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Researching and asserting Aboriginal rights in Rupert's Land

Department of Native American Studies

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Without supervision appropriate to the Aboriginal world in which this thesis study’s innovations are to be applied, and without access to relevant legal expertise, achieving the aims of this study would have proven impossible. This author is very grateful to Leroy Little Bear for that supervision throughout this study. His timely comments and suggestions allowed the author to explore and innovate to a greater degree than would have been otherwise possible. Exploration and innovation, have throughout this study been prerequisite to accommodating an Aboriginal cognitive style and an Aboriginal customary legal style. Not only did this author benefit from Little Bear’s generosity, he also gained access to his peers. This author acknowledges the kind and advice of Kent McNeil, James Youngblood Henderson, John Borrows, Brian Slattery, and Mark Walters.

Given the surprising discoveries of this study and their likely impact, the objectivity of my thesis study committee members, Shawn Bubel and Steve Ferzacca, in requiring pertinent and probative evidence within an appropriate framework, was essential to achieving the aims of this study. This author is also much indebted to Kathy Schrage for her patient support and rescue services when they were needed.

Being at the University of Lethbridge meant being far from home, Waskaganish, northern Quebec. That was prevented from being a significant obstacle by good friends such as Lois and Harley Frank and their family, Rodney Big Bull, Adrian and Leslie Stimson, Delray Wodsworth, Ray and Mary Amato, and the late Joan Ryan.

This thesis would neither have been as interesting or possible without the moral support this author has enjoyed from his wife Gerti, along with five sons and daughters, plus ten grandchildren. This author’s motivations to both take on this challenge and to complete it were very much motivated by a desire to make them proud.
ABSTRACT

It was the realization that certain legal, economic and political questions, unresolved, frustrate, even prevent satisfying lives in the relatively small world of Waskaganish that motivated this thesis study about protecting the liberties of the Aboriginal inhabitants of what was formerly called Rupert’s Land. This author was well aware that such liberties have not enjoyed the kind and level of protection that is normal elsewhere in Canada from arbitrary use of authority. But, this author believed and is now assured that this is an error that can be corrected within the current Canadian legal and political system.

Investigating the assurances granted to the inhabitants of Rupert’s Land at the time of annexation produced a solemn and binding promise made by the Canadian House of Commons and Senate to Her Majesty’s Government of Great Britain. That promise was entrenched in Canada’s first constitution, itself a British statute. In the form of proclamations, orders-in-council, published documents and sworn testimony, this study uncovered the proof of such assurances, their content and their survival. Moreover, these forms of proof are all admissible in the fact-finding of Canadian courts as ‘so notorious as to not require any further proof’.

The resurrection and revival of these assurances is fundamentally important to achieving any education or socio-cultural goal. Equally important is the need to understand why and how these assurances have been so long suppressed. In addition, this author needed to explore the convergence possible between the command order of the Canadian state and the customary order of the Aboriginal inhabitants of Rupert’s Land. Such convergence is prerequisite to restoring the relative equilibrium that characterized two centuries of a bĳural relationship between the Hudson’s Bay Company and Aboriginal First Nations.

Finally, the author illustrates and corroborates such a bĳural approach in the example of training, apprenticeship and recognition of competence within common, provincially certified trades.
FORWARD

Don't ask what is right or wrong... These questions are very dangerous... Right is only the goodness you carry in your heart, love for your ancestors, for your family. Wrong is what comes between you and that love.

(Advice of father to daughter, Le Ly Fong, a Vietnamese woman in 1970s, war torn Viet Nam, in an autobiographical movie, Heaven and Earth, 1989)

This author has relied on this piece of wisdom during a life where there have been often conflicting standards for right or wrong. This author would add, that any uncertainty of one’s family or ancestors could be compensated for by the love of lifelong friends. Although fine examples of parents and grandparents were readily available, it was at times challenging when negotiating more than one world, to know what a man should do in a new and challenging situation. On October 22, 2007, the author lost a dear friend of almost forty years. Stephen Ratt of Wemindji died suddenly while recovering from a year of illness. Only a day earlier, the author had made plans to fly up the east coast of James Bay to visit him in order, as he had done many times before, pick Stephen’s brains, this time on efforts that had arisen from this thesis study. Since first meeting in 1970, the author had valued Stephen’s kind words, good humour and reliable advice. Stephen will be missed, but this author will always know what Stephen would advise in any situation as easily as remembering the melody and words of a favourite song.
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ABREVIATIONS
BNA Act British North America Act, 1867
CNA Cree Naskapi Act, 1984
CLVA Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865
RL&NWTO Rupert’s Land & North-Western Territory Order, 1870
RP1763 Royal Proclamation, 1763
RP1869 Royal Proclamation, 1869
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem

During the late summer and fall of 2003, this author began a long awaited opportunity to participate in delivering a secondary school education, organized to serve the needs and preferences of northern Algonquian Aboriginals. Almost three decades earlier, this author had completed a doctoral thesis in education and anthropology entitled, The Legacy of Dress-Up Creek: Formal Education for Northern Algonquian Hunters. For most of the intervening years, this author had worked with the Cree School Board, Cree Trapper’s Association, Crees of Waskaganish First Nation and other similar organizations of northern Quebec, developing programs to serve the same needs and preferences. From 1989 through 1990, this author had opportunities with Cree and Ojibwa adults from the northern parts of Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec to develop and implement training of three or four months duration, in tourism outfitting and traditional hunting and trapping. In the late summer of 2003, as a teacher of ‘academic’ courses, this author was to have an opportunity to assist the delivery of a normal, junior matriculation (Quebec first cycle) secondary school curriculum, in a traditional Waskaganish Cree social context. This implied moving from one location to another according to a traditional Cree cycle and functioning socially as a hunting group. The students, five boys and five girls were in their mid teens. This Alternative Education Program was their last chance to get a secondary school education as they had already experienced too many difficulties, usually social difficulties, in order to continue in the conventional, Euro-Canadian styled school of Waskaganish. In addition to this author, a Waskaganish Cree couple, Mary and Charlie Diamond, were also hired to teach, especially those matters that related to traditional Cree culture. The plan was that, Mary and Charlie Diamond, recognized as Cree elders and this author, qualified by formal education and relevant experience, could together deliver an authentic secondary school education to the ten Cree teenagers, in a manner more attuned to their needs and preferences than the Euro-Canadian styled school of Waskaganish.
Certainly, a traditional Cree camp proved to be just the kind of intimate and nurturing climate needed. The fact that Mary and Charlie Diamond are this author’s sister-in-law and brother-in-law and that the students were either related or well known, encouraged such an atmosphere. The absence of imposed structure such as classroom walls, and rotation on a schedule helped as well, in adopting the more spontaneous or intuitive traditional Cree order of a hunting camp. It was also possible to lever those activities which students enjoyed less, such as mathematics, language arts and other written work, against those activities such as hunting, fishing and crafts which they enjoyed more.

Unfortunately, as our efforts became increasingly spontaneous, even though the students proved to be significantly more productive, the monopoly of coercive authority retained by the school and school board administration grew ever larger as a serious and unpredictable obstacle. For example, ‘teachers’ are qualified in a Cree context by their particular experience with the student combined with their competence in the particular knowledge and skills required. The ‘best’ teachers are typically those persons who have already established an effective and affectionate relationship with the student. In contrast, Euro-centric qualifications are authoritative, based on formal education sanctioned by the state. Because the human and financial resources of the school and the school board were organized in accordance with Euro-Canadian authoritative criteria, the ‘best’ teachers were beyond the reach of our Alternative Education Program. Worse, instead of being directed and organized by Cree traditions of leadership and consensus, our program was subject to commands, constructed in isolation. It did not take the students and their families long to realize that our program was in fact organized in the same manner as the conventional village school, but located in an alternative place. Finally, compelled to act as conventional Euro-Canadian styled teachers, Mary, Charlie and this author were obliged to use or depend on a monopoly of coercive authority for maintaining order in a non-Euro-Canadian context. By mid November, the Alternative Education Project was suffering most of the same organizational difficulties as the regular village school, exacerbated by the rigors of the Canadian subarctic and a dependence on a distant administration, increasingly more imposing and unpredictable.
The experience of the Alternative Education Project confirmed both the positive and the negative conclusions reached by this author as a result of previous experience with both adults acquiring vocational skills, and children following a secondary school education. First, most if not all of the terminal objectives of knowledge and skill that comprise a secondary school education could be very effectively accomplished in a Cree socio-cultural setting according to established Cree practices. For those students who could not or would not embrace Euro-Canadian cognitive and social style, probably the only way that they will complete a secondary education is by such a Cree socio-cultural approach. Secondly, when Cree, Aboriginal spontaneous order is subjected to interference by Euro-centric commanded order, the former order disintegrates and the latter commanded order fails to accomplish compliant order. Without an appearance of fairness and justification, Euro-centric commanded order fails to stimulate effective Cree participation and deference. As in the Euro-centric village school, students and their families expressed their resistance to commanded order with their feet, with the result that the village school produces a ninety percent or greater student dropout rate. Thirdly, Euro-centric educators, especially those with authority, did not believe in the existence or value of a Cree, Aboriginal order. Fourthly, based on his formal education as well as both incidental and deliberate experience, this author believes the brightest prospects for improving Cree Aboriginal performance in secondary school lie in protecting Cree individual freedoms from interference, usually Eurocentric.

Thus the purpose of this thesis study is the development of strategies for protecting the Cree practices or customs that shield individual freedoms from infringement whether by accident or by design. The context of acquiring knowledge and skills is chosen because of the author's familiarity with it and because it clearly engages individual freedoms, values and customs.

As a means of gaining access to the expertise able to conceive and organize such protection, this author sought and was most fortunate to gain the mentorship of a scholar who had been relied upon by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, where the issue at trial was Aboriginal individual liberties in fishing activities. Subordination as a student to this scholar, Leroy Little Bear, assured this author
primacy of an Aboriginal perspective while exploring both Canadian and Aboriginal systems of legal order. This relationship also engendered access to his peers, such as Brian Slattery, Kent McNeil, John Borrows, James Youngblood Henderson, and Mark Walters.

In his seminal work, *Understanding Aboriginal Rights*, Brian Slattery, the law professor most often cited on such matters by Canadian courts, described the subject of Aboriginal rights thus:

The ambiguity and confusion described by Professor Slattery can be attributed to a number of sources. The term ‘Aboriginal’ is a vague quasi-racial expression without a constant social or cultural meaning. A Mohawk Aboriginal, for example, is a traditional warrior-hunter and farmer, while a northern Cree Aboriginal is more exclusively a hunter who traditionally, prefers not to be a warrior.

As this author quickly learned, during this thesis study, normal obligations accorded other Canadian citizens, to respect legal precedents, international agreements, or declarations of human rights, have not always considered when dealing with Aboriginal actions. The principle of stare decisis, literally meaning, *standing by decisions*, has not been carefully or consistently followed in Canadian courts. As a result, Canadian court decisions about Aboriginal rights have not evolved in such a manner that a clear body of jurisprudence or previous decisions has emerged. Without principles laid down in advance as is normal in actions involving other groups of Canadians, Aboriginal rights are much more dependent upon new discoveries at each separate trial.

Paul Rubin convincingly argued in his 1977 article, *Why Is the Common Law Efficient*, “the evolutionary pressure [to create common law] comes from the behaviour of litigants, rather than judges” and that “when different types of parties have an interest
in the same type of case, we would expect inconsistencies to exist in the law”, (Rubin 1977:61). The Crown and Aboriginal interests in the same types of cases are consistently so different as to be diametrically opposed. Being obliged to prove occupation at the time of European arrival in order to have property and related Aboriginal rights validated by Canadian courts, also introduces uncertainty. Kent McNeil drew attention to this problem in his article, *A Question of Title: Has the Common Law Been Misapplied to Dispossess the Aboriginals?* noting that “proving Aboriginal occupation of specific lands at the time of colonization may itself be a formidable task” (McNeil 1990:108).

This author argues that much of the formidability flows from the burden of proving occupation against the Crown’s unsubstantiated character allegations that Aboriginal, alleged nomadic occupation does not constitute occupation. Non-Aboriginal Canadians do not face the same burden of character evidence in any trial because such character evidence is prohibited without a body of similar facts, evoking a striking pattern of similar acts manifesting the discreditable character at issue. Moreover, for other Canadian citizens or immigrants to Canada, 'different' does not constitute discreditable. For example, at Immigration Review Board hearings, immigrants or refugees may invoke their own customs of marriage, family ties or inheritance and unlike Aboriginal oral accounts, their testimony cannot be doubted without clear and admissible evidence to justify skepticism. In *Maldonado v. Minister of Employment and Immigration* [1980] 2 F.C. 302 at paragraph 5, the Federal Court instructed that:

> It is my opinion that the Board acted arbitrarily in choosing without valid reasons, to doubt the applicant’s credibility concerning the sworn statements made by him ...When an applicant swears to the truth of certain allegations, this creates a presumption that those allegations are true unless there be reason to doubt their truthfulness.

During the past ten years, this principle has been applied in more than a hundred judgments of non-Aboriginal issues, but only once in Aboriginal issues in *Benoit v. Canada*, [2002] FCT 243.

As this author argues in this thesis study, the greatest causes of confusion, convolution and discontinuity lie in the failure of the excavators of Aboriginal rights to include other relevant perspectives and their attendant bodies of tacit knowledge. Kent
McNeil wrote in his article, *Sovereignty and the Aboriginal Nations of Rupert's Land*, that:

Where the rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada are concerned, history and law are inseparable. Lawyers working on Aboriginal claims ignore history at their peril. But the converse is also true – historians whose work involves the Aboriginal peoples cannot afford to disregard law. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Rupert's Land, out of which the province of Manitoba was at least partially created. (McNeil 1999:1)

This inseparability of history and law is well illustrated by the fact that the *Royal Proclamation of December 6, 1869* has only been noticed by University of Manitoba, History professor, Jack Bumsted (1996), who had neither seen its full text nor appreciated its legal weight. But, the history of law is no less important. Failing to research the history of law, especially common law is no less perilous. For example, the lawyers representing the Manitoba Metis Federation and others against Manitoba and Canada in their Final Argument, referred to the same Royal Proclamation as “Governor General Sir John Young’s Proclamation of December 6, 1869”, completely missing its common law status as an executive order where Her Majesty had used Her power exhaustively and whereby such a proclamation’s terms could only be altered later by British Parliament or an elected assembly of Rupert’s Land inhabitants. A study of the history of such proclamations would have uncovered the principles declared in *Campbell v. Hall*, [1774], 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045, by Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the highest court in the British Empire. Such a study would also have uncovered how these principles had since been applied in *Calder v. Attorney-General of B.C.*, [1973] S.C.R. 313 at p. 388, by the Supreme Court of Canada. It is the history of purpose, executive authority, and manner of promulgation, defined by Lord Mansfield, that distinguishes Governor General Sir John Young’s Proclamation of December 6, 1869 as a *Royal Proclamation*. In fact, it was not Governor General Sir John Young’s Proclamation at all, but rather the proclamation of the cabinet of Her Majesty’s Government of Great Britain and Ireland, justified by a debate on the subject, June 1, 1869, in British parliament.

Much confusion and convolution has been caused to the subject of Aboriginal rights by ignoring or uncritically enlisting the help of anthropologists, including archaeologists, cultural anthropologist and linguists without reconciling their methods and resulting...
expertise with relevant common law. By following eminent Clifford Geertz' maxim that “by searching out and analyzing the symbolic forms - words, images, institutions and behaviors - in terms of which, in each place, people actually represent themselves to themselves and to one another”, some anthropologists have created a ‘thick description’ from which to deduce a theory of the character or cultural behaviour of a given society (Geertz 1974:30). ‘Thick description’ is a considerable body of related facts derived from personal experience with a subject people. Thus acquired, an expert’s generalizations emerge from underlying patterns of shared behaviour. Accordingly, the theories and the facts witnessed by anthropologists using ‘thick description’ satisfy common law on admissibility of character evidence at trial. Such common law on admissibility of character evidence was well described by a former judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, John Sopinka:

The theory or generalizations must arise from a substantial body of relevant, probative similar facts as a striking pattern or system of behaviour which could not be accounted for as coincidence by a reasonable person. The facts themselves must describe acts which illustrate motive, intent, method or some other aspect of a particular individual or group's behaviour. (The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd Edition, 11.1.1)

However, as this author demonstrates later in this thesis, Canadian courts have often admitted expert evidence, even allowing unsubstantiated use of such propensity terms as ‘nomad’, or ‘primitive’ without the presentation of any observed facts whatsoever. The bar against admitting such evidence has existed since early in the 19th century (Cocks 2003:45; Farmer 2005:18-19). Beginning late in the 19th century, where a pattern of behaviour can be proven, with relevant, probative and similar facts of similar acts, an exception to a bar against character evidence has been allowed (Hoffmann 1975:202). But, expert opinions about Aboriginal behaviour, motives, intentions, or methods, based on literature, not ‘thick descriptions’ of witnessed facts, never have and not likely ever will be admissible as evidence at trial. Admission of hearsay evidence such as scholarly writings describing Aboriginal character has noticeably prejudiced Canadian courts’ determination of Aboriginal rights. Moreover, unchecked, such expert opinion based on
hearsay rather than witnessed facts has affected both the length and clarity of judgment of
many recent trials.

In this author’s opinion, it is a lack of experience with and a lack of tacit knowledge
of customary law that most seriously inhibits discovering the meaning and import of
Aboriginal rights. La Forest J wrote for the Supreme Court of Canada, in *Lac Minerals
Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd.*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 that:

"Custom" in the sense of a rule having the force of law and existing since
time immemorial is not in issue in this case. Indeed, Canadian law being
largely of imported origin will rarely, if ever, evince that sort of custom.
Custom in Canadian law must be given a broader definition. In any event,
both courts below were not using the term in such a technical sense, as is
clear from the fact that both substituted the term "practice" as a synonym.

This view that ‘custom’ as a rule having the force of law is now rare and antiquated
has very much diminished the meaning and import of Aboriginal legal systems based on
custom. Integrated with unchecked character evidence of nomads and primitives, this
notion of custom as being archaic and having fallen into disuse, obscures the fundamental
difference between Aboriginal and Canadian legal systems – how individual freedoms
are protected. This author has lived in accordance with the customs of the Cree of
Waskaganish First Nation for almost four decades. Customs have guided and informed
his behaviour as a husband, father, family or community member. More importantly,
customs have conveyed accepted Cree values and practices for performing a wide range
of roles, which are themselves not a normal part of Cree socio-cultural traditions. As a
school principal, guidance counselor, and classroom teacher, this author has relied upon
Cree values and custom to shape his relations with other family and community members
in resolving problems from trivial to crisis in magnitude. Whatever additional advice was
needed in order to properly apply such accepted practices, was readily available from
others with vested interests. Moreover, when this author began graduate thesis fieldwork
throughout the Boreal Forest, the Eastern Arctic and the Australian outback, many of the
same values and customs provided a good starting point for engaging with these other
Aboriginal communities.
Far from being obsolete, especially beyond the reach of Euro-centric interference, customs protect individual freedoms by providing ways of exercising freedoms, least likely to result in collisions with others. This customary approach is quite different from a ‘rights’ approach where, in latter instance, the state monopolizes coercive force and offers limited protection from its use, for such substantive freedoms as: freedom of thought and religion; equality under and before the law; and a less clearly defined, life, liberty and security of person. A customary legal system, on the other hand, avoids and discourages the use of coercion altogether. Thus, ‘rights’ are neither relevant nor necessary when social order and protection of individual freedoms are achieved through Aboriginal customs.

Denial of customs as a legitimate basis for a legal system, accompanied by a narrow view that protection of individual freedoms can only be accomplished with ‘rights’, also denies the changes which have occurred within a Canadian legal system since 1982. Prior to the Constitution Act of 1982, the state may well have had a monopoly on coercion, acting through legislative supremacy. Since 1982, however, the aforementioned substantive freedoms are now protected from state coercion, not by the state itself, but rather by the coercive powers of Canadian courts and tribunals. In other words, within those private domains such as home, family and faith, Canadian individuals are now living in stateless societies where instead the accepted practices or customs of home, family and faith, guide their freedom. The same myopic perspective that still believes in the state/stateless dichotomy between Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal legal order, fails to fully appreciate a spontaneous or customary order, very much in use in economic and international affairs. This author found the same aversion to using coercive force that characterizes Aboriginal legal order, also motivates the spontaneous order of economic and international affairs. Accordingly, much of the literature describing past and current practices in economic and international affairs, proved quite helpful in this study for explaining and anticipating the effects of Aboriginal legal order.

Finally, much of the meaning and import of protecting Aboriginal individual freedom have not escaped clear definition merely as the result of poorly conceived or poorly coordinated efforts. Unlike the individual freedoms of other groups of Canadian
citizens or immigrants, mainly by the federal and provincial governments, Aboriginal freedoms are attacked, reduced and extinguished by, well financed, and sustained efforts. It has become increasingly more apparent that federal and provincial governments do not own or have dubious titles to the ‘treasure house’ of land and natural resources. The threat of successful challenges is a directly related to the survival and assertion of Aboriginal rights. Governments’ preoccupation with that threat is apparent in the manner in which they relate to Aboriginal Canadians. This author created a staff list of permanent employees of Indian & Northern Affairs Canada from the information available online from Public Services Canada (see Appendix A). On one hand there are more than a hundred lawyers and paralegals for litigating against Aboriginals, but there are no employees charged with protecting, or monitoring respect of Aboriginal rights to education, health, justice, potable water, etc.. There is an ombudsman, but only responsible for departmental staff. Since 1996 there has been a team of scholars, unofficially known as the ‘Indian fighters’ maintained on contracts to oppose Aboriginal claims, reduce the weight of Aboriginal evidence and to gather evidence in support of extinguishing Aboriginal claims (Barnsley 2001; Brownlie 2006; Pryce 1992). The Canadian government does not seem to have established other such teams as the ‘Franco-Manitoban fighters’, ‘Gay fighters’, or ‘Sikh fighters’ in response to those groups, actually more successful efforts to preserve their freedoms. As this author will illustrate in chapter 4, Canada’s various teams have proven quite effective in creating common law on Aboriginal rights which confounds definitions of: individual and communal rights; property rights; and, the distinction of Aboriginal substantive rights from procedural rights or privileges. In the same chapter, this author will show how Canada, in order to maintain its international economic advantage of a treasure house of natural resources, has used unlimited discretionary powers, passive violence, gerrymandering, and suppression of documented promises to respect and protect rights.

In summary, the ambiguity of the meaning and import of the subject of protecting Aboriginal freedoms is, in this author’s opinion, the direct result of accidental and deliberate omission of important perspectives, not the least of which has been that of Aboriginal custom.
Aim of This Study

In order to resolve the meaning and import of protecting Aboriginal freedoms, this author has organized this thesis study to:

i) trace the history of the manner in which Aboriginal freedoms were alleged to be protected and were in fact treated, before and after the annexation of Rupert’s Land (including the traditional lands of the Crees of Waskaganish First Nation);

ii) locate within a Canadian constitutional paradigm, the promise to respect the legal rights of every individual and to locate their protection by the civil procedure of the court of competent jurisdiction (the Quebec Superior Court);

iii) explain how Canada’s federal and provincial governments have been able to evade their constitutional obligations to respect and protect the legal rights of every individual; and,

iv) explain and propose the remedy of Quebec’s and Canada’s evasion of respect and protection of the legal rights of the Crees of Waskaganish First Nation, using a current, pressing example of training, apprenticeship and certification of competence in skilled trades.

Orientation in Relation to Relevant Literature

This author has identified four bodies of literature relevant to his thesis problem, including: law, history, anthropology, and economics.

Law

The body of relevant law literature engaged by this researcher can be further subdivided into four areas: Aboriginal, administrative and constitutional law, and civil procedures. In all cases, this author’s identification of authoritative works began with their citation, usually by superior courts and the Supreme Court of Canada. After identifying the writers preferred by Canadian courts, this researcher read extensively each
writer's cited and other works. In most instances, it was also possible to ask these writers' advice on the various positions taken on Aboriginal issues. Early on, it became clearer to this researcher that the more general notion of Aboriginal rights, aptly characterized as overgrown and poorly excavated by Slattery, were of less importance than the specific and clear facts of the legal rights in the *Rupert's Land & North-Western Territory Order, 1870*, clearly enunciated and constitutionally entrenched, this researcher examined more closely the works of Kent McNeil, Brian Slattery and Mark Walters. Upon discovery of the *Royal Proclamation of December 6, 1869*, this researcher turned to the common law which has evolved, for applying such executive orders of Her Majesty’s Government, notably Lord Mansfield’s judgment of *Campbell v. Hall, [1774]* and *Calder v. Attorney-General of B.C., [1973]*. In order to locate Rupert’s Land legal rights within a Canadian constitutional paradigm, once more, this researcher turned to the writers cited by Canada’s superior courts and the Supreme Court of Canada. Especially helpful and authoritative were Peter H. Hogg, W. R. Lederman, A. V. Dicey, Gerard V. La Forest, Beverley McLachlin, John Bora Laskin, Joseph Raz, Ruth Sullivan and Robert J. Sharpe. In the course of exploring Aboriginal issues at trial, this author was immediately aware of the scarcity of facts to support experts’ assertions about Aboriginal character. For a better understanding of the common law of evidence, this researcher began with those writers cited in Aboriginal actions in superior courts and the Supreme Court of Canada. Next, this author compared the standards of admissibility and assigned weight adopted in judgments of Aboriginal actions with those standards applied to non-Aboriginal actions. As a result of this comparison, this researcher discovered a blind spot in fact finding in Aboriginal actions, especially in applying the principles of a similar fact exception to the prohibition against character evidence. This author noted especially the requirement that a properly qualified expert present the facts upon which his expert opinion was based. The views of L. H. Hoffmann, J. R. S. Forbes, John Sopinka, Ronald B. Sklar, Ronald Joseph Delisle, and Sidney L. Phipson, adopted by Canadian courts were carefully examined.

After exploring writings on economic and international spontaneous order, and particularly the role of customary law, this researcher read widely the writings of such
legal scholars as Mark D. Walters, Lon L. Fuller, Taslim Olawale Elias, and A. N. Allott. Recent studies by various Australian and New Zealand law commissions were also helpful in appreciating the challenges of converging customary law with statutory law.

Finally this author referred to current Canadian laws and regulations for pleading, discovery and trial in Canadian courts. A customary law approach to achieving training, apprenticeship and certification in a trade, described in Chapter 7, anticipates the need to follow Canadian civil procedure in order to secure the protection of Quebec Superior Court of the legal rights of the Cree of Waskaganish First Nation.

History

For general overviews of the history of the time period, approximately 1850 through 1900, this author relied upon the writings of William Louis Morton, Desmond Morton, Arthur S. Morton, Jack Bumsted, Edwin Ernst Rich, John S. Galbraith, and Paul Knaplundi. For descriptions of the arrival of Canadian law enforcement and courts, this author relied upon the writings of Howard Robert Baker, Louis Knafla, Sidney L. Harring, and Hamar Foster. Biographies of important figures were easily found at the University of Toronto's and the Université Laval's Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online.

As the reader will notice especially in chapters 2 and 4, there were significant discrepancies in various historical accounts of the period 1857 through 1900, so much so that this researcher resorted to the first hand accounts of key participants such as the bishops, news reporters, soldiers and politicians of the period. It was only through comparing such personal accounts that it was possible to determine that important documents had in fact not been distributed. In addition, this author was able to resolve ambiguities and conflicts surrounding historical events using the debates of the Canadian senate and house of commons, censuses, and the many sets of sessional papers prepared to brief members of parliament on important events. These sources of information were for the most part available online through the University of Alberta's database, Peel's Prairie Provinces and the Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproduction's Early Canadiana Online. First hand accounts and official government documents are especially
important as admissible evidence in the event that the support of a superior court becomes necessary for the protection of individual legal rights.

**Anthropology**

Two anthropological issues were especially important to this thesis study. First, this author was concerned with the approach to fieldwork promoted by Clifford Geertz and Gilbert Ryle based on: intuiting systems of cultural behaviour from thick descriptions; that is, the information resulting from sustained participation and observation within a cultural community. Of particular importance to this author was a focus on the motives, intentions and explanations of the subjects being studied. This is the only well known anthropological approach to researching cultural behaviour or propensity that respects common law on the admissibility of character evidence by eliciting similar facts to prove similar acts. The anthropological writings of Julius Lips, Richard J. Preston, Jose Mailhot, Adrian Tanner, Harvey Feit and Jean Briggs were useful for their ‘thick descriptions’ based on intracultural meanings among Rupert’s Land individuals, especially the Crees of Waskaganish First Nation and their neighbours. Terms such as ‘nomad’, ‘primitive’, ‘preliterate’ are the hallmarks of writings produced by authors gathering facts to support a theory constructed exterior to the culture studied. Such approaches at common law are at best trawling, or the fruit of poisonous reasoning, and are thus inadmissible as similar fact evidence. Reviewing literature for opinions or hearsay information to support an externally constructed theory does not provide the foundation on witnessed facts to authenticate expert opinion.

The second anthropological issue of concern to this author during this thesis study was the identification of the substantive individual freedoms that are the object of protection, either by custom or by rights. At common law, those cultural behaviours were described in *New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.*), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, by Chief Justice Lamer, when he wrote for a majority:

> For a restriction of security of the person to be made out, then, the impugned state action must have a serious and profound effect on a person’s psychological integrity. The effects of the state interference must be assessed objectively, with a view to their impact on the psychological
integrity of a person of reasonable sensibility. This need not rise to the level of nervous shock or psychiatric illness, but must be greater than ordinary stress or anxiety.

In Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000], 2 S.C.R. 307, Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for a majority, comprised a list of examples from the previous decade where liberty had been compromised by the state:

The liberty interest protected by s. 7 of the Charter is no longer restricted to mere freedom from physical restraint. Members of this Court have found that "liberty" is engaged where state compulsions or prohibitions affect important and fundamental life choices.

The correlation with profound effect on a person’s psychological integrity as well as engagement with important and fundamental life choices, correspond exactly with Felix Maxwell Keesings inventory of seven general areas of cultural behaviour, which if disturbed voluntarily or otherwise result in acute psychological stress and disorientation (Keesing 1958:411-412). This inventory was especially useful in creating customary solutions and identifying the freedoms which customs for training, apprenticeship and certification must enable and avoid interfering with (for the complete list see Appendix B).

**Economics**

Notably, the writings of Friedrich August von Hayek and Michael Polanyi describe a spontaneous order essential to economic and international relations in the absence of a state monopoly of coercive force either over its own citizens or other states. Although neither Hayek nor Polanyi were much concerned with Aboriginal societies, their writings and their commentators describe an excellent theoretical model for explaining Aboriginal spontaneous order created through customs. The main distinction between Hayek and Polanyi’s spontaneous order, on one hand, and Aboriginal spontaneous order on the other, is that where the former needs some rules or legislation to compensate for the lack of morality in a free market, the latter Aboriginal hybrid is characterized by a strong moral gravitational field which curbs any such amoral centrifugal force.
Limitations of This Study

The range of literature engaged has been vast and multidisciplinary. For reasons of practicality and relevance, this author adopted a framework appropriate to achieving the very concrete goal of remedying current infringement of legal rights in the specific context of training, apprenticeship and certification in trades common to Rupert’s Land, such as, carpenter, plumber electrician, heavy equipment operator, automotive mechanic, and traditional hunter. A further limit of the Crees of Waskaganish First Nation is added in order to reduce the scope of this study to that of a band or basic political group, quite typical in most of Rupert’s Land and the Northwestern Territory. Finally, the scope of this thesis is limited to those facts, allegations and points of law which might need to be pleaded in order to secure the protection of a court of competent jurisdiction, in this area, the Quebec Superior Court, as promised in Canada’s constitution.

Methodology

This research created ‘thick descriptions’ of not only Aboriginals, but as well of the legal scholars, social scientists and historical figures that described Aboriginals. In the hermeneutic style of Hodder (1977:268-269) and Preston (1999:152-153) this researcher intuited hypotheses, tested them further in relevant contexts, edited these hypotheses in accordance with the inconsistencies apparent during testing, tested them in further relevant contexts, etc. etc.. This researcher repeated this process until a ‘thick description’ had been produced, which in the words of Gilbert Ryle (1968:16), allowed this researcher
“to march along some stretches of some of his old tracks, pacing this time not
interrogatively but didactically ... able to pilot others along ways along which no one had
piloted him and delete some of the queries that he had inscribed on his own, originally
hypothetical signposts”. As this researcher approached the subject matter of chapters 5
and 6, increasingly, it became necessary to involve Crees of Waskaganish First Nation in
the hermeneutical process.

Organisation of This Thesis

Chapter 1 - Introduction
In this chapter, the researcher introduces the nature of the problem that undermines
the meaning and import of Aboriginal rights – the omission of important historical,
anthropological, customary and economic perspectives. The aim of this study is to
remedy these omissions in the course of creating a customary remedy to the current
infringement of the legal rights of the Crees of Waskaganish First Nation, a typical band
of Rupert’s Land and the Northwestern Territory. The author concludes this chapter by
stating the limitations, methodology used and the organization of this study.

Chapter 2 - Rupert’s Land Rights as Historical Fact
In this chapter, the researcher develops the notion that Canada’s international and
domestic application of the rule of law is derived from British Imperial history and
principles. Rupert’s Land rights are the result of British Imperial law. The author traces
the rights of the Aboriginal inhabitants of Rupert’s Land, noting Canada’s promise that
its government and Parliament shall respect the legal rights of any individual within the
territory and to place them under the protection of courts of competent jurisdiction. This
chapter concludes with extensive and unequivocal proof from authoritative sources as to
the authenticity of legal rights of Rupert’s Land Aboriginal inhabitants.

Chapter 3 - Tide of History
This chapter narrates the history of how Rupert’s Land rights were suppressed upon
union with Canada. This chapter also illustrates the manner in which the Canadian
Crown, or executive has enlisted the assistance, first of legislative powers and more recently, judiciary powers in order to create unlimited discretionary power for itself and illiberal democracy for Aboriginals. These effects have been euphemistically known as 'the tide of history' and are an important part of a continuing economic strategy that relies on ignoring Aboriginal property and legal rights in order to achieve an international economic advantage.

**Chapter 4 - A Canadian Constitutional Paradigm - Origins**

In this chapter, this author examines the basic principles of Canada's first constitution. These organizing principles are examined within the British, Federal and Colonial traditions from which they are derived. This chapter ends with a summary as to the combined effect of these principles and traditions of Canadian constitutionalism on Canadians in general and Aboriginals in particular.

**Chapter 5 - A Canadian Constitutional Paradigm - Creating Remedies**

Using modern theoretical models for spontaneous order in economic and international affairs, this chapter explains blueprints of the convergence of Rupert's Land Aboriginal customary order with Canadian constitutional and civil order. Further, this chapter describes a Rupert's Land customary order which is compatible with and uses the adaptive features of Canadian constitutional and civil order necessary for the protection of the individual freedoms of Rupert's Land Aboriginal inhabitants. Here the author resumes his attention to a Canadian constitutional paradigm with an examination of the Liberal tradition introduced by the Constitution patriated from Great Britain in 1982. This author pays particular attention to the manner in which the changes introduced limits to executive and legislative powers, spontaneously creating new space within for individual freedoms relatively uninhibited by coercive force either by the state or any other source.

**Chapter 6 - Training, Apprenticeship and Certification**

This chapter narrates the development of a customary approach to training, apprenticeship and certification based on: the provisions of the RL&NWTO; the values
and established practices of the Crees of Waskaganish First Nation; and, the important objectives of the Quebec government. This chapter, as an integral part of this thesis study, is intended to illustrate and provide further tacit knowledge of the subject—application of Rupert's Land legal rights.

