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Feminist assemblages: Peruvian feminisms, forced sterilization, and paradox of rights in Fujimori's Peru

Department of Anthropology

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FEMINIST ASSEMBLAGES:
PERUVIAN FEMINISMS, FORCED STERILIZATION,
AND THE PARADOX OF RIGHTS IN FUJIMORI’S PERU

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AND THE PARADOX OF RIGHTS IN FUJIMORI’S PERU

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Dedication

Esta tesis la dedico a las mujeres del Perú.
A nuestras luchas.
A nuestros futuros.

Como siempre ha dicho mi madre,
la justicia tarda, pero llega.
Abstract

How does it come to pass that the rollout of a women’s rights regime becomes a condition for the violation of women’s rights? This thesis begins with the rollout of the PNSRPF 1996-2000 (a family planning program), as part of a larger women’s rights campaign in Fujimori’s Peru, and the forced sterilization of upwards of 10,000 campesina women. I examine the historic memory of the Peruvian feminist movement for factors that led to the vulnerabilization of campesinas in a women’s rights campaign. The feminist movement was made up of three assemblages concentrated around reproductive and sexual rights, critical human rights, and civil and political rights. However, only the critical rights paradigms was able to contend with the intersectional identity of campesinas and their inclusive exclusion as citizens. The other two assemblages assumed they were protecting “all women” or “all Peruvians,” leaving campesinas to fall into the lacunae created by the siloization of rights paradigms.
Preface

Didn’t anyone see this coming? Given the global history of population control, didn’t anyone see this coming? The more I learned the more horror came like a freight train, faster and faster—it was so clear to me what was going to happen. Or maybe it was only clear because it already had. The thing was, this seemed avoidable. It seemed improbable given the various UN conventions at play, that the feminist movement was involved. It shouldn’t have happened. Some did see danger. This story is as much about them as about those who didn’t.

How didn’t we see it? How didn’t we see it coming? What were the conditions of possibility for this horror? Might we see it coming in the future? This thesis comes out of the larger question of how this happened, how we didn’t see this coming. It focuses on the feminist movement and the issue of rights discoursing: Who do citizenship and human rights protect? Who don’t they? Who can’t they? Who might they? It starts with the paradox of rights and begins with our collective future.
Acknowledgements

First I would like to thank all the incredible feminists I spoke with in Lima in the summer of 2015. I have been awed and humbled by your unwavering dedication to women and justice. I hope to have done justice to your stories and knowledges. Though our approaches sometimes diverge, what we all want is a better world for women and a better world, period. I also thank you for your time and patience with me, a Peruvian gringa making sense of the many ways in which her worlds interact, contradict, and create one another.

I would also like to thank the University of Lethbridge, the School of Graduate Studies, the Graduate Student Association, and especially the Department of Anthropology and Dr. Patrick Wilson for financial and academic support. This innovative Master’s program allowed me the space, flexibility and resources to embark on a truly unique research experience.

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I would also like to thank my whole family in Perú, and especially my tíos Mariella Corvetto, Ewald Schmidt, Patricia Morante, Stacy DeLano, Mariella Sala, and
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And finally to my mamita, Dr. Ella Schmidt, my late father, Dr. Ward Stavig, and my sister, Mariana Dora Stavig. You are the light of my life and the stars of my sky. Your love and guidance have made me who I am and have taught me to be a fierce, courageous, compassionate, and dedicated human being. Your examples light a path that unites the life of mind and the love of people. Mil gracias, mis amores.
# Table of Contents

Introduction.........................................................................................................................1  
  Conditions of possibility: las mujeres son más indias ....................................................... 10  
  “How did it come to pass...”: Forced sterilization and  
  historical memory.............................................................................................................17  
  The Roadmap: The conditions of possibility.............................................................. 23  
  Engaged Scholarship.......................................................................................................26  
Methodology .......................................................................................................................28  
The Politics of Research ....................................................................................................31  
  Methods and Analysis .....................................................................................................36  
  On Compassionate Research .........................................................................................42  
Chapter 1: On the Peruvian Context....................................................................................44  
  Programa Nacional de Salud Reproductiva y  
  Planificación Familiar 1996-2000 ..............................................................................49  
  Family Planning in Peru.................................................................................................49  
  Reading Fujimori against the ICPD...............................................................................51  
  “Choice” .........................................................................................................................57  
  The Indian Problem and Hygienic Racism.................................................................61  
  Citizenship, Human Rights, and Coloniality................................................................70  
Chapter 2: The Feminist movement of the ‘80s and ‘90s.....................................................82  
  Feminist foundations........................................................................................................87  
  Divides and Discords.......................................................................................................100  
Chapter 3: Feminist Assemblages........................................................................................107  
  The Sexual and Reproductive Rights Assemblage.....................................................115  
  Cairo Accords and Discords.........................................................................................120  
  Miriam and the Mesa Tripartita.....................................................................................123  
  The Critical Human Rights Assemblage ...................................................................141  
  The PTRC and the CNNDH.........................................................................................147  
  Civil Political Rights .......................................................................................................158  
  The debate: civil political or human rights?.............................................................160  
  El Movimiento Amplio de Mujeres (MAM)..............................................................162  
  Conclusions......................................................................................................................171  
Conclusions and Further Research.....................................................................................173  
Avenues for further research.............................................................................................178  
Bibliography.......................................................................................................................183
Figures

Image 1: Women march against forced sterilizations in 2011
https://losmovimientoscontraatacan.wordpress.com/2013/03/11/lucha_contra_esteralizaciones_forzadas_fujimori/ accessed 1/7/2016 pg. 5

### List of Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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| **APROPO**   | Apoyo a Programas de Población  
Support for Population Programs |
| **CEDAW**    | Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Violence Against Women |
| **CLADEM**   | Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights |
| **CNNDH**    | Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (National Coordinator of Human Rights) |
| **GAD**      | Gender and Development |
| **DEMUS**    | Estudio para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer  
Firm for the Defense of Women's Rights |
| **ICPD**     | International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo 1994 |
| **MAM**      | Movimiento Amplio de Mujeres (Broad Women's Movement) |
| **Mesa Tripartita** | Mesa Tripartita de Seguimiento a la Conferencia Internacional  
Sobre Población y Desarrollo (Tripartite working group on the follow-up to the International Conference on Population and Development) |
| **MIMP**     | Ministerio de la Mujer y Poblaciones Vulnerables  
Ministry of the Woman and Vulnerable Populations |
| **PNSRPF**   | Programa Nacional de Salud Reproductiva y Planificación Familiar;  
National Program for Reproductive Health and Family Planning |
| **PROMUDEH** | Ministerio de Promoción de la Mujer y del Desarrollo Humano  
Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Human Development |
| **UNFPA**    | United Nations Population Fund |
| **USAID**    | United States Agency for International Development |
| **WID**      | Women in Development |
Introduction

Twenty years. That is how long campesinas1 from the regions of Huancabamba, Piura and Anta, Cusco (in the North and South of Peru, respectively) have been organizing and fighting. They are demanding that the Peruvian government recognize its role in the forced sterilization of at least 10,000 indigenous women out of a total of 300,000 people sterilized between 1996 and 2000 under the Programa Nacional de Salud Reproductiva y Planificación Familiar 1996-2000 (The National Program for Reproductive Health and Family Planning) (PNSRPF 1996-2000). The seventy-five women involved in the current legal battle have seen their case archived six times—the latest in December of 2016. Joined by their sisters in Arequipa, Lima, and Cajamarca, they denounced this latest violation of their rights December 9, 2016:

PRONUNCIAMIENTO

ESTAMOS INDIGNADAS ANTE NUEVO ARCHIVAMIENTO DEL CASO DE ESTERILIZACIONES FORZADAS
La Asociación de Mujeres Peruanas Afectadas por las Esterilizaciones Forzadas (AMPAEF), integrada por la Asociación de Mujeres Afectadas por las Esterilizaciones Forzadas de Cusco (AMAEFC), la Asociación de Mujeres de la Provincia de Huancabamba (AMHBA), además por las víctimas organizadas de Arequipa, Cajamarca, Lima, expresa su indignación ante la Resolución N°21 de la fiscal Marcelita Gutiérrez que archiva la denuncia sobre la violación de sus derechos humanos mediante las esterilizaciones forzadas ejecutadas desde el gobierno de Alberto Fujimori y sus ex ministros de salud y otros funcionarios.La fiscal Marcelita Gutiérrez, de la Segunda Fiscalía Penal Supraprovincial de Lima recibió la solicitud del Fiscal Luis Landa para incorporar 75 casos a la Resolución que había emitido el 27 de julio de 2016. Al parecer el objetivo de la Fiscal Gutiérrez es archivar usando una serie de argumentos violatorios a los estándares internacionales y mostrando su deficiente trabajo investigativo. Entre la pobreza de su investigación, señala que no hay historias clínicas de 45 de las afectadas, y en caso de existir

1 “Peasants,” the term used by Peruvian indigenous peoples to refer to themselves.
tampoco existe el consentimiento informado, o que no señalan quienes las operaron y aduce la inexistencia del consentimiento informado de otras muchas. Se burla de las víctimas cuando dice que el hecho de ser quechua hablantes no es motivo de vulnerabilidad y que no es demostrable la amenaza, el maltrato u otros. Usa una serie de leguleyadas para archivar, en ningún momento usa los terribles testimonios de las víctimas, ni los dramas que hoy viven con sus familias luego del impacto de las esterilizaciones. La Fiscal en ningún momento refiere profundidad ni pericia en su investigación. Justamente en la serie de irregularidades señaladas durante estos años: desaparición de historias clínicas, inexistencia de consentimiento informado, amenazas, torturas, analfabetismo de muchas víctimas, entre otras.

Sin analizar la política pública impulsada por el gobierno de Fujimori, la fiscal concluye que no encuentra responsabilidad en Alberto Fujimori y sus ex ministros de Salud -Eduardo Yong Motta, Marino Costa Bauer y Alejandro Aguinaga.

Ya son varios archivamientos, hace cerca de 20 años que venimos con nuestras denuncias en todo lugar donde nos presentamos y continuaremos en nuestra demanda de Verdad, Justicia y Reparación, nada nos va a debilitar, iremos a todas las instancias necesarias...

(Associación de Mujeres Peruanas Afectadas por las Esterilizaciones Forzadas December 9, 2016)^2

DECLARATION
WE ARE FURIOUS AT THE LATEST MOVE TO ARCHIVE THE CASE OF FORCED STERILIZATIONS

The Association of Peruvian Women Affected by Forced Sterilization (AMPAEF), made up of the Association of Women Affected by Forced Sterilizations of Cusco (AMAEFC), the Association of Women from the Province of Huancabamba (AMHBA), and victims organized in Arequipa, Cajamarca, and Lima expresses its indignation at District Attorney (fiscal) Marcelita Gutiérrez’s Resolution No.21 which archived the denouncement of the violation of their rights by means of the forced sterilizations undertaken by the government of Alberto Fujimori and his ex-ministers of health and other functionaries.

State’s Attorney Marcelita Gutiérrez, from the Second Supraregional Criminal District Attorney’s Office, received the request from District Attorney Luis Landa to incorporate 75 cases into the Resolution she had emitted on July 27, 2016. It appears that State’s Attorney Gutiérrez’s objective is to archive the case using a series of arguments that violate international standards and illustrate her deficient investigation.

Among many other illustrations of the poor quality of her investigation, she argues that medical histories for 45 of the claimants do not exist; and that even where they [clinical

^2 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1395454573827843&id=280150618691583 &substory_index=0
histories] do exist, there is no record of informed consent or who performed the surgeries, and claims the absence of informed consent in many other cases. She makes a mockery of the victims when she says that being Quechua speakers is not the basis of their vulnerability and that there is no demonstrable evidence of threats, mistreatment, etc. She uses a series of legal manipulations to archive the case, and in no instance does she refer to the horrific testimonies given by victims, or the current hardships these women and their families are facing due to their sterilization. The District Attorney shows no profundity or skill in her investigation, particularly given the series of irregularities noted throughout the years: disappearance of clinical histories, the non-existence of informed consent, threats, torture, and the illiteracy of many victims, etc.

Without analyzing the public policy enacted by Fujimori’s government, the District Attorney concludes that Alberto Fujimori and his ex-ministers of Health—Eduardo Yong Motta, Marino Costa Bauer and Alejandro Aguinaga—are not legally responsible.

This case has been archived many times. It has been almost twenty years that we have denounced [abuses] and we will continue to demand Truth, Justice and Reparation. Nothing will weaken us, and we will go the lengths necessary.

December 9, 2016 Asociación de Mujeres Peruanas Afectadas por las Esterilizacion Forzadas

The struggle of forcibly sterilized women to see the violation of their rights recognized by the state has intrigued me for some time. My earliest research forays into the matter in 2012 revealed that the sterilizations have been a highly contentious site of legal, cultural, and institutional battles at levels both local and global.

The presidential debates of 2011 between Ollanta Humala and Keiko Fujimori (daughter of the former authoritarian president of Peru and former First Lady) pushed the sterilizations back into the public discourse after almost ten years of relative silence. During the debates, Humala questioned Fujimori for having Alejandro Aguinaga (former Minister of Health under Alberto Fujimori) on her political team, arguing that the latter orchestrated the forced sterilization of
300,000² people during his tenure as Minister of Health. (Isla Isuiza 5/29/2011).⁴ This accusation, and Keiko Fujimori’s defense of Aguinaga, is widely seen as having cost her the election (El Comercio 2015)⁵.

2011 also saw the return of large-scale feminist advocacy for the victims of forced sterilization. A new generation of young feminists took to the streets to protest the continuing state of impunity for crimes undertaken by the Fujimori government, including the forced sterilizations, during Keiko Fujimori’s 2011 campaign. Several individuals I interviewed during my stay in Lima in the summer and fall of 2015 perceived this time, and the new feminist activity, as a watershed moment in the case being brought by forcibly sterilized women. The new advocacy was pointed, using the female body to represent the violation of rights of (largely) campesina women. Young Limeña women (not campesinas) marching in the streets pulled up their skirts to reveal stylized depictions of bloodied uteruses and cut fallopian tubes, red paint running down their legs to recall the hemorrhages some affected women suffered (and some even succumbed to).

This form of protest was extremely effective in bringing new attention to the case partially due to its shock value. It awakened coastal Peruvians to the violations

---

³ As will become clear throughout this thesis there is a politics around the numbers of sterilizations presented. The government has acknowledged estimates that place the number of forced sterilizations at approximately 10,000 out of a total of 292,000 sterilizations performed. News reports, human rights reports and reports from the political right in Peru often cite the full 300,000 insinuating that all are forced. This inflation of forced sterilizations works for the political needs of both the political left and right; both can use this number as evidence of an egregious violation of rights, though for opposite goals. The political left would go on to use it to bring attention to the need of expanding reproductive rights, while the political right would use it to call for an end to family planning, though both groups would do so under the banner of “genocide.”
⁴ http://elcomercio.pe/politica/gobierno/pullas-entre-keiko-humala-fueron-constante-debate-noticia-765629
⁵ http://elcomercio.pe/politica/actualidad/esterilizaciones-forzadas-flanco-campana-keiko-noticia-1828230
suffered by campesina women under the PNSRPF 1996-2000. However, this visually arresting dis-covering of the body is not a form of protest that campesina women would typically use. These and other representations of violence against campesina women's bodies have created new spaces of advocacy by shocking the public into activism while simultaneously creating new sites of discursive contest between campesinas and coastal feminists over representation.

image 1: Women march against forced sterilization in 2011
https://losmovimientoscontraatacan.wordpress.com/2013/03/11/lucha_contra_esterilizaciones_fujimori/ accessed 1/7/2016

Other ally organizations grew out of these 2011 protests, including the Alfombra Roja (Red Carpet), a feminist organization dedicated to ending violence against women and also advocating for women’s reproductive rights through public action; Project Quipu, a call-in service where people affected by forced sterilization can call and share their stories or listen to those of others; and GREF, the Working
Group for Reparations for Forcibly Sterilized people, among others. All of these organizations are committed to seeking justice in the case of the forced sterilizations, particularly in the form of state recognition of legal wrongdoing and reparations (through monetary remuneration, access to healthcare, and resources for affected families).

Nevertheless there remain tensions between some of these organizations and campesina organizations over issues of representation and end goals. For at the heart of the protest movement are the forcibly sterilized women themselves who have been organizing and protesting since the late 1990s—a point they emphasized at a conference I attended, organized by Hilaria Supa Huamán (one of Peru’s first indigenous congresswomen) and the Andean Parliament⁶. That these reminders are necessary to point to the possibility that the organization of sterilized women feel sidelined by the advocacy taking place on their behalf.

The sterilized women have had some legal success in individual cases. The case of Mamérita Mestanza, who died after receiving a tubal ligation, went to the Interamerican Court in 1999. Peru accepted liability in her death in 2003. This case seemed to establish a precedent for the legal culpability of the Peruvian state in cases of forced sterilizations. However, the class-action cases brought against the state for crimes of genocide⁷ and crimes against humanity have been archived (archivado; that is, not allowed to move toward adjudication) by the state’s attorneys six times between 2003 and 2016. As the Association of Peruvian Women

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⁶ A regional parliament that covers the region of the Andes
⁷ Denuncia Constitucional Nº 151 contra Alberto Fujimori y sus ex ministros de salud: Eduardo Yong Motta, Marino Costa Bauer y Alejandro Aguinaga, por el delito de genocidio y otros (Fechas: https://1996pnsrp2000.wordpress.com/fechas/). accessed 1.7.2017
Affected by Forced Sterilization states in their declaration, the case is often archived after superficial investigations that do not take into account the large corpus of evidence of wrongdoing amassed by human rights and feminist organizations against the state.

Given the interest young feminists have been showing in the forced sterilizations in the 2010s, I began to wonder whether the older generation of feminists had taken much interest in the case. How had the feminist movement reacted to the news of forced sterilizations? What actions did the movement take since the first denounced forced sterilization in 1996 until the final report from the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2003?8

Initial Internet searches revealed a common sentiment: No hicieron nada. They didn’t do anything. Tellingly, some of these admonitions came from conservative think tanks whose criticism was levied at feminists with the intent of justifying cutting reproductive health initiatives. But other such admonitions came from the Peruvian human rights movement and other civil society observers (Barrig 2002; Bueno Hansen 2015). As I did more research, however, it became clear that the human rights and feminist movements in Peru were not necessarily allied or able to work together during the time of the forced sterilizations, but rather worked in parallel: human rights on human rights, and feminists on women’s rights, a reality which severely limited the ability of either to help campesinas in their quest for

---

8 The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission was in operation from 2001 to 2003. It was charged with documenting and analyzing the human rights abuses in the internal armed conflict and the Fujimori presidency from 1990 to 2000.
justice due to the fact that neither approach was able to incorporate campesinas’ intersectional identity as women and indigenous people (Bueno Hansen 2015).

These were uncomfortable truths to contend with. From the outside, the feminist movement did seem awkwardly silent on the issue of forced sterilizations during the end of the Fujimorato (1990-2000 the tenure of ex-President Alberto Fujimori) and the transition to democracy (2000-2003). Moreover, sectors of the feminist movement (particularly the one working on reproductive and sexual rights) had supported Fujimori’s National Program of Reproductive Health and Family Planning (PNSRPF 1996-2000) and had been slow to denounce the sterilizations.

Further research revealed that other sectors of the feminist movement were wary and some wholeheartedly opposed to the family planning program as well as other women’s rights initiatives undertaken by the Fujimori regime. They argued that an authoritarian government known for its human rights violations could not be trusted. Working under the slogan “what is bad for women is bad for democracy” (Vargas 2006), they challenged Fujimori throughout his tenure and worked to bring him and his ilk to justice during the 2000 transition to democracy. Though while heavily involved in the transition to democracy, it was less clear how this and other sectors of the feminist movement specifically understood the forced sterilizations as violations of rights and how those fit into the larger authoritarian tilt of the Fujimorato.
What seems sure to me, however, is that far from doing nothing, the feminist movement was ablaze with activity during the end of the Fujimorato and the transition to democracy.

Peruvian feminists have worked tirelessly, usually with little pay or recognition, for the rights of Peruvian women for the past forty years. Their efforts have been an important factor in the Peruvian state adopting new laws against domestic violence, gender equality in government representation, and reproductive and sexual rights (Rousseau 2006). Their commitment to women is unmistakable. Nevertheless, in a country as unequal as Peru—in 1994 forty-eight percent of all Peruvian households lived in poverty and 18 percent in extreme poverty—one wonders whether all Peruvian women benefit equally or equitably from these rights advances (Rousseau 2006). In other words, who are the “women” of “women’s rights”? Looking more closely, then, though much of this advocacy was for “all” Peruvians. I found this to be a curious point, as it appeared it had been the rollout of a women’s rights regime (that had promised “all women” rights) that had led to the violation of campesinas’ rights. How could this be? How could it come to pass that the rollout of a women’s rights regime (of which the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was a part) could be the condition of possibility for the violation of women’s rights? This became the central question of my research.

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9 Though peri-urban women and 22,000 men were also sterilized in the PNSRPF 1996-2000, I am focusing on rural campesinas at the risk of excluding important insights that could be gleaned from including these populations. One reason for this choice is that most research and secondary sources on forced sterilizations have focused on rural campesinas (who appear to have made up the bulk of those people forcibly sterilized).
Conditions of possibility: *las mujeres son más indias*\(^{10}\)

In 1990, Fujimori’s government passed the Programa Nacional de Salud Reproductiva y Planificación Familiar 1990-1995 (PNSRPF 1990-1995). However, like his predecessor, Alan García, Fujimori was unable to overcome the considerable force of the Catholic Church to gain the support and funding necessary to institute the policy. Thus, while it remained government policy, the PNSRPF 1995-2000 went unfunded (Boesten 2007; Rousseau 2007; Necochea 2014; Bueno Hansen 2015).

Fujimori’s 1995 landslide reelection changed the political landscape, granting Fujimori the power to stand up to the Catholic Church’s active blockade of reproductive health programs, enabling his party to pass and fund the PNSRPF 1996-2000. As passed, this policy was to make all forms of contraception and family planning counseling publicly available in a country in which 70 percent of the population used the public health system (Ewig 2010). This was an important step in the history of family planning in Peru as various administrations from the 1960s on had passed policies to make family planning publicly available, though none had been able to fully implement them.

In October of 1995, the Population Law (Ley de Población) was altered to include tubal ligation at the same time Fujimori became the only male head of state to address the UN-sponsored Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (Bueno Hansen 2015). There he announced to the world the roll out of the family planning campaign. Because of the coded language he used to talk about women’s rights and family planning, I believe that his address to the Beijing Conference is worth quoting

\(^{10}\) “The women are more indigenous” (de la Cadena 1992)
Poverty in our [developing] countries hits women twice as hard in times of crisis...I routinely travel four times a week—this is my style—to marginal urban areas in the larger cities of Peru as well as to rural areas where I see the same picture: a woman carrying a baby wrapped in a blanket on her back, surrounded by an additional three or four more children. And even more unbelievably, she often carries one more human being in her womb...The world is swiftly changing, and luckily, new and more humane concepts are being adopted for program and goals in order to advance economic development...Social, cultural, or economic transformation can be sustained only if it involves women...Last year my country had the greatest economic growth in the world with a rate of 13 percent. Some people believe that the benefits of rapid economic growth do not trickle down to reach the less favored sectors of society, mainly women and children. This is correct. That is why our goal is to bring together these two main objectives: economic growth and social development...We agree with trustworthy studies which state that investing in women is the most rational and profitable way to reduce poverty and improve social conditions...My government has decided to carry out, as part of a policy of social development and the fight against poverty, an integral strategy of family planning that confronts openly—for the first time in the history of our country—the serious lack of information and services available on this matter. Thus, women can have at their disposal, with full autonomy and freedom, the tools necessary to make decisions about their own lives (Fujimori 1995).

As his address indicates, Fujimori pulled from the global women’s rights discourse and particularly from the reproductive and sexual rights paradigm, which broadly argued that women’s reproductive and sexual health belonged to them alone. I explain this paradigm more in depth in the sections that follow, but it is important to note his speech and the reproductive and sexual rights movement differed in significant ways. The rights movement argued that family planning should not be used as a development tool, but should be thought of as one of the critical foundations for realizing women’s rights (McIntosh and Finkle 1995; Petchesky 1995; DeJong 2000; Coe 2004; Ewig 2006; Boesten 2007; Bueno-Hansen 2015).
Though it appeared that the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was constructed for all Peruvian women, the image of “a woman carrying a baby wrapped in a blanket on her back, surrounded by an additional three or four more children...” evokes well-worn stereotypes of rural campesina and poor, urban mestiza women who have migrated from the Andes to Lima. The stereotypes about these women paint them as overly fecund and either unwilling or unable to control their reproductive capacity. As having “too many children” is often assumed to be co-terminus with poverty, campesina women are often read as the architects of their own and their children’s poverty.

This stereotype comes from the larger discourse of the Indian Problem, a concept that will be taken up in chapter one. Suffice it to say that this discourse argues indigenous peoples and indigeneity in general are impediments to modernization, and has played out in the history of public health and family planning in Peru (Ewig 2010), including the PNSRPF 1996-2000.

A Program Manager at the Ministry of Health (which administered the PNSRF 1996-2000) made the following statement in 1998:

The fertility rate among poor women is 6.9 children—they are poor and are producing more poor people. The president is aware that the government cannot fight poverty without reducing poor people’s fertility. Thus, demographic goals are a condition of the population’s right to access family planning and the government’s anti-poverty strategy (Coe 2004 in Getgen 2009: 11 footnote 58).

Thus, though couched in the language of women’s rights, the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was born out of a “traditional demographic argument...coupled with an argument advocating equal rights which focused on individual and family rights” (Aramburu 2002 in Getgen 2009: 10), as well as a neoliberal version of the Indian Problem
which more tightly linked poverty to indigeneity via the image of the over-taxed campesina woman.

The PNSRPF 1996-2000 was rolled out to much fanfare in 1996, but by late that year, reports of coercion in the family planning program were beginning to come to light (Ballón 2014). The first human rights fact-finding report published by CLADEM in 1999, revealed the systematic use of misinformation, coercion, and entrapment to pressure women into sterilization, especially rural and indigenous women (CLADEM 1999). Though the policy claimed that all forms of contraception were to be made available, sterilization by tubal ligation was the preferred method, with quotas being regularly set and reset every week by top government officials, including Fujimori himself (Ewig 2010; Boesten 2014; Theidon 2014; Ballón 2014). Health workers were incentivized to persuade women to undergo tubal ligations. In some cases, Peruvian health workers reportedly received bonuses ranging variously from $4 to $12 USD for each woman they “persuaded” (McElroy 2002). ¹¹ These workers were also threatened with losing their jobs if they did not fulfill quotas. In one case, a nurse submitted to sterilization to meet the government mandated goals. She was later fired (Cicatrices del Engaño 2014).

Many of the aforementioned reports document sterilizations undertaken without the informed consent of the women undergoing the procedure, many of whom were monolingual Quechua speakers and could not read the documents they

¹¹ Coercion can take multiple forms in a social context of prevailing racisms and sharp social class and gender divides. The social force behind these divides can act to create fear and to silence subjugated peoples, and some indigenous women may have assented to sterilization due to social pressures inherent in the presence of white or mestizo doctors in remote areas. Due to legal definitions and the levels of evidence necessary to prove coercion, in addition to the rurality of some of the women sterilized, it is probable that many more were coerced than have been reported (CLADEM 1999; DEMUS n/d).
were being asked to sign. Reports also show that in some cases, women were not given an explanation of what a tubal ligation was, or were told that it was reversible. In some cases, men were allowed to sign consent forms on behalf of their wives, even while drunk. Other reports show that women were threatened with loss of work (their husband’s or their own) and/or given food in exchange for undergoing the procedure. In some areas, tubal ligation fairs were held in which women were sterilized in makeshift operating rooms with poor sanitation, by tired doctors, with little post-operative care. Other women were taken by force from their homes and transported to the health centers for surgeries. In one particularly chilling episode, women were locked in a health outpost after trying to leave because they could hear the screams of women undergoing tubal ligations without anesthesia. The rural outpost had run out (Diario 16 July 22, 2015; Cicatrices del Engaño 2014; Ballón 2014).

Some women were left debilitated by botched surgeries and poor postoperative care, making it impossible to work in their fields or weave using backstrap looms (kallwa) that required that the abdomen support sustained pressure and tamping down of the threads. Both actions became too painful for some women after the surgery, again leaving them with little means of cash flow. This disability also further deteriorated some campesinas’ ability to engage in culturally significant acts of textile production already threatened by poverty, and many of these women had to leave their lands and move to the cities to find wage work (Ballón 2014).

According to reports put together by Defensorías del Pueblo (the legal ombudsman’s offices), the Peruvian Congress, and human and women's rights
organizations, between 1996 and 2001, 270,000 rural, poor, and indigenous Peruvian women and 22,000 rural, poor, and indigenous men received surgical sterilization (Defensoría del Pueblo, January 1998; CLADEM 1999; Congreso de la República, June 2002; Amnesty 2004). Although the case against the state for crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity had been archived several times before, in 2014 State’s Attorney Marco Guzmán Baca archived the case again. However, in his statement, he also acknowledged the estimates that placed the number of forcibly and coercively sterilized people at around 10,000 in all of Peru with a total of 1,448 women having testified to their forced sterilization in Cusco, Piura and Cajamarca (Cuentas Ramirez 2014).

A registro único de víctimas (or unified registry of victims), shadowing that of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation process, was inaugurated in 2016 to create a comprehensive list of victims of forced sterilization (Interview 14). By October 31, 2016, 3,461 people had signaled their desire to be included in the registry, and 1,761 had been added (Rivas, personal correspondence 1/26/17). Although the number of forced sterilizations varies according to reports (leading some to dismiss claims of mass coercion altogether) it is clear that among the 270,000 women and

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13 I engaged in 22 interviews with feminist rights workers in Lima between June and October of 2015.
22,000 men sterilized under the PNSRPF 1996-2000, there were more sterilizations than might be expected under normal circumstances in indigenous populations (as I discuss later in the thesis)—even when statistics of “unmet need” for contraception and a colonial medical history are taken into account. 

Perhaps most disturbingly, many of the rural areas on which the program focused on were not “...overpopulated area[s]...rather they were set in inaccessible, poor, and marginalized areas” (Boesten 2007: 7). Some communities where the sterilizations took place had been decimated in the conflict between Sendero Luminoso and the government, in which upwards of 70,000 people (largely campesinos) were killed (Succar Rahme, García Trovato, Reyes Solari, Supa Huamán 2002: 3; CVR 2003). It is important to note that campesinos had come to be seen as synonymous with Sendero due to the fact that many campesinos were Senderistas—this despite huge numbers of non-Sendero campesino deaths at the hands of both Sendero and the government. This has led some observers to read the forced sterilizations as a counter-insurgency tactic, a theory for which they have found evidence in the as-of-yet inaccessible Plan Verde (Ballón personal correspondence May 30th, 2016).

Though this connection is hard to make given available evidence, it is nevertheless quite clear that the program showed disdain for the health and wellbeing of many of the women it served, especially indigenous women. The disproportionate targeting of women in family planning campaigns has been well

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14 There is evidence that some doctors in rural or impoverished areas sterilized indigenous and peri-urban mestiza women without their consent while performing other medical procedures, suggesting the existence of a colonial medical history prior to the PNSRPF 1996-2000 (Gianella 2014)
documented by scholars (Shapiro 1985; Hartmann 1995; Smith 2005). Moreover, the control of women’s sexuality and reproductive capacity writ large has been tied to the metaphor of the body of the woman as standing in for the body of the nation: the body in which the citizen and upon which citizenship is produced (Stoler 1991; Yuval Davis 1997; Stoler 2002; Nussbaum 2004).

In the Peruvian case, this emphasis on campesinas can additionally be attributed to a historical interest in maternal and infant health in the Peruvian public health apparatus (Ewig 2010; Necochea 2014) and the perception that campesinas are “more indigenous” vis-à-vis campesinos due to the fact that the latter out migrate for work at higher numbers, and often take on more western dress, diets, and attitudes (de la Cadena 1992). Both of these interests and attitudes can be linked to the discursive construction of the indigenous female body as antithetical to national development and progress. Thus, to work on that body is to work on the nation; the hope of national progress lies in transforming the reproductive capacities of indigenous women.

“How did it come to pass...”: Forced sterilization and historical memory

Between June and October 2015, I interviewed twenty-two feminist rights workers in Lima, Peru concerning the violent stripping of campesinas’ reproductive autonomy. I told interviewees I was interested in the historic memory of the feminist movement, how the movement remembered the Fujimorato and the forced sterilizations. What I found underneath the supposed silence was a world teeming with activity, advocacy, debate, and disagreement as to what the sterilizations were
(an unfortunate accident or government policy), how they could be understood (crimes of excess of overzealous doctors, crimes against humanity, or even genocide), and how they should be dealt with.

