islam, which emerged repetitively among Islamic intellectuals since the early eleventh century.52 This theological dissatisfaction Rosenthal sources to a regressive teleology of religious, intellectual, and social decline from an imagined “Golden Age” to the present.53 This created a sustained discourse within Islamic theology on the need for periodic “renewals” (tajdid) to purify Islam by harkening back and returning to the teachings and traditions of this imagined Golden Age. These renewals were conceptually preservationist; they were meant to return Islam, as a religion and socio-cultural system, to its proper pure form by cleansing it of any local impurities, described as “restoring what once was and should be

again.” Islamic renewal was to purify Muslim religious practise and society to an imagined state of original, though perhaps fleeting, perfection.

During the mid-nineteenth century, a new form of Islamic renewal was emerging which was vastly different from any preceding it. This renewal took a new form in a kind of holistic reform of Islamic theology, society, and politics in response to the changing circumstances of a modern, desacralized, and European imperialist world. This has been termed “Islamic modernism” by scholars, to differentiate from “Islamic reformism” which operates within more traditionalist channels. Led by Afghan intellectual Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani (1839-1897), this new Islamic modernism was primarily directed to develop a new, authentically Islamic response to the changing situation of European modernism, nationalism, and colonialism either directly or indirectly affecting the Muslim world. One of the most interesting areas of this critique was to challenge the cultural capital upon which the ‘ulema derived their authority, as Islamic modernists claimed the right to lead Islamic society within the new modern nationalist

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future.58 Wider currents of Islamic modernism would shape the debates in Central Asia in 1905; in fact, the Central Asian Jadids inherited Islamic modernism from the Tatars within the Russian Empire, notably through the figure of Ismail Bey Gazprinskii.

Ismail Bey Gazprinskii (1851-1914) was responsible for bringing Islamic modernism to Russia, and his own Tatar Jadidist movement would become the most effective Muslim modernist movement within the Russian Empire. Gazprinskii, a Crimean Tatar Muslim, received a traditional old method education before entering the Moscow Military Academy from 1865-1867.59 After his education in Russia, Gasprinskii lived in Istanbul and Paris from 1870-1878, where he was notably influenced by the intellectual currents during the end of the Tanzimat (Reform) period (1839-1878) in the Ottoman Empire. The Tanzimat period allowed Islamic reformists groups, such as the Young Ottomans, to advocate for wide-ranging political and religious reforms within the declining Ottoman Empire.60 Upon his return to Crimea in 1881, Gazprinskii would mobilize for the creation of a Tatar nation around a unique Islamic and Turkic identities until his death in 1914. Key to Gasprinskii’s argument, which would influence later Muslim nationalists throughout the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, was the idea of

national unity based around a common religious and ethnic heritage, which became known as “Turkism.”

Gasprinskii’s Turkism was explicitly nationalistic, advocating the autonomy of Russia’s Turkic Muslim peoples united by common historic, ethnic, and religious characteristics. Through his publication of the Turkic newspaper *Terjüman*, founded in 1883, Gasprinskii advocated the development of a Turkic literary language and the modernization of Turkic Muslim society through the active adoption of Western modes of communication, such as the newspaper and printing-press, to correct the “backwardness” of isolated Muslim Tatar communities. The key of Gasprinskii’s Turkism was the “new method” schools (*usul-i jadid*), the site of Turkic national education which would give the movement its name. While the Tatar Jadids led by Gasprinskii adopted Western secularist rationalism and science, Islam was still considered to be one of the pillars of Turkic national identity; often, Islam was explicitly used to justify Tatar Jadid reforms. The local adaptions or “vulgarities” of Islam among the Tatars was something to take pride in as they exemplify the Turkic unique national character, rather than being removed through Islamic reform. Nor was Turkism explicitly separatist. Gasprinskii imagined the Russian Empire transformed into a truly multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire, and argued that Turkism could best operate within the Russian Empire; “we think that sooner or later Russian borders will include within them all Tatar [Turkic-speaking] peoples… In the future, perhaps,

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62 Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism*, 31-34.
63 Gasprinskii/Lazzerini, “Gadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” 251-252; Lazzerini, “Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia,” 6-7.
Russia will become one of the most important Muslim states, which, I suppose, will in no way diminish her importance as a great Christian power.”

Islamic modernism would be transplanted into Central Asia by Tatar Jadids around the turn of the twentieth century. Gaining momentum following 1905, the origins of Central Asian Jadidism can largely be traced chronologically to the establishment of the Tatar-inspired new method schools throughout Central Asia from the 1890s into the twentieth century. The first of these new-method schools in Central Asia was opened by Tatar Jadid immigrants in Andijan in 1897, followed by schools in Samarkand and Tormuk in 1898. Other new method schools followed, opened by new Central Asian enthusiasts for the Tatar Jadids methods, notably in Tashkent by 1901 and in Samarkand by 1903. More were to be opened as the decade progressed. The Tatar influence is important in explaining how limited the influence of Central Asian Jadidism was; rather than developing from a perceived need for renewal within the Central Asian ‘ulema, it was a foreign idea transplanted by external Muslim nationalists, adopted by some ‘ulema yet not all.

From the Tatar model, Central Asian Jadids universally advocated the “new method” schools (usul-i jadid) and opposed to the “old method” schools (usul-i qadim). The Tajik poet and Jadid Sadriddin Aini presents some of the best descriptions of the old method education in Central Asia; in his village maktab, Aini describes how he was taught the Arabic letter and vowel conjugations orally through recitation of simple phrases, such as “Alif with be and zabar – ab, jim with dol and zabar – jad: abjad…” In the madrasa in Bukhara, the oral memorization

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68 D’Encausse, “The Stirring of National Feeling,” 177; Khalid, Muslim Cultural Reform, 80.
of texts also included the memorization of a set of appropriate questions and appropriate answers, which was considered the height of learning among the ‘ulema.\textsuperscript{70} Within Aini’s text, the old method style of education is critiqued by his father (perhaps a personification of a Jadid), who challenged Aini’s lack of understanding the phrases he recited: “Oh, so you’re a parrot! You can say anything, but you don’t understand what you’re saying.”\textsuperscript{71}

In response to this old method, Central Asian Jadids universally advocated a new method school on the Tatar model. The new method schools stressed the phonetic learning of the Turkic alphabet (often alongside limited Arabic or Russian instruction) and a subsequent learning of words and concepts through a mixture of textual reading, oral memorization, and series of questions and answers.\textsuperscript{72} The new method schools were meant to expanded a Muslim education beyond traditional Islamic subjects by incorporating new Western science, history, math, and European languages.\textsuperscript{73} Even the physical design of the new method schools was innovative, with students sitting on chairs in rows with a teacher standing in front facing the class instead of teaching in seated circles.\textsuperscript{74} Yet, despite all these new innovations the Jadids were still interesting in recreating Islamic cultural and social capital in their students; more than 70% of the class-time was still devoted to the traditional Islamic education of memorizing key texts and Qur’anic suras.\textsuperscript{75} The possession of institutional Islamic cultural capital through education was still essential for the Jadids.

\textsuperscript{70} Aini/Perry and Lehr, \textit{The Sand of Oxus}, 111.
\textsuperscript{71} Aini/Perry and Lehr, \textit{The Sand of Oxus}, 244-245.
\textsuperscript{72} Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 161-163; Williams, “The Traditional Muslim Schools,” 340.
\textsuperscript{73} Williams, “The Traditional Muslim Schools,” 342-343; Bečka, “Traditional Schools,” 291-293.
\textsuperscript{74} Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 164.
\textsuperscript{75} Lazzerini, “Beyond Renewal,” 162; Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 163-164.
The responses of the Qadimis to the new method schools were universally condemnatory. One of the only examples of a direct confrontation between the Jadids and Qadimis over the new method schools took place in Bukhara in 1909 over the closing of a new method school by the Emir. The debate between two *mullahs*, the Jadid Damulla Ikran and the Qadimis ‘Abd al-Rafiq, captures the Qadimi position which did not revolve around issues of language or the physical design of the school, but instead on the method of teaching and the content being taught.76 ‘Abd al-Rafiq argued that the new method of instruction, focusing on the reading of texts and debating their meaning, infringed upon the integrity of an Islamic identity inherited through the social replication of traditional Islamic *habitus*.77 As well, the profane subjects of Western arithmetic, geography, and the natural sciences diluted the proper moral training Muslims needed to live within their Islamic society.78 The attack on the new method schools by the Qadimis revolved around the continued re-creation of a proper Islamic cultural capital and morality, which was seemingly being threatened by the new method schools.

The influences of the Jadids extend beyond education. One of the major Central Asian Jadid within the Imperial and Soviet periods was Abdurauf Fitrat (1886-1934), who became one of the most prolific Central Asian writers of the early twentieth century. Fitrat’s first major work, called *The Debate between a Teacher from Bukhara and a European* and published in Persian in 1911, captures the desire to modernize Islamic Central Asian society among the Jadids. The titular European, personifying Fitrat himself, debates a Qadimis *mullah* over the legality of the new method schools through demonstrating his own superior knowledge in traditional Islamic

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76 Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates*, 205-208; This is also referenced and expanded upon in Fitrat, *The Debate*, 245.
subjects such as Islamic history and theology. Importantly, Fitrat’s European lectures the *mullah* by drawing upon Islamic traditions; Fitrat’s European quotes the Qur’an and the Prophet’s *hadiths* to place the cause for the decline of Islamic knowledge in the corruption and ineffectual learning of the old method schools. In *The Debate*, the new method schools are validated by the superior Islamic knowledge and cultural capital they could produce when compared to the comparatively “backwards” old method schools of the Qadimis.

The Jadids were also important pioneers in developing new methods of communication, such as the theatre and the newspaper, which “represented a challenge to the old elite’s monopoly over cultural production in Muslim society,” acting as new arenas for the debate over the Qadimis claims to the possession of Islamic cultural and social capital. Mahmud Khoja Behbud (1874-1919), known popularly as his diminutive “Behbudi,” was a prominent *mullah* and *qazi* (Islamic judge), trained in the old method *maktabs* and *madrasas*, and ended his life at the high position of *mufti* (chief justice) of his native city of Samarkand. Behbudi’s religious and legal role did not exclude him from being an active member of Islamic modernism and the Jadid movement. Behbudi wrote pieces in various traditional and modern mediums advocating Islamic reform, opened a new-method school and bookstore in Samarkand, and wrote the first Turkestanian Western-style play, *Pidarkush* (“the Patricide”) in 1913. *Pidarkush*, the story of the son of a wealthy merchant who, deprived of a proper Muslim education because of the ineffectual old method schools, becomes morally corrupt and eventually kills his own father, was

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80 Fitrat/Hanaway, 245-247.
explicitly didactic in tone.\textsuperscript{84} Behbudi criticizes the lack of a proper Islamic moral education, which causes the downfall of the protagonist.\textsuperscript{85} Utilizing the new Western form of the theatre, Behbudi challenged the moral education provided by the Qadimis while extending debates over Islamic cultural capital through new methods of entertainment.