Chapter 7 - Conclusion

This chapter summarizes what has been learned in the course of this thesis study. Here, the author proposes some of the implications this study has for Aboriginals and other Canadians as well. This chapter concludes with suggestions as to what further research is needed or will be of use to those concerned with the legal rights of the inhabitants of Rupert's Land and the North-West Territories.
CHAPTER TWO

RUPERT'S LAND RIGHTS AS HISTORICAL FACT

History and International Function of the Rule of Law:

The notion of the rule of law having a function of protecting the rights of individuals is a much more recent development than the rule of law’s main purpose of maintaining order, particularly among diverse populations or populations that are spread over vast regions. This value of maintaining order is no less appreciated today by American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq than it was by Roman forces more than two thousand years ago. Rome, for example, with a minimum of resources was able to maintain its sovereignty over great distances and over dissimilar populations by maintaining the rule of law. The law component was very often the customary laws of the ruled kingdom. The customary laws of a newly acquired territory, however foreign to Rome, were already installed, tightly woven with the values and traditions of the conquered people. Upheld by imperial Rome, these customary laws invariably provided a more effective system of law and order than any system Rome could ever impose. Pontius Pilot’s deference to the Hebrew clerics in the judgment of Jesus Christ was in accordance with a Roman policy of continuity of the rule of law.

By the middle of the 16th century, increasingly laws were created and modified by courts. Britain, especially excelled at this art, well illustrated by the judgments of: Edmond Coke, William Blackstone, and, Lord Mansfield. Given the frequency with which these jurors’ decisions were cited in support of a coherent body of British Imperial traditions, it is fair to say that they are the main authors of a British doctrine of continuity, that is an international version of the rule of law. Aimed at maintaining normative order as peacefully and as frugally as possible, the notion of continuity flows from Coke’s, Blackstone’s and Mansfield’s common belief that the rule of law or peace and good order, critically depend on persons and institutions retaining their laws and property during changes in sovereignty.

By the dawn of the 17th century, the efficiency of the rule of law in maintaining obedience and order among citizens far from the authority of the state, was being greatly
challenged by ventures into the New World. Not only was the rule of law being strained
over great distances, it was also being required to protect citizens and regulate their
behaviour internationally with other very different states. In order to avoid competitive,
mutual destruction, colonizing states had to agree on laws to regulate relations between
states. This burden was in addition to maintaining law and order within the colony.

Throughout the 19th century, into the dawn of the 20th century, Britain continued to
extend its sovereignty over distant regions of the world such as Africa, North and Central
America, Asia and the South Pacific, each time using the formula refined by Coke,
Blackstone and Mansfield. In fact, British Imperial rules have changed little over four
centuries. In his 1998, The Rule of Law in International Affairs, renown Oxford scholar,
Ian Brownlie outlined key elements constituting an international version of the Rule of
Law:

1. Powers exercised by officials must be based upon authority conferred by
   law.
2. The law itself must conform to certain standards of justice, both
   substantial and procedural.
3. There must be a substantial separation of powers between the executive,
   the legislature and the judicial function. Whilst this separation is difficult
   to maintain in practice, it is at least accepted that a body determining
   facts and applying legal principles with dispositive effect, even if it is
   not constituted as a tribunal, should observe certain standards of
   procedural fairness.
4. The judiciary should not be subject to the control of the executive.
5. All legal persons are subject to rules of law which are applied on the
   basis of equality. To the elements offered above, it should be added that
   the Rule of Law implies the absence of wide discretionary powers in the
   Government which may encroach on personal liberty, rights of property
   or freedom of contract. [Brownlie 1998:213-214]

Brownlie’s international description of the rule-of-law resonates in the descriptions
presented later in this chapter based on Canadian sources. This is more than mere
coincidence. During the last two decades, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International
Law, has been the authority most often cited by the Supreme Court of Canada (see
Brownlie 2003) on international issues, moreover, he was a mentor of Brian Slattery.
British Imperial Tradition

In accordance with British Imperial traditions, the rule of law prevailed in the acquisition of or exercise of sovereignty over Aboriginal property. For example, in West Africa, according to Aboriginal customary laws land could not be owned, subsequently lands were leased not expropriated from their Aboriginal owners. At the Judiciary Committee of Britain’s Privy Council’s judgment in Adeyinka Oyekan et al v. Musendiku Adele 26, June 1957, Lord Denning wrote, “... there is one guiding principle. It is this: the courts will assume that the British Crown intends that the rights of property of the inhabitants are to be fully respected ... if a dispute arises between the inhabitants as to the right to occupy a piece of land, it will be determined according to native law and custom, without importing English conceptions of property law”, (Journal of African Law, Vol. 1, No. 3, p.189). The “native law and custom” Lord Denning referred to are remarkably similar to those traditionally followed by Aboriginals of Rupert’s Land: “no one man was entitled to own a piece of land absolutely”; “it belonged to the family for their use”; “the Chief had charge of it on behalf of the family but could not sell it. The idea of sale did not come into the scheme of things at all”; and, “the Chief had control of the land, and any member of the family who wanted to make use of it had to go to him for it, but even the Chief could not make any important disposition of it without consulting the elders of the family”.

The Judiciary Committee was just as willing to overrule Aboriginal government or customary law decisions in order to maintain the rule of law. During the 1960’s in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) a pro-Western officer named Liyanage and others were convicted of charges relating to an attempted coup d’état. Ceylon’s legislature passed a number of statutes, specifically to punish the perpetrators. The latter appealed their convictions to the highest court of the time, the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council of Britain. In its landmark ruling the latter overturned the convictions, declaring the statutes null and void for their offense to the rule of law. Lord Pierce declared:

If such Acts as these were valid the judicial power could be wholly absorbed by the legislature and taken out of the hands of the judges. It is appreciated that the legislature had no such general intention. It was beset by a grave situation and it took grave measures to deal with it, thinking, one must
presume, that it had power to do so and was acting rightly. But that consideration is irrelevant, and gives no validity to acts which infringe the Constitution. What is done once, if it be allowed, may be done again and in a lesser crisis and less serious circumstances. And thus judicial power may be eroded. Such an erosion is contrary to the clear intention of the Constitution. In their Lordships' view the Acts were ultra vires and invalid. *Liyanage v. The Queen* [1967] 1 A.C. 259

As a result of its respect of the rule of law, especially according to Aboriginal norms and customs of facts and fairness, the British Empire's sovereignty was usually bolstered by leadership and values of conquered or annexed populations, making it possible for Britain to maintain a vast empire with minimal force or consequent expense.

**British Tradition in Colonial Canada**

Canada as a nation under the rule of law came into being shortly after Britain's conquest of New France in 1759. The *RP1763*, was one of its earliest acts of applying a doctrine of continuity. R. A. Humphreys (1934:256-257), in his description of the construction of the Royal Proclamations, states:

...One of the reasons adduced by Pownall for his definition of the boundaries of Canada had been to prevent the Canadians from being put "under a variety of different governments from which they could receive no protection and to which they would consequently pay no obedience or yield any subjection to laws or constitution to them unknown and founded on principles the most adverse in their nature and consciences that can be imagined.

Norman Macdonald describes the early governance of Quebec by Generals Murray and Carleton whose scrupulous respect of Quebec's property and legal rights bolstered civil order and loyalty to the British Crown:

Murray's pro-French sympathies and his opposition to the selfish designs of the 'old subjects' precipitated a bitter quarrel that resulted in his recall (April 1, 1765): he was made the scapegoat of official blunders for loyally carrying out the instructions of 1763. The seigneurs, however, testified to his 'clearsightedness, equity and wisdom' in maintaining public peace..... Murray was succeeded by General Guy Carleton, a Scotsman by an Irishman, a lesser man by greater, though in many respects they had much in common. Both were members of the landed gentry and distinguished
soldiers, with the merits and shortcomings of their class; conservative in outlook yet tolerant; free from national prejudices and able to appreciate the point of view of a foreign race and to treat them fairly; cold and imperious towards humbler men, yet gifted with common sense and practical ability.... Carleton saw in the satisfaction of the French claims the best method of preserving the internal harmony of the colony and securing obedience to the civil authority. (Macdonald 1934:34-35)

The harmony and obedience noted by Macdonald was further promoted by the entrenchment of French civil rights in the Quebec Act of 1774. Restoring French civil law, probably kept Quebec from supporting the American Revolution soon after (Laskin 1969:5). Similarly, the Constitutional Act of 1791 achieved the separation of English speaking Upper Canada from French speaking Lower Canada (Quebec) reducing any further possibility of French-English friction (Laskin 1969:5), further promoting Quebec’s loyalty to Britain during the War of 1812. Britain responded in a like manner to Canadian rebelliousness during the mid 19th century. Continuing efforts to secure harmony, obedience, and British sovereignty culminated in the Quebec conference of 1864. Canada’s first constitution of 1867 began with a preamble that declares that Canada is to have a “constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom”. In an article he coauthored with Cara F. Zwibel, the eminent Peter H. Hogg wrote:

The Supreme Court of Canada has held that this language contains an implicit recognition of the rule of law. In our later discussion of the cases, we shall see that the Court has invoked the two preambles from time to time when it has relied on the rule of law. [Hogg & Zwibel 2005:720]

The rule of law is a hallmark of British traditions of governance which uses individual and group freedom.

The Rule of Law in the History of Rupert’s Land

In 1670, Charles II of England granted a charter to a group of English merchants to operate as the Hudson’s Bay Company. This charter was essentially “a grant of a right to acquire lands within the Hudson watershed by actually possessing them or purchasing them from the Aboriginal people” (McNeil 1999:3).
According to Slattery, “the legislative powers of the Company are explicitly confined to the Company proper and its officers. They do not extend to persons not employed by the Company and in particular the indigenous inhabitants of the region” (Slattery 1979:159). Slattery continued that “the Charter did introduce the English law, but did not, at the same time, make it applicable generally or indiscriminately – it did not abrogate the Indian law and usages (Slattery 1979:161). J. E. Cote noted that, “though the Company had governmental powers, it did little to exercise them until the founding of Selkirk Colony (Cote 1964:263-264).

Hamar Foster (1990) noted that the Hudson’s Bay Company took the view that its law enforcement obligations did not apply to offenses committed among Indians. That view was most evident in 1857 in testimony before a British House of Commons Select Committee inquiring into the rights and privileges of the Company (Galbraith 1949:458). Most of the questions asked were related to agriculture, climate and travel. When asked if the Company was required to prosecute Indians for crimes against Europeans, Governor George Simpson replied, “we are obliged to punish Indians as a measure of self-preservation in some parts of the country” (Select Committee Hearings, February 26, 1857:1060) and, that “we seldom get hold of them for the purpose of a trial and they are usually punished by their own tribe” (February 26, 1857 – 1061).

When asked if the Company had ignored Aboriginal title to the land, Simpson replied, “No, the land was purchased of them, I think, in the time of Lord Selkirk by a regular purchase; a certain quantity of ammunition and tobacco and various other supplies being given for it” (February 26, 1857 – 1096).

Later in the interview, Simpson, testified that not only did the Company not have general legislative powers in Rupert’s Land, on the advice of their legal counsel, they did not have freehold title to the land, rather they had a 999 year lease (1159-1164). On March 2, 1857 when the inquiry resumed, Simpson was again asked about the Company’s control over the Aboriginals of Rupert’s Land, to which Simpson replied, “They are perfectly at liberty to do what they please: we never restrain Indians”, that the Company had no authority over them whatsoever (1748-1751).
Even for “Whites”, it is far from certain that the laws of Rupert’s Land were the laws of England. Howard Robert Baker, called such an assertion that English law applied, “perhaps the largest legal fiction ever imposed on Assiniboia” (Baker 1999:244). Baker noted that in 1851, the governing council had appointed a law amendment committee of three men. In its report, the latter committee commented that, “the laws of England [1670] independently of their inherent and essential inferiority are difficult, nay generally speaking impossible to be ascertained, more particularly in such a wilderness as this” (Baker 1999:244). In fact, as Louis A. Knafla writes,

.... the company officers used a mixture of private and public law at their posts. Because they lacked any knowledge of formal law, their rule was characterized by discretion. [Joseph] Isbister’s method resulted in conflict and poor trade. [James] Isham’s method led to a collegial atmosphere in which there were few breaches of order and a successful level of trade. Natives who dealt with Isbister would have little interest in English common law. Those who dealt with Isham must have seen it as customary practices not unlike their own. (Knafla 2005:13).

This view of a Rupert’s Land being ordered by custom and leadership rather than statute and state is very consistent with the testimonies of Simpson and other witnesses who appeared before the Select Committee, and as well it is very consistent with the views of Baker’s and Knafla’s of Red River throughout the 19th century. Finally, such order of Rupert’s Land by custom quite consistent with both British Imperial and modern Canadian definitions of the ‘rule of law’ as the most efficient means to allow people with different interests and values to live together in society without resorting to discord, conflict, or civil war.

The End of Hudson’s Bay Company Rule of Rupert’s Land

The hearings during 1857 of the Select Committee on the Hudson’s Bay Company, held by the British House of Commons signaled the end of the Company’s monopoly. Indeed, the hearings were conducted by British Parliament in response to growing protests against the Company’s rule and treatment of individual legal rights, especially in the Assiniboia or Red River region of present day Manitoba. Chief Justice William Draper sent by Upper Canada disputed the Company’s claim to territory, especially that
between Lake Superior and the Rocky Mountains, later to be known as the ‘Fertile Belt’. By 1859 the Company had transferred sovereignty for all lands back to British Imperial hands. In 1863, the Company was sold to an association of investors, the International Finance Society, who were much more interested in colonization (and land sales) than the Company previously had been. The International Finance Society, was deeply involved with the Grand Trunk Railroad, and generally ignored the ‘wintering partners’, the chief factors and partners who previously had always been at the centre of Company decision making (Galbraith 1949:458-459).

By 1864, however, the threat of an American expansion into Rupert’s Land grew significantly. This threat was amplified by an American attempt at pursuit of Sioux Indians into the Red River area. A Major E. A. C. Hatch of the United States Army requested of and was granted permission by A. G. Dallas, Hudson’s Bay Company Governor in Chief of Rupert’s Land to pursue with an armed force, a band of Sioux into the Poplar Point area, near Red River (Rogers 1864). However, when the few of the band who had participated in the massacre of American troops at Little Big Horn were extradited to Pembina, U.S.A., the remaining Sioux were given refuge in Canada. The fear was not of an invasion by American troops but rather the arrival of American troops as a positive expression of support of some faction of Rupert’s land inhabitants, followed by an American reluctance or refusal to leave. Moreover, without a trail, railroad or water route over British territory from Canada to Rupert’s Land, British subjects had no choice but to reach Rupert’s Land through the United States. In July 1864, Edward Cardwell, Britain’s Secretary of State for the Colonies advised Canada’s Governor-General, Viscount Monck that if Rupert’s Land was to remain British it must be annexed to Canada. George Brown was immediately sent from Canada to Britain to begin negotiations. He proved poorly suited, largely because of his previous editorials which heaped abuse on the Hudson’s Bay Company, and questioned the Company’s legal claims. In 1865, a delegation of four, John A. MacDonald, George E. Cartier, George Brown, and Alexander T. Galt arrived in London to reopen discussions. The Hudson’s Bay Company wanted the greatest return on the sale of their interests while Canada wanted to gain sovereignty over Rupert’s Land as cheaply as possible. For the next two
years, negotiations, refereed by Britain’s Colonial Office were fractious with little progress realized. The political threats of American expansion as well as unrest in the Red River area continued to grow (Galbraith 1949:466-468), (Morton 1939:852-869). The Quebec Conference of 1864 and the London Conference of 1866 had produced the British North America Act of 1867 as well as a resulting union of the three British colonies, Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick under a single Canadian federal government. Annexation of Rupert’s Land were anticipated in s. 146 of the British North America Act, but by 1867, the necessary surrender by the Hudson’s Bay Company and terms fit to approve for transfer to a new Canadian sovereign still eluded the British Imperial government.

During the summer of 1867, in Quebec’s Superior Court, a judgment on Aboriginal customary law and civil rights was rendered, which is absent from authoritative political histories of the times, nevertheless is described as seminal among legal scholars. This author refers to the judgment of *Connolly v. Woolrich [1867]* 11 L.C. Jur. 197; 17 R.J.R.Q. rendered by Samuel C. Monk. The plaintiff was John Connolly, son of a chief trader, William Connolly and the daughter of a Cree chief from the Athabaska region of Rupert’s Land, Suzanne. In 1803, William and Suzanne had been married in accordance with Cree Aboriginal customary law. After almost thirty years of marriage and six children, William sent his Cree wife, Suzanne to live in a convent in the Red River settlement, in order that he could marry his second cousin, Julia Woolrich. William Connolly later died leaving all of his property to his second wife, Julia Woolrich, and their two children. After his mother Suzanne’s death in 1862, William’s son by Suzanne, John Connolly sued Julia Woolrich for his share of his father William Connolly’s estate. Judge Samuel C. Monk found for the plaintiff, John Connolly, recognizing Aboriginal customary law as a legal basis for marriage and annulling William Connolly’s second marriage to Julia Woolrich. In one, well reasoned, clearly written judgment, Monk had recognized Aboriginal laws in Rupert Land’s, declared ‘half-castes’ British subjects as legitimate heirs to Euro-Canadian property, and declared pure blood European British subjects to be ‘illegitimate’. It is difficult to imagine that this judgment did not catch the attention of the Canadian and British officials negotiating the transfer of sovereignty.
Monk, presiding over Quebec Superior Court, a court of competent jurisdiction according to the BNA Act for determining legal rights, declared a previous Rupert’s Land Aboriginal customary law marriage valid and a later English law marriage invalid.

**Her Majesty’s Terms**

A few months after *Connolly v. Woolrich [1867]*, on December 7, 1867, a proposal of terms was made before the Canadian House of Commons to be included in the address to Her Majesty for transfer of Rupert’s Land:

...the legal rights of any Corporation, Company or individual within the same, will be respected, and that in the case of difference of opinion as to the extent, nature or value of these rights, the same shall be submitted to judicial decision, or be determined by mutual agreement between the Government of Canada and the parties interested; such an agreement to have no effect or validity until first sanctioned by the Parliament of Canada. [Journals of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada from November 6, 1867 to May 22, 1868, Vol. I, p. 54]

Such terms completely favoured Canada over the Hudson’s Bay Company and fell far short of Her Majesty’s doctrine of continuity that preserved normative order by respecting inhabitants legal rights. Consequently, Canada’s proposal was unacceptable to either Britain or the Hudson’s Bay Company. Accordingly, a revised text was presented once more, on December 12, 1867 to the Canadian House of Commons:

... the legal rights of any Corporation, Company or individual shall be respected, and placed under the protection of Courts of competent jurisdiction. [Journals of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada from November 6, 1867 to May 22, 1868, Vol. I, p. 67, Emphasis added]

That text worked its way through the Canadian-House of Commons and Senate and can still be found in the Address to Her Majesty the Queen of December 17, 1867, Appendix A of the RL&NWTO which itself is in Schedule B of Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982. Monk’s ruling in *Connolly v. Woolrich [1867]* on the legal rights is especially important in that from a court of competent jurisdiction, sworn by Canada to protect any individual’s legal rights, made clear that the customary laws of Aboriginal inhabitants
By the Deed of Surrender, passed by Britain’s Parliament in the fall of 1868, the Hudson’s Bay Company transferred all of its interests in Rupert’s Land and the North-West Territory to the British Imperial government. Now only the terms of transferring sovereignty to Canada remained. Lord Granville, Colonial Secretary to the newly elected British government of William Gladstone, invited George E. Cartier and William McDougall of the Canadian government to London for negotiations with Sir Stafford Northcote, representing the Hudson’s Bay Company. Representatives of Canada and the Company, unfortunately, soon fell into their opposing positions over legal titles and payments for the Company’s interests (Galbraith 1949:473-474).

Meanwhile in Red River, a series of jail breakings began. Dr. John Christian Schultz had been arrested for nonpayment of a debt on January 17, 1868. The following morning, Schultz’s wife accompanied by fifteen others broke him out of jail (Clarke 2000:2). Without the help of a much larger police force or soldiers, the Hudson’s Bay Company’s Red River government could do little to stop what became a series of jail breaks (Corbett 1888:32-37). Thus the winter of 1868 marked a noticeable decline in the Company’s ability to maintain peace and good order in a colony whose population had now grown to more than twelve thousand permanent residents.

In order to break the impasse in negotiations between Canada and the Hudson’s Bay Company, Lord Granville threatened to put the matter as a legal question before the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council. Neither Canada nor the Company were willing to risk the judgment of the Privy Council. During the winter of 1868-1869, Monk’s judgment of Connolly v. Woolrich was again before the courts on appeal. Monk’s detailed and scholarly treatment of the Company’s claims as well as his upholding Aboriginal customary law must have dampened any enthusiasm either the Company or Canada might have had to face the Privy Council. Thus Granville’s terms, virtually identical to those previously rejected, were finally accepted by both parties in a new a
more cooperative light. Northcote, after an initial storm was able to secure the support of his Hudson’s Bay Company on March 20, 1869.

Canada, by this date had already accepted Granville’s terms. In addition to the solemn promise that “the legal rights of any Corporation, Company or individual shall be respected” were two other terms “as stated in the Letter from Sir Frederic Rogers of 9th March, 1869” also attached to the RL&NWTO:

Resolved, -- That upon the transference of the territories in question to the Canadian Government, it will be the duty of the Government to make adequate provision for the protection of the Indian tribes whose interests and wellbeing are involved in the transfer.

[... and as part of a “Memorandum” providing greater detail to the resolutions]

That upon the transference of the territories in question to the Canadian Government it will be our duty to make adequate provision for the protection of the Indian tribes whose interests and wellbeing are involved in the transfer, and we authorize and empower the Governor in Council to arrange any details that may be necessary to carry out the terms and conditions of the above agreement.

Though the major obstacle of an agreement between Canada and the Hudson’s Bay Company had been resolved, the road ahead for the transfer of Rupert’s Land was far from clear. On June 1, 1869, Gladstone faced strong opposition to the transfer without stronger guarantees of Aboriginal rights made by Canada. His own British House of Commons felt that without such guarantees that the Imperial Government was breaking faith with its Indian subjects [U.K. Hansard, June 1, 1869, 1127-1128].

Even a cursory reading of the debates in Britain’s Parliament during June 1, 1869 (see a complete record of the debate in Appendix C) will resolve any ambiguity as to the inclusion of Aboriginals in the ‘any individuals’ contained in Canada’s promise. Sir Harry Vinney (June 1, 1969 at 1099) opened the debate, calling for ‘arrangements to be made for “respecting native rights and regulating their legal position and dealings with the Europeans”. Mr. R. N. Fowler, spoke sharply of the Hudson’s Bay Company (at 1100-1101), recalling a petition of Indian chiefs placed before the House in 1860 complaining that the Company had sold their lands along the Red and Assiniboine Rivers, praying “the House to take the matter into serious consideration to grant them and
their people the customary native title to their lands and ordain facilities for conveying the same to each other and to their children’s children”. Fowler declared that:

…the House had now an opportunity of answering that Petition. He earnestly hoped that before the negotiations which were now going on were terminated, Her Majesty’s Government would make due provision for protecting the rights of the Indians. The question was not rendered difficult by there being a very large number of them. (June 1, 1869:1100-1101)

…As the Indians could not protect themselves, he thought it was the duty of Her Majesty’s Government to make such arrangements as would secure the rights and interests of these our fellow subjects on the handing over of the Hudson’s Bay territories to the Dominion of Canada. (1103)

Member, Mr. Kinnaird thanked Fowler for his remarks but offered praises of the Hudson’s Bay Company to dampen the former’s sharp criticism of the latter, adding his hope “that the Colonial Office would take care that the Indians should not suffer by the proposed transfer”, and that “proper protection would be assured to them” (June 1, 1869:1104).

The House was unanimous on the need to protect the legal rights of Aboriginal inhabitants from both the European settlers and the Dominion Government. British Parliament would have easily passed a motion to, in some way supervise or guarantee a lawful transfer of sovereignty beyond the promises contained in the transfer order; however, Under Secretary for the Colonies, Monsell did not respond to such assertions from all quarters of Parliament that some assurances should be extracted from Canada. He, instead described the looming American threat to the south, combined with Sioux Indians using Rupert’s Land as a base from which to raid Americans, and of the consequent need to not push Canada too far, to make such guarantees (June 1, 1869:1109). These alleged threats are not very credible given the concessions which Britain had made to the United States, generous access to the fisheries on both coasts and the complete withdrawal of the British garrisons in North America.

Neither was the Sioux Indian threat based on fact. Alexander Morris, a decade later wrote of the Sioux Indians in whom the Americans had such great interest, that “during their sojourn of thirteen years on British territory, these Indians have on the whole, been orderly, and there was only one grave crime committed among them, under peculiar
circumstances – the putting to death of one of their number, which was done under their tribal law” (Morris 1880:281). The risk involved by the Sioux was not their behaviour so much as the excuse the Sioux presence might provide an American Government to send soldiers into the Fertile Belt to remain indefinitely. Combined with the relations between America and the Metis being friendlier than with Canada, there was much for Britain to worry about. Prime Minister Gladstone confided later in his Colonial Secretary Lord Granville that he would have preferred to have put annexation of Rupert’s Land to Canada to a plebiscite but was afraid that Metis might use their newly asserted legal rights to invite the United States in (Knaplund 1934:77).

Monsell’s offer to produce the ‘Papers’ bearing Canada’s promises (June 1, 1869:1112) did not sway Viscount Bury (Sir Charles Dilke), certainly, the most eloquent and effective critic. Viscount Bury, “having held the office of superintendent-general of the Indian tribes during the time that he was in Canada” unleashed a scathing criticism of Canadian treatment of Indians thus far (June 1, 1869:115-1119)

Prime Minister Gladstone brought debate to a close, responding to an array of issues contained in comments made by other members of the House. In closing, he remarked:

I cannot adopt an absolute rule on this subject. It is impossible to say that there will be no such thing proposed to this House as a colonial guarantee. But whenever a Government has proposed a colonial guarantee in the past, this House has always expected that Government to show that the proposal was made with a view of escaping from the kind of relations under which alone such a guarantee was required, and of establishing freer relations under which our colonial fellow-subjects would bear their own burdens and leave us to bear ours. In conclusion, I thank the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles Dilke) for having given the House the benefit of his experience with regard to the difficulties with which this portion of the subject is based. (June 1, 1869:1127)

The Viscount, Sir Charles Dilke, apologized if he had described their treatment too harshly, but:

...he had had in his mind at the time a covering dispatch from Sir Edmund Head, who said that he approached the subject with pain and misgiving, never having been able to persuade himself that the conduct of this country
towards the Indians had been consistent with good faith. (June 1, 1969:1127)

A Fumbled Transition

Anticipating a December 1, 1869 transfer of territory to Canada, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald pushed through a statute, *Temporary Government of Rupert's Land Act*, assented on June 22, 1869. Macdonald’s Minister of Public Works, William McDougall had already sent survey crews to Assiniboia, including John Stoughton, John Snow and Charles Mair. Macdonald would within a few months, very much regret his choice of McDougall for the territories first Lieutenant Governor. McDougall had already demonstrated a “righteous paternalism in his dealings with natives” (Zeller 2000:1) during his repossession of Indian reserves on Manitoulin Island, on the grounds that these lands had not been put to agricultural use.

Even before McDougall’s own arrival, his survey crew had already created quite a stir. According to most who testified before an 1874 Parliamentary committee (Journals of the House of Commons, Vol. VIII, 1874, Appendix 6), Snow and Mair carried on editorial correspondence with Ontario papers which resulted in a continuing series of highly inflammatory articles, most insulting to the Metis and Half-Breed majority of Assiniboia (Machray 1909:83). Snow used liquor to obtain land from the Indians. Surveys were limited to Metis and Half-Breed lands and disregarded completely the riverstrip holdings of the Metis (Bale 1985:466) (Kilgour 1988). During the summer, news reached the area that the Hudson’s Bay Company was to be paid three-hundred thousand pounds sterling for land it claimed to own.

As the unrest in Assiniboia grew, the Canadian government’s attention undoubtedly also was taken by another event. On September 8, 1869 Quebec’s Court of Appeal rendered judgment of *Johnston et al v. Conolly [1869]*, 17 R.J.R.Q. 266, actually an appeal of *Conolly v. Woolrich [1867]*. The majority of the court dismissed the appeal and unanimously upheld both Monk’s judgment and his reasons. The Euro-Canadian appellants now planned to present their case to the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council of Britain. For a number of reasons, such a further appeal would put both the legal positions of the Hudson’s Bay Company and that of the government of Canada
squarely before the highest court in the Empire, after both had already agreed to
Granville’s terms to avoid just such an event. A closer look at Connolly v. Woolrich
[1867] and the appeal, Johnston et al v. Connolly [1869], leaves no questions of their
fears. Slattery (1979:161) and many writers since view these decisions as an affirmation
of the British Imperial ‘rule of law’ or doctrine of continuity. Samuel C. Monk was
described by his peers as possessing impressive language and legal skills:

His knowledge of both the French and English languages is so perfect that it
would be impossible for a stranger to tell by his speech to which nationality
he belonged.
The old French law, which forms the basis of the jurisprudence in the
province of Quebec is so familiar to him that when a case is heard in court
of Queen’s Bench, before him and his associates, one can easily find out
that, after reading the printed factum of both parties, he is generally ready to
give his opinion and support it with the most learned and scientific
arguments. [Canadian Biographical Dictionary 1881:263]

More simply, here was Monk, a judge in the very court of ‘competent jurisdiction’
responsible for protecting individual legal rights, rendering a judgment which was upheld
on appeal recognizing the very Aboriginal rights in Rupert’s Land which Canada was
already set to later ignore and extinguish. The fact that Monk was highly skilled and
respected at applying British Imperial doctrine of continuity in a bijural system in Quebec
would have impressed the Judiciary Committee even more. Monk had written:

Neither the French government nor any of its colonists or their trading
associations ever attempted, during an intercourse of over two hundred
years, to subvert or modify the laws and usages of the aboriginal tribes,
except where they had established colonies and permanent settlements, and
then only by persuasion.

[...and by the English or the Hudson’s Bay Company..]

...it [English law] could be administered and enforced only among, and in
favor of, and against those who belonged to the Company or were living
under them. It did not apply to the Indians, nor were the native laws or
customs abolished or modified, and this is unquestionably true in regard to
their civil rights. It is easy to conceive, in the case of joint occupation of
extensive countries by Europeans and native nations or tribes, that two
different systems of civil and even criminal law may prevail. History is full

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of such instances, and the dominions of the British Crown exhibit cases of that kind. The Charter did introduce the English law, but did not, at the same time, make it applicable generally or indiscriminately – it did not abrogate the Indian laws and usages. \cite{Connolly v. Woolrich [1867] 11 L.C. Jur. 197}

Slattery (1979:161) notes that "these views were unanimously approved on appeal and have been adopted in a number of subsequent cases. Indeed this author has noted more than twenty, such citations, the most recent being, \textit{R. v. Morris and Olsen}, [2004] BCCA. Monk's judgment reasons and their strength against appeal would have shaken the Hudson's Bay Company. Monk's first two judgment reasons included:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Held:}
1. That though the Hudson's Bay Company's Charter is of doubtful validity, yet if valid, the chartered limits of the company did not extend westward beyond navigable waters of the rivers flowing into the Bay;

2. That the English Common Law prevailing in the Hudson's Bay territories, did not apply to natives who were joint occupants of the territories; nor did it supersede or abrogate even within the limits of the Charter, the laws, usages, and customs of the aborigines; \cite{Connolly v. Woolrich [1867] 11 L.C. Jur. 197}
\end{quote}

Fortunately for both Canada and the Hudson's Bay Company, for reasons this author has yet to discover, the appeal to the Privy Council was abandoned by William Connolly's European heirs. Based on Monk's judgment and Slattery's own research of other authorities, Slattery concluded that:

\begin{quote}
Rupert's Land was initially deemed to be a conquered colony, in which the laws and property rights of the inhabitants remained in force until modified. The Charter of 1670 effected a partial introduction of English law, but only as regards Company employees and others living under their rule; the customary laws of the indigenous peoples were otherwise unaffected. The grant of propriety rights in the Charter vested in the Company no more than what the Crown itself purported to hold in the territory, namely an underlying title to the soil subject to subsisting aboriginal interests, along with an exclusive right to extinguish such interests by cession or purchase. \cite{Slattery 1979:164}
\end{quote}

Believing a pending transfer of sovereignty to be only a month or two away, McDougall arrived in Pembina, U.S.A., south of Red River and the Canadian border on
October 30, 1869 planning to establish his government at Red River (Zeller 2000:3). McDougal had sent ahead a proclamation which aside from pompous wording offered no assurances or even a hint of Canada’s likely respect of the rights of inhabitants of the territories being annexed. By October 25, 1869, Louis Riel and his supporters had met with most of the inhabitants of Red River to assure continued loyalty to the Hudson’s Bay Company and Her Majesty while opposing Canada’s continued ignorance of their rights. On November 2, McDougall was met near Pembina, by an armed Metis party that warned him not to enter Rupert’s Land. The same day, Riel and his followers occupied Fort Garry (Morton 1939:882-888). McDougall soon after returned in embarrassment to Canada. McDougall’s embarrassment was much deepened by Prime Minister Macdonald’s change of position. The latter told Britain and the Hudson’s Bay Company that Canada would not accept responsibility until civil order was reestablished. Macdonald’s sudden change of posture left McDougall as the new Canadian governor effectively abandoned.

On November 30, 1869 Lord Granville, the main representative of Britain’s Colonial Office wrote to Canada’s Lieutenant Governor John Young, urging an immediate resolution of peace and good order at Red River:

On the 22nd of June 1866, the Executive Council of Canada expressed the opinion that the most inviting parts of the territory would shortly be peopled by persons whom the Company were unable to control, and who would establish a Government and tribunals of their own, and assert their political independence; that such a community would cut British North America in two, and retard or prevent their communications by railway and therefore that ‘the future interests of Canada and all British North America were virtually concerned in the immediate establishment of a strong Government there, and its settlement as a part of the British Colonial System. (Sessional Papers, Vol. 5, #12, 1870, p.139)

This letter described the British Imperial government’s greatest fear only partially expressed. The population of Red River was united and rebellious, beyond the control of the Hudson’s Bay Company, and now as a result of McDougall’s bungling, alienated from Canada, her nearest British North American neighbour, The United States of America stood nearby most willing to offer support of Red River’s independence. Her
Majesty's government did next what she had done once before, in 1763 under similar
circumstances. Her Majesty's Government had in 1763 then and now in 1869 issued a
Royal Proclamation, reassuring both her colonies as well as her Aboriginal allies fair
treatment while at the same time asserting her sovereignty over British North America.
The *RP1763* was intended to: diffuse expansion of American settlement; quell an
uprising among Aboriginals; and consolidate as a single colony, territory newly acquired
in battle with France (Suddard 2002:2-5). An uprising led by Pontiac was seen to have
occurred as a result of Governor Jeffrey Amherst's mishandling of relations with
Aboriginals (Cashin 2003). Until 1768, the responsibilities of the British Secretary of
State for the Southern Department included British North America. In 1763, that
Secretary of State was Charles Wyndham, 2nd Earl of Egremont. The *RP1763* was based
on a draft written for Egremont by Henry Ellis, the Governor of Georgia (Cashin 2003:2-3).