From the interviews I conducted, I was helped to see three main assemblages (a la Deleuze and Guattari) within the feminist movement: reproductive and sexual rights, critical human rights, and civil and political rights. According to Deleuze and Guattari, an assemblage is a being-in-relation that comes together at a particular point in time. It is fluid while maintaining being-in-relation between groups of humans, non-humans, ideas, places, etcetera (1978). In this way, an assemblage is like a constellation, or even more concretely, like a bee colony: a bee colony is an assemblage of queen bee, worker bees, flowers, dances, pheromones, predators, insecticides, perhaps the larger apiary, bee keeper, market, etc. All of these elements are being-in-relation in the assemblage of 'bee colony'. What is important about the notion of assemblage is that it is fluid—certain actors come and go—while maintaining an internal coherence through this being-in-relation. As long as there is relating, there is assemblage.

The three feminist assemblages I follow in this thesis found their coherence in the distinct rights discourses that served as (to use another metaphor from nature) the nuclei of each assemblage. These rights paradigms are the assemblage’s raison d’être as they are the primary mean, mode and reason for being-in-relation for the feminist rights workers in each assemblage.

One might think that these rights assemblages would map neatly onto particular feminist rights NGOs. What I realized was that, in fact, they did not. Most
large feminist NGOs in Lima work in several different rights paradigms at the same time. Thus, these assemblages came into being as feminist rights advocates began being-in-relation with one another via adherence to reproductive and sexual rights, critical human rights, and civil and political rights paradigms, respectively.

Moreover, these assemblages came into being in different points in history. While the civil and political rights assemblage was older (dating back to the 1970s), the reproductive and sexual rights assemblage came into being in the mid 1990s with the global boom in reproductive and sexual rights advocacy. The critical human rights assemblage only came into being with the discovery of the forced sterilizations—from 1996 on.

While some rights workers did move between assemblages, these appear to have been in the minority. Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblage is useful in characterizing the Peruvian feminist movement as it allows intra-, inter-, and exo-assemblage movement to not only be visible, but accounted for. This is important because putting a feminist assemblages into movement makes it possible to see “lines of flight” or “bolts of pent-up energy that break through the cracks in a system of control and shoot off on the diagonal. By the light of their passage, they reveal the open spaces beyond the limits of what exists” (Rayner, 2013: n.p.). The critical human rights perspective is just such a ‘line of flight’ that went ‘beyond the limit of what exist[ed]’ as it presented a new way of doing human rights that included indigenous women in all their intersections as political subjects with the right to have rights.
Furthermore, though some people might have moved between assemblages (though quite few and in the final analysis, to make new assemblages), the rights paradigms that served as the nuclei for being-in-relation in these three assemblages remained consistent. In practice, this meant that these three rights assemblages approached rights advocacy from different standpoints; and I argue that it is this ideological siloization that appears to have made it difficult for the feminist movement of the late 1990s and early 2000s to be an ally to campesina women as the violation of the latter’s right crisscrossed rights arenas such that they eluded visibility. Furthermore, though there was some conversation between assemblages (these conversations created the critical human rights assemblage, after all), there appears to have been no sustained interchange to discuss what the sterilizations were (human rights violations or criminal acts, e.g.).

This siloization is only one piece of the story, for—with perhaps the exception of the critical human rights assemblage—each assemblage appears to have taken for granted the existence of a universal rights subject. By advocating for “Peruvians” or “women,” it appears that some parts of the feminist movement may have thought that they were in fact advocating for everyone. However, critical scholarship on human rights, women’s rights, and civil and political rights has revealed that the politics of citizenship and human rights have tended to be exclusive if not in word, at least in application.

In the case of Peru, the living legacy of colonial and neocolonial politics places campesinas in an odd political state. Though citizens in status, their everyday existence and treatment at the hands of the state reveal that they are kept at arm’s
length from a meaningful social inclusion, what Carbado calls “inclusive exclusion” (2005). Whether it be measured through a lack of access to education, healthcare, and legal recourse or through poverty, discrimination, and discourse like the “Indian Problem,” the structural violence under which indigenous peoples in Peru live prejudices their ability to be read as rights-bearing citizens. Read instead as nuisances or threats to Peruvian modernity and prosperity, the indigenous body, I argue, is rendered instrumentalizable for projects of statecraft as it was for the PNSRPF 1996-2000. These are citizen-non-citizens, people who are legally citizens but whose humanity—and therefore the right to have rights—is illegible to the state—a situation made clear by and reinforced through structural violence.

It is important to note that the feminists I spoke with, unlike the state, recognized campesinas as rights-bearing individuals. In fact, campesinas were grouped into the categories of “all women” and “all Peruvians.” What it appears at least two of the feminist assemblages missed, though, was how the system of rights could not adequately defend campesina women due to their lack of citizenship and human rights. Campesinas did not fit within the categories of “all women” or “all Peruvians” due to their social exclusion in the larger Peruvian society. As the saying goes el ladrón cree que todos son de su condición, the thief thinks everyone is a thief—everyone thinks that everyone’s reality is like theirs. Like Chandra Mohanty (2003) and other feminist scholars have noted in other situations, it is quite possible that as middle class, coastal, urban, educated women, some members of the feminist movement may have thought that just as they could fight to gain rights for themselves, they could use similar strategies to gain rights for all Peruvian women.
But people in different social positions have differential access to rights. In Peru class, ethnicity and race work together to form a pigmentocracy in which indigenous peoples and indigeneity are set on a continuum against whiteness as skin color and proximity to modernity. Though there is space for racial mobility, structural violence operates such that indigenous peoples do not have the same social, and therefore legal standing as coastal, middle-class Limeñas, for example. To clarify, I am not saying that campesinas lack rights on paper (though many only received the right to vote in 1979 when the last literacy requirements were lifted), but rather that there is a lack of political will on the part of the state to recognize those rights.

Nevertheless, in order to expand rights—which one can argue both women and indigenous peoples have done through CEDAW and UNDRIP\textsuperscript{15}—one must advocate within their strictures. This is the paradox of rights (Brown 2010). One works with what one has. In the case of the critical human rights assemblage, interviews I conducted reveal that feminist human rights lawyers were attempting to expand the notion of rights to incorporate more sociologically defined notions of rights, including an evaluation of structural violence as related to race, ethnicity, and class in the evaluation of rights violations. This assemblage was in its nascent form at the time of the sterilizations and their aftermath, and was unable to curry favor with the other assemblages—this, though it appears to have been the assemblage most closely aligned to how campesina women, including indigenous congresswoman Hilaria Supa Huamán, conceptualize the sterilization campaign:

an act of genocide in a 500-year history of genocidal acts by the state, first colonial and then republican.

**The Roadmap: conditions of possibility**

In chapter one, “On the Peruvian Context,” I lay the groundwork for understanding the historical dynamics undergirding the sterilizations and, perhaps, the feminist movement’s reaction to them. In this chapter, I cover the rise of Fujimori as popular authoritarian president, his neoliberal reforms that plunged Peru’s poor deeper into poverty, and the PNSRPF 1996-2000 as part of a Malthusian inspired development program. It is my assertion that the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was part of a broader attempt to transform Peru’s rural, poor, and indigenous citizenry—peoples often invested in collective and communitarian modes of life—into neoliberal consumer citizens (Somers 2010) in order to help power Peru’s neoliberal transformation, to be the engines of the economic growth that has now been called the “Peruvian Miracle” (Mendoza 2014; IMF 2015)

To explain this, I move to a discussion of the history of the “Indian Problem” and hygienic racism—two discourses that have marked the indigenous body and indigenous life as problematic to Peru’s modernizing hopes, leading to both superficial and invasive interventions upon “dysgenic” bodies. I then turn to a discussion on citizenship and rights to show how discourses of the Indian Problem and hygienic racism stem from the colonial nature of citizenship as an institution, further finding that both citizenship and human rights are deeply embedded in the colonial encounter in ways that limit campesinas’ access to rights.
In chapter two “The Feminist Movement of the 1980s and ’90s,” I attempt to retell the history of the feminist movement. While other scholars (Vargas and Villanueva 1994; Rousseau 2006) have tended to group the feminist movement and women’s movement under the banner of the women’s movement, I argue (based on interview data) that the feminist movement and women’s movement appear to have been far more divided than united, particularly due to ideological differences based in race and class. I find that absent from mainstream discussion of the women’s and feminist movements was the campesina movement, who some feminists said did not organize around issues of gender, but rather around class as campesinas—peasants. Here I discuss the gendered nature of feminist work, observing that feminism can unwittingly become a tool of coloniality in the absence of intersectional or decolonial evaluations of movement politics (Mohanty 2003; Mahmood 2004). I then discuss the divides and discords within the feminist movement in reference to the PNSRPF 1996-2000 and the idea of “working with” the Fujimorato.

In chapter three “Feminist Assemblages” I take a closer look at the feminist movement. With help from the feminists I interviewed, I identify three assemblages or constellations of feminists working in the feminist movement. Each of these fluid assemblages was organized around a different rights paradigm (reproductive and sexual rights, critical human rights, and civil and political rights) and responded differently to the news of forced sterilizations due in part to their different positions within the rights movement and, thus, their understanding of how rights work. I find that the reproductive and sexual rights assemblage was riding high on the global interest and support of women’s reproductive rights and the opportunity to provide
publicly supported reproductive health to all Peruvian women for the first time in the country’s history. In its enthusiasm, it appears that this assemblage was unable to see how a family planning campaign might be prejudicial to campesinas due to the discourses of the Indian Problem and the historic structural violence visited upon indigenous peoples in Peru.

The critical human rights assemblage, on the other hand, read the sterilizations within this broader history of structural violence and went as far as to call them a genocidal act, in line with how campesinas themselves describe what happened to them. The other two assemblages overshadowed the findings of the critical human rights assemblage, however. It appears that the civil and political rights assemblage, while quite concerned with the forced sterilizations, was intensely focused on the transition to democracy starting in 1999. Though this assemblage pushed for the forced sterilizations to be included in the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, disagreements and tensions within the assemblage appear to have made advocacy on behalf of affected women difficult.

By way of conclusion I turn to a question asked many times with equal intensity and necessity: can the subaltern speak (Spivak 1988). In the face of the transition to democracy, it appears that the voices of the affected women faded away. Though a government commission placed the responsibility for the forced sterilizations squarely on the Fujimori regime in 2003, by then it appears to have been too late: the political tides had turned. Though several feminist organizations involved in the critical human rights assemblage have overseen the case on behalf of the forcibly sterilized women through the decade of 2000, it was not until 2011 that
concern for the case was renewed in wider society. Though there have been many mobilizations on behalf of the affected women, there is a concerning tendency to use their stories and images in the wider feminist movement in ways that may or may not benefit the women affected by Fujimori’s campaign. Indeed, political rifts have opened between some feminist organizations and the groups of affected women.

**Engaged Scholarship**

This thesis is theoretically innovative in its attempt to combine Agamben’s concept of bare life and Foucault’s biopolitics with critical race and critical legal scholarship that re-introduce race into these theories and describe them “in the idiom of dehumanization” (Weheliye 2014). “[B]ecause full access to legal personhood has been a systematic absence within racialized minority cultures, the analyses of political violence that arise from them tend to neither describe this brutality in the idiom of dehumanization nor make legal recognition the point of redress” (11). This thesis recognizes this ‘systematic absence’ and understands the value of articulating redress in the form of legal recognition of rights. For while oppressed peoples refuse the terms of their dehumanization through “practices of freedom” (Weheliye 2014: 13), like continuing to take part in and reproduce “alternative versions of humanity” other than the imposed Western, humanistic culture of Man (11), it is still the case that the sociopolitical parameters within which they do so dehumanize them through lack of legal recognition. The ability to see and name this dehumanization through lack of recognition is essential to the
future success of the human rights movement, for this ability is part and parcel to closing the gap between “the flesh and the law” (11).

Lastly, a note on why this research is important. Looking at the website for the National Coordinator of Human Rights (CNDDHH), the Working Group on Reparation for Forced Sterilizations (GREF) cites the work of anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists, and legal scholars in their appeals to the Peruvian government and civil society to not let the impunity of the Fujimori government stand in the case of forced sterilizations.16 This leads me to believe that rights are only as useful as they are understood and used. Far from being a platitude, it is incumbent upon researchers of rights and indigeneity to provide rights practitioners with the tools to understand how both citizenship and human rights are bound up in the projects of colonialism, imperialism and statecraft. Though this will not make the state any less of a formidable opponent, it might stand a chance of helping rights practitioners close the gaps between rights discourses into which the most vulnerable fall. By taking an intersectional (and even decolonial) view of rights, it may become possible to create new methods and strategies for campesinas and their allies to advocate for their rights.

Methodology

I am a child of the Andes. My parents met in the Andean town of Sicuani, a couple hours outside Cusco, Peru while doing fieldwork for their graduate degrees in anthropology and history. My Peruvian mother and American father had both developed differential consciousnesses through their lives and studies; consciousnesses that allowed them to “…function within yet beyond the demands of dominant ideology” (Sandoval 1991: 3). It is through them and the worlds to which they introduced me that I track my “dissent lines” (Tuhiwai Smith 2012), the oppositional ways of seeing the world that have led me to this research.

The world of the Andes gave me my first lessons in race and racism and differential consciousness (Sandoval 1991). When I was six years old, my family moved from Northern California to Sucre, Bolivia for my father to do research in the local archives on the mita, the forced labor regime brutally imposed upon indigenous peoples in service to the Spanish Crown. While we were there, my parents employed an indigenous woman, Dionysia, to take care of my sister and me from time to time. Dionysia had five children of her own, one with mild developmental issues due to a botched forceps procedure during her induced birth. Her husband had been electrocuted on the job as an electrician several years before. Though a small child, I have vivid memories of going to visit her house in the pueblos jovenes, “young towns” or shanties on the outskirts of Sucre. I remember being taken by the fact that the floor was made out of dirt—but clean dirt; earth swept clean until it shone. For both my family and Dionysia’s these visits were border-crossings, unusual if not rare exchanges between ideologically cordoned-off worlds.
One day as Dionysia went to leave our home she reached up and kissed my mom on the cheek. This greeting and goodbye is quite common amongst mestizo and white Latin Americans but is rare among indigenous folk (who prefer a handshake upon greeting), and rarer still between indigenous and white or mestizo people due to overt racism. Dionysia then turned to me and kissed me on the cheek. Her kiss was wet so I reached up and wiped it off my face. My mom immediately squeezed my hand and said, “We do not do that.”

Little did I know at six years of age that this gesture—which might have seemed innocuous to most, the sign of an ill-mannered child, perhaps — had broken open a five hundred year history. In the context of the Andes, wiping away Dionysia’s kiss was not the innocent movement of a bratty child, but could be interpreted as a gesture of disgust; disgust not with the kiss itself, but with Dionysia as an indigenous woman; disgust at her touch.

I have come to wonder what Dionysia might have thought in the split second between my faux pas and my mother’s admonition. Was my mother the type of white person she claimed to be through word and deed? Was she actually different from other mistis?17 “We do not do that.” My mother’s response spoke to her differential consciousness; and in speaking, she—in a small, almost imperceptible way—intervened in five hundred years of colonial arrogance by teaching me to be a different sort of misti.

Straddling the two equally complex worlds of North America and Latin America, I have come to understand my identities in each as relational (Fine 2004):

17 A term used to denote white people in the Andes.
my body, culture, knowledge, intents all have different weights and meanings as I move through the world and relate to different people. Through my experiences as a child of the Andes and a white, middle class Latina growing up between the US and Latin America, I have developed what DuBois called “double consciousness,” and Anzaldúa “mestiza consciousness”—consciousnesses which straddle worlds and are reflexive by necessity. My constant movement between worlds (from Peru to California to Bolivia to Florida to indigenous Mexico to ex-British Nicaragua to Arizona to Canada to North Carolina) has necessitated keen observation of how I am seen and understood in the different contexts I inhabit, not only for the sake of research, but also for my own wellbeing. Observing how people treat me and interact with me (and how this compares to how they treat others) serves as a basis for understanding how a culture works: what sorts of social hierarchies are in operation? How do people understand their worlds in relation to others?

My experiences have also made me what Anzaldúa refers to as a *nepantlera*, a bridge builder, someone who lives in the interstices between disparate worlds, and in doing so, connects them (2001). Nepantla is a “…Nahuatl word meaning tierra entre medio [the earth between]…Transformations occur in this in-between space, an unstable, unpredictable, precarious, always-in-transition space lacking clear boundaries” (xv). It is in one of these in-between spaces, the space between the world of feminist rights workers and campesinas, that undergirds the intellectual plane of this thesis. Although this thesis hones in on the experience of feminist rights workers, it does so with the realities of campesina women in mind, for these worlds came to be deeply entangled in the case of the PNSRPF 1996-2000. While I
am not here to condemn or to condone but to observe, the partial conclusions I come to are often uncomfortable if not painful due to the entanglement between feminist decisions and indigenous lives.

At the same time, I hope that my representation of the feminist movement in terms of separate but interlocking assemblages makes it clear that there was no one “feminist response” to the forced sterilizations. Rather there was a set of feminist responses that came out of different political orientations as well as differing relationships to rights paradigms and discourses. Tantamount to appreciating the complexity of the situation this thesis attempts to unpack is precisely this tracking of relationships and discourses. Any failures to attend to this complexity are mine and mine alone.

The Politics of Research

Just as the situation being researched is politically complex, so is the act of research itself. This is true in at least two ways. First, all knowledge is contested, situated, produced by and productive of regimes of power (Fine 2004; Tuhiwai Smith 2012). Almost thirty years ago, Donna Haraway contended that knowledges are situated and that to write as if knowledge were universal is to engage in the “...God trick...that mode of seeing that pretends to offer a vision that is from everywhere and nowhere, equally and fully” (1988: 584). This is problematic, as Michelle Fine elaborates, because the God trick is one “...in which researchers pronounce ‘truths’ while whitening out their own authority so as to be unlocatable and irresponsible” (Fine 2004: 19).
To combat this, I have attempted to situate this research project in the political, social, economic, and discursive contexts that helped give shape to both the PNSRPF 1996-2000 and feminist responses to reports of forced sterilizations. I have also tried to place myself in the narratives as much as possible to illustrate the processes I went through as I came to understand the breaches between the feminist movement and organized campesinas. For instance, the ethnographic note that opens chapter one, “On the Peruvian Context,” serves to illustrate the ways in which some advocacy performed by coastal feminist groups (as well as other interested groups) in the case of forced sterilization is done on behalf of campesinas, sidelining them (though probably unwittingly) even as they are physically present. Such scenes offer glimpses into larger social dynamics and histories through what they silence as much as what they say. These instances served as points of departure for me.

If knowledge is political, then so is research. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues, “...research is not an innocent or distant academic exercise but an activity that has something at stake and that occurs in a set of political and social conditions” (2012: 5). In terms of differential access to power, indigenous women have been some of the most marginalized in Peru. While I dare not speak for or from a campesina position I do speak with a deep understanding of the continued histories of colonialism, internal colonialism, and settler colonialism. There is no one moment of conquest, but rather a continued reconquista that indigenous peoples the world over, including those in Peru, must contend with on a daily basis (Fabien 1983).
This "structure of colonialism" (Wolfe 1999) shapes not only the lives of campesinas, but also how rights are understood and how rights work is done in feminist circles. What I found fascinating in my conversations with feminists was that, in the face of biting racism, feminist NGO workers saw indigenous peoples as full political members of society, deserving of rights. But rather than supporting campesinas, these views ironically seemed to have contributed to their vulnerability. For faith in the universality of human rights (be they civil and political, reproductive and sexual or human) had serious consequences in the face of campesina’s second-class citizenship. Campesinas were not part of the universal human in this case, and feminists’ inability to read campesinas’ second-class citizenship as a vulnerability contributed to the abuses they suffered under the PNSRPF 1996-2000. If this thesis exemplifies one observation, it is that “[t]he contemporary world system is neocolonial in its structure” (Harrison 1991).

Rights workers’ best intentions are often thwarted by the uneven extension of rights across difference—an unevenness that is produced by histories of marginalization and oppression, and serves to shore up inequalities that drive, for instance, racialized capitalism (Robinson 1983). Thus, post-mortems on failures of rights regimes require a certain amount of “studying up” or “reaching back,” as Tuhiwai Smith puts it (2012). What was it about the rights paradigms being used by the assemblages in the feminist movement that enabled some feminists to read the PNSRPRF 1996-2000 and its outcomes so differently? Shedding light on this and other questions involves shedding light on how local processes and outcomes (including tubal ligations) are imbricated within state, regional and global politics.
In this way, “studying up” reveals that the situations of oppression and neocolonialism that touch us all are not inevitable. They are historically produced. That campesinas fight to have the Peruvian state recognize the wrongs it committed speaks to this evitability; for it signals that a differential consciousness exists that speaks truth to power.

Moreover, I chose to “study up” as an issue of personal ethics. It might seem curious that research on the forced sterilizations of campesina women does not include research with campesina women. I felt that given my prior research on issues of citizenship and rights, my skills and knowledges might be of more use to feminist rights workers; that I might be able to help explicate the gap between the aspirational goals of rights work and what happened in the PNSRPF 1996-2000. To the question “how did this happen?” many people I interviewed answered “political pragmatism.” They argued that certain sectors of the feminist movement were so keen on seeing a reproductive rights program introduced that they looked past Fujimori’s history of rights abuses. This is definitely part of the story. I wanted, however, to go deeper and show how the exclusionary nature of both citizenship and human rights as institutions implicated not just the “pragmatic” sector of the feminist movement, but all those sectors working within a human rights paradigm. Campesinas’ citizenship and rights are limited by histories of structural violence. In order, then, to do effective rights work, it may be necessary to shift to a rights paradigm that works with the most vulnerable in mind, as argued, for instance, by the Combahee River Collective (Smith 1983)

Thus, due to my position and knowledges,
[t]he world in which I feel a moral pull to intervene is the world of the privileged in which I participate as an equal, not the world of village women elsewhere. In light of the global reach of rights work and rights talk, and their implications to remold human lives, I would rather use my knowledge and experience to intervene into the worlds of power that authorize and naturalize rights work and the sometimes-dangerous understandings of human social life to which they are made to give rise. (Abu-Lughod 2013: 227)

In the case of the PNSRPF 1996-200 the “sometimes-dangerous understanding” at work was, ironically, that campesinas had the same rights as middle-class, coastal Limeñas—that an “all women” approach to rights work would be adequate. This belief, while beautiful in its aspiration, missed how campesinas’ second-class citizenship produced them as subjects vulnerable to state intervention. It is my hope that some of my observations are found to be helpful by the feminist NGOs who are walking the campesinas’ case through the Peruvian courts.

Lastly, I have attempted to use sources from scholars, scholar feminists, and observers from within Peru, where possible, though my foray into this literature is still far from comprehensive. Sourcing is a critical area for the decolonization of methodologies. For it is often the case that the scholarship of women, people of color, and scholars in the global South (and especially scholars who are women of color in the global South) is not read, read and not cited, or taken out of context, i.e. paid lip service (Lutz 1990; Harrison 1991; Tuhiwai Smith 2012). I follow the lead of scholars like Florence E. Babb who have called for academics in the global North to put their work into meaningful dialogue with that of researchers in the global South in an effort to both rectify colonial tendencies in scholarship as well as to create new and rich research dialogues and partnerships (Babb, n.d.)
Methods and Analysis

By the end of my four month stay in Lima, I had conducted twenty-two interviews with feminist rights workers who were active in the movement at the time of the forced sterilizations; feminist academics who work in the area of public health; and current feminist rights workers. Most interviews lasted between one and a half and two hours and took place in interviewees’ homes, NGO offices, or public spaces. Interviewees decided where we met. I also spoke informally with people in the human rights movement and academics outside the realm of public health (such as history) in order to get a better sense of the social and political terrain.

My research was not limited to interviews. I attended several conferences and talks on the issue of forced sterilizations. I also poured through the library and archives of Flora Tristan and the e-archive “Archivo PNSRPF 1996-2000” curated by Alejandra Ballón Gutiérrez (https://1996pnsrpf2000.wordpress.com). TheArchivo PNSRPF 1996-2000 provided invaluable resources in the form of reports, timelines, bibliographies, images, and art and together with the resources provided by Flora Tristán (with the aid of their librarian, Hiromi Toguchi), I was better able to contextualize what I was learning in interviews.

My entrée into the Peruvian feminist movement was facilitated through family connections and friendships. This assisted my ability to access informants it might have taken other researchers significantly longer to reach. Significant credit is also due to my tía (aunt) Mariella, who upon realizing my terror at having to make phone calls (a much more effective way to make contact than the more impersonal
email], coached me through proper phone etiquette and even made calls on my behalf.

Contacts offered by professors in the US and initial meetings with friends in the Peruvian feminist movement helped me pinpoint key people with whom to speak. Speaking with those people helped provide further contacts in the fashion of the snowball method. In this way, I was able to speak with several people each from what I later identified as the three feminist assemblages. I had initially wanted to speak with more people who served on the Mesa Tripartita, a significant player in the history of the PNSRPF 1996-2000. However, I was only able to speak to one, Miriam, whom I dialogue with in chapter three. Other members I identified did not seem keen to talk. Reflecting on this one day, another feminist rights worker told me that my other contacts from the Mesa had lost their jobs, or had left the country, unable to find work due to the backlash they received from their role on the Mesa.

I hesitate to call the people I interviewed ‘collaborators’ as they did not have a hand in creating the research questions, interview schedules, or much of the analysis. However, I would be remiss if I said that the people I interviewed did not shape my project, the questions I asked or my analyses over time. At the beginning of each interview, I explained to interviewees that the purpose of my project was to learn about the feminist movement’s historical memory concerning the forced sterilizations; that I wanted to know how the movement reacted to the sterilizations and how it made sense to them.

Time and time again I was told that mine was an important project; that the feminist movement needed to reflect on this time in its history. Throughout the
interviews themselves, I used a prepared (though loose) interview schedule that I
interspersed with reflections and questions brought about by speaking with other
interviewees. Thus, interviews were less formulaic and more narrative in structure.

I told participants that I was doing a project on the historical memory of the
feminist movement regarding the forced sterilizations of the 1990s; that I was
interested in knowing what was going on at the time (was it true like the
newspapers say that the feminist movement did nothing?); what they saw, heard,
felt and experienced. I asked participants about their memories of the Fujimorato
and the actions of the feminist movement as the forced sterilizations came to light;
how the movement responded as a movement. These questions resulted in a
cascade of memories and personal analysis of the movement and the Peruvian
situation at large.

At the end of each interview, I would ask if there were any questions or ideas
I was missing or which they thought were important to add. In these ways, I
attempted to “share authority” with the people I interviewed by not treating
interviews as “fact-finding missions,” but rather as “spaces where [interviewees]
and scholars can work together to not only understand the stories that are told, but
also determine significance to the larger community” (Sheftel and Zembrzycki 2010:
194).

I digitally recorded all interviews with the permission of interviewees and
then transcribed all interviews using transcription software. I began analyses by
grouping together like commentaries to uncover themes. Nevertheless, my analyses
were also partially collaborative. In my analyses, I took to heart Comaroff and
Comaroff’s admonition to place interviews within their sociohistorical framework, to read them as texts, as products of particular times, places, people, and dynamics too. As they argue, “if texts are to be more than literary topoi, scattered shards from which we presume worlds, they have to be anchored in the processes of their production, in the orbits of connection and influence that give them life and force” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 43 in Ortner 1995: 174). We must be wary of ‘cultural thinning’ or research practices that fail to “recognize the authentic cultural universe”\(^\text{18}\) of those people being studied (Ortner 1995: 180).

For this reason, I have attempted to read collaborators’ knowledge against what I know about contemporary Peruvian history; debates within the feminist movement; discourses on indigeneity, modernity, and coloniality; and global and local debates on women’s rights. My knowledge of all these sociohistorical facets is partial, especially in the case of Peru. Thus I was fortunate to have several collaborators help me make sense of and interpret the narrative themes I was noticing in interviews. For instance, the impetus for rethinking the Peruvian feminist movement in terms of fluid assemblages came from Maia, a veteran feminist and women’s rights worker at one of the large women’s rights NGOs. She helped me trace when and why people moved in and out of particular rights assemblages within the feminist movement.

Maia’s reflection on this frenetic movement in and out of the different assemblages and the movement altogether helped me understand just how active

\(^{18}\) As further revealed in her writing, Ortner does not mean “authentic” as a static and unchanging set of cultural norms believed inherent to a people (especially in colonial situations in which oppression is justified through various means of hierarchy and comparison), but rather those practices, ideas, and feelings around which a group coheres and defines itself.
the feminist movement had been in the wake of the forced sterilizations, even if this activity had not been visible outside the movement. Maia’s intervention helped me to see that prior representations of the Peruvian feminist movement in terms of ‘sectors’ or ‘streams’ was too static and regimented and helped me to add depth to my analysis. So although not traditionally collaborative, I attempted to make space in my research for shared reflection, suggestion, intervention and surprise.

Just as formulating research requires reflection and reflexivity, so does the process of writing, as representation is an essential part of the research process. When writing about a group, one does not only represent a person or group, but produces knowledge about them as well (Fabian 1983; Harrison 1991; Behar and Gordon 1995). This makes selecting quotes and ethnographic notes to include in a piece of work political in the sense that it contributes to readers’ perspectives about issues or people. For instance, the quotes I pull out and analyze in chapter three “Feminist Assemblages” were chosen because I found them to best represent each assemblage. Each of these quotes speaks to the heart of the assemblage; though it is possible that in choosing them for their distinctive (yet representative) characters, they may not fully represent their respective assemblage. Nevertheless, partial as they may be, each quote gives an approximate idea of what each assemblage was centered on—though this may have changed in the twenty years that have passed.

This brings me to a note on interviews. Interviews do not offer direct knowledge upon a subject. Rather, they are productions of knowledge mediated by knowledge, culture, social position, and power (Ortner 1995; Briggs 1997; Nagar 2002). My own positionality changed in relation to the people I was speaking with—
though in almost every interview I conducted, my interlocutors held considerable power over me. Many had terminal degrees (some PhDs from prestigious US institutions) and had toed the line between activism and academia for many years. Others were lawyers who worked in the human rights system, and some were public political figures. In all instances, I was much younger than the people I interviewed in a culture where age (still) matters.

My identity as a Peruvian *gringa*—an “outsider within” (Hill Collins 2004)—made me an interesting interlocutor. Marginal to and yet a part of the world of Peruvian feminists, I was able to make connections and observations that perhaps only an insider with a little bit of distance could make, such as connecting the forced sterilizations in Peru to the global population control movement (a theme I was not able to take up in this thesis, but hope to in subsequent projects). This connection led to my invitation to sit on a panel at the *contra cumbre* or counter-congress to the 2015 World Trade Organization’s Meeting of Governors. Titled “Desmintiendo el Milagro Peruano” or “Refuting the Peruvian Miracle,” this counter-congress spoke to the millions left behind and ravaged by Peru’s neoliberal shift.

I spoke on a panel with four other feminists who tied the forced sterilizations in Peru (and other countries in Latin America) to neoliberal practices and authoritarian governments. Together, we began rethinking what forced sterilizations in Peru meant on a global level. If Peruvian campesinas were not alone in being forcible sterilized, what sorts of interventions could be made at both local and global levels? We remain in contact to discuss these issues.
On Compassionate Research

Lastly, I am not only interested in doing what Haraway calls “passionate research” (research that is situated and illuminated by the complexities of context), but compassionate research: research that is nonjudgmental and respects people’s positionalities, boundaries and limits. My job as a researcher—particularly when faced with interviewees whose politics I might disagree with—is to understand where they are coming from, contextualize what they are saying, and place them within the larger arch of history. Furthermore, Following Audra Simpson’s (2007) work on ethnographies of refusal, there are certain conversations that I have chosen not to reproduce in this work, tensions and conflicts that are too tender to be opened to the light of scrutiny. While some may see this as an act of epistemic violence through withholding information, I think about this in the way that Simpson does: “What can I say and still go home” (2007: 78)?

Writing about the Mohawk, Simpson argues that control over representation is tantamount to sovereignty. But ethnographic refusal presents a problem for the anthropologist:

How does one write about or analyze what is so clearly offensive to the anthropological sensibilities of access, of replicable results, on some ways of ‘fairness,’ and reconcile all this with the plight of those who are struggling every day to maintain what little they have left? And when they are struggling so clearly with the languages and analytics of a foreign culture that occupies their semantic and material space, and naturalizes this occupation through history-writing and the very analytics that are used to know them? (Simpson 2007:75).

While Peruvian coastal feminists have not been subjected to the ethnocide and genocide of indigenous peoples, feminists in Peru do live in a precarious state as both women and leftists in a country that is friendly to neither. In this situation,
representation matters. In some cases I was explicitly told not to share certain information; in others, I elected not to divulge the inner workings of conflict; and in some cases, interviewee’s silence on a certain subject was the limit.

In listening and shutting off the tape recorder, in situating each subject within their own shifting historical context of the present, these refusal speak volumes, because they tell us when to stop...‘Enough,’ I realized (sic), was when I reached the limit of my own return and our collective arrival. Can I do this and still come home; what am I revealing here and why? Where will this get us? Who benefits from this and why? And ‘enough’ was when they [her interiewees] shut down (or told me to turn off the recorder), or told me outright funny things like ‘nobody seems to know’—when everybody does know and talks about it all the time...Dominion then had to be exercised over these representations, and that determined when enough was said. The ethnographic limit then, was reached not just when it would cause harm...—the limit was arrived at when the presentation would bite all of us and compromised the representational territory that we have gained for ourselves... (Simpson 2007: 78).