From his home city of Tashkent, the Jadid Munawwar Qārī Abdurrashid Khān oghli (1878-1931) developing another method of modern communication, the printed newspaper. Like Behbudi, Qārī received a rigorous old-method education as the son of a mullah, attending a prominent madrasa in Tashkent and another in Bukhara.\textsuperscript{86} Qārī was not a practising mullah and qazi like Behbudi, instead living as an educator, writer, and entrepreneur, and was the publisher of four short-lived Central Asian Jadid newspapers; \textit{Taraqqi} (Progress) in 1905, \textit{Khurshid} (The Sun) in 1906, \textit{Shuhrat} (Glory) in late 1907-early 1908, and \textit{Asiya} (Asia) in 1908.\textsuperscript{87} Qārī’s first publication, \textit{Taraqqi}, set a trend for the early Jadid publications; it was harshly critical of European imperialism in all its forms, and described Russian officials and the conservative Qadimis as enemies of Central Asian’s newly-won liberties in the October Manifesto.\textsuperscript{88} Through developing a new medium of communication, Qārī challenged the dominance of the Qadimis in controlling Central Asian society.

The contest over Islamic cultural and social capital through education and new forms of debate, such as the theatre and newspaper, show the Jadids as dynamic cultural agents operating within their urban milieu to challenge the Qadimis dominance. However, the Qadimis response

\textsuperscript{85} Allworth, “The Early Reformist Theatre,” 87.
\textsuperscript{86} Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 95-96.
\textsuperscript{87} D’Encausse, \textit{Islam and the Russian Empire}, 79
\textsuperscript{88} D’Encausse, \textit{Islam and the Russian Empire}, 79; Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 122.
was not a “sterile conservative bias” or a “fundamentalist conservatism,” but was also dynamic and innovative within acceptable traditions of Islamic reform.\(^89\) The Qadimis mullah Abdulqādir Sayyāh established his own newspaper \(al\-\text{Islāh}\) (“Reform”) in early 1915 in response to Qāri’s challenge through a new medium of communication.\(^90\) However, \(al\-\text{Islāh}\)’s titular “reform” was not advocating a new method of Western borrowing, but instead focused on concerns with Islamic reform and purification within a modern context. Sayyāh saw a current perversion of Islam resulting from the secular corruption of the sacred, and urged Muslims to purify their faith and morality from invasive Western influences to return Islam to its previous splendour.\(^91\) Here is the traditional Islamic renewal, with a regressive teleology and a harkening back to an imagined Golden Age as the solution to contemporary issues.

Another Qadimis mullah, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Sami, wrote the history of the Emirs of Bukhara called the \(Ta’rikh\-i Salatin-i Manghiitiya\) in 1902-1903. Sami used the traditional Perso-Islamic literary form to express a reformist message; the degradation of the Emirate of Bukhara from glories of an idealized Islamic Golden Age under the Timurids, when the “correct” values of justice and propriety (\(adab\)) were correctly interpreted and enforced.\(^92\) Sami focused on how Bukhara had declined from a stable, strong, and just Islamic state; his solution was to remove the corruption among Central Asian officials and reinvigorate Islam among the population, with an ultimate goal of overthrowing the Russian yoke by returning to a state of Islamic strength.\(^93\)

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\(^90\) Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 100.
\(^91\) Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 100; Khalid, \textit{Making Uzbekistan}, 59-60.
\(^93\) Sami/Gross, “Historical Memory, Cultural Identity, and Change,” 208.
rejection of the Islamic modernism of the Jadids therefore was not necessarily an argument that no change was needed, but that change should fall within the accepted parameters of Islamic theological and social renewal.

In a period of Russian military defeat, rural Russian and Central Asian revolt, and theological contests between Islamic modernism and reformism, a vigorous debate between Central Asian Jadids and Qadimis contested their shared Islamic identity and the cultural and social capital upon which it was constructed. This contest was not just about new forms of knowledge, education, or communication but also the social reproduction and possession of Islamic cultural capital within their society. The central debate over Islam’s cultural and social capital would continue into the realm of politics as the Russian Empire fell and Central Asia descended into anarchy.
Chapter II: The Revolutions of 1917 and the Russian Civil War in Central Asia.

On 19 July 1914 (O.C.), the German Ambassador to St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war to Tsar Nicholas II in response to the general mobilization of Russia’s military along Germany’s eastern borders.94 This would bring the Russian Empire into the First World War (1914-1918), with disastrous consequences. By spring 1916, the Russian Imperial Army was stretched thin; a combined German-Austro-Hungarian offensive had forced a hasty retreat across Poland at the cost of half a million Russian casualties, and an offensive against the Ottoman Empire across the Caucasus during the winter of 1915-1916 had extended Russian military operations further afield.95 There was a desperate need for able-bodied men for military service in 1916, not just as soldiers but also to construct infrastructure, communication lines, and defensive works behind the frontlines. To fill the growing need, Tsar Nicholas II passed a decree on 25 June 1916 ordering a special draft of the male population of Russia’s Central Asian subjects.96 This draft would have dramatic repercussions when implemented, sparking a revolt which destabilizing Imperial colonial rule shortly before revolutions in Russia would sweep the Russian Empire away.

Upon receiving the Tsar’s decree on 25 June, Russian officials met in Tashkent to decide how best to implement the Tsar’s commands. The decree was problematic in many respects; first, a military draft had never been called among Russia’s Central Asian subjects, due to a

distrust of arming potentially rebellious Muslim “fanatics.” As well, birth records were notoriously fragmentary, making it practically impossible to conduct any draft based on an age cohort as the decree dictated. The Russian officials decided instead that recruitment quotas would be set for each local district, and that Central Asian local officials, such as the village elders (aksakals) or the district headmen, would be required to select draftees based upon their superior “local knowledge.” Placing responsibility in the hands of native officials was also a means to redirect popular dissatisfaction away from the Russian officials, should unrest occur. In addition, each district’s quota was determined based on the district’s economic worth; those districts cultivating the lucrative cash-crop cotton would provide fewer workers than poorer regions with less-lucrative agricultural products, such as livestock or millet. The result was that poor rural Central Asians were hit the hardest by the draft.

Implemented on 4 July 1916, the draft led to violent resistance in rural areas of Turkestan (Uzbekistan/Tajikistan), which spread to nearby Semirech’ye (Kyrgyzstan) and Transcaspia (Turkmenistan) within a few weeks. One of the most destructive events of the 1916 Revolt was at the district of Jizzakh, south of Tashkent. One of the poorest and most isolated districts of Central Asia, the predominantly sheep and goat-herding Central Asian population rioted and attacked the town of Jizzakh on 13 July, murdering several Russian and Central Asian officials including the Russian military commandant. An Austrian prisoner of war in Jizzakh, Franz

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100 Pierce, *Russian Central Asia*, 271.
Willfort, reports that 83 Russians were killed in Jizzakh, with around 70 Russian women and children taken into captivity.\(^\text{103}\) The Jizzakh rebels, led by local tribal chieftains and village mullahs, declaring a *jihad* or “holy war” against the Russian infidels, and destroyed the local infrastructure, including railway lines, bridges, and post stations, and burned government lists of draftees. The Jizzakh revolt continued until Russian soldiers re-took the town on 17 July; over one thousand Central Asians were killed in the subsequent pacification of the region by Russian military force.\(^\text{104}\) The next day, 18 July, the entire Governor-Generalship of Turkestan was placed under martial law and an old hand in Central Asia, General A. N. Kuropatkin, was recalled on 21 July from his command of the Northern Front to serve as Governor General to help stabilize the degrading situation.\(^\text{105}\)

The uprising at Jizzakh, the declaration of martial law, and the recall of a senior general to stabilize Turkestan all illustrate the seriousness of this instability for the Imperial government. Meanwhile, popular unrest spread beyond Jizzakh to the Semirech’ye (modern Kyrgyzstan), where decades of ethnic tensions exploded with incredible violence. The spark came in mid-August 1916 when a group of Russians settlers lured 517 Kazakh herdsmen to “negotiate” the return of Kazakh livestock stolen by the Russians; the Kazakhs were locked in a cage and ripped apart by angry Russian settlers.\(^\text{106}\) A full-blown war between Russian settlers and Kazakh and Kyrgyz herdsmen then erupted, with both sides committing barbaric atrocities until it was

\(^{103}\) Franz Willfort, *Turkestanisches Tagebuch; sechs Jahre in Russisch-Zentralasien*; quoted and trans. in Pierce, *Russian Central Asia*, 275-276.


\(^{105}\) Pierce, *Russian Central Asia*, 277; Brower, *Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire*, 154, 160.

General Kuropatkin had previously served in the Russian conquest of the Ferghana from 1875-1876 and Transcaspia from 1880-1881, even serving as the governor of Transcaspia from 1890-1898. However, Kuropatkin was most famous for serving as the Minister of War during the Russo-Japanese War, where he took much of the blame for the disastrous Battle of Mukden.

ruthlessly squashed by Russian Cossack reinforcements, who slaughtered entire Central Asian tribes in retaliation.\(^{107}\) In addition to the revolt of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, several tribes of Turkmen in Transcaspia saw an opportunity to overthrow Russian colonial rule and by late September were attacking Russian settlements and patrols.\(^{108}\) At the years-end, Kuropatkin had managed to force the Turkmen to submit, and reported to Petrograd that 2,325 Russian civilians had been killed, along with 24 government officials and 97 soldiers; as well, 1,384 civilians and 66 soldiers were reported missing. Central Asian casualties were left unrecorded.\(^{109}\)

Taking place among rural Central Asians in Jizzakh, the Semirech’ye, and Transcaspia regions, the 1916 Revolts were grass-roots resistance movements against Russian colonial rule like the 1906-1910 revolts. Islam took an important role in the 1916 Revolts, serving as a powerful unifier for Central Asians against the Russian “infidels,” and demonstrating how appeals to Islam were not unique to the Jadids and Qadimis.\(^{110}\) In the Jizzakh uprising, there are descriptions of local mullahs riling up the local herders to attack the Russians, and one tribal chieftain unsuccessfully invited the Emirates of Afghanistan and Bukhara to join their Muslim brothers in waging a *jihad* against Russia.\(^{111}\) However, this religious leadership was provided by village mullahs and tribal chieftains rather than the modernist Jadids or the reformist Qadimis.