The *RP1869* was written by the Earl Granville, Secretary of State for the Colonies,
serving under William Ewart Gladstone, Prime Minister of Her Majesty's Government.
Meant to remedy the complications which were provoked by McDougall, this Royal
Proclamation of 1869 assured 'Her Subjects in the North-West', the area to be affected
by the RL&NWTO, that:

...By Her Majesty's authority I do therefore assure you, that on the Union
with Canada all your civil and religious rights and privileges will be
respected, your properties secured to you, and that your Country will be
governed, as in the past, under British laws and in the spirit of British
justice. [see the complete proclamation in Appendix D]

On December 10, 1869, Donald Smith, an officer of the Hudson's Bay Company in
Montreal, was recruited by Canada's Prime Minister, John A. McDonald to lead a team
to negotiate an end to the trouble that had arisen (Reford 2000:2-3). Smith arrived at Red
River on December 27, 1869, allegedly leaving the Royal Proclamation of December 6,
1869 at Pembina to prevent its interception. On January 19, 1870 the contents of this
proclamation and other similar assurances were read aloud to an assembly of Red River
inhabitants. For reasons better explained by this author in Chapter 4, the true status and
gravity of this or royal proclamations in general have yet to be fully appreciated. As did the proclamation of 1763, this proclamation of 1869 triggered a British Imperial principle described by Lord Mansfield in *Campbell v. Hall*, [1774], 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045, that is, the terms of such a Royal Proclamation have the effect of a statute of the Parliament of Great Britain.

Accordingly, once proclaimed, the provisions contained can only be altered by a local legislature. This principle was accepted in 1887 by Gwynne J. in *St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen*, citing the RP1763 as the ‘Indian Bill of Rights’; and was cited again in 1973 by Hall, J. in *Calder v. Attorney-General of BC* [1973], S.C.R. 313, supporting the claim of the Nisga’as. Both 1763 and 1869 Royal Proclamations were issued on instructions from cabinet, by the responsible minister of Her Majesty’s Government to prevent collisions between colonists and Aboriginals, as well as to restore peace and good order under British sovereignty. This 1869 proclamation was published in Canada under the signature of Her Majesty’s representative, Governor General Sir John Young, Lord Lisgar. Telegraphed and later published correspondence leave no doubt of the authenticity of the *Royal Proclamation of December 6, 1869*. Notwithstanding the crowd’s failure to fully appreciate their full legal weight, the words of this Royal Proclamation had their intended effect. The peace they encouraged might have lasted until Rupert’s Land officially was annexed by Canada five months later. Unfortunately, on February 18th, a Canadian, Thomas Scott and 47 others were captured while challenging Riel’s control over the Red River. Scott was an obnoxious prisoner and was finally beaten for his behaviour on February 28, 1870. On March 3, Scott was tried and sentenced to death. In spite of pleas by other leaders and clergy, Scott was executed on March 4, 1870.

Granville, expressing concern for the growing unrest in the Red River region, on April 9, 1870, appointed Sir John Young, the current Governor General of Canada, as Governor of Rupert’s Land. On May 3rd, 1200 troops departed from Toronto under the command of a most experienced British Imperial officer, Colonel Garnet Joseph Wolseley. This force was made up of one-third British and two-third Canadian soldiers. The force arrived by steamer, June 30th, adjacent to Fort William, present day Thunder
Bay. Traveling south and parallel to the column, through Chicago, the south shore of Lake Superior, Duluth, and Marquette, Minnesota, a Lieutenant William Francis Butler conducted a secret mission, assessing any danger that might be posed by Fenians who had threatened to disrupt the expedition. Butler (1872) carried out his mission without incident, reporting that the Fenians were no threat at all. Wolseley expected him to rejoin the column mid way between Thunder Bay and Fort Garry. Visiting Fort Garry was left by Wolseley entirely to Butler’s discretion. While in St. Paul’s, Butler had met Bishop Tache, securing from him a letter of introduction that was to protect him from interference by Riel or the Metis. As a result, Butler risked visiting Fort Garry. He arrived on the steamer, the International, jumping off in the dark shortly before its arrival at Fort Garry. Butler was able to visit Hudson’s Bay Company Governor McTavish, Anglican Bishop of Rupert’s Land Machray and Indian Chief Henry Prince. After a brief meeting with Louis Riel himself, Butler set out to intercept Colonel Wolseley and the expedition. Butler rejoined Wolseley at the mouth of Rainy River, assuring him there was no Fenian threat as well as giving him a full account of conditions at Red River. Alexander Begg’s diary (Morton 1956:391-394), leaves no doubt that a proclamation from Colonel Wolseley was published Saturday July 23, 1870 while Butler was still in Red River. He was credited by Begg’s diary with having brought it to the settlement. In order to resolve the manner in which this proclamation actually arrived, this researcher needed to review the first person accounts of Wolseley’s other officers, traveling with the column. Butler himself makes no reference to the proclamation while clear and detailed reference is made by Captain G. L. Huyshe of the 60th Royal Rifles, traveling under Wolseley’s command:

Mr. Donald Smith, who had succeeded the late Mr. McTavish as Governor of the Hudson’s Bay Company, had arrived at Fort William on his way to ‘Norway House’ and to him Colonel Wolseley entrusted the delivery of a proclamation, which he had drawn up, to the Red River people. Mr. Donald Smith undertook to send it into the settlement, by a safe hand, from Fort Alexander, at the entrance to Lake Winnipeg.

Copies of this proclamation were sent to the Protestant and Roman Catholic Bishops at Red River, and to the Hudson’s Bay Company’s officer at Fort Garry. (Huyshe 1871:88-89)
Wolseley’s proclamation was to be delivered to Red River by Smith who assumed an official status that bridged the transition of sovereignty. Smith represented Sir John Young, the Acting Governor under British Imperial sovereignty, and the Canadian government. On and after July 15, 1870, Smith was the Acting Governor until Governor Adams George Archibald, the permanent governor appointed by Canada arrived to take up office. Completely consistent with the *Royal Proclamation of December 6, 1869 (RP1869)*, issued by Her Majesty’s Government, this second proclamation declared “the loyal Indians or Half Breeds being as dear to our Queen as any other loyal subjects ... The force I have the honour of commanding will enter your Province representing no party either in religion or politics, and will offer equal protection to the lives and property of all races and all creeds”, (see full text in Appendix D). This second proclamation, signed by Wolseley and the *Rupert’s Land & North-Western Territory Order, 1870 (RL&NWTO)* were both issued after his scheduled communication with British Cabinet on his arrival at Port Arthur. It is not surprising that Wolseley would trust Donald A. Smith with its delivery. Smith, according to M. Bell Irvine’s accounting report of the expedition (Irvine 1871:5-9) had already provided not only useful advice on supplies, but a regular mail service to the expedition as well. This researcher also noted that Smith and Wolseley had already shared at least one close friend in Montreal, a George Stephen, later to become Lord Mount-Stephen. George Stephen was actually Smith’s cousin with whom he had already invested in many financial ventures, later including the Canadian Pacific Railroad. Wolseley, on the other hand dedicated his 1904 autobiography, *The Story of a Soldier’s Life*, to George Stephen, “who for forty years have given me your unvarying friendship” (Wolseley 1904:vii).

But, neither Smith, nor the bishops had shared Wolseley’s proclamation with anyone in Red River. As this author explains in greater detail in the next chapter, Smith and the bishops suppressed this proclamation as they had already done the Royal Proclamation of Her Majesty’s Government some seven months earlier. This author was able to determine through newspaper articles, diaries and other personal accounts that, in fact, William Francis Butler arrived a month ahead to reconnoiter the settlement for his
Colonel, only to discover that the proclamation had not been published. In addition assuring the Cree and Saulteaux in the region, Butler obtained Governor McTavish’s copy. After a meeting between Butler and Riel, Riel himself supervised its printing and publication (Morton 1939:917-918). Colonel Wolseley arrived with his complete force on August 23rd. The RL&NWTO, establishing Canada’s sovereignty had, in July 15, 1870, become part of the BNA Act, Canada’s constitution, while Wolseley had been en route with his army between Lake Superior and the Red River.
CHAPTER THREE

THE TIDE OF HISTORY

Meaning of the Tide of History

In October 1987, thirty-six members of the Abenaki Nation staged a ‘fish-in’ demonstration on land they claimed as their ancestral home. The State of Vermont charged the thirty-six with fishing without a license. Those charged claimed they were not subject to state regulation because they held Aboriginal rights to the land. After a lengthy trial, charges were dismissed by Vermont Trial Court. In 1992, Vermont Supreme Court reinstated charges because whatever rights the Abenaki’s had, had been extinguished by the ‘weight of history’ (Lord & Shutkin 1994:7; Duthu 2000:185; Lowndes 1994)

In 2002, Olney J wrote for the High Court of Australia in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria [2002] HCA 58, that:

[107] …The facts in this case lead inevitably to the conclusion that before the end of the 19th century the ancestors through whom the claimants claim title had ceased to occupy their traditional lands in accordance with their traditional laws and customs. The tide of history has indeed washed away any real acknowledgment of their traditional laws and any real observance of their traditional customs.

As a result, the members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community lost all claim to their lands or their rights to live under their own legal system. David Ritter wrote in criticism of this judgment:

Justice Olney evoked notions of an inevitable submergence of ancient customs, resulting in decay and ultimately loss, stones eroded, shells tumbled into sand, headlands crumbled into dust, a traditional Aboriginal past obliterated by the blind and relentless power of Western civilization. (Ritter 2001:121)
Canadian Aboriginals have not fared much better. A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada determined a similar outcome for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick Mi'kmaqs in *R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220*, because “the accused did not establish that they hold aboriginal title to the lands they logged”. Ritter's commentary of *Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23*, where Australia's highest court rejected terra nullius, that is a European right of discovery, could have been read as a foreboding of the “tide of history” doctrine which replaced them:

....the High Court's apparent 'rejection of terra nullius' in Mabo is highly ambiguous and requires explanation that goes beyond mere doctrine (p.6)... the High Court in rejecting terra nullius threw away a name but retained the substance (p.32), (Ritter 1996:6-32)

The substance of terra nullius or discovery doctrines are that since ownership of property, (or legal occupation under English law) is a result of a legal system and that lacking such a legal system, Aboriginal lands were not legally owned or occupied. The 'tide of history' merely says that even if at one time Aboriginals were legal owners, the 'tide of history' has washed away the evidence of such ownership and therefore their claim, leaving only the original European claim. In his 2004 comments on *Yorta Yorta*, Ritter commented that:

When Justice Olney employed the ‘tide of history’ he etymologically married the decision in the case to certain venerable, religious, imperial and racist discourses, all of which had long previously been relied upon to deliver the ‘verdict of the world’ on Indigenous civilizations. In the physical world, tides are not inexplicable and neither is the metaphoric ‘tide of history’. (Ritter 2004:118)

Indeed, this author discovered that during the 19th century, ‘the tide of history’ or other similar term was being used in Canada to explain and justify, European displacement of Aboriginals. Until shortly after the Second World War, the driving force behind the tide was the executive branch of the Canadian government, supported by the legislature. The *Canadian Bill of Rights* which made possible the first successful attack on the *Indian Act, R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282*, striking down the criminalization of alcohol for Canadian Aboriginals. This author believes a sea change was predictable
when the federal government's notorious 1969 White Paper met previously unheard of resistance from Aboriginals across Canada. Moreover, Canadian parliament appeared unlikely to endorse the changes required by the White Paper to liquidate Indian assets and place them in the care of respective provinces.

Without a willing legislature as a partner, the Canadian executive then needed to drive its tide of history using its unlimited discretionary powers and the courts. To understand why a tide of history has been necessary at all and why it should be necessary to resort to such indirect means, one must consider the problem raised by Professor McNeil in his seminal work, *Common Law Aboriginal Title*. As Professor McNeil explains in authoritative detail, "it is quite impossible in English law for the Crown to acquire an original title to lands that are already occupied by the Indians" (McNeil 1989:229). Even in the High Arctic, Canada could assert a much stronger claim to title based on thousands of years of occupation but would have to sacrifice its present exercise of absolute control over the 'treasure house' of resources as well as the individual freedoms of the region's Aboriginal inhabitants. The particular choice of method for the tide of history was well described by Alexis de Tocqueville, the 19th century philosopher, historian, and author of two volumes entitled, *Democracy in America*:

The Spaniards were unable to exterminate the Indian race by those unparalleled atrocities which brand them with indelible shame, nor did they succeed even in wholly depriving it of its rights; but the Americans of the United States have accomplished this twofold purpose with singular felicity, tranquility, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood, and without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of the world. It is impossible to destroy men with more respect for the laws of humanity. (de Tocqueville 1945:345)

Paraphrasing de Tocqueville, University of California Professor Philip Frickey wrote:

.... De Tocqueville recognized that America is a constitutional democracy built through the legalized coercion of colonialism. The rule of law did double work, providing the glue holding the republic together while legitimating the displacement of indigenous institutions to make room for it.
For de Tocqueville, a commitment to liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire made America exceptional. These values are largely consistent with the constitutional democracy that was built on top of the colonial process, but patently incongruent with the colonization buried underneath. It is unsurprising, then, that federal Indian law – the law governing the historical and ongoing colonial process underpinning the United States – is itself a largely overlooked, little understood paradox. (Frickey 2005)

Canadian courts and politicians embraced the colonial process praised by the American statesman, Benjamin Franklin and enunciated by Emerich de Vattel in his Law of Nations. U. S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshal’s adopted and created an attendant common law of Aboriginal title. As a result, a Canadian colonial process is undistinguishable from its American counterpart. A better understanding of this colonial process, today, euphemistically called the ‘tide of history’ is important to this study, by way of explaining why and how the legal rights of the Aboriginal inhabitants of Rupert’s Land were allegedly washed way.

The ‘tide of history’ or the ‘march of civilization’ critically depends on the monopoly of coercive force wielded by a state that is disconnected from a respect for individual freedoms in order that it can make legal and justifiable for material wealth, that which is immoral – the destruction of other people or living entities. This disconnection is virtually impossible for societies whose legal systems are based on customs or accepted practices that protect individual freedoms. Indeed, the Canadian common law proof of the existence of custom is two fold. Claimants must prove the alleged custom or practice – a foundation on values since time immemorial and a consensus to ensure that it will be respected (see Chapter 5 for a more complete explanation). During two hundred years of relations with Hudson’s Bay Company employees, it was in neither Aboriginal nor Company interests to accept such a monopoly of coercive force. Accordingly, both the Company and Aboriginal societies within Rupert’s Land used customary legal systems, among themselves, as well as among their societies. During and after the annexation of Rupert’s Land by Canada, the feat of achieving such peace and good order, was often attributed “to the manner in which they were dealt with for generations by the Hudson’s Bay Company” (Morris 1890:285)
It was Aboriginal confidence, however misplaced, in the continuation, even enhancement of this balance, that kept them from responding to European and Euro-Canadian arrivals in defense of their values and customs with coercive force of their own. This balance achieved under British sovereignty was upset when the Canadian government used a combination of false promises, illiberal laws and coercive force in order to gain material advantages at the expense of the Aboriginal inhabitants of Rupert’s Land. It was not weakness but rather aversion to using coercive force and adopting immoral behaviour that prevented Aboriginals from opposing a European and Euro-Canadian onslaught. Initially, before the latter were present in large enough numbers, the Canadian state feigned moral intentions with attendant noble behaviour and generous assurances. Morton recorded a interview given by William McDougall, the member of Canadian parliament who Prime Minister John A. Macdonald had first appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the new territory. McDougall was interviewed by news correspondent, John Robertson-Ross in St. Paul, Minneapolis, for an article printed in the *Daily Telegraph* of Toronto, January 6, 1870

Correspondent - Are all the Indians loyal?
Governor - Yes, all the Indian tribes are loyal and would at a moment’s warning take up arms in defense of the British Government. They know full well that if ever annexation took place their changes would be small.

Correspondent - You intended, did you not, to recognize the Indian claims?
Governor - Certainly. I intended to look on the Indians as owners of the land, and would treat for it with them as such. (Morton 1956:482)

... 

Correspondent - Did they [Americans] dread an Indian uprising?
Governor - Yes. They knew well that the Indians have been always decently treated by the British Government and that if any trouble did ensue, their chances would not be very good. They swore, knowing this, that if Americans had to suffer our party should be cleaned out first. (Morton 1956:483)

This position differs greatly from McDougall’s treatment a few years earlier of Aboriginals on Manitoulin Island, where he sold their lands out from under them (Zeller 2000:2). Most important, McDougall’s position described to the reporter differs

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completely from that taken by his superior, Prime Minister Macdonald, who pushed through parliament, An Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians, assented to June 22, 1869, which among many other oppressive measures, established that:

1. In Townships or other tracts of land set apart for Indians in Canada, and subdivided by survey into lots, no Indian or person claiming to be of Indian blood, or intermarried with an Indian family, shall be deemed to be lawfully in possession of any land in such Townships or tracts, unless he or she has been or shall be located for the same by the order of the Superintendent General. ...

In his instructions to Colonel Wolseley, Lieutenant-General James Lindsay, on March 24, 1870 advised:

23. In conclusion it will doubtless occur to you that owing to the mixed character of the Force, and its inexperience in the nature of the service, the proximity of the United States frontier, the peculiar character of Indians and voyageurs, great care will be required in enforcing strict attention to orders. Indians should be ceremoniously treated. (The War Office to Lieutenant-General the Honourable James Lindsay, 24 March, 1870, CIHM 91209)

Colonel Wolseley, in turn, issued Standing Orders for the Red River Expeditionary Force, from Toronto, 14th May, 1870, cautioning his officers:

35. All officers belonging to this Force will be most careful in impressing upon those under their command the great necessity there is for cultivating the good will of the Indians and others employed as voyageurs. Colonel Wolseley will punish with the utmost severity any one who ill treats them. The same rule applies to all Indians who may be met on the line of route. It must be remembered that the Government has made a treaty with them securing the right of way through their country; all are therefore bound to protect them from injury, and it is of special importance that our intercourse with them should be of the utmost friendly nature.

As Wolseley wrote soon after his return to Britain, these precautions were well conceived.
[... of the mainly Aboriginal, Métis and Half-Breed population of Red River] It would have been impossible to have carried out the measure in the face of their opposition, so it became necessary to soothe their alarm by fair promises; no coercion was to be attempted, and the troops, for the protection of law and order. In fact, they were going there, more in the capacity of police than of soldiers. (Wolseley 1870:714)

As they [the Aboriginals of NW Ontario] are all armed and capable of great endurance, and as the country generally is a network of lakes, where they can go in any direction for hundreds of miles in their light canoes, they might cause endless trouble and great loss to any military force seeming to push its way through the country without their permission. (Wolseley 1870:718)

Wolseley’s expeditionary force was guided by Indians and en route between Thunder Bay and Red River, stretched one-hundred-fifty miles (Wolseley 1971:65). Her Majesty’s Government of Great Britain and Ireland was well aware of Canada’s colonial behaviour. Historian Paul Knaplund’s explanation of this duplicity may be less acceptable today but was quite well reasonable then:

Gladstone and the majority of his colleagues hoped to keep the colonies within the Empire by applying the principle of freedom. This principle could not always be followed; true statesmanship must be opportunistic. (Knaplund 1966:139)

Wolseley in a characteristically blunt style explained the situation more plainly:

He [Georges-Etienne Cartier] is a firm friend and a good hater. His ordinary promise is more to be relied upon than the oath of many of his contemporaries and he is a hard working public servant. To accuse him of descending at times into the lowest depths of jobbery and political trickery is merely to accuse him of being a Canadian politician. (Wolseley 1870:715)

Thus, it was allegedly as a result of naivety, a weakness, on the part of Aboriginals that they did not sufficiently doubt British and Canadian sincerity. Aboriginals were not averse to separating the use of coercive force from morality in order to be free to accomplish ‘legal and justified objectives’ through immoral means -- conniving use of deceit and coercive force. What had been a positive trait shared by Europeans and Aboriginals alike for more than two hundred years in Rupert’s Land -- mutual acceptance
of established moral practices, was now archaic and a weakness in the paths of relentless advancing European civilizations.

Only by exercise of coercive force in a covert manner, disconnected from ordinary morals would it have been possible to achieve the goals of both imperial and colonial governments. Recruiting the unscrupulous and uninhibited agents required of such a project was not so difficult as it might seem. In his classic work, The Road to Serfdom, in a chapter entitled, Why the Worst Get on Top, Frederick Hayek (1945:149) explained:

Just as the democratic statesman who sets out to plan economic life will soon be confronted with the alternative of either assuming dictatorial powers or abandoning his plans, so the totalitarian dictator would soon have to choose between disregard of ordinary morals and failure. It is for this reason that the unscrupulous and uninhibited are likely to be more successful in a society tending toward totalitarianism.

Hayek (1945:150) continues his essay, describing the circumstances that present opportunity and justification for the “suppression of democratic institutions”:

We must here return for a moment to the position which precedes the suppression of democratic institutions and the creation of a totalitarian regime. In this stage it is the general demand for quick and determined government action that is the dominating element in the situation, dissatisfaction with the slow and cumbersome course of democratic procedure which makes action for action’s sake the goal. It is then the man or the party who seems strong and resolute enough ‘to get things done’ who exercises the greatest appeal.

Hayek (1945:152-153) identifies three factors contributing to “why such a numerous and strong group with fairly homogeneous views is not likely to be formed by the best, but rather by the worst elements of any society”:

... the higher the education and intelligence of individuals become, the more likely their views and tastes are differentiated and less likely they are to agree on a particular hierarchy of values. It is a corollary of this that if we wish to find a high degree of uniformity and similarity of outlook, we have to descend to the regions of lower moral and intellectual standards where the more primitive and ‘common’ instincts and tastes prevail. This does not mean that the majority of people have low moral standards; it merely means
that the largest group of people whose values are very similar are the people with low standards.

If, however, a political dictator had to rely entirely on those whose uncomplicated and primitive instincts happen to be very similar, their number would scarcely give sufficient weight to their endeavours. He will have to increase their numbers by converting more to the same simple creed.

... It is in connection with the deliberate effort of the skilful demagogue to weld together a closely coherent and homogeneous body of supporters that the third and perhaps most important negative element of selection enters. It seems to be almost a law of human nature that it is easier for people to agree on a negative program – on the hatred of an enemy, on the envy of those better off – than on any positive task.

The project to annex Rupert's Land found dedicated and effective demagogues in such major characters as John A. Macdonald, George-Etienne Cartier, Bishop Alexandre Tache, Louis Riel, Donald A. Smith, skillfully manipulating factions and the tensions which separated them. Though divided by hatred and envy for one another, these factions were united in their attitudes toward the Aboriginal inhabitants. Significant departures from Christian beliefs, codes of honour and democratic values happened easily in the face of choices between "disregard of ordinary morals and failure" of their various projects - the expansion of Canada (and curbing of the U.S.); realizing a new Catholic and Francophone province (to offset the power of an Orange Ontario); or, exploiting huge economic opportunities such as railroads, telegraph, mining, farming and forestry (without having to share with or compensate the owners).

**Historical Suppression of Rupert's Land Rights**

The *Royal Proclamation of December 6, 1869* might have achieved the same peace and order that its predecessor the *RP1763* had, if it was faithfully circulated and had achieved warranted recognition as a general statement of British Imperial doctrine of continuity in British North America. Indeed, Colonel Wolseley's own proclamation was mainly necessary because the proclamation issued by Her Majesty’s Government was never distributed.
The federal and provincial governments of Canada have thus far succeeded in suppressing the same legal rights of every individual that they are obliged to respect and place under the protection of by superior courts. This suppression has been mainly accomplished by physically removing the Royal Proclamation of December 6, 1869, from public view and on the rare occasions when that has not been possible, by obscuring its legal import.

According to the sworn testimony of Prime Minister John A. Macdonald, published by Canadian Parliament in its Report of the Select Committee on the Causes of the Difficulties in the North-West Territory in 1869-70, Appendix 6, 1874, this Royal Proclamation issued by Her Majesty's Government of Great Britain and Ireland, was entrusted to the Roman Catholic missionary, Jean-Baptiste Thibault, Donald A. Smith and Bishop Taché.

Hector Langevin, Macdonald's Minister of Public Works, sent for Jean-Baptiste Thibault, a missionary who had been on the prairie's since 1842, who had established a mission at Lac Ste. Anne, in present-day Alberta and had published a number of hymn and prayer books in the Cree language. During the Select Committee hearings of 1874, Macdonald testified that:

The proclamation, as first issued was transmitted for dissemination in the North-West through the Very Reverend Mr. Thibault. It was printed in English, French, and Cree, at Ottawa, and sent by him. At the same time, the Bishop of St. Boniface was telegraphed for and requested to return, if possible, and use his great influence among the people of his diocese. The Government here was informed that, though Mr. Thibault was allowed access to the Territory, he was deprived of the proclamation given him and they were not published. When Bishop Taché arrived in Ottawa, circumstances in the North-West had not materially changed and the Governor-General decided that the proclamation should be entrusted for publication to the Bishop. (Report of the Select Committee on the Causes of the Difficulties in the North-West Territory in 1869-70:100-102)

The same report includes a letter (p. 17) from Joseph Howe, December 6, 1869 to Very Reverend Mr. Thibault explaining, "herewith you will receive 500 copies of a proclamation, signed by the Queen's representative, for distribution in the North-West; and 100 copies of the instructions given to the Hon. Mr. McDougall on September 28th."
The report also includes a letter (p. 192-193), from Governor-General Young to Bishop Taché, February 16, 1870:

I need not try to furnish you with any instructions for your guidance, beyond those contained in the telegraphic message sent me by Lord Granville on the part of the British Cabinet, in the Proclamation which I drew up in accordance with that message, and in the letters which I addressed to Gov. McTavish, your Vicar General and Mr. Smith.

Bishop Taché never saw fit to publish the Royal Proclamation in the North-West. However, the Royal Proclamation was produced in 1875, when Taché argued to have the death sentence of Elzear Goulet commuted (Sessional Papers #11 – House of Commons 1875) and again two decades later in a valiant effort to save French language and schooling rights from being abolished by the Manitoba Legislature. Donald A. Smith read a few sentences from the Proclamation to a crowd gathered in front of Fort Garry, January 19, 1870. As noted by Jack Bumsted in his book, The Red River Rebellion, “the best shorthand reporter in the settlement, William Coldwell, was on hand as reporter for the New Nation to keep an official record of the proceedings” (Bumsted 1996:122). This record does, in fact, appear in the New Nation for January 20, 1870. As Bumsted commented:

Not every listener believed the promises of the Canadians; however, [Thomas] Bunn emphasized that the governor-general’s proclamation of December 7, which called upon the people to lay down their arms and disperse was not available and was not read at this gathering. (Bumsted 1996:126)

Donald A. Smith served on the Select Committee on the Causes of the Difficulties in the North-West Territory in 1869-70, and was as a result able to control the manner in which the documents and testimony were reported and the manner in which they were used to explain the difficulties surrounding the annexation of Rupert’s Land.

After Vicar General Jean Baptiste Thibault allegedly lost his copies of the Royal Proclamation in English, French and Cree, the promulgation of this important document was left to Bishop Taché. The latter chose not to release it until he required it in his 1874
efforts in support of Goulet and his efforts to save Francophone education and language rights, fifteen years later.

Even today, the Crown continues to suppress the existence and full meaning of both the Royal Proclamation of December 6, 1869 and Colonel Wolseley's Proclamation of June 1870, (see Chronology in Appendix E).

**Tide of History Reliant on the Legislature**

The exact form of the 'tide of history', the metaphor which disguises calculated and sustained efforts of the executive of the Canadian government has shape shifted according to the changes occurring in a larger Canadian context. The Crown has alternately used whatever branch of government has been the most amenable to tolerate the tide of history for preventing and washing away any Aboriginal resistance. Chief Justice Brian Dickson characterized the separate branches of Canadian government and their respective roles in the Supreme Courts judgment of *Fraser v. P.S.S.R.B.*, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455

39 .... There is in Canada a separation of powers among the three branches of government--the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. In broad terms, the role of the judiciary is, of course, to interpret and apply the law; the role of the legislature is to decide upon and enunciate policy; the role of the executive is to administer and implement that policy.

From 1869, until 1951, Canada's federal executive was able to write whatever legislation it needed in order to legally (as opposed to morally or fairly acquire unlimited discretionary powers. In preparation for its annexation of Rupert's Land, John A. Macdonald's government presented in 1868, its *Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians*. This legislation was at first objected to by Senator McCully (Senate Debates April 20, 1868:179):

Hon. Mr. McCully wished to express his strong disapprobation and objection to the vast and dangerous powers, as he thought, which the bill gave to the head of the Department, respecting the administration of the Indian lands and taking the functions and powers of the ordinary tribunals of the country, which would be alike dangerous and unwise, such as the arrest and imprisonment of trespassers, etc.. Such vast and extraordinary powers
were unheard of in any free and civilized country where British laws were administered.

Senator Ross responded on behalf of the governing Conservative party:

In the case of the Indians, who were infants in the eye of the law, some guardian had to be appointed, and who so well suited and likely to act so fairly as the Government, who could have no motive or inducement to do wrong between them and the public domain.

However strongly felt Senator McCully’s objectives were, he and his fellow senators, on June 9th 1869, approved the Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians, with only one amendment (Debates of the Senate, 2nd Session, 1st Parliament, April 15 - June 22, 1869:279) requiring the band of any Indian convicted of a crime to pay the expenses of his incarceration. During passages of the bill, Senator McCully remarked “the Indians of Nova Scotia had not advanced to that state of civilization to enable them to inherit property”. Less than two weeks later, Royal Assent was given the bill by the Governor-General. On December 17th, 1869 the Minister of Colonial Affairs advised Governor General John Young that “Her Majesty will not be advised to exercise Her power of disallowance with respect to the following Acts of the Legislature of Canada” (Sessional Papers, 1st Parliament, 1870 Vol. VI, #39:1-2). The list included the Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians, as well as An Act for the Temporary Government of Rupert’s Land. Using these draconian powers, Prime Minister Macdonald drew the boundaries of Manitoba in such a manner that non-Aboriginals were in the majority. Within ten years, after the immigration of more than eighty-thousand, mostly from Ontario, even the French speaking Metis who had until 1879 controlled the Manitoba legislature, were also outnumbered. By 1890, Franco Manitoban language and education rights were legislated away by an English dominated legislature.

The normal process for non-Aboriginal Canadians has long been that: first, the need for particular legislation arises, in the views expressed by voting citizens; initially as part of an election platform. Then, the elected government strikes committees to consult further and to draft the necessary legislation. After a series of readings in Parliament and the Senate, the bill is finally put before both the House of Commons and Senate and revisions according to feedback with a reasonable expectation of passage. The fairness
and reasonableness of Canadian laws critically depend on this lengthy and democratic process in order that the resulting laws will be obeyed by citizens and upheld by the courts.

Aboriginals have never had any democratic voice in proposing, constructing or approving the laws they are subjected to. A failing of the Canadian system noted by Keith Penner and Jim Manly, respectively, during the pronouncement of Bill C-31 in June 1985, allegedly removing discrimination against women from the Indian Act:

I think there was the overwhelming feeling that if we are to have the concept of Indian status, anyone recognized by the Indian people as being a band member should also be recognized as having Indian status in the eyes of the Government. I regret to say that the amendments brought forth by the Minister do not yet satisfy that requirement. This is a serious shortcoming in the Bill and one that continues to exist. ... Every amendment that we approve or reject must be done in recognition of the fact that at some point, and let it not be too far down the road, we will have to take the big leap forward so that in the next Parliament and the Parliament after that we will not be engaged in the same kind of exercise. It is long overdue that we cease this constant meddling and interfering and turn matters like this to the proper authorities, namely, the First Nations themselves. (House of Commons Debates, June 10, 1985, p.5571)

Rights to vote in provincial and federal elections were only granted long after electoral boundaries had been drawn in such a manner that Aboriginals were, and continue to be, severely outvoted by non-Aboriginals. Even in those more recent ridings, where Aboriginals are in a majority, such as northern Manitoba or the northern Territories, the members of parliament elected do not represent a strong enough voice in Canadian Parliament to influence changes in, for example, the *Indian Act; Cree Naskapi Act (CNA)*; or, *Nunavut Act*. This author has noticed that, for the legislation it puts before parliament, the Crown has used a different process in order to create an illusion of fairness and reasonableness. The first such commission was the Bagot Commission of 1844, led by, Governor-General Sir Charles Bagot. The commissioners' main concern was the appraisal of the current situation. It was mainly focused on land.

As Benjamin Franklin (Penn 1829:22) and Chief Justice John Marshal of the U.S. Supreme Court had already done, Governor-General Bagot adopted, without a foundation
in fact, the opinion of Emmerich de Vattel, presented in the latter’s 1758 work, The Law of Nations. The following is one of Vattel’s most often cited principle:

§ 81. The cultivation of the soil a natural obligation

The cultivation of the soil deserves the attention of the government, not only on account of the invaluable advantages that flow from it, but from its being an obligation imposed by nature on mankind. The whole earth is destined to feed its inhabitants; but this it would be incapable of doing if it were uncultivated. ... There are others, who, to avoid labour, choose to live only by hunting, and their flocks. This might, doubtless, be allowed in the first ages of the world, when the earth, without cultivation, produced more than was sufficient to feed its small number of inhabitants. But at present, when the human race is so greatly multiplied, it could not subsist if all nations were disposed to live in that manner. Those who still pursue this idle mode of life, usurp more extensive territories than, with a reasonable share of labour, they would have occasion for, and have, therefore, no reason to complain, if other nations, more industrious and too closely confined, come to take possession of a part of those lands. Thus, though the conquest of the civilized empires of Peru and Mexico was a notorious usurpation, the establishment of many colonies on the continent of North America might, on their confining themselves within just bounds, be extremely lawful. The people of those extensive tracts rather ranged through than inhabited them.

[Emphasis added by author]

Bagot advised that if “the Government had not made arrangements for the voluntary surrender of the lands, the white settlers would gradually have taken possession of them, without offering any compensation whatever”. Resisting white encroachment upon Indian lands, notwithstanding promises made by Her Majesty’s government, was viewed by Bagot as resisting “the natural laws of society” and “impolitic to check the tide of immigration” (Bagot 1845). Thus, Vattel provided a legal opinion which allowed the Canadian colonial government to disconnect morality from its use of coercive force in order to break solemn promises and dispossess Aboriginals. Adopting Vattel’s logic made this possible, in the words of Tocqueville, “with singular felicity, tranquility, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood, and without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of the world”. Supported by the Bagot Commission Report, the colonial government wrote and passed into law, the first Indian Act, 1850,
largely concerned with the disposal of Indian lands and the legal definition of an ‘Indian’. The Pennefather Commission, led by Richard T. Pennefather, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, produced the Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed on the 8th of September 1856, to Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada. The commission's objectives were two-fold, to investigate: “the best means of securing the future progress and civilization of the Indian Tribes in Canada”; and, “the best mode of so managing the Indian Properties as to secure its full benefit to the Indians, without impeding the settlement of the country”. Under the heading of Position of the Native Tribes in the Eye of the Law, the report noted:

In 1840, the Attorney General gave it as his opinion,

1st. That Indians under the age of 21 years are minors in the eye of the law, beyond that age they have the rights of other subjects.
2nd. That they are not incapable of making civil contracts.
3rdly. That they have legal capacity, either as plaintiffs or defendants.