The limit is, then, one of representation: when one knows one is being watched, how does one control representation? Thus, sometimes “the limit of my own return and our collective arrival” as feminists means not speaking. This is not a lack of willingness to deal with the messiness of life, but rather an attention to politics as well as an ethics. If representations can do damage, where does one stop? This involves a political reflexivity on the part of the researcher, a reflexivity that attends issues of positionality, epistemology and representation while also asking what a piece of scholarly work makes possible for people on the ground? What lines of action and inquiry does it help open or shut (Nagar 2002)?

I have remained in contact with many of the feminist rights workers I spoke with during my time in Peru. We exchange sources, resources, ideas and inspiration. It has been my honor to work with Peruvian feminist and my hope to continue doing so.
Chapter 1: On The Peruvian Context

In 1990, Alberto Fujimori was elected president of Perú as the antiestablishment candidate. He did not have an identifiable political platform, which appears to have appealed to a Peruvian electorate upset with the implosion of tradition political parties and the latter’s general lack of efficacy (Vargas 2006). In his first years as president, however, Fujimori’s non-existent political platform was replaced by a virulent neoliberal reform embodied in the slogan, “honor, technology, work” (Vargas 2006: 51). ["En los primeros años de gobierno, el casi inexistente discurso político fue reemplazado por el lema: “honradez, tecnología, trabajo” (Vargas 2006: 51)]. Moreover, Fujimori showed,

[un] estilo personal de manejo del poder, sin alianzas explícitas, basado en la imagen del presidente como “protector” del pueblo, buscando establecer una relación directa y personalizada, asumiendo como eje político la “lucha contra la pobreza”, lo que fue facilitado por las atribuciones y recursos de los que dispuso a través de un modelo centralista y por el inusitado protagonismo que adquirieron los también inusitados y abundantes recursos del Ministerio de la Presidencia (Vargas 2006: 52).

[a] personal style of handling power, without explicit alliances, based on the image of the president as "protector" of the people, searching for a personalized and direct interaction, assuming, as its political axis the "fight against poverty" which was facilitated by the resources and prerogatives afforded to him by a centralist model and the unexpected protagonism that the equally unexpected resources afforded the Presidential Office (author's translation).

This centralization of power enabled a system of clientelism, in which services were traded for political support in a political economy resembling both the modern market as well as old patterns of caudillismo (Vargas 2006: 52). Peruvian feminist scholars have called this part of Peruvian history “modernization without democratization” (52).

Several factors contributed to this centralization of power, but perhaps none so much as the internal armed conflict waged between the insurgent Maoist group,
Sendero Luminoso (or Shining Path) and the Peruvian armed forces. By 1990, the conflict was already ten years old. Though the armed conflict had begun in Ayacucho, a south-central province and one of the poorest in Perú, by 1990 the war was knocking on Lima’s door. The Senderista’s strategy sought to choke the capital by attacking power plants, railroads, and highways such that frequent blackouts, lack of food, gas, clean running water, and other basic amenities were frequent occurrences in the capital. In response to a Congress he found ineffectual in the face of this growing threat, Fujimori undertook a self-coup in April of 1992. He abruptly ended the rule of law... implemented a strategy to combat an economic crisis and government subversion; he suppressed civil liberties and eroded political institutions and notions of accountability. Then, when faced with congressional opposition to his oppressive measures, he joined forces with the military, suspended the Constitution, censored the media, dissolved the National Congress, and incapacitated the judiciary (Getgen 2009: 9).

These changes effectively placed the majority of political power and access to government funds in the hands of the executive branch (Vargas 2006). Nevertheless, national support of the coup was over 70% (Vargas 2006: 51), reflecting of the deep insecurity and frustration of the Peruvian people.

Following Fujimori’s landslide re-election in April 1995, another all-night Congressional session on June 14, 1995 produced law No. 26479. Known as the "Amnesty Law," law No. 26479 granted general amnesty to all those members of the security forces and civilians who were the subject of human rights complaints, investigations, indictments, trials, convictions, and those who were serving prison sentences for violations committed after May 1980 in Peru’s internal armed conflict. Though aimed at quelling subversion and political violence, these and other
measures were used against those protesting Fujimori’s growing authoritarian government, known as the Fujimorato. This included feminist organizations and the women’s movement, both of which became targets of government repression (Interview 9; Vargas 2006). “Even after the capture of the leading subversives and the awareness of a crumbling insurgency, Fujimori’s repressive authoritarian regime used public fear and isolated incidence of violence to justify continued human rights abuses and political suppression throughout the 1990s” (Getgen 2009: 9). The effects of these authoritarian policies are still being felt today.\(^\text{19}\)

Fujimori’s redrawing of the Peruvian political terrain was both accompanied and facilitated by an aggressive structural adjustment policy. He “...relaxed private sector price controls, drastically reduced government subsidies and government employment, eliminated all exchange controls, and also reduced restrictions on investment, imports, and capital” (Manzetti 1999: 235). Tariffs were simplified, the minimum wage was immediately quadrupled, and the government established a $400 million poverty relief fund (ibid). The latter policy, however, seemed to foretell the effects of the most aggressive structural adjustment ever undertaken: the price of electricity quintupled, water prices rose eightfold, and gasoline prices rose 3,000% (Gouge 2003; Manzetti 1999). Fujimori’s austerity program was so drastic

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\(^{19}\) In June 2016 the Coordinadora de Derechos Humanos Perú or the Peruvian Coordinator for Human Rights launched a campaign to urge the sitting president, Ollanta Humala, to sign into law the Ley de Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas (Law for the Search for Disappeared Persons) in an effort to locate the more than 15,000 disappeared during the internal armed conflict and Fujimorato (1980-2000) (CNDDHH June 17th, 2016). Moreover, levels of insecurity are so high in Metropolitan Lima that during the summer of 2015, some Lima residents were calling for the return of Fujimori, or “un pequeño Pinochet” (a little Pinochet) to bring order to the city (Personal correspondence, September 2015). Statements like this reveal the double-edge nature of Fujimori’s regime: on the one hand, it brought order and economic stability, but did so at the price of violating human rights and deepening poverty in the Andes and other provincial regions (Rousseau 2006).
that even the World Bank advised the Peruvian government to slow down (Perea, 2011: para. 4), and the reform is so singular in economic history that it has its own name: Fujishock. In a pattern now well described by scholars, the primary beneficiaries of this neoliberal reform were wealthy, urban, white elite. By the mid-1990s, between 30-50% of Peruvians were living under the poverty line, an increase from before the implementation of the structural adjustment program (ibid; Judd, n.d.: para.6).

At the same time Fujimori was establishing his sui generis “popular authoritarianism” (Carrión 2006) characterized by clientelism and fear.

Fujimori also seemed paradigmatic in his approach to women’s issues. Within the model of modernization without democracy, Fujimori’s administration was still the one which has historically given the most attention to women’s “issues,” the one to do the most to advance the institutionalization of women’s issues (Vargas 2006: 52 author’s translation).

To this end, his administration created the Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Humano, The Ministry of the Woman and Human Development (PROMUDEH), developing within this the Gerencia de Género or the Gender Agency—both of which were the first in the South American continent. He also established quotas for the number of women in Congress (30%); created the Comisión de la Mujer, or the Women’s Commission, in the National Congress; and established the Defensoría Especializada de la Mujer or Special Defender of Women in the Defensoría del Pueblo, or People’s Ombudsman Office (Barrig 2002; Vargas 2006). Fujimori’s presidency also saw the passage of the first laws denouncing domestic violence.
That women and women’s issues are institutionalized by a government does not necessarily indicate, however, that the latter’s politics are feminist in orientation. Indeed, “Fujimori’s women,” (Barrig 2002) as they were called, bolstered Fujimori’s authoritarian politic:

The women politicians in Fujimori’s administration were distinct from the men recruited by the regime. They were more hawkish, less tolerant, and above all, more loyal to the president and his shadowy advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos. Dismissing former intelligence service agent Leonor La Rosas’s accusation that she had been tortured under Montesino’s orders, one prominent congresswoman allied with Fujimori, Martha Chávez, asserted that the woman “had tortured herself” (Barrig 2001: 29-30).

This authoritarian attitude among Fujimori’s women and the contradiction between his support for “women’s issues” within the confines of an authoritarian dictatorship and a historically aggressive austerity program—both of which undermined women’s fundamental rights—led to heated debates within the Peruvian feminist movement. One of the issues that would most divide the Peruvian feminist movement in the mid-1990s was the Programa Nacional de Salud Reproductiva y Planificación Familiar 1996-2000, or the National Program of Reproductive Health and Family Planning 1996-2000 (PNSRPF 1996-2000).

For decades, feminists had advocated for the introduction of a state sponsored reproductive health program (Rousseau 2007; Vargas 2006; Interview 22). Multiple attempts had failed due to the power of the Catholic Church to control the discourse around policy, as well as lack of available funding (Necochea 2014). However, Fujimori stood up to the Catholic hierarchy and insisted on the need of Peruvian women to have access to contraceptives. This would set off an internal debate in the feminist movement due to Fujimori’s clear history of rights violation.
Despite the fact that Peruvian women needed and desired access to contraceptives in the context of the Fujimorato seemed to beg several questions: should the feminist movement seize the opportunity and work with an administration that disregarded human rights? Or should the principle that “what is bad for democracy is bad for women” take precedence suggesting that feminists should not work with the government? (Barrig 2002; Vargas 2006). Ultimately, these two positions (and multiple others) were the source of dialogue and friction within the feminist movement of the mid-1990s.

**Programa Nacional de Salud Reproductiva y Planificación Familiar 1996-2000**

The coercive turn of the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was out of step with the recent history of family planning policy (if not implementation) both in Peru and at the supranational level. In Peru, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed the passage of family planning programs that were anti-imperialist in nature (though the conflation of family planning with population control sometimes led to a restriction of reproductive rights) (Necochea 2014). This time period also witnessed a concerted effort at the global level to contend with the history of population control programs masked as family planning particularly in the global South. For these reasons, the coercive turn of the PNSRPF 1996-2000 in the 1990s was both unexpected and part of a longer historical practice of masking population control as family planning.

**Family Planning in Peru**

In Peru, one of the most famous and revolutionary of these family planning policies came under the military government of General Francisco Morales
Bermúdez. In a turn away from traditional Cold War era population policy (which tended to correlate rapid population growth with poverty\(^{20}\)), Bermúdez’s 1976 policy did not tie poverty to overpopulation. In keeping with the UN’s 1974 International Conference on Population in Bucharest, Peru’s Population Policy Guideline argued that “high birth rates were not a cause but a consequence of underdevelopment, and that attempts to set population-limitation targets were racist and driven by the will of powerful countries to violate the sovereignty of weaker ones” (Necochea 2014: 149).

This document also cited “…long-standing, unjust conditions such as illiteracy, racism and gender inequality” as reasons for high birth rates; and while pointing out that growth could not go on forever, argued that the final barrier of population density had not been breached (ibid).

Thus, instead of setting quantitative birth-rate targets the guideline set national qualitative goals based on strengthening families, promoting equality of rights between men and women, ensuring freedom and responsibility in parental decisions regarding family size, protecting children, and achieving national security and development. That established, the guideline acknowledged that rapid population growth worsened problems such as urban chaos and unemployment. It also acknowledged the individually painful experiences of women regarding maternal mortality and malnutrition, worsened by having too many children or by short interparity intervals. The document utterly criticized men’s views of women as sexual objects, their abusive attitudes, and their lack of commitment to their families. Future population laws must, according to the guideline, entail coordination between different sectors to address housing availability, the use of technology for the production of food, the improvement of demographic data gathering, employment generation, environmental pollution, and the distribution of the population in the country’s territory. However, the guideline also indicated that, even more important than the above, at least in the short term, was the promotion of the equality of rights and responsibilities for men and women, including the right to choose fertility-limitation methods (all but

\(^{20}\) For a discussion of Cold War population control policies and strategies, see the 1974 Kissinger report; Hartmann 1995;
abortion and sterilization were legalized). Crucially, the guideline did not cast this right as an individual right, but rather as the right and duty of a couple, a position that is still commonly accepted in Peru today (Necochea 2014: 150).

This population guideline thus called for heavy investment in the public health sector to improve access to contraceptives and promotion of sexual health. However, the agencies involved in carrying out these policy imperatives were “chronically cash-strapped” resulting in only very limited implementation (Necochea 2014).

Bermúdez’s Population Policy Guideline guided much of Peru’s population policy from then on, although those policies passed by later presidents Belaúnde and Alan García were never implemented, also due to lack of funds, though also in part to opposition by the Catholic Church.21 The passage and funding of the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was a coup for all those interested in reproductive and sexual health. For not only was contraception to be publicly available to all Peruvian women through the public health sector, but the Congress had also made changes to the Population Law (Ley de Población) making surgical sterilization legal for the first time in Peruvian history.

**Reading Fujimori against the ICPD**

Though Fujimori’s address to the Beijing Conference pulled from both the Peruvian tradition and the global women’s rights discourse (particularly the reproductive and sexual rights paradigm), it is unclear whether the reproductive and sexual health paradigm or the development paradigm held more salience for his 21 The Catholic Church and its private organizations were also instrumental in implementing some of Peru’s most successful and long-lasting birth control efforts. Please see Necochea (2014)
policy goals. While not mutually exclusive (indeed, women’s rights workers have often seen women’s economic development as a means toward autonomy), programs for women’s reproductive rights (and family planning in particular) have oftentimes been thinly veiled Malthusian-inspired mechanisms for population control.

Fujimori’s speech on the right of women to control their destiny through family planning was given within the context of the Beijing Conference, which served as a follow-up conference for the project of women’s reproductive rights initiated at the global level in Cairo in 1994. The broad bases of the reproductive and sexual rights movement had been laid out and documented at the UN-sponsored International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in the form of the Cairo Programme of Action, also known as the Cairo Accords, the year prior (1994). Feminist scholars argue that “[t]he ICPD is correctly credited with establishing a ‘new paradigm’ in population policy—shifting focus from a macro preoccupation with the impact of rapid population growth on economic development to a concern for individual rights in sexuality and reproduction...” (DeJong 2000: 941-42). Indeed, given the historic reliance of population policy on neo-Malthusian notions, the adoption of a rights-centered approach to population policy at Cairo was an important shift in the history of population policy (McIntosh and Finkle 1995; Pочекский 1995; Hodgson and Watkins 1997; DeJong 2000).

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22 Please see Razavi and Miller (1995) on the development paradigms of Women in Development (WID) and Gender and Development (GAD).
23 Please see Hartmann 1995; 1997
Nonetheless some attendees were wary of the alliances forged at Cairo between purported neo-Malthusians (like the USAID) and feminists. Was the Cairo Programme to be a “Trojan horse” for population control policies? For their part, neo-Malthusian entities, “recognising the moral high ground occupied by those arguing in favor of the individual good and individual rights, as opposed to the social good [of Malthusian policies]...attempted to meld the concerns of the feminists into their traditional concern about the negative social effects of rapid population growth” (DeJong 2000: 946). In more critical analyses of the Cairo agreement, some scholars argued that Malthusian intents did not disappear, but were rather subsumed to—but not disarticulated by— the rights framework (McIntosh and Finkle 1995; Hodgson and Watkins 1997).

Critical feminists were also concerned about what they perceived to be the overall lack of an intersectional approach in the Cairo Programme toward understanding, conceptualizing and operationalizing women’s rights (McIntosh and Finkle 1995). For one, critics were uncomfortable with the pro-market orientation of the agreement, both in its promotion of private enterprise as a solution to user demand for family planning as well as a larger critique about the agreement’s failure to address global structural inequalities, particularly the structural adjustment policies of the 1990s and the role they played in the continuation of the oppression of women and children (Petchesky 1995; Hartmann 1995, 1997).

Therefore, critical feminists felt that “...the disavowal of traditional demographic themes [at the Cairo conference] remain[ed] a fairly empty gesture in light of two glaring flaws in the [Cairo] document: its failure to challenge
mainstream development and macro-economic models and its lack of any real mechanisms for enlarging resources and assuring accountability in enforcement” (Petchesky 1995: 157). This was especially the case given the Cairo Programme promoted “privatization, commodification and deregulation of reproductive health services” (Petchesky 1995: 157). In this way, the Cairo Programme of Action not only did not address the effects of structural adjustment on women, but also took up neoliberal rationalities as a means of re-invigorating the family planning paradigm in an era of forced state retrenchment.

Leftist feminists noted that the ICPD also did not address “racial and ethnic conflicts as impediments to sustainable development,” except in areas of migration (Petchesky 1995: 158). Though chapter 6 of the Programme did address the specific needs of particular population groups (namely children and youth, the elderly, indigenous people, and people with disabilities), “...racial and ethnic minorities, as well as the poor are jarringly absent” (ibid). What is more, as Petchesky points out, the inclusion of ‘indigenous people’ [in chapter 6] is also patronizing (sic) in tone. The conference rejected the term ‘peoples,’ thus effacing the identity of indigenous groups as autonomous nations or anything but aggregated individuals...reflect[ing] a form of racism within the document, in the refusal to recognise (sic) that diverse ethnic or racial groups or classes may be the victims of particular forms of abuse or neglect, or may suffer from particular reproductive and sexual hazards...that government policies should address (1995: 158).

Hence, even while the Cairo Programme of Action was being drafted, questions were being raised as to “how the universalistic proscriptions of the ICPD agenda cross
diverse cultures and political contexts” (DeJong 2000)\textsuperscript{24}—or more importantly, whether they can and do cross.

By pinpointing whom the Cairo Programme of Action excluded through discourse analysis—poor, non-white, non-western, indigenous—it is possible to construct an idea of who the discursively produced “women” of reproductive and sexual rights were—namely, white, middle- and upper-class women. Moreover, the document’s elision of communal and collective groups (such as indigenous peoples) again produced “women” as autonomous, self-sufficient actors in need of empowerment to succeed in the capitalist system. This is not to say that women were not in need of means of empowerment. Rather, my point is to indicate the problem of empowerment within discourses that essentialize the category “woman” within a neoliberal framework. Gender essentialism is the “...notion that a unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation and other realities of experience... The homogenous grouping of ‘women’ assumes a certain type of woman as normative while marginalizing differences among women” (Bueno-Hansen 2015: 19).

Indeed, though couched in the rhetoric of rights, Fujimori’s address to the Beijing Conference was not intended for “all women,” but rather targeted campesinas and newly urbanized campesina migrants. That the vast majority of forcibly sterilized women were indigenous bears this out. And while more evidence would be needed to confirm a connection between the sterilization campaign and counter-insurgency strategy, it is nevertheless telling that neo-Malthusian

\textsuperscript{24} Please see Petchesky 1996; Zurayk 1997 and Obermeyer 2001 for more on concerns about the universalistic proscriptions of the ICPD.
population policy architects\textsuperscript{25} often note a (now debunked) connection between overpopulation and the threat of social unrest (Hartmann 1997). In 1998, noted political scientist, Jo Marie Burt argued,

\begin{quote}
[i]t is no surprise that the Fujimori government has implemented measures to forcibly bring Peru's population rate down in order to meet so-called economic and development goals. Back in the late 1980s, a select group of military officers wrote a document entitled "Coup Plan”—a plan that would later be put in practice by Fujimori and his associates in 1992—which argued that "the most important problem facing Peru is that its demographic trends since World War II have reached epidemic proportions. Population growth must be stopped immediately," concludes the document, suggesting that the most "convenient" method toward this end is "the generalized use of sterilization among culturally backward and economically impoverished groups." There is no doubt that Fujimori's neo-Malthusian project sees the elimination of the "surplus population" as the solution to Peru's endemic poverty and the social unrest it breeds (1998: 5).
\end{quote}

The “Coup Plan” was written as the internal armed conflict was moving out of the Andes and ever closer to the capital. Read through the lens of neo-Malthusian population control, which, again, links overpopulation and social unrest (Hartmann 1995), it is possible that the forced sterilizations were instituted as one means of quelling an internal threat by retraining indigenous bodies through biopolitical means. Interestingly, the vast majority of the feminist rights workers I interviewed do not ascribe to this reading. Most saw the forced sterilizations as part of Fujimori's larger authoritarian project of recasting Peru and its populace in neoliberal terms, but not as part of a counter insurgency plan. As I will develop later in this thesis, how the sterilizations are read is important to how rights workers articulate the violations of campesinas rights—or if they do.

\textsuperscript{25} Henry Kissinger made this connection clear in the 1974 “Kissinger Report.” In this report, he outlined the need for population control in the middle and far East so as to quell possible social unrest stemming from overpopulation that could infringe upon US market expansion into those areas.
Putting these narratives together, it appears that the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was an attempt to expand the reach of the Peruvian state (which historically has had very little control in peripheral urban or rural spaces). That the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was undertaken in neo-Malthusian terms (which, again, causally connect overpopulation and social unrest) suggests that campesinos were inherently legible as both problems and threats by the state—and perhaps overtly so due to the country’s recent emergence from the internal conflict. However, perhaps due to the growth of the global human rights movement, and the women’s rights and reproductive and sexual rights movements in particular, as evidenced by the Cairo and Beijing conferences, undertaking an overt population control program would not have been politically feasible.

“Choice”

Abuses notwithstanding, some newspapers have reported that many women are happy with their tubal ligations (Necochea 2014). This is a move that reintroduces indigenous women’s agency in contrast to a slew of reporting that sees these women only as victims. However, while individual claims of happiness cannot be disputed, it is arguable whether sterilization would have been their first choice if other forms of contraception had been available. In 1996, the ENDES (Encuesta Nacional de Demografía, Educación y Salud; the National Survey on Demography, Education, and Health) found that close to sixty percent of married Peruvian women did not want more children—a statistic that rose to 75% in more rural settings and among Andean women, and close to 82% and 85% in Apurímac and Huancavelica, two of the poorest departments in Peru (Barrig 2002: 18). This said, surgical
sterilization was cited as the option of last choice by indigenous women (Interview 2; Boesten 2007). This may be partly due to indigenous understandings of bodily integrity in which cuts to the body are seen as stealing one’s strength and ability to work (Interview 2; Succar Rahme, García Trovato, Reyes Solari, Supa Huamán 2002: 3).

Similar studies also found that perceptions of modern contraceptive use in the highlands were not favorable to women. Within indigenous communities, some assume that a woman on contraceptives is a “loose” woman (Boesten 2007). And as Boesten argues, indigenous women still had their own means of controlling their reproduction through the use of herbs and other natural methods. Moreover, many were wary of modern medical interventions in their reproduction (Boesten 2007), due to a history of abuses committed by the medical establishment against indigenous women, including tubal ligations performed on poor and indigenous women without their consent during Cesarean sections (Gianella 2014).

This said, as sterilization was in many areas the only method of contraception offered for free by the government, it may have been the only “choice” for some poorer women—where choice was given (Succar Rahme, García Trovato, Reyes Solari, Supa Huamán 2002). At the same time, I do not mean to suggest that no campesina woman would choose tubal ligation as a method of contraception. The permanence of this method may have appealed to some women. It is nevertheless necessary to be mindful of the complicated social conditions under which campesina women may have come to opt for sterilization, conditions shaped by what I term later in this section “inclusive exclusion,” after Carbado (2005).
Thus, although couched in the rhetoric of women’s rights, it seems that the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was not undertaken with health and wellbeing of indigenous women in mind, but rather as a means of producing the idealized, modern woman "cleansed" of indigeneity and its accompanying poverty. What is paradoxical is that the existence of this program would seem to concede that indigenous populations are as much a responsibility of the state, deserving of the state’s care as coastal “modern” populations (Ahmed 2010; Scherz 2014). Moreover, it appears to admit that indigenous women are adversely affected by social dynamics of poverty. However, the PNSRPF 1996-2000 continued to place the blame of poverty on indigenous peoples rather than on the structural conditions shaping indigenous women’s lives (oppressive policies, laws, and discourses). Thus, the PNSRPF 1996-2000 can be read as a biopolitical program in a larger project of governmentality to reshape indigenous bodies to produce the nation in the image of neoliberal modernity.

It is my assertion that the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was part of a broader attempt to transform Peru’s rural, poor, and indigenous citizenry—peoples often invested in collective and communitarian modes of life—into neoliberal consumer citizens (Somers 2010) in order to help power Peru’s neoliberal transformation, to be the engines of the economic growth that has now been called the “Peruvian Miracle” (Mendoza 2014; IMF 2015). As I will discuss in the next sections, indigenous peoples in Peru have been held in a state of inclusive exclusion: though status citizens, they have been included in the imaginary and discourse of the Peruvian nation by way of their exclusion and the possibilities for exploitation this engenders. For instance,
while largely regarded as “problems” and impediments to development, there have been moments in Peruvian history in which indigenous peoples have been called upon as citizens to realize their obligations to the state—though they have been excluded from the rights of citizenship. Peru’s neoliberal ‘revolution’ is one such moment.

Image 2 illustrates this call to indigenous peoples to realize their obligations as citizens. Note the difference between the two families. The family on the left is darker, overflowing with children; the parents looking harried and overwhelmed sitting in front their little house. Compare this with the family on the right, which has chosen to control their fertility: whiter, smaller, with a bigger house, and over all, much happier looking. The differences are glaring in the face of Peruvian style racism, which equates whiteness with modernity, and particularly conspicuous consumption.

Image 2: “The ministry of Health: Only you can decide home many children to have” A campesina stands in front of an advertisement for family planning painted on a rural health outpost.26

In the next section, I elaborate upon the inclusive exclusion of indigenous peoples in

Peru (specifically in the Andes) and the instrumentalization of indigenous bodies in the project of modernity.

**The Indian Problem and Hygienic Racism**

The deepened poverty and social exclusion experienced by indigenous peoples under the *Fujimorato* was an exacerbated form of the centuries of structural violence that have shaped Andean indigenous life.\(^{27}\) The contours of structural violence against indigenous people have been shaped by the discourse of the “Indian Problem,” as the culturally hegemonic notion that indigenous peoples—their bodies, cultures, politics, and cosmovisions—arere holding Peru back from becoming a “true” (European defined, homogenous) nation by “refusing” to assimilate (Orlove 1993). Developed in the late nineteenth century, the discourse of the Indian Problem has been extraordinarily resilient, able to morph and change as politically necessary but always belying a deep concern with indigenous peoples and lifeways as impediments to progress and modernity.

Scholars of Latin American have long used the concept of race to understand the “impulse to order” in republican (i.e. postcolonial) Peruvian governance (Orlove 1993).\(^{28}\) Orlove, for example, shows how postcolonial administrative geographies in Peru were used to, among other things, conceptualize Andean indigenous peoples as analogous to their highland environment: as “obstacles” to “integration” and “national progress” (1993: 327). As this illustrates, race in Peru takes on very

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\(^{27}\) While engaged in this study, it has come to light that forced sterilizations also took place in the Peruvian Amazon, which also targeted indigenous women.

\(^{28}\) Since Weismantel and Eisenman's (1998) call to take race seriously in the Latin American context, there has been a proliferation of texts explaining the particular brands of racism present on the continent.
different contours than its US counterpart. Part cultural determinism, part biology, part geography, Peru’s (and much of Latin America’s) was a new form of racism that relied on what lay beneath the skin—the mind, the soul, and the attitudes—as much as on phenotype and space to categorize and create social hierarchies. It is interesting to note that similar processes were taking place in roughly the same time period in Southeast Asia as documented by Stoler (1992), showing that these processes were part of larger imperial discourses of order and power.

This view of race developed in the Republican period during the development of settler colonialism (as it is known in North America and the British Commonwealth), or internal colonialism (as it is known in Latin America), and undergirded a racialized governance that made indigenous land and labor available to the new Republic (Radcliffe 1995). For indigenous labor had been abolished during the Peruvian war of Independence (1810-1824). However, with the emergence of extractive capitalism in the 1850s, both indigenous labor and land became prime commodities for the Creole elite. In this context, the same discourses of liberalism and modernity, which were supposed to ensure the rights of citizenship for indigenous peoples in the new Republic, were used to create a discourse of nationalism that was to exclude them yet again (Larson 2004: 49):

Liberalism, postulating its ideals of equality and liberty, was invoked against any restriction or privilege, particularly the inherited corporate privileges of indigenous communities and the Church...state-driven

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29 Internal colonialism refers “...to a process by which interior portions and peoples of a single national territory are dominated both culturally and economically by a dominant elite” (Ewig 2010: 30).
30 An influx of international investment in guano for depleted wheat fields, nitrates, wool, silver and other minerals, commercial agriculture, sugar, wine, cotton, rubber, quinine, among other raw materials began to drive Peruvian extractive capitalism (Larson 2004: 46).
liberal land reforms, even when they include protective clauses, threatened dispossession to indigenous peasants who still cultivated communal village lands. Processes of divestiture were particularly dramatic in the South Andes, where thousands of communal peasants were often pushed into the rural proletariat and their lands swallowed up by the spreading latifundia system...” (Larson 2004: 48)

This process of internal colonialism would not have been possible without the racialized discourse of the Indian Problem, which set the limits of the “universalistic” ideals of liberalism (de la Cadena 2000: 13) and placed indigenous peoples in a position of internal exclusion at the boundaries of national belonging. The material mandates of modernization (and extractive capitalism as a project thereof) required not only a reordering of land and policy but of longstanding “...internal ethno-racial hierarchies...to map the boundaries of civil society and citizenship” (Larson 2004:49). Amidst the liberal mandates of equality among citizens, discourses such as the “Indian Problem” were produced such that indigenous people could remain in subordinate sociopolitical positions, making their labor and lands (legally) exploitable.

As aforementioned, race in Peru was and is not defined solely or even primarily by skin color, but by an amalgamation of internal and external characteristics, traits, and attitudes that signal one’s proximity to modernity which, while coded as whiteness, is not, again, exclusive to skin color. This idea of race was developed around Peruvian elites’ need to maintain power in a quickly globalizing racial apartheid (Haviland 1990) as persons not considered white by European eugenicists like Gustave LeBon (Stepan 1991). Thus, instead of thinking of inheritability as purely genetic like many European thinkers, Peruvian Republican-era elites’ thinking on race tended to stem more from Lamarck’s theory of acquired
characteristics in which positive characteristics acquired through education and good hygiene, e.g., could be inherited from one generation to another (Stepan 1991). They believed that the environment and practices of “nurture” were as important as biology and “nature” to health and development. Even as newer genetic theories cast doubt on the inheritability of external characteristics, Latin American scientists and eugenicists remained firmly planted within a Lamarckian optimism (Stepan 1991): namely, that with public health and eugenic interventions, their countries could be made modern by intervening upon dysgenic bodies, indigenous bodies among them.31

This concern with the hygiene and location of indigenous and other nonwhite peoples “reflect[ed] a change in the optic through which belonging, place and social practice were viewed. A new grid of intelligibility was taking hold. The [nation] perceived through a biological metaphor became a precarious social organism...[that could] grow and flourish or succumb to too many bodies and too much dirt” (Wilson 2004: 166). Here we see, as Mary Douglas (1995) has pointed out, that dirt was being seen not as a natural outcome of everyday life, but as symbolic of a lack of purity. Under this symbolic system of purity, the indigenous body came to be seen as a contagion and “Indian-ness as indicative of pollution and disorder” (Wilson 2004:

31 Staying within the Lamarckian tradition was as much a political as a scientific decision. One reason for the continued Latin American elites’ intrigue with Lamarckian notions of inheritance stemmed from their ambivalent status as non-white elites (as defined by European standards) and their political need to maintain a status of racial superiority vis-à-vis the peoples of the New World (de la Cadena 2000:17). The use of discourses of race that connected whiteness to proximity to modernity and progress also allowed Peruvian elites to assuage fears about their own “dubious” racial status. European racial thinkers such as Le Bon, Paul Broca, and Herbert Spencer doubted Latin America’s ability to construct stable nations and blocked “any stable superior identity for regional elites” because of their mixed racial heritage (de la Cadena 2000: 14).
This move from the colonial to post-colonial forms of racism fundamentally changed notions of belonging and citizenship. Indeed,

> The image of a modern, progressive town gaining ground amongst the white elite was one cleared of an (uncontrolled) Indian presence, and this entailed suppressing indigenous rights, claims and practices surviving...from the colonial period in the name of the ‘public’ good, which in turn meant taking a stand in relation to Indian rights to citizenship” (Wilson 2004: 166).

These attitudes served to further marginalize indigenous peoples and also to produce an idea of nation that saw indigeneity as antithetical to modernity and development (Hale 1996; Boesten 2007). Indeed,

> ..despite tangible signs of economic modernization, the ideal of national sovereignty still seemed more theory than reality to many Peruvian...state builders in the last years of the nineteenth century. And as many dangers seemed to lurk within their own societies and national borders as outside them. Here, then, was the critical national question still confronting the Andean nation-states at the end of the nineteenth century: how finally to solve the Indian problem—interpreted by Creole discourses as the main impediment to order, progress, civilization, and modernity (Larson 2004: 51).