The maintenance and contestation of Islamic cultural and social capital, with the theological


discussions of Islamic renewal and modernism which preoccupied the urban Jadids and Qadimis, had no place in the rural 1916 Revolts.\textsuperscript{112}

The response of the urban Jadids and Qadimis to the draft clearly illustrates the disconnect between urban and rural Central Asia. Many Jadids supported the draft in the hopes of creating “a Central Asian Muslim presence in mainstream Russian life,” accomplished by breaking down of civil barriers between Central Asians and Russians, such as exclusion from military service.\textsuperscript{113} Notable Jadids such as Behbudi saw the draft as an opportunity to prove their loyalty to their colonial rulers, and advocated using it as a method to curry political prestige with their Russian compatriots during and after the war.\textsuperscript{114} While support for conscription may not have been uniform, the Jadid response appear to have been one born primarily out of pragmatic political interest, though emotive responses such as patriotic loyalty should not be disregarded completely.\textsuperscript{115} Unfortunately, the Qadimis reception of the 1916 Revolt is unknown. Yet, as the Jadids and Qadimis were both confined to their own urban milieu, the Jadids and Qadimis were paradoxically united in their distance from the issues and desires of rural Central Asians. This distance would only increase as Central Asia became destabilized in 1917.

On 1 February 1917, Governor-General Kuropatkin submitted an official report to the Tsar on his administration with recommendations for future policies. Kuropatkin reported proudly that between 150,000 to 180,000 Central Asians had successfully been drafted to serve

\textsuperscript{113} Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 241-242.
\textsuperscript{114} Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Reform}, 241-242; Brower, \textit{Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire}, 159.
the Russian war effort; however, most of these workers never made it to the front, and instead remained in Central Asia to rebuild infrastructure damaged during the revolts of the previous year.\(^{116}\) Popular resistance, simmered under the surface, was believed to have been successfully controlled. A little over a month after Kuropatkin submitted his report on a stabilized Central Asia, Tsar Nicholas II abdicated in the wake of a revolution in Petrograd where Tsarist autocracy would give way to a constitutional Provisional Government. The February Revolution (22 February-3 March 1917 O.C./ 7-16 March 1917 N.C.) in Petrograd would have a rippling effect throughout the rest of the Russian Empire.\(^{117}\) In Central Asia, 1917 was a period of limited and unexpected political upheaval, where local Russian and Central Asians created new governments to achieve their needs as Russia’s position deteriorated.

On 3 March 1917, the same day that the Provisional Government was created in Petrograd, Russian railway workers in Tashkent quickly mobilized to create a Soviet of Workers’ Deputies to seize political power in the vacuum following the Tsar’s abdication. Joined by a Soviet of Soldiers’ Deputies and Soviet of Peasant’ Deputies, these Russian soviets formed the municipal Tashkent Soviet, while a Provisional Government of Turkestan was also created to serve as the local organ of the Petrograd Provisional Government.\(^{118}\) The former Tsarist Governor-General Kuropatkin tried to retain control over Tashkent by making concessions while keeping Tsarist officials in major appointments. However, the Russian worker-led Tashkent

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\(^{116}\) Pierce, *Russian Central Asia*, 298-299.


Soviet became the major political power in Tashkent and Russian Central Asia from March 1917 onwards, removing Kuropatkin from power and placing him under house arrest. Once Kuropatkin was deported to Russia on 31 March, the Tashkent Soviet’s power became undisputed; Tsarist officials were removed from power throughout Central Asia, replaced by Tashkent Soviet commissars.120

The Tashkent Soviet explicitly favoured ethnic Russians interests over those of Central Asians, reserving the highest governmental and administrative positions for Russians. Though Central Asians were granted limited enfranchisement and rights by the Provisional Government in Petrograd, they were excluded from participation in the Tashkent Soviet and therefore effective positions of political power.121 One Tashkent Soviet commissar argued that because the Revolution had been carried out by Russians, “it is only fair that its direction should be theirs.”122 The Tashkent Soviet was also an exploitative regime; commissars from the Tashkent Soviet, supported by Russian militiamen, were sent out to requisition grain and other foodstuff from Central Asians farmers and herdsman, by force if necessary.123 This led to increased ethnic friction between Central Asians and Russians, and heightened the cultural distance of urban and rural Central Asia. Though the Tashkent Soviet had seized power for Russians, the events of March 1917 created also created opportunities for the Jadids and Qadimis to move beyond debates over Islamic cultural and social capital to mobilizing with the goal of controlling Central Asian’s political destiny.

121 Khalid, “Tashkent 1917,” 278; Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society, 194.
123 Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 300; D’Encausse, “The Fall of the Czarist Empire,” 216.
While the Kazakh Jadid Mustafa Chokayev (1890-1943) laments that “the longed-for revolution had caught us unawares,” Central Asians were able to quickly mobilize within days of the new Tashkent Soviet’s and Provisional Government’s formation through a series of Muslim Congresses. The first Congress of Turkestan Muslims met in Tashkent on 5 March 1917, which mobilized to force the election of two Jadids into the Tashkent Soviet as its Central Asian Muslim representatives. The election of two Jadid representatives was resented by the Qadimis, who questioned why these “youth” were elected to represent Central Asian’s interests over themselves. The claims of both groups to representing Islamic Central Asia, which had previously been confined to culture, was now extending into politics. The first Congress also called for the creation of a Russian democratic federative republic, territorial autonomy for Central Asia within that republic, and the formation of a Turkestan Muslim Central Council to represent their interests to the Provisional Government. The idea of territorial autonomy and a special governmental apparatus to address Central Asian needs would become a hallmark of Central Asian political platforms in 1917.

Concurrent to the first Congress of Turkestan Muslims, the Jadids and Qadimis organized into what Khalid describes as two “political organs” or “parties”; while these “parties” lacked many of the features of a modern political party system, this term is used for literary ease. The Jadids coalesced into the Shura-i Islamiyya (“Council of Islam/Muslims”), which pledged to pursue an Islamic modernist political agenda focusing on developing new method schools and

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127 Pierce, *Russian Central Asia*, 300.
creating a place for Central Asian Muslims within the new Russia. The second party was the Ulema Jamiyati (“Union of the Clergy”), which formed a conservative and traditionalist bloc drawn from the Qadimis, yet led by the former native official and lawyer Shir Ali Lapin who argued for Central Asia’s independence from Russia and the creation of an Islamic Shari’ah state. While before the boundaries between Jadid and Qadimis had been drawn culturally, now these two groups took on solidifying political positions. Going forward from 1917, the contest of the Shura-i Islamiyya and the Ulema Jamiyati was no longer focused on Islamic cultural and social capital, but now extended to what I define as Islamic political capital; the claim of political authority which, still grounded in a shared Muslim identity, could be based either traditionally in the possession of Islamic cultural and social capital or in the advocation of new ideologies such as nationalism or socialism.

The Ulema Jamiyati, lobbying for the creation of a separate Muslim republic of Turkestan which would be organized as a theocratic Islamic Shari’ah state, was the most powerful Central Asian party in 1917. Led by a Russified lawyer Shir Ali Lapin, the core of the Ulema Jamiyati was the old Qadimis ‘ulema, joined by some socially-conservative former Central Asian officials and wealthy merchants. The Ulema Jamiyati offer an interesting example of the political pragmatism of Central Asians during 1917; they negotiated with the Tashkent Soviet to gain Muslim confessional rights and political agency while mobilized widespread support from the urban Central Asian population. The Ulema Jamiyati even achieved electoral success against their Central Asian and Russian rivals in the Tashkent Municipal Elections, held in August 1917, where the Ulema Jamiyati won over 60% of the popular vote; their

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129 Khalid, “Tashkent 1917,” 278; Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 300
131 Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union, 72.
rivals the Shura-i Islamiyya were left with 10%, when the Russian Social Revolutionaries (SR) held 25% of the vote.132

The appeal of the Ulema Jamiyati to newly-enfranchised Central Asian voters was through their claim to Islamic political capital through their possession of the traditional forms of Islamic cultural and social capital. Continuing the claim of institutional cultural authority through their possession of the old method schools and the social capital of being ‘ulema, the Ulema Jamiyati expanded this authority by linking these claims to the possession of the necessary political capital required to represent Central Asian Muslims.133 The self-identification of Islamic cultural and social capital, embodied in the Islamic religious scholars the ‘ulema, within the political capital of the Ulema Jamiyati acted to exclude their old rivals from these sources of authority. The Shura-i Islamiyya, pictured as Russian collaborators and espousing foreign concepts of Islamic modernization and the Tatar new method schools, lost the debate on Islamic cultural and social capital in 1917.134 Despite many of the Jadids of the Shura-i Islamiyya being ‘ulema themselves, they could no longer claim the traditional Islamic cultural and social capital monopolized by the Ulema Jamiyati in the increasingly politicized 1917 Central Asia; instead, the Shura-i Islamiyya looked for other, nationalistic alternatives for Islamic political capital following the October Revolution.

Once news of the Bolshevik overthrow of the Provisional Government in the October Revolution (25 October 1917 O.C., 7 November N.C.) reached Central Asia, Tashkent politics

133 Haugen, The Establishment of National Republics, 57; Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, 60-61.
134 Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, 64-67; D’Encausse, “The Fall of the Czarist Empire,” 143-144, 220.
became increasingly radicalized. The Bolshevik Party within the Tashkent Soviet had been growing since June 1917, yet in the aftermath largely seized power, and in early November local Russian Mensheviks and SR’s were marginalized or removed from power. The Tashkent Soviet, now dominated by the Bolsheviks (known locally as the “Old Communists”), escalated Russo-centric policies in the countryside as the situation in Central Asia became more desperate. By late 1917, Central Asia was entering a period of famine and political instability, and as the Russian Civil War raged in Russia, Central Asia was disconnected from Moscow and its necessary grain supplies and military reinforcements. Requisitions by Tashkent Soviet commissars became increasingly violent, which led to small-scale rural revolts pitting Central Asians peasants and herdsmen against Russians militiamen and settlers throughout Tashkent’s hinterland. By the end of November 1917, Central Asia was quickly sliding into political fragmentation and anarchy.

In the aftermath of the October Revolution, the Ulema Jamiyati saw an opportunity for collaboration with the Bolsheviks to gain political power in Tashkent. The Ulema Jamiyati’s offered to form a coalition Tashkent Soviet government where the Ulema Jamiyati would hold 50% of the seats while the Bolsheviks would retain the other 50%. However, this was rejected

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138 Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society, 215-216.

out of hand. A resolution passed by the Bolshevik Tashkent Soviet in early November stated that
“It is impossible to let the Muslims into the revolutionary government at this time, because the
attitude of the local population towards the authority of the Soviets is doubtful, and because the
indigenous population has no proletarian organization which the [Bolshevik] group could
welcome into the highest organs of the regional government.” 140 This refusal to negotiate with
the Ulema Jamiyati emphasized the continued priorities of the Tashkent Soviet towards Central
Asians; cloaked now in Marxist rhetoric, this remained a revolution by the Russians, for the
Russians.