At this time there was no legislative declaration bearing upon the subject matter of these opinions, but the Canadian Parliament have from time to time provided for the Indians as a class incapable in many respects of managing their own affairs. Indeed the 20 Vic. c. 26 expressly acknowledges their inferiority in regard to their legal rights and liabilities as compared with Her Majesty's other subjects resident in this Province, and provides means whereby they may be gradually enfranchised. (Pennefather 1858:99)

In their recommendations, Pennefather and his colleagues advised a strategy of aggressive assimilation of Indians to the language and culture of English and French citizens:

Great stress should be laid upon instruction either in French or English. It is true that the Missionaries in the North-West districts urge the propriety of some instruction being given in the native tongue, and no doubt it may facilitate the important object of spreading Christianity among the adults. In our opinion however nothing will so pave the way for the amalgamation of the Indian and white races, as the disuse among the former of their peculiar dialects. So long as they continue to cling to them, they will remain a distinct people dwelling apart in the midst of their White neighbours. ... Another point of vital importance to be kept steadily in view, is the gradual destruction of the tribal organization. It has been proposed to substitute Municipal Institutions, at once for it. (Pennefather 1858:152)
On March 14th 1879, Nicholas Flood Davin submitted the report he was commissioned by Prime Minister John A. Macdonald to complete. Davin reported a thorough research of “Industrial Schools for the education of Indians and mixed-bloods in the United States, and on the advisability of establishing similar institutions in the North-West Territories of the Dominion” (Davin 1979:1). Davin described the industrial school as “the principal feature of the policy known as aggressive civilization”, inaugurated by President Grant in 1869 on recommendations made by the Peace Commission. The latter commission had recommended that: “the Indians should be consolidated on few reservations”; “provided with permanent individual homes”; “the tribal relation should be abolished”; “lands should be allotted in severalty not in common”; and, “that the Indian should speedily become a citizen of the United States”. Davin’s reasons for a preference for a residential school over a day school leaves little doubt that the intent of aggressive civilization is to wipe out Aboriginal language and culture:

... it was found that the day-school did not work, because the influence of the wigwam was stronger than the influence of the school. ... The experience of the United States is the same as our own as far as the adult Indian is concerned. Little can be done with him. He can be taught to do a little at farming, and at stock-raising, and to dress in a more civilized manner, but that is all. The child, again, who goes to a day school learns little, and what he learns is soon forgotten, while his tastes are fashioned at home, and his inherited aversion to toil is in no way combated. (Davin 1879:1-2)

Not until shortly after the Second World War did the Crown feel the need to significantly alter the Indian Act or its policies. In 1947, the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, revisited this legislation with some sort of final solution in mind. Diamond Jenness, the Dominion Anthropologist, testified and submitted a single page report, Plan for Liquidating Canada’s Indian Problem within 25 Years. As suggested by the title, the objective of this plan, well received by the committee was “to abolish, gradually but rapidly the separate political and social status of the Indians (and Eskimos); to enfranchise them and merge them into the rest of the population on an equal footing” (Jenness 1947). The resulting 1951 Indian Act appeared
to have lost some of its undemocratic features, for example, it was no longer a crime to raise money for legal counsel or to hire a lawyer to present a claim in court. However, the revised Act markedly increased the discretionary powers of the Department of Indian & Northern Affairs and its officers (Lawrence 2004:36). Approximately twenty years after Jenness’ plan, Professor Harry Hawthorn and a team of his academic peers were hired to research and report on economic, political, educational situations of contemporary Indians of Canada, making suggestions as to the policies that might best be adopted. Hawthorn submitted his report in two volumes in 1966 and 1967. At more than four-hundred-sixty pages in two volumes, Hawthorn’s report was more detailed and delivered the same message as Jenness’ in a kinder and a more gentle fashion. The sorry state of contemporary Aboriginals, Hawthorn attributed to “general isolation, poverty, and backwardness which prevail in most Canadian Indian communities”. Like his predecessors, Hawthorn saw ‘tribal structure’ as a major obstacle to both desirable and inevitable assimilation:

3. Kinship Ties and Obligations
One of the most widely observed factors in economic development, generally held to be negative in its effects, is the obligation of the individual to his kinship group. In most tribal and peasant societies, a fairly wide kinship group is the basic unit of organization, economic and otherwise. It defines the role and status of the individual, and provides him with some degree of security; that is, in terms of a right to minimum subsistence and other prerequisites in times of need. The mutual ties of rights and obligations act as deterrents to economic advancement in an industrial society. The individual’s mobility may be reduced, for one thing, as he may be reluctant to sacrifice his security by moving to centres of job opportunity elsewhere. Where an individual does advance himself, through wage employment or successful entrepreneurship, the claims of his kinfolk may reduce his standard of living and his capital. This sort of pattern is conspicuous and therefore easily and frequently observed by outsiders. (Hawthorn 1966:121-122)

Hawthorn, like his predecessors characterized the legal relationship between Aboriginals and the Crown as “due to the fact that they were waiting on the shore when the White man first set foot on the northern half of this continent” (Hawthorn 1966:396).
From Charles Bagot to Harry Hawthorn, all were commissioned by the Crown, to conduct research relying exclusively upon non-Aboriginals who exercised control over Aboriginals. Even the most recent, Hawthorn Report is based for the most part on ethnocentric non-Aboriginal observations of Aboriginal behaviour. None of these efforts provided opportunity for Aboriginals to present the facts of Aboriginal motives, intentions and methodology. Vattel’s legal reasoning for dispossessing Aboriginals of their lands as well as their culture and an attendant characterization of Aboriginals as backward or primitive wards was incorporated in each report without factual foundations.

Soon after the patriation of Canada’s constitution with entrenched protection of individual rights, the Indian Act came under scrutiny by the first bipartisan committee that sought and received Aboriginal testimony. Chaired by Keith Penner, this parliamentary committee was to review Indian Self-Government. The committee’s second report, submitted September 12, 1983, is commonly known as The Penner Report. This report made fifty-eight recommendations, mostly related to general findings that: “the programs of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development relating to Indian people be phased out”; “the best way to promote Indian rights is through Indian self-government and not by special representation for First Nations in Parliament”; and, “the implementation of this report in its entirety, legislatively and constitutionally, is the best means of satisfying international standards in relation to Indian First Nations” (Penner 1983:148). Rather than blueprinting the tide of history for Aboriginals, the Penner Report provided a road map, back from the brink of extinction. This report began with the following quotation from Leo Tolstoy’s 1866, What Then Must We Do?

I sit on a man’s back choking him and making him carry me and yet assure myself and others that I am sorry for him and wish to lighten his load by all possible means – except by getting off his back.

Immediately before its conclusions and recommendations, the Penner Report included the remarks of former Commissioner of Indian Claims, Dr. Lloyd Barber:

I hope that we are psychologically prepared for this challenge. It has come upon us rather suddenly and tends to shake the basis on which we have always thought about our relationship with native people. I suppose in a
way, we tend to react like somebody who has been standing on the other fellow’s toes for so long that we are indignant when he wants to pull his foot out. I hope we can overcome this for his sake and ours.

This author experienced difficulty in locating the Penner Report and noticed its virtual disappearance from literature, less than a decade after its release. Much easier to find are the more recent reports of the 1996, Royal Commission on Aboriginal People and the 2007, Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry, both are available on the internet and in most Canadian libraries.

The only recent change to the Indian Act, Bill C-31 passed into law in June of 1985, allegedly to eliminate gender discrimination, provided unlimited discretionary powers to the Minister of Indian Affairs. The regulations used to implement these changes, still secret to all but immediate staff, have precipitated much litigation and a large Aboriginal migration to urban centers. One such action, Sawridge Band v. Canada, [2001] FCA 338 (CanLII), [2002] 2 F.C. 346 has been through more than forty-four hearings and is now cited as jurisprudence for a judge to refuse a motion as ‘abusive’. Although Minister David Crombie’s objectives, presented in parliament, for Bill C-31 were altruistic, this legislation, written with ambiguity and silent on important matters, placed in the hands of senior Crown officials, an unlimited discretionary power. The enabling regulations created with such sweeping power and the government’s application of them, threaten the very survival of Aboriginal people (Liberal Party of Canada 2002; Clatworthy & Delisle 2004; Lawrence 2004). The Crown’s regulations use the approach of referring to grand parents instead of the more offensive term of blood quantum. In addition to contributing to confusion that these regulations are in some way related to Aboriginal customs. During recent research conducted by this author for an Alberta First Nation, this researcher quickly realized that not only was blood quantum not an Aboriginal custom, its logic and objectives were not well understood.

While searching for historical illustrations of blood quantum limits applied to identity or citizenship, this researcher was provided by the Simon Weisenthal Holocaust Center with The Definition of a Jew, proclaimed by Governor-General Frank (see Appendix F). Though the genocide in this case was literal, the approach is identical to the cultural genocide intended by the Crown. In fact, this author’s findings in his research
conducted for the Alberta First Nation indicated that the Crown’s blood quantum controls, in combination with its other its controls of education, health and social services, if unchecked, will cause the disappearance of the subject First Nation, even sooner than anticipated by Clatworthy, the Assembly of First Nations; and, Liberal Party of Canada 2002.

Very recently, on June 8th 2007, in McIvor v. The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, [2007] BCSC 827, the section of the Indian Act altered by Bill C-31 has been struck down by the BC Supreme Court, for the following reasons cited by Honorable Madam Justice Ross:

[343] I have concluded that s. 6 of the 1985 Act violates s. 15(1) of the Charter in that it discriminates between matrilineal and patrilineal descendants born prior to April 17, 1985, in the conferring of Indian status, and discriminates between descendants born prior to April 17, 1985, of Indian women who married non-Indian men, and the descendants of Indian men who married non-Indian women. I have concluded that these provisions are not saved by s. 1.

Given these results are now well known, it seems highly unlikely that Canadian Parliament will ever allow itself to again be blind sided with amendments to the Indian Act that are as open to abusive use of executive authority as Bill C-31 has been.

Tide of History Reliant on the Courts

It is this author’s belief that the Crown has more recently adjusted its tide of history strategy, to rely more on Canadian courts for assistance, exploiting the substance which Ritter (1996:32) notes has been retained since rejection of the name, ‘terra nullius’ in Mabo. To appreciate this distinction between name and substance, one needs to examine what was been adopted from Mabo by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507;

Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The nature and incidents of native title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference to those laws and customs. (Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2], [1992], 175 C.L.R. 1 at p. 58)
This *Mabo* principle gave rise to the *Van der Peet* Test, most often cited as...

46. ...in order to be an aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right. (Van der Peet)

Essentially, *Mabo* and *Van der Peet* require Aboriginals to prove the past existence and present day survival of the very customs and tribal structure which the Bagot, Pennefather, Davin, Jenness and Hawthorne Reports made recommendations for erasing. These are the same customs and tribal structure which successive amendments to the *Indian Act* have been dedicated to criminalizing and suppressing -- the same customs and tribal structure characterized by Vattel as errant and part of ranging rather than legally occupying. Vattel’s opinion of Aboriginal legal character was adopted by Chief Justice John Marshall, in *Johnson v. M’Intosh*, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823), without any factual foundation (McNeil 1989:301-302; Harvard 1984:423-425; Seifert 2004:295-301). Thus, the role of the Crown’s ‘Indian Fighters’ has been to disguise as the *tide of history*, the efforts of their patron to destroy Aboriginal customs and tribal structure and to discredit Aboriginal legal character as being too errant to amount to legal occupation rather than mere ranging. An especially active member of the Crown’s team of experts, Dr. Alexander von Gernet, has proven himself most effective in discrediting Aboriginal legal character and in reducing the weight of Aboriginal historical evidence based on oral traditions. Von Gernet’s expert testimony was a major factor in the Crown winning an eventual Supreme Court of Canada decision in *R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard*, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220. The importance of Von Gernet’s testimony to the Crown’s arguments against the Mi’kmaq, were clearly acknowledged in the lower court judgment, with such phrases as “Dr. von Gernet replied, convincingly”; and, “Dr. von Gernet’s conclusion is accurate”, (see Appendix G for more examples)

This shift by the Crown away from legislative support toward judicial support for its *tide of history* will not succeed long. The character or propensity evidence presented by von Gernet, were it presented in non-Aboriginal actions, would not likely have been
admitted into the fact finding of a trial, regardless of whether it is a criminal or civil matter. Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada in *R. v. Handy*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908, Binnie J wrote:

39 It is, of course, common human experience that people generally act consistently with their known character. We make everyday judgments about the reliability or honesty of particular individuals based on what we know of their track record. If the jurors in this case had been the respondent’s inquisitive neighbours, instead of sitting in judgment in a court of law, they would undoubtedly have wanted to know everything about his character and related activities. His ex-wife’s anecdotal evidence would have been of great interest. Perhaps too great, as pointed out by Sopinka J. in *B. (C.R.)*, supra, at p. 744:

The principal reason for the exclusionary rule relating to propensity is that there is a natural human tendency to judge a person’s action on the basis of character. Particularly with juries there would be a strong inclination to conclude that a thief has stolen, a violent man has assaulted and a pedophile has engaged in pedophilic acts. Yet the policy of the law is wholly against this process of reasoning.

40 The policy of the law recognizes the difficulty of containing the effects of such information which, once dropped like poison in the juror’s ear, “swift as quicksilver it courses through the natural gates and alleys of the body”: Hamlet, Act I, Scene v, ll. 66-67.

[Emphasis added by this author]

Although the latter reasons relate to criminal trials, the reasons for not admitting character or propensity evidence in civil trials are remarkably similar, well explained by Supreme Court Justice John Sopinka in his seminal article, *Character Evidence in Civil Cases*:

It has perhaps been demonstrated that the law of evidence in civil cases is somewhat of a hodgepodge. There does not appear to be a consistent legal thread connecting the various rules. Some evidence is excluded which appears to be logically relevant. This over-zealousness on the part of the courts to protect character is perhaps the hallmark of an advanced civilization. One must be free to indulge his idiosyncrasies, oddities and peculiar habits without fear of having them exposed when seeking civil redress. Failure to cry at one’s mother’s funeral may not live up to the
expectations of those who sit in judgment, but it should not be a basis for attracting liability. (Sopinka 1972:257)

[Emphasis added by this author]

An exception to the prohibition against character or propensity evidence is the admission of, under specific conditions, similar fact evidence. Similar fact evidence is evidence of past discreditable conduct, adduced to prove that the accused is guilty of the offence for which he is now charged. The concept of similar fact evidence is now two centuries old. Clear principles for its admission were laid down more than a century ago in 1894 in *Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales*, [1894] A.C. 57. To what had previously been a simple exclusionary rule was added a rule for exceptionally admitting similar fact evidence to prove plan or design and to rebut a defense that would otherwise have been open to the accused. More than a century later, two tests for admissibility were enunciated in *Director of Public Prosecutions v. Boardman*, [1975] A.C. 421: (i) that the evidence must be of positive probative value; or, (ii) that it be uniquely or strikingly similar. Principles for determining admissibility have become more focused since *Boardman*, as pronounced by Supreme Court Justice McLachlin, writing for a majority in *R. v. B. (C.R.)*, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 717:

The Canadian jurisprudence since Boardman is generally consistent with the approach advocated in that case. It has followed Boardman in rejecting the category approach to the admission of similar fact evidence. At the same time, cases in Canada have on the whole maintained an emphasis on the general rule that evidence of mere propensity is inadmissible, and have continued to emphasize the necessity that such evidence possess high probative value in relation to its potential prejudice.


50 In summary, in considering the admissibility of similar fact evidence, the basic rule is that the trial judge must first determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. In most
cases where similar fact evidence is adduced to prove identity it might be helpful for the trial judge to consider the following suggestions in deciding whether to admit the evidence:

(1) Generally where similar fact evidence is adduced to prove identity a high degree of similarity between the acts is required in order to ensure that the similar fact evidence has the requisite probative value of outweighing its prejudicial effect to be admissible. The similarity between the acts may consist of a unique trademark or signature on a series of significant similarities.

(2) In assessing the similarity of the acts, the trial judge should only consider the manner in which the acts were committed and not the evidence as to the accused’s involvement in each act.

(3) There may well be exceptions but as a general rule if there is such a degree of similarity between the acts that it is likely that they were committed by the same person then the similar fact evidence will ordinarily have sufficient probative force to outweigh its prejudicial effect and may be admitted.

(4) The jury will then be able to consider all the evidence related to the alleged similar acts in determining the accused’s guilt for any one act.

The hallmark or pattern of strikingly similar acts must not be confused with trawling to find facts which support a theory -- poisonous reasoning, as defined in R. v. Handy. Likewise, the evidence of acts that comprise a striking pattern, which cannot be explained as coincidence, must not include other forms of evidence other than observed facts, such as expert opinion or treatise evidence. Master Calum U.C. MacLeod of Ontario Superior Court, spoke to this issue in Toronto (City) v. MFP Financial Services Ltd., [2002] CanLII 45516 (ON S.C.), citing Sopinka’s The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd Edition, para. 11.5

......when the disposition or propensity of a person is proven by either expert opinion or reputation evidence, the term “similar fact evidence” seems inappropriate.
To summarize then, before similar fact evidence of the character or propensity of a defendant can be admitted to the fact finding of a trial, the following four stages must be accomplished, using only relevant, probative, observed facts:

1) a high degree of similarity between acts, not likely explained by a reasonable person as coincidence;
2) the similarity of acts must be proven, not the subject’s involvement;
3) that the acts were committed by the same person; and,
4) only after accomplishing stages 1), 2), and 3), then the subject’s involvement must be proven.

There is a particular problem with the propensity term ‘nomad’ or ‘nomadic’, resulting from the connotation attached to it in Canadian courtrooms. Especially since *Bear Island Foundation et al v. Ontario Attorney General, [1984] 49 O.R. (2d) 353*, generalizations about Aboriginal propensity to discreditable behaviour – living as ‘nomads’ have been admitted into the fact finding of trials, invariably on the strength of treatise evidence, without factual foundation at all. As an indication of the extent to which the prohibition against character evidence and the principles for the exception of similar facts have been ignored, in Aboriginal actions, this author offers the example of the term ‘nomad’ found in recent Canadian court decisions.

In judgments rendered by Canadian courts since 1982, this author found one-hundred-three judgments using the term ‘nomad’. In thirty-one judgments, ‘nomad’ was used to describe the criminal character of the members of a criminal organization, a chapter of a motorcycle gang named the ‘Hell’s Angels’. These ‘nomads’ are outlawed because of members’ involvement in drug trafficking, prostitution, murder, extortion and organized crime. Proving the facts of this definition of ‘nomad’ generally have not been difficult as these nomads wear insignia and associate with other known members in a pattern of criminal activities, easily proven with admissible evidence gained from wire taps, photographs, video tape, financial paper trails, and testimony of under cover police officers.

In twenty-eight judgments in Canadian courts, the term ‘nomad’ was used to describe the social character of persons of no particular ethnic or criminal affiliation, but
who have changed their addresses a number of times within a short time. The facts of such address changes would be easily proven with such readily admissible physical evidence as utility bills, cancelled cheques for rent paid, etc., in combination with evidence to prove that the defendant was unemployed, had no fixed motive or intentions.

In forty-four judgments in Canadian courts the term ‘nomad’ was used to describe the cultural character of Aboriginals. This characterization accepted into the fact finding of these trials, invariably resulted in a reduction of the freedoms of the people to whom such character was attributed.

Not only did the court in such Aboriginal cases fail to demand a clear statement of the generalizations implied by the use of the character term ‘nomad’, being made about Aboriginal motives, intentions and methods, but the court also failed to require admissible factual proof that there was ever a striking and frequent pattern of similar facts about similar acts to attest to the actual existence of such a cultural nomad (as opposed to a criminal or social one), anywhere on earth, at any time. Considering the history of the propensity term, ‘nomad’ researched by William W. Bassett, that proof would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to produce:

The myth of the nomad took its origins with comparisons drawn out of Renaissance travelogues and applied by the English conquerors to the native Irish in Elizabethan times. The myth was confirmed by eighteenth century European ethnology. In variations, however, the myth has been used in America through the centuries not only on the Indians, but also on Blacks, Asians, Jews, Gypsies, Catholics, Mormons, immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, women, tenants, migrant workers, and countless other victims of legal discrimination. The myth of the nomad deprecates legal personhood by stripping away the human expectation of private property rights and the equal protection of the laws. (Bassett 1986:150-151)

In the unlikely event that a hallmark system of motive, intention or method had been adduced for any ‘nomad’, founded on admissible similar facts, evoking striking patterns whose frequency could not be explained by coincidence, still, the Crown should be compelled to prove a nexus between that ‘nomad’ behaviour and the cultural behaviour of the subject Aboriginal people. This multifaceted burden of evidence is more easily illustrated in a diagram than in words and phrases.
Not only was the term ‘nomad’ admitted into the fact finding in each judgment (step 1), the generalization of a connection (step 2) with Canadian Aboriginals and generalizations of similar propensity (step 3) were admitted without any factual foundation at all. Based on such poisonous reasoning, the legal rights of the subject Aboriginals were either denigrated or denied altogether. The expert evidence of Alexander Von Gernet provides a spectacular example of this abdication from the prohibition of character evidence in adjudication of Aboriginal rights. By his own admission Von Gernet has no personal experience with Aboriginal persons, a fact acknowledged by Judge Stevens-Guille in R. v. Frank, [1999] ABPC 81.

Von Gernet has never heard an Aboriginal oral tradition, nor has he ever witnessed or solicited the similar facts that would establish for the court, an important pattern of issues such as motives, intentions and methods. Yet, at a much accelerated rate during the past ten years, Von Gernet and many of his similarly qualified colleagues have been allowed with their expert opinions to poison the fact finding of numerous trials (see Appendix G). His practical training was in archaeological field methods applied to sites in southern Ontario. His research related to the cultural behaviour and history of Canadian Aboriginal communities, according to his expert reports, is entirely based on the writings of others. According to Canadian common law of evidence, such sources are hearsay. Because their reliability is open to debate they are therefore not admissible by judicial notice. Without presentation of the facts upon which the generalizations contained depend, such expert testimony and reports are inadmissible. Neither Von
Gernet, nor any other scholars have been required to, nor have they ever provided factual proof of the existence in reality of a ‘nomad’ as a system of shared motives, intentions or methods or a connection with any group of Canadian Aboriginals.

What Von Gernet and his fellow expert witnesses have presented, have been generalizations about ‘nomadic character’ and the alleged propensity of various Aboriginal communities, without being asked for the similar fact foundations required by the laws of evidence in Canadian courts. Not only is their evidence inadmissible as character evidence by similar fact exception, it is also inadmissible because they cannot present the facts upon which their expert opinions are based. As the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgments of R. v. Abbey, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24 and R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, declared “before any weight can be given to expert opinion evidence, the facts upon which the opinion is based must be found to exist”.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Crown is the tide of history “that has washed away any real acknowledgment of traditional law and any real observance of traditional customs”, in order to precipitate the disappearance of “the foundation of native title”. However successful the Crown may have been as the tide of history, it has not washed away such documents as the Canadian Constitution, the RL&NWTO, Wolseley’s Proclamation, the RP1869 or British Hansard records of the debates in British Parliament on June 1, 1869.

Lamer CJ’s Van der Peet Test is not relevant in the protection of the freedoms of every individual inhabiting Rupert’s Land as both the freedoms and their protection by Canadian courts of competent jurisdiction are clearly enunciated in the aforementioned documents, not requiring discovery by the court, already determined to be so notorious as requiring no further proof.

The federal and provincial statutes which have been applied to the lives of every individual inhabiting Rupert’s Land are unconstitutional and of no legal force to the extent that they are inconsistent with the customs that define the legal system which protects the individual freedoms of the Aboriginal inhabitants. Having such federal and provincial statutes struck down for their repugnance to a Aboriginal custom is only part
of the project of asserting individual freedoms in Rupert’s Land. A remedy, an alternative to an offending federal or provincial statute is also required. This author found that failure to plead remedies has been a common and serious weakness of approaches to litigating of Aboriginal issues. For example, in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, the Supreme Court noted that:

No amendment was made with respect to the amalgamation of the individual claims brought by the individual Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en Houses into two collective claims, one by each nation, for aboriginal title and self-government. The collective claims were simply not in issue at trial and to frame the case on appeal in a different manner would retroactively deny the respondents the opportunity to know the appellants’ case.

More simply, because no claim of self-government was made in the first pleading of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en against the Attorney-General of British Columbia and naturally, no remedy of Aboriginal title or self-governance was included, these considerations could not be added in later appeal stages either. The Supreme Court sent the parties to negotiate a remedy. Now, ten years since the victory of Delgumuukw, the “process of negotiation and reconciliation” with the Crown has still not produced a remedy. A similar Aboriginal victory in Mclvor v. The Registrar, may wait some time because a remedy was not included in the original statement of claim. Ross J disposed of the case by offering “the parties the opportunity to draft appropriate relief”. Without setting a time limit, he added, “Should the parties fail to reach agreement, I will hear further submissions on the issue of remedy”.

As well as a considerable delay, this may also allow the Crown opportunity to limit the scope of the court’s decision to a single section of the impugned statute and to a single band. This, it was able to do in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, limiting the scope to one section of the Indian Act, s. 77(1) and to one band, Batchewana Indian Band.

It is this author’s view that the pleading of Mclvor v. The Registrar should have included the remedy of restoring Mclvor’s Rupert’s Land right to live in accordance with the membership customs of her family and the other families of Montreal Lake Band of present day Saskatchewan. Pleading such a remedy would have been well supported by:
1) Judge Monk’s reasons for judgment in *Connolly v. Woolrich* as well as their confirmation on appeal and their 1895 approval by the highest court in the British Empire;

2) British Hansard of Parliamentary Debates, June 1, 1869;

3) both the *Royal Proclamation of December 6, 1869* and Wolseley’s of June 1870; and,

4) the sworn testimony of Prime Minister John A. Macdonald in the *Report of the Select Committee on the Causes of the Difficulties in the North-West Territory in 1869-70*.

The relevant customs should have been alleged in pleading, with the names of elders, middle aged and older as witnesses for proving the existence of such customs in the manner prescribed by *Halsbury’s Laws of England*, 4th Edition, previously used in 2000 in the BC Supreme Court, in *Prince & Julian v. HTMQ et al, [2000] BCSC 1066.* Most important to this author’s thesis study, the authoritative inclusion of such a remedy in pleading would likely encourage the Crown to negotiate an accord for respecting the individual freedoms of the Aboriginal inhabitants of Rupert’s Land instead of invoking a judicial *tide of history* to extinguish them. It seems reasonable that the Crown (provincial or federal), faced with a choice between negotiating in good faith and alternately risking judicial review of its abuse of power may prefer the former to the latter.

Accordingly, this author now directs this thesis study to the construction of remedies to infringement of the protection of the freedoms of every individual inhabiting Rupert’s Land, which can be negotiated or litigated if necessary. Two major themes now require attention: the nature of the Canadian constitutional paradigm; and, the nature of Aboriginal legal systems based on customs.
CHAPTER FOUR

A CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM - ORIGINS

This author has recognized four distinct traditions that affect a Canadian constitutional paradigm. They are: a British tradition of legislative supremacy; a Federal tradition of dividing powers among a central and provincial governments; a Colonial tradition of supervision by and accountability to an Imperial government (executive, legislature and judiciary); and, a Liberal tradition of greater protection of individual freedoms. These four traditions are not mutually exclusive but are easily identified by the principles which define them. This author does not pretend to present a complete description of Canadian constitutionalism since 1867, but rather the practical minimum required for locating the legal rights of every individual inhabiting Rupert’s Land.

Canada’s first constitution, a British Imperial statute, the BNA Act, was firmly based on the latter three traditions. The fourth and last, Liberal tradition, addressed in the next chapter, embraces principles of limiting legislative and executive powers to protect individual freedoms. These principles were inferred in Canada’s first constitution but entrenched in Canada’s second, patriated constitution of 1982.

British Tradition of Parliamentary Supremacy

Essentially, the British tradition of legislative or parliamentary supremacy, in the words of Professor Peter H. Hogg, meant “the hard fact remained that if a statute plainly took away a civil liberty there was no redress for the injured citizen” (Hogg 1984:25).

An early application of this attitude by Canadian politicians to the liberties of Aboriginals can be found in the Pennefather Report, 1858, where it was noted that according to the Attorney General in 1840, that “beyond that age [21] they [Indians] have the rights of other subjects”:

... but the Canadian Parliament have from time to time provided for the Indians as a class incapable in many respects of managing their own affairs. Indeed the 20 Vic. c. 26 expressly acknowledges their inferiority in regard to their legal rights and liabilities as compared with Her Majesty’s other
subjects resident in this Province, and provides means whereby they may be
gradually enfranchised. (Pennefather 1858:99)

Similar remarks were made at the 1885 appeal of Louis Riel’s conviction of high
treason by Judge Killam of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench:

There can be no doubt that the Imperial Parliament has full power to
legislate away any of the rights claimed within Great Britain and Ireland. ...
It thus appears that the Parliament of Canada is not, within its legislative
powers, placed in an inferior position to that of Britain. ... From this
necessarily follows the complete supremacy of Parliament, its power to
legislate away the rights guaranteed by Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, or
any enactments of Parliament or charters of the Sovereign. ... A court of
justice cannot set itself above the legislature.

In practice among non-Aboriginals, the British notion of supremacy of the
legislature, however, has not been quite so sweeping. There are certain long established
British Parliamentary principles found in common law, that is, the judgments of British
courts, including: “the independence of the judiciary, the separation of executive,
judiciary and legislative powers, all commonly expressed as the rule of law” (Weiler
1973:233). “A statute or government action was unconstitutional, therefore illegal, if it
did not satisfy such an important British Parliamentary principle” (Weiler 1973:235). The
operation of this British tradition in Canada was alternately described in 1925 by Herbert
A. Smith:

Under the British scheme of government the general doctrine is that judges
have no control over the policy of Parliament, except when they are called
upon to decide between the conflicting claims of rival legislatures in a
federal system. If they hold that a particular statute is ultra vires, then the
result automatically follows that it must fall within the proper competence of
some other assembly. The current of law-making power may be diverted,
but it cannot be prevented from flowing, as soon as it has found its proper
channel, and the only real corrective for legislative folly is that which the
suffrage places in the hands of the people themselves. (Smith 1925:286)

Notions of judicial independence and the separation of powers were integrated in
the seminal writings of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, in his book, L’Esprit
des Lois [The Spirit of Laws], first published in 1758:
Tout serait perdu si le même homme, ou le même corps des principaux, ou des nobles, ou du peuple, exerçait ces trois pouvoirs: celui de faire des lois, celui d’exécuter des résolutions publiques, et celui de juger les crimes ou les différends des particuliers. (De l’esprit des lois, XI, 8, in Oeuvres Complètes, Paris, RF: Pléiade, 1958:397)

[Translation by this author: All would be lost if the same man, or the same body of principals or nobles or people, exercised these three powers: the one of making laws, the one of executing their public implementation, and the one of judging their breach or variance]

A recent application of judicial independence and the separation of powers can be found in the judgment reasons of Supreme Court Justice Arbour, in Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519:

23 Applying the two Hunter criteria discussed above to child apprehension, it becomes apparent that the director or a representative of the Child and Family Services agency, as well as a peace officer, is empowered under Part III of the Act generally, and under s. 21(1) specifically, to act as both investigator of whether a child is in need of protection and adjudicator of whether or not the need for protection has risen to the level where the child must be removed from his or her parent’s care. The conflation of these two roles within the same agency seriously undermines the ability of these investigators to act impartially and, consequently, risks the possibility that the statutory requirement of reasonable and probable grounds will be diluted — possibly to the extent that children may be apprehended on the basis of suspicion.

Thus, it could be seen that the principle of separation of powers (executing and judging) is still applied by the Supreme Court of Canada as part of the common law associated with the British tradition of the legislative supremacy. In his renowned work, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th Edition, A. V. Dicey describes an internal and an external limitation of the legislature:

[citing Leslie Stephen’s Science of Ethics] ‘... from a scientific point of view, the power of the legislature is of course strictly limited. It is limited, so to speak, both from within and from without; from within, because the legislature is the product of a certain social condition, and determined by whatever determines the society; and from without, because the power of
imposing laws is dependent upon the instinct of subordination, which is itself limited. If a legislature decided that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies would be illegal; but legislators must go mad before they could pass such a law, and subjects be idiotic before they could submit to it'. (Dicey 1915:78-79)

A British or a Canadian approach to protecting liberty by *strengthening* legislatures (legislative supremacy) undoubtedly contrast with the American alternative of *limiting* legislatures. This difference is probably rooted in a different history of British and Canadian revolts against the executive abuses of the Stuart kings and colonial governors in contrast with an American revolt against a British legislature (Risk & Vipond 1996:15)

**Federal Tradition of Dividing Powers**

This author found great irony in the history of the effect which a federal tradition of dividing powers among legislatures has had on the aforementioned British tradition of legislative supremacy. The latter British tradition is based on the principle that the power of the legislature is practically beyond the reach of the courts. There are still no traditions for judicial review in Britain today. As quoted earlier of Smith (1925:286), according to British traditions, the “current of law-making power may be diverted, but it cannot be prevented from flowing”. Simply expressed, there is no provision within British constitutional paradigm for a court to review legislation or executive acts.