One way this was accomplished was through the sanitation sciences, eugenic and public health.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Latin American sanitation sciences and eugenics further cemented racial hierarchies with help from the discourses of modern science and medicine (Stepan 1991: 7). As Stepan contends, scientific practices and discourses influence and are influenced by the cultural milieu in which they are taken up. The specific brand of sanitation science and eugenics practiced in Latin America, though differing from country to country, was influenced by the resurgence of a profound anxiety around the question of the nation and its external and internal boundaries during the Republican period (Stepan 1991: 10). This was not only a question of political belonging but one of biopolitics: what the state’s role
might be in creating a biologically strong (re: European, modern) productive populace, especially in the turn to intensive capitalist extraction in the 1850s (Boesten and Drinot 2004). Thus, the health sciences in Peru became the sciences of intervention upon “un-modern” or “dysgenic” bodies (Stepan 1991: 10).

In Peru, these biopolitical concerns resulted in the proliferation of the sanitation sciences (de la Cadena 2000), and eugenics (Stepan 1991; Ewig 2010; Necochea 2014), as well as the creation of the public health system (Ewig 2010) to mold Peru’s peoples into a modern citizenry. Christina Ewig argues that public health was seen “...as an important tool for the government to gain control over, or internally ‘colonize’ geographically isolated areas and improve the nation’s human ‘stock’ for economic and political ends” (30).

Because of public health’s emphasis on the creation of human capital, it is crucial to note the emphasis that public health measures placed on the carnal and intimate spheres of human life, indicating a concern with creating and maintaining gender and racial hierarchies as a way of preserving elite power. Pulling from the works of McClintock (1995) and Stoler (1992), Ewig finds that Peruvian internal colonialism through the practice of public health was a complex system in which “...the line between colonized and colonizer was constantly subject to construction and where not just the cultural and economic, but also sexual aspects of domination were central” (Ewig 2010: 31). Indeed, though concerns with moral and sexual behavior were present in all classes, public health measures were mainly focused on lower-class Peruvians, not on the elite, indicating that conceptions of “problematic”
sexuality were tightly bound to cultural understandings of “problematic” races and classes.

The calls for eugenics in most of Latin America (including Peru) were not concerned with limiting the growth of certain populations, however, but rather with the active intervention of the state in “the reproductive potential of the nation” (Necochea 2014: 14). Anxious to halt “racial degeneration” (coded as indigeneity or a move away from whiteness cum modernity), the eugenics movement in Peru sought to create a larger population capable of working, of being the engines of the economic growth as human capital. Thus, the public health system had a dual function: to better the lot of the poor, but “…out of a desire to exploit these groups so that they might contribute the human resources necessary for the economic and social development of the nation as a whole” (Ewig 2010: 31).

For Raúl Necochea López, the 1940s mark a major turn toward these more biopolitical understandings of population and health. Before this time, he argues, the eugenics discourse among doctors was limited to “paternalistic calls for the improvement of the social and hygiene environment with a view to enhancing the reproductive potential of men and women” (2014: 31). Indeed, “to govern is to populate,” as the adage goes (Necochea 2014: 19). But the internal rural-to-urban migration of the mid-twentieth century changed this attitude by challenging the established geographic racial order. This order was further challenged by the mass displacement of people from the Sierra brought about by the internal armed conflict of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as economic pressures which drove people off their lands and into the cities during the same time (Getgen 2009).
Recall that discourses of geographic racism held that the place of indigenous peoples was in rural areas “working for the greater good of the nation as agricultural and mining workers, as soldiers, and as colonizers of the farthest reaches of the country, civilized by whites, and politically subordinate to them” (Larson 2004: 61). It is in this context that the movement of indigenous and rural peoples from the Sierra to Lima during the mid twentieth century came to be seen as a threat, and the first whispers of “overpopulation” were heard in elite circles—although it would be thirty years before Peru’s first population control program would be designed under the presidency of Belaúnde Terry in the early 1980s (Boesten 2007; Necochea 2014; Bueno Hansen 2015).

Historically, therefore, the sanitation sciences, as directed upon the indigenous body, were not solely engaged in creating a healthy society, but also in creating modern citizens as non-indigenous. By engaging in a genealogy of the sanitations sciences in Peru, it becomes possible to see how the PNSRPF 1996-2000 is but one iteration of a long history of disciplining bodies—especially indigenous and female bodies—into the rubric of modernity read as capitalistic development. Moreover, the focus on hygiene, sanitation, geography, environment, and cultural determinism created a species of racism through metaphor that could elide accusations of racism in the liberal republic. This has had stark repercussions for indigenous citizenship. Indeed, “[t]he spacialization of the Indian [for example] became a way to speak safely of race in an era of citizenship: the overt topic could be

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32 The argument went that the sierra must be overpopulated if so many people were moving to the city. This analysis, however, did not take into account the structural (especially economic) factors that were enticing people to move from the Andes into the city.
the integration of the highlands into the nation, while the subtext continued to be Peru’s Indian problem” (Orlove 1993: 328).

Likewise, discourses of hygienic racism became not only a means of (re)producing the local population through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but also a measure of whether a group of people were deserving of the status of citizen (Boesten and Drinot 2004; Bueno-Hansen 2015). As Wilson points out, “[c]itizenship had become conflated with ‘race’ in late nineteenth century Latin America partly on account of the new language of biological science” (2004: 165). Nevertheless, the fact that there were many variations on the racial-evolutionary discourse, Larson argues,

...cautions against the temptation to view racial discourse as a finely hewed instrument of biopower in the hands of a monolithic modernizing state. Clearly, there was no unifying vision of the Indian Other that shaped, or guided, state policy making in the Andes. In fact, official race thinking often became a battle site for liberal, conservative, and dissident factions of the oligarchy to argue over the parameters of the Indian problem...The race theme also lent itself to ideological debate over broader social issues like immigration, education, citizenship, poverty, morality, criminality and public hygiene (Larson 2004: 63).

Within this statement, however, we can see the nascent form of citizenship that would mark indigenous life in the Andes: included, but through discourses of exclusion. In this way, indigenous peoples have been kept in a strange space of social and legal limbo, a space of inclusionary exclusion, which at points in Peru’s history, has bordered on a state of exception (Agamben 1998). This has allowed those same social factions that Larson identified (the liberal, conservative and dissident) to decide when indigenous peoples qualify as citizens (that is, when indigenous peoples will be called upon to fulfill their obligations as citizens) and
when they do not, as it suits varying faction’s punctual political needs. This shows that the “usefulness” of the indigenous body is premised on the structure of violation (Lassovoy 2010)—that is, an incorporation granted on the basis of exclusion.

Although certainly not the case in the earlier Republican period, as the twentieth century wore on and the Peruvian state became more centralized, it seems more appropriate to say that the state did and does take up “racial discourse as a finely hewed instrument of biopower” (Larson 2004: 63), particularly in the case of the PNSRPF 1996-2000. And while the history of the construction of racial hierarchies is by no means monolithic, it is clear that “...modern Andean racial-cultural hierarchies were built to shore up the exclusive domain of whiteness in the face of erosive market forces, threat of ‘race war’, and subaltern social practices,” whether built by conservatives, liberals or others, belying a similar concern to their Republican forefathers: the issue of the Indian Problem as an issue of citizenship (Larson 2004: 70).

**Citizenship, Human Rights, and Coloniality**

To say that the Indian Problem is a problem of citizenship creates the potential to understand how legal processes at both the state and supra-state levels affect indigenous peoples. As ideals, both state level rights (civil political rights, for instance) and supra-state rights (human rights) encompass all peoples. But as the

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33 Indigenous people put up a complex and formidable fight against these totalizing narratives, showing the “...the more hidden counternarratives of native Andean nationalist imaginings, ethnic resurgence, and everyday forms of resistance that went into the unmaking, or reordering, of postcolonial political formations.” In investigating these we can “...begin to appreciate the powerful material and cultural forces that Creole oligarchies came up against” (Larson 2004: 52).
racial history of Peru embodied in the Indian Problem (and illustrated through the hygienic movement, public health, and the Peruvian internal armed conflict) indicates, mitigating factors such as race, ethnicity, class, and gender temper access to legal personhood through citizenship. It is telling that campesina organizing in Peru has historically not taken place around ethnic identity (identity politics), but rather around issues of class (hence the use of the term campesina or peasant, versus indígena or indigenous), and citizenship (Radcliffe 1995).

It is worth indicating that the type of advocacy campesinos at large are engaged in ties into larger global dynamics of citizenship as an institution and its colonial legacy in particular. To say that campesina women, for instance, do not have citizenship rights in Peru is not to say that they are not citizens. This is not a question of whether they are legal citizens, which of course they are. But as Hannah Arendt pointed out almost 70 years ago, there is a curious connection between a group’s right to have rights and their recognition by a state as citizens (Arendt 1962; Benhabib 2004). In her work on the rise of totalitarianism in the inter-war period Arendt noted that the stateless—the refugee, the asylee—having no state recognition (i.e. citizenship), had no state protection. Their political personhood seemed to elide them. Moreover, these de-politicized figures (in the Latin sense, people falling outside the social group) were taken to be problems, threats to be resolved rather than people suffering in the humanitarian crisis of the interwar period.

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34 It can be argued that indigenous peoples in Peru gained “full” citizenship rights in 1970 when they were extended the right to vote, i.e. the right to participate in the decision making process of the body politic.
While campesina women are not stateless, there is an eerie similarity between Arendt’s characterization of the stateless peoples and campesinos due to the Peruvian state’s refusal to treat campesinas as citizens. Their inclusive exclusion in the nation is characterized by their inclusion in national discourse and state policy as “problems” and as a potential wellspring of biopolitical power as consumers (hence the focus they received in development projects like the PNSRPF 1996-2000) while they are also excluded as full members of the nation.

The effect of this liminal situation is not ambivalent in the lives of campesinas, for denied political personhood (in this situation, through a lack of recognition) campesinas are denied the right to make claims on the state. In the case of the forced sterilizations this is evidenced first by the state’s refusal to recognize indigenous lifeways as legitimate Peruvian lifeways (though Peru makes claims of being a tolerant, multicultural nation [Golash-Boza 2010]); through the infliction of violence upon the bodies of citizens through forced and coerced sterilization; and lastly, by the unwillingness of the state to address violation of rights in the legal system (the class action case against the state has been archived half a dozen times). The question, then, is whether campesinas have the right to have rights in the gaze of the state.

Agamben argues that those without the right to have rights are “bare life,” (i.e. not political entities, again in the Latin sense of being considered members of society), politically unintelligible (Agamben 1998). Stripped of personhood, this person’s body and life is then politicized by the state as a representation of political, social, and cultural threats to the unity of the nation-state. This person Agamben
calls *homo sacer*, the “sacred” man—the person who can be killed but not sacrificed. Without the right to have rights homo sacer has little recourse to appeal their oppression and marginalization, for their appeal comes from a politically unintelligible person severely restricted by systems of law and social custom. Thus, these people are left in what Agamben calls the “state of exception” (Agamben 1998). While indigenous people are neither refugees nor stateless people, the dehumanizing discourse of the Indian Problem—and the structural violence that it produces and is productive of—have left Peru’s indigenous peoples, I argue, in this state of exception, instrumentalizable in processes of biopolitical governmentality and statecraft.

By recognizing that the nation-state is constituted not only by that which it desires to, but also by that which it holds at its limits (Agamben 1998: 18), it becomes possible to see the nation-state as a system (21) versus a simple binary (inside/outside) that is played out on the bodies that reside within its bounds. It is in the interstitial space between inside and outside that “the social condition of being neither fully excluded nor fully recognized” becomes possible (Walters, 2008: 187).

Though Agamben’s observations were wrought from the extreme conditions of the concentration camp, he quickly expanded his notion of “the camp” to show how the political use of those who have been inclusively excluded in the (re)creation of the nation-state aids in the maintenance of its boundaries and self-imagined identity (Anderson 1991). It is upon this basis of political use of bodies that
Agamben expands his notion of the state of exception to account for the everyday politics of the law.

The statement “the rule lives of the exception alone” [the exception makes the rule] must therefore be taken to the letter. Law is made of nothing but what it manages to capture inside itself through the inclusive exclusion of the *expetio*: it nourishes itself on this exception and is a dead letter without it. In this sense, the law truly “has no existence in itself, but rather has its being in the very life of men” (1998: 27).

I argue that campesinos’ *de facto* legal exclusion serves to shore up the interests of the Peruvian elite both economically and discursively. The elite’s investment in extractive industries in particular have made indigenous lands and peoples attractive as both material resources and labor. Elite power defined vis-à-vis discourses of modernity remain entrenched in the workings of Peruvian law and its economic system and undergirds the formers’ ’right’ to said lands and labor. Thus, the Indian Problem as discourse and practice is a source of ‘legal magic’ (Russell 2005)

For the exclusionarily included this translates into practical hypervisibility as problems and invisibility as people. The discourse of the Indian Problem, for example, conceptualizes indigenous peoples and lifeways as “unmodern” or “backward,” threats to the progress of the nation. Policy built upon this “fact” helps to maintain a differentiated system of citizenship in which some Peruvians are intelligible and governable political subjects (that is, they fit into elite conceptions of Peru as a modern nation), while others are simultaneously viewed as unintelligible and ungovernable and in need of intervention, intense re-governing—as made evident in Peru’s extensive intervention on indigenous bodies and lifeways through
the sanitation sciences, the hygenics movement, and public health, among other means.

It is also the case that peoples denied rights as citizens can make appeals to supranational bodies for their rights. The human rights system was created in the wake of World War II to address precisely these limits of citizenship, and particularly the extreme states of exception produced when states revoke or deny their citizens’ membership. Human rights, rather than citizenship (or civil political) rights, are extended to people by virtue of their humanity, not their recognition by a state. However, there is an interesting interplay between citizenship and human rights, which turns on the axis of the concept of the human.

Human rights are extended to all persons considered human: conscious, civilized, showing ethical consideration toward other human life (Benhabib 2004).\(^{35}\) This indicates that the understanding of ‘the human’ at the foundation of human rights is historically tied to Occidocentric, Enlightenment (i.e. humanist) notions of the human as an individual, autonomous, self-creating and self-reliant being that lives in concert with others but who is in need of protection from the excesses of others. This is the human as the Western, monied, male, masculine subject. This limited notion of the human has had devastating consequences for much of the world’s population, which falls outside this conception of the human. As Arendt points out, states (and their citizenry through hegemonic notions of the human) can

\(^{35}\) This is partly due to the fact that the rights system rests on the Kantian notion of the categorical imperative; and within that, specifically the principle that the human is an end-in-itself: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity in all your actions as an end, and never as a means only” (Benhabib 2004: 58).
and do refuse to become “legal consociates” of people who fall outside this limited definition of the human, or whose actions are read as falling outside the same (Arendt 1962; Benhabib 2004). Historically, states have refused to become legal consociates with indigenous peoples and nations due to the latters’ claims to colonized land and also to protect elites’ differential power status vis-à-vis indigenous people (Russell 2005).

It is important to remember that the human rights system has its historical antecedents in Christian and Natural law which then bled into the law of nations whose vision “…was one of all human beings belonging to a universal civil society bound together by laws based ultimately on natural law and justice” (Russell 2005: 35). However, as indigenous people were not considered to be part of that “universal civil society,” under each of these rights regimes (including that of human rights), it has been incumbent upon indigenous peoples to respect the laws imposed upon them or be seen as aggressors. Indeed, the idea that one’s rights stop at the rights of another was used by colonial forces to justify the oppression of indigenous peoples who refused imperial or colonial forced entry (Russell 2005). Once indigenous peoples fought against the intrusion of their lands, they were no longer people but aggressors, people who did not “respect” the rights of others. This attitude is alive and well in settler colonial politics in Peru, especially evident in the conflicts between extractive industries and indigenous peoples, as well as the reasoning behind (if not the actual) internal armed conflict (Radcliffe 1995).

Thus, both citizenship rights and human rights are deeply embedded in the history of the colonial encounter, and particularly in the politicization of the
category of “human.” I would like to take a moment to further tease out the relationship between citizenship, human rights, and the colonial encounter as it pertains to Peru.

In her work on citizenship, Ratna Kapur (2007) argues that contemporary peoples are addressed through a spectrum of legal rules based on normative criteria reminiscent of the colonial encounter. These criteria reinscribe citizenship within dominant racial, sexual, and cultural norms as well as claims of civilizational superiority. That which does not fall within the boundaries of citizenship is regarded as outcast, and ‘Other’ and subject to restraint, persecution, censorship, social stigma, incarceration, and even annihilation (537).

Again, human rights and citizenship came out of the liberal, Occidental movement to restrain the power of monarchies and government in order to allow citizens more freedom and liberty. But “while Europe was developing ideas of political freedom...it simultaneously pursued and held vast empires where such freedoms were either absent or severely attenuated for the majority of native inhabitants” (Kapur 2007: 541). The way these two projects were reconciled was through the production of difference between the colonizers and the colonized. While these differences were presumed by colonial power, as Kapur points out, these differences were actually produced using categories of race, ethnicity, and gender to forcibly bring the colonial Other under liberal regimes of civilization.

The purpose of such exclusionary formulations of citizenship becomes clear when one realizes the intimate connection between the rise of nationalism, capitalism, and imperialism (Isin and Wood 1999). When exclusionary citizenship is evaluated in light of its imperialist beginning, it can consequently be seen as
...a reflection of an imperialist practice that found its strongest expression in citizenship to mark out the Other. Such a practice includes the categorization of land as 'territory' and people as 'races'. Both presuppose ownership and control. At the core of this practice is an invented hierarchy of peoples and nations that attempts to justify the claiming of land and the subjugation of peoples previously foreign to the conqueror. It was from within imperialism that nations were born, not only as a means to overthrow oppressive empires (Said, 1993). Nations were established by and governed by similar groups and classes that had launched empires. As power moved increasingly from monarchies to corporations, the nation-state became the most efficient means by which to solidify and from which to defend modern capitalism (Isin and Wood, 1999: 55).

By revealing the interconnection between the rise of the modern nation-state and that of capitalism, it becomes clear that citizenship originated with the need to delineate ownership and control. Making citizenship an exclusionary mechanism was a way of justifying who had access to resources and their ownership, who had the opportunity to make those decisions, and who would ultimately benefit both politically and materially from such decisions. Rocco echoes this conclusion in his essay “Transforming Citizenship: Membership, Strategies of Containment, and Public Sphere in Latino Communities,”

...citizenship is not solely nor even primarily a legal status, but rather a political mechanism for the control and containment of access to institutions of power and of the distribution of rights, benefits, privileges, entitlements, and resources to different sectors of the population who reside within territorial bounds of the nation-state (2004: 16).

Thus, the ideological definition of the human was and continues to be tied to the institution of citizenship and reveals that “humanity” is politically defined through this institution.

The formulation of human rights within the liberal institution of citizenship-as-legal-status does not address how citizenship-as-belonging also imbues one with political humanity, and thus the right to have rights. As evidenced historically, the
rights system has quite a hard time defending those people whose lives are not considered grievable (Butler 2004) and who, in actuality, are treated as the detritus of the nation-state system (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004: 36), *homo sacer*, the exception that confirms the rule (Agamben 1998).

Furthermore, neoliberal political and economic reforms have also changed the contours of citizenship by subjecting it to a market rationality: “…we are in an era in which market fundamentalism—the drive to subject all of social life and the public sphere to market mechanisms—has become the prevailing ideational regime” (Somers 2008: 2). Under this regime, the rights of the poor are further eroded as the right to citizenship is defined through one’s ability to contribute to the nation-state through consumption, i.e. by becoming a consumer citizen:

The most prominent force in this eroding of rights is what I call the *contractualization of citizenship*—an effort to reorganize the relationship between the state and its citizenry, from noncontractual rights and obligations to the principles and practices of quid pro quo market exchange. The growing moral authority of both market and contract make social inclusion no longer inherent rights but rather earned privileges that are wholly conditional upon the ability to exchange something of equal value. This is the model by which the structurally unemployed become *contractual malfeasants* (Somers 2008: 2, 3)

Applied to the situation of the Indian Problem in Peru, this contractualization of the relationship between citizen and state again makes indigenous peoples legible as “problems” due to their inability to contribute to the development and modernization of the nation through consumption. Though Fujimori’s speech shows concern for indigenous peoples based on their poverty, as David Theo Goldberg points out, the discourse of neoliberalism is one of “racism without race,” one that mobilizes class as if it were not inherently and inextricably bound up with race,
ethnicity, gender, etc. (2009). Moreover, class images are particularly powerful in Peru where indigenous peoples self-identify and are identified as campesinas or peasants—a class designation rather than a racialized ethnic identity. Poverty was a code for indigeneity prior to Peru’s neoliberal reformation, but it appears that this reform further tied indigenous peoples to poverty.

The Fujishock of the early 1990s plunged Peru’s poor—indigenous peoples among them—even deeper into poverty, showing that neoliberal economic policies often further bolster “the institutionalization of insecurity, domination through precariously (Bourdieu 2003: 29 cited in Kingfisher and Maskovsky 2008: 117). Under this rubric, Peru’s campesina poor became even more clearly legible as “problems” that needed to be intervened upon as deficient (i.e. poor) subjects (Li 2007; Ferguson 1990; Ahmed 2010).

Of course, human rights advocates are able to make cases for the defense of particular groups by appealing to their humanity—or better yet, reviving their humanity in the eyes of others. Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) systemically groom indigenous peoples, groups, and cases to fit within the human rights discourse in order for them to be seen as “deserving” of defense (Ramos 1994; Stavig 2010). But before this can happen, the issue at hand must be seen as an issue of rights—be it human rights, civil political, or reproductive and sexual rights.

In the case of the sterilized women in Peru, I argue that the siloization between rights assemblages within the feminist movement made the sterilizations hard to see as an issue of human rights. Thus, how feminist rights workers were positioned in the rights framework in the 1990s (and that their knowledge of how rights and
citizenship were inflected by coloniality) seems to have made a difference as to whether campesinas were protected.

The neoliberal discourse of rights and individualized responsibilities in Peru under Fujimori appears to have created a situation that allowed indigenous populations to be both formally included and also "excepted" in shifting ways. They were included in the government’s forays into neoliberal governmentality through their attempted reformation as neoliberal (consumer) citizenship subjects through the PNSRPF 1996-2000. However, they were included based on their exclusion from the nation as citizen-non-citizens. As I have shown, this inclusive exclusion has a long history in Peru as well as in the wider world of coloniality. In the next chapter of this thesis, I shift my focus to the Peruvian feminist movement. I explore how campesinos’ (though particularly campesinas’) situation of inclusive exclusion may have been a factor in how the feminist movement saw the PNSRPF 1996-2000 and how it responded to reports of forced sterilization.
Chapter 2: Feminist movement of the ‘80s and ‘90s

To get to Flora Tristán\textsuperscript{36} near downtown Lima from my apartment in Miraflores, I would take the new public transport: the Metropolitano. The name makes one think of the Metropolitan, the tight circuit of subway lines crisscrossing the Paris underground. The Lima Metro, however, is a bit more humble. It has one central bus line that runs north-south on the Paseo de la República, colloquially known as the ‘zanjón’ or “large ditch,” as it was dug down under street level to pass under the cities major streets. It is the major thoroughfare connecting the more posh coastal districts of the city to downtown. The Metropolitano also has several extensions that run through the cono norte or the conglomerate of districts that house Lima’s working and underclasses to the north of the city. Connecting Lima north to south thus means connecting domestics, gardeners and laborers in the far north and south and the petty bourgeoisie and government functionaries who live closer to the center to their jobs in the more posh central districts and downtown. Fast and efficient, these buses carry thousands of people every day—including Lima’s upper class who prefer to leave their Jeeps, Audis, BMWs and Subarus at home rather than risk them in Lima’s seedy downtown areas. A round-trip fare is about five soles, which in the summer of 2015, equaled about $1.50—a far cry from the 18 soles or $6.00 each way I had been paying for taxis de confianza, ‘secure taxis’ which my upper class family insisted I take lest I be kidnapped or worse.

I wish I had overcome my engrained fear and taken the Metropolitano earlier in my stay as my rides gave me a feel for Lima’s pulse. Lima is a vibrant city

\footnote{\textsuperscript{36} One of Peru’s first and leading feminist NGOs.}
with people constantly on the move. On the buses, government functionaries on their way to work stood next to *albañiles* or construction workers covered in plaster, carrying supplies from Sodimac (the Peruvian Home Depot), who in turn stood next to young people on their way to university, who stood next to older women knitting, who sat next to, and stood next to, and sat next to, and stood next to. My eyes never stopped moving except to pause on a person and guess what it was they were up to.

Because of the large swath of everyday Limeños who take the Metropolitano, it has also become a site for political protest and consciousness-raising, particularly around issues of women’s rights. Young women dressed in Catholic schoolgirl uniforms took to the buses for the *¡déjala decidir!* or “let her choose” campaign on extending abortion rights—a very gutsy move in the traditionally conservative capital. The bus has also been a site for addressing the open street harassment of women, which is still quite prevalent, with slogans like “*tocan a una, tocan a todas*” (touch one and they touch us all) from the Facebook collective Let us Stop Street Harassment, which is part of the larger #NiUnaMenos (#NotOneLess) campaign highlighting violence against women. This campaign is supported by many of Lima’s feminists and feminist NGOs.

My first time going to Flora Tristán by bus, I got off at the National Stadium stop, put my backpack on my belly and began walking toward my destination as if I knew where it was. I walked by the food stands in the park across from the stadium, older women wiping down the plastic tables and chairs after the post-lunch rush. I spied them from across the broad but quiet avenue, and they spied back at me with
quizzical looks. It was clear that lone, tall, blonde women did not come around there often and definitely not on foot. On the corner stood what must be the go-to church for wakes in the neighborhood, for it was ringed by at least ten different flower shops with cross-shaped arrangements displayed in front of each shop. This is a particularity of the economy of Lima: where there is one flower shop there are ten and where there is one all-purpose computer, print, and copy shop there are fifteen, as I found when I turned the next corner. This is also typical of Andean markets where one can find a dozen vendors selling the same wares next to one another.

This part of Lima is home to not one but three university campuses and technical institutes: The Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, The National School of Statistics and Informatics and the Peruvian University of Technology. An army of copy shops, diners, bodegas (corner stores), and ambulant vendors has popped up to serve their populations. They also serve those people working in the National Office for Electoral Processes, the Ministry of Health, The Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Defense, and the headquarters of the Air Force, which surround the nearby Campo de Marte, one of the largest parks in Lima.

The sidewalk on Petit Thouars Avenue where these copy shops and bodegas call home was barely passable between the masses of students and ambulant vendors on one side and the overflowing copy shops and cafés on the other. I stuck out from the waves of Limeños who, having lived in this city their whole lives, do an intricate dance through these congested streets. I must have appeared to be more bear than ballerina.
I was spit out of the wave of people at the end of the block, turned the corner and was surprised to find myself in the suburban oasis of Hernán Velarde Park, a long loop of a park surrounded by old casonas, former mansions of the Limeñan elite. Lima’s upper classes lived in downtown until the first decades of the 20th century when they began moving to the oceanfront districts of Miraflores, San Isidro, and Barranco for “fresh air.” This abandonment of the downtown area brought about its decline into squalor and insecurity—a trend that the city has worked to reverse in the last 20 years. Some of these casonas around Hernán Velarde Park are still homes, but most have been converted into office spaces. An engineering firm calls the park home, as does la Posada del Parque, a boutique hotel and, of course, Flora Tristán which has been there for decades now.

Walking up to the door, I pass their wachimán (or security guard) booth which seems to now stand empty most of the time—a change from the 1980s and 1990s when some feminist NGOs took down their signs in order to protect themselves from attack, especially by Senderistas (Interview 9). I was buzzed through the iron gate and walked into a sprawling white mansion whose wooden floors creaked under their age and Lima’s notorious humidity. I was asked to wait in the ‘parlor’ and took a seat on a couch that felt like it had cradled many a visitor. The resident cat walked by, checking me out as I admired the art, posters, and books on display from the center’s many campaigns and research projects.

A young woman came to meet me and took me through the back garden to what were probably once ‘the help’s’ quarters. This area now houses offices and Flora Tristán’s library, which is open to the public three times a week. I encountered
several high school and university students—men and women alike—doing research for papers and projects on women’s rights while doing my own research there. The young woman was a student and assistant to Maia, one of the longest working members of Flora Tristán. Maia’s focus within the feminist movement is civil and political rights. When I was brought in to meet her, the Peruvian version of CSPAN was blaring in the background as she waited to hear the result of a vote in congress.

As her name suggests, Maia is a warrior—fierce in every sense of the term. She immediately asked me for my Ethics forms and letters, why I was here and what I was about, her blues eyes piercing my calm: the tables were turned and I was the one being interviewed! I told her that I was doing a project on the historical memory of the feminist movement regarding the forced sterilizations of the 1990s; that I was interested in knowing what was going on at the time (was it true like the newspapers say that the feminist movement did nothing?); what they saw, heard, felt and experienced. Appeased, Maia settled in and we talked for a couple of hours while members of her team came in and out to present the power point slides and talks they were giving the next morning. “This is our friend Lucía,” she would tell them, “she’s doing a project on the forced sterilizations. Don’t mind her just tell me what you’ve got” when she saw them pause upon seeing me. “We aren’t leaving until I have heard every one of you give your presentations!” Maia would bellow down the hall from time to time. It was already 6pm.

37 All names have been changed to protect interviewees’ identities.
38 The Canadian counterpart to the Internal Review Board.
Peruvian feminists have worked tirelessly, usually with little pay or recognition, for the rights of Peruvian women for the past forty years. Their efforts have been an important factor in the Peruvian state adopting new laws against domestic violence, gender equality in government representation, and reproductive and sexual rights (Rousseau 2006). Their commitment to women is unmistakable. Nevertheless, in a country as unequal as Peru—in 1994 forty-eight percent of all Peruvian households lived in poverty and 18 percent in extreme poverty—one wonders whether all Peruvian women benefit equally or equitably from these rights advances (Rousseau 2006). In other words, who are the “women” of “women’s rights”? The Peruvian feminist movement is Lima-based and largely middle class whites, mestizas and criollas. Did this affect the ways they advocated on behalf of forcibly sterilized rural campesina and peri-urban mestiza women? Likewise, did their closeness to modern, liberal rights regimes (which discursively do not account for indigenous lifeways) affect their ability to advocate for forcibly sterilized women? In an effort to begin contextualizing these questions, in this chapter I consider the history of the Peruvian feminist movement as it emerged from the New Left political parties of the 1970s. I also discuss its relationship to the popular women’s movement—a movement of poor, peri-urban women, many of whom were recent migrants to the city from the Andes—and with rural campesina movements.

Feminist foundations

Much of the literature on the Peruvian feminist movement (of which there is a small but growing body) does not separate the feminist movement from the women’s movement, but rather groups both under the banner of the “women’s
movement.” Those who characterize the women’s movement of the 1990s in this way identify three main branches: the feminist movement, the popular women’s movement, and women working in government and other official spaces like unions (Barrig 1994; Vargas and Villanueva 1996; Anderson 1996; Rousseau 2006). The feminist branch came out of the New Left parties in the 1970s, and established their identity through critiques of the same (Rousseau 2006). Originally, the feminist branch was comprised of independent collectives and consciousness raising groups organized around collective political action. They covered issues such as “human rights, reproductive rights, antiviolence, lesbian rights, and communication...[which] spurred the formation of feminist institutes and centers that research and edit numerous magazines and books” (Vargas and Villanueva 1994: 582).

In the 1980s the feminist branch “developed a new vision of feminist politics based on a strategy of addressing the state and seeking to reform discriminatory laws” (Rousseau 2006: 126). This is when one can see the strongest push for professionalization of the feminist movement in the form of instutionalization through NGOs. This changed again in the 1990s with a renewal of movement-based politics that brought feminists, women activist collectives and professionals together to create a movement “parallel to that of NGOs” in the face of a political regime that was growing ever more authoritarian (126).

The other two branches of the women’s movement are the popular women’s movement and those women active in the mainstream political sphere. Taking root in the pueblos jóvenes, settlements on the outskirts of Lima where there was little to no infrastructure, the popular women's movement was the largest of the three
branches and has been characterized as being made up of “survival organizations” (Rousseau 2006: 126). Women in these communities organized communal kitchens (comedores populares) and the glass of milk (vaso de leche) campaign in the late 1970s and the 1980s in order to address the pressing needs of their families. These women, “...though acting from within the space defined by their traditional roles began to enter the public sphere and change the content of these traditional roles” (Vargas and Villanueva 1994: 582). Over 200,000 women were involved in the communal kitchens and around 300,000 in the glass of milk campaign (1994: 583), and were a powerful oppositional group, able to mobilize tens of thousands of people to march—as they did in the march for peace against Sendero Luminoso in 1990 (Interview 21) and against neoliberal economic reforms under Fujimori (Rousseau 2009). This group was so powerful that several of their leaders—María Antenati Hilario de Olympia, Margarita Astride de la Cruz and, perhaps most notably, María Elena Moyano—were separately assassinated by Sendero Luminoso during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Miloslavich 2000).