In the aftermath of the Ulema Jamiyati’s failure to compromise with the Bolshevik
regime in Tashkent, another regional congress of Muslim Central Asians was held in the city of
Kokand on 25 November 1917. 141 This congress was almost exclusively the members of the
Shura-i Islamiyya and their allies; the only member of the Ulema Jamiyati in attendance was the
Russophile lawyer Sher Ali Lapin, while the rest of the Ulema Jamiyati remained in Tashkent.
After several days of debate, the Kokand congress unilaterally declared the autonomy of Central
Asia from the rest of Russia “in accordance to the principles proclaimed by the great Russian
revolution [of October 1917].” Led by the Kazakh Jadid Mustafa Chokayev, this new
Government of Autonomous Turkestan (or the Kokand Autonomy) would include a council and
constituent assembly whose delegates were to be balanced two-thirds Central Asians and one-
third Russians; Russians were symbolically included to gain political acceptance. 142 The Kokand
Autonomy presents the political alternative to Bolshevik rule offered by the Shura-i Islamiyya’s

140 D’Encausse, “The Fall of the Czarist Empire,” 225.
142 Chokayev, “Fifteen Years,” 407; Fraser, “The Basmachi – I,” 21; D’Encausse, “The Fall of the
Czarist Empire,” 226.
Jadids, moving beyond questions of Islamic cultural capital through the new method schools to claiming Islamic political capital through a Turkic Muslim nationalism.

Declaring themselves the sole representative body of a “Turkestani nation,” the Kokand Autonomy claimed an explicitly nationalist authority over Central Asia’s future. Defined by Chokayev, the “Turkestani nation” was based around a common Turkic language and ethnicity with a shared Islamic Central Asian culture; this is much like Gasprinskii’s nineteenth-century Turkism, inherited by Central Asian Jadids alongside new methods schools. This changed the Jadidist debate over Islamic cultural and social capital through the assertion of the authority of a nationalist Islamic political capital. Now, in the newly-modern Central Asia, only the Jadids could lead the Muslim Turkestani nation; the Ulema Jamiyati were to be left behind in the nationalist future. Pragmatically situating themselves within Marxist-Leninist rhetoric of nationalism as a vehicle to socialism, the Kokand Autonomy also attacked the “colonial oppression” of the Tashkent Soviet, declaring that the Turkestani nation could only be brought to socialism under their leadership. Turkestani nationalism, centered on Central Asians shared ethno-linguistic and religious character, which offers a glimpse into early Central Asian national consciousness which would eventually be affirmed in Soviet Central Asia.

However, events would turn against the Kokand Autonomy in early 1918. The rhetoric of Turkestani nationalism failed to gain support from the Central Asian rural population, while a chronic lack of funds led the Kokand Autonomy to tax those villages under its political aegis heavily, alienating potential support.

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143 Fraser, “The Basmachi – I,” 21-22; Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, 74.
brought about responses from both the Tashkent Soviet and the Ulema Jamiyati. In distant Moscow, Kolesov and the Tashkent Soviet won a signal victory in branding the Kokand Autonomy as the last gasp of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie resisting the proletariat revolution.\(^\text{147}\) The Ulema Jamiyati condemned their rivals in the Kokand Autonomy, publishing in their newspaper \textit{al-Islah} on 5 January 1918 their vehement refusal to accept the rule of the anti-Islamic secularist regime in Kokand.\(^\text{148}\) Lacking financial and social support, the Kokand Autonomy fell when a force of Tashkent Russian militiamen sacked the city on 14 February 1918; the rape of Kokand would continue until February 20, with anywhere between 3,000 and 25,000 Central Asian civilians killed.\(^\text{149}\)

The fall of Kokand in February 1918 marks the end of the Jadid alternative to Soviet rule in Central Asia; those who survived the sack would either flee abroad, or laid low to wait for a change in the political situation. In its wake, Kokand’s fall would give rise to a major wave of popular resistance in the form of the \textit{Basmachi}, who would terrorize the famine-ridden Central Asian countryside from February 1918 until 1923.\(^\text{150}\) Though many Basmachi may have taken part in the earlier revolts of 1906-1910 and 1916, the first known Basmachi leader was Irgash, the former chief of the Kokand Autonomy’s militia, who organized a group of 4,000 like-minded guerilla fighters to ambush Tashkent’s requisition parties in the Ferghana in late 1918. Irgash’s successes and popularity among the rural Central Asians was such that, by 1919, Irgash’s band swelled to an estimated 20,000 fighters.\(^\text{151}\) Spreading beyond the Ferghana valley, Basmachi

\(^{147}\) D’Encausse, “The Fall of the Czarist Empire,” 227; Khalid, \textit{Making Uzbekistan}, 74.


\(^{151}\) Olcott, “The Basmachi or Freeman’s Revolt,” 355.
bands cooperated with former Tsarist officers and loyalists to control most of rural Central Asia by 1920; the local Bolsheviks of the Tashkent Soviet largely became caged in the city as anarchy and political fragmentation consumed Central Asia.

The Basmachi movement represents rural resistance to Soviet rule anchored in local concerns. Leadership among the Basmachi was highly decentralized, with an estimated 40 leaders operating with bands of local followers throughout Turkestan.\(^{152}\) It was tribal chieftains who emerged as the leaders of the Basmachi, identifiable through the proliferation of aristocratic titles such as bey or bek in written reports, and their authority was anchored to their own native kin-groups and tribes.\(^{153}\) These leaders, called kurbashi, ruled as feudal warlords who possessed combined military and administrative power over their local “fiefs;” the kurbashi collecting taxes, administering justice, and jealously guarded their resources and territories from Tashkent Red Guards and each other.\(^{154}\) Unlike the ethno-linguistic and religious Turkestani nation, the kurbashi fiefs unified Central Asians around geographically localized tribal pockets of feudal rule. Interestingly, this kurbashi fief system functioning as the most effective Central Asian “working alternatives to Soviet administration” amid the anarchy of Civil War Central Asia, bring some political and social stability to rural regions like the Ferghana valley.\(^{155}\)

Like the 1906-1910 and 1916 Revolts preceding it, the Basmachi movement was a grassroots rural rebellion motivated by economic, political, and religious concerns. The popularity of the Basmachi hinged upon their ability to address the needs of rural Central Asians in this time


\(^{154}\) De Lageard, “Red Army Journals,” 6, 14; Chokayev, “The Basmachi Movement,” 278, 281-282

of crisis. Central Asia was suffering a region-wide famine which hit its peak in 1920, and the excessive armed requisitions of Tashkent commissars backed by Russian militiamen primed Central Asian peasants to resist the insensitive rule of the Tashkent Soviet.\(^{156}\) While the promises of defending Central Asians during a period of uncertainty certainly made the Basmachi popular, the religious dimension is necessary to understand the Basmachi’s success. The rhetoric of Muslim *jihad* is also explicit among the Basmachi, with prominent *kurbashi* such as Irgash depicted their guerilla bands as “an army of Islam,” waging a holy *jihad* against the Russians “infidels.”\(^{157}\) The term *mujahidin*, “holy warrior,” was even used synonymously with “Basmachi” in places like Bukhara.\(^{158}\) Another Basmachi argued the irreconcilability of Islam and Russian colonial rule; “We recognize the religious duty to fight against you [the Bolsheviks], you who burst into our land despite the wishes of our people. We are glad to spill your blood and be a martyr to the faith.”\(^{159}\) With the Basmachi, Islam was intimately linked to anti-colonialism like with the Turkestani nationalism of Kokand.

Scholarly interpretations of the importance of the Basmachi movement vary. Mustafa Chokayev, the former President of the Kokand Autonomy who fled into exile to Paris, harshly rebuked the Basmachi as a failed chance for national unity and autonomy.\(^{160}\) Chokayev criticized the lack of political unity among the rival kurbashi warlords, degrading the Basmachi as “only brave fighters for whom the whole meaning of the struggle was defined by the success they obtained in the battles of the day.”\(^{161}\) Martha Brill Olcott argues that the Basmachi played a role

\(^{156}\) Olcott, “The Basmachi or Freeman’s Revolt,” 364; Buttino, “Politics in a Famine,” 261-262.


\(^{158}\) Fraser, “The Basmachi – I,” 22-23.

\(^{159}\) Olcott, “The Basmachi or Freeman’s Revolt,” 364.


in the modernization of Central Asian society by “bringing together the various elements of Turkestanian society to defeat a common enemy,” which served to create a new kind of anti-colonial social consciousness.\footnote{162} Glenda Fraser agrees that the Basmachi united disparate segments of Central Asian society more effectively than either the Central Asian political parties or the Bolsheviks. While the Basmachi appealed to rural Central Asians as the embodied “representative of a way of life and tradition of a greater part of the people,” they were unable to contend with the military power of the Red Army arriving in the 1920s.\footnote{163} The Basmachi, powerful enough to threaten the Tashkent Soviet, failed to survive the weight of Moscow’s centralized authority.

Effectively disconnected from Moscow since late 1917, the Tashkent Soviet had attempted to assert political control over an unstable Central Asia alone, with varying success. However, by May 1919, the tide of the Russian Civil War had turned decisively in the favour of the Bolshevik Red Army. Led by Leon Trotsky (1879-1940), the Red Army was driving the White Army back into Siberia by mid-1919, and in May desperately needed supplies and reinforcements began steaming towards Tashkent.\footnote{164} Upon the arrival of the Red Fifth Army in mid-1920, Soviet rule was gradually re-established in the countryside with ruthless efficiency. Basmachi rebels and Tsarist loyalists were hunted down and killed as Red Army battalions swept through the rural hinterlands, and by 1923 the remaining Basmachi bands had been brought to heel and their leaders executed, though scattered resistance continuing into the 1930s.\footnote{165}

\footnote{162} Olcott, “The Basmachi,” 365.
\footnote{163} Fraser, “The Basmachi – I,” 29.
\footnote{164} Luckett, The White Generals, 343-355; Sahadeo, Making Colonial Society, 220.
1919 would mark the end of Central Asia brief period of independence, yet the experiments in local rule and the political experience gained would help shape Soviet Central Asia. Yet, the 1917 Revolutions marked a time of opportunity for Central Asian Jadids, Qadimis, rural chieftains and Russian settlers to mobilize politically and developed local alternatives disconnected from Moscow’s centralized control during the uncertain period of the Russian Civil War. Taking advantage of the new political arena opened during 1917, the Jadids and Qadimis debated issues involving the political future of Turkestan, moving beyond debates of Islamic cultural and social capital to new debates on Islamic political capital. Appealing to rhetoric of Islam and the nation, the Central Asian parties the Ulema Jamiyati and the Shura-i Islamiyya gained political agency operating with and against the Russo-centric Tashkent Soviet. Local alternatives, such as the Kokand Autonomy and the Basmachi fiefs, illustrate authentic forms of Central Asian political organization, which attempt to utilized Turkic nationalism and Islam to unify segments of Central Asian rural and urban society. The alternatives of 1917-1919 would give way to cooperation in the 1920s, where a mixture of old and new Central Asian intellectuals would assist in creating a new Soviet Central Asia along Muslim national lines.