Such corrections must be made on the floor of the legislature. In spite of this, there seems little doubt among legal scholars that it was judicial review of the legislation and acts of American colonial government, by a Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council, that inspired an independent United States of America to include judicial review in its constitution (Beth 1976:40-41). Moreover, Canada’s first constitution began with the statement of its provinces desire to be “federally united”, “with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom”. But, Canada could not function without an independent judiciary with extraordinary powers (from a British perspective) to review and even prevent any statute enacted by a legislature or any action taken (or not taken) by an executive. A. V. Dicey, in his discussion of federalism in his authoritative volume, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution*, 8th edition, wrote that “federalism, lastly, means legalism – the predominance of the judiciary in the constitution
the prevalence of a spirit of legality among the people. That in a confederation like the
United States, the Courts become the pivot on which the constitutional arrangements of
the country turn, is obvious” (Dicey 1915:170). In adopting a federal tradition, Canada
adopted judicial review by an independent judiciary. Most of the constitutional cases
before the Judicial Committee of Britain’s Privy Council came from Canada and
Australia (Beth 1976:32). Supreme Court Justice John Bora Laskin doubted the Fathers
of Confederation fully appreciated that “Canadian federalism did require judicial review
and there is some indication they believed conflicts of jurisdiction would rarely arise”
(Laskin 1959:102). As one of the authors of Canada’s first constitution as well as the first
prime minister, John A. Macdonald’s vision was of a central federal legislature with
powers of disallowance over inferior provincial legislatures. That vision was quickly lost
in a pitched battle with a most worthy adversary, Ontario’s first premier, Sir Oliver
Mowat (Smith 1925:282-283). The Privy Council of Great Britain, as the authority to
which questions of constitutional power were appealed, heard appeals directly from the
provinces or on more rare occasions, on appeal from the decision of the highest court of
Canada. After 1875, that highest court was the Supreme Court of Canada (Haines
1915:574). As a result of such access to the highest court in the British Empire, “as
colonies gained their own constitutional powers of self-government, of course, the
possibility of using disallowance vanished, since the powers of the local legislature [in
this case, provincial] came to approximate those of the English Parliament, and were
irreversible by the disallowance technique – a fact which may have tended to increase the
number of attempts to use judicial review through litigation” (Beth 1976:35).
Macdonald’s battle for federal dominance over provincial governments was ended in
1883 in Hodge v. The Queen, [1883] 9 App Cas. 117. The origins and outcome of this
battle are well described by Herbert A. Smith, in his article, Judicial Control of
Legislation in the British Empire:

In the debates which preceded confederation Macdonald had not concealed
his own preference for a purely unitary scheme of government, and only
accepted the federal solution as the best which could be obtained in the
circumstances. As Premier of Canada he pressed strongly for the view that
the Dominion Parliament was the only truly sovereign legislature in Canada,
and that the provincial bodies were rather on the footing of municipal councils enjoying only delegated powers. This doctrine was condemned in Hodge v. The Queen, and on the whole Mowat was the winner in a long struggle. But the Canadian solution differed from the American in that the last word lay with men who had played no part in Canadian political controversy. (Smith 1925:283)

W. R. Lederman, often cited as an authority on the Canadian constitution and judiciary, wrote:

Unique flexibility for Canada comes from having many power-conferring phrases in competition with one another, and the equilibrium points established between them portray the critical detail of Canadian federalism. The power conferring phrases themselves are given by the B.N.A. Act, but the equilibrium points are not to be found there. They have necessarily been worked out painstakingly by judicial interpretation and precedent over many years. Furthermore, particular equilibrium points are not fixed for all time. As conditions in the country genuinely change and truly new statutory schemes are enacted, judicial interpretation can adjust and refine the equilibrium of the division of legislative powers to meet the new needs. So the high importance of sophisticated judicial interpretation as an ongoing process is obvious. (Lederman 1976:38)

In addition to legislatures not invading each other's sphere of authority, certain additional principles have become part of the Canadian common law in order to regulate the collateral effect one legislature enactments have upon another. For example, in similarly reconciling the powers of state legislatures with the central federal legislature, the immortal Chief Justice John Marshall of the U. S. Supreme Court pronounced in 1819, a principle in M'Culloch v. Maryland, [1819] 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, which has never become outdated. Cited as recently as Westbank First Nation v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 134, the principle is:

That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that there is plain repugnance, in conferring on one government a power to control the constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be denied.
Judicial review of either legislation or an action of an executive, may also need to examine the purpose for which the legislature or corresponding executive was delegated power. Lord Cranworth L.C. of Great Britain’s Privy Council in *Galloway v. City of London [1866]*, L.R. 1 H.L. 34, stated “persons so authorized cannot be allowed to exercise the powers conferred on them for any collateral object; that is, for any purposes except those for which the Legislature has invested them with extraordinary powers”.

Sometimes called the ‘doctrine of improper purposes’ this principle has been applied to curtail the actions of legislatures and executives that have used powers granted, for example, to expropriate land, for very different purposes than what the same powers were assigned.

By 1949, the provincial legislatures had come to respect the Privy Council as a guardian of their jurisdiction, so much so that “there was considerable fear that an Ottawa based Supreme Court, unshackled from the Privy Council, would push the Constitution in a highly centralized direction” (Russell 1987:339). However, as former Supreme Court justice, Gerard La Forest (1975:135-142) noted, “delegation of legislative power in Canada, though still a source of fascination for constitutional scholars, was no longer a ‘live subject’”. La Forest commented in 1975 that this was “in sharp contrast to the situation some years ago when it was a major issue, not only in the courts and with legal commentators, but also in any serious political discussion of constitutional change”. The issue was very much settled in *Attorney-General of Nova Scotia v. Attorney-General of Canada, [1951]* S.C.R.. This was an appeal from the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia on a reference regarding the validity of a Nova Scotia statute, the *Delegation of Legislative Jurisdiction Act*, proposed by Nova Scotia to exchange respective powers to legislate for employment and retail sales taxes.

Nova Scotia’s highest court found this statute ‘ultra vires’, that is, beyond the powers given to Nova Scotia in the Canadian constitution. The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that judgment of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. La Forest explained that the Supreme Court of Canada’s reasons were two fold: “if a power of delegation had been intended, it would have been expressly given”; and, “each [legislature] was sovereign within its sphere, but delegation involves subordination to the delegator” (La
Thus, according to the Supreme Court, “interdelegation between the federal Parliament and provincial legislatures, therefore, appears impossible”.

However, the boundaries between federal and provincial powers are not ‘water tight’. Bruce Ryder describes a ‘classic’ and a ‘modern’ paradigm where the latter allows for some ‘leakage’ whereas the former does not (Ryder 1991:312-313). Peter W. Hogg, often cited by Canadian courts on constitutional law, explains that federal and provincial legislatures may not “directly delegate their respective legislative powers to each other”, but, may delegate the administration of otherwise validly enacted laws to a subordinate agency that is established by validly enacted legislation of the receiving jurisdiction” (Hogg 1992:14).

Hogg, as do other legal scholars such as Harrison (1997:405), La Forest (1975:137-138) and Ryder (1991:312-313), identifies ‘incorporation by reference’ as an approach that allows one legislature to incorporate statutes from another legislature by making reference to them but without doing the forbidden – actually delegating powers. For example, a federal, that is, national statute regulating trucking could incorporate provincial statutes by making reference to them. The advantage to this incorporation by reference is that it avoids duplication or confusion between legislatures by having to repeat each of the other participating legislatures’ statutes. La Forest, in his authoritative 1975 article warns that incorporation by reference is not allowed when it is “so broad as to amount in substance to a grant of legislative power” (La Forest 1975:142). La Forest also explained the important need served by incorporation by reference:

Flexibility or ‘leakage’ as Ryder calls it is important for the respect and protection of Rupert’s Land civil rights in that many of the supports required are not available under federal powers. Education and health, for example, though of federal national concern, are usually made available to Canadian citizens generally under provincial statutes.

The most common power-sharing device between Canadian legislatures has become the accord. A very recent example is the Agreement on Internal Trade, signed in 1994. Its main objective is to remove or prevent trade barriers between provinces and territories by developing practices for power sharing between Canadian legislatures and
executives. This accord includes chapters on procurement, investment, labour mobility, consumer standards, agricultural and food goods, alcoholic beverages, natural resources, communications, transportation and environmental protection.

The accord differs from the ‘incorporation by reference’ approach in that the various legislatures work out an agreement upon the principles or values that need to be respected in order to achieve some shared purpose. Then each legislature incorporates this agreement as the principles or values to be embraced in applying respective legislation. In some cases legislation needs to be modified. In most cases, only the enabling regulations established by ministers need to be altered or merely interpreted as agreed within the inter-legislative accord.

Notwithstanding the common law that has evolved since 1867 for refereeing between legislatures, there is one issue that has occasionally surfaced, but, which none of the existing legislatures appear eager to resolve – residual power not delegated to either a federal legislature or to a provincial legislature. The federal and provincial governments have long argued that when the BNA Act divided powers among them, it did so exhaustively, with the result that is there were no powers left over. This opinion was shared by most legal scholars during almost a century and a half, that “among the salient features of the Canadian federal system is the provision that powers not specifically granted to the provinces are reserved to the Dominion” (Haines 1915:568-569), a view seemingly supported by Britain’s Privy Council in Attorney-General of Ontario v. Attorney-General of Canada, [1912] A.C. 571, at p. 581, when it proclaimed “...there can be no doubt that under this organic instrument the powers distributed between the Dominion on the one hand and the provinces on the other hand cover the whole area of self-government within the whole area of Canada”. Therefore, there are no legislative powers left for Aboriginals.

During the last twenty-five years this question of residual powers of Aboriginal self-governance has arisen repeatedly as a collateral issue. In 2000, when the provincial government of British Columbia challenged the Nisga’a’s rights of self-governance contained in the Nisga’a Treaty between the province, Canada and the Nisga’as, the issue of residual power was the central issue. Writing for the BC Supreme Court, Williamson,
J. identified the flaw in the Crown’s reasoning of exhaustive distribution of power. Further on, noted at p. 584, Williamson J, in Attorney-General of Ontario v. Attorney-General of Canada, the Privy Council in 1912 had clarified its position that, “whatever belongs to self-government in Canada belongs either to the Dominion or to the provinces, within the limits of the British North America Act”. As a result, Williamson J. held that:

[76] Thus, what was distributed in ss. 91 and 92 of the British North America Act was all of (but no more than) the powers which until June 30, 1867 had belonged to the colonies. Anything outside of the powers enjoyed by the colonies was not encompassed by ss. 91 and 92 and remained outside of the power of Parliament and the legislative assemblies just as it had been beyond the powers of the colonies.

As a result of this finding, together with a review of the treatment of such residual Aboriginal power by the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; and, Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85, Williamson J. concluded:

... that the Constitution Act, 1867 did not distribute all legislative power to the Parliament and the legislatures. Those bodies have exclusive powers in the areas listed in Sections 91 and 92 (subject until 1931 to the Imperial Parliament). But the Constitution Act, 1867, did not purport to, and does not end, what remains of the royal prerogative or aboriginal and treaty rights, including the diminished but not extinguished power of self-government which remained with the Nisga’a people in 1982.

It is this author’s belief that Aboriginals thus far have not been able to make use of this residual power because they have not yet pleaded the facts of traditional systems of self-governance, a former exercise of residual power. Moreover, the stereotypes of nomad and primitive bolstered by the Crown’s recent strategy to litigate extinguishments, casts doubts that Aboriginals ever exercised powers of self-governance.

The legal rights of every individual in Rupert’s Land were defined, for example, by English law in the case of non-Aboriginals employed by the Hudson’s Bay Company or, by Aboriginal custom in the case of the Aboriginal inhabitants. This bijural arrangement, described authoritatively by Judge Samuel Monk in Connolly v. Woolrich was permanently entrenched in Canada’s constitution as a result of the BNA Act, s. 146 and
the RL&NWTO. Unequivocal assurances of continuity of this bijural relationship, or in Williamson J’s parlance ‘diminished but not extinguished power of self-government’ were provided by British Cabinet in its RP1869. According to the common law of such proclamations or orders-in-council enunciated by Lord Mansfield in Campbell v. Hall, those unequivocal assurances of continuity could not be diminished in the subsequent order-in-council, the RL&NWTO. More simply stated, the powers of self-government of the collectivity of every individual is far from residual or diminished, it was clearly pronounced and entrenched as one of those historical agreements without which there would be no Canada.

Colonial Tradition of Imperial Supervision

Undoubtedly one of the most important instruments of a Colonial tradition has been the Imperial government’s use of Royal prerogative in the form of proclamations and orders-in-council. For an historical definition, this author found an excellent review of the literature, especially sensitive to historical context, in Michael Suddard’s essay, The Royal Proclamation of 1763: A Temporary and Permanent Solution. He reviewed the writings of such eminent writers as: Robert Allen, Olive Dickason, Victor Lytwyn, Desmond Morton, and Arthur Ray, identifying an historical context with missions to be accomplished. Suddard argues convincingly that a royal proclamation addressed two main issues, with an attendant need “to move quickly in an attempt to quell the problems within North America before they got out of control”. Though separated by one hundred years, the historical contexts and objectives of both proclamations were remarkably similar. The Treaty of Paris and the annexation of Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory to Canada both caused major shifts in sovereignty within the British Empire. In both cases, there was much anxiety as to “what the British would do with the Amerindian population” (Suddard 2002:1). On the eve of peacefully transferring Rupert’s Land to Canada, in the middle of plans to remove its remaining garrison of soldiers from North America, as a direct result of Canada’s fumbling and agitations, the legal governor of Rupert’s Land was under house arrest with what control that remained, held by Métis, engaged in friendly relations with Americans. In light of Britain’s concessions of coastal
fisheries and removing her troops, the Americans would not likely invade, but might well support Metis independence. Canada was refusing to assume control of Rupert’s Land until lawful order was restored by Britain.


In order that an act of the Crown may be recognised as an expression of the Royal will and have any legal effect whatever, it must in general be done with the assent of, or through some Minister or Ministers who will be held responsible for it. For the Royal will can, generally speaking, be expressed only in one of three different ways, viz. (1) by order in Council; (2) by order, commission, or warrant under the sign-manual; (3) by proclamations, writs, patents, letters, or other documents under the Great Seal. (Dicey 1915:321-322)

In his 1951 article, *Judicial Review of Royal Proclamations and Orders in Council*, legal scholar, Glendon A. Schubert Jr. described the defining features and uses of Royal Proclamations and Orders in Council since 1611, Edmond Coke’s judgment in *Case of Proclamations* [1611], 77 E.R. 1352:

Among the more important aspects of what Blackstone [in W. Blackstone *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, p. 248-249 Dublin 1794] calls direct prerogative are the power to declare war and to make peace; to wage war and call up troops as commander-in-chief of the army and navy; to regulate commerce … The traditional attitudes towards the exercise of prerogative powers within the realm were set in their classic mould by Sir Edward Coke almost three and a half centuries ago in his celebrated judgment in the *Case of Proclamations* [1611]. The effect of Coke’s decision was to limit the scope of such royal proclamations to declaring, publicizing, and providing for the enforcement of statutory law - a relationship clearly analogous to that between statutes and the common law only two centuries earlier! … The last two centuries have brought about no expansion in the scope of the royal legislative prerogative in municipal law as outlined thus by Blackstone. (Schubert 1951:77-79)

Great Britain’s own political evolution between 1763 and 1869 might be considered as a mitigating factor, if executive control of British governance had changed much in any relevant way since 1763, or since Mansfield’s judgment of 1774. Schubert noted that
no such relevant, executive change had occurred. According to Schubert, at the time of Montesquieu’s 1748 publication of his *L’Esprit des Lois*, “England was ruled not by kings but by cabinets. The principle of parliamentary supremacy was by this time firmly established (Schubert 1951:69 Note 2). Schubert’s findings are confirmed by Margaret A. Banks, a Canadian legal historian, who deciphered, in her article, *Privy Council, Cabinet, and Ministry in Britain and Canada: A Story of Confusion*, the sometimes confusing connections between British and Canadian traditions of Privy Council, Queen-in-Council, and Cabinet.

Thus the legal facts are rather plain. The *RP1763* was approved by the British Cabinet, issued by the minister responsible for the Americas, Lord Egremont, and promulgated by respective Governors in the Americas, notably General Murray, in what later became Upper and Lower Canada. The format and method of promulgation of both 1763 and 1869 proclamations were as described by Coke, Blackstone and Dicey. The *RP1869* was approved by the British Cabinet and subsequently issued by the Minister for Colonial Affairs, Earl Granville, and promulgated by Governor General John Young in Canada, in order to prevent conflict, by reassuring the potential combatants that protection of their legal rights was official Imperial policy. These facts are part of the sworn testimony of both Prime Minister of Canada and the Governor-General, before the Select Committee on the Causes of the Difficulties in the North-West Territory in 1869-70. According to Prime Minister Macdonald’s testimony, the document that he referred to as a proclamation, was translated into English, French and Cree and printed in quantity, five-hundred copies, for distribution throughout the territory being annexed. Though, many more languages were spoken by the inhabitants, the three languages into which the proclamation was translated were the three main trading languages of the territories being annexed. Jean-Bapiste Thibault, himself had used Creë to communicate with his Dene parishioners in northern Saskatchewan (Dorge 2000:2). For all of these historical and legal reasons, the proclamation of December 6, 1869 is a *Royal Proclamation*.

After the proclamations, the next most important instrument of the Colonial tradition was the British Imperial statute, the *British North America Act, 1867*, that
created Canada and provide a constitutional blueprint for its evolution. The *BNA Act*’s instructions for the annexation of Rupert’s Land are contained in s. 146:

146. … to admit those Colonies or Provinces, or any of them, into the Union, and on Address from the Houses of the Parliament of Canada to admit Rupert’s Land and the North-western Territory, or either of them, into the Union, on such Terms and Conditions in each Case as are in the Addresses expressed and as the Queen thinks fit to approve, subject to the Provisions of this Act; and the Provisions of any Order in Council in that Behalf shall have effect as if they had been enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.


Fourth - “that the law and legislative government of every dominion, equally affects all persons and all property within the limits thereof; and is the rule of decision for all questions which arise there. Whoever purchases, lives, or sues there, puts himself under the law of the place. An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the plantations, has no privilege distinct from the natives”.

Fifth - “In the present case the capitulation expressly provides and agrees, that they shall continue to be governed by their own laws, until His Majesty’s further pleasure be known.”

Sixth - “he cannot make any new change contrary to fundamental principles”
The very act of interpreting by the highest courts of Britain and Canada, of the legislative enactments of their respective governments in accordance with Lord Mansfield's principles, followed by government compliance with the courts' modifications and limits is fundamentally important to this thesis study. This judicial review, followed by executive and legislative compliance, attest to the validity of Lord Mansfield's principles. Taken together, the action of the court followed by compliance also attest to the independence of the judiciary in determining matters of fact. The value of a separate judicial power for declaring fact and submission to its findings by executive and legislative powers is also consistent with Dicey's internal and external limits of legislative supremacy. The meaning of royal proclamations enunciated by Lord Mansfield, preserved in British and Canadian constitutional law, must also be integrated with the judicial interpretation of the relevant facts as they were determined by competent Canadian courts at the time: in *Connolly v. Woolwich* (1) 11 L.C. Jur. 197; upheld in *Johnston et al v. Connolly* [1869], 17 R.J.R.Q. 266; and, approved by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in *Ontario v. The Dominion of Canada and Quebec; In Re Indian Claims*, [1895] 25 S. C. R. 434. The facts of property and self-government were determined to be:

Neither the French government nor any of its colonists or their trading associations ever attempted, during an intercourse of over two hundred years, to subvert or modify the laws and usages of the aboriginal tribes, except where they had established colonies and permanent settlements, and then only by persuasion.

[...and by the English or the Hudson's Bay Company..]

..it [English law] could be administered and enforced only among, and in favor of, and against those who belonged to the Company or were living under them. It did not apply to the Indians, nor were the native laws or customs abrogated or modified, and this is unquestionably true in regard to their civil rights. It is easy to conceive, in the case of joint occupation of extensive countries by Europeans and native nations or tribes, that two different systems of civil and even criminal law may prevail. History is full of such instances, and the dominions of the British Crown exhibit cases of that kind. The Charter did introduce the English law, but did not, at the same time, make it applicable generally or indiscriminately – it did not abrogate the Indian laws and usages.
Given that this fact-finding was confirmed on appeal on September 8, 1869 in *Johnston et al v. Connolly*, Judge Monk’s facts are those that must be integrated with Lord Mansfield’s principles in order to interpret and give legal effect to the RP1869. Stated more clearly, “By Her Majesty’s authority I do therefore assure you, that on the Union with Canada all your civil and religious rights and privileges will be respected, your properties secured to you, and that your Country will be governed, as in the past, under British laws and in the spirit of British justice” must be interpreted in such a manner consistent with both Lord Mansfield’s principles and Monk J’s fact-finding. Accordingly: ‘you’ refers to all individuals and all property (Lord Mansfield principle #4); that individuals “shall continue to be governed by their own laws” (Lord Mansfield principle #5); and, that in a manner consistent with British traditions of the rule of law and doctrine of continuity, two different systems of law, Aboriginal and English, will prevail in the sort of bijural system which Monk J, himself adjudicated in Quebec (Lord Mansfield #5 and #6).

The British Cabinet had exhausted its power with the RP1869, defining ‘individuals’ as the inhabitants of Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory, with no reference to race or creed. Moreover, acting under direct orders from the British Cabinet, from Port Arthur (present day Thunder Bay, Ontario), Colonel Wolseley issued a further proclamation, promising “equal protection to the lives and property of all races and all creeds”. Wolseley’s assurances were consistent with Mansfield’s fourth and fifth principles for interpreting such royal prerogative as proclamations and orders-in-council issued by a member or members of the British Cabinet. The RP1869, as such a British Imperial statute, ensures that any exclusion of Aboriginals as ‘individuals’ in applying the 1870, RL&NWTO, could not survive judicial review, not in 1870, nor in 2007.

Allegedly, such an unconstitutional interpretation was made ‘legal’, however; by the *CLVA*. The British Parliament’s passage of this Act, was officially intended to free colonial legislatures from British traditions, such as the rule of law, judicial independence or the separation of powers, thus allowing colonial legislatures to discover their own internal and external limits. Accordingly, s. 3 of this Act provided that:
No colonial law shall be, or be deemed to have been, void or inoperative on the ground of repugnancy to the law of England, unless the same shall be repugnant to the provisions of some such Act of Parliament, order, or regulation, as aforesaid.

Notwithstanding the fact that this Act was a British statute offending *Campbell v. Hall* as well as other long-established British traditions, the *RP1869* also enjoyed status as a British statute, therefore invalid in accordance with s. 2 of the *CLVA*:

Any colonial law, which is or shall be in any respect repugnant to the provisions of any Act of Parliament extending to the colony to which such law may relate, or repugnant to any order or regulation made under authority of such Act of Parliament, or having in the colony the force or effect of such Act, shall be read subject to such Act, order, or regulation, and shall to the extent of such repugnancy but not otherwise, be and remain absolutely void and inoperative.

As earlier mentioned by this author, the Canadian executive and parliament had in 1867, similar powers of disallowance over provincial executives and legislatures; nonetheless, it was the provinces access to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of Great Britain that rendered impotent such federal powers of disallowance. Aboriginals did not fare as well as did the provinces. Three years after Macdonald’s vision of a subordinate provincial government was destroyed by the Judicial Committee’s judgment in *Hodge v. The Queen*; less than a year after the Riel Rebellion, Six Nations Indians challenged the same federal powers of disallowance over Aboriginal self-government. Granville brought the Six Nations’ challenge to the attention of Prime Minister John A. Macdonald. Sixteen years earlier, Earl Granville, representing the British Cabinet, had made transferring territory and providing military support *conditional* upon Canada’s passage of the Manitoba Act to protect the civil rights of inhabitants of the Red River area. In the case of the Aboriginals of southern Ontario, Granville refused to intervene on the rather flimsy grounds that:

I do not feel able to advise Her Majesty to exercise her power under the Act 3 and 4 William IV, cap. 41, and to refer this matter to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, seeing that the request is made only at the instance of one party to the dispute, and there is no statement of ascertained
facts upon which that tribunal could come to a decision. I shall, however, be prepared to advise Her Majesty so to refer the matter, if such is also the desire of the Dominion Government, and if both parties will agree upon a statement of facts, in the form of a special case, which can be argued by counsel before the Judicial Committee. (Granville to Macdonald, May 3, 1886 – see Appendix H for complete text)

Macdonald responded, not surprisingly, referring to Indians as “inveterate grumblers” and commenting “the present claim of the Six Nations has no merits and does not deserve any exceptional consideration” (see Appendix H). While Macdonald acknowledged a “right to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council”, “should the Six Nations be dissatisfied with the judgment of a Canadian court”, he also added:

5. The introduction of a new practice of submitting Indian claims in the first instance to the Judicial Committee would operate as a complete change in the manner in which the Indian races have hitherto been dealt with and would establish a distinction between them and the other inhabitants of Canada. This is very objectionable, as the great aim of our legislation has been to do away with the tribal system and assimilate the Indian people in all respects with the other inhabitants of the Dominion as speedily as they are fit for the change. (Macdonald to Granville, January 3, 1887)

In fact, by 1927, Her Majesty’s Government of Great Britain allowed amendments to the Indian Act that made Aboriginal efforts to seek justice in Canadian courts a crime punishable with severe fines and imprisonment. Such selective use of the powers of disallowance and access to the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council aroused this researcher’s curiosity as to the actual interests served by the CLVA, not only in Canada, but as well, in the other colonies to which it applied. As in Canada, the legislatures that represented European settlers were usually able to circumvent the Act by placing their grievances before a colonial court which upheld “the law of England”, specifically, the common law - such as the rule of law, judicial independence or the separation of power. Using Dicey’s metaphor, in the unlikely event that a colonial legislature passed a law that “all blue-eyed babies should be murdered”, invariably, blue-eyed adults would likely find relief in a colonial court, if not, certainly with the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council.
The CLVA was a nineteenth century version of earlier similar enactments, designed to protect "the economic and social interests of the ruling classes at home and in the colonies":

From the seventeenth and eighteenth century British point of view the semi-popular legislatures in America must be prevented from enacting laws prejudicial to the economic and social interests of the ruling classes at home and in the colonies as well. ... The Privy Council was given or acquired three kinds of power to defeat or annul laws made in the colonies: 1) disallowance or repeal of colonial statutes; 2) veto of such statutes; 3) judicial annulment of such statutes, commonly called judicial review of legislation. (McGoveny 1945:60-61)

It was the effect on ruling class interests by 19th century Australian judge, Benjamin Boothby's application of English common law to property that precipitated the enactment of the CLVA in 1865 (Walters 2003:108-109; Taylor 2001:515). In Canada, and other settler colonies such as Australia and South Africa, the CLVA performed its real service in freeing the colonial legislatures from Her Majesty's Government disallowance powers for the kind of draconian legislation used to extinguish Aboriginal legal and property rights. Europeans were rarely ever charged, judged or sentenced in the same manner as Aboriginals. The former usually faced judges of their own ethnicity. According to Louis Knafla, "many judges in the West in the First Formative Period were positivists, men who had a strong belief in case law, precedents and in the rule of law. They were strong on traditional rights and would deny the application of recent decisions from other British or Canadian jurisdictions if they were thought to be inapplicable (Knafla 1986:64). Inevitably, research of the application of the CLVA becomes a study of 'Indirect Rule', a colonial strategy perfected by Her Majesty's Government during the 19th century.

Early in the 19th century, British Prime Minister Robert Peel borrowed a page from Napoleon's play book for maintaining order in a defeated country, using 'gendarme', a highly mobile police force, in place of soldiers. The Royal Irish Constabulary, as it was called, "was intended to crush agrarian unrest and sporadic terrorism directed against British rule. Unlike the Metropolitan Police it was armed, organized on semi-military lines, housed in barracks and kept under the direct orders of the colonial government in Dublin" (Arnold 1976:4). A few decades later, in India, a similar force, based on the
Royal Irish Constabulary model was established after crushing the mutiny of Indian troops in 1857. Following the Queen’s proclamation of 1858, British control of India was stabilized by applying another important lesson learned about colonial control. According to Michael H. Fisher’s important history of the period, *Indirect Rule in the British Empire: The Foundations of the Residency System in India (1764-1858)*:

"... the 1857 ‘Mutiny’ had been confined primarily to the areas under direct British control. Princely states like Hyderabad had been held out of the conflict by their rulers and Residents. Even in the areas where the populace had risen against the British, the princes had exerted authority which the British sought after 1858 to harness to their own purposes. British attitudes toward the princes thus changed significantly following 1858, as the Queen’s proclamation indicates. After that date, the British annexed few of the remaining princely states. Indeed, British policy depended on the princes as ‘the natural leaders’ who would hold the people of their states in loyalty to the British crown. (Fisher 1984:402) ... Both in East and later in West Africa, the application of the principle of indirect rule was largely the work of Frederick Lugard. By birth and training, Lugard knew India well. From his first confrontation with a well developed indigenous political structure in Uganda to his extensive use of indirect rule in northern Nigeria, Lugard appealed to the Indian model. (Fisher 1984:424) ... the application of indirect rule in Southeast Asia and Africa drew heavily and explicitly on the Indian example. This example provided the explicit justification for indirect rule and the body of experience upon which later imperialists drew. The significant references to the Indian case by imperial politicians and officials in Southeast Asia and Africa does not imply that they slavishly imitated their Indian colleagues. Rather it seeks to indicate the power of the Indian precedent. (Fisher 1984:427-428)

The dramatic differences in efficiency, that is the minimal use of European officials while relying more on local, ‘natural’ leaders’ is well illustrated by Fisher’s statistics on Indian and African states (see Appendix I). Ugandan born, anthropologists and political scientist, Mahood Mamdani, describes Britain’s development of her colonial project as:

... a protracted process of thinking through ‘tradition’ analytically, of separating its authoritarian strands from its popular strands. The construction of a ‘customary’ law, whereby authoritarian strands in tradition would form the building blocks of a legal regime disciplining ‘natives’ in the name of enforcing ‘tradition’, began in India, not in Africa. In India, though this measure came late, mainly in the aftermath of the great 1857 rebellion, too late to affect the form of land tenure in the colony. Defined in
a religious idiom, the scope of the ‘customary’ was thus restricted to personal law. In Africa, however, its scope was broadened, most importantly to include land. (Mandami 1999:869)

Especially British colonial initiatives, were very much catalyzed by dramatic changes in communications and transportation. After its invention by Morse in 1835, telegraph “lines were put into operation in Britain, Europe, North America, and even in parts of the Near East. Dover and Calais were connected by submarine cable as early as 1851” (Cell 1970:224). Before the end of the decade, a transatlantic cable had been laid. Thomas Parker Moon identified ‘surplus manufactures’ as “the chief cause of the imperialistic expansion of Europe in the last quarter of the nineteenth century” (Moon 1926:28). This surplus, in turn precipitated three other expansions: large scale steamships for making colonial produce profitable; railways to make commercial and military penetration of the interior wilds of Africa, Asia, (and Canada) possible; and, telegraph lines to bind colonies close to mother-countries. Moon noted that approximately 24,000 miles of railway mid century had become half a million by 1900. Approximately a quarter of the world’s total shipping was by steamship in 1873, became seventy-seven per cent a quarter century later. Five thousand miles of telegraph lines mid century became more than a million by 1900 (Moon 1926:30 see Appendix I).

The strategy of establishing ‘indirect rule’, later known as ‘the Birmingham Screw’, (Cain & Hopkins 1993:386; Ashafa 2006:6), went approximately, this way. First, Her Majesty’s Government or some representative would declare or offer peaceful terms for British indirect rule of a region or state. The Minister of Colonial Affairs in collaboration with the Treasury and Minister of War would organize troops, investors and loans to pay for an initial military force to establish order, construction of telegraph and railway lines. Ordinarily, such projects would be too risky and challenging to attract investors. Military and Treasury Board support changed that entirely. Citing the 1886 findings of French economist, Leroy-Beaulieu, Moon (1926:31) noted that “the same capital which will earn three or four percent in agricultural improvements in France will bring ten, fifteen, twenty percent in an agricultural enterprise in United States, Canada, La Plata, Australia, or New Zealand”. Lord Frederick Lugard, a military commander and governor who coined the term ‘Birmingham Screw’ for its systematic ruthlessness, in honour of his
superior Joseph Chamberlain, Minister of Colonial Affairs. Lugard described the objects of this particular brand of imperialism:

The more tangible motives of the present demands appear to me, however, to be based on three separate grounds, viz: a. Pressure of population and the need of colonies to which the surplus population can emigrate; b. The need of access to supplies of raw materials and food-stuffs and to markets for manufactured goods; and, c. The right to equality with the present Colonial Powers, on grounds of national prestige and status. (Lugard 1936:118)

The economic importance of Canadian annexation and development of new territories to Britain is well described by P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, in their tome, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688 – 1914. “It was the extension of railway and shipping networks, embodying many technological improvements over half a century, which brought the price of transport tumbling down and made it possible, by the 1890s, for wheat to be brought thousands of miles from the newly settled frontier to Britain and sold at a price which was half that ruling in the British market 20 years earlier” (Cain & Hopkins 1993:230). Similarly, evolving from 1850, when most Canadian financial reserves were held by New York City banks, “the economic integration of east and west after 1870 formed the basis for an independent Canadian state in the twentieth century; and it was financed to a large degree by London bankers (Cain & Hopkins 1993:271). Canadian infrastructure was paid for through the liquidation of Aboriginal lands and natural resources, whereas African and Asian were paid for by refinancing over a period of decades (Dumett 1975:321). British confidence that the U. S. would not interfere with Canada’s annexations was based on: “tacit recognition of its own military hegemony in Northern America, implied by British military withdrawal”; and, “improved fishing rights for American vessels in Canadian waters” (Cain & Hopkins 1993:266). There are many examples of key individuals who served the same purposes in Canada as well as Africa. For example, it was Colonel Wolseley who played the role of military commander in Red River in 1870, Asante, South Africa and the Sudan. Wolseley had served in India with distinction during the 1857 rebellion. One of his officers, who had also served in India, William Francis Butler, had recommended in 1871 to the Canadian government, establishing a North West Mounted Police force based on the
Royal Irish Constabulary model. Sir Percy Girouard, a Canadian railway engineer “was able to double the line between Bloemfontein and Johannesburg, at one place laying 80 miles of track in 48 hours”. That made Lord Robert’s march on Pretoria, South Africa possible (Kirk-Greene 1984:217).

The implementation of the ‘Birmingham Screw’ deserves much more attention than this researcher dares offer here. This author has provided this discussion in order to suggest motives why the executive of Her Majesty’s Government of Britain might enact a CL VA and assist Canada and her other colonies to prevent Aboriginal access to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. As had proven true for Canada’s provincial legislatures, judicial review by the latter had made federal subordination of provincial power quite impossible. Connolly v. Woolrich, 1867 recognizing the legitimacy of a Rupert’s Land Aboriginal legal system had been used elsewhere in the Empire by the Privy Council in Bethel v. Hildyard [1888]; Brinkley v. Attorney-General [1890]; Kenward v. Kenward [1950]; and most importantly, in its 1897 judgment of an 1895 Ontario, Quebec and Canada boundary dispute, Ontario v. The Dominion of Canada and Quebec; In Re Indian Claims, [1895] 25 S. C. R. 434.

Typically, the Birmingham Screw or ‘Indirect Rule’ as it is more widely known, requires a determination by the executive of an imperial or colonial government that the occupying Aboriginal inhabitants are culturally inferior, justifying their legal regard as wards of the imperial or colonial government. As wards, Aboriginals and their lands can be legally regulated at the discretion of the executive, without reference to either the legislature (parliament) or the courts. The resulting sweeping powers allow the executive to engage the Treasury, War Department and Colonial Affairs to extraordinary economic advantage. The elements of the screw as implied involve initial pressure imposed on Aboriginals to enter into treaties of peace and friendship whose wording usually allows them to be resurrected later as surrenders. As imperial or colonial governments establish the necessary infrastructure, such as railroads, telegraph lines and a rapid deployment police force such as the Royal Irish Constabulary or North West Mounted Police, the screw tightens. More coercive force and much less friendship can be used. Increasingly, the Aboriginal tribal structure and customary legal system are deprived of their
spontaneity as traditional leaders are replaced by chiefs who are merely spokespersons of administrators wielding unlimited discretionary power. Unlimited discretionary power is unconstitutional because it offends the rule of law. It is impossible in the absence of laws known in advance to be able to organize one's life accordingly. For example, there are no laws for Aboriginals, governing education, health, social services, public security, etc., which the government is obliged to follow.