This organizational prowess was in part facilitated by the fact that many migrants to the city were Andean and retained communal forms of problem solving (Vargas and Villanueva 1994). Indeed, the women organizing in the pueblos jóvenes were either indigenous, mestiza, or in the process of becoming mestiza through urbanization, according to Peruvian theories of racialized geographies and racial progression (Orlove 1993; Larson 2004: Applebaum et al 2003). These organizations were fiercely autonomous, deciding from whom they would take food donations and with whom they would deal politically so as to maintain their
autonomy. Early on in his presidency, Fujimori realized the power of these popular women’s groups and later centralized food distribution to the communal kitchens through the government program PRONAA (which was also used to incentivize rural women to accept sterilization). Fujimori was able to successfully co-opt the movement and in some instances, its leaders (Rousseau 2006). As Vargas and Villanueva indicated in 1994, “...the government has implemented social compensation programs that use the work of women’s groups and their organizations’ capacities to the maximum extent. Yet they take away from women one of the most important achievements of these organizations: the capacity of at least deciding about and controlling their own programs” (587-588).

The final branch of the women’s movement is made up of women in the mainstream political sphere such as political parties, trade unions, and guilds who, “began questioning and organizing from within these masculine spaces” (Vargas and Villanueva 1994: 582) and collaborated with feminists to advocate for change to the legal system to promote gender equality in the 1980s and 1990s (Rousseau 2006).

The literature suggests that these three main branches all came together around “the common problems of violence, crisis, and democracy that [women] face[d]” (Vargas and Villanueva 1994: 582). As Rousseau rightly explains, all these movements were fighting for the citizenship rights of different sectors of Peruvian women within the 1980s and early 1990s—times of incredible political and economic crisis (2006). However, several conversations I had with people in the feminist movement did not depict the women’s movement as a unified “women’s movement” at all, but rather talked about the feminist movement and the popular
women’s movement as two separate entities that moved parallel to one another throughout the 1990s (Interview 16; 21). Though Vargas and Villanueva—leaders in the feminist movement—indicate that in 1994 the women’s movement was a unified movement (and it was probably more so in the early 1990s than at any other time in the movement’s history [Bueno-Hansen 2015]), in the mid-1980s, some sectors of the feminist movement were quite critical of the popular women’s movement. They based their critique on what they perceived as the latter’s ‘pragmatic’ versus ‘strategic’ interests as women—i.e. their lack of a ‘gender analysis,’ a dynamic recorded by feminist anthropologists in other parts of Latin America (Molyneux 1985) as well as in Peru (Blondet 1991).

I met Sara in her office at a small international NGO. Sara was quite critical of what appeared to be the mainstream feminist attitude toward the popular women’s movement. She adds that

there was a very strong debate within the feminist movement. There was a position that was of a more classic or orthodox feminism that—and this is where you hear the first conversations about the pragmatic interests and the strategic interests of women, right? So one side was like, “here you have women who are organizing for practical reasons, to feed their children—but that doesn’t reflect the strategic interests around gender; 2. The work in the comedores is an extension of domestic labor, which moreover, requires women to work not just a double, but a triple workday because now they have the organization’s life too.” And that this work did not rearticulate or reorganize the relations of gender within the home, because, I don’t know, their husbands keep beating them and they are still responsible for the reproduction of the home. Those of us who were on the other side of this debate said, “you can’t think so mechanistically! Here, the women are confronting a problem of gender, but they are doing so from their class position. We are women of the middle class and I solve my

39 Interestingly, the mainstream political women's movement was not mentioned of all. Perhaps this is due to the breakdown of party politics and union busting under the internal political violence and neoliberal reforms of the 1990s (Rousseau 2006); or perhaps the people with whom I spoke grouped these women into the larger feminist movement.
problem of domestic labor by hiring another woman to do it so that I have free time to be a feminist. When I don't have the money to hire someone to work for me, I find another way. Moreover, this is generating a women’s space where they discover that they all have the same problems. Where they all come together, create power, and can start to make politics’ (Sara, Interview 21).

In the later 1980s and early 1990s the *comedores populares* and *vaso de leche* groups began to consolidate and gain political power and stand up to Sendero’s violence and the government’s neoliberal economic reforms (Rousseau 2006; Bueno-Hansen 2015). Sara, along with other members of the feminist movement, again tried to build bridges with the popular women’s movement only to have the project again stymied by ideological impasses:

> What we proposed was a political alliance between the women’s movement and the feminist movement. And the more orthodox feminist movement says no, that we are the ones that have the consciousness about gender, and we have to recruit them into this. We have to indoctrinate them. They should come with us, behind us. And we would say “nooo, they are two different movements. You can’t ask them to be feminists. Why do you want to ideologically indoctrinate them? They have their interests. They are making their own different experience. Let’s ally. And they wouldn’t (Sara, Interview 21).

As is evidenced here, there appears to have been a tendency for elite liberal forms of feminism to downplay and even outright dismiss forms of women’s organizing that did not conform to their notions of ideological feminisms based in organizing around gender—a dynamic repeated in many parts of the world (Lorde 1984; Molyneaux 1985; Mohanty 1988; Hill Collins 2000). This may in part be due to the reality that women in the feminist and popular women’s branches of the putative women’s movement often had vastly different social positionalities: from college educated (sometimes with a post-secondary degree from Europe or the U.S.), white, middle class, women living in the central districts of Barranco, Miraflores, San Isidro, and Jesus María; to poor, indigenous (now mestiza) migrants to Lima living
on the edge of precarity in the *pueblos jóvenes*, respectively. While positionality is not a determinant of worldview in any causal sense, it can and often does affect people’s social perceptions and attitudes. As many third world feminists, critical feminists and womanists argue,

...the fiction that gender is produced and regulated autonomously, independently of other modalities of social power [such as race], has been one of the most severe impediments to the development of racially inclusive feminism, a feminism that does not require an analytic or political distinction between feminism and the experience of women of color (Brown 2000: 235).

Likewise absent from conversations I had with feminists about the women’s movement was non-urban women’s organizing (i.e. *campesina* organizing) beyond that of the sterilized women of Huancabamba and Anta who have formed advocacy groups. This might have been due to these organizations not having been the focus of my study or questions. However, placing this silence in the longer context of Peruvian feminist history, it might also be indicative of the socio-spatial barriers to cross-cultural organizing. For a spatial analysis of Peruvian political dynamics highlights the connection between “geographic isolation, social exclusion, and political marginalization” (Hays-Mitchell 2006: 200). Some feminist scholarship of early 1990s seems to point to this. For instance, in their essay on the women’s movement published in 1994, Vargas and Villanueva assert that,

Although other peasant women’s organizations have existed for a long time, such organizations did not facilitate an autonomous struggle of peasant women. Thus, the women’s organizations that did develop in rural areas did not really favor the creation of a women’s movement. Under traditional and hierarchical conditions of rural Peru, even class organizations, though historically male-oriented, seemed to offer rural women a better vehicle for confronting and questioning their experiences as women peasants than did other traditional women’s organizations (583-4, my translation)
What is striking about this quote is its apparent assumption that *campesina* women coming from cultures based in collectivity and communality that were suffering from extreme poverty and state violence would organize in the same way—autonomously from men—as their urban counterparts. This is not to say that indigenous *campesinas* do not want or have their own informal autonomous spaces where they gather and discuss—kitchens are one such space (Wiesmantel 1989). Rather, I mean to indicate that their gender-based struggles might not have been so immediately separable from their class and ethnic struggles, hence their decision, perhaps, to remain in mixed-gendered organizations. Moreover, the Andean gender regime is based on the complementarity of genders (Babb 1985; Isbell 1985; Bunster and Chaney 1987; Silverblatt 1987; Seligmann 1989; Babb 1998; Babb forthcoming), though five hundred years of colonial and structural violence have inflected this regime with gender-based violence. Hence,

*Women in the Peruvian peasant unions demonstrate a distinct femininity or female identity compared with that represented in Hispanic, Catholic urban culture, which in itself is differentiated between popular elements and the elite and middle class. Such different femininities arise through the different class, ethnic and regional cultures in which women live and act, and in turn are negotiated and changed in relation to the state’s action (Radcliffe and Westwood 1993: 197)*

Moreover, it is telling that the literature finds, “[c]ampesinas do not generally identify with feminists, since community leaders and members commonly view them as bourgeois, given their urban middle-class focus. Furthermore, the rural women’s movements express ostensibly different demands than those of the feminist movement...” (Bueno-Hansen 2015: 27). That Vargas and Villanueva appear to attribute the decision of indigenous women to remain in mixed-gender
movements to gender oppression (coded as tradition and hierarchy) only seems to add credence to indigenous women’s observations cited by Bueno Hansen. Furthermore, depicting the rural Andean region as more ‘traditional and hierarchical’ than the supposedly modern and enlightened coastal region works to reinforce the discourse of spatial apartheid (Francke 1990) that makes the people of the Andes legible as backward and un-modern. This mapping of race onto political strategy—this “racism without race” (Goldberg 2009)—functions as a microaggression toward indigenous women by invoking a racialized geography (Orlove 1993).

This seems to indicate that race, ethnic, gender, and class hierarchies are at work in feminist organizing. When examining the relation between urban white and mestiza women and campesinas it is important to note that gender does not always implicate bodies (Lagarde y de los Rios 2010; Bueno Hansen 2015). Practices and behaviors can also be grounded in “…power relationships based on gender norms at the social, institutional, legal, and representational levels” (12). That the fact that campesina and peri-urban campesinas cum mestizas did not organize around ideological formations of gender was enough for some urban feminists to dismiss their organizing is a case and point of this type of gendered subordination.

This kind gendered politicking can be seen in the political foci of the mainstream feminist movement. In the late 1980s, early 1990s, Peruvian feminists generally prioritized making formal political inroads over building interclass alliances with popular women’s organizations or focusing on the impact of the [internal armed] conflict on campesinas. Feminists’ emphasis on autonomy and constructing their own space made it especially difficult to collaborate with groups engaged in social struggle for basic needs (Bueno-Hansen 2015: 35).
This seemingly binary division between ‘feminist’ and ‘non-feminist’ bases for social mobilization appears to have influenced the general mainstream feminist attitude toward the popular women’s movement, indicating both gendered and colonial power dynamics in some feminist politicking. Reading mainstream, liberal feminism against the project of modernity—including rights—I am reminded that the “darker side” of modernity is coloniality, that there is, in fact, no “modernity without coloniality” (Migñolo 2007: 39; Mohanty 2003).

Rights regimes require subjects of rights, and it is clearly the case that human rights advocacy is more effective where there are more voices standing in protest of abuses. While all Peruvian women were experiencing a lack of rights in the realms of reproductive rights, civil and political rights, and human rights, the severity of this lack depended on where they were positioned in the social order (Rousseau 2006):

> in inegalitarian orders, rights differentially empower different social groups, depending upon their ability to enact the power that a right potentially entails. This is not to say that generically distributed rights offer nothing to those in the lower strata of such orders...but that, as countless critics have pointed out, the more social resources and the less social vulnerability one brings to the exercise of a right, the more power that exercise will reap, whether the right at issue is sexual freedom, private property, speech or abortion (Brown 2010 232).

Where central, urban, middle class women control the feminist platform, it is often the case that “…campesinas’ rights are perceived as add-ons to the main demands of...feminist movements. (Bueno-Hansen 2015: 27). Looking to 1990s Peru and the implementation of reproductive and sexual rights that were supposed to benefit “all women,” one wonders whether campesina and mestiza women were partly
instrumentalized by the feminist movement (through the specter of a unified women’s movement) to build momentum for the passage of a package of rights that would ultimately not address the former’s most pressing (economic) needs?

In no way do I mean to imply that mainstream feminists were Machiavellian or that campesina women did and do not need rights. Rather, my intention is to point at the paradoxes present in the rights system. For it is also the case that in using the framework of women’s rights, urban feminists were being “locked into the identity of [their] subordination” (i.e. “woman”) (Brown 2000: 232): “Put more generally, the rights that women bear and exercise as women tend to consolidate the regulative norms of gender, and thus function at odds with challenging these norms” (234). So when working within rights paradigms, as Bueno-Hansen observes, “[w]e work within the paradox of rights, doing the best we can with available tools” (Bueno-Hansen 2015: 10). Given the absence of any other viable alternatives, the liberal rights regime represents that which “we cannot not want” (Spivak 1993: 44).

Be that as it may, while it is indubitably the case that all Peruvian women experience these “unemancipatory relations of power,” they do so in vastly different ways and have vastly different life chances due to the power dynamics of race, gender, and class (Wilson Gilmore 2006). Therefore, while there was no reason, in principle, that the women’s popular movement, the campesina movement and the feminist movement could not have mutually benefitted from one another (at one point, the women’s movement was much stronger politically than the feminist movement), history shows that each group’s political concerns were different
enough to ensure that the women’s popular movement and the feminist movement worked in parallel.

Moreover, the emphasis of the popular women’s movement on economic justice made it a political threat to the neoliberalizing Peruvian economy—one of the reasons it became a target of co-optation by the Fujimori regime (Barrig 2002; Rousseau 2006). The 1990s feminist gender-based agenda of institutional change via civil and political and reproductive and sexual rights, however, did not present the political threat that the women’s movement did, which might partly explain why Fujimori picked up their platform. But where the popular women’s movement platform was more inclusive in its bottom-up approach to politics, the feminist movement worked from the top down—almost a “trickle down” rights perspective—using global discourse to guide its work, especially in reproductive and sexual rights. In retrospect,

some feminist activists acknowledged the limits of the strategies implemented by the main [feminist] women’s NGOs during the 1990s, which corresponded primarily to an entitlement agenda rather than a participatory platform for grassroots women’s empowerment. These strategies thus revealed a great gap between the advances made and the need for major structural changes for the majority of women to benefit from them (Rousseau 2006: 135).

I have presented this overview of the women’s and feminist movement as a means of introducing this thesis’s central question: How might it have come to pass that the roll out of women’s rights (with the support of urban feminists) might have actually lead to the violation of the rights of the most vulnerable members of Peruvian society, indigenous women? As the debate above shows, there seems to

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40 The Combahee River Collective argues that by taking care of the rights of the most vulnerable and disenfranchised first, those higher up in the social hierarchy would also see their rights respected, whereas the opposite is not necessarily the case (Smith 1983)
have been a misunderstanding on the part of some urban feminists about indigenous ways and reasons for organizing in both rural and urban settings. It is possible that this misunderstanding was based on the default assumption that “all women” in Peru face the same challenges regardless of race, ethnicity, rurality—i.e. that being a “woman” was necessary and sufficient to be protected by a women’s rights regime. Reflecting on issues within the Peruvian feminist movement, Mujica observes that

...cuando se alude a los temas de discriminación y violencia contra la mujer, a veces, con demasiada frecuencia, se sostiene que “estamos todas/os de acuerdo” o que “todas/os luchamos por lo mismo”, invadidos por un discurso feministas que parece trascender las fronteras políticas e ideológicas del sector social del que podemos formar parte. No obstante, es evidente que más allá de la generosidad de estas expresiones, no partimos ni tratamos de los mismos contenidos ni de las mismas percepciones ni de las mismas necesidades. Porque esto es algo que no sucede ni siquiera entre las mismas mujeres” (2004: 83)

when one speaks about issues of discrimination and violence against women, sometimes—way too frequently—it is said that “we all agree” or that “we are all fighting for the same thing.” These phrases are invaded by a feminist discourse that would seem to transcend the political and ideological borders of the social sector of which they form part. Generous these statements may be, it is nevertheless evident that we are not analyzing the same context, nor do we have the same perspectives, nor the same necessities. Not even between women is sameness achieved (author’s translation).

As this quote indicates, the feminist agenda of the 1980s and early 1990s was meant to be beneficial to all women. However, analysis of some of feminist discourses reveals that they were sometimes closely tied to the discourse of the Indian Problem in the former’s invocation of the theme of modernity/tradition and its seeming disregard for indigenous experiences, needs, and ways of organizing in both rural and urban settings. Indeed, as shown in the quotes above, it appears that in some cases, the expectation was for campesinas and urban mestizas to transform themselves into feminist subjects so as to be valuable to the movement.
These attitudes and demands seem to reveal, again, that the dark side of modernity is coloniality (Migñolo 2000)—a coloniality so hegemonic that even the most well-meaning and well-intentioned people (including feminists) can get caught up in its hegemony and perpetuate dynamics of internal colonialism based not only on racial domination, but on a gendered reading of modernity as well. This is an important point to consider as Bueno Hansen finds that Peruvian feminist Marfil Franck’s 1990 analysis of gender, class, and ethnicity in Peru “...highlights how gender subordination does not figure into the critical assessment of colonialism.” Rather, “she asserts that gender is a third strand that gets confused for the other two, ethnicity and class. While ethnicity, class, and gender are related sites of domination, they are not identical” (Bueno Hansen 2015: 20). What this seems to indicate is that gender should not be dismissed as a factor in the relationship between the feminist movement and campesina women simply because the actors are purportedly of the same gender—this is to miss the dynamics of gendered politicking, namely the production of subordination through the use of discourses of modernity and the dismissal of certain types of women’s organizing.

**Divides and Discords**

Of course, the feminist movement of the 1990s was far from monolithic. There were and continue to be those feminist workers who work tirelessly for the rights and well-being of rural campesinas from the latter’s understandings of the “good life.” In fact, it is important to note that not only was the women’s movement not united, but the feminist branch of the women’s movement saw discord, conflict, and negotiation as well.
One of the most serious divides in the feminist movement was over whether or not to work with the state during the Fujimorato. Those individuals and organizations that chose to do so appear to have seen Fujimori’s presidency as a political opening. His administration’s stated concern for women’s rights and the creation of the Ministry of the woman and human development (among other policies that included women in the government) seemed to be the ideal time for feminists to realize goals of reproductive rights that had been a part of their advocacy since the 1970s. In retrospect, many of the feminists I interviewed saw this approach as “pragmatic”—that is, apolitical, not mindful of the effects the Fujimorato had on women, particularly in the form of growing inequalities post-neoliberal structural adjustment and political repression of dissent (Interview 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 16, 17, 19).

Therefore, while some feminists saw Fujimori and his advocacy as a new dawn in Peruvian politics, others doubted Fujimori’s sudden alignment with global human rights norms given that he and his government were already under investigation for crimes against humanity for his government’s brutal counterinsurgency strategies during the armed conflict, and were quite critical of those feminists who chose to work with the government (Bueno-Hansen 2015).

Thus, it is not possible to say that the feminist movement as a total whole was either for or against working within the Fujimori state. Even organizations were split over whether to work with the Fujimori government or not. Flora Tristán, one of the leading feminist organizations in Peru, had representatives on the Mesa Tripartita de seguimiento a la Conferencia sobre Población y Desarrollo
(Tripartite Monitoring Group on the Cairo conference on Population and Development), which consisted of feminist NGOs, transnational “cooperative” agencies like USAID and UNFPA, government ministries and universities (among others) and will be further discussed below. At the same time Flora Tristán had representatives on the Mesa, its legal team was actively condemning the forced sterilizations, especially Giulia Tamayo.

The *Mesa Tripartita*, as it came to be known, was initiated by the Latin American Women’s Health Network and two of Peru’s most visible women’s rights organizations, Flora Tristán and Manuela Ramos in 1997. These organizations began constructing this advisory body to oversee the implementation of the Cairo accords in. The PNSRPF 1996-2000 was one of the flagship programs signaling the implementation of the accords. As mentioned before, this board came to include members of government, transnational agencies, and three of Peru’s most visible women’s rights organizations, Flora Tristán, Manuela Ramos, and the *Red Nacional de Promoción de la Mujer* and was directed by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (Ewig 2006; Bueno-Hansen 2015).

At the time of its inception, the *Mesa* was one of the only sites where civil society was able to influence the evermore-repressive Fujimori government (Ewig 2006). This said it is not clear how much influence the *Mesa* actually had (Barrig 2002). It was internally divided as to its role: was it to cooperate with the government or was it to be a government ‘watchdog’ (Barrig 2002)? Moreover, unlike the Peruvian popular women’s movement, which had mass popular support and even elected officials to municipal seats (Sara, Interview 21; Bueno Hanson
2015), the feminist movement did not have the same political power. Sara indicated that in comparison with the women’s movement the feminist movement was politically inconsequential in the mid-1990s, according to one interviewee (Sara, Interview 21). Sara, the self-proclaimed member of the feminist movement who ‘accompanied’ the women’s movement that we met in “feminist foundations,” indicated to me that the feminist movement could have been more powerful if it had partnered with the women’s movement—which many feminists urged the movement to do. But the more ideological factions of the feminist movement not only did not want to partner with the women’s movement due to their perceived lack of gender analysis, but also signaled that the women’s movement should follow their lead in transforming gender relations, as discussed in the section on “feminist foundations.”

What this suggests is that it was probably not feminist’s advocacy that pushed Fujimori to make reproductive rights (including political empowerment) part of his legislative agenda. Rather, pushing through women's rights seems to have been a form of the ‘bread and circus’ common to Latin American populist presidents to build both national and international credibility after his self-coup in 1992 (Bueno Hansen 2015), and perhaps even to distract from the PNSRPF 1996-2000 and the corruption and embezzlement undertaken with his advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, which would eventually topple his government.41

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41 It is worth noting that the extension of other women’s rights, like suffrage, also took place under dictatorship (interview 19), though how significant this or what it might mean is difficult to determine as Peru has had a significant number of authoritarian governments.
But even if Fujimori rolled out women’s rights measures as political smoke and mirrors, the importance of the changes his government made are undeniable. Under his tenure, the Ministerio de la Promoción de la Mujer y del Desarrollo Humano (PROMUDEH) or the Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Human Development was created; quotas for the number of women in Congress were instituted; anti-domestic violence legislation was passed; and the Congress saw its first female president, among other changes (Barrig 2001). Some feminists were quick to point out, however, that the women in charge of these institutions and positions were Fujimoristas, conservative and in some cases, like that of Martha Chávez (ex-president of Congress), opposed women’s reproductive rights due to ties with conservative factions of the Catholic Church (Interview 22; Barrig 2001; Bueno-Hansen 2015).

Other feminists rebutted that while these women might not have been the champions of women’s rights they had hoped for, they were nonetheless women who were breaking down historic barriers (Interview 22). Twenty years later, however, quotas for female presence in Congress have not been enforced (Interview 16a-d), and PROMUDEH has now become el Ministerio de la Mujer y Pueblos Vulnerables (MIMP) or Ministry of the Woman and Vulnerable Populations, which treats women as another interest group seeking ‘special’ rights.

The reactions of the feminist movement to reports of the forced sterilizations ranged along a spectrum from dismissal to outrage to outright silence. There are those who argue that there were ‘not that many’ forced sterilizations (Interviews 6, 22, and 24), and those who argue that what happened borders on genocide
(Interviews 9 and 13). But the vast majority sit somewhere in the middle: yes, the sterilizations were an unfortunate occurrence for which the state should be held accountable. Until 2011, this middle section was, especially institutionally, quite silent on the issue, though many individual feminists as well as groups (such as the Movimiento Amplio de Mujeres, MAM) took up this question.

There appear to be several reasons the forced sterilizations cases may have taken a back seat to other political issues. One reason seems to be that the evidence of forced sterilizations reached a critical mass in the form of first hand testimonies, independent NGO reports, reports from the Defensoría del Pueblo, and the Catholic Church right as the Fujimorato began to crumble under the weight of its vast system of bribes and patronage, orchestrated by Fujimori’s right hand man, Vladimir Montesinos; and though Fujimori was reelected in 2000, the election results were deemed irregular (Bueno-Hansen 2105).

As it became clear the Fujimori’s regime was coming to an end, the human rights and feminist movements came together (a historically unprecedented move) to begin preparations for the transition to democracy, particularly the establishment of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC) (Bueno-Hansen 2015). Though the sterilizations were an important part of what feminists wanted to see taken up by the PTRC, this was not done for two primary reasons: first, though the PTRC was made in the image of those of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia which incorporated a gender perspective, it was nevertheless

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42 In 2011, Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of embroiled ex-President Alberto Fujimori made her first bid for the presidency. According to commentators, the use of the forced sterilizations by Ollanta Humala on the campaign trail cemented his victory.
difficult for Peruvian feminists to get the PTRC to not equate ‘gender’ with ‘women,’ but with gender dynamics (i.e. power and subordination) writ large (Henríquez Ayín 2006; Bueno-Hansen 2015). This made it difficult to get the PTRC to see how an act like forced sterilization of indigenous women could be analyzed on a similar valence as rape, sexual assault and sexual slavery. Perhaps for this reason, the forced sterilizations were considered to fall outside the purview of the PTRC—though later reflections by Salomon Lerner, the chair of the PTRC and Ivan DeGregori, a renown Peruvian social scientist indicate that the sterilizations could have comfortably fit within the PTRC’s mandate to investigate all crime associated with the Fujimorato between 1980 and 2000 (Boesten 2007; Getgen 2009; Ballón 2014; Bueno-Hansen 2015).

One interviewee indicated another reason the sterilizations were not incorporated into the PTRC and the wider politic of the transition to democracy was the feminist movement’s overall inability to come to a consensus of what the sterilizations were and how to handle them. Where they, as some said, a crime against humanity or an incident of state overreach that could be prosecuted in the penal system, but was not a human rights abuse? Or was it, as it was for other parts of the feminist movement claimed, the product of over-eager doctors, ‘bad eggs’ whose actions should not overshadow the good of the program. In the next chapter, I tease out these distinctions and how each position correlates to a particular paradigm in the larger women’s and human rights movements which may have worked to shape feminist’s perceptions of the forced sterilizations.
Chapter 3: Feminist Assemblages

Based on research and interviews it appears that the Peruvian feminist movement has at least three different assemblages, or constellations: those of reproductive and sexual rights, civil and political rights, and human rights. In their theory on assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the relationships between a ‘constellation’ of components (people, objects, even ideas) are not stable or fixed, but rather can be displaced and replaced within and among other constellations or assemblages (1980; Livesey 2010). This framework emphasizes the “fluidity, exchangeability, and the multiple functionalities” of components in an assemblage, while also recognizing that these are “self-subsistent” and “retain autonomy outside of the assemblage in which they exist” (DeLanda 2006:1).

I came to see the feminist movement in this way after Maia mapped out what I thought were the different streams and people working within the feminist movement. She noted the three main streams of reproductive and sexual rights, civil and political rights, and human rights; but when she was done filling in who belonged where, when, and along what tracks they moved, her map looked something like a log of quantum leaps: feminists disappeared out of one stream, group, collective, NGO, or government ministry only to appear in a different one, or outside the movement all together. This highly mobile, highly fluid, and yet persistent plane of organization did not fit into the way that other scholars had written about the Peruvian feminist movement (Vargas and Villanueva 1994; Barrig; Ewig 2006 Rousseau 2006; Boesten 2007; Bueno-Hansen 2015) who presented it in far more static language. The exception to this rule has been Sonia Álvarez who
characterizes the Peruvian feminist movement as a “wide, heterogeneous, polycentric, multifaceted and polyphonic discursive field” (1999: 184). Nevertheless, the idea of assemblages seems to better capture the frenetic change within feminist politicking.

In speaking of the feminist assemblages as assemblages, I argue that what is holding the constellation together in relation-of-being is the project and discourse of rights that defines each one. Methodologically, this is important as it presents the people within the assemblage as agents able to respond to the discourse and project of rights in which they are working.

Moreover, this approach allowed for appreciation of the tensions between the fluid assemblages within the feminist movement and the more rigid, bounded workings of rights discourse and the law in which Peruvian feminists were working. This brings to light the “paradox of rights” (Brown 2000): On the one hand, “women” need tools with which to defend themselves from the violence inherent in the heteropatriarchal, colonial system. The rights system provides such tools. On the other hand, these same rights not only (re)produce the category of “woman” as constantly victim, but also leave out indigenous women due to the rights system’s foundation in liberal, individual rights.

Furthermore, as discussed in my chapter on rights, both citizenship and human rights were built with the needs of particular subjects in mind; namely, elite, male, white subjects. Thus, in excluding indigenous women, one might surmise that rights regimes are doing exactly what they were designed to do: preserve elite power. Nevertheless, rights are the main tools available to end state-sponsored,
sanctioned, or ignored abuses (Bahar 1996; Brown 2010). Accordingly, rights regimes have been creatively stretched and critiqued by indigenous peoples (Russell 2005; Corntassel 2005, 2007, 2009, 2012) and feminists (Petchesky 1995; Hodgson and Watkins 1997; Lewis 2003; Brown 2000) such that exclusion of indigenous peoples and women from the protections offered these legal regimes can no longer be ignored, though translating these critiques into lived protections is a slow and arduous process—for indigenous women, a 500 year process.

That an indigenous woman is forcibly sterilized because she is poor (in a country were poverty is coded as Indian) brings to bear a five-hundred-year colonial history—as well as a genealogy of public health initiatives crafted to “modernize” indigenous bodies (Wilson 2004; de la Cadena 2000; Necochea 2014) in a way that, say, forcibly sterilizing white women from Miraflores (which is very unlikely) would not. The way indigenous and white women are discursively produced differentiates the type of violations they will suffer (though these violations are interconnected due to the heteropatriarchal system under which they live), and hence, the type of advocacy they need. Feminists work in an imperfect rights system as evidenced by their ability to address the violences suffered by some women while leaving many Peruvian women vulnerable to abuse due to the paradoxes and limitations of a racialized system. Some of these limitations can be illustrated through a discussion of the rights assemblages in the Peruvian feminist movement of the 1990s.

The first assemblage or constellation of the feminist movement is the reproductive and sexual rights assemblage. This was a latent trend in the Peruvian
feminist movement throughout the 1980s, but burst onto the scene in Peru starting in the 1990s through immense effort by local feminists, as well as through global political and financing trends supporting women's reproductive rights. These trends stemmed from supranational level conferences called by the United Nations: the 1993 Vienna conference, the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, and the 1995 Fourth World Women's Conference in Beijing (Ewig 2006; Boesten 2007; Rousseau 2007; Getgen 2009; Bueno-Hansen 2015; Interviews 18, 22).

The second is the critical human rights assemblage, which was only beginning to emerge as a constellation in feminist circles in Peru during the 1990s (Interview 17). This is not to say that there were not human rights workers and lawyers in the feminist movement—Giulia Tamayo is probably the most recognized of these—but that there was no critical human rights assemblage that could respond to indigenous women's concerns from the perspective of human rights (Bueno-Hansen 2015). In mid 1990s Peru, the human rights movement and the feminist movement were wholly separate. Indeed, it was not until late in Fujimori's second term that there began to be a national rapprochement between the feminist and human rights movement, for the purpose of setting the agenda for the democratic transition of 2000 (Bueno-Hansen 2015). The absence of a critical human rights discourse in the feminist movement appears to have dealt a critical blow to the ability of sterilized women and their supporters to have their case heard in the political arena dominated by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC) charged with investigating human rights abuses from 1980 to 2000. Framed
in the Peruvian context, this absence seems to reflect the perception by some feminists that the Peruvian human rights establishment was not willing to include an expanded gender analysis in its work that went beyond the crimes of rape, sexual assault and sexual slavery in the internal armed conflict (Falcon 2005; Bueno Hansen 2015; Interview 16). Feminists certainly did appeal to the PTRC to include the forced sterilizations in the proceedings, but these requests were rejected on the basis that there was no connection between the forced sterilizations and the internal armed conflict (Bueno Hansen 2015: 59; Interview 16). However, the sterilizations could have been included under the PTRC’s mandate which included not only the armed conflict (which ended in 1995), but also the entirety of the Fujimorato.

The last assemblage is the civil and political rights assemblage, which the literature suggests is the oldest and most consistent of the three and has worked to see women and women’s issues represented in government and the law (Blondet 1998; 1999; Rousseau 2001; 2005; 2006; 2009). This assemblage was the more dominant of the three in the 1990s due to the movement’s history, as well as Fujimori’s personal interest in the inclusion of women and women’s issues in his government.

Though these assemblages appear to have been quite fluid in terms of the people populating them, I argue that rights discourses writ large provided the *raison d’être* for each assemblage; that different right paradigms were the gravitational core of each assemblage, if you will. Sometimes the same people would be part of different assemblages, cross-pollinating and/or trying to find spaces for different
kinds of advocacy. This new conceptualization also illustrates how dividing the feminist movement into different assemblages is, while necessary, an artificial exercise. Nonetheless, when I refer to the “reproductive and sexual rights” or the “civil and political rights” assemblage I am not necessarily referring to key people, but rather to key ideas and guiding discourses brought people into relation with those ideas and each other.

It is my proposition that each one of these assemblages represents a different approach and understanding of women’s rights that was in conversation with both local and global understandings of rights, as well the local political milieu. Each rights assemblage was working within the context of post-internal armed conflict, authoritarian, and neoliberalizing 1990s Perú. This era was marked by state violence against people perceived to be Leftist radicals and likewise movements that threatened the burgeoning neoliberal order, such as the popular women’s movement (Miloslavish 2000).

Moreover, it must be stated that neoliberal marketization of citizenship and rights was also profoundly reshaping the topography of rights work throughout the world. Perú was no exception. Cheah argues that under neoliberalism’s further marketization of the human (and the consequent dehumanization of the poor) human rights instruments may not be adequately up to the interpolation of the “human” and “inhuman”—that is people who have been extended the right to have rights and those who are held in a position of inclusive exclusion (Agamben 1998):

My point is not simply that existing human rights instruments are practically ineffective because we live in a particularistic, unjust, and competitive world. My more sobering argument is that the normative framework of human rights discourse, which is based in
the doctrine of human reason’s capacity to transcend the inhuman, cannot adequately comprehend the perverse processes that lead to the constitutive marking of the inhuman within the human (Cheah, 2006: 232)

Despite living in a context as conservative and openly racist as Perú (Golash-Boza 2010), many feminists articulated in their interviews that they saw indigenous women as either having equal rights or being deserving of equal rights as women and as humans.