In 1913, a young Georgian Marxist named Joseph V. Dzhugashvili, better known by his pseudonym “Stalin,” published a paper titled “Marxism and the National Question” which defined “the nation” within Marxist-Leninist terms and laid out the appropriate Socialist response. Stalin’s definition of “nation,” which would become standard within Soviet discourse, was a “historical constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”166 In this paper, Stalin argued that certain nations should have the right of self-determination and be supported by a Socialist state, as “only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny” free from interference.167 The response of Russian Marxists to the rise in national movements should, Stalin argued, not be focused on curtailing these popular movements but to work with them to “put an end to the policy of national oppression, to render it impossible, and thereby to remove the grounds for strife between nations.”168 This perhaps-idealized response to the spread of nationalist movements in the early twentieth century, though fluctuating in character and subscription, would shape how the Soviet Union, with Stalin as its new Commissar of Nationalities (1917-1923), would approach the problem of nationalism once the Marxist-Leninist Bolshevik Party seized power of Petrograd in October 1917.

Once the Soviet Union’s Central Executive Committee (CEC) in Moscow re-exerted control over Central Asia following the successes of the Red Army in late 1919, the question of

167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
nationalism and Islam was brought into focus. With conflicting policy of national self-determination and centralized control, Soviet power had to be brought to the peripheries of Russia’s old empire once the Civil War had ended. Central Asia had been effectively cut off from Moscow from mid-1917 until 1919, and the authority of Moscow meant little while the Civil War raged and the Basmachi controlled the countryside. The disconnect between Moscow and Tashkent is expressed by the Tashkent Soviet Chairman Kolesov’s acknowledgement in mid-1918 that “Moscow is so very far away [that] we do what seems right to us.”

Central Asia’s political isolation would continue well into the 1920s. Due to the disjunction between Moscow and Tashkent, analyzing the policies laid out by Lenin, Stalin, or the CEC is less effective in understanding the Central Asian experience within the Soviet Union during the 1920s than studying the actions of the local Tashkent Soviet, the Turkestan Commission, and the Central Asian Bureau who implemented Soviet policies “on the ground.”

While the previous chapter identified Central Asian resistance to Soviet rule, this chapter will explore Central Asian cooperation with Soviet rule, and demonstrate how Central Asian Muslims worked within the Communist Party and administrative apparatus to shape Soviet policy to conform with their own Muslim nationalist desires.

On 4 November 1919, a new Turkestan Commission (Turkkomissiia) dispatched from Moscow arrived in Tashkent; its members included S. Eliava, M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuibyshev and F. I. Goloshchekin, all of whom would play important roles in the Soviet Union and Soviet Central Asia.

However, these representatives of the CEC found that here on the Soviet

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169 Brun, Troubles Times, 78.
171 These four leaders ascended through the Communist Party; M. V. Frunze as the People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs from January 1925 to his death in October of that year; V. V. Kuibyshev served as director of Gosplan from 1930-1934 and full member of the Politburo from 1934 to his death in 1935; while S. Eliava and F. I. Goloshchekin served in various positions throughout the
frontier, events had taken a disastrous turn. Widespread famine often pitted Russian settlers against Central Asian peasants in the countryside, while the Tashkent Soviet sent battalions of Russian militiamen to seize foodstuff through ruthless force; contemporary estimates place half of the Central Asian population at starvation level from 1919-1923.\textsuperscript{172} As well, the Basmachi continued to operate in the rural hinterland, harassing Russian patrols and settlers. The general state of regional anarchy made the task of re-establishing Soviet control incredibly difficult for the Turkestan Commission, even backed by the Red Army and the CEC.

The Turkestan Commission had two major goals upon their arrival. The first was to increase local participation within the Soviet administrative bureaucracy and the local Communist Party. This was meant to “indigenize” Soviet rule among Central Asians, which Terry Martin defines as \textit{korenizatsii} or “indigenization,” and to create a model postcolonial state to encourage a pan-Asian Communist revolution.\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Korenizatsii} was emphasized by the Soviet government during the period of NEP (1922-1928), and was meant to win the support of the various national groups within the Soviet Union by making Soviet rule “native” (\textit{rodnaia}) and “intimate” (\textit{blizaia}).\textsuperscript{174} Part of this policy included giving religious freedom to Central Asian Muslims to gain their support for centralized Soviet rule, with the belief that Islam would eventually wither away or be destroyed through state action.\textsuperscript{175} Secondly, the Turkestan

\begin{itemize}
\item Martin, \textit{The Affirmative-Action Empire}, 10-12; Bernard V. Oliver, “Korenizatsii,” \textit{Central Asian Survey} 9, no. 3 (1990): 77-98.
\end{itemize}
Commission wished to revitalize and coordinate the cotton agricultural economy of Central Asia with Russia, as cotton was a lucrative cash-crop in Central Asia since the end of the nineteenth-century.\textsuperscript{176} While this second goal was important, I would argue that *korenizatsiia*, literally “opening the door” for Central Asians to enter the Communist Party, played a more important role in demonstrating how Central Asians shaped Soviet policy according to their Muslim national interests.

Interestingly, the process of *korenizatsiia* had begun before the Turkestan Commission had arrived in Central Asia. In February 1919, under the direction of new Chairman of the Tashkent Soviet P. A. Kobozev, created a Central Bureau of Muslim Communist Organizations of Turkestan (Musburo) to include Turkestani Muslims within the Communist Party and the Soviet administrative apparatus.\textsuperscript{177} Kobozev, sent by the CEC to control the independent Tashkent Soviet, arrived in Central Asia in February 1918; during the Civil War, a rare period of communication and transfer between Moscow and Tashkent did occur, yet as the Civil War raged on these moments were scattered and had limited impact on Tashkent’s effective independence.\textsuperscript{178} A Russian Bolshevik and later Communist Party member, Kobozev had received greater training in Marxist-Leninism than the local Tashkent Bolsheviks, and was more in tune with the ideas of Lenin and Stalin regarding the “nationality question.”\textsuperscript{179} This may explain why he chose to include Central Asians within the Tashkent Soviet, despite opposition

\textsuperscript{178} For descriptions of other such moments, see Brun, *Troubles Times*, 21-23; Nazaroff, *Hunted in Central Asia*, 49-53.
from the “Old Communists” who had ruled Central Asia with a heavy hand since 1917.\textsuperscript{180} Therefore, while the arrival of the Turkestan Commission was the beginnings of Moscow’s direction of Soviet Central Asia and korenizatsiia, these policies aligned with and worked within institutions already in place.

Importantly, the Musburo provided “an institutional framework” for Central Asian power to grow within the Tashkent Soviet, which was supported whole-heartedly by the Turkestan Commission upon their arrival in November 1919.\textsuperscript{181} However, it was the remaining members of the Shura-i Islamiyya Jadids, many of whom had gone into hiding following the failure at Kokand, who flocked to the Musburo in February 1919. Kobozev’s arrival seems to have upset the pre-existing power relations within Tashkent, as the Ulema Jamiyati, who had continued to negotiate with the Old Communists within the Tashkent Soviet following the fall of Kokand, became vilified by Kobozev and his Jadid allies.\textsuperscript{182} Once given power through the Musburo, the Jadids used their newfound political power to defeat their old rivals; the Ulema Jamiyati were denounced as “counterrevolutionaries” on May 21 1919, which led to the confiscation of their property, the dismemberment of the Islamic reformist journal \textit{al-Islah}, and the beginnings of concerted attacks on the old method \textit{maktabs} and \textit{madrasas}.\textsuperscript{183} From May 1919 onwards, it was the Jadids of the old Shura-i Islamiyya, now entrenched within the Musburo, who could claim Islamic cultural, social, and political capital within Soviet Central Asia. No longer contested among the ‘ulema, the internal debates within Islam become less important in comparison to the external debates involving Islam’s place within an increasingly-centralized Soviet Central Asia.

\textsuperscript{181} Khalid, \textit{Making Uzbekistan}, 107.
\textsuperscript{182} Bennigsen and Wimbush, \textit{Muslims in the Soviet Empire}, 14-16, 60.
\textsuperscript{183} Khalid, \textit{Making Uzbekistan}, 96.
Despite the relatively-painless transition of the Shura-i Islamiyya Jadids into the Musburo, the inclusion of Central Asia Muslims into the Communist Party and the Soviet administrative apparatus was not without its difficulties. To better understand korenizatsiia in Central Asia, the period of 1919-1928 can be broken down into two general phases. From 1919-1923, the old Jadids, with some of the first Muslim apparatchiks, were brought into the Communist Party through the Musburo. The members of the Musburo, now the sole possessors of Islamic cultural, social, and political capital, formed what Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush have famously described as the “Muslim National Communists,” offering an explicitly Muslim nationalist alternative to the Soviet’s “nationality question.” Following 1923, the Communist Party cracked down and purged many of these Muslim National Communists from the Musburo, while also accelerating the process of korenizatsiia by training and incorporating younger Central Asian Muslims to become a new socialist cohort. This led to what I will call the “Muslim Soviet” cohort, who played important roles in national delimitation and the socialist assault on Islam, yet were again purged in 1928 as these Central Asians Soviets were deemed sullied by their continued identification as Muslims. Tracing the developments of Muslim National Communism and the Muslim Soviets presents another round of Central Asian alternatives to Soviet state-socialism, illustrating how Islam continued to occupy an important position within Central Asian constructions of themselves, the nation, and the Soviet state.

“Muslim National Communism” refers to a reinterpretation of classical Marxist-Leninist thought by Russian Muslims to satisfy their own anti-colonial and nationalist desires. Arguing that “only a socialist regime could destroy with one blow and in one

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generation imperial domination by alien forces and thereby lay the foundations for true liberation,” Russian Muslims focused on the revolutionary liberation of an oppressed proletarian nation from an oppressive bourgeois imperial power within Marxist-Leninist theory.\textsuperscript{185} Lenin’s own work \textit{Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism} likely influenced Muslim Russian’s conception of the colonial world as one of oppressor and oppressed groups, with the arrival of socialism bringing an end to colonial oppression.\textsuperscript{186} One of the most effective proponents of National Communism among Russia’s Muslim populations was the Volga Tatar Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev (1892-1939), who joined the Bolshevik Party in November 1917 and was a member of the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities (Narkomnats) in 1922 until his imprisonment in 1924 and execution in 1939.\textsuperscript{187} In a Regional Congress in Kazan in March 1918, Sultan-Galiev argued that “All Muslim colonized people are proletarian peoples… Therefore, it is legitimate to say that the national liberation movement in Muslim countries has the character of a Socialist revolution;” here, Sultan-Galiev firmly links colonialism to capitalist oppression, and argues for national liberation as the true function of socialism.\textsuperscript{188}

The use of “Muslim” by Bennigsen and Wimbush is revealing and prescient; religion was used as an identifier between the colonized (Muslim Turkic peoples, such as the Tatars, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, etc.) and the colonizers (non-Muslim peoples, notably the Russians).

during the Imperial and Soviet periods. Islam served more than just as an identifier; instead, it remained at the centre of Central Asian political validation. To validate National Communism, Central Asian Muslims attempted to give Socialism an Islamic legitimacy. Sher Ali Lapin, the former leader of the Ulema Jamiyati, wrote to the Tashkent Soviet in late 1918 arguing that “the root of socialism lay in Islam,” and that the ‘ulema embodied the true revolutionary potential of Islam rather than the “so-called progressives” that wanted to modernize Muslim society. Abdurauf Fitrat, the Jadid writer of The Debate in 1911, wrote intensely anti-colonial plays in 1919-1920 where the violent revolutionary actions of Muslim socialist revolutionaries (primarily Indian Muslims operating within the British Raj) were validated by an Islamic rejection of non-Muslim rule. A close linkage between socialism and Islam among Central Asians, while not aligning with Moscow’s formulation of Marxist-Leninism, is revealing of the continued importance of Islam at the core of the new Central Asian nationalist-socialist identity.