Without access to judicial review, Canadian Aboriginals have been powerless to prevent the Crown’s distortion of the traditions and principles of the Canadian constitutional paradigm. The internal and external limits of a British tradition of legislative supremacy; residual powers of Aboriginal self-governance which should have been supported within a federal tradition; and, the respect and protection of Aboriginal individual freedoms during annexation under the *BNA Act*, have all been disabled or distorted by the Crown. Though Canadian judges and politicians have commented on the repugnance of federal control of Aboriginal individual freedoms, none have proposed or offered remedy. This author has provided this discussion of colonial strategy to offer a plausible explanation as to why Canadian Aboriginals share a remarkably similar current situation with those other populations of Africa and Asia to which the policy of ‘Indirect Rule’, the Birmingham Screw, was applied. A recent United Nations report described the situation of Canadian Aboriginals as “among the most pressing human rights issues facing Canada” (Stavenhagen 2005:7#17)

This is very similar to that described of Africa by Muna Ndulo, a Zambian authority on African legal systems. “The continent has vast mineral, oil, water, land, and human resources. Nonetheless, about 240 million Africans live on less than one dollar a day, have no access to safe drinking water, and are illiterate. ... Africa receives only five per cent of all direct foreign investment flowing to developing countries. This is in spite of the fact that investments made in Africa consistently generate high rates of return. For example, during the period from 1990 to 1994, the average annual return on book value of US direct investment in Africa was nearly twenty-eight percent, compared with eight and a half per cent for US direct investment worldwide” (Ndulo 2003:326). The African
situation Ndulo describes after “forty years or so into independence” resembles, for the most part, a Canadian Aboriginal situation:

(1) highly centralized systems of governance; (2) excessive state control coupled with limited capacity to govern; (3) arbitrary policymaking and abuse of executive power; (4) erosion of the boundaries between state and civil society; (5) weak institutions of both state and civil society, with few forces countervailing the executive branch of authority; (6) unaccountable bureaucracies; (7) widespread corruption; (8) unenforced or unjust legal systems; (9) widespread violation of human rights; (10) limited participation in governance by the general citizenry; and (11) preferential access to power and resources often determined by religious, ethnic or geographical considerations. The lack of democratic governance has resulted in unprecedented economic decline and mismanagement, causing unimaginable poverty and conflict. (Ndulo 2003:334)

Without doubt, both Canadian and African Aboriginal situations are a direct result of similar abuses of colonial power and are correspondingly, soluble by similar means. As A. N. Allott wrote in 1965, “pre-colonial integration of societies destroyed by indirect rule imposed higher up without regard for disintegration”... “Therefore independence requires re-integration” (Allott 1965:389). Maxwell Owusu, in his article, Democracy and Africa – A View from the Village, prescribes, “decentralisation is widely held to be an antidote to the concentration and corruption of power, and as a means of strengthening the intermediate voluntaristic institutions of civil society, and of ensuring that the basic needs and expectations of local communities and citizenry are respected. Popular, participatory democracy based on African concepts of community appears to be an essential element in any meaningful answer to endemic political and economic troubles” (Owusu 1992:379-380). Mahmood Mamdani adds that, “the theoretical lesson of the latest round of radical reforms may be the simple proposition that, for democratization to happen, reform will also have to contend with how to join representation in the central state with participation in the local sphere” (Mamdani 1999:885). Fareed Zakaria, in his 1997 article, followed by a book (Zakaria 2003), described the ‘rise of ‘illiberal democracy’. “The two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is flourishing; constitutional liberalism is not” (Zakaria 1997:22). Very much in agreement with Allott, Owusu, and
Mamdani, Fareed Zakaria noted that "the tension between constitutional liberalism and democracy centers on the scope of governmental authority. Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation and use" (Zakaria 1997:22).

This author believes that the antidote required in Rupert’s Land is two fold. First, Aboriginal inhabitants must have the same access to judicial review as other Canadians, in order to ensure the respect and protection of individual freedoms promised in British proclamations and always entrenched in Canada’s constitutions. Second, remedial solutions to unconstitutional laws and executive behaviour must be resolved through remedies constructed within the customary legal systems of the Aboriginal societies of Rupert’s Land, for example through the revival, maintenance and innovation of customs through Aboriginal processes. Here, this author means customs, synonymous with the ‘reasonable expectations’ articulated by La Forest J in Lac Minerals. That is, customs are authenticated against reasonable expectations of Aboriginals themselves, not to be confused with the Euro-centric principles for authentication declared by Chief Justice Lamer in R. v. Van der Peet. To this end, an exploration of a more modern Canadian Liberal tradition is in order, along with an exploration of converging both Canadian and Aboriginal legal systems, the former based on made law and the latter based on customs, or discovered laws.
CHAPTER FIVE
A CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM
– CREATING SOLUTIONS

Liberal Tradition

As most states have, during the decades immediately after the Second World War, Canada found itself very much changed. In 1960, Prime Minister Deifenbaker had succeeded with the passage of a Canadian Bill of Rights. A decade later, in *R v. Drybones*, [1970] S.C.R. 282, this Bill of Rights was used in a successful challenge of the *Indian Act*’s discriminatory provisions that criminalized Aboriginal use of alcohol off reserve. The offending s. 94b was removed a year later. By 1977, when most provinces had passed legislation protecting human rights, the federal government passed its *Canadian Human Rights Act*, establishing tribunals for receiving, investigating and remedying infringements of individual freedoms. Nevertheless, the application of the *Canadian Bill of Rights* after *Drybones* proved timid and disappointing as Canadian courts still seemed reluctant to challenge the supremacy of legislatures, a fundamental tradition inherited from Great Britain.

This was all to change, however, along with the role of Canadian courts. In her 1990 lecture to the County Carleton Law Association, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin described the situation precipitated by the amendment and patriation of Canada’s constitution:

During the nineteenth and for a large part of the twentieth century, Canada could best be described as a small, agricultural, Caucasian, Christian society. Its structures rested on a virtually unquestioned core of shared common values. …We are no longer an essentially Caucasian country. One has only to walk the streets of our major cities – Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver and Ottawa – to realize that we are a country of mixed race. In this newly cosmopolitan Canada, issues arising from divergences of race and culture increasingly find their way into our legal system. …In sum, Canadian society has experienced a revolution in recent decades, however quiet and incipient may have been its passage. Our society is large, diverse and multifaceted. It is no longer homogeneous. While we can still speak of
shared values, we find ourselves increasingly confronted by conflict between divergent sets of shared values. (McLachlin 1990:1-4)

In order to meet the demands of such a dramatically altered citizenry, the role of Canadian courts and tribunals was made much more explicit as also were the traditions of justice that, previously, had been only implied. As a result of this change, Canada became a constitutional, that is, a liberal democracy. In more recent parlance, Fareed Zakaria, in his article and his book, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, describes liberal democracy as “a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property” (Zakaria 1997:22-23; 2003). Before, merely implied, the ‘rule of law’, after 1982 is now explicitly stated in the preamble of Canada’s Constitution.

All of the historic agreements and orders in council which made confederation and annexation of new territories possible are much more visible in the schedules appended under the heading ‘Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, Modernization of the Constitution’. As well, s. 52 clearly establishes both the contents and the supremacy of the constitution as the supreme law of Canada and that “any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect”. The previous character of parliamentary and legislative supremacy is now balanced against the sovereignty of individuals. More simply, no legislature or executive is allowed to infringe upon the freedoms of citizens, except: for reasons and in a manner as can be justified in a free and democratic society. The constitution also asserts the right of individuals to a judicial review of the beaviour of an executive or legislature where their freedoms are believed to have been infringed. Such basic liberties as speech, assembly, religion, equality, life, liberty and security of person, Canadian courts have determined, can only be justifiably infringed during crises or national emergencies. When infringement is justified for important objectives, executives and legislatures are limited to only those infringements that are necessary, reasonable, and proportional, and that infringe as little as possible.

Such an independent and robust role of the Courts has injected new life into established doctrines. The “Doctrine of the Living Tree”, enunciated when women were
accorded legal status as persons in Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124, was applied only once more, in 1979, before judicial review of infringement of individual freedoms was constitutionally entrenched. The Constitution Act, 1982, has enlarged doctrines that had previously been applied only in the protection of federal or provincial powers, to new, individual powers to enjoy basic liberties. The changes to Canada’s constitution has breathed new life into historical agreements, such as the guarantee of Catholic and Protestant education in Ontario and Quebec respectively, and the language rights of Franco Manitobans. The general effect of the Liberal tradition established by Canada’s 1982 Constitution has been, in the words of McLachlin CJ, “a culture of justification, [where] an exercise of public power is only appropriate where it can be justified to citizens in terms of rationality and fairness” (McLachlin 1999:289). Alternately described by Gus diZerega:

... most importantly, liberal democracies universally subordinate the state institutions of police, military, courts, and law making to the systemic principles which characterize spontaneous orders in Hayek’s sense. (diZerega 2000:4) .... In my view the pre-eminent contemporary liberal thinker was F. A. Hayek. Along with Michael Polanyi, Hayek focused on the expanded role in modern society of what they termed “spontaneous orders” as liberalism’s most important institutional innovation.... Hayek is the pre-eminent theorist of spontaneous order of the market and Polanyi the equivalent theorist of such an order in science. (Hayek 1948, pp. 77-106, 1978, pp. 179-90; Lachmann, 1986; Polanyi, 1969; Ziman, 1968; Hall, 1988). (diZerega 2000:3)

**Command vs. Spontaneous Order**

In his contribution to Essays in Honour of Fredrich A. von Hayek, Michael Polanyi described command order as, “incorporation in a hierarchy of command, on the lines on which for example an army is organized when it goes into action”; and, the latter as “that of self co-ordination ... [where] ... each has to adjust himself to the situation created by the others and by doing so he contributes to the adjustment of all to their common task” (Polanyi 1969:166). Although Canada’s adoption of a Liberal tradition, in addition to original British, federal and colonial traditions has resulted in greater spontaneity, its basic legal character remains exogenous control, reliant on command of coercive powers. On the other hand,
the legal character of Rupert’s Land Aboriginal societies remain spontaneous, as
described by Julius Lips, in his seminal work *Naskapi Law*, reliant on ‘mutual
assistance’ and ‘public opinion’ (Lips 1947:472). This author’s own personal
experiences, throughout the eastern Arctic and the Boreal Forest of Rupert’s
Land, are quite consistent with Lip’s notion of Naskapi order – “the law of the
Naskapi is not a judge-made law, nor is it a scholar-made law. It is a law of the
people, by the people, for the people” (Lips 1947:483). According to this author’s
experience, the essential character, either command or spontaneous is most clearly
evident in times of crisis. For example, at such a time the Supreme Court of
Canada considers that the state has a right to infringe most of the liberties of its
citizens. Dickson J. writing for the majority in *Operation Dismantle v. The Queen,*
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, adopted the view of Mortimer J. Adler that “living in
organized societies under effective government and enforceable laws, as they
must in order to survive and prosper, human beings neither have autonomy nor
are they entitled to unlimited liberty of action. Autonomy is incompatible with
organized society. Unlimited liberty is destructive of it” (Adler 1981:144).

Lips, on the other hand, remarked of Naskapi law that “… it is noteworthy that
these rules of mutual assistance have the greatest effect in immediate danger of life or of
starvation. In such cases they have full priority even over those norms which under
ordinary circumstances are sacrosanct” (Lips 1947:472). A Canadian reflex in the face of
 crisis is typically to restore command where as Naskapi reflexes favour restoring
endogenous cues, that is, spontaneity. Even today, Aboriginals seeking to restore order
are more likely to turn inward, renewing ties of family and faith, rather than resort to
coercion.

Command and spontaneous orders also process knowledge differently. In one of his
most important articles, *Use of Knowledge in Society*, Hayek determined that, in a
spontaneous order, “the whole acts as one market, not because any of its members survey
the whole field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap
so that through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all”
(Hayek 1945:526). DiZerega describes a spontaneous order as “primarily a
communications network" whose signals generated "increase the likelihood that participants independently chosen plans will be successful" (diZerega 2004:446). Rather than one market, command order compartmentalizes knowledge and assigns different weight to different bodies of knowledge. Further compartmentalizing and further weighing takes place within subsequent compartments or disciplines, to the degree that whatever overlap may have been noticed by individuals disappears from general view. Ultimately, in a command order, individuals are divided rather than united by the dissemination of knowledge within a command order (Castillo 2002). Paraphrasing Michael Polanyi, Straun Jacobs wrote that even the hierarchical aspect of authority challenges any unity that might arise from processing information:

Communication and decisions flowing vertically must clog up the official channels causing chaos at ground level, while permitting more horizontal communication and decisions at the base of the organization would undermine its structure of authority. (Jacobs 1999:115).

Dicey's external and internal limits or framework of a British tradition of command order discussed in the previous chapter have proven less and less reliable for maintaining order as Canada's population has become more socially diverse on such measures as race, ethnicity, or gender. Canada's more recent addition of a Liberal tradition has shifted the coercive power of command in order to protect those differences from state or other interference. That is the definition of 'rights', statutory or commanded protection of individual freedoms.

Spontaneous order, on the other hand, is endogenously organized and in crisis resorts to 'mutual assistance' or kinship for cohesiveness. In the relative absence of command or coercion, the framework or basic rules for reproducing spontaneous order are understandably different. Barry McLeod-Cullinane describes this aspect of spontaneous order accordingly:

Because customary law is rooted in "the existence of 'social mores' defining rules of conduct" it is necessarily associated with the basic rules establishing civil association, i.e. it is dependent upon the morality of duty. Three conditions, Fuller suggests, underpin duty. "First, the relationship of
reciprocity out of which the duty arises must result from a voluntary agreement between the parties affected; they themselves 'create' the duty. Second, the reciprocal performances must in some sense be equal in value.' Because it is nonsensical to consider equality as exact identity some common unit of measurement, into which differences can be subsumed, is necessary. And, "[t]hird, the relationships within the society must be sufficiently fluid so that the same duty you owe me today, I may owe you tomorrow in other words, the relationship of duty must in theory and in practice be reversible." (McLeod-Cullinane 1995:6)

Similarly, liberties are shaped differently. Paraphrasing Polanyi's theory of spontaneous order, Straun Jacobs identifies respective notions of liberties as an additional factor determining unity within command or spontaneous orders. While liberty within a made order is achieved by shielding individual liberties, Liberty within a spontaneous order is achieved by avoiding coercion, depending on leadership and persuasion instead of command:

A person left to her own devices, acting on personal desires and not obliged to serve any externally defined purpose, was seen by Polanyi as enjoying 'private' liberty. It is 'the converse of personal servitude', people devoid of it are as 'slaves or villains'. 'Public' liberty on the other hand is exercised within spontaneous orders, someone (or some corporation) being free in this sense when able to act as she/he personally considers appropriate in a given context in relation to a predetermined public goal or ideal end. The agent here acts independently, on her own initiative without having to follow instructions, contrasting the duty of a subordinate official in a planned or corporate order. Polanyi .... associated public liberty with performance of 'social functions' or tasks, describing their discharge as a 'public responsibility' that participants accept as a condition of being members of a spontaneous order as they conscientiously work toward the ideal end or absolute value of the order. (Jacobs 1999:119).

Statute, Common Law and Custom

Deemed by John Hasnas as likely the result of his lack of training as an attorney and not having been raised in a common law country, Hayek confused customary law with common law as interchangeable alternatives of 'unplanned law' (Hasnas 2005:79-81). Hasnas describes the important differences between customary and common law, that were confused by Hayek:
By the end of the nineteenth century, the operation of these forces [merging of various common law courts, more reliable case reports and the practice of holding judges bound to decisions of higher courts] had transformed the common law process from one designed to properly prepare a dispute for submission to a jury, who would do justice according to custom, to one designed to ensure that courts of inferior jurisdiction were applying both procedural and substantial rules of law consistently with the rules announced in prior judicial decisions. Significantly, the focus of the process had shifted from the just resolution of particular disputes to the maintenance of a consistent and coherent body of rules. At this point, the common law had lost its character as a customary law .... No longer a discoverer of customs, the judge is now an intellectual craftsman, charged with sculpting the rules into a consistent and coherent body of law while ensuring that the whole does not lose touch with the normative ends it is designed to serve. In every appellate decision, the judge must consider not merely what is fair to the parties to the dispute, but how the decision will impact the law's twin goals of maintaining a reasonable consistency with past rulings and advancing good public policy. Hence, the modern common law is case-generated, but judge-made law. (Hasnas 2005:94-96)

Essential to this study, common law differs from customary law to the extent that the common law is made, affected by command and no longer, law of liberty. The extent to which stare decisis or case-generated characterizations of Aboriginals as lawless nomads, ineligible for liberties would not have survived customary adjudication which is rooted in notions of natural justice rather established than legal conventions. As discussed earlier in relation to the events surrounding the transfer of sovereignty for Rupert's Land to Canada, it was the possibility of disconnecting morality from coercive power to make legal what is immoral, that was the most decisive factor in the denial of the liberties of the Aboriginal inhabitants of Rupert's Land. Lon Fuller, renown legal scholar, offers a superior definition of customary law:

Customary law is not the product of official enactment, but owes its force to the fact that it has found direct expression in the conduct of men towards one another... This neglect of the phenomenon called customary law has, I think, done great damage to our thinking about law generally. Even if we accept the rather casual analysis of the subject offered by the treatises, it still remains true that a proper understanding of customary law is of capital importance to the world. ... I shall argue that the phenomenon called customary law can best be described as a language of interaction. To
interact meaningfully men require a social setting in which the moves of the participating players will fall generally within some predictable pattern. We sometimes speak of customary law as offering an unwritten code of conduct. The word code is appropriate here because what is involved is not simply a negation, a prohibition of certain disapproved actions, but also the obverse side of this negation, the meaning it confers on foreseeable and approved actions, which then furnish a point of orientation for ongoing interactive responses. (Fuller 1981:212-214)

The normative function of customary law, rooted in social mores is fundamentally important to the survival of the Aboriginal inhabitants of Rupert’s Land, unfortunately too often a casualty of ‘analysis of the subject offered by the treatises’. Certainly, it is overlooked in the typical comment that “on account of its decentralization, general international law has the character of a primitive law” (Campbell 1988:182). Michael Polanyi’s brother Karl, in his influential work, The Great Transformation, identified the spontaneous order of a free market as a potentially destructive force threatening social order. Ronaldo Munck wrote in his review, Globalization and Democracy: A New "Great Transformation"?:

For Polanyi (1957), a major characteristic of the market society was that it had become "disembedded" socially; that is to say it was uprooted or divorced from its social and political institutions. What a disembedded and self-regulating market economy produces in people is insecurity and social anxiety. Protective counter-movements by society and the state must also seek to block the total disembedding of the market through re-embedding it through state intervention and social legislation. Of course, in the era of globalization, that re-embedding will also occur at an international level to be effective, even more than was the case in the 1930s. (Munck 2002:18)

Here, corporate economic entities, not individuals, have escaped or ‘become disembedded’ from the social and political institutions that might normally control them. The solution, it is generally agreed, is to use international customs (actually enforced by coercion) to ‘re-embed’ them, a process suggested by Alina Rocha Menocal:

Successfully mediating state–market relations is a double-sided process that requires a fine balance between fostering market forces on the one hand and protecting the population against harmful consequences on the other. (Menocal 2004:775)
Another example of the allegedly interchangeability of the terms customary order and spontaneous order needs closer examination. Mark A. Drumbl describes the current state of ‘customary law’ in Afghanistan:

Afghanistan’s widespread poverty has increased the practice of the sale by parents of their young daughters, putatively as brides but in practice as prostitutes, thereby contributing to global patterns of sex trafficking. Although selling girls is prohibited by Islamic law, local custom is more ambiguous, so much so that one Afghan jurist opines that “nobody would ever be charged for selling a daughter.” (Drumbl 2004:110)

Especially revealing to this author, is Drumbl acceptance of a disconnect between Islamic law and local custom. Clearly, Islamic law is a normative system concerned with social mores and should influence local custom. In the absence of a normative underlayer, these practices would more accurately be described as bad habits. As in the case of the character of ‘nomads’ there is not sufficient overlap between the tacit knowledge of legal scholars with that of economists or political scientists to support a ‘one market’ connotation of the terms spontaneous order, or customary law. As in the case of the ‘nomad’, the term ‘customary law’ has become disconnected from the probative and relevant evidence of behaviour upon which its legal meaning is founded. It is unfortunate that in this example, the terms custom and law have been used without reference to the traits which define them. In this Afghanistan example there is reference to Islamic law, local custom, and apparently a secular court. Is the Islamic law, statutory law, enforced with the coercive powers of a state. Apparently not if parents are able to sell daughters or use them as currency in dispute resolution. The ‘local custom’ obviously involves a common practice but obviously also lacks the normative element required to create spontaneous, customary peace and good order. Finally, no reference is made of the kind of legal system presided over by an Afghan jurist. As this author will now argue, the legitimacy of custom, custom worthy of a Canadian court of competent jurisdiction, lies in its capacity for creating voluntary peace and good order, based on public opinion, mutual dependence, and reasonable expectations.
Legal Foundations of Custom


Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th) states that, in proving custom, “the usual course taken is to call persons of middle or old age to state that in their times . . . the custom has always prevailed”. (Zlotkin 1984)

As is the case with all customary law, it has to be proved in the first instance by calling witnesses acquainted with the native customs until the particular customs have, by frequent proof in the courts, become so notorious that the courts will take judicial notice of them.” Angu v. Atta [1916]

A. St, John Hannigan noted that in the Privy Council’s judgment of Bongay v. Macauley, 1 W.A.C.A., p. 225, a Sierra Leonean case, Kingdon, C.J., refers at page 229, to the dictum of the Privy Council in the Nigerian case of Eleko v. The Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria & anor. [1931], A.C., 662, at p. 673, “It is the assent of the native community that gives a custom its validity and, therefore, barbarous or mild, it must be shown to be recognized by the community whose conduct it is supposed to regulate”. (Hannigan 1958:112). Beyond the manner of proving the existence of a custom, the case law from the British Empire reached the Privy Council from lower colonial courts which invariably bent Aboriginal customary legal systems to suit policies of Indirect Rule (Ibhawoh 2002:76; Killingray 1986:413; Seidman 1970:188; Heussler 1968:48; and, Forde 1939:153-154). Here, custom has been subordinated to the political and economic projects of a colonial government, As noted by Roger S. Gocking of British Africa, “local chiefs who attempted to adjudicate more than trivial criminal cases invariably found themselves in conflict with both the Chief Magistrate and the Governor” (Gocking 1993:4-5). Failing to appreciate critical differences between command and spontaneous orders, there is an even greater risk that well-meaning efforts will attempt to fuse the two. For example, Erika Techera, described such an effort in her article, Local Approaches to the Protection of Biological Diversity: The Role of Customary Law in Community Based Conservation in the South Pacific:
Power is given to the Fono to punish anyone who fails to obey any direction of the Fono according to the traditional custom and usage of the village … This is practically viable and desirable in the context of the South Pacific Island States. More broadly, the examples of Samoa and Vanuatu demonstrate that it is possible to synthesise customary law with western style legislation, provided the political will to do so is present. (Techera 2007:7-13)

Whatever, the logic used, the delegation of coercive power by a Western styled command order to an Aboriginal leader of a spontaneous order, notwithstanding good intentions will eventually produce the same results as Indirect Rule. Moreover, such synthesis is irrelevant in Rupert’s Land where a Canadian government is committed to respect and protect the legal system that safeguards the freedoms of every individual, a purpose quite different from subordinating legal systems to satisfy its own colonial objectives. Subsequently, the principles for conceiving or proving important features of such a customary legal system must be drawn from sources intended to respect its integrity.

The International Court of Justice in the Hague enunciated such principles in its judgment of Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1968. They are well described by Judge Kotaro Tanaka:

The formation of a customary law in a given society, be it municipal or international, is a complex psychological and sociological process, and therefore, it is not an easy matter to decide. The first factor of customary law, which can be called its corpus, constitutes a usage or a continuous repetition of the same kind of acts; in customary international law State practice is required. It represents a quantitative factor of customary law. The second factor of customary law, which can be called its animus, constitutes opinio juris sive necessitatis by which a simple usage can be transformed into a custom with the binding power. It represents a qualitative factor of customary law. (Tanaka 1968:175)

Francesco Parisi, in his 2001 article, The Formation of Customary Law, clearly identifies the two defining elements:

(1) the practice should emerge out of the spontaneous and uncoerced behaviour of various members of a group, and
(2) the parties involved must subjectively believe in the obligatory or necessary nature of the emerging practice (opinio iuris).
(Parisi 2001:7-8)

These same principles of: uncoerced behaviour; plus, opinio juris; applied by the ICJ in Nicaragua v. The United States of America were applied recently by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hape, [2007] S.C.C. 26, at paragraph 46:

46. Sovereign equality remains a cornerstone of the international legal system. Its foundational principles – including non-intervention and respect for the territorial sovereignty of foreign states – cannot be regarded as anything less than firmly established rules of customary international law, as the International Court of Justice held when it recognized non-intervention as a customary principle in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14, at pp. 106. As the International Court of Justice noted on that occasion, the status of these principles as international customs is supported by both state practice and opinio juris, the two necessary elements of customary international law.

[Emphasis added by this author]

In conclusion, the legal rights of every Aboriginal inhabitant of Rupert’s Land that requires the respect of the government and parliament of Canada are well described in the RP1869, issued by the British Cabinet. The protection of these rights by Canada’s courts of competent jurisdiction will require judicial notice and protection of the customs which comprise the customary legal system of the Aboriginal families and bands of Rupert’s Land. These customs are distinguished by spontaneous, uncoerced behaviour, as well as attendant beliefs and social mores. What is needed now is a practical illustration of their application in a meaningful context. This author has chosen the context of recognized trades, including the traditional Cree trade of hunting and trapping, as well as those normally certified by Canadian provinces. Specifically, this illustration involves the Aboriginal inhabitants of northern Quebec in general, the Crees of Waskaganish First Nation in particular. Including approximately 2300 individuals, this band of families was identified in the RL&NWTO as affiliated with Rupert House trading post, the oldest, continuously occupied post of the Hudson’s Bay Company in Canada. This example was
chosen by this author because of his extensive experience in training, apprenticeship and certification of competence in skilled trades. This example will be relevant to the greatest number of individuals, their families, bands and First Nations, elsewhere in Rupert’s Land. As emergent, rather than designed order, customary legal systems are more easily and clearly illustrated in behaviour engaging reasonable expectations and attendant values.
CHAPTER SIX
TRAINING, APPRENTICESHIP AND CERTIFICATION
IN A RECOGNIZED TRADE

Basis of Sovereignty in Rupert’s Land

In 1870, Canada could not claim anything more in sovereignty in Rupert’s Land from Her Majesty’s Government, than the latter had claimed, nor could Canada claim anything more than allowed by the terms under which the transfer was made. Throughout this study, this author has presented the facts, principles of interpretation and constitutionally entrenched promises to respect and protect the legal rights of every individual Aboriginal inhabitant of Rupert’s Land upon annexation to Canada. They are embedded in documents such as orders in council, minutes and reports of parliament, royal proclamations, court judgments, legislation and constitutions, which, according to English and Canadian civil procedure are “so notorious as to require no further proof” and may be included as facts, in a statement of claim or pleading (Jacob & Goldrein (1990:61-62). These facts underpin the meaning of the phrase, “the legal rights of every individual” which Canada’s denial of legal rights balances on – the notion that Indians (Aboriginals) are not legally individuals as a result of Canada’s reduction of their status towards in an exercise of legislative supremacy. That argument is not saved by the CLVA, s.2, which provided that “in any respect repugnant” was “absolutely void and inoperative”.

The RP1869 and the RL&NWTO, June 23, 1870 were both orders-in-council issued by the British Cabinet. Any Canadian federal or provincial enactment that denied the legal rights of every individual Aboriginal inhabitant of Rupert’s Land was therefore repugnant, absolutely void and inoperative. This was not changed by the Statute of Westminster, 1931, which freed the Canada’s parliament from the CLVA:

7. (1) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment or alteration of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930, or any order, rule or regulation made thereunder.
The *Constitution Act, 1982* patriated Canada’s constitution, explicitly referring in s. 52, to the RL&NWTO, in the Schedules #3, as part of the constitution. The continuity of the legal rights of every Aboriginal individual is illustrated in Appendix J.

During the first hundred years of annexation by Canada, notwithstanding two boundary extensions (1898 and 1912), Quebec largely ignored Rupert’s Land. Suddenly, on November 24, 1966, Quebec established a Commission d’Étude sur l’Intégrité du Territoire du Québec [Commission to Study the Integrity of Quebec’s Territory], and appointed Henri Dorion as its president. The organization and methodology of this project closely resembled similar efforts by federal commissions to legitimate a denial or extinguishment of Aboriginal rights. Hearings were not frequent enough nor ever held in the north to pretend any democratic process. The commissions rather large, *Rapport de la Commission d’Étude sur l’Intégrité du Territoire du Québec* was released February 5, 1971. Its recommendations were reduced to a few pages in Cree, Montagnais, Iroquois and Inuktitut. This author recognizes the syllabic font used for the Cree as that of Father Louis-Philippe Vaillancourt, an Oblate priest who verified Cree testimony for Hydro Quebec during the court sessions of 1973. This author was present in the Cree communities after the Dorion Commission’s report was released. The few pages translated into Cree never arrived in the Cree communities.

The report’s legal opinion was largely written by Université de Laval professor, Henri Brun. Though *Connolly v. Woolrich*, was a judgment of a Quebec court, confirmed on appeal and adopted throughout the Empire (see Appendix K), Brun completely ignored it as well as most of the primary source materials in Appendix J. Brun accepted Canada’s view that Indians were not legally ‘individuals’. Volume 4 of the *Rapport de la Commission d’Étude sur l’Intégrité du Territoire du Québec*, contains Brun opinion, largely based on views of legal scholars, including Ernerrick de Vattel. Brun determined, based on a blatantly selective use of hearsay evidence, and the exclusion of most of the primary sources in Appendix J, that no Aboriginal rights of sovereignty or land title had survived. This was, he claimed, largely the result of federal legislation that could extinguish or alter, explicitly or tacitly, what there may once have been, without any legal obligation for compensation. Brun added:
... un titre indien de nature privée existe théoriquement sur une immense partie du territoire actuel du Québec, - en l’occurrence sur la partie s’étendant au nord de la province de Québec de 1763 [an Indian title of a ‘private nature’ theoretically exists on an immense part of the territory of northern Quebec, north of the province of Quebec of 1763] (Brun 1967:111)

By implication, Brun alleges, that private interest or title was limited to traditional uses such as hunting and fishing. Brun’s position was very much like the position taken by most governments and legal scholars prior to Calder v. AG BC; Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; and R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. Brun’s legal reasoning is an earlier rendition of the ‘overgrown and poorly excavated archaeological site’ which the field of Aboriginal rights continues to be. It is not relevant to this study of the legal rights of every individual inhabiting Rupert’s Land which is based on notorious facts rather than the reasoning of legal scholars. The prevalence of Brun’s opinion and its adoption by legal counsel and judges do, however, explain the outcomes of Gros Louis et al v. SDBJ, [1973] and La Société de Développement de la Baie James et al v. Kanatewat et al [1973], and a view of the James Bay & Northern Quebec Agreement in 1975 as an Aboriginal victory, notwithstanding is purported extinguishment of many legal and all property rights. Most of these judgments could easily be reversed because of their inconsistency with the rule of law, principles of fundamental justice, a free and democratic society and existing Aboriginal rights which survive because, contrary to Brun’s opinion, they were not extingushed tacitly, by legislation lacking ‘clear and plain intention’. As this author has clearly shown, the legal rights of the Aboriginal inhabitants of Rupert’s Land were always entrenched in the Canadian constitution, beyond the reach of legislatures or executives. As enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771, at para. 76, treaties and land settlement agreements, are not the sources or rights, but rather “are analogous to contracts, albeit of a very solemn and special, public nature”. Subsequently, any aspects of treaties and land settlement agreements, as well as any federal or provincial statutes that are inconsistent with the legal rights of the Aboriginal individuals inhabiting Rupert’s Land are, according to: the CLVA, s.2 until 1931; the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 7(1) until 1982; and, the Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(1) to present, “to the extent of the inconsistency, of
no force or effect. A number of treaties or accords have been signed between, mainly Quebec and the Crees since 1975. The most recent, the Paix des Braves, 2002 was negotiated in secret between Quebec Premier Bernard Landry and Grand Chief Ted Moses, each assisted by only a few aids. This agreement was even more complex than the James Bay & Northern Quebec Agreement, more lucrative and enjoyed much less unanimity.

The Growth of Illiberal Democracy in Eastern Rupert’s Land

Now, almost thirty years ago, in an influential work, Negotiating a Way of Life, a group of mostly social scientists, commented on the “nature of Cree participation”:

What really is at issue, however, is the sort of role the new Cree regional staff have in their structure. What is their position vis-a-vis the consultants who have played such an important role in the development of the organization? There is evidence (which shall be presented and developed more completely in the following papers) to suggest that a system has developed wherein Cree are trained in and assume control of the more routine aspects of administration, while the more active or dynamic areas of bureaucracy – the level at which decision and policy-making power resides – remain under the determining influence of consultants, in general, and legal advisers in particular. From such a situation, it is not surprising that one already sees some early signs of a potential resentment developing among the Cree concerning the power of consultants and the difficulty of controlling them. (La Rusic et al 1979 :50-51)

[Emphasis added by this author]

The remarks underlined above by this author have since proven to be prophetic. But, the Crees performing administrative tasks have become a cohort in a legion led by consultants. The growing resentment is, today, most sharply felt by the general Cree population, the subject or clients of the legion. In 1978, the total budget of the Cree School Board was less than eight-million dollars per year. Today, thirty years later, the same Cree School Board’s budget exceeds ten times that amount. A Cree Board of Health & Social Services, barely visible in 1978, today reaches deep into the lives of every inhabitant of eastern Rupert’s Land. Controlling these institutions or the consultants and administrative staff that animate them through supposedly democratically elected boards
or committees is a numerical impossibility (see Appendix M). In Waskaganish alone, virtually every person over the age of eighteen would need to be serving on some board or committee, more than sixty-three and growing. In fact, the roles of board or committee members fall to a rather small number of community members who might serve on as many as ten or twelve boards or committees at a time. The regular meetings required of such democratic institutions are usually organized in Montreal, Quebec City, Ottawa or some urban centre far from the Cree community being represented. The agenda, background information, political and legal implications relevant to these meetings in forms not publically accessible are maintained by the consultants and sometimes senior administrators. Consequently, it should not surprise the reader that the rule of law, separation of powers, procedural fairness and respect for individual freedoms that distinguish democratic tyranny from liberal democracy are largely absent from that part of eastern Rupert’s Land, now known as the James Bay Territory of northern Quebec.

The rule of law according to Hayek (1994:80) and Raz (1979:2-3) requires “that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand”; and, that “it is possible to foresee with fair certainty how authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge”. Both Canada and Quebec have organized electoral boundaries in such a manner that non-Aboriginal interests in northern development outvote many times over an opposing Aboriginal interest in maintaining legal and property rights. In the same manner that s. 88 of the Indian Act operates to make provincial laws of general application enforceable by provincial authorities upon Aboriginals, the CNA, a federal statute does the same to the Crees of northern Quebec (see Appendix N). Even before considering the effect on Aboriginal individuals, such delegation of powers clearly violates an important Federal tradition of Canadian constitutionalism, that is, there can be no delegation of powers between legislatures that result in an abdication of responsibilities. Supreme Court Justice, Gerard La Forest wrote that when such legislation is vaguely written, it amounts to such forbidden abdication of powers. As an illustration of such abdication, this author offers the example of youth protection (see Appendix N). The life, liberty and security of parent and child are so closely intertwined that its not possible for the state to infringe
upon one without infringing substantive individual freedoms of both. In Quebec, as in most provinces, there is procedural fairness built into the system to protect such substantive individual freedoms from arbitrary, unjustified infringement by government agencies. That procedural fairness, in Quebec, takes the form of a Commission des Droits de la Personne et des Droits de la Jeunesse, [Human Rights and Youth Rights Commission]. This commission (see Appendix P), is an indispensable part of a fair and justified application in Quebec of a provincial statute, the *Youth Protection Act*. The reader will also notice that there is no commission or office responsible for northern Quebec. In short, the *CNA*, a federal statute, has allowed the federal government to delegate its powers to regulate Aboriginal lives, abdicating its constitutional responsibility to protect their individual rights. A survey of provincial education, health, social services, and public security statutes will reveal that the substantive individual freedoms of Aboriginals are mostly unprotected. This practice of delegating federal powers to provinces combined with abdicating responsibilities for protecting the rights of Aboriginals also offends the rule of law. Obvious in this author’s example of youth protection, neither federal nor provincial governments are “bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand”, with the result that it is impossible “to foresee with fair certainty how authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances”. Subsequently, it is impossible for an Aboriginal “to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge”. In the absence of the normal provincial measures of procedural fairness, an Aboriginal is forced to depend on the particular officer wielding such powers – an arrangement which the Supreme Court of Canada refused to accept in: *R. v. Adams*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, at paragraph 54; and *Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice)*, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, at paragraph 141.