Moreover, from interviews I conducted with feminists in the different rights assemblages, it appears that there was an understanding that the structural violence in Peru was prejudicial to indigenous women—hence the need to extend them civil, reproductive and human rights. But while individually seeing the humanity of indigenous women, it appears that some rights workers may have missed how profoundly the system in which they lived dehumanized indigenous women; in fact, that they were dehumanized to the point of not having the right to have rights. It is in this gap between the real and the ideal that a program like the PNSRPF 1996-2000, which looked like it might extend rights, could actually be a vehicle of violation.

Thus, the paradox of rights—the observation that rights paradigms are too narrow to adequately protect women, but are currently the only viable tool for women to gain rights—both enabled and constrained feminist advocacy on indigenous women’s behalf: “While well-meaning actors and institutions may mobilize international human right law to defend rights, such efforts may also lead to further erasures and silencing” in contexts like Peru where many of the subjects that need protection as *indigenous women* are actively dehumanized and rendered
invisible in and by the law (Bueno Hansen 2015: 3). As Spade (2013) asserts, using an intersectional approach to understanding the law brings "attention to the violence of legal systems and administrative systems that articulate themselves as race and gender neutral but are actually sites of the gendered racialization processes that produce the nation-state" (1031).

“Analyzing human rights as discourse assumes that it is constituted in social practice and as a cultural process” in a particular time and place (Bueno-Hansen 2015: 11). Adding an intersectional approach “…brings light to how gender and race are separate and disconnected categories within legal frameworks, creating analytical blind spots in the law” (Bueno-Hansen 2015: 12). Through this lens it can be observed how these three rights assemblages helped (re)produce the subjects they defended as ‘women,’ ‘humans,’ and ‘citizens,’ respectively. Far from being universal, these subject categories have been honed by histories of oppression and structural violence to mark certain bodies as “citizens” and others as the citizen’s foil: homos sacer, the citizen non-citizen against which the nation is defined (Agamben 1998). In the case of Perú, the discourse of the “Indian Problem” has produced indigenous peoples as citizen non-citizens, in need of ‘modernizing’ intervention as evidenced, for instance, in public health initiatives (Ewig 2006, 2010; Boesten 2007; Ballón 2014; Bueno-Hansen 2015).

Supporters of reproductive rights discourse pushed to weave the Cairo Accords into the Peruvian context, essentializing global rights discourses, Peruvian histories of differentiated citizenship, and feminist politics that created a set of conditions of possibility that may have contributed to the abuse of indigenous
women’s rights by the Peruvian state. For while individual rights workers may have been able to see past the limitations of these discourses, their advocacy was in many ways limited by their strictures. So though not completely blinding, the discourses of reproductive and sexual rights, civil and political rights and human rights nevertheless created lacunae in which the particular intersectional positions of rural campesina women fell, a theme I explore in the next sections.

The Sexual and Reproductive Rights Assemblage

Starting in the electoral season of 2010 and 2011, NGOs working in the reproductive and sexual rights assemblage (such as DEMUS), were pivotal actors in the movement seeking justice for sterilized women. In the mid-1990s, however, some NGOs with a focus in reproductive and sexual rights were working to defend Fujimori’s family planning campaign (Barrig 2002; Ewig 2006; Bueno Hansen 2015). In 1996, a year into the PNSRPF 1996-2000, reports of forced sterilizations began to be made to local dioceses and Defensorías del Pueblo (legal ombudsman’s office) (Ballón 2014). By 1998, CLADEM and several other human rights bodies were undertaking comprehensive investigations and both La República and El Comercio (the most read Left and Right leaning newspapers in Perú) had published their own investigations in 1996, 1997, and 1998 confirming suspicions of government abuses in the PNSRPF 1996-2000 (Barrig 2002: 19). Thus, it is striking to read the pronouncement the Mesa Tripartita de Seguimiento de los Acuerdos de Cairo put out in February of 1998 (Barrig 2002: 22) in response to growing evidence of systematic abuses:
La Mesa Tripartita ha prestado también especial atención a las observaciones y denuncias que, desde su constitución, ONGs de mujeres y otras instituciones integrantes de la Mesa, han venido expresando en relación a problemas detectados en la implementación de las acciones de AQV del Programa de Salud Reproductiva y Planificación Familiar del Ministerio de Salud (MINSA) realizadas a nivel nacional. Para conocer sobre esta problemática, la Mesa Tripartita ha promovido el intercambio de información entre el Estado Peruano y la Sociedad Civil y ha sostenido reuniones y consultas con el MINSA, la Defensoría del Pueblo y las ONGs de mujeres que recibieron denuncias sobre los procedimientos de AQV e investigaron las mismas. En este sentido, y frente a las publicaciones que desde hace varios meses vienen realizando algunos medios de prensa nacional e internacional, sobre la supuesta aplicación en el Perú de un “programa de esterilización masivo de carácter coercitivo” la Mesa Tripartita considera que esta información es errónea pues no se ajusta a la realidad (Mesa Tripartita 1998: E3).

The report goes on to say that between the Defensoría del Pueblo and Flora Tristán, along with CLADEM and CRLP, 278 people—either direct victims or their families—had come forward to declare violations of their rights through forced sterilization.

Taking these denunciations seriously, the Mesa recommended The Ministry of health (MINSA, the body overseeing the PNSRPF 1996-2000, but which also sat on the Mesa) improve its quality of care by enforcing pre-procedure counseling; instituting an obligatory wait period; getting rid of quotas and goals; ensuring proper consent procedures; and properly accrediting doctors and centers to perform sterilizations (Mesa Tripartita 1998: E3).

What makes this response striking is the background of the Mesa Tripartita as a body meant to oversee the implementation of the Cairo Accords in Perú. The Cairo Accords (or the ICPD Programme of Action) agreed upon at the 1994
International Conference on Population and Development called for an end to Malthusian\textsuperscript{43} inspired population control policies (including coercive sterilization campaigns) that infringed people’s reproductive rights and physical integrity. In a monumental shift from prior population programs that had focused squarely on family planning as a means of reducing births and poverty, the Cairo Programme of Action held the ‘empowerment of women’ as the cornerstone of a comprehensive platform of reproductive rights. This program was to pay heed to the health consequences of reproduction, as well as emphasize gender relations as “...a critical determinant of reproductive decision-making and sexual behavior,” and advocate for the discussion of population in a less technical and more social justice framework (DeJong 2000: 947). The Programme dictated that family planning programs were to be put in place with the explicit intention of respecting the decisions of each individual woman to participate or not, and to be free of coercion, incentives, or disincentives to participate (McIntosh and Finkle 1995; Petchesky 1995; Hodsgon and Watkins 1997).

These safety measures were invoked in light of past abuses within family planning programs. In 1975, for instance, approximately 6.2 million men and women were sterilized in India as part of a World Bank and UNFPA sponsored

\textsuperscript{43} Thomas Malthus was a late 18\textsuperscript{th} century theorist who first proposed that population growth outruns subsistence. He argued that the only check to human reproduction was famine, and that while population grew exponentially, food production only grew linearly (Siedl and Tisdell 1999). He suggested “preventive” checks to population growth through delayed marriage, and pointed to already existent “positive” checks, such as disease, famine, and squalor—or as he called them “vice and misery” (Seidl and Tisdell 1999: 397) Critics have since shown that his ‘findings’ were based on no empirical data at all, but on the observation of everyday life in Victorian England. Nevertheless, it was a reading whose politics suited the burgeoning capitalist class (ibid). As his name is now synonymous with (often coercive) population control programs, it is ironic to note that he was against the usage of birth control within marriage (AAG center for Global Geography Education accessed august 2, 2016).
family planning program aimed at aiding development (Biswas 2014). As was to be the case in Perú, many of those sterilized were paid and/or outright threatened. Some were told that if they did not submit to sterilization their children would be excluded from government services such as healthcare and education. Likewise, in some cases medical personnel were paid based on the number of procedures carried out or threatened with dismissal if they did not meet quotas or goals (Kaur 2014). The Cairo Accords seemed to take this history of coercion seriously, apparently spelling a new age in population policy, one more focused on individual rights than on development targets.

Looking at the response of the Mesa, then, it is striking that they did not denounce the PNSRPF 1996-2000. Indeed, in some cases members the Mesa declared that an enemy of the program was an enemy of women's rights (Barrig 2001). The Mesa’s proximity to the state may have been a factor in some members’ reactions to reports of forced sterilizations.

The Mesa was not the only space advocating for reproductive and sexual rights that was moved to respond to reports. As reports of forced sterilizations started to come in, feminist NGOs (including Flora Tristán and Manuela Ramos who had representatives on the Mesa Tripartita) and feminist collectives working on reproductive and sexual rights had rich internal dialogues as to what to make of the first reports of forced sterilizations. There were several positions present in the reproductive rights assemblage as to how to proceed, especially before the extent of the forced sterilizations (now documented at around 10,000) were fully known.

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44 It is reported that another 4 million women were sterilized in India in the 2013-2014 year (Biswas 2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-30040790 accessed 8/2/2016).
(Boesten 2007; Sara Cuentas 2014; Sara, Interview 21). One of these positions was concerned with the possible consequences that denouncing the sterilizations would have on women’s access to tubal ligation in Perú—a contraceptive option only made legal in 1995 (Barrig 2002; Ewig 2006; Boesten 2007; Getgen 2009). Sara characterized this position in the following manner:

Nosotros no podemos, este, salir en contra de la AOV porque si justamente nosotros estamos para que las mujeres tengan acceso a métodos de anticoncepción y que tengan la posibilidad de recurrir a este método ¿no? Además, sobre todo, las mujeres en las zona pobres, rurales, más pobres, que son las que tienen, pues, un número más alto de hijos ¿no? Y que es muy difícil que utilicen de manera permanente otros métodos anticonceptivos por el problema del costo, por el acceso, por la negativa del marido. Y además, bueno, en esto habían mujeres que otro embarazo suponía un riesgo muy grande de salud para ellas ¿no? Entonces para muchas mujeres ésta es una buena alternativa, y si denunciamos van a perder una posibilidad que les pueda beneficiar (Sara, Interview 21)

Another undesired consequence of coming out against the sterilizations involved the oddity of an assumed alliance between the feminist movement and the Catholic Church. Some feminists argued that denouncing the sterilizations would put them in the same camp as the Catholic Church, which, even before the PNSRPF 1996-2000 had been instituted, had been denouncing the genocidal possibilities of such a program—albeit within the confines of the right-to-life discourse.45 “We're

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45 Indeed, the role of the Catholic Church in the sterilization case is a complex one. One of the reasons part of the feminist movement was enamored with Fujimori was because he ‘stood up’ to the Catholic hierarchy and its opposition to family planning. For its part, the conservative Catholic Right began denouncing the sterilizations as genocide before they even started happening. However, local parishes in rural parts of Perú were some of the first non-governmental bodies to receive denunciations about forced sterilizations and to refer cases to the Defensoría del Pueblo, or the local legal ombudsman. Historically, the Catholic Church
going to be with the priests then? With Opus Dei? With these guys? We are going to unite with them to denounce the state’s progressive turn which is giving women access to birth control?” this position articulated (Interview 21; Barrig 2002; Ewig 2006).

For all feminist actors, the turn of an internationally supported family planning program into a coercive sterilization campaign presented serious affronts and grave consequences for reproductive rights projects. However, their reactions (and particularly the defense of the PNSRPF 1996-2000 by the Mesa) seem to point back to the way some Peruvian feminists may have been conceptualizing and acting upon the discursively produced subject of “woman” within women’s rights. Were they NGOing, as, Hilhorst (2003) puts it? That is, did the sexual and reproductive rights assemblage, by filtering and translating global discourses of women’s rights into the Peruvian context through advocacy and projects, help produce the “women” of women’s rights as urban, white, and middle class at the expense of indigenous women? To get a better idea of who these discursively produced “women” might have been I turn to critical feminist critiques of the Cairo Accords.

Cairo Accords and Discords

To understand how some Peruvian feminist actors were conceptualizing the “women” of women’s rights, it is necessary to grasp the importance the International Conference on Population and Development’s (ICPD) Programme of
Action (known in the rights community as the Cairo Accords) had on feminist advocacy globally and in Perú in particular.

“The ICPD is correctly credited with establishing a ‘new paradigm’ in population policy—shifting focus from a macro preoccupation with the impact of rapid population growth on economic development to a concern for individual rights in sexuality and reproduction...” (DeJong 2000: 941-42). Indeed, given the historic reliance of population policy on neo-Malthusian notions, the adoption of a rights-centered approach to population policy at Cairo was an important shift in the history population policy (McIntosh and Finkle 1995; Petchesky 1995; Hodgson and Watkins 1997; DeJong 2000).

Nonetheless, as mentioned in chapter one, some attendees were wary of the alliances forged at Cairo between purported neo-Malthusians46 (like the USAID and UNFPA). They worried that the Cairo program might prove to be a “Trojan Horse” for population control policies. Indeed, critical feminists were concerned about the absence of an intersectional approach in the Cairo Accords and its embrace of market-based solutions to women’s rights (McIntosh and Finkle 1995; Petchesky 1995; Hartmann 1995, 1997).

That the ICPD did not address “racial and ethnic conflicts as impediments to sustainable development,” except in areas of migration (Petchesky 1995: 158) also concerned critical feminists. Indeed, though chapter 6 of the Programme did address needs of specific population groups “…racial and ethnic minorities, as well as the poor [were] jarringly absent” (ibid). Indigenous peoples were not included as

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46 Beginning in the Cold War, neo-Malthusian thinkers argued that rapid population growth in the global South threatened to destabilize those countries (Kissinger Report, 1974)
such, but as ‘indigenous people’ which erased histories of structural violence incurred against them. This “reflect[ed] a form of racism within the document, in the refusal to recognize that diverse ethnic or racial groups or classes may be the victims of particular forms of abuse or neglect, or may suffer from particular reproductive and sexual hazards...that government policies should address” (1995: 158). This indicates that rather than being universal, the Cairo Accords were quite circumscribed in whose rights they were representing—namely, white middle class, urban women.

It is important to note that the document’s elision of communal and collective groups produces the idea of “woman” as an autonomous, self-sufficient actor in need of empowerment to succeed in the capitalist system. This approach takes for granted that capitalism is the only economic system in which women participate (while many women continue to participate in parallel markets), and that capitalist expansion is not an underlying cause of women’s inequality.

This is not to say that women were not in need ‘empowerment’. Rather, my point is to indicate the problem of empowerment within neoliberal discourses that essentialize gender based on the “notion that a unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation and other realities of experience...[This] homogenous grouping of ‘women’ assumes a certain type of woman as normative while marginalizing differences among women” (Bueno-Hansen 2015: 19). When introduced into the context of Perú, it appears that the concerns critical feminists had over the creation of a demand-based family planning programs and the exclusion of racial and ethnic
minority interests in the Cairo Accords were well founded. The section below offers an illustration of what a straightforward approach to the reproductive and sexual rights discourse looked like in Perú.

**Miriam and the Mesa Tripartita**

I met Miriam\(^{47}\) in her home on a quiet street in Miraflores, an upper-middle class part of Lima. At seventy years old, she is CEO of APROPO, a social marketing firm committed to educating youth and adolescents about sexual health and reproductive rights (Coe 2004). Founded in 1983 by Lima’s business elite concerned with demographic issues and Peru’s population boom (Donayre V., Guerra-García, Sobrevilla A. 2012), APROPO self-funds through the sale of its own line of contraceptives (particularly condoms).

Miriam attended both the Cairo Conference in 1994 and the Beijing world conference in 1995 and has attended most of the follow-up conferences as a representative from Perú. She told me that the Cairo conference changed her life, marking a path for her future work and ways of thinking about reproductive and sexual health. Miriam was on the *Mesa Tripartita* as a representative from APROPO, and was the only person I was able to interview who was on the *Mesa*. It is clear that one person cannot speak for the *Mesa Tripartita* let alone an entire rights paradigm, but her insights are worth taking into consideration as they provide a window on how some representatives of the reproductive and sexual rights assemblage were thinking.

\(^{47}\) All names have been changed to pseudonyms to help protect the identity of participants.
I was struck by how closely Miriam’s statements mirrored the discourse of the Cairo accords in its emphasis on ‘women’s rights as human rights’, empowerment, responsible parenthood and choice. I was also surprised at her espousal that there were ‘not that many’ forced sterilizations in a time when it is often taken for granted by many academic researchers and journalists that roughly all 290,000 sterilizations were forced (though it is not clear that this was the case). As I listened to her more deeply, her statements appeared to be a defense of contraceptive technologies against a Catholic Right, which persists in blocking women’s reproductive rights to this day.

Miriam repeated several times that she thought the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was a “good policy” and that Fujimori had been right in implementing it. In defending the PNSRPF 1996-2000, Miriam appeared at first to be dismissing the suffering of those women forcibly sterilized. However, upon listening deeper, it appeared that her take on the situation was informed by her belief that access to family planning is a basic human right. A 2002 study from Flora Tristán estimated that roughly sixty percent of all pregnancies in Perú are unwanted, and further finds that there are 66 abortions per every 100 live births (Ferrando 2002). Considering that abortion is illegal in Perú, many of these abortions are done clandestinely. Unsafe abortions account for sixteen percent of the country’s pregnancy-related deaths (Coe 2004). It is likely that these statistics were even higher in the 1990s due to war, mass migration, and neoliberal state retrenchment when the poverty and extreme poverty rates were even higher than in the 2000s (Rousseau 2006).
Thus, it appears that the hope of reproductive and sexual rights advocates was that the introduction of a human rights frame in the field of reproductive health would help overcome barriers to access to contraceptives for women and couples (Cottingham, Germain, Hunt 2012). This seems to be part of the reason that some sectors of the sexual and reproductive rights assemblage chose to work with Fujimori to roll out the PNSRPF 1996-2000. However, as critical feminists pointed out, the Cairo Accords essentialized a modern, western, white, moneyed woman as the subject of reproductive and sexual rights and applied this essentialized model to women worldwide ignoring conditions of structural poverty or violence. Their assumption might have been a generous one. It is the case, however, that conditions of structural violence often deter the roll out of rights programs (Uvin 1998) as well as producing differential access to rights based on one’s social position (Bueno-Hansen 2015).

Within the Peruvian context, the historic oppression of indigenous peoples might have created a situation in which their citizenship—and therefore access to all human rights (including reproductive and sexual rights)—was limited. It is also possible that the discursively produced subject of “women” in the Cairo Programme of Action did not account for the ways in which the structural violence against indigenous women in Perú would adversely affect their rights. For while it appears that some feminists had an intersectional approach to analyzing indigenous women’s situation, the rights discourse (including law) they were trying to implement did not account for the structure of oppression and discrimination
endemically present in Peruvian society and that are at the basis of structural violence.

Mariella, a Peruvian academic who works on issues of intercultural health in the rural areas of Peru, told me that a possible misreading of the political milieu of the 1990s may have led some feminists to think that their work would cover all Peruvians despite living under a regime that clearly devalued rural and indigenous life.

Though it is clear that Mariella is talking about Fujimori’s regime, this observation could also refer to the limitations of the global reproductive and sexual rights movement of the Cairo Programme Action and the discourses it produced. For it seems that the reproductive and sexual rights discourse they advanced was not equipped to include women whose ethnicity and class fell outside the Western middle-class norm and/or to work in situations of extreme structural violence where there were no “...solid institutions abiding by the rule of law or respecting human rights” at the time (Rousseau 2006: 136).

The following excerpt from my conversation with Miriam seems to suggest that she was confident that the PNSRPF 1996-2000 as a policy was a “good one”—
La gente urbana tiene mucho más acceso a servicios, a opciones de distintos tipos. Llegar a la selva, por ejemplo Lucía, es sumamente difícil...Yo creo que Fujimori hizo una buena política. Respondió a las necesidades de la población. Pero la ejecución del dicho al hecho hay mucho trecho, hay muchos, eh, actores, y no todos estaban con la misma mirada de opción. Tú ya tuviste todos los hijos que quisiste tener? Sea uno o sean 10 o sean 20 tienes la posibilidad de limitar. Entonces fue buena política, hubo fallas en su implementación. Y lo malo ha sido que esas fallas han sido más fuertes que la experiencia de los beneficiarios. Porque hoy en día, no tienes acceso a la limitación (Interview 22)

As the saying goes: del dicho al hecho hay mucho trecho (there is a lot of space between word and deed). In the Peruvian context, what this seems to illustrate is the difficulty of implementing a rights regime in a situation of extreme structural violence and poverty. Especially one in which indigenous peoples were not treated as though they had rights—especially by by a medical establishment that had a history of sterilizing indigenous women without their consent on the basis that they had “too many” children” (Gianella 2014).48

In the Peruvian case, the addition of quotas appears to have promoted abuse (intimidation, threat or coercion) on the part of doctors in order to meet

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48 Perú is not the only place where rights workers’ inattention to situations of structural violence had dire consequences. In his work on the Rwandan genocide, Peter Uvin explains how the rights movement—NGO workers, the UN peace keeping forces, the UN General Council—contributed to the occurrence of the genocide due to their inattention to the context of structural violence in which they were working. He reports that up until the genocide itself, social indicators showed that their programs of economic development and other human rights-based development were having positive effects in the populace (1998). However, he goes on, these indicators were blind to the violence that surrounded the projects.
those quotas. Miriam seems to understand the complexity of the situation and the reality of forced sterilizations. However, she spent quite a bit of time explaining that abuses could have been due to a lack of proper planning that left a gap between the assumed “unmet need” among indigenous women and their consenting to undergo sterilization.

In the case of APROPO, of which I am a member, we were part of the Mesa Tripartita, the body monitoring the implementation of the Cairo Accords in Perú. As such, we did monitor the issue of sterilizations, we did discuss and debate it, and corrections were made to the problems the program had—generally, the problem of how a policy program is implemented into practice. There are a whole line of processes, failures of communication, misunderstandings which, of course, makes things happen that you wish would not happen...So the issue has been complex, and the main issue for me—the biggest preoccupation we had was that, at the time, social indicators, studies showed that many people wanted to limit the number of children they had. Nevertheless, after the crisis, after the scandal of the sterilizations—now those services [sterilization] are not accessible through the ministry of health [i.e. public health services]. So it’s a big problem, and, um, for me signals a rollback of the advances we had made toward realizing the right people have to decide how many children they want, when to have them, and what contraceptive to use.

As Miriam indicates, it was the case that Peruvian women had indicated desire for access to contraceptive: both the INDES (like the Peruvian census, but on health issues) and independent anthropological studies had shown that upwards of 60% of rural women did not want to have ‘too many’ children (Boesten 2007; Mariella, Interview 2).
However, Mariella, the Peruvian anthropologist who works in intercultural health, argued that even though rural, indigenous women wanted to control their fertility, sterilization was not a form of birth control they would have probably opted for⁴⁹ (Mariella, Interview 2). Other studies indicate that campesinas in the present day still prefer natural methods such as the rhythm method and medicinal herbs to modern contraceptives (Boesten 2007).

Moreover, as this anthropologist pointed out, there is not much information on what campesinas take to be “too many” children (Mariella, Interview 2): In a situation where children are labor, inheritors, social safety net, and a major nexus of social connections through compadrazgo or god-parenting, the role of children and the number of desired children is often different than in the city (Leinaweaver 2008). Thus, the political need to rely on numbers (which made a population legible as in need of intervention), and, perhaps, an inattention to the context in which the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was being introduced appears to have contributed to making indigenous women vulnerable.

Moreover, there seems to not have been much attention paid to the economic rationale of Fujimori’s interest in family planning. Starting during his time as a Rector at the Universidad Agraria in the late 1980s and as the host of a television show where he often spoke about family planning, all the way through the first years of his presidency and his speech at Beijing in 1995, it was clear that he linked poverty to the number of children a woman had. Absent from his talks

⁴⁹ Within the Andean indigenous worldview, cuts into the body are seen as inherently power-robbing (Interview 2).
was the five hundred years of structural violence that produced indigenous peoples’ marginality and poverty.

Even considering statistics indicating an “unmet need” for contraceptives, there is no evidence suggesting that campesinas would opt for surgical sterilization if it were provided. That Miriam glosses over this seems to suggest that indigenous women’s desires and needs were assumed to be similar to all Peruvian women at large. This instance might be an illustration of “legitimated inequalities within the feminist movement” based on power and privilege differences, especially in regards to campesina indigenous women (Bueno-Hansen 2015: 34, 36)

Miriam also points to the complexity of the issue of the rollback of reproductive rights, and especially public access to all forms of contraceptives including tubal ligation, as these were programs mainly meant for the poor. In this next quote, Miriam talks about the errors that occurred in the program and the need to admit them to be able to move forward for a better program. Again, she argues that there were “not that many” forcibly sterilized women and that these cases should not overshadow the greater good that the program did.
I think that--we need to weigh, we need to give weight to things. You just mentioned that the mistakes have been "x" but that the benefits have been "y". And if we compare, we cannot allow that the few cases [of forced sterilization] weigh more and erase the benefits in the other cases. That is what worries me when people say "sterilizations! no more sterilizations!" How many [women] are you hurting [by cutting off access]? Because, there is something—that because of wrongdoing, a mistake you do away with the possible benefits in other cases. Therefore, I think that in society we always need to weigh things, pay attention so that few mistakes are made. But life is fluid, we go forward: admit that mistakes were made, that I was mistaken—at the Mesa Tripartita we identified things that could be improved: more waiting time between being given the information and taking the decision [to be sterilized] for instance, making sure that you are sure of your decision. Then there was also the issue of whether the man [spouse or partner] intervened or not. Because the woman might have wanted it [the sterilization] but the partner didn’t. In consequence, whose body is it? what would the impact be on the couple? Especially considering what you just indicated, that many women were abandoned by their husbands after the forced sterilizations. And this because--of the issue of infidelity or the incapacity of having children in the future. But especially because the woman is considered property of the husband/partner and if she is not having children [with me] then I can’t tell if she is cheating with somebody else. There is the root of the problem (Interview 22).

In her analysis, Miriam appears to be responding to the Catholic Right’s successful roll back of reproductive rights (and particularly access to tubal litigation) in the wake of the forced sterilizations. But, curiously, in her defense of the program, she seems to pay little attention to the consequences of the actual forced sterilizations. Therefore, that the forcibly sterilized also appear to have
been majority indigenous *campesinas* seems to further tie together discourses of the Indian Problem (whose solutions have been historically utilitarian and biopolitically attuned) and the limited ability of rights discourses to protect indigenous women due to these rights regimes' lack of intersectional analysis.

Moreover, if it is the case that there “were not that many” forced sterilizations and that those that were should not overshadow the “greater good”—i.e. the rights of all Peruvian women using the public health system—then it seems to be the case that a roll out of reproductive and sexual rights in this context of structural violence required a certain amount of utilitarian ethics. This ethics of the “greater good” is inextricably linked to coloniality:

“For happiness to become a mission, the colonized must be first deemed unhappy. The Colonial archive can be considered as an archive of unhappiness. Colonial knowledge constitutes the other as not only an object of knowledge, a truth to be discovered, but as being unhappy, as lacking the qualities or attributes required for a happier state of existence...It constitutes the misery of native culture as justification of colonial rule” (Ahmed 2010: 125)

Though human rights and the British Empire are not coeval, human rights discourse is marked by colonial mindsets, especially in terms of how subjects in need of rights are made legible as in need of saving (Ahmed 2010)

Empire becomes a moral and pedagogical project of improving manners, a project of cultivation, described in the familiar terms of the emergence of women from a state of 'abject slavery.' In relation to Indian, James Mills argues that ‘nothing can exceed the habitual contempt which the Hindus entertain toward their women’ (311). The habitual contempt is what women must be liberated from. The investment in the abjection of colonized women can serve to justify empire as the liberation of women from abjection. Gayatri Spivak’s description of this investment as ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ remains extraordinary for its precision (1988: 297) (Ahmed 2010: 127).
But while their husbands may be one reason indigenous women might not be allowed access to contraceptives (Boesten 2007), there are other reasons many *campesina* women have chosen to not to use them. One is distrust of the medical establishment, which stems from histories of abuse by the medical community, including nonconsensual sterilizations prior to the PNSRPF 1996-2000 (Gianella 2014). It is also the case that indigenous women have historically had the knowledge and means to induce abortion and to *cuidarse* (literally to take care of oneself)—through the use herbs (Boesten 2007). And, of course, the issue of access to contraceptives has been another mitigating factor.

Many *campesina* women did want access to modern contraceptives (Boesten 2007). But to argue that the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was going to take indigenous women out from under the yoke of indigenous male patriarchy as Miriam argued with me, is to assume that indigenous men’s machismo is the root of the problem ignoring five centuries of structural violence against indigenous peoples.

As Gayatri Spivak (1988), Leila Ahmed (1992), Lila Abu-Lughod (2002), and Sarah Ahmed (2010) all argue, brown women do not need saving from brown men; they need a transformation in the structures of society. Miriam seems to dismiss the forced sterilizations as collateral damage in the greater project of realizing women’s reproductive and sexual rights, while in the same breath marking indigenous men and their patriarchal (re: backward) ideas about contraceptives as the reason women suffered under the PNSRPF 1996-2000. This appears to be indicative of a colonialist mentality. Is it women’s rights as the “gift
that cannot be refused, a forced gift” (Ahmed 2010: 125)? In the end, to whom did the body of the indigenous woman belong? Here it becomes possible to see how the female indigenous body has been the homo sacer of Peru: the site of nation making for the state and laboratory for the right world: the body upon which the opportunity for others to have rights is built.

Furthermore, Miriam’s conceptualization of the PNSRPF 1996-2000 as a good-policy-gone-bad due to user mishandling elides the history of internal colonialism worked through the Peruvian public health system (Ewig 2010). A genealogy of this system reveals an institution built around ‘improving’ dysgenic bodies (Stepan 1991; Necochea 2014). Dysgenic, however, often meant ‘unmodern’ and indigenous in the coded language of race of Perú. The female indigenous body has been a particularly poignant site for modernist interventions in the field of public health (de la Cadena 2000; Wilson 2004), and indeed, citizenship. As one anthropologist interviewee put it,

Siempre han asumido en el sector de salud...específicamente, han asumido que las poblaciones rurales tienen que pasar por una especie de proceso de modernización, civilizatorio, en el cual digamos, son prácticamente pasivas ¿no? En los cuales, este, no se asume que precisamente tienen derechos y que tienen una propia cosmovisión del cuerpo, etc., sino que este—se asume que para que ellas accedan a tener derechos, tienen que hacer lo que se supone es correcto desde el punto de vista de las políticas ¿no? (Interview 2).

The health sector has always assumed that—specifically they have assumed that rural populations need to pass through a type of modernization, a civilizing process, in which, we could say, they are practically passive, right? In this programs...it is not assumed that they have rights, per se, or that they have a proper cosmovision that informs the way they understand their bodies, etc., but rather that for them to gain the right to have rights, they have to do what is supposedly correct according to the point of view of the policies themselves, right? (Interview 2).
Thus, in the public health sector the assumed backwardness of indigenous populations, the 'Indian Problem' and the fraught power relationship between the women’s reproductive and sexual rights assemblage with campesina women comes to a head. For though Miriam time and time again reiterated that indigenous women are or should be equal to everyone else, the Peruvian context of structural violence has created a situation in which indigenous people are not equal citizens as long as they “hold on” to their indigenous ways (de la Cadena 2000; Wilson 2004)

There is a large gap between the ideal of human rights advocacy (that everyone be treated equally) and the lived reality of differentiated citizenship. It is possible that those in the reproductive and sexual rights assemblage thought that a program like the PNSRPF 1996-2000 would help close the gap by providing rights and access to reproductive health to campesina women.

In addition, there have been problems in using health to close a rights gap due to long standing difficulties in intercultural dialogue in the health field. In “Unwillingly Given, Ungratefully Received,” Weismanel speaks to the difficulties of such interactions. In this piece, she tells the story of a food aid program in Zumbagua, Ecuador in which mestizo and white doctors from the city come to the small town to give out government-sanctioned aid to the local women. What is particular about their interactions is that the indigenous women receiving the aid—responding to five hundred years of mistreatment and abuse—get on their knees, plead in high voices, and even cry, trying to convince the doctors to give them food for their families. The doctors respond violently, perhaps embarrassed
at the show of what they interpret as “begging” and “groveling” for items that they are mandated by the government to give out (Weismantel 1987). But what is at play in this “show” is a version of the “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985)—a means for subaltern folk to get powerful people to act in ways that benefit them without having to resort to the kinds of blatant protest that could result in their violent demise. For most people at most points in history, openly standing up to power has been certain suicide, Scott points out (1985: 3). Without an understanding of this dynamic, however, the doctors Weismantel observes treat these indigenous women with contempt and disdain (1987).