In Central Asia, Sultan-Galiev’s ideas on Muslim National Communism was picked up by a young Kazakh lawyer named Turar Rysqulov (1894-1938), who became the most prominent Muslim National Communist in Soviet Central Asia. Rysqulov was educated in a Jadid school in the Semirech’ye, where he also attended a Russian agricultural school and rose within the local Soviet organizations in the wake of the October Revolution; later, he travelled to Tashkent to become the Tashkent Soviet’s Commissar for Health by the end of 1918. Rysqulov had no connection with the Shura-i Islamiyya or the Ulema Jamiyati; instead, he can perhaps be regarded as one of the first Central Asian apparatchik, with his

189 Quoted in Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, 99.
191 Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, 97-98.
political career solely confined within the Central Asian Communist organizations. Joining the Musburo in November 1918, Rysqulov became its most active spokesperson in furthered the ideas of Muslim National Communism within Central Asia. Rysqulov, who came to lead the Musburo to Muslim National Communism, argued that in “the non-Russian colonial peripheries of the empire, revolution made sense only as a national anticolonial struggle… [and that] the duty of the Russian revolution was to undo colonial oppression at home and to liberate the colonial world abroad.” For Rysqulov, socialism was explicitly national and anti-colonial, with the creation of a Muslim proletariat necessary to create a Soviet Central Asia.

Beyond the Musburo, where Rysqulov created a strong core of Muslim National Communists by early 1919, Central Asian politics took on more anti-colonial and anti-Russian overtones. The Socialist Party of Turkestan (also called the “Party of Freedom” or the EPK) was an independent autochthonous nationalist-socialist party formed by Central Asian and Bashkir intellectuals in secret in Tashkent in 1919; later in 1922 the EPK was absorbed into the Communist Party. In their polemic the “Program of the Socialist Party of Turkestan EPK (Party of Freedom),” an anticolonial Muslim socialism was laid out using the rhetoric of a Marxist-Leninist class struggle. Arguing that the oppressed cotton peasants and textile workers of Central Asia could unite to form a revolutionary proletariat, the EPK argued that Central Asia could embark on a socialist revolution to liberate itself from all forms of Russian imperialist power. Furthering this anti-colonial rhetoric, the EPK also

192 Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism, 44-46.
193 Summarized by Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, 111.
194 Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism, 166-167.
argued that “a proletariat of an imperialist nation cannot easily renounce opinions and attitudes towards colonies and peoples formerly oppressed by their own bourgeoisie,” and therefore were little more than “hypocritical oppressors” using socialism for their own imperialist aims.\footnote{Ibid., 172.} Here, Muslim National Communism is laid out in its most extreme form; even Russian socialists were regarded as tainted by their colonial past, and therefore a socialist revolution can only come from within an indigenous context.

Upon the arrival of the Turkestan Commission in late 1919, the desires of the Muslim National Communists in the Musburo were directly challenged; here the divergence of the desires of local Muslim National Communism and Moscow’s state-socialism became painfully apparent. The Musburo’s proposal for Central Asia’s promotion to a national republic with wide-ranging autonomy, including its own Muslim Communist Party, the right to conduct independent foreign affairs, and to print its own money, was rejected by the Turkestan Commission.\footnote{Sahadeo, \textit{Russian Colonial Society}, 216-218; Walter Kolarz, \textit{Russia and Her Colonies} (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953): 33.} Instead, the Turkestan Commission declared Central Asia “an autonomous part of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic],” placing Central Asia’s economic and food-supply policies under the direct control of Moscow.\footnote{Khalid, \textit{Making Uzbekistan}, 115.} Later, once the Turkestan Commission was transformed into an elective Turkestan Bureau in 1920 (\textit{Turkbuuro}, later the Central Asia Bureau or \textit{Sredazbuuro} in 1922), Moscow ordered the re-election of all Communist Party members in Central Asia; Rysqulov and other prominent Muslim National Communists were suspiciously not re-elected in what was likely a rigged election.\footnote{Khalid, \textit{Making Uzbekistan}, 115; for a detailed analysis of the Central Asian Bureau, see Keller, “The Central Asian Bureau” 281-297.} Following this electoral defeat, Rysqulov and several others prominent Muslim
National Communists were briefly arrested on the crimes of being “bourgeois nationalists,” and were eventually executed during the Great Purges (1936-1938). The loss of Rysqulov effectively ended Muslim National Communism in Central Asia. This was mirrored in events in Russia proper, where Sultan-Galiev and other Muslim National Communists increasingly fell out of favour following the death of Lenin in 1924, with most expelled from the party by 1928.200

Following the defeat of Rysqulov and the Muslim National Communists, the Central Asian Bureau turned towards the “nationality question” within Central Asia. By the early 1920s, rhetoric of decolonization and “cultural backwardness” (kul’turno-otstalost’) was being used by Muslim Communists and non-Party Muslims to argue for the creation of specifically non-colonial republics and Muslim Communist Parties for the oppressed Muslim nations throughout the Soviet Union.201 The most extreme visions of these Muslim republics was espoused by Sultan-Galiev in 1923, who argued for the creation of a “Soviet Socialist Republic of Turan,” which would encompass all the Turkic peoples within one decolonized territory; this included the disparate regions of Central Asia, Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Azerbaijan, and Daghestan among others.202 This Republic of Turan was a harkening back to the mythical homeland of the Turkic peoples, which had mythic origins in the Persian epic poem the Shahnameh, and was meant to connect Muslim Communists with their glorious pan-Turkic past.203 While moving away from an explicit Islamic identity,
Sultan-Galiev’s vision of a pan-Turkic republic demonstrates the intellectual heritage of the Muslim National Communists to Jadidism, notably Gasprinskii’s Turkism. Sultan-Galiev’s Turanian Republic was rejected by Moscow for the fear that this pan-Turkic republic would be too powerful to be controlled effectively.

In response to the growing issues of Central Asia nationalism, the Central Asian Bureau began a process of national delimitation to create new territories for each of the five recognized Central Asian nationalities beginning in 1924. The process of national delimitation in Central Asia was a complex affair for the Soviet government. Soviet officials and ethnographers, both Russian and Central Asians, were preoccupied with creating “accurate” delimitations by using what Francine Hirsch has described as a “laundry list of traits” to distinguish different ethno-linguistic nations: language, religion, race, culture, byt (everyday life, such as nomadic versus sedentary), and occupation were all used to determine national boundaries. National delimitation was also used by Central Asian Communists and non-Party elites to create new territorial states within which ethnic decolonization and national development could continue. National delimitation was intended to bring about an end to the social, ethnic, and economic fragmentation which Soviet officials felt characterized Central Asia since 1917, with more to do with pragmatic state construction done locally rather than under dogmatic ideologies aligning with Moscow.

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204 For good overviews of this process, see Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire; Hirsch, Empire of Nations; and Haugen, The Establishment of National Republics.
206 For examples, see Edgar, Tribal Nation, 220-247; Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, 170-189; Bergne, The Birth of Tajikistan, 47-61.
The process of national delimitation was begun in 1924 by the Central Asian Bureau, and was finished in 1936; this would result the creation of the five Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR’s) of Central Asia, which share similar geographic borders to the modern Central Asian Republics. Begun with the separation of the Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs, with the later additions of the Tajik SSR, formed from the Uzbek SSR in 1929, and the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSRs formed from the RSFSR in 1936, national delimitation was lauded by Soviet contemporaries as one of the most impressive feats of Soviet rule. National delimitation had far more long-reaching effects than simply the drawing of borders; it strengthened Soviet control over the region by breaking up localized and tribal loyalties, yet also increased the troubling drive towards nationalism. Described by Khalid as Central Asia’s “second revolution,” national delimitation consolidated the gains made by the October Revolution in Central Asia by strengthening the processes of decolonization of Russia’s inherited colonial possessions and the “indigenization” of Soviet power into the population.

Concurrently with national delimitation, the “indigenization” or korenizatsiia of Soviet power within Central Asia allowed Central Asian Muslims to participate directly in the Soviet experiment. The term korenizatsiia encompassed both “mechanical korenizatsiia,” the physical incorporation of Central Asians within the Communist Party, and “linguistic korenizatsiia,” the process of creating national languages and education.

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systems meant to promote economic and cultural modernization.\textsuperscript{211} The old Musburo, dismantled following the discredit of Rysqulov and the Muslim National Communists, was rejected as a source of ethnic segregation unbefitting of a truly Communist regime. The old Jadids, those members of the Shura-i Islamiyya and the Musburo who survived the purge of 1922, joined local tribal chieftains, village elders, and young men and women educated in the new method Jadid schools who were brought directly into local Communist Party organs in a new cohort of Communist apprentices (praktikanty) from 1924-1928.\textsuperscript{212} These new additions to the Communist Party came to form an astonishing 46.7\% of local Communist Party members by 1926; in 1924, Central Asians had only formed 9.8\%.\textsuperscript{213} To make room for these new apprentices within the Soviet administrative apparatus, Russians were removed under the banner of decolonization, creating an ethnic discontent which inversed the previous relationship between the Tashkent Soviet and Central Asians during 1917-1919.

The Muslim Soviet cohort, which would propel notable Central Asians such as Fayzullah Khodzhaev (1896-1938) and Akmal Ikramov (1898-1938) into positions of power within the Communist Parties of the new Central Asian national republics, were closer aligned to the direction of Moscow and the Central Asian Bureau than their predecessors the Muslim National Communists.\textsuperscript{214} However, many of these Muslim Soviets retained their


\textsuperscript{213} Khalid, \textit{Making Uzbekistan}, 261-267.

\textsuperscript{214} Fayzullah Khodzhaev was an important Jadid in Bukhara before 1917; establishing the Young Bukharan Party in 1916 and was the head of the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic from 1920-1924. Later, Khodzhaev became the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars in the Uzbek SSR from 1925 and sat on the Central Executive Committee till he was purged in 1937 alongside Ikramov.