**Effect of Related Provincial Statutes, Regulations and Policies:**

As a result of research conducted during the last twenty years, this author noticed the situation faced by Aboriginals in most provinces varies little. The federal government delegates its powers to the provinces for Aboriginal training, apprenticeships and proving
competence in certified trades performed by carpenters, electricians, plumbers, mechanics, etc..

In a recent interprovincial accord, the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), Chapter 7 - Labour Mobility, most of those trades are now harmonized among provinces. Training, apprenticeship and recognition in these trades engage most individual freedoms in some manner, all of which are protected with procedural fairness in some form, such as tribunals, ombudsmen, and other appeal processes. The AIT, Chapter 7 provides similar protection of a constitutional right to mobility. As in the Youth Protection Act example offered earlier, the federal government has delegated to Quebec, its powers over training, apprenticeships and proving competence for Aboriginals, stripped of any board that might represent Aboriginal interests, and the tribunals, ombudsmen, and other appeal processes that might protect Aboriginals from the arbitrary behaviour of government officials.

Achieving knowledge, skills and recognition in a certified trade requires the careful and seamless integration of three main activities: formal training, supervised apprenticeship and testing. In the James Bay Territory of northern Quebec, jurisdiction for formal training has usually been held by the Cree School Board, operating under Quebec statutes. Apprenticeships are not usually available to Crees as the Quebec offices responsible are located outside Cree communities, although they do offer services to non-Aboriginal corporations such as Hydro-Quebec on the latter’s project sites on traditional Cree lands. Nor is competence testing available. Cree workers wishing to write such tests have gone to Val d’Or and Montreal; however, there they face another, much larger obstacle. In the largest sector, construction trades, authenticating hours of work experience hours to qualify as apprentices or to maintain competence in a trade, can only be done through membership in one of five Quebec certified trade unions. Preparation to write the competence exams is usually only available through a union affiliated with the work site. The company employing the apprentice or worker must also be recognized by the Quebec government. Construction companies must have an RBQ, that is a Quebec building permit. There are no apprenticeship services available in Cree communities, no unions and few Cree employers have the necessary Quebec permits. As a result of these
shortcomings and especially the lack of judicial review of abuse of unlimited discretionary powers, there are very few recognized Cree tradesmen. Those few had to leave the James Bay Territory in order to achieve such recognition or they were allowed to log hours of experience and write exams with the normal support of trade unions. Should the latter become too numerous, it would be reasonable to expect their recognition to be challenged by trade unions and revoked as having been accomplished outside legal means.

As one might expect, a highly skilled Cree workforce upon which the Cree communities critically depend are neither recognized nor paid accordingly. Most of the projects and employers operating on Cree lands are obliged to operate in compliance with an array of provincial statutes. Responsibility for protecting Cree rights to equality under provincial statutes has been abdicated by the federal government, while the power to serve their training, apprenticeship and certification needs has been delegated to the province. The aspirations of a youth of becoming a tradesperson with recognized and lucrative skills is just as remote as the aspirations of the older skilled worker who has been denied both recognition and fair compensation. This federal government strategy of simultaneously putting a class of citizens in harms way and withholding protection is called "passive violence". Arun Gandhi explained his famous grandfather's views on the subject, highly relevant to this study:

"... Grandfather explained to me the connection between passive and physical violence. Passive violence, he said, generates anger in the victim, and because justice in modern times has come to mean revenge, the victim resorts to physical violence. Thus passive violence is the fuel that ignites physical violence...." (Ghandhi 1995)

The usual form of "passive violence", Ghandi taught as 'The Violence Family Tree' (see Appendix Q) corresponds very closely to the observations of Aboriginal legal experts, Howard E. Staats, a Mohawk from Brantford; Leroy Little Bear, a Blackfoot from southern Alberta; and, John Borrows, an Chippewa from southwestern Ontario:

To a large extent both the social the social dislocation and the public image which plague the Indian in Canada today can be traced to the legal position in which the Indian finds himself. (Staats 1964:36-37)
Colonization created a fragmentary worldview among Aboriginal peoples. By force, terror, and educational policy, it attempted to destroy the Aboriginal worldview – but failed. Instead, colonization left a heritage of jagged worldviews among Indigenous peoples. They no longer had an Aboriginal worldview. Nor did they adopt a Eurocentric worldview. Their consciousness became a random puzzle, a jigsaw puzzle that each person has to attempt to understand. Many collective views of the world competed for control of their behaviour, and since none was dominant modern Aboriginal people had to make guesses or choices about everything. Aboriginal consciousness became a site of overlapping, contentious, fragmented, competing desires and values. Such jagged worldviews minimize legitimate cultural and social control; thus, external force and law, relatives of terrorism, become the instruments of social control. (Little Bear 2000:84-85)

We have a real crisis in the rule of law in Aboriginal communities; it is not a crisis because Aboriginal peoples do not have the rule of law, it is a crisis of legitimacy about the rule of law in Aboriginal communities. If Aboriginal peoples were able to start to see themselves and their normative values reflected in how they conduct their day-to-day affairs, I believe that would go at least some distance to diminishing some of our problems. It is not the whole solution, but it is a part of the solution. (Borrows 2005:168)

Even with a more equitable delivery of training, apprenticeship and certification services, and the installation of the procedural protection of individual freedoms available to non-Aboriginals, the essential problem of command order by statute, disrupting spontaneous order by custom would remain. Moreover, the socio-economic conditions to which spontaneous order is so well suited, also remain – in addition to a diverse and rapidly changing population spread over a vast geographic area. A recent study of international, circumpolar Aboriginal populations actually increase rather than abandon their traditional subsistence activities as wage employment provides them more cash (Kruse & Poppel 2007).

**Training, Apprenticeship and Trade Certification by Custom**

Using the basic principles which this author developed in the previous chapter, this author now describes the form which training, apprenticeship and recognition of competence much assume when spontaneously ordered by custom rather than
commanded by statute. The following five principles define a framework for this approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. <strong>Customs Must Be Defined in Accordance with Stable Principles</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The framework must conform to definition of customary law upheld by Canadian and British Empire courts and the International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) providing for the voluntary, uncoerced behaviour of participants; and,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) a consensus on the obligatory or necessary nature of defining practices.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>2. <strong>Acceptance of Public Goals in Exchange for Liberty</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participants must be able to act independently, on initiative rather than instructions where freedom is expanded through increasing the number of choices for achieving predetermined public goals or ideals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) the goals of instructors, students and functionaries will be clearly prescribed, that is, mandatory, but methodologies and relationships will only be advisory;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) the paths to recognition of trade competence to be followed and resources made available to expert, semi-skilled and novice workers will vary, the minimum standard of competence required for recognition will be the same for all.</td>
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<tr>
<th>3. <strong>Relations between Participants Will Be Voluntary</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>The predominant pedagogical approach will be learning by example and refining in practice.</td>
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<tr>
<th>4. <strong>Information Will Be Maintained in a Single Open ‘Market’</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All pertinent information such as required trade competences, availability of human and material resources, experience opportunities, etc., will be maintained in one ‘market’, accessible to all actual and potential participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) animated by leadership and organized by custom, all of the decisions normally related to training, apprenticeship and recognizing competence in certified trades will be determined by consensus within an open, single market of relevant information;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) notwithstanding the knowledge, skills and attitudes upon which certified trade competences are based, all other decisions related to curriculum, pedagogical approach and organization of instructions will be made by an appropriate group of skilled family/band members and ratified by every family.</td>
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<tr>
<th>5. <strong>Judicial Review Will Maintain Justification, Fairness and Opinio Juris</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All disputes or complaints and of any individual(s) should be resolved in the first instance within the family or the band of families. The final arbitor of all disputes or complaints is the Superior Court of Quebec, under whose protection the legal rights of every individual were placed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) every individual will have easy access to judicial review of any disputes or complaints: within the family, within the band of families, and, in the absence of resolution by the latter, with the Superior Court of Quebec; and,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) in the case of infringement of the freedoms of any individual, family or the band of families, by any external organization or individual, relief should be sought from the Superior Court of Quebec</td>
</tr>
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From Principles to Practice

The practice of customary, spontaneous order must accomplish and maintain two main objectives. First, it must establish and maintain spontaneous order, an endogenous order navigated by values. Those values must be shared Cree values as well as two main Quebec goals—achievement of the knowledge and skills seeking recognition; and the scrupulous use of public funds.

Secondly, and closely related to the first, the practice must always be defensible as fair and justified to both the individuals whose freedoms are engaged and the ‘court of competent jurisdiction’ constitutionally mandated to protect them. Where a potentially coercive force is required, it must be introduced in a fashion not disruptive of spontaneous order, that is, as guide posts rather than as commands. This approach is now a Canadian one. Since the constitutional entrenchment of the rule of law and protection of individual freedoms, Canadian governments (executives and legislatures) are restrained by judicial review. As a result of the frequent review of their behaviour by tribunals and courts, and the latters’ restraint of such behaviour when it is inconsistent with the constitution, a body of unwritten but well known values as to what government can get away with has evolved. The threat of a successful challenge of questionable behaviour being supported by the judiciary, provides internal values or guide posts which navigate government’s use of its coercive powers. At the same time, individuals learn what they may and may not be allowed to do. Subsequently, judicial review is superior to command for promoting and maintaining spontaneous order. Judicial review also safeguards the ‘opinio juris’ which must be clearly evident should a custom or behaviour in accordance with a custom require judicial notice or protection by a court of competent jurisdiction. For the Crees of Waskaganish First Nation, that court is the Superior Court of Quebec. An Aboriginal customary legal system in present-day Rupert’s Land can no longer rely on abandonment or banishment to provide the coercive authority or guide posts needed for protection of its customs. Specifically, it is the opinio juris or social legitimacy of customs that most needs protection. Judicial review is thus important to prevent social legitimacy from becoming disembedded from practices. Accordingly, a Canadian liberal
tradition of judicial review must be adopted in order to 'protect the legal rights of every individual' by protecting the customs that enable rather than shield the individual’s freedoms.

Safeguarding Cree and accepted Quebec values are attended by a further normative advantage. In a customary order, instructors are chosen by their students and maintain their credibility based on respect for their competence and ability to relate well to the student. In such a social order, the relationship between the instructor and student is the complete, albeit voluntary submission of the latter to the former, aptly described by Michael Polanyi in his *Personal Knowledge: Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy*:

> To learn by example is to submit to authority. You follow your master because you trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyze and account in detail for its effectiveness. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated only by a person who surrenders himself to the extent uncritically to the imitation of another. A society which wants to preserve a fund of personal knowledge must submit to tradition. (Polanyi 1964:53)

**Operational Information**

Unlike command authority, such voluntary submission to authority promotes rather than disrupts spontaneous order. To the degree that ‘made’ order depends on the integrity and efficacy of its design, found in its statute and common laws, spontaneous order depends on the integrity and efficacy of a communications network and a freedom of individuals to pursue private interests without supervision or obstruction. Consequently, all information relevant to both public goals and private interests must be readily available in a single ‘market’, such as a CD or website where the information is also in a highly accessible form such as photographs or short movie clips which provide a novice with an overview at the same time as providing a master with a contextual depiction of the subject with all the nuances only a master would know. The public nature of this approach also satisfies the rule of law - “it is possible to foresee with fair certainty how authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge” (Raz 1979:2-3).
The rules or guideposts should also be as accessible and based on public acceptance as a customary approach to achieving public goals through the pursuit of private interests. A loose-leaf operations manual, ratified annually with the community, with version and dates accepted on page margins, downloadable from a website, would assure both accessibility and consensus.

Judicial Review and Reference

There should be judicial review available within each family, band of families and the Quebec Superior Court, easily accessible as needs arise. In order to ensure the principles of a unified market of information as well as a sense of fairness and justification, judicial review should be organized in the same hierarchical order as within a Canadian liberal tradition. In other words, in the event that a complaint or dispute cannot be resolved within a family, either because parties cannot agree or because the issue is important outside the family, the issue should be resolved in the band tribunal. The band referred to here is the band comprised of families, defined by custom, not the band defined and subject to federal and provincial legislation. In the event that a complaint or dispute cannot be resolved by the band tribunal, either because parties cannot agree or because the issue is important outside the band, for example with provincial and federal government, the issue should be resolved in negotiations or by the Quebec Superior Court. Similarly, in order to avoid conflicts, references or important questions to be resolved should be made in advance to family and band tribunals and to the Quebec Superior Court.

Ownership, Administration and Use of Resources

A distinction needs to be made between family and band resources. Facilities and equipment need to be maintained and used in accordance with the customs of both a family and band. Decisions to share, improve or dispose of facilities and equipment must be made within the band, as most negotiating, acquiring and reporting will likely occur between the band, Quebec and Canada. For the same reason, public funding to support training, apprenticeship and examination activities need to be maintained and used in
accordance with the customs of both a family and band. Typically, the norms or
guideposts will be negotiated between the band, Quebec and Canada while the
application of those norms will be determined within a particular family. Naturally, the
terms negotiated between the band, Quebec and Canada must have the consent of the
individuals and families represented.

In those instances where the family and band believe there is value in recognition of
instructors by the Cree School Board, or any other federal or provincial entity, then, the
attendant norms of that organization will be adopted as a limited custom for achieving the
valued purpose. For example, there may not be adequate numbers of English, French,
Physics or Chemistry instructors available to students. In such a case, it may become
necessary to hire or borrow a teacher in a relationship with the Cree School Board,
respecting the salary schedules, work load, etc., of the current collective agreement
between the Cree School Board and the appropriate union. These terms would be treated
as a ‘band custom’ subject to application by family custom within the agreed framework.
Undoubtedly, a director (school principal) and other permanent staff will be required. In
the same manner that conventional administrations must respect the rights of staff,
parents and students and work to the satisfaction of a board in accordance with
commands order; so too, a customary administration must respect the customs of the
families and band allowing staff, parents and students to pursue private interests with
minimal supervision, while respecting public goals and working to the satisfaction of
family and band customs.

The spontaneous approach to training, apprenticeship and recognition within a
certified trade proposed here could easily exist as a program within an existing command
or ‘made’ entity, such as the Cree School Board, Cree Board of Health & Social Services.
The latter entities are creations of provincial and federal legislation. Both the legislatures
and their respective executives are bound by the Constitution Act, 1982, including the
assurances of respect and protection contained in the RL&NWTO, keeping with the
voluntary nature of customary order, the present services of such entities should continue
to exist as alternatives to Crees who have a choice of living according to Canadian (and
Quebec) order or according to Cree order.
Current ‘organized’ approaches to training, apprenticeship and recognition and a spontaneous or customary approach would share the same terminal objectives of preparing a person to prove or demonstrate the same knowledge, skills and attitudes which comprise Canadian industry or trade standards. The main difference between the two approaches would be the style of organization adopted in order to achieve such common terminal objectives. For example, the conventional ‘organized’ approach imposes a common design especially upon learning experiences. The customary approach offers a greater degree of personal freedom as long as the individual accepts the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the group.

This author confidence that such a customary approach is not only possible but also the only consistently reliable one is based on forty years of experience in adapting formal instruction to a customary social organization. To describe in advance what form the ‘reasonable expectations’ or customs might take, risks precluding the voluntary, mutually dependent, co-operative nature of a customary approach. The latter form of democracy requires full participation of all members, not merely their elected representatives; moreover, the absence of a coercive state to enforce custom implies that peace and good order depends on endogenous rather than exogenous pressures. Accordingly, public opinion, mutual dependence and a fear of being left out for ignoring the reasonable expectations of others are the forces upon which customary peace and good order depend. Deciding in advance anything more than the knowledge, skills and attitudes which are certified by provincial authorities, risks undermining or frustrating the endogenous processes upon which customary, spontaneous order depends.

There is not enough space in this thesis for the author to defend or explain customary order or the personal freedom it makes possible to individuals who accept their dependence upon their family and fellow band members. Moreover, customary legal systems have been given a bad reputation by societies that substitute coercive force for opinion juris. But, such societies would not be protected by either the International Court of Justice or Canadian courts as they would fail the common law tests of validity. Rather than a thesis, this author believes what is now needed is an individual invoking the protection of his or her legal rights, according to the RL&NWTO, by the Canadian Court
of competent jurisdiction, as those legal rights are created by customs that can be proven
to exist according to a remarkably well integrated body of British, Canadian and
International common law.

This author believes that any apprehension about potential losses of individual
freedom or the obsolescence of customary law are based on a lack of experience with the
kind of customary order that would achieve judicial notice by Canadian or International
Courts. Ironically, Canadian legal order began as customary order because there were not
the courts, police or prisons to support a statutory order in a vast territory. Since 1982,
and the addition of protection of individual freedoms to the supreme law, Canadian legal
order has evolved once again in a customary direction. Peace and good order are
maintained by the supremacy of 'reasonable expectations' determined by a judiciary.
Canada is no longer governed merely by the statutes preferred by the majority. Although
Canada and the world have seemed to grow smaller, both have at the same time become
much more diverse. Reasonable expectations enunciated by Canadian courts have
increasingly limited government interference with the personal freedoms of citizens.
Canadian citizens have in turn, notwithstanding significant ethical and ethnic differences,
have shown themselves much more sensitive to public opinion, mutual dependence and
more likely to voluntarily obey the reasonable expectations enunciated by Canadian
courts.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION

What Has Been Learned

Already sensitive from previous thesis study, to the need for a thoughtful and deliberate methodology, this author has been even more deeply impressed with the implications which methodology has for the accuracy of information and generalizations generated. The 'thick description', hermeneutics and preoccupation with the motives, intentions, and methods of the subjects being studied articulated by anthropologists, Geertz, Ryle and Hodder corresponds closely with the emergent order sought by political scientists, Hayek, Polanyi and Fuller. Both approaches, anthropological and political science maintain the concern for emergent order based on observable similar facts connected to similar acts supporting a pattern of behaviour are compatible with the common law enunciated by Canadian courts on admissibility of evidence. Especially as related to expert opinion on the behaviour of the Aboriginal inhabitants of Rupert's Land, methods used are incompatible with the common law. Even such giants as Robert Lowie, Julian Steward, Alfred Irving Hallowell or Frank Speck have employed methods which were navigated by current thought within their discipline rather than an generalizations which emerged from participant observation. The hallmark of this methodology is a preoccupation with a subject's difference with Euro-centric norms attended by a corresponding lack of interest in the subject's motives, intentions and own methodology. The myopic labeling of Aboriginals as nomads and the unquestioning acceptance of such expert opinion as fact is the result of circuitous reasoning, deemed poisonous by Binnie J in the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment of R. v. Handy. Without the thick description or the similar facts (not opinions) describing similar acts, the researcher asks and answers his own question and in Binnie J's use of Shakespeare's words, "once dropped like poison in the juror's ear, 'swift as quicksilver it courses through the natural gates and alleys of the body'".

Ethnocentric blindness of Canadian courts and a lack of diligence of legal counsel nurtured a potential calamity of thousands of reversible judgments. This author
discovered that the real architect of this situation, the federal government, has delegated power over Aboriginals to provinces who share a federal interest in extinguishing Aboriginal rights. This delegation has become passive violence because the federal government has at the same time, abdicated its responsibility to protect Aboriginals. This responsibility was clearly articulated for Rupert’s Land, “to respect the legal rights of every individual and place them under the protection of courts of competent jurisdiction”. As this author has demonstrated, that promise survives still, entrenched in Canada’s constitution, supported by ample and unequivocal proof of its true meaning. As a result of such unconstitutional delegation with abdication, Aboriginals are made subject to all of the same laws as other Canadians but with few or none of the usual protection of freedoms. The noticeable disarray and social stress of most Aboriginal communities is more logically attributable to the passive violence they are subject to than to the stereotype of being primitive or nomadic, engineered by government.

As a result of what has been learned, not only about the reverseable errors in fact-finding, the unconstitutional delegation of power with abdication of responsibility and the suppression of the constitutionally entrenched legal rights of every Aboriginal in Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory, neither legislatures nor courts should provide the necessary coercive force for destroying tribal structure as a means to extinguish Aboriginal rights. Moreover, as a result of what has been learned of customary order, Aboriginals in all of Canada should be free to restore the spontaneous order of their families and communities, relying on court protection of their customs, no longer reliant on court discovery of their rights.

Implications for Further Research

Even without the debate of British Parliament in June of 1869, RP1869, or Wolseley’s Proclamation of 1870, there still remains enough unequivocal support, recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. For example, the RP1763, interpreted in accordance with Lord Mansfield’s six principles (see Appendix G), s. 25 and s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provide more than adequate support for a statement of claim for striking out, reading in or reading down any law that is
inconsistent with an individual, a family, a band (in the Aboriginal sense) or a First Nation to live in accordance with custom. Where this author found the greatest need for research was in identifying Aboriginal customs, their practices and their inherent legitimacy to Aboriginals themselves. The disingenuous questions posed by those interested in extinguishing Aboriginal freedoms should be discarded in favour of those questions that will elicit Aboriginal motive, intention and methodology. In this author’s opinion, these latter questions are more likely to contribute useful knowledge to respective disciplines and at the same time provide the authentic assistance to Canadian courts that is expected of expert witnesses.

This study’s critique of authoritative historical description of Canada’s first few decades, especially in revelation of documents and events suppressed by powerful interests, implies that future historical research would do well to apply the same values of thick description, emergent order and similar fact standards for admitting character evidence. Moreover, the common law’s scepticism of admitting the writings of others without presentation of a factual foundation is vindicated by this study.

Having accomplished the aim of this study, this author now intends to pursue the further research required to implement customary remedies. Supported by the knowledge of Canadian and international civil procedure required for seeking judicial notice of custom, this author would next like to explore the instrumentality and inherent legitimacy of those Aboriginal customs that will be needed for restoring much needed composure to Aboriginal lives.
APPENDIX A

INDIAN & NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA
Staff

Although in Canada's constitution, s. 91(24), the federal government has power to regulate Indians and Indian Lands, and an attendant responsibility to protect Aboriginals (Indians) and their lands, it is obvious that it is organized to litigate against or impose treaties on Aboriginals in order to extinguish their rights. The Auditor General of Canada drew attention to this in her Report of the Auditor General of Canada – April 2000:

...many departmental regions interpret their major role as that of providing a funding service. Only one of seven regional offices maintains an education program; however, even there, the major priority is to negotiate and provide educational funding. [para. 4.33, pg. 4-11]:

The following Indian & Northern Affairs, Ottawa legal staff list was composed using the contact information available through Public Works Canada's Directory. Indian & Northern Affairs does not offer such a list or an organigram to the public

Indian & Northern Affairs, Ottawa, Headquarters Staff Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clerk</th>
<th>Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>Administrator/Registrar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>Chief or A/Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>Coordinator or A/Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receptionist</td>
<td>Deputy or A/Deputy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Director or A/Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Executive +</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/Paralegal</td>
<td>Manager or A/Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counsel (Lawyer)</td>
<td>Project Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Assistance</td>
<td>Sr., A/Sr., Senior, or A/Senior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paralegal</td>
<td>Supervisor or A/Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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**Indian & Northern Affairs, Ottawa, Headquarters Staff Summary (cont’d)**

Management

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Technical</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst</td>
<td>Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Various Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professionals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher or Research Officer</td>
<td>Total 340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Headquarters Staff: 2196**

---

**INDIAN & NORTHERN AFFAIRS EDUCATION STAFF**

**Headquarters Educational Staff**

**Socio-Economic & Regional Operations**

- Director General
- Sr Policy Manager
- Sr. Analyst-Records Consultant
- Administrative Assistant
- Executive Assistant

**Education Policy & Planning**

- Director
- Policy Analyst
- Administrative Assistant
- Senior Policy Analyst
- Policy Analyst

**First Nation Education System Development**

- Sr Program Analyst
- Policy Officer
- A/Director
- Policy Analyst
- Policy Analyst

**Alberta Region Educational Staff**

Corporate Services

- Data Collections, Processing & Analysis
  - Education Clerk

First Nations Relations, Treaty 6

Field Operational Services
  - Education Officer

First Nations Relations, Treaty 7

Field Operational Services
  - Education Officer

First Nations Relations, Treaty 8

Field Operational Services
  - Education Officer

Operational Program & Policy

- Education Officer
- A/Education Policy Officer
- Special Education Officer
- Education Officer
Content of Individual Freedoms Protected by Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essentials of early constitutional conditioning</th>
<th>the fundamental kinds of body-training habits such as digesting, evacuating, sleeping, using energy and relaxing; also mental sets such as friendliness, suspicion, curiosity, enjoyment, worry, fear.</th>
<th>s. 7 Life, liberty and security of person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essentials of organic maintenance</td>
<td>materials, techniques, and ideas which a people count vital to their physical survival, e.g., staple foods, medicines, some aspects of clothing, housing, transport. An innovation here must usually be immediately demonstrable as a superior substitute.</td>
<td>s. 7 Life, liberty and security of person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essentials of communication</td>
<td>verbal and other techniques by which people share meanings and so organize and transmit experience.</td>
<td>s. 2 Freedom of thought, religion and speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essentials of primary group relations or societal security</td>
<td>the face-to-face social structure of age, generation, sex, child-rearing group, work organization, and any closely interdependent kinsmen or others beyond these.</td>
<td>s. 7 Life, liberty and security of person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essentials for the maintenance of high prestige status</td>
<td>elements vital to established superior statuses and roles, &quot;vested interests,&quot; entrenched authority, especially of ascribed character. At least persistence shows among their beneficiaries.</td>
<td>s. 7 Life, liberty and security of person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essentials of territorial security</td>
<td>vital interests of living space and resource control and associated in-group loyalty and political authority.</td>
<td>s. 7 Life, liberty and security of person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essentials of ideological security</td>
<td>basic intellectual and religious assumptions and interpretations as to existence, power, providence, mortality, welfare, and attendant emotional tensions. Perhaps most consistently stable have been those beliefs and behaviours which become active at times of extreme crisis or insecurity, as with natural calamity, accident, sickness, death and disposal of the dead, or the spiritual threat of pollution, as with black magic. (Keesing 1958:411-412)</td>
<td>s. 2 Freedom of thought, religion and speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s. 7 Life, liberty and security of person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HANSARD'S
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,
THIRD SERIES:
COMMENCING WITH THE ACCESSION OF
WILLIAM IV.

32° VICTORIÆ, 1868-9.

VOL. CXCVI.

COMPRISING THE PERIOD FROM
THE THIRD DAY OF MAY 1869,
to
THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF JUNE 1869.

Third Volume of the Session

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY CORNELIUS BUCK,
AT THE OFFICE FOR "HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,
23, PATERNOSTER ROW. [H.C.]
1869.
HOUSE OF COMMONS,
Tuesday, 1st June, 1869.

MINUTES.—Serjeant—considered in Committee
Resolution (May 31) reported — Exchequer
Books (£3,500,000).
Finance Bills — Second Reading—Poor Relief
(Ireland) Act (1862) Amendment * [117];
Oxford University Statutes * [134].
Considered as amended — Beehouses, &c. *
[114-141].
Third Reading — Norfolk Island Bishopric *
[104]; Customs and Inland Revenue Duties *
[133], and passed.

CIVIL OFFICES PENSIONS BILL.

Mr. FAWCETT said, he would beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, whether it will be possible for a person deriving a pension, either from the Indian or Colonial Revenues, at the same time to receive a pension under the Civil Offices Pensions Bill; and, if so, whether it is the intention of the Government to meet such a case by introducing a new Clause upon the Report of this Bill?

Mr. GLADSTONE, in reply, said, his hon. Friend would perceive, from Clause 6 of the Bill, that its intention was to impose a stringent limitation upon the receipts of these political pensions. He did not think the restrictions in the Bill would apply to Indian and colonial pensions. He proposed, therefore, to reconsider the question, and to insert a clause which would be uniform in its application, as the circumstances connected with the two cases were entirely different. He begged, therefore, to move the postponement of the Order for Consideration till Monday next.

TAXES ON SERVANTS.—QUESTION.

Viscount GALWAY said, he would beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether, under the Customs and Inland Revenue Duties Bill, a farm servant living in the house of his employer will be liable to be taxed to the amount of fifteen shillings?

The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER replied that living in the house made no difference. A farm servant or labourer employed solely in that capacity would not make his master liable to the tax by living in the house; but if he were employed in any of the capacities mentioned in the Bill, the fact that he was a farm servant would not secure his master exemption.

Viscount GALWAY said, he wished to ask, whether the farm servant living in the House would become an under-gardener if he were occasionally employed in the garden?

The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, that point involved the question of skilled labour. If the man worked as a gardener his master would become liable; if he worked only as a labourer no liability would be incurred.

BRITISH COLUMBIA.

MOTION FOR PAPERS.

Sir HARRY VERNEY rose to call attention to the result of the negotiations of the Government with the Hudson's Bay Company and the Government of Canada. The most opposite accounts as to the value of the territories of that Company are to be found in the Papers presented to Parliament. In some it had been stated that the territory between Lake Superior and the Rocky Mountains consisted entirely of uninhabitable regions frozen during half the year, where cereals could not grow, and where settling, without costly protection, was impossible owing to the cannibality of the Indians; but others, disinterested and conversant with the facts, stated that the country west of Lake Superior was likely to become of very high importance and value; that large portions of the district were very fertile and capable of producing cereals; and that the Indians were friendly, thanks to the fair dealing of the Company, and ready to work for adequate remuneration. The approach to the Rocky Mountains from Lake Superior was said to be excellent—travellers from the East could tell when they had reached the height of land between the Atlantic and the Pacific only by the flow of the water to the West, so gradual was the ascent, and it would be an easy thing to make land and water communication between Lake Superior and the Rocky Mountains. But as these points were in dispute he desired to have the authoritative statement of the Under Secretary for the Colonies upon them. Up to this time there had been a friendly feeling between the Hudson's Bay Company and the Indians, for both had
the same interest, and both desired that the land should be the resort of the trapper and the hunter; but it was not certain that when Canadians and Americans and our own countrymen resorted to the purpose of settling that the Indians would view the newcomers with favour. Arrangements ought to be made for respecting native rights, and regulating their legal position and dealings with the Europeans. It was certain that the Americans had an eye to the country. They had sent Commissioners thither, who had declared that out of the Hudson's Bay territory four or five first-class American States might be formed. It was also alleged that the Commissioners said that it was a country worth fighting for, and had made some offer which had been entertained by the authorities of the United States. If the favourable reports which had reached us were true, this vast territory might afford a solution of some of the difficulties which created anxiety among us from time to time. It was stated on high authority that there was landed there a territory extensive and fertile enough to maintain a population as large as that of England and Wales, and that railway communication might easily be established. It was of great importance that encouragement should be given to the commerce of Europe and Asia passing through British territory; and he entertained a hope that we might yet see that country inhabited by an industrious, well-conducted population, which might spread the honour and the influence of England. There was a class of politicians who were of opinion that our enemies were of no value to us. To that opinion he could not subscribe. He held that they greatly enhanced our power, our influence, and our ability to do good to the world. Those who had never left their own home were little aware how affectionately the old country was viewed by some of those who had located themselves in America and other of our possessions, and how jealous these people were with regard to all that affected the honour and the welfare of this country. He entertained sanguine hopes that rapid communication might be established in a short time with Vancouver's Island and with British Columbia. That district contained a great amount of mineral wealth, but in the mining part sufficient food could not be grown for those who arrived there. On the one side of the Rocky Mountains, however, there were millions of acres which might be cultivated, and which would afford food to those who worked for the mines to the west. He trusted the Government of Canada would take up this question in the way it ought to be viewed, and that the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies would be able to inform the House that the Parliament and Government of Canada, as well as the authorities of British Columbia, and the Hudson's Bay Company had come to some agreement, so that those vast territories might be utilized. He begged to move for any Papers on the union of British Columbia with the Dominion of Canada.

Mr. R. N. FOWLER, in seconding the Motion, said, he would take that opportunity of making an appeal on behalf of the Indians resident in the Hudson's Bay territory. The Hudson's Bay Company had never recognized the Indian title; but as they had never been a colonizing company, and had always discouraged colonization, that was not, practically, a point of great importance. The question now, however, was about to assume a different aspect; we were going to annex that country to Canada, and we all hoped that colonization would go on. Under these circumstances it was most important that the question affecting the Indians should be carefully considered both by the Home and Colonial Government. On this point he might quote the words of his right hon. friend Professor Hinde, who said that when he asked an Ojibbeway chief at the Lake of the Woods whether he would permit one of his tribe to guide him through a swampy district, said—"It is hard to deny your request; but we see how the Indians are treated far away. The white man comes, looks at their places, their trees, and their rivers; others soon follow; the lands of the Indians pass from their hands, and they have nowhere a home." Such was, he could not help thinking, a very natural feeling on the part of the Indian; looking at the way in which colonization had driven the Indians into the far West in other parts of the American continent. A Petition of Indian chiefs was presented to that House in 1850. The petitioners complained that the Hudson's Bay Company had sold their lands in
In this case, it's interesting to note that the author of the document has used a combination of quote and citation sources to support their arguments. The first quote is from Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., who famously said, "In a sense we have, come full circle, back to our own footsteps. Indeed, we are quite correct in saying that we have come full circle, but the circle is a closed one." This quote is a strong statement about the cyclical nature of history and the need for continued reflection and progress.

The second quote is from a U.S. Supreme Court decision that reads, "We are not above the law and we are not above the Constitution. We are called upon to interpret the Constitution and its amendments, and to apply them to the case before us on the basis of that law as we understand it." This quote highlights the importance of legal precedent and the role of the judiciary in upholding the law and the Constitution.

These quotes serve to reinforce the author's argument, which is likely focused on the importance of understanding the past to shape the future. The author is probably making a case for the need for continued reflection on past events and the ways in which they have shaped our present society. The combination of quote and citation sources helps to lend credibility to the author's arguments and to provide a nuanced view of the topic at hand.
ber for Buckingham (Sir Harry Verney) and that they would not be deterred from doing so by the alarm of the hon. Member who had spoken last.

Colonel SYKES said he was much disposed to sympathize in the alarm of the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Mr. Ayton) as to guarantees. We were now pledged to thirteen or fourteen guarantees and were obliged to pay the interest on some of them to parties to whom those guarantees were given being unable to do so, and ultimately we might be obliged to pay the capital. The extension of the guarantee system was highly inexpedient, mischievous, and contrary to the wishes of a great part of the people of this country. As to a short and direct route to China through the Rocky Mountains or through Canada, he was afraid the views of the hon. Member for Perth (Mr. Kinnaird) were a little visionary.