Miriam also spoke to the issue that many doctors are condescending toward indigenous clients, that there was not a horizontal relationship between doctor and patient. Nevertheless, in this next quote, Miriam discusses the interaction between doctors and indigenous peoples as a two-way street, with rights and responsibilities on both sides.
...yo lo que busco en mi humilde opinión y de prioridades es que no vuelvan a suceder las cosas. Y para eso tienes que ser claro en tus políticas, en tus normas, en tus reglamentos, en las capacitaciones que le das al personal de salud, en la capacitación, en la información que le das tú a todo el ciudadano de pie, que todas las personas sepan cuáles son sus derechos, cuáles son sus responsabilidades. Porque no es solamente—es igualito: “It takes two to tango.” Entonces es una falta de articulación en dos partes. Cuando nosotros trabajamos un proyecto financiado por el Banco Mundial para el Ministerio de Salud en lo que es los servicios de salud para mejorar los servicios de salud, nos quedó clarísimo que esa comunicación entre el proveedor de salud con el usuario de salud no era buena, ni sigue siendo buena. Entonces nosotros tratamos de identificar algunas cosas que mejoraran esa relación pero había todo el tema, como te digo, cultural—el tema de actitud “yo sé más que tú” y entonces—no era una relación horizontal, Tú tienes que conocer tu cuerpo; tú tienes que saber cómo estás tú para que el médico pueda hacerte un buen diagnóstico. Porque si tú no sabes cuándo menstruas, si no sabes...cómo es la menstruación, o qué efectos tiene ¿cómo te van a decir algo? Y después cuando el personal de salud le dice a la persona—estamos hablando principalmente a mujeres pero hay que incluir a los hombres también—si le dices que tienes que hacer tal cosa o qué te pasa el otro, y la persona no pregunta ¿qué es eso? y no sabe si lo ha entendido bien, entonces ¿de qué sirvió ir al servicio de salud? Lo que se da es curación. Y en lo que trabajamos nosotros es como prever. Tratamos de impulsar lo que es una cultura de prevención. Y la cultura de prevención tiene que ser basada en—lo que es una calidad de información que sea objetiva. Escoge a tu gusto. Aquí están las alternativas tú decides. En eso también estamos buscando que la persona se apodere de sí misma, se quiera a sí misma—y decir yo quiero hacer así o yo quiero hacer así. Sin juzgar tú decides. Pero ten la información. Dale las opciones, también construye responsabilidades (Miriam, Interview 22)

What I look for, in my humble opinion and based on my priorities, is that these things [forced sterilizations] never happen again. And for that you need to be very clear in your policies, in your standards, rules, the training you offer your health staff, in the information you give to all everyday citizens so that every individual knows what their rights are, what their responsibilities are. Because it’s not only—it’s the same: It takes two to tango. So it is a question of a lack of interfacing between the two parties. When we worked with a project funded by the World Bank for the Ministry of Health around services, to improve health services, it became more than clear to us that the communication between the provider and the population using those services was not good, it continues to not be good. Because of this, we tried to identify some elements that could improve that interaction/relationship, but there was this issue, how do I say this, a cultural issue—the issue of attitude around "I know more than you do" so that the interaction was not horizontal. You have to know your body; you need to know how you are doing so that the doctor is able to give you a good diagnosis. Because, if you do not know when your menstrual cycle is, if you do not know what it entails or what effects it has on you, how can the doctor tell you anything? And so, after the health staff tells a person—we are talking mainly about women, but men have to be included too—if you tell them they need to do this or that or that this is the problem you have, and the person does not ask what that all means, and you do not know whether they have understood correctly, then what is benefit of having visited the health services? What you get is a treatment. But we work in prevention. We try to motivate a culture of prevention. And this culture of prevention has to be based on—the quality of objective information. Make your own choices as you please. Here are the possible choices, you decide. Through this process we are looking for the person to feel herself empowered, to love herself so that she can say that she wants this thing or this other. Without judgment, you decide. But have the information. Give options, but also construct responsibility.
While it is quite the case that all people need access to information about their bodies and their health, this view of rights and responsibilities is based squarely on the modern, liberal rights subject: the autonomous actor with the right to choice—which indigenous peoples in Perú have never been allowed to be. To expect indigenous peoples to act as the equals of representatives of an establishment that has often been disdainful, condescending and violent without appearing to understand the dire consequences this has had in the past seems to be a version of victim blaming. In this situation, whether indigenous folks think they are equal to these representatives of the state is often immaterial, as evidenced by the kidnapped and forcibly sterilized women of the PNSRPF 1996-2000: the state will carry out its “will to improve” (Li 2007).

Put in this context, Miriam’s observation seems to suggest that in the marketplace of contraceptives, you are free to choose—but you are not free to not choose. For, as Miriam indicates “with choice comes responsibility.” Therefore it seems that the PNSRPF 1996-2000 was not only about extending rights, but also about producing particular kinds of citizens, a theme I take up in the next chapter.

Although it is necessary for people to know what their rights are and how to exercise them, it is also the case that to have responsibilities, one must first have rights. It can be argued that one creates one’s right to have rights by exercising them—a case made in the context of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., for instance (Stavig 2015; Schmidt 2012). But it also seems to be the case that indigenous peoples are often forced to defend themselves with rights
paradigms and discourses that do not speak to their everyday realities because, as mentioned earlier, they were not built with them in mind (Churchill 1994). In order to work in them, indigenous peoples must translate themselves, express their worldview in a language intelligible to the liberal West (Barsh 1996).

Rights that are geared toward indigenous peoples often have them perform “proper” forms of indigeneity (Hale 2006; Oliart 2008). As Ramos puts it, they must become “hyperreal Indians” (1992)—that is, they must conform to imposed discourses of what indigeneity is and how it operates (Stavig 2010). Reductive visions of indigeneity tend to collapse difference; but it appears to be the case that rights programs also collapse difference in order to operate. As mentioned earlier, in the case of indigenous women, their differences are ignored in order to construct the ‘universal’ woman (i.e. white, urban, etc.). This presents a challenge in a context of diversity

Perú es un país multicultural. Entonces el nativo quechua del Norte es totalmente diferente al del Sur y al del centro! Y la costa es totalmente diferente a la selva. Entonces cómo haces—en el tema de los otros ¿cómo haces campañas nacionales para promover conductas de prevención? O sea, ¿dónde encuentras un hilo que junta a todos? ese es uno de los grandes dilemas, retos que tenemos para promover los cambios de comportamiento—para promover comportamientos saludables en sexualidad (Interview 22)

Perú is a multicultural country. The indigenous Quechua from the North is completely different from the one from the South and from the Central Andes. And coastal peoples are completely different from people from the jungle. So how do you—with everyone in mind—how do you create a national campaign to promote a culture of prevention? Where do you find the thread that connects every culture? That is one of the great dilemmas and challenges we have in promoting changes in behavior—to promoting healthy sexual behavior.

Perhaps one of the only things that unites these groups is their experience as peoples classified as “indigenous.” As such, they have been subjected to internal colonialisit interventions by the state and public health apparatus to mitigate the “Indian Problem” on the one hand; and a long history of well-intentioned but often
ill-fated rights programs on the other. One could write a book on the archaeology of rights and development programs in indigenous communities in Perú: from the green revolution, to the introduction of iceberg lettuce as a cash crop, to putative “energy saving” solar ovens that had indigenous women running all over the mountain side to chase the sun (Schmidt, personal correspondence June 6, 2015), to the PNSRPF 1996-2000. These were all projects meant to help indigenous peoples, and particularly indigenous women.

Yet, as Brown points out the

... proliferation of rights for women also recalls that rights almost always serve as a mitigation—but not a resolution—of subordinating powers. While rights may attenuate the subordination and violation to which women are vulnerable in a masculinist, social, political, and economic regime, they vanquish neither the regime nor its mechanisms of reproduction. They do not eliminate male dominance even as they soften some of its effects. Such softening is not itself a problem, if violence is upon you, almost any means of reducing it is of value. The problem surfaces in the question of when and whether rights for women are formulated in such a way as to enable the escape of the subordinated from the site of that violation, and when and whether they build a fence around us at that site, regulating rather than challenging the conditions within (Brown 2000: 231).

What this interview with Miriam appears to show is that the reproductive and sexual rights assemblage, while well intentioned, helped to re-inscribe indigenous women’s subordination to the Peruvian woman essentialized as modern, western, and urban.

The image of the indigenous woman as needing to be taught her rights or to be saved from her husband also re-invigorates the 'Indian Problem, while eliding the larger issues of the structural violence that has marginalized indigenous women for centuries. This appears to further reveal the racial, ethnic, and gendered
subalternity of indigenous women within the reproductive and sexual rights assemblage. Therefore,

  to have a right as a woman is not to be free of being designated and subordinated by gender. Rather, while it may entail some protection from the most immobilizing features of that designation, it reinserts the designation as it protects us, and thus enables our further regulation through that designation...The regulatory dimension of identity based rights emerges to the extend that rights are never deployed ‘freely,’ but always within a discursive, hence normative context, precisely the context in which ‘woman’ (and any other identity category) is iterated and reiterated (Brown 2000: 232).

Indeed, to be indigenous, and to be an indigenous woman in Perú is to be regulated (de la Cadena 2000; Weismantel 1989a; Wiesmantel 1989b; Wilson 2004) and in many instances, as we will see, their human rights ignored.

**The Critical Human Rights Assemblage**

The second assemblage involved in the feminist movement was what I am calling the Critical Human Rights paradigm, which was characterized by a sociologically and historically informed view of human rights violations against indigenous peoples, and indigenous women in particular. The academic discussion of this assemblage within the feminist movement appears to be a new one. There has been work done on the involvement of the feminist movement in the expansion of women's rights (Molyneux 2002; Bueno-Hansen 2015), including in the realm of civil political rights (Rousseau 2006). There has also been some work done on the history of the establishment and expansion of the human rights movement in Peru, as well as on the relationship between the Peruvian human rights feminist movements (Bueno-Hansen 2015). However, it appears that there has not been
work done on the proliferation of human rights concerns within the Peruvian feminist movement itself. This is a contribution this thesis makes.

The human rights assemblage is less narrowly focused than the women’s rights and civil and political rights assemblages, which, one could argue, are subsets of the former. The larger human rights paradigm proffers tools for a more holistic reading of rights violations, readings that can account for histories of structural violence. This is particularly useful for indigenous peoples, as many of the rights violations they face as citizens and women cannot be untangled from the history of colonization they have faced as indigenous peoples (Radcliffe 1995).

It is also the case that rights as tools are only as dynamic as the people putting them into service. In the case of the feminist movement in Peru, feminist human rights lawyers like Giulia Tamayo and others took an expanded view of human rights, a critical view. This perspective read the forced sterilizations as not only violations of women’s rights as women, or civil political rights as citizens, but as human rights violations that targeted poor campesinas, particularly those that maintained indigenous practices (CLADEM 1999). This view of the sterilizations created the legal possibility of holding the state responsible for crimes of genocide under the Rome Convention.

Ultimately, however, this interpretation of the forced sterilizations—even with ample evidence of a systematic government plan of coercive sterilization—would be a hard sell, even in feminist circles. This is not to say that feminists did not think that the forcible sterilization of campesinas was egregious. Rather, it was an
issue of how the problem was to be defined, and what that might mean for reproductive rights in Peru.

There were those, as laid out in the former section, who feared denouncing Fujimori’s family planning program as genocide would spell an end to family planning in Peru all together. This apprehension was not unfounded: conservative Catholic politicians from the Opus Dei, such as Rafael Rey Rey and the Archbishop of Ayacucho, “accused the government of depriving the country of its most precious resource—people—and of trying to depopulate the Peruvian countryside” (Burt 1998: 5). Even prior to the roll out of the PNSRPF 1996-2000, conservative Catholic groups had painted the program as “genocidal.” This may have spawned the critiques circling within the late 1990s feminist movement of those feminists who called the sterilizations genocidal. These feminists were accused of “sounding like” the Catholic Church, which was also denouncing the sterilizations as genocide (Ewig 2006), though with the intent of halting further family planning programs in Peru. Eventually, the feminist movement on a whole did denounce the forced sterilizations despite fears that doing so would lead to the roll back of women’s reproductive rights.

Within the feminist movement, there were those who wanted to pursue the legal recourses offered by the human rights paradigm, but there were several factors that made this difficult in the immediate aftermath of the sterilizations. The first reason appears to have been the historically tenuous relationship between the human rights movement and the feminist movements in Peru. According to Bueno-Hansen, this relationship had been strained early on as the human rights movement
in Perú (like many in Latin America) was closely tied the Catholic Church, which did not have a strong history of supporting women’s reproductive rights (2015). The feminist movement’s skepticism of the human rights movement also stemmed from the human rights movement’s historical dismissal of the specific ways in which women’s rights were violated because of and through their position as women in society:

A Latin American regional study of the relationship between human rights advocates and feminists conducted since 2000 found that although many feminists consider themselves defenders of human rights, human rights circles are generally unaware of feminist critiques...From a feminist perspective, one of the most serious problems between the two movements is that human rights advocates lack recognition of feminist contributions...(Bueno-Hansen 2015: 33).

That is, the violation of women’s rights spans across the private/public divide, whereas standard human rights advocacy—in spite of huge strides in human rights accords and agreements—tends to focus on the violation of “public” (i.e. political) rights. As in many other legal contexts, the corpus of human rights conventions and agreements is far more progressive than its implementation would suggest.

In the 1990s, the relationship between the human rights and feminist movements did improve. This was due to their joint rights advocacy for Peruvians at global human rights conferences as it became clear that both movements were under surveillance and threat from the Fujimori government back home (Bueno-Hansen 2015). This consciousness arrived at outside of Perú never quite translated into domestic cooperation at home, however. This was partly due to the distrust the human rights movement had for the feminist movement—particularly as the sexual and reproductive rights assemblage was interpreted as “working with” the
Fujimorato in its extension of women’s reproductive rights in the 1990s (Bueno-Hansen 2015).

This distrust was somewhat overcome in the period of the democratic transition beginning in the late 1990s as it became clear that the Fujimorato was coming to a close. In this moment, these two movements came together to discuss what a transition to democracy might look like, and began to lobby for what would become the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC). However, because the PTRC was primarily concerned with the transition to democracy, it tended to focus on first generation civil and political rights—the right to free speech, to not be illegally detained, tortured, disappeared, or subjected to extrajudicial killings.

These first generation rights are known as “public rights” as they are seen as being essential for the elaboration of public, political life. That said, feminists did successfully lobby the PTRC to take the rampant sexual violence (rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery, forced maternity and abortion) of the internal armed conflict seriously, and the PTRC did investigate these violations, though not with the gendered perspective feminists had hoped for (Henríquez Ayín 2006).

Despite this rapprochement between the feminist and human rights movements, the cases of forced sterilizations did not make it into the considerations of the PTRC. Although it is clear that feminists did attempt to get the human rights community address the sterilizations as a human rights violation (Interviews 7, 13, 16a-d, 17a-b, 19, 21, 23), neither the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission nor the Coordinadora de Derechos Humanos (CNDDHH) the Human Rights
Coordinating Body would entertain the sterilizations as human rights violations (Getgen 2009; Interview 17a-b). However, that feminists did act to attempt to have the sterilizations recognized as rights violations is beyond a shadow of a doubt—an important historical consideration as some have levied criticisms against the feminist movement for “doing nothing” to help sterilized women (Ewig 2006; Bueno-Hansen 2015).

Nevertheless, as aforementioned, the disagreements within the feminist movement as to how to act, what to do, and what the consequences of each action might appear to have prevented the feminist movement from acting in a coordinated manner. Even as they denounced the forced sterilizations it was unclear how they should be spoken about. Was it a criminal act? Was it genocide? An act of systematic government abuse? Though the evidence of the latter was beginning to surface, it appears that disagreement within the larger feminist movement over what to do (Interview 16), and perhaps even the meaning and extent of “human rights” (Interview 16) worked against the sterilizations being seen as a human rights violation within the feminist movement of the late 1990s. In a notable episode, those feminists most tied to reading the sterilization as genocide were ousted from the Movimiento Amplio de Mujeres (MAM), a group of women and feminists working for women’s rights in the transition to democracy. Though the reason given for this ouster was mismanagement of funds (Interview 16), it is curious that these women were also specifically invested in the case of the forced sterilizations.
From this episode and others, it appears that those feminists working from a holistic and critical human rights perspective had difficulties if not having their voices heard (some like Giulia Tamayo were at the forefront of the transition and quite vociferous), having their interpretation of the forced sterilizations as human rights violations taken up in the process of the PTRC and the transition to democracy.\(^{50}\) The rest of this section will focus on the process of negotiating the status of the forced sterilizations within the PTRC and the transition to democracy.

**The PTRC and the CNNDH**

The Supreme Decree which created the PTRC in 2001 charged it with “investigating murders, kidnappings, forced disappearances, torture, and other gross bodily harms, and violations of the collective rights of the Andean and native communities in Peru” (Falcon 2005: 1). It was also charged with “clarifying the process, facts and responsibilities of the terrorist violence and human rights violations produced from May 1980 to November 2000, whether imputable to terrorist organizations or State agents, as well as proposing initiatives destined to affirm peace and harmony among Peruvians” (Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 1 in Getgen 2009: 15).\(^{51}\) The Commission’s final report of 2003 showed that almost 70,000 people had been killed and almost 15,000 ‘disappeared’ in the conflict and that of those, more than ninety percent came from the eight poorest Andean and

\(^{50}\) This attitude has changed in the present. From 2011 on, the parts of the mainstream feminist movement, most notably DEMUS, have taken up the case of the forced sterilizations in the Inter American system, winning legal battles on individual cases of sterilization. However, the larger class-action case against the Peruvian state has been archived by the Attorney General of Perú half a dozen times, most recently in December 2016, when the case was archived “definitively.”

\(^{51}\) It is worth noting that this grant of jurisdiction to the CVR stood in “...direct opposition to Fujimori’s 1995 amnesty laws and signified a possible end to the impunity that security forces had enjoyed under Fujimori’s regime” (Getgen 2009: 16).
Amazonian indigenous regions, with more than seventy percent of victims having been native Quechua speakers (Getgen 2009: 17).

In a nod to the precedent set by the Guatemalan Truth and Reconciliation Report (which included a chapter on sexual violence) as well as the South African TRC (which collected the experience of women under apartheid) the PTRC defined rape and other sexual violence within the purview of ‘gross bodily harm’ (Falcon 2005: 2). It is worth emphasizing how historically significant the inclusion of violence against women was in the PTRC. Human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch had also issued reports on the systemic use of sexual violence against women during the Peruvian internal armed conflict. Their reporting on such issues had also marked a shift in the understanding of the use of rape and sexual assault in armed conflicts as a human rights violation rather than a collateral damage of war (Falcon 2005).

It is important to keep in mind that the PTRC not only covered the armed conflict (1980-1995) but also includes the entirety of the Fujimorato (which ended in 2000) when an overwhelming majority of forced sterilizations took place. Moreover army personnel supported the sterilization effort with man-power and materials such as tents for “tubal ligation fairs.” Some explain away the involvement of army personnel, arguing that in a country such as Peru where basic infrastructure is lacking, the armed forces often take on a national guard-like function to support state efforts (Interview 22). Others, however, argue that this explanation does not take into account the terror visited upon Andean communities by the armed forces
and the added pressure their presence may have placed on indigenous women to comply with coercive mandates (Ballón 2014; Chamorro and Meza 2015).

Though the PTRC followed the openings made by the Guatemalan and South African TRCs to include sexual violence and violence against women more generally, it did not include the forced sterilizations. Thus, not all forms of violence against women were considered human rights violations, suggesting that although strides had been made to include gendered and specifically sexual violence, the human rights movement (which was at the fore of the transition process, including the PTRC) did not consider forced sterilizations as a violation of human rights. However, the Rome Convention of 1998 clearly states that inhibiting births within a group “...with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such” is an article of genocide (2002: 3).

In Perú, the precedent to not treat the forced sterilizations as a human right issue by the PTRC seems to have been laid even before the transition to democracy. In 1996, indigenous congresswoman Hilaria Supa Huamán went to the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (National Coordinator for Human Rights-CNDDHH) to denounce the forced sterilizations occurring in her home community of Anta in Cusco province. When I spoke to another ex-secretary of the

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Lawyers working on behalf of the sterilized women attempted to charge the Peruvian state with the crime of genocide. However, this case was archived by the Peruvian state. Since then, lawyers have tried to prove the lesser crime of crime against humanity which includes murder, extermination, enslavement, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, among other offenses when these are “...committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack” (1998: 3-4). The difficulty of proving genocide lies in the legal principal of mens rea or “guilty mind,” or the necessity of proving a state acted to intentionally destroy a particular protected group. This is quite difficult to prove, especially as the legal definition of genocide tends to be ahistorical and sociologically narrow (Feierstein 2014).
CNNDH, Nieves, she told me that this former secretary informed Congresswoman Supa Huamán that the issue of forced sterilization was not an issue of human rights.

I met Nieves in her home, a small apartment in a nice neighborhood of Lima.

She has a doctorate from a US institution and works in Lima as a lawyer, writer and social critic. When she mentioned that the secretary of the CNNDHH had not considered the forced sterilizations to be an issue of human rights, I asked her why.

Eso fue terrible. Eso fue...¿por qué? o sea, porque no era por eso sino era por—el tema de las esterilizaciones forzadas era un tema que no—desde la perspectiva de los derechos humanos no entraba, no encajaba en ese ‘frame’ tan absurdo de derechos humanos de conflicto armado interno. Entonces ah no, son esterilizaciones forzadas, son otra cosa, no sé qué no sé cuántos. No tiene que ver con—cuando eh, como me ha dicho en varias oportunidades [nombre] y otra gente que ha investigado sobre el tema, o sea, no es que el mandato del CVR fue, era sólo el conflicto armado interno. Sino fueron los años de la violencia y los epifenómenos también que se dieron alrededor. Francamente, el tema de las esterilizaciones forzadas pudo entrar tranquilamente en el informe ¿no? Pero entonces de esta perspectiva de derechos humanos vinculado con desaparición forzada, tortura, violación sexual etc etc—y el tema de violación sexual que fue un tema que salió en la comisión de la verdad eran un tema como Shhhhh—y si sabían—algunos sí sabían de algunos casos pero no, no, no se tenía el impetu digamos de hacer un análisis al respeto. Y bueno, lamentablemente eso fue la respuesta de Hilaria. Eso me lo ha dicho Hilaria a mí cuando yo he sido directora de la coordinadora. O sea, ella fue y me dijo “yo quisiera saber cuál es su posición porque en el año tal yo vine acá y aquí mismo en este sitio me dijeron que ese tema no era de DDHH”. Entonces yo dije, no puuuf, de ninguna manera, ¿no? Obviamente el tema de esterilizaciones forzadas es un tema de violación de derechos humanos de las mujeres. Es un tema prioritario y es un tema que interesa (entrevista 17)

That was terrible. That was...why? The issue of the forced sterilizations was an issue that didn’t—from the perspective of human rights, it didn't correspond, didn't fit into the absurd frame of human rights within an internal armed conflict. So they were like “Oh, they are forced sterilizations, that's something different, this, that, and the other. It doesn’t have to do with”—when, well, various people have told me on several occasions [name of informant] being one of them along with other people who have studied the subject—it's that...the mandate of the PTRC wasn't just to cover the internal armed conflict. It was to cover all the years of violence and the epiphenomena that these produced. Frankly, the forced sterilizations could have easily been a part of the [PTRC’s] final report, right? But from this perspective of human rights tied to forced disappearance, torture, rape, etc., etc.—even rape which was a part of the commission's report was an issue that was like shhhhhhh—and they did know about it. Some knew about it, but no, no, no they didn’t have the impetus to do a deep analysis on the issue. And unfortunately, that was the response they gave Hilaria. That is what Hilaria told me when I was secretary of the Coordinadora. She came and she said, “I would like to know what your position is [on the issue of forced sterilizations] because in this year, I came to this same office, and in this place they told me that this was not an issue of human rights.” So I said, pffffffff, without a doubt, right? Obviously the issue of forced sterilization is an issue of the violation of women’s human rights. It’s an issue of top priority and an issue that interests us (Interview 17).
Within the parameters of Nieve’s interpretation, the reticence of the CNDDHH to address the forced sterilizations as human rights violations stemmed from an inability to read them as an issue of human rights, thus indicating a structural limitation of the dominant discourse of human rights circulating in Peru at the time.

First, as Nieves indicates, there was an assumed hierarchy of rights and, thus, rights violations: “From this perspective of human rights tied to forced disappearance, torture, rape, etc., etc., etc.—even rape which was a part of the commission’s report was a theme that was like shhhhhh—and they did know about it.” To understand why these first generation, public rights such as the ones mentioned in this quote sit higher on the rights hierarchy, it is necessary to point out that “[u]ntil recently, the international human rights movement was defined in terms of those who first promoted it, Western-educated, propertied men” (Bahar 1996: 105). As Sarah Bahar (1996) indicates, rights advocacy by large NGOs like Amnesty International tended, through the 1990s, to focus on ‘first generation,’ or political and civil rights (110)—that is, public rights.

This division of public and private in the human rights paradigm is inherently prejudicial to women’s rights as many of the violations women are subject to take place in the so-called private realm, such as the home or the sphere of reproduction (Bahar 1996). While feminist critiques of the public/private divide have made this clear, these critiques had only started to be taken into consideration in the mid 1990s. However, when NGOs like Amnesty International (AI) did begin to incorporate women’s rights, it protected their rights in the public sphere as activists, trade unionists and political opponents of the state, but did not include the more
intimate spheres of women’s lives, like reproduction (Bahar 1996). Though the PTRC did include issues of sexual violence, it upheld this private/public divide in much the same way the human rights movement’s approach to violence against women did. Bahar argues, however, that states are responsible for direct as well as indirect violations of women’s rights stemming from state sanctioned discrimination of women that upholds patriarchal power both in the public and private spheres (1996).

It is also important to note the challenges the human rights movement has in attending to the rights of indigenous peoples—particularly before the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007. That the women who were forcibly sterilized appear to have been indigenous or could be read as indigenous is of vital importance due to the history of Perú in which violence against indigenous women has been part and parcel to the process of colonization. Thus, by prioritizing public rights, the PTRC doubly excluded forcibly sterilized campesina women: first, by excluding reproductive violence from its purview by continuing to prioritize public rights; and secondly, for not attending to the ethnic and racial components of PNSRPF 1996-2000 which might have qualified it as an act of state violence against protected group: genocide.

Certainly, in contexts of extreme violence such as that of the internal armed conflict (in which 70,000 people died and 15,000 were disappeared) and the Fujimorato it might be possible to see forced sterilizations as a lesser offense. In one correspondence, a human rights lawyer informed me that, “unless there are dead bodies, it’s hard to get the human rights community to get involved” (Piccard,
personal correspondence 6/17/16). This is where it appears that the critical human rights lawyers in the feminist movement were attempting to make an intervention.

The human rights discourse tends to read violations in ahistorical manner. This makes it difficult to show how rights violations occur across a time continuum and within historical context.

However, if taken within a history of colonial violence and the Republican and modern discourses of the “Indian Problem”, one could read the forced sterilizations as one instance of a 500-year campaign in the “elimination of the native” (Wolfe 1999). Indeed, in his book Genocide as Social Practice, Feierstein encourages his readers to rethink genocide as a punctual occurrence and to instead think of genocide as a product of genocidal societies—that is, societies whose configurations of power create and sustain the dehumanization of an inassimilable ‘Other,’ (2014).

In her work “All in the Family,” Hill Collins refers to both external and internal racisms. External racism, she argues,

occurs when powerful racial groups aim to remove less powerful groups from schools, jobs, neighborhoods, regions, nation-states, or social spaces that more powerful groups perceive as being their property or birthright. As racisms of elimination or extermination, external racisms foster ideas and practices that exclude outsiders or ‘others’ from these spaces. Designed to maintain the racial homogeneity of the neighborhood, school, occupational category or nation-state, such racisms aim to purify geographical or social space of the threat that inferior races seemingly represent. Expressed through practices such as xenophobia, genocide, or so-called ethnic cleansing, external racisms aim to remove undesirable races from what is seen a privileged home space (Collins 2001: 6).

53 It is important to note here that the definition of genocide in the Rome Statute of 1998 (which went into force in 2002) is not only the massacre of people, but encompasses a much wider range of actions.
This type of racism, as Collins states, is one of extermination and can be seen throughout Perú’s history in the colonial forms of repúblicas de indos, the encomienda system, and the mita (Stavig 1999), to the powerful geographic racisms developed in the early Republican Era that locate the indigenous outside metropolitan areas (Orlove 1993; de la Cadena 2000), to current struggles over extractive industries which not only continue to forcibly displace indigenous peoples, but to also expose them to toxic waste and physical attacks by forces hired by mining companies. Internal racisms on the other hand,

...occur when powerful racial groups subordinate less powerful racial groups within one society, typically because they need such to maintain their standard of living...as racisms of oppression and exploitation, internal racisms foster ideas and practices that partition society into distinctive racial groups and that maintain social hierarchies through racialized group identities. Expressed via practices such as colonialism, apartheid and racial segregation, internal racisms include and control less powerful groups within what is seen as a privileged home space (Collins 2001: 6-7)

Internal racism, then, is one of subordination and even instrumentalization as those peoples made subject to internal racism are exploited in the economic and social systems, as evidenced, for example by the persistence of the latifundio system into the 1960s and literacy requirements that continued to disenfranchise many indigenous Peruvians until legal reforms in 1979 (Paredes 2008: 6).

However, Collins is also quick to point out that “...while analytically distinct, neither form [of racism] typically appears by itself and, because they remain deeply intertwined...often reinforce one another...” (2001: 7). Indigenous peoples of Perú have been subject to both forms of racism throughout the country’s history in alternating and concurrent forms (Orlove 1993; Orlove 1998; Stavig 1999; Tamayo 1999; de la Cadena 2000; Weisman 2001; Larsen 2004; Paredes 2008; Golash-
Boza 2010; Ballón 2014). However, as much of this violence is structural and sustained through discourses such as the Indian Problem, genocidal racism has been normalized to the extent to appear mundane.

An example is fitting: One day while I was sitting in a café in the upper-middle class neighborhood of Miraflores, I fell into conversation with a man waiting for his espresso. Over the sound of hissing machines, I told him about my work: the forced sterilization of indigenous women. Taking a sip from his coffee, he said, “Those women should be grateful! They were reproducing like rabbits! How could they support all those kids being so poor? It’s irresponsible!” This gentleman’s statement, said with such surety, reveals the seed of a genocidal thread in the attitudes of dominant Peruvian society toward indigenous peoples: that they are problems that need fixing, even if that means intervening forcibly upon their bodies for the good of the nation.

By calling attention to these historical dynamics, critical human rights lawyers in the feminist movement appear to have attempted to bring this 500-year history to bear (Tamayo 1999; Interviews 17 and 18). From the writings of Giulia Tamayo (one of the most notable human rights lawyers in the feminist movement who published the first human rights report, Nada Personal, about the forced sterilizations in 1999) and several interviews I conducted, it seems that critical human rights did not only denote a legal framework for feminist human rights lawyers, but a sociological one as well. This sentiment has also been echoed in scholarly work on the matter:
The sterilization revelations created an enormous scandal in Peru and abroad. USAID, which had underwritten the government's family planning program, hired the Population Council to write a report, which feebly concluded that there had been lapses in quality of care. But Giulia and the advocates with whom she worked had none of it. They rightly asserted that the sterilizations were representative of pervasive structural violence and discrimination against women, and in particular indigenous women, in public health services across Peru, which, in turn, reflected the cleavages in Peruvian society (Yamin 2014: n.p.).

The feminists who worked in this nascent assemblage of critical human rights, took a critical stance towards issues of race, gender, and even human rights themselves (interviews 7,10, and 19); a deeper look into the origins of conflict and social unrest (interviews 13, 19, 23); and a critique of the nation state and the violence of its founding and continued reproduction through the “normalization” of its citizenry (Tamayo 2015: 103). This critical stance separates this assemblage from the other two feminists constellations and the dominant Peruvian human rights establishment as well.

Besides ideological differences, other more mundane factors help explain the exclusion of the forced sterilizations from the PTRC: a lack of time and money. The PTRC had a very broad mandate. As indicated by the quote above, they could investigate any phenomenon or epiphenomenon of both the internal armed conflict and the Fujimorato, from 1980 to 2000. But perhaps due to the Commission’s broad mandate and, perhaps, to the lack of a general decision-making policy, Commissioners “...drew different lines as to which cases to investigate and publish under the mandate” (Getgen 2009: 18). The forced sterilizations, it was decided, fell outside this mandate. But upon further research, Getgen found that
During separate interviews, two of the Peruvian Truth Commission’s Commissioners, Salomón Lerner Febres and Carlos Iván Degregori, stated that they did not think that these enforced sterilization cases were within the Truth Commission’s mandate. However, after looking at the text of the mandate once more, each one remarked that these cases could have been included in the mandate and that they were overlooked due to a lack of time and resources (2009: 18 footnote 115).

These interviews appear to indicate that the PTRC saw the sterilizations of indigenous women as a lesser crime in comparison with, for instance, the high levels of state and political corruption and generalized violence, which had affected all Peruvians and had captivated the nation’s attention.