Akmal Ikramov was an apparatchik, joining the Party in 1918 and going to technical school in Moscow from 1922-1924. Upon his return, Ikramov became First Secretary of the Tashkent oblast
private Muslim faith during the early 1920s; in many of the regional congresses, meetings would be interrupted by the call to prayer, while prayer mats were often kept at the “Houses of Culture” despite their avowed intent to spread Socialist propaganda.\textsuperscript{215} Here is a key difference between the Muslim National Communists and Muslim Soviets in their formulation of socialism and Islam. Both the Muslim National Communists and Muslim Soviets saw socialism from an explicitly-nationalist lens, focusing on Russian decolonization and the indigenization of the local Communist Party instead of atheism.\textsuperscript{216} However, unlike the Muslim National Communists, the Muslim Soviets continued to practise their Muslim faith privately while working within the Communist Party and Soviet bureaucratic apparatus. The private prayers and faith of the Muslim Soviets were unacceptable for Moscow, causing the Central Asian Communist Parties to be purged several more times in the subsequent years once this faith was discovered, notably in 1928, 1931-1932, and finally in the Great Purge of 1937-1938.\textsuperscript{217}

Adburauf Fitrat, a former Jadid associated with the Communist Party from 1920 until arrested and executed during the Great Purge of 1937, serves as an exemplar of the ideas of Central Asian Muslims during the Early Soviet period. The 1920s are notable for featuring some of Fitrat’s most anti-clerical works, which appears in keeping with larger movements


towards the removal of Islam from a socialist Central Asia.\(^{218}\) However, Fitrat’s anti-clericism remained entrenched within an Islamicist idiom; Fitrat attacks Islam on issues such as the corruption of the ‘ulema and the meaninglessness of Paradise, yet never completely removes himself from his own belief in the ultimate worth of a reformed Islam.\(^{219}\) An inability to move past an Islamic heritage is tied to Fitrat’s ideas of the new Uzbek nation; this nation, through anti-colonial, socialist, and revolutionary in character, remained legitimated through its Muslim character. In 1924, Fitrat saw the creation of a nationalist-socialist Uzbek state as necessary to spark a pan-Asian revolution, which would be led by Central Asians within the Communist Party.\(^{220}\) Fitrat described Central Asian need to liberate British India from colonial rule through Communism through appealing directly to Islam’s sacred nature, expressing the need of revolution being “as great as saving the pages of the Qur’an from being trampled by an animal..., a worry as great as that of driving a pig out of a mosque.”\(^{221}\) This merging of socialism within Islam is illustrative; socialism is made imperative through appeals to the sacred nature of Islam.

In addition to mechanical *korenizatsiia*, the Soviet regime intended to create new national languages among its Central Asian populations in what Terry Martin describes as linguistic *korenizatsiia*. These national languages, modelled on specific local dialects, were used to end the dominance of trans-national literary languages such as Persian,

\(^{218}\) For more on Fitrat during the 1920s specifically, see Khalid, “Visions of India in Central Asian Modernism: The Work of Abdurauf Fitrat”; and Shawn T. Lyons, “‘Chase away this pig from the mosque’: Eastern politics in the Indian Dramas of Abdurauf Fitrat,” *Central Asian Survey* 22, no. 2/3 (June/September 2003): 299-313.


\(^{221}\) Abdurauf Fitrat, “Hind ixtilolchilari,” quoted and trans. in Khalid, *Islam after Communism*, 56; Lyons, “‘Chase away this pig from the mosque’, 301-306.
Chagatay/Turki, and Arabic.222 These also served as the primary sacred languages in Central Asia, strongly associated with the creation of Islamic cultural capital in the old method schools. Practically, Soviet linguistic korenizatsiya built upon the previous examples of the Jadid new method schools, who had also advocated the promotion of Turkic languages, yet the Soviet schools would focus on teaching the new national language alongside Russian, and removed the Islamic content from the previous curriculum.223 Linguistic korenizatsiya, providing a basis for an Andersonian “imagined community” through the replacement of transnational sacred languages by a vernacular national language, was also used by Soviet officials to disrupt the insidious presence of Islam within Central Asia.224

Linguistic korenizatsiya, requiring the creation of new alphabets, textbooks, and dictionaries and the subsequent systematic learning of the new national languages, took a while to take effective hold; it would take until the 1930s for the national languages to truly develop. Pioneering works by Fitrat in Uzbek and Sadriddin Aini in Tajik in the 1920s served to develop the poetic and literary capabilities of these new languages, yet the spread of these languages was limited to the urban intellectual milieus and within the Communist Party during the 1920s.225 Again, they served to disconnect the new national-language speakers in the urban cities of Tashkent and Samarkand from the Persian-Chagatay speaking rural Central Asians in the countryside.

222 Martin, The Affirmative-Action Empire, 159-170; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union, 144-145.
224 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 12-19; Oliver, “Korenizatsiya,” 82.
225 Allworth, Evading Reality, 8-13; Aini/Perry, The Sands of Oxus, 5-9; Kassymbekova, Despite Cultures, 59-63.
In addition to the logistical constraints of creating and educating Central Asians in their new language, the old languages continued to have relevance as sources of traditional and Islamic cultural capital. While Aini was developing the capabilities of Tajik poetry and prose, urban and rural Tajikistani parents continued to send their children to the old-method village maktabs to learn the recitations of the Qur’an in the traditional Arabic.\footnote{Bergne, \textit{The Birth of Tajikistan}, 77-85.} The continued relevance of Muslim confessional schools in the 1920s was rooted in the continued relevance and desire for Islamic cultural capital, gained before children were enrolled in Russian technical schools to participate in the changing socialist world.\footnote{Khalid, \textit{Making Uzbekistan}, 196-197.} This interesting cooption of both traditional and modern forms of education to provide children with the greatest opportunities in their lives, also present the limits of Soviet rule with regards to educational reform. Like the Jadids before them, Russian and Central Asian Communists were unable to break the hold of Islamic cultural capital in segments of Central Asian Muslim society.

Concurrently with the creation of Central Asian nations, the CEC began a full attack on Islam to effectively destroy Islam in Central Asia. Despite an appeal to Russia’s Muslims by the CEC in 1917 which promised that “your beliefs and usages, your national and cultural institutions are forever free and inviolate,” religion of any form was never truly considered part of the new Soviet Union.\footnote{Quoted in Richard Pipes, \textit{The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955): 155.} Lenin wrote in 1905 that within the Bolshevik Party, “religion is not a private concern,” and to be a true leader of a revolutionary proletariat religious belief must be rejected.\footnote{V. I. Lenin, “Socialism and Religion,” in \textit{Lenin: Collected Works}, vol. 10 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965): 83-87.}
Soviet society after 1917. Islam was vilified by Communist officials as particularly restrictive and monolithic, even when compared to other religions such as Christianity. In Islam, very little distinction is drawn between the temporal and spiritual, explaining how religious laws and the ‘ulema possessed incredible legal and cultural authority; Bolshevik officials believed this created an “insurmountable psychological barrier” permanently separating Soviet Muslims from other Soviet citizens.

The Soviet assault on Islam had to be delayed until 1923-1924. This delay was practical, dependent on the conditions in Central Asia following the destruction inflicted during the Russian Civil War and the continued popularity of the Basmachi along the rural frontiers of Soviet control. The Soviet regime in Tashkent, realizing that their own rule was precarious, courted Muslim support by providing Islam a brief period of relative safety and freedom from oppression from 1919-1923. Mosques closed during the Civil War were reopened, *waqf* (charitable donations of land and property to support Islamic institutions) was returned, and mullahs were allowed to preach openly throughout Soviet Central Asia. The Soviets even allowed some districts to establish Shari’ah law, and allowed Islamic courts to administer local justice for cases involving Central Asian Muslims (though under Russian supervision). This local accommodation demonstrates the difficulties between the desires of the ideological centre in Moscow and the realities in the Tashkent periphery. Yet, while the local Soviets in Tashkent courted Muslim support, this was never seen as a long-term strategy for Soviet rule.

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This period of Soviet accommodation for Islam ended in 1924 in a subversive attack on Islamic institutions previously supported. The Soviet plan to attack Islam was two-pronged. The first attack was mounted against the traditional Islamic legal institutions charged with the application of the Shari’ah and ‘adat (local customary law). Presided over by the qazi, these Islamic courts slowly had their authority and case-load limited while their legal prices were fixed at artificially high levels.\textsuperscript{235} In contrast, the local Soviet “People’s Courts” had their jurisdiction expanded over all aspects of Muslim life, while offered cheap legal fees to attract Central Asian plaintiffs.\textsuperscript{236} In addition, traditional Central Asian Muslim practises such as polygamy and the fixing of a bride price (kalym) was outlawed in the Soviet Criminal Code of 1924, and finally in 1927 the CEC issued a decree outlawing any Islamic courts in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{237}

Secondly, the Soviet regime intended to limit the powers of the ‘ulema over traditional forms of Central Asian education. In 1924, Tashkent (under Moscow’s direction) re-issued Lenin’s 1918 decree “Separation of the Church from the State and the Schools from the Church,” a 13-point document outlining the introduction of modern scientific subjects, replacement of religious subjects with ethics, and the substitution of the ‘ulema with Russian-trained professionals in teaching within school environments.\textsuperscript{238} The Islamic maktabs and madrasas were also deprived of income as their waqf property was nationalized by the Soviets.\textsuperscript{239} In combination with linguistic korenizatsiia, the replacement of the old method schools with new Russo-native schools built upon the Jadid new method schools legacy, yet took this further by replacing the teaching of Islamic theology with modern ethics. However, as addressed above,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{235} Keller, \textit{To Moscow Not Mecca}, 124-129.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Kolarz, \textit{Religion in the Soviet Union}, 67-69; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, \textit{Islam in the Soviet Union}, 145-146.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Haghayeghi, \textit{Islam and Politics in Central Asia}, 19-20.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Pipes, \textit{The Formation of the Soviet Union}, 178; Khalid, \textit{Making Uzbekistan}, 227-230.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Pianciola and Sartori, “Waqf in Turkestan,” 291-292.
\end{itemize}
these Soviet schools did not completely replace the Islamic old method schools in the 1920s, which continued to exist despite official oppression into the 1950s.

Tied into the two-pronged assault on Islamic institutions, Soviet officials began attacks on other traditional forms of Islamic culture in Central Asia. The League of the Militant Godless were introduced in Central Asia in 1928, largely drawn from ethnic Russians, who physically attacked ‘ulema and vandalized mosques; the movement eventually petered away by the 1930s due to a lack of Central Asian support.\(^{240}\) However, the most important of these efforts beginning in 1924 was the \textit{hujum}, literally meaning “attack” in Uzbek, which refers to Soviet efforts to unveil Muslim women both literally and figuratively. This unveiling took many forms; the physical removal of restrictive clothing such as the \textit{burqa} (either by choice or by force), laws allowing women to participate in the public sphere without male company or supervision, and the entry of women into Russian schools to receive an education (with the eventual belief that these women would enter the workforce).\(^{241}\) Originally formulated by Gregory Massell in his seminal 1974 work, the \textit{hujum} was intended by the Soviet state to mobilize unveiled Muslim women into a “surrogate proletariat.”\(^{242}\) Believing that Central Asian men lacked the proper revolutionary potential and education in Communism, and that their privileged position made them oppressors of their women, Soviet officials intended to use Central Asian women to create a Communist foundation.\(^{243}\) Filled with gratitude for their freedom from Islam’s constraints and


\(^{241}\) Northrup, \textit{Veiled Empire}, 34-66.


\(^{243}\) Also see Marianne Kamp, \textit{The New Women in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism} (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007); Marianne Kamp, “Unveiling Uzbek Women: Liberation, Representation, and Discourse, 1906-1929” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago,
trained in socialism, these unveiled Muslim women would become the core of the new atheistic Soviet Central Asian citizenry.

The “freeing” of Central Asian women from Islam’s oppression failed to discredit Islam completely; instead, the freeing of Muslim women was debated and validated through Islam rather than socialism. The idea of freeing Central Asian women by appealing to Islam was not itself an innovation; by 1906 at least, the Jadids were voicing demands for the freeing of Central Asian women from restrictive customary practise such as veiling, polygamy, and the seclusion of women.\footnote{Khalid, \textit{Muslim Cultural Politics}, 278-279; Kamp, “Unveiling Uzbek Women,” 11-29.} The Jadids’ demands were explicitly couched within Islamic theology; Islam itself required women to receive an education to become good Muslims and mothers.\footnote{Kamp, \textit{The New Women}, 36-52; Khalid, \textit{Making Uzbekistan}, 197-208.} This conception of the freeing of Central Asian women as an internal Muslim concern continued within Soviet Central Asia.

At a \textit{hujum} meeting on 15 May 1924 in Tashkent, including relatively equal numbers of males and unveiled females as well as Muslim conservatives and Muslim Soviets, the issues surrounding women’s place in Central Asia was explored through questions of Muslim morality and the correct reading of the Qur’an rather than Marxist rhetoric of class struggle and oppression.\footnote{Khalid, \textit{Making Uzbekistan}, 203; Northrup, \textit{Veiled Empire}, 93-96.} Blame for women’s position in Central Asian society was due to incorrect readings of Islam by previous religious experts. The ‘ulema were accused for constructed false images of women based upon a faulty and limited understanding of Islam which Muslim Soviets had since overcome.\footnote{Keller, \textit{To Moscow Not Mecca}, 178-183; Kamp, \textit{The New Women}, 47-51.} Even the old Jadids, some of whom remained within the Central Asian Communist Parties, were accused of being party to the subjugation of Muslim women by not

challenging women’s oppression rigorously enough.\textsuperscript{248} Like the distorted lines of Islamic social transmission in the decline of Islam since a Golden Age, Soviet Central Asians argued for a renewal of “proper” Islamic practice from within their new modern, nationalist, and socialist context. The “women’s question” was still a question of Islamic legal interpretation amid the Soviet assault on Islam during the establishment of Soviet Central Asia.

During the early 1920s, Communist Party members sent from Moscow to Soviet Central Asia were confronted with two questions: the “national question” and, perhaps more importantly, the “Muslim question.” Muslim National Communists within the Musburo presented their own vision of socialism which focused on decolonization and the creation of explicitly Muslim national republics; their arguments linking socialism to Islam present an alternative socialism to the official Marxist-Leninist position, one which was ultimately rejected. Following the removal of the Muslim National Communists from the Communist Party by 1922, \textit{korenizatsiia} through 1921-1928, and national delimitation beginning in 1924, Soviet power was continually being exerted at the cost of local autonomy. Moving beyond contests of Islamic cultural, social, or political capital, Soviet Central Asia was consumed instead with the debate between Central Asian Muslims and the Soviet state over the correct interpretations of the nation, socialism, and their relationship to Islam.

However, all these actions failed to limit the strength of an Islamic identity within Central Asia. Though the Muslim National Communists were largely discredited by 1922, \textit{korenizatsiia}’s Muslim Soviets continued to practise Islam privately while operating within the Soviet apparatus. Linguistic \textit{korenizatsiia} failed to diminish the prestige of traditional forms of Islamic learning through Arabic or Persian during the 1920s. Despite processes of

\textsuperscript{248} Kamp, \textit{The New Women}, 89-92; Northrup, \textit{Veiled Empire}, 117.
national delimitation, *korenizatsiia*, and the Soviet *hujum*, Central Asian elites remained grounded within an Islamic identity which was malleable to the changing nationalist and socialist political culture. While nationalism was encouraged through the creation of the Central Asian Republics and their corresponding national groups, Islam remained couched within Central Asian formulations of nationhood.
1905-1928 was a period of revolts and revolutions in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The movement towards a constitutional monarchy in 1905, the disasters of the First World War in 1914-1917, the Revolutions of 1917, the Russian Civil War from 1917-1921, and the gradual creation of a Communist Soviet Union state during NEP define much of the Imperial Russian and Soviet historiography of this important period. However, equally important was the series of revolutions occurring along the Imperial and Soviet peripheries. In Central Asia, the Russian Revolt of 1905-1906 and the Central Asian Revolts of 1906-1910 and 1916 are revolutionary moments which contributed to the unique experience of Central Asia during the aftermath of the 1917 Revolutions. Though not active participants in the events in Petrograd or Moscow, events in Tashkent and Kokand in 1917 are important by demonstrating the agency of both Russians and Central Asians in a colonial periphery disconnected suddenly from its metropole. As the Russian Civil War raged, local Russian and Central Asians created alternatives which were politically pragmatic, dependent on their own regional contexts and concerns rather than central ideologies.

The experiences of Central Asian Jadids and Qadimis within the Imperial Governor-Generalship of Turkestan and Soviet Central Asia are important in demonstrating how native intellectuals gained political voice through the events of 1917 like their Russian counterparts. New forms of communication, political organizations, and territorial delimitation were developing in Central Asia allowing Russians and Central Asians to participate with the violent changes and radical opportunities produced by the fall of the Russian Empire. By illustrating the experiences of the Jadids and Qadimis during this period, I hope to have contributed to understanding the political, cultural, and social agency of Central Asians within the rapidly-changing political climate they lived in.
The focus of this study has been the internal debate within the Central Asian urban intellectual and religious elite stratum. This has been simplified into sets of dichotomies, which served as a convenient method to analyzing how concepts such as the nation, socialism, and Islam was debated and contested by various Central Asian intellectual and religious elites. The theological and cultural debates of the Jadids and Qadimis in the Late Imperial period focused on the possession of Islamic cultural and social capital within a modernizing context, and the introduction of new modes of cultural discussion, notably new method schools, theatre, and newspapers. Importantly, both groups existed within the acceptable boundaries of the Islamic religious elite; even by pushing for Western adoption, the Jadids continued to consider themselves good Muslims in keeping with the traditions of the theology of Islamic modernism.

The Jadids and Qadimis contestation of Islamic cultural and social capital continued and became politicized in 1917 when both formed new political parties, the Shura-i Islamiyya and the Ulema Jamiyati. These Central Asian parties, reacting to the opportunities presented by 1917 in different ways, remained explicitly Islamic in character and desires, utilizing new forms of Islamic political capital to claim wider representational authority. This Islamic focus continue within more subversive channels in the Early Soviet period, where the Muslim National Communists presented an alternative reading of Marxist-Leninism which gave a place for Islam within an anti-colonial, nationalist, and socialist Central Asia. Even the Muslim Soviets, formed after the purging of the Muslim National Communists, remained perhaps unconsciously within a Muslim confessional identity during the 1920s, debating topics such as the hujum from within Islamic theology even as accommodation for Islam broke down during the Soviet assault on Islam in 1924.
This study has also revealed the limitations of the Jadids and Qadimis within the colonial Russian state. While presenting several political alternatives, such as a compromise with the Tashkent Soviet (1917), the Kokand Autonomy (1917-1918), and the Muslim National Communists (1919-1922), the Jadids and Qadimis were unable to exist within a system they themselves formulated. Instead, the Jadids and Qadimis relied on cooperation with the Imperial Russian colonial administration and incorporation within the Tashkent Soviet, the Bolshevik Communist Party, and Soviet bureaucratic apparatus. While they lacked the political power to administer a Muslim national autonomous territory their own way, the Jadids and Qadimis, the Shura-i Islamiyya and Ulema Jamiyati, and the Muslim National Communists and Muslim Soviets demonstrate the agency of Central Asian elites within their own society in participating in cultural, social, intellectual, political, and religious change. By showing the dichotomous relationship of Islamic organizations advocating various forms of change and cooperation, I hope to add to studies in Imperial and Soviet historiography on subaltern participation within their own cultural and national contexts.

Interestingly, this study has also revealed the limitations of Central Asian elites within their own society. A running dialogue concurrent with the development of the Jadids and Qadimis and the Shura-i Islamiyya and Ulema Jamiyati is the ineffectiveness of bridging the gap between their urban milieu and the rural Central Asian population. Despite claims to represent the Central Asian Muslim and nationalist voice, rural alternatives in the 1906-1910 and 1916 Revolts and the Basmachi movement (1917-1923) demonstrate the limits of Jadid and Qadimis authority. As with the Jadids and Qadimis, the Basmachi’s claims to political legitimacy includes an appeal to a common Muslim identity. This demonstrates how Islam was actively contested and debated within Central Asian society not only between the urban Jadids and Qadimis, but
also between these urban elites and those rural Central Asians they claimed to represent. While the source material on these rural groups in English is limited, my brief analysis and comparison may illustrate a further area of research to extend studies of Central Asian agency beyond the highly-visible elite example presented here.

Within this analysis of the Jadids and Qadimis, the Shura-i Islamiyya and Ulema Jamiyati, and the Muslim National Communists and Muslim Soviets, the continued importance of Islam as a form of shared Central Asian identity is explored. Despite the radical changes of the period, and the introduction of new ideologies such as nationalism and socialism, Islam remains one of the foundations of a shared confessional and cultural community among the ‘ulema and in Central Asian society more generally. The heated debate of the Jadids and Qadimis over new versus old method schools, the electoral success of the Ulema Jamiyati in the 1917 Tashkent civic elections, the strength of the Basmachi movement, and attempts to reconcile nationalism and socialism within an Islamic frame of reference demonstrates the importance of Islam in understanding the events and changes in Central Asia during the years of 1905-1928. Though the current focus is on modernism, nationalism, and socialism as the areas of historical study, the continued yet contested role of Islam within Central Asian society during this period of revolution is a rich area of study which has only touched upon here. The importance of Islam in Central Asian political and cultural change during the Late Imperial and Early Soviet periods reveals a treasure trove of new areas of research to explore the construction of nationalism, socialism, and the nation.
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