Part of the PTRC’s mandate was to construct a historical memory of the armed conflict and Fujimorato. Deducing from the exclusion of the forced sterilizations, it appears that this ‘historical memory' was constructed around the interests of the urban elite. In so doing, “the Commission allowed Lima, the capital city and center of political discourse and public opinion, to remain ‘emotionally distant’ from these victims of State supported violence...In this regard the PTRC [helped] to perpetuate and legitimize physical, racial, and class divides in Peruvian society and impedes public support for accountability and reproductive justice through the rule of law” (Getgen 2009: 20). The argument made by these two representatives of the PTRC (one who is a very well-known and respected anthropologist) of lack of time and resources, fits within this frame. Moreover, it indicates rather than a punctual a more structural, systematic, and historic devaluation of indigenous women, and by extension, their rights—even by very well intentioned and learned people.
The effects of this exclusion are still ongoing twenty years later as forcibly sterilized women are still trying to prove that what was done to them was not only criminal, but a crime against humanity\textsuperscript{54} and perhaps even an act of genocide (Getgen 2009; Ballón 2014). Moreover, “...the omission of enforced sterilization cases excluded women who were already members of socially and politically marginalized groups and greatly decreased their chances for truth, accountability, and justice in Peruvian society” (Getgen 2009: 20).

\textbf{Civil Political Rights}

This appears to be the largest and the oldest of the feminist assemblages in Peru. Dealing in issues of representation, the civil and political assemblage seems to be most interested in making sure that Peruvian women and their interests are presented in government positions, law, and the penal code. The feminists I interviewed involved in civil political rights tended to focus on gender parity (the idea that representation, access and pay should be equal among men and women) and worked mainly in the areas of representation and involvement in civic life, namely electoral politics and governing. As Maia, from Flora Tristán’s Civil and Political Rights branch put it,

\textsuperscript{54} A case of crime against humanity has been brought against the state three separate times. The first two times it was archived, and the third is still in the hands of the State Attorney who is to make a decision whether to allow the case to advance by the end of June 2016.
concerted efforts by feminists and women’s rights workers have brought women’s issues to the fore. Feminists, thus, seem to be working in a political environment in which the usual customary paradigm are just as conservative. Imagine that you are trying to tell them that hey! the experiences of other countries indicate something else—but no. They don’t take it.

Maia went on to say that women’s issues are not taken seriously by the state and Peruvian society in general, and that even doing women’s studies is frowned upon in the major universities (”why, if they [women] haven’t done anything worth noting?” was the general attitude, she said) (Maia, Interview 16a).

As the previous statement indicates, the movement aims to get women into government (“you can’t make change from outside,” Maia indicated), pass laws, and put pressure on elected officials to act in women’s best interests (Interview 16a-d). According to Maia, this is important in a political environment that tends toward conservatism from its halls of congress to its intellectual circles:

Both the intellectual and political classes in Peru are very closed, very conservative. Those operators on the political Left and within the human rights paradigm are just as conservative. Imagine that you are trying to tell them that hey! the experiences of other countries indicate something else—but no. They don’t take it.

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55 Recent events, such as the Women’s March that took place in the fall of 2016 and other concerted efforts by feminists and women’s rights workers have brought women’s issues to the fore.
allies of feminism and women’s issues (where these exist), universities and intellectuals, are not necessarily taking these issues seriously. “In other countries like Ecuador and Bolivia, they are talking gender parity while we're over here trying not to lose the quotas [instituted by Fujimori]. This is a very closed and very conservative society, very conservative” (Maia, Interview 16a).

The debate: civil political or human rights?

People I spoke with in the civil political assemblage seemed to understand the differential nature of citizenship, and that indigenous and poor women in particular have a hard time accessing and defending their citizenship rights. Unlike other groups, rights workers in the civil political assemblage seemed to see citizenship rights as foundational to accessing human rights—or put another way, sees human rights in its supra-state position as incapable of assuring women’s civil political right:

Because we are talking about reality here. The mayor hit the councilwoman from X municipality. And they are two different things, her husband hitting her or the mayor hitting her. So these women put forth this—this thing that human rights are holistic. Holistic for whom? Don't bother me with this “holistic” thing. I want—just like they want us to say “sexual diversity” I want them to say “political harassment.” I don't defend human rights. I defend political rights. Because if we have political rights, we have them, and if we don't, we don't. And if we don't fight for them, we will never have gender parity in our countries.

Porque acá estamos hablando de la realidad. Es la regidora del municipio X, que el tipo le pegó. Que no es lo mismo que le pegue el marido a que le pegue el alcalde... Entonces ellas están con—esta cosa que decían que los derechos humanos son integrales—¿integrales para quién? No me jodan con su "integralidad," Acá yo quiero—así como los otros quieren que diga "diversidad sexual" yo quiero que digan "acoso político." Yo no defiendo a los derechos humanos. Yo defiendo a los derechos políticos. Porque tenemos derechos políticos, si no, no los tenemos. Y si no peleamos por ellos nunca va a haber paridad en nuestros países (Maia, Interview 16e).
As Maia intercedes here, the right to political presence and expression of women is a fundamental right that helps towards gender parity, at least in the public arena.

Civil political rights make up the 'first generation' of human rights and include the right to life, equality before the law, freedom of speech, voting rights, the right to a fair trial, and freedom of religion. Unlike second (cultural, social, and economic rights) and third generation human rights (collective rights, right to self-determination), these rights are negative—that is they protect the individual from state infringement of their liberties and participation in political life—and are written into most democratic states’ legal codes, including Perú’s. This is what this line of feminism is both promoting and defending: the right of women to be counted as citizens, and for the state to rectify the discrimination they experience as women through the civil codes of the state and through the entry of women into government.

But as the above quote indicates, there is often acrimony between civil political rights advocates and human rights advocates, which can sometimes create silos between their advocacies. For while feminists working in human rights saw the sterilizations as violation of second-generation rights that included the breach of indigenous women’s collective and cultural rights, for feminists working in the civil political realm, the violation of rights beyond first generation rights was unclear. This is an important distinction as the human rights assemblage read the violated subject as an indigenous woman whose identity protected her under human rights norms as an indigenous woman while the civil
political group read the violated subject as a citizen like any other Peruvian, appearing to collapse the particularities of indigenous experience as an historically targeted group into the essentialized category of ‘citizen’, making it possible for the case of sterilizations to be grouped under the larger authoritarian political umbrella.

This was partly the result of the Peruvian feminist movement being heavily entrenched in middle class, urban, coastal politics up to the present. “We lacked an intersectional approach,” Maia told me (Maia, Interview 16a). The insular nature of the 1990s feminist establishment (the same worker declared that the movement acted as if nothing outside of Lima existed) may have been one factor that made it difficult for some feminists to see how their approach to the sterilizations left (particularly) indigenous women vulnerable. Both the debate about where the sterilizations fit in the rights world and how they should be analyzed are partly evident in the history of the collective Movimiento Amplio de Mujeres (MAM) or the Broad Movement of Women.

**El Movimiento Amplio de Mujeres (MAM)**

There has been some literature published on MUDE, Mujeres Para la Democracia, or Women for Democracy (Rousseau 2006; Bueno Hansen 2015), a large social movement group that came together to address the Fujimorato and, later, the transition to democracy. Less discussed is MAM, or the Movimiento Amplio de Mujeres (Broad Women’s Movement). MAM was a more radical, leftist response to MUDE (Rousseau 2006) and was founded in 1996 as a feminist collective to reflect on the violence Perú had experienced in the 1980s and 1990s.
under the internal armed conflict and the rise of the *Fujimorato* (Rousseau 2006; Bueno-Hansen 2015; Zoila, Interview 9).

This collective was made up of NGO workers, members of other collectives like MUDE, and independent feminists, representing a wide range of interests and institutional associations and entanglements. After an almost decade-long hiatus, this collective was able to revive *El Canto de la Vida*, or the Song of Life, a feminist *encuentro* or countrywide meeting, the first since the internal armed conflict (Zoila, Interview 9). In their weekly meetings as MAM, these feminists discussed how they might live and operate as feminists under an authoritarian government that also planned on creating a Ministry of the Woman. As a collective, they issued communiqués detailing the type of Ministry they desired, a wide agenda of issues they wished to see addressed (such as violence against women), and a critique of ‘Fujimori’s women’ (Zoila, Interview 9).

In the initial years of MAM, there appears to have been a general consensus as to what they were living through and how they might respond as a collective. But this consensus appears to have broken down as reports of the forced sterilizations began to become more frequent and more detailed. Zoila, a representative of MAM Fundacional (an organization that was created after some felt that MAM was not addressing the forced sterilizations) spoke to me about the growing discord within MAM as it became clear to some that there was something amiss in the PNSRPF 1996-2000.
Pero cuando vimos el abuso que ya venía, pues, la cosa cambió ¿no? Entonces empezamos a hacer plantones frente el ministerio de salud, y ahí tuvimos otras certezas: no teníamos la solidaridad de todas las organizaciones que suponíamos ¿no? Entonces—Entonces ahí qué estaba pasando? ¿Qué es la solidaridad? Porque está bien, todas estábamos de acuerdo con querer un programa de planificación familiar para las mujeres, ¿no? porque es mi cuerpo, me lo cuido etcétera, etcétera. Y aparte que ya venía también, ya venían las conclusiones de la reunión mundial de planificación ¿no? este, la conferencia mundial de población que ya también traía estructurado ciertas cosas que eran derechos, y que se incorporaron rápidamente a, este, nuestras agendas. Este, pero la irregularidad? No podíamos estar de acuerdo. Entonces empezaron a haber fisuras en las opiniones ¿no? (Zoila, Interview 9).

But when we saw the abuses that were already in progress, things changed, right? So we started to have protests in front of the Ministry of Health, and there we became sure of other things: we didn't have the solidarity of other organizations that we thought we had. So what was happening? What is solidarity? Because it was ok, we were all on board with wanting a family planning program for women, right? Because it’s my body, and I take care of it, etcetera, etcetera. On top of this, the conclusions from the global meeting on family planning were coming out, right? The global conference on population had already put forth certain pronouncements about rights, and we incorporated them quickly into our agendas. But the irregularities? We couldn’t agree with these irregularities. So fissures began to show in the various opinions in the feminist movement.

According to Zoila, some people in the collective who were wary of the reports of forced sterilization began to question the leadership of Hilaria Supa Huamán, an indigenous political leader from Anta (an area near Cusco) whose sterilized women had formed a collective to denounce their forced sterilization. Illiterate at the time, Supa Huamán audio recorded the testimonies of women sterilized in her community and sent them to Giulia Tamayo, the human rights lawyer responsible for the first human rights report on the sterilizations (and also a member of MAM). Supa Huamán’s reading of the sterilizations was that they were a genocidal means of controlling the indigenous population of Peru. Her stance twenty years later as a now-congresswoman remains the same (Interviews 7, 9, 11, 13).

When I asked Zoila why she thought some feminists in MAM questioned Supa Huamán’s leadership she said
Because I feel that there was a conflict of interests regardless of the hopes of Peru to have its own family planning program, and our 'noise' was going to interfere with that. In this context, many worked through projects funded by the international community, training programs, IUD placement and who knows what else. All this was in danger in front of a public denunciation. I assume that all funding agencies were already investigating what was happening, though some of the funding agencies were involved like USAID.

The way Zoila interpreted the distrust of Supa Huamán was not as distrust of her person, but rather through the lens of NGO's entanglement with outside funding sources. The fear seems to have been that these sources of funding might dry up if it proved true that forced sterilizations were occurring—a denial not out of malice but out of survival. 56 It is also possible, as mentioned before, that feminists were afraid that Peruvian women would lose access to reproductive rights due to backlash from the religious right if they denounced the forced sterilizations (Sarah, Interview 21). It is perhaps for this reason (among others) that it took certain parts of the feminist movement longer to react to reports of forced sterilization.

It is important to note that as an organization MAM did not have an institutional home and therefore roved between NGO spaces; and did not have a source of income and thus relied on donated NGO funds for basic supplies like banners, transport, and other organizational necessities. So even as this interviewee questioned how NGOs got their money and what they were willing to

56 As I will explore in the next chapter, NGOs rely on grants from external donors for their operating costs, and are often charged with accepting projects not on the basis of community necessity, but rather out of a need to keep the NGO going (Fisher 1997).
do to keep it (namely, deny the possibility of forced sterilizations as institutions), MAM continued to use these funds.

But again, as reports of forced sterilizations continued to pour in during the last years of the Fujimorato, the debate between feminists as to how to respond ended in silence, and later acrimony. Zoila states,

Entonces éramos como unas gitanas, pero también yo les decía, bueno, las ONGs, las instituciones que tengan local tienen que comprarse la responsabilidad y alojarnos... Entonces cuatro reuniones mensuales en cada institución ¿no? Eso fue interesante. Pero las reuniones donde era la opinión de peso pesado, yo me di cuenta que habían dificultades ¿no? Habían organizaciones que decían que sí estaban de acuerdo con el programa de Fujimori—con otras cosas no, pero sí con su programa... Y bueno, a la hora de la hora, estábamos en un plantón, de los infinitos plantones frente al Ministerio de Salud sobre todo exigiendo revisión de los programas, exigiendo alto a la violación de los derechos. Siempre había un tema, este, que colocábamos. Y a veces éramos 10 personas. Y no aparecían las organizaciones. O sea que, a mí que no me digan—porque ahora yo las veo que sacan su comunicado que siempre estuvieron. No fue así. No fue así. Nos dejaron muy solas (Interview 9).

Eventually, Zoila and several others were ousted from MAM. According to another member of MAM, these women were ousted from the organization for not informing the membership of a sum of money they had received (Maia, Interview 16). However, Zoila argues that this money had been procured and sent to another Lima based women’s rights legal NGO to fund investigations and legal denouncements of the sterilizations, an investigation that MAM appeared to have been loathe back (Zoila, Interview 9).
It is crucial to note in this back and forth, that those ousted from MAM were those most planted within the critical human rights—and even indigenous rights—paradigm which saw the sterilizations as not only human rights abuses, but as crimes against humanity (CLADEM 1999), and even genocide (Zoila, Interviews 9; Interview 19). Taken in context this suggests the possibility that they were not only ousted for supposed mishandling of money, but perhaps also for their insistence that the sterilizations were not only product of the “ordinary political violence” (Uvin 1998) of the Fujimorato, but a systematic government policy of a violation of indigenous women’s human rights. This would differentiate the sterilizations from the murder, disappearances, and torture of women during the internal armed conflict (which fell under civil political rights), and it appears that this differentiation presented political difficulties. Indeed, when asked what divided MAM, one integrant said Giulia Tamayo (i.e. the critical human rights framework) and the lack of transparency about the money coming in for the investigation of the sterilizations (Maia, Interview 16).

The difference in these two positions—that of the civil political rights and that of critical human rights—thus, appears to have come down to how each group perceived what was happening based on their position within the rights movement and the risks that denouncing the program would create a backlash toward reproductive rights. Zoila, of MAM Fundacional, the group that would go on to accompany the organization of sterilized women in Anta, spoke about it this way:
Porque las compañeras de repente que no eran abogadas ¿no? o que no tenían mucho conocimiento de la teoría de los derechos humanos, y en ese momento este, ehhh, tal vez ehhh, por temor a que--a que la iglesia, que estaba en contra de la creación del programa y que, pudiera demandar su cierre, ¿no? Y que de esa manera nos íbamos a quedar sin política de anticoncepción, ¿no? Entonces creo que al comienzo hubo mucho debate en cómo se debía caracterizar el problema, si era un problema aislado, si eran casos excepcionales, si eran "excesos" como lo suelen llamar a las cosas ¿no? Este, pero para Giulia [Tamayo] siempre fue violación de los derechos humanos ¿no? ¿Por qué? Porque era a través del estado que se estaba, ehhh, esterilizando a las mujeres... Ella sí sostenía que era una violación a los derechos humanos y que no eran delitos comunes ¿no? Entonces que no se traban de meras lesiones, homicidios, y menos por negligencia culposa sino que correspondía a toda una política. Y por lo tanto esa política, este, debía ser juzgada de acuerdo al estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional por delito de lesa humanidad en la modalidad de esterilizaciones forzadas (Interview 7).

Because some of our feminist comrades weren’t lawyers, right? and they didn’t have much knowledge about the theory of human rights, and at that time, ummm, maybe, ummm out of fear that—that the Church, which was against the creation of the program, could demand that it be terminated, no? And if that happened, we were going to end up without a contraceptives program, right? So I think at the beginning [of the reports of forced sterilizations] there was a lot of debate over how the problem should be characterized, whether it was an isolated problem, if they were exceptional cases, if they were “excesses” as people tend to call them, no? But Giulia [Tamayo] was always very clear that these were violations of human rights, right? Why? Because it was the state that was sterilizing women... she sustained the argument this was a violation of human rights and not just an infringement of the penal code, right? This was not a case that was about simple injury and murder, and even less about culpable negligence. It was the result of a state policy and political And for this reason, this policy should be tried according to the Rome statute within the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in the form of forced sterilization.

Hence, even though within MAM there were many different opinions as to what was happening, the dominance of the civil political group and their worries that denouncing the PNSRPF 1996-2000 would lead to a conservative backlash (which it did) appears to have dominated its political decisions and actions (Zoila and Maia, Interview 9 and 16a-d).

Furthermore, by grouping the sterilizations within the Fujimorato’s larger authoritarian attack on civil political rights rather than as an occurrence that went beyond the violation of these first generation rights, MAM as a whole left indigenous women vulnerable by not addressing the particularities of their situation as indigenous women within the Peruvian system. It is impossible to
know what might have happened if the feminist movement as-a-whole had come together to denounce the sterilizations as human rights violations and crimes against humanity, but it is possible that they would have been able to successfully bring a case against the state—something they have yet to be able to accomplish even twenty years later due to political recalcitrance.

It is important to remember that at the time of these debates, the Fujimori government was doing everything in its power to deny and/or spin the reports of forced sterilization, which it managed to do quite effectively by bringing in counter testimonials, from satisfied women, doctors, and government functionaries (Ballón 2014; Interview 19). As a consequence, in the early days of denouncements (1996, 1997, 1998) of the PNSRPF 1996-2000 (which were mostly being made by local dioceses and the local ombudsman’s office), one could still say that the Catholic Church, for instance, was denouncing out of a hope to reverse the liberalization of reproductive rights—i.e. it was unthinkable that the Church could be telling the truth.

However, by the time Fujimori left Perú in 2000 and the transition toward democracy began, there was enough evidence to prove that the coercive nature of the PNSRPF 1996-2000 had not been imagined, but had been a systemic government abuse of indigenous women’s rights. (Boesten 2007; Getgen 2009; Ballón 2014; Theidon 2014). But by the time those in the civil political branch of the feminist movement became convinced of this, they did not have political leverage, energy, or focus to make sure the sterilizations were included in the transition platform. Reflection on this time Maia stated that
the problem with the democratic transition—because during the democratic transition, when the document guiding the democratic transition (which was primarily put together by the civil society) was debated, what were they debating? What did they put in the document? One of the things there was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; another was decentralization. Another was organizing new elections. But I think during that time the feminist movement did not have the strength to get the issues of the sterilizations into the transition’s document, right? And they didn’t have the strength because the feminist sectors that are part of the transition are those that deal more closely with the political process, right? So we can also say that the movement didn’t know how to get the ear of the people who were putting items on the transition’s agenda. I think that is where the difficulty lay, don’t you think? No theme close to the women made it into the democratic transition’s agenda. Not one. The issues of the sterilizations should have been there. And that is a debt we have to those women.

In other words, during the ‘return to democracy’ some of Peru’s most violated citizens were overlooked as the civil and political rights assemblage spent its political capital on helping re-building democratic institutions for ‘all’ Peruvians— institutions which, unfortunately, did not serve indigenous women they remained outside the protections of citizenship. But as Maia said, with regret in her voice, addressing the sterilizations should have been part of the transition process. “That is a debt we have to those women.”

The point is nt to assign blame, but rather to see how the violation of indigenous women’s rights could come to pass within the extension of women’s rights. Within the civil political arena, it is clear that the emphasis was on all Peruvian ‘citizens’ and that in this focus, the particular experiences of indigenous peoples as second class citizens was not adequately addressed due to the conceptual
lacunae created by the siloization of civil political rights from other types of rights and the unthinkable that civil political rights could not cover indigenous women.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have worked to show the way in which the reproductive and sexual rights, human rights, and civil political rights assemblages were working under the assumption that indigenous women would be protected by rights paradigms. This assumption came from beliefs in the universality of the rights subject—a progressive stance—but which unfortunately did not correspond to the realities of indigenous women’s access to rights on the ground. While rights subjects in name, as citizens indigenous women nonetheless are held in a position of citizen-non-citizens by the Peruvian state, which curtails their legibility in the rights system. The efforts by all three rights assemblages show that the rights situation of indigenous women was not always apparent to rights defenders, which made it difficult for those who did see what was happening to advocate for indigenous women, and indeed, for indigenous women to advocate for themselves.

Feminist rights defenders work with the tools they have at hand. As Brown (2010) indicates, the paradox of rights places rights workers in a bind: one must use the rights tools at hand to advocate against deadly violence, but doing so can perpetuate categories of victimization without addressing the larger structural issues causing those violations in the first place. Both the reproductive and sexual rights and civil and politic rights discourses could not see beyond their colonial strictures, which excluded indigenous women from their purview, even if
unintentionally so. The attempts by the critical human rights assemblage to rectify this omission through historicizing the sterilizations were met with resistance and were ultimately unable to call the rights community to account. This case study serves as an illustration of the power of the rights movement.
Conclusions and Further Research

This thesis has been guided by one main question: how did it come to pass that the introduction of a women’s rights campaign—and particularly a family planning program—became a vehicle for the violation of campesina women’s rights? I argued that the history of structural violence in Peru (hygienic racism, the Indian Problem, and the neoliberal Fujimorato) prejudiced the possibility of campesinas having their rights recognized by the state. While citizens according to legal status, campesinas’ social citizenship (social belonging) is tenuous at best, reflective of an inclusive exclusion. This inclusion based on a social exclusion reproduces the structure of power through indigenous people’s continued exploitation, marginalization and oppression (Carbado 2005).

The human rights system was developed to address the limitations of citizenship, especially in contexts where social citizenship is not granted and legal citizenship rights are quite frequently denied. These structural realities render those whose rights are ignored as, ironically, illegible as right bearers—that is, without the right to have rights (Arendt 1962; Benhabib 2004). Unfortunately, human rights discourses have regularly cleaved to liberal, humanistic notions of the human (i.e. “man”), as a universal category devoid of specific contexts of inequality or discrimination brought by the intersection of gender, ethnicity, and class, among other key categories. In consequence, these discourses have tended to exclude women and indigenous peoples from the category of “the human” in practice. In the last several decades, great strides have been made to include both these categories of people under the purview of human rights by making the particular violences
perpetrated against them legible as rights violations. (CEDAW and UNDRIP are evidence of this.) Nevertheless, despite these efforts, there remains a significant gap between states’ commitment to UN conventions through signature and the translation of these commitments into national law and practice.

The violence perpetrated against indigenous women through forced sterilization in Perú presents a particular challenge as those women affected fall into both the categories of “women” and “indigenous,” challenging rights workers to respect campesina rights not as women or indigenous people but as indigenous women. Programs like the PNSRPF 1996-2000 (which targeted poor, illiterate indigenous women for sterilizations) particularly reveal the necessity of understanding citizenship and human rights as historically produced discourses that are limited in their ability to protect the most socially vulnerable (Bahar 1996; Cheah 2006; Weheliye 2014).

In the case of the forced sterilization of indigenous women during the course of the PNSRPF 1996-2000, the reproductive and sexual rights and civil and political rights assemblages actively participated in discussions of the responsibilities of the Peruvian state and women’s organizations in the face of such an egregious criminal abuse. Unfortunately, they assumed that campesinas fit in the categories of “(all) women” and “(all) citizens,” when in practice they were historically, socially—if not legally—inclusively excluded from both categories. Feminist rights defenders’ belief in the universality of the law of citizenship and human rights contributed, though unwittingly, to the erasure of difference by assuming the social and political equality of indigenous people in general, thus contributing to the violence social “others”
were subject to. Advocacy without attention to blind spots in the law—in this particular case, the assumption of a universal human or woman regardless of historic discrimination—portends to leave the most vulnerable (in this case campesinas) subject to violence without justice.

Moreover, it is possible that issues of racialized geographies, the discourse of the Indian Problem (as a problem of modernity), and the stark hierarchicalization among people of different races, classes, and ethnicities also undergirded and/or seeped into how some feminist rights workers read the forced sterilizations.

The complexity of this situation is further compounded by what Brown calls “the paradox of rights” (2000): while human rights are limited, they are the tools available to people concerned with stopping violence against women and violence against indigenous peoples. Using these tools, however, runs the risk of (re)inscribing women and indigenous peoples as victims, or making suffering the prerequisite for legal inclusion (Weheliye 2014). However, one could argue that within situations of extreme violence like the ones indigenous people (and especially indigenous women) suffered from 1980 to 2000 (at the very minimum), any protection that the human rights system can bring is welcome, even if it does not address the structural root from which violence springs (i.e. the interlacing of colonialism, gender bias, capitalism, etc.).

Though I have spent the majority of this thesis critiquing the Peruvian human rights and women’s rights discourses because of their universalizing tendencies, I also would venture to say that the aspirations presented by human rights are necessary as antidotes to abusive and oppressive relations of global
power. The work of the Peruvian feminist assemblages in this thesis attempted to expand human rights toward this inclusive goal—though some with more understanding of the ways in which human rights and feminist discourses excluded campesina women than others. The feminists in the critical human rights assemblage, it appears, were the most inclusive in their vision as they attended to the historical context of the forced sterilizations. By treating the sterilizations not as an isolated incident but as a node in a longer genealogy of violations of indigenous people’s rights, the critical human rights assemblage came closest to echoing how forcibly sterilized campesina women conceptualized the violation of their rights: as part of a slow, 500 year genocide punctuated by moments of extreme violence (Succar Rahme, García Trovato, Reyes Solari, Supa Huamán 2002).

Though concerned by the violation of campesinas’ rights, this was not the reading the reproductive and sexual rights and civil and political rights assemblages took away. As I have discussed, this could be for various reasons. For the reproductive and sexual rights assemblage, for instance, mentioning genocide in the same sentence as family planning seemed to doom reproductive rights in Perú—and indeed it did. With pressure from conservative Catholic congress members, the post-democratic transition of Toledo government did roll back funding for family planning.

For the civil and political rights assemblage, the transition to democracy and the effect the corruption of the Fujimori government had had on “all Peruvians” seemed to take precedence over issues that affected a smaller portion of Perú’s population, like the forced sterilizations of indigenous women. However, as I found
out through my interviews with several feminists, this assemblage did advocate for the forced sterilizations to be treated by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, though unsuccessfully. Dissent and disagreement within this assemblage as to how to deal with the forced sterilizations also made it difficult for it to respond in a sustained and effective manner.

This turns me to a question asked many times with equal intensity and necessity: can the subaltern speak (Spivak 1988)? In the face of the transition to democracy, it appears that the voices of the affected women were silenced by the roar of the many other crimes committed by the Fujimori regime (Interview 9). Though a government commission placed the responsibility for the forced sterilizations squarely on the Fujimori regime in 2003, by then it appears to have been too late for a concerted and popularly supported legal case: the political tides had turned.

Several feminist organizations involved in the critical human rights assemblage oversaw the case on behalf of the forcibly sterilized women through the decade of 2000. However, it was not until 2011 that concern for the case was renewed in wider society. Though there have been many mobilizations on behalf of the affected women, there is a concerning tendency to use their stories and images in the wider feminist movement in ways that may or may not benefit the campesinas affected by Fujimori’s campaign. Indeed, political rifts have opened between some feminist organizations and the groups of Affected Women around issues of representation (Zoila, Interview 9; Camila, Interview 13). There is much that remains to be explored about these issues.
Avenues for further research

Further research on the relationship between feminist rights NGOs and campesinas might explore the effect of neoliberal governmentality on NGOing. Some authors argue that neoliberalism has weakened the power and sovereignty of the nation-state; others have seen not a decrease in power, but rather a transformation in what power looks like and how it operates (Larner 2000; Hale 2005; Sending and Neumann 2006; Kingfisher and Maskovsky 2008; Wilson 2008). Focusing in on neoliberal governmentality, these authors show how neoliberal reforms have reconfigured the relationship between the state and civil society (including NGOs), inviting us to see neoliberalism as a process rather than a static institution (Kingfisher and Maskovsky 2008).

This view of neoliberalism also stands to shift conceptions of the flow of governing from a hierarchical, top-down, sovereignty-based model to a more horizontal network-based model of governing (Sending and Neumann 2006:651). It is possible that neoliberalism inaugurated a shift in the way governmentality—the conduct of conduct—operates (Foucault 1991). “If citizenship is a form of governing that is diffuse, located at many sites in everyday life, then the neoliberalization of citizenship is the reconfiguration of those sites of governance from state to civil society and a reconfiguration of the goals of governance, particularly under the will to improve” (Li 2007). This means that bodies other than the government take part in shaping citizens and the conduct of those hoping to be legible as citizens. NGOs are one such non-governmental body engaged in the shaping the conduct of conducts.
In reference to NGOs and governmentality, Sending and Neumann argue that

These actors [NGOs] are not brought into the fold and as such are deprived of their autonomy and as recognized representatives of 'civil society.' Rather, it is precisely their status as actors that possess expertise central to the task of governing and, much more importantly, the fact that they appear to be autonomous political subjects with a capacity for political-will formation that make them key subjects of, and allies in, governmental tasks (2006: 668).

Through their expertise, NGOs can help make populations legible to the state—wittingly or unwittingly—as groups in need of intervention (Ferguson 1990; Sending and Neumann 2006; Li 2007). Moreover, in many countries, including Perú, NGOs have taken over services formerly provided by the state due to austerity measures introduced under neoliberal reform. As clearinghouses of services, NGOs again help “teach” those they serve how to present themselves to the state to be eligible for services—that is, how to be “proper” citizens (Ong 2003; Stavig 2010). In both the instances of aiding in making populations legible and in being clearinghouses of services, NGOs become implicated in the practices of governmentality.

In the case of the forced sterilizations, one wonders whether the dynamics of neoliberal governmentality did not affect how feminist organizations interacted with both campesinas and the state. I am especially interested in whether this dynamic played a role in how rights workers in the reproductive and sexual rights assemblage understood their involvement in the rollout of the PNSRPF 1996-2000. Some argued that the feminist movement had been co-opted by the state. But in a situation of neoliberal governmentality where NGOs freely share their expertise, can it rightly be said they were co-opted? Or is it more complicated than this? Can NGOs—non-governmental, ostensibly independent bodies—be willful subjects
under neoliberal governmentality? Or does a horizontal, network-based model of governing preclude researchers from assuming the independence of NGOs?

Another course of research might follow how the inclusive exclusion of campesinos in Peruvian society has left them—their bodies, lands, and identity—open to being politically and economically instrumentalizable. A historical example of this is the War of the Pacific in which the Peruvian government implored indigenous peoples to “be citizens” and fight for their country. After Perú lost the war, the same voices that implored indigenous peoples to fight blamed the loss on indigenous people’s laziness and general lack of patriotism—though history has shown that indigenous soldiers were not to blame for the loss of the war (Larson 2004). This example illustrates how indigenous peoples are included within the nation when expedient but also readily scapegoated and excluded in order to rebuild a sense of national pride. Neither this inclusion nor exclusion was readily beneficial to indigenous peoples, however.

The forced sterilization of indigenous women and the case built up around them also seem to exhibit this tendency towards instrumentalizing indigenous life for others’ benefit. One could argue that indigenous bodies were instrumentalized in service of neoliberal modernization by the Fujimori regime. Another more contentious argument might be made citing the instrumentalizing tendency of both the human rights and conservative Catholic movements in Peru. There has been a tendency in some of the literature to inflate the number of forced sterilizations. One is led to believe by some accounts that all 297,000 sterilizations reported by the government were forced. At least one person I interviewed argued that this simply
was not the case and actually did more harm than good by painting campesinas and other sterilized people as not only ignorant, but as victims, wholesale (Interview 18). So why do it?

It is absolutely the case that the human rights system responds more quickly and with more resources where there are a significant number of victims—particularly if those victims are sympathetic (Uvin 1998; Stavig 2010). Interestingly, those maximizing the number of forced sterilizations belong to both the human rights crowd and the Catholic Right. In fact, these two seemingly opposing bodies have been the only ones to read what happened to the indigenous community as a possible genocide—though for very different reasons. Further research might delve into the politics of representation and how this affects campesinas’ fight for justice.

Finally, in further studies on this subject, it might be productive to employ a decolonial, feminist methodology to plan, execute and write up research about the relationship between the feminist movement and campesinas in Peru. This approach might help contribute to new dialogues between these two groups toward a shared politics of structural change. Focusing more on the politics of empowerment and development, specifically the critiques levied on both as colonial enterprises, might also be another way of addressing this issue (Escobar 1995).

For the time being, I will share my observations and reflections with the Peruvian feminist movement—something many interviewees were excited about—in order to reflect upon the movement’s methods, goals, assumptions, and politics. The goal of my work is to go beyond interpreting the world towards working with people toward social transformation. As Marx famously said, “[t]he philosophers
have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx 1998[1888]).
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