Mr. B. SAMUELSON urged that it was impossible for them to be too jealous about guarantees, and submitted that the case of India could not be justly quoted as a precedent in the case under consideration. In India, our dominion being despotic, we were directly responsible for the good government and for the development of that country. But the case was altogether different in respect to any of our Anglo-Saxon colonies. The time had come when we ought to endeavour to free ourselves as much as possible from any expenditure on behalf of those colonies. They were well able to take care of themselves; and the labouring man out there earned a much larger income, with no more fatigue, than his fellow-subjects of the same grade in the mother country. The hon. Baronet (Sir Harry Verney) had given a very fair account of the country in respect of which we might be hereafter called upon to incur great expense. It appeared that we knew very little about the country, except that it contained a tract of fertile land about the size of these kingdoms. That of course could not be compared with the vast tracts of land which our own countrymen were cultivating in the Western States of America. The question which the hon. Baronet had brought forward might be extremely interesting to the Canadian Parliament or the Royal Geographical Society; but in his opinion the House of Commons ought not to give itself too much concern about it. The more we considered our position with regard to Canada, the more we should be led to hope that the bonds between Canada and this country might be still further loosened, and that Canada might ultimately become entirely independent of the mother country. We ought to be especially careful to keep clear of all difficulties in connection with Canada, not only on account of the proximity of that colony to the United States, but also because we had not found in our North American fellow-subjects any great disposition to be grateful for our interference with their affairs. Within the last few Sessions, Petitions had been presented from Nova Scotia to that House, and powerfully supported by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, complaining that that colony had not been consulted on the subject of the consolidation of the Dominion of Canada. The prayer of those Petitions was supported by politicians of mark in the colony, and yet in a short time these very men turned completely round, and now approved the arrangements which were then entered into. We had, in fact, no sure means of ascertaining the real state of public opinion in the colonies, and therefore the less we meddled with questions of this kind the better. It was evident that our connection with Canada could only be a source of anxiety both to the Canadians and ourselves. In the event of a dispute with the United States, we should not be able to render the Canadians prompt and efficient assistance, and they would therefore have to bear the brunt of the war. The more attempt on our part, fruitless as it was, to defend Canada would involve an expense during the present year of £300,000 sterling, and if the cost of stores, the transport of troops, and all the items of the non-effective service were added, the total cost would be nearly double the amount he had mentioned. If war broke out between this country and the United States to-morrow, every soldier in the Dominion would probably be taken prisoner if he were not speedily withdrawn. He was glad the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Mr. Ayton) had called attention to the possibility of our being called upon to give guarantees on behalf of some scheme of communication which might be hereafter proposed; and he trusted the right
able authority on the subject, the authority of Colonel Palliser, who was sent out specially to investigate the matter, and the high authority of the noble Lord the Member for West Yorkshire (Viscount Milton) who had written a most interesting volume with respect to that country. They stated, and the statement was simply confirmed, that there were millions of acres of the very richest land, producing several products which in this country we could not produce—maize, for instance, and wheat—in the greatest abundance, and that there was, besides, the most excellent meadow land and grass land, and that in every way the country was one that invited colonization. But there was another reason why there could be no doubt at all on the subject. The neighbouring territory of Minnesota was on the average less fertile than the Red River Settlement, and proved what could be done by a few years by the exertions of energetic men. The point was one, indeed, upon which it was rather painful for us to reflect. When the present subject had been brought before the House, some twenty years ago, for the first time in recent years, by his noble Friend the late Duke of Newcastle, there were in Minnesota only 2,000 inhabitants, while there were now 400,000. There were also 502 manufacturing establishments there; more than 500 miles of railway constructed or in the course of construction; and in a very short time the prominent parts of the State would be brought into communication by railway with Chicago. Contrast that state of things with the position of the Hudson's Bay territory. In its case there had been no advance, or, at all events, a very small advance in population; there had been no colonization and no progress of any kind. The absence of any system of government in the Hudson's Bay territory had also, he might add, led to very serious international complications. In 1864, the inhabitants of the Red River Settlement, in order to obtain protection against the Indians, were obliged to ask the American Government to send troops to take care of them. In 1867, an application was made by the American Government for permission to send American troops into the Hudson's Bay territory for the purpose of protecting it being made a resort by Indians who were carrying on war against the Government of the United States. Not only, therefore, colonial, but Imperial interests were mixed up in the matter; for it was not desirable that there should be any portion of Her Majesty's dominions in which she should not be able to preserve law and order, or do that which was necessary to keep on terms of amity with a neighbouring State. His hon. Friend had asked him a question with respect to British Columbia. There had been several indications by means of public meetings and by addresses to the Legislature, of a great desire on the part of the inhabitants of British Columbia to become connected with the Dominion of Canada. The most recent information was to the effect that they had undergone a change in that respect; but whether they had changed their minds or not, he was quite sure they would change them back again, for it was perfectly obvious that it was a matter of great advantage of British Columbia to be connected with Canada, and that the rich valley of the Saskatchewan was almost a necessary complement to her territory. There was in British Columbia vast mineral wealth, and also in Vancouver's Island the finding of coal was going on very rapidly. Of that fact there could be no better proof than that the dividends of the Vancouver's Coal Company had risen from 2 or 3 to 20 per cent, at which price they stood at present. In Vancouver's Island, too, and in Queen Charlotte's Island, the best coal of the whole state could be found which could be found in that part of the Pacific—a matter of great importance in the development of the resources of a country. The proposal which had been made by his noble Friend (Earl Granville), and which had been accepted by the Hudson's Bay Company, and which he hoped and believed would be accepted by the Canadian Government, would, of course, in no way touch British Columbia. This question, so far as it affected them, the inhabitants of British Columbia would have to decide for themselves; but the Government would afford them every facility should they wish to join the Dominion of Canada, and he entertained very little doubt that they would very soon adopt that course. The subject to which his hon. Friend had called attention was one which had now been under the notice of the Government for many
years. Ever since the Committee of 1827 successive Governments had endeavoured to arrange terms between the Canadian Government and the Hudson's Bay Company. It had been held that that was the only true solution of the question and the only way of opening the Hudson's Bay territory to civilization. When, however, the present Government came into Office they were in a state of despair in the matter. In a letter dated the 9th of February last Sir George Cartier, addressing his noble Friend (Earl Granville), expressed it to be his opinion that no money which might be offered by either the Canadian or the Imperial Government, and which they might deem reasonable, would be accepted by the Hudson's Bay Company. His noble Friend, however, was not discouraged, and the result of the negotiations had been the success which he had to state to the House. His hon. Friend took a great interest in the guarantee, and asked whether any promise of a guarantee had been given. There was an engagement that a sum of £800,000 which was to be paid by Canada to the Hudson's Bay Company was to be guaranteed; but that matter would be brought before the House, and the fullest opportunity of discussing it would be afforded. His hon. Friend had unintentionally misrepresented the steps which had been taken by the Canadian Government with regard to the money raised under the guarantee given two or three years ago. His statement, as he understood it, was that the Canadian Government had appropriated that money to the payment of certain debts of the Dominion. What, however, they had really done was, that, finding they had £1,300,000 which had been raised under the guarantee at a very low rate of interest, and that they were paying a very high interest for debts due by the Dominion, they paid off those debts with the money, securing at the same time by means of the credit which they had with Messrs. Glyn and Baring for £250,000, and another credit they had with the Montreal Bank, that when the money was required for the purposes of the railway it should be immediately forthcoming. He did not express any opinion upon the matter; but it was due to the Canadian Government to say that the true facts of the case should go forth, and that it should not be supposed that they had deliberately taken the money to pay the debts of the Canadians. He felt with his hon. Friend (Mr. Fowler) that they had a duty to perform with regard to the Indians, and he might say that the Hudson's Bay Company had always discharged that duty in a way that reflected the highest credit upon them. The Government had communicated their opinion upon this to the Canadian Government, and had expressed their conviction that the Canadian Government would not forget to bestow due care upon the Indians. He believed that this was a perfectly wise course to take, and they had received the assurance of those distinguished men who had negotiated the matter that the rights of the Indians should be carefully attended to. He thought that it was better to rely upon the Canadian Government to pursue the same course of conduct which they had hitherto pursued towards the Indians in their own dominion, rather than endeavour to bind them down by any stringent conditions. He hoped the proposed arrangement would be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, because he believed that it would result in the great territory of the Hudson's Bay Company being civilised by colonisation, and that it would be beneficial to Canada and to the honour of the British Empire. There would be no objection to produce the Papers.

Mr. STAFFORD NORTHCOSE wished to say a few words in consequence of an observation made by the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies, and which, he thought, was open to be understood in a way not intended by the right hon. Gentleman himself. Speaking of the country in question, the right hon. Gentleman said that there were fine territories, which were capable of development, but that civilization and colonisation had been hitherto excluded from them by a fur-trading company. No doubt the expression was not used to cast blame upon the Hudson's Bay Company, but still it might lead to misunderstanding. It was quite true that a very appreciable proportion of this enormous district was, by its natural advantages of soil and climate, capable of sustaining a large population—that was to say, it would yield a very considerable produce. This, however, was not all that
was required to render a country capable of settlement by colonization. It was also required that there should be convenient means of access; and, moreover, it was required, when settlers were invited to go to a territory, that they should be certain that when they got there they would have the advantage of a regular form of government; that they would have protection, and the means of carrying on their affairs. Until a comparatively recent period this had not been the case with the territory to which reference had been made, and that, not owing to any fault on the part of the Company, but owing to the comparatively slow progress of the neighbouring countries. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Monsell) had contrasted Minnesota with the Red River Settlement, but it should be borne in mind that Minnesota had immediate connection with the United States, and the population had been advancing to Minnesota with comparative ease; whereas to get to the Red River Settlement a very difficult country had to be traversed. There was also the question as to what was to be the position of the settlers when they did get there. In Minnesota there could be no difficulty, for the American Constitution provided for the case; but with regard to the Red River Territory there was a difficulty because of the peculiar position and powers of the Company. It was a Company which had been formed for the purposes of trade; it had certain rights, and powers to administer government, but those rights were very imperfect, and it was improbable that a proper settlement of territory could be made unless the powers of the Company were extended, or unless the Imperial Government took the matter in hand, and formed a colony there; or lastly, unless there were some arrangement for annexing the territory to a British colony. The administrators of the Hudson's Bay Company had always expressed themselves ready to aid the Government in the adoption of any measures which might be taken for the settlement of that portion of their territory capable of settlement; but there was an enormous tract of country which never could be made suitable for settlement, and in which the fur trade would continue to be carried on. The directors of the Hudson's Bay Company had always been ready to co-operate with the Imperial Government; but the uncertainty which had existed during the last or seven years in relation to the proposed Confederation of the American Provinces had kept things back. And further, it was at the request of the Imperial Government that the Hudson's Bay Company had abstained from coming to arrangements to develop the country, and they were very pleased to find that arrangements were now being made to open up the country. They thought that it was far better that those arrangements should be made through the instrumentality of the Government than by giving to the Company a character that would be foreign to them, or than by the Government establishing a Crown colony, though something might be said for this latter course. Those who were best informed were convinced that it would be for the advantage of Canada that she should have this territory connected with her, and at the same time he believed that such an arrangement would be the best for this country, and the best calculated to develop the territory of the Company. Feeling that this was a matter in which the honour and interests of the Imperial Government were concerned, he thought that the Government should facilitate the arrangements which Canada was making, and which arrangements would tend to relieve this country of responsibility. For instance, there was this question of our relations with the Indians, in which we should be relieved of responsibility. The Hudson's Bay Company had always done the best they could to preserve the Indian tribes with whom they came into communication. They had done a good deal to prevent the introduction of spirits, and had done other things to promote the welfare of the tribes. He believed that it was owing to the great skill with which the noble Lord (Earl Granville) had managed this matter that there was a chance of a satisfactory settlement. No doubt that when the question of guarantee was raised in such a form as that it could be discussed in that House the matter would be more thoroughly gone into; but at present he would content himself with thanking the Government, and more especially the noble Lord (Earl Granville), for the patience with which they had dealt with the matter, and in their not having despai red of the settlement when there seemed very little hope.
of its being brought about. He felt certain he was only correctly representing what was the right hon. Gentleman's meaning in saying that he (Mr. Munsell) had no intention of casting any reflection on the Hudson's Bay Company.

Mr. MUNSSELL said, that his right hon. Friend was correct in assuming that it was not his intention to cast any reflections on the Company.

Viscount BURY said, he had taken for many years past great interest in this territory. He had not anticipated any discussion on the Motion before the House, because he had understood that the Papers asked for would be presented, and he believed that little now remained beyond expressing satisfaction at the termination of a long and tedious dispute that had for years existed. In spite of what had fallen from the right hon. Baronet the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote), he maintained that the Hudson's Bay Company had shut up the territory from any possibility of development, and had kept it entirely to themselves. He was glad that this peaceable solution had been brought about, and had it been otherwise he should have been prepared to argue that the claims of the Hudson's Bay Company were untenable and indefensible. He trusted the Canadian Government would see that they were incurring great responsibility by throwing obstacles in the way of a peaceable solution of the difficulty. They were, no doubt, of opinion that the rights of the Hudson's Bay Company, if they existed, had been very much exaggerated; and they might perhaps think it unfair that the £300,000 which they were called upon to pay should come out of their pockets, or be a charge upon them. As one who agreed with the Canadians in the main, he nevertheless trusted that they would not raise such an objection, but that they should take the long tenure of the Hudson's Bay Company as a guarantee that their rights did exist in some way or another. At all events, if he were a member of the Canadian House of Assembly, he would not raise such an objection, but would accept the settlement now arrived at as the best that could be devised. The right hon. Baronet who had just sat down had pleaded very strongly in favour of the Company, and he seemed to argue that the Company had done the best they could for the Indians. He (Viscount Bury) did not think that was the case. The Hudson's Bay Company, of course, wanted people to procure the furs for them, and for this purpose they employed the aborigines. But they took little care of them. They always discouraged any attempt to educate the Indians, and the backwardness of the country was entirely due to the course they pursued. As the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government said some years since, they placed a "No Thoroughfare" board at the entrance to their dominions, and prohibited all access to them. There was enough fertile land to afford a farm and homestead for every man, woman, and child in the British dominions, and it was that which they were about to obtain for the £300,000 to which allusion had been made. The only way into it had been through the Red River, and there the Hudson's Bay Company established a military post for the purpose of cutting off communication with the interior. That post was established in 1812 by Lord Selkirk to prevent the North-west and Canadian Companies' hunters from entering the Hudson's Bay territories, who interfered with their fur-bearing animals, and that post had been maintained ever since. So far, however, from the establishment of that post being a friendly act towards the Indians, he regarded it solely as showing that the Company had determined to hold the territory as long as they could. The hon. Member for Banbury (Mr. B. Samuelson) had expressed a doubt whether emigration could be attracted into this country—because the tide of emigration was exclusively turned towards the United States—from their being no access to this land. He (Viscount Bury) hoped that now easy access would be given to the interior, in which case there would be as vast and as rapid a tide of British emigration into that country as there now was into the West of the United States. A man when he landed in America was forwarded on to the fertile prairies of the West, but if he went to Canada he had to hew down a vast forest before he could plant his first crop. A man did not like to encounter such labour and toil when he knew that by going a little south of the 49th parallel he came on a vast tract of prairie land, where he could at once commence his ploughing and sowing operations, and in the course
of a year reap a harvest. If Canada
did her duty—as he was sure she would—they would have a fair and free access
to land as fertile as that which was so
generally sought after in the United
States. No man who had not seen this
country could form any conception what
wealth nature had placed there. A great
deal had been said about the barrenness
of the country. It had been compared
to Siberia and the rocky regions around
the North Pole. Some portions, un-
doubtedly, were inaccessible to coloniza-
tion; but others were equal to any part
of Europe in the abundance of crops
that they offered in return for moderate
labour and moderate tillage. He hoped,
too, that by-and-by we should through
this territory have an excellent route to our
possessions in the East; and he believed
that within the lifetime of many
now living there would be established,
by ship, canal, railroad, and telegraph,
direct communication between the At-
lantic and the Pacific. The navigation
required improvement he believed only
in three places in order to admit of their
taking a ship straight from England to the
West Coast of the Rocky Mountains with-
out discharging cargo. The land, too,
could be easily adapted to the laying of
railways, as the gradients to be overcome
were very few and very slight. The
enterprise was a magnificent one in an
engineering point of view, but apprehen-
sion of this enterprise. He believed that it could
never be a good commercial speculation,
since being constructed in part upon the
slopes of the Sierra Nevada, it could not
be worked during some months in winter.
Another line somewhat lower down had
been designed, but not yet constructed,
and, if carried out, this, he believed,
would be a route in every way suited to
the traffic of which he had spoken. But
there was another line passing through
Canada, and lying, as it were, ready to
our hands, and our Canadian fellow-
subjects were not the men to let slip an
opportunity of improving it. Having
held the office of superintendent-
general of the Indian tribes during the
time that he was in Canada, he had to a
certain extent studied the Indian question
and felt considerably interested in it. He
hoped the Government would not fall into
mistakes similar to those which had been
committed on former occasions. The
practice of setting aside reserves of land
for Indians he believed to be an erro-
rous policy; for if the lands were well
placed, and suitable for purposes of set-
tlement, in time they became mere baits
to attract the cupidity of squatters, who
must be displaced in favour of the In-
dians if faith were to be kept with them.
There had been a precedent illustrated
already of the mode in which engage-
ments entered into with the Indians had
been dealt with. When the lands were
taken from the Indians and apportioned
among the settlers the Indians were pro-
mised British protection, and told in the
figurative language of their own treaties,
that as long as grass grew and water
ran they should receive certain annual
presents from the British Government.
These were given to them for many
years, till a time came when the British
Government grew tired of the payments,
and, supposing, apparently, that, being
savages, they were incapable, as a race,
of civilization, proceeded to act upon the
principle that the faith of treaties need
not be kept up with them. At the time
when he himself was in Office he was in-
structed, as his predecessor had also
been, to prepare a scheme by which,
once for all, those promises of the
British Government should be discon-
tinued. They had been discontinued,
and a great breach of faith with the
Indians had been committed. It was
one of those things that were gone
and past, but he could not, when he
looked back, but lament that he had
been often asked by the Indians them-
se1ves, whether their great mother across
the Atlantic—as they called the Queen
—really knew of the fraud which, they
said, had been committed upon the
children of those who had faithfully
served her fathers in former years. This
question was one which he could not
answer, and he had felt the shame of
being obliged to hold his tongue before
these untutored savages. He hoped that
we should avoid these errors in future,
and, while extending to the Indians the
protection of British Law, we should no
longer keep them under perpetual tut-
lage, teaching them to look to the Go-

cernment for the food they ate and the
plough they tilled the land with. We
had made the property of the Indians
not that of the individual, but of the
tribe; we had made them incapable of
being sold for debt, incapable of even
running up a tavern score. He himself
had seen a new plough left in the soil,
a new seine left on the bank of the river, simply because no one was responsible for the care of their implements, which belonged to the tribe. Had the Government acted towards them on a different principle, the Methodists— who were by far the best missionaries— would soon have taught them the values and the duty of protecting property. Some of the native Indians were quite capable of civilization—he had known one who was a barrister, and a very able one, too—but he was bound to confess that, as a general rule, they were not up to the mark of the average of the population. In Lower Canada they were more nearly on a level as regards intelligence, but in Upper Canada the comparison was not quite fair, for the average intelligence there was much greater than amongst the rest of the population. The repugnance in point of language between the Indians and the English-speaking population was the real difficulty in the way of the progress of the tribes. He would not discuss the question of the rights of the Hudson’s Bay Company. If they were merely sitting round a table, some one possibly might advance the opinion that the Company had no rights at all; but he thought it most undesirable that any such question should be raised, and he conjured the Government to let it alone. He could not sit down without protesting against the death that had been thrown out by some hon. Members in the course of this debate, as to the loyalty of the Canadians and their attachment to the Queen and British institutions. Putting the matter on the lowest ground of self-interest, he could see no reason why the Canadians should wish to join the Confederacy of the United States. Why should they who possessed complete autonomy, be anxious to throw themselves in the arms of that democracy? The yoke of the Queen did not press heavily upon the Canadians, and they escaped from finding themselves every four years involved in the throes of what resembled the sublimated essence of a general election—the election of a President,—which was no sooner decided than they were thrown afresh into the turmoil of canvassing for his successor. Canada, moreover, in place of diminishing her taxation, by joining the United States, would have to take over a share of the existing debt. On the other hand, by remaining as she was, with one half of the continent of America in her hands, her future prospects were not inferior to those of the United States. The Canadians had been brought up under the British flag—they were attached to our form of government—they revered our beloved Queen, and he was persuaded that nothing would induce them to change the form of government under which they had commenced such a happy era of prosperity.

Mr. ELlice concurred to the fullest extent in all that his noble Friend (Viscount Bury) had asserted respecting the loyalty of the Canadians, but wished that even a part of his great expectations, as to the future progress of the North-west territory, might be fulfilled. He thought that the Government had taken a proper step in the settlement they had made with the Hudson’s Bay Company. He agreed that a trading company was the worst possible body to do the work of colonization; but, at the same time, he did not think that the past management of the Hudson’s Bay Company had been open to all the criticisms of his noble Friend. The North-west territory was the only British colony where there had been a considerable expenditure of British capital, which had not cost the taxpayers of this country a single sixpence. With respect to the Indians, it was of the interest of the Company to keep them at all costs. They were influenced by no other motive, to nurse and to maintain them; and it was perfectly well known that if the Company were to be withdrawn tomorrow from that territory, the Indians would starve. They had given up their primitive habits in hunting for the service of the Company, and by the Company they were supported. He agreed with the noble Lord that reserves were of no use for the Indians. It was useless to shun the fact that the Indians and civilization were incompatible with one another, and that, as civilization advanced, so, in Canada, as in the United States, the Indians would disappear. As long, however, as the Hudson’s Bay Company existed, as a fur-trading company, they could not do without the Indians; and it was to that Company that the House must trust for their future protection and maintenance. With respect to the settlement proposed by the Colonial Office, it was, upon the whole, fair and equitable,

Viscount Bury
and beneficial to this country; because, as long as there was an independent territory in America having no means of protecting itself, and claiming protection from this country, there was always an element of danger in the connection. Now that it was united to Canada, the Government of that country must take charge of it, and this country would cease to be responsible. He trusted that the Colonial Office had received a guarantee from the Colonial Government for the establishment of a proper Government in the Red River territory. He thought it wise on the part of the Colonial Office to give the guarantee of £300,000, if it succeeded in effecting a settlement with the Hudson's Bay Company, and relieving this country of all responsibility with regard to the settlement; but the Colonial Office ought to insist that a Government should be placed by Canada in the Red River to enforce the law, and maintain good order in the settlement.

Sir CHARLES DILKE said, that as the House might not have another opportunity of discussing this question, he was anxious to make a reply to one or two of the points raised by the noble Lord (Viscount Bury). When the noble Lord represented it to be a matter of vital importance that there should be a communication through the British territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and drew an analogy with the case of the United States, he (Sir Charles Dilke) desired to point out that this communication—in the case of the United States—was mainly established for political, and not for commercial reasons; whereas, in the case of Canada, if the consideration there was also political, then it was for the consideration of the Colonial and not of the Home Government; or, if it was to be alleged that the through communication was desirable for commercial purposes, then he took exception to that statement altogether. In the first place, the American line had got the start; and further, he was convinced that no line of railway, whether English or American, could ever compete, in the China and India trade, with water carriage. The main articles of that trade were tea and silks, and both suffered great damage from repeated transhipments. The time occupied by the journey was of no great importance, but it was strictly necessary to avoid the four shipments and transhipments that would be needed if the goods were sent from the Pacific to the Atlantic by land. It might, perhaps, be said that the railway was required for the purpose of opening up the country to emigration from England, but he much doubted the truth of that representation, because European emigrants generally remained in the cities and large towns, and the natives, whose labour they displaced, sought the plains of the West. He made these remarks because he was afraid that an opinion prevailed in Canada that this country would be inclined to guarantee an extension of the Inter-colonial Railroad.

Mr. ADDERLEY said, he was glad attention had been called to this subject, because what had been stated by the Under Secretary for the Colonies, by the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-on-Tweed (Viscount Bury), and the discussion which had followed, would spread abroad in the country a knowledge of the great resources which the fertile belt in the Hudson's Bay territory would offer to colonization. It was a misfortune to this country that so much ignorance should prevail among the people with reference to the space of country which belonged to them. It had often struck him that in our primary schools, every geography was taught but that of our colonies. Americans who visited this country were astonished that so little attention was given to this subject in the primary education of the great mass of the people. Our colonies ought to be as valuable to us—as a means of relieving over-population and the pent-up industries of the kingdom—as the Far West was to the United States. They should be almost a guarantee against the prevalence of chronic poverty among us; but for want of information and familiarity their advantages were never looked to as a provision for the poor and enterprising, if, indeed, they had not purposely been kept in mystery not to use the horrors of transportation. Representing, to a certain extent, the late Government, he offered his congratulations to Her Majesty's Ministers on the successful termination of the negotiations with the Hudson's Bay Company. The late Government had conducted the negotiations from the time of the Confederation of Canada upon the foundation of the previous negotiations.
Mr. Adderley

Mr. Adderley
exceedingly glad that the time has at length arrived when a very difficult problem has reached its solution. Twenty years ago, when discussions took place in this House having in view the very object that is now about to be attended, I was one of those who, at the time, feeling a very lively interest in the question, entered keenly into the matter, and, perhaps, did somewhat less than justice to the Hudson's Bay Company, to whom now everyone would wish that the fullest justice should be done. At the same time I think that, fundamentally, we were right in the policy we then endeavoured to recommend, because it has been frankly admitted in this debate, and is now generally conceded, in the first place, that the Hudson's Bay Company, as a company with exclusive privileges, and constituted for the purpose of fur trading, neither was nor possibly could be a good steward of the great interests involved in the government of a large continent; and, in the second place, that it was not possible for this country to take upon itself and to administer directly the responsibilities that were then incumbent upon the Hudson's Bay Company. Canada evidently was pointed out by nature and by circumstances as the proper person to come into that position, and that position she is about at length to adopt. My hon. Friend the Member for St. Andrew's (Mr. Ellice) asks us whether we took an engagement from Canada for the government of this territory, and I shall repeat on the part of the Government the answer made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Staffordshire (Mr. Addison), that it would be neither becoming nor possible to ask Canada to give such an engagement. Canada would be senseless unless she entertained the fullest sense of her responsibility and duty in this matter, and her interests are as much connected with the fulfilment of this duty as in any possible case they could be. There was a remark that fell from my noble Friend the Member for Berwick (Viscount Bury) that I am both to pass without some qualification. I must thank him—and I think I express the general feeling—for the interesting and able speech which he delivered. I am sure he will excuse me if on one point I venture to say a word for the honour of this country, though in apparent opposition to what he said—I mean with respect to that very animated censure which he passed upon the course taken by the British Parliament in regard to the presents made to the Indians, and which he did not scruple to describe as a gross breach of faith, of which the undivided responsibility lay with this country—if with this country, then necessarily and exclusively with this House. The ground of my noble Friend's charge was this—that a covenant had been made with the Indians that those presents should be annually given to them "so long as the grass grow and the water run." I will not attempt to escape from the stringency of that covenant; but this I will say, that I do not think it necessary for me to attempt to defend England against a charge of gross breach of faith by shifting the responsibility elsewhere. But this I do say, that that covenant to give presents to the Indians was strictly and essentially an incident of the position which we then held in regard to Canada. At the time when we entered into that covenant we held Canada not so much for the benefit of Canada as for the benefit of this country, and Canada was managed, not according to her own will and discretion, but according to ours. In process of time that state of things was fundamentally changed. Every power that we had exercised over Canada for our own use or supposed advantage was successively given over into the hands of Canada. With these powers the people of this country practically came to the conclusion that it was necessary that the incidental costs and burdens should be likewise handed over, and among those incidental costs and burdens that of the annual presents to the Indians. That is the real ground on which this House proceeded. I do not think it was any part of our duty to determine whether the covenant with the Indians was liable to change in consequence of the altered circumstances. The question to which we looked was whether we could fairly and justly, under this covenant, continue to ask the tax-payer of this country to pay a sum of, I think, a good many thousands a year for the purpose of these presents to the Indians, when Canada became a country for every practical purpose perfectly independent. The House of Commons arrived at the conclusion that it was not reasonable or just to make that demand upon the people of

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England. I notice this part of my noble Friend's speech, because nothing can be more unworthy of an Assembly like the present than to have it supposed that, in respect to the engagements we concluded, we adhered to them less faithfully when dealing with a weak people than when stipulating with a strong country. With regard to the other topic of debate, I must say if certainly is a question of the greatest interest to consider what will be the course of events with respect to the future settlement of the great valley of Saskatchewan. There is very conflicting testimony on the subject; and probably it is affected by so many circumstances of which as yet we have no experience, that the soundest judgment and the most extensive knowledge cannot speak with confidence upon it at the present time. When Sir George Simpson published that interesting account of his voyage round the world he spoke in the most sanguine terms of this territory; but subsequently when he gave evidence before a Committee of this House, he very much qualified and almost contradicted his former statements. The future alone can tell what are the capabilities of this territory. I think it necessary to say a word with regard to continuing colonial guarantees. I believe that in the private relations of life it often happens that a man who is ready to undertake an engagement on the part of somebody else, by the fact of his undertaking such engagement, instead of leaving on the mind of the other party the impression that he ought not to apply to him again, leaves, on the contrary, the impression that he is an accommodating person, and that nothing but a succession of pertinacities, or at least energetic applications is required in order to extend the process of entering into engagements. I hope our excellent Canadian fellow-subjects are not under an impression of this kind; but whether they are or not, I feelcontent to bear my testimony to what the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Adderley) has said on colonial guarantees. I cannot adopt an absolute rule on this subject. It is impossible to say that there will be no such thing proposed to this House as a colonial guarantee. But whenever a Government has proposed a colonial guarantee in the past, this House has always expected that Government to show that the proposal was made with a view of escaping from the kind of relations under which alone such a guarantee was required, and of establishing freer relations under which our colonial subjects would bear their own burdens and leave us to bear ours. In conclusion, I thank the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles Dilke) for having given the House the benefit of his experience with regard to the difficulties with which this portion of the subject is beset.

Viscount BURY apologized if he had used too strong expressions with regard to our treatment of the Indians; but he had had in his mind at the time a covering despatch from Sir Edmund Head, who said that he approached the subject with pain and misgiving, never having been able to persuade himself that the conduct of this country towards the Indians had been consistent with good faith.

Mr. HADFIELD said, it was strange that the opportunities for emigration which these vast regions presented were so much neglected by the English people. While those regions were inviting settlers, England was over-run with population, often hard driven to find employment. He regretted greatly that the sons of our aristocracy, instead of remaining at home to fill up all the places which they could obtain in the army, the navy, the church, or the law, did not follow the examples of their ancestors, and set themselves the task of colonizing fresh regions of the earth. He had heard it said that the reason why the younger sons of the aristocracy remained at home was because they did not wish to live in the luxuries of their fathers' tables. It was a poor reason; and he thought that the teeming population of this country ought to be better instructed as to the position and advantages of our colonies as fields for emigration.

Motion put, and agreed to.

MAIL CONTRACTS.—RESOLUTIONS.

Mr. SEELY, in calling attention to the Report of the Select Committee on the American Mail Contracts, said that these contracts had been objected to last year on various grounds. It was said that they ought not to have been entered into for so long a period as eight years; that it was unwise to pay a fixed subsidy annually to certain firms, irrespective of the number of letters carried;
APPENDIX D

Version Published by Parliament of the United Kingdom in August 1870, in Correspondence Relating to the Recent Disturbances in the Red River Settlement, Printed by William Clowes & Sons, London

PROCLAMATION.

V. R.

By His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir JOHN YOUNG, Bart., a Member of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of The Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Cross of The Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, Governor General of Canada.

To all and every the Loyal Subjects of Her Majesty the Queen, and to all to whom these Presents shall come

GREETING:

THE QUEEN has charged me, as Her Representative, to inform you that certain misguided persons in Her Settlements on the Red River, have banded themselves together to oppose by force the entry into Her North-Western Territories of the Officer selected to administer, in Her name, the Government, when the Territories are united to the Dominion of Canada, under the authority of the late Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom; and that those parties have also forcibly, and with violence, prevented others of Her loyal Subjects from ingress into the Country.

Her Majesty feels assured that She may rely upon the loyalty of Her Subjects in the North-West, and believes those men who have thus illegally joined together, have done so from some misrepresentation.

The Queen is convinced that in sanctioning the Union of the North-West Territories with Canada, She is promoting the best interests of the residents, and at the same time strengthening and consolidating Her North American Possessions as part of the British Empire. You may judge then of Her sorrow and displeasure with which the Queen views the unreasonable and lawless proceedings which have occurred.

Her Majesty commands me to state to you, that She will always be ready through me as Her Representative, to redress all well founded grievances, and that She has instructed me to hear and consider any complaints that may be made, or desires that may be expressed to me as Governor-General. At the same time She has charged me to exercise all the powers and authority with which She has intrusted me in the support of order, and the suppression of unlawful disturbances.

By Her Majesty's authority I do therefore assure you, that on the Union with Canada all your civil and religious rights and privileges will be respected, your properties secured to you, and that your Country will be governed, as in the past, under British laws, and in the spirit of British justice.

I do, further, under Her authority, entrust and command those of you who are still assembled and banded together, in defiance of law, peaceably to disperse and return to your homes, under the penalties of the law in case of disobedience.

And I do hereby inform you, that in case of your immediate and peaceable obedience and suspension, I shall order that no legal proceedings be taken against any party implicated in those unfortunate breaches of the law.

Given under my Hand and Seal at Arms at Ottawa, this Sixth day of December, in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-nine, and in the Thirty-second year of Her Majesty's Reign.

By Command,

JOHN YOUNG.

H. L. LANGEVIN, Secretary of State.
PROCLAMATION.

By His Excellency the Right Honorable Sir John Young, Baronet, a Member of Her Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, Governor General of Canada.

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And I do hereby inform you, that in case of your immediate and peaceable obedience and dispersion, I shall order that no legal proceedings be taken against any parties implicated in these unfortunate breaches of the law.

Given under my Hand and Seal at Arms at Ottawa, this Sixth day of December, in the year of our Lord, One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-nine, and in the Thirty-third year of Her Majesty's Reign.

[SEAL]

By Command.

John Young.

H. L. Langevin,
Secretary of State.
Colonel Garnet Joseph Wolseley's Proclamation

To the Loyal Inhabitants of Manitoba

Her Majesty's Government having determined upon stationing some troops among you, I have been instructed by the Lieutenant-General Commanding in British North America to proceed to Fort Garry with the force under my command. Our mission is one of peace and the sole object of the expedition is to secure Her Majesty's sovereign authority - Courts of Law such as are common to every portion of Her Majesty's Empire will be duly established and Justice will be impartially administered to all races and to all classes. The Loyal Indians or Half Breeds being as dear to our Queen as any other Loyal Subjects.

The force I have the honour of commanding will enter your Province representing no party either in Religion or Politics, and will offer equal protection to the lives and property of all races and all creeds. The strictest order and discipline will be maintained and private property will be carefully respected. All supplies furnished to the troops will be duly paid for - should any one consider himself injured by any individual attached to the force his grievances shall be promptly enquired into.

All loyal people are earnestly invited to aid me in carrying out the above mentioned subjects.

G. J. Wolseley
Colonel
Commanding Red River Force

Port Arthur's Landing
30th June 1870

[Emphasis added by the author]

Reproduced by:

Louis Riel on the New Nation Press (Butler 1870)

Morton, W. L.
1956 Alexander Begg's Red River Journal and Other Papers Relative to the Red River Resistance of 1869-1870, Toronto, ON: Champlain Society

Huyshe, G. L.
1871 The Red River Expedition, London, UK: Macmillan and Company
This series of maps and description illustrate the historical evolution of Canada through treaty-making between 1867 and 1999, focussing on the Numbered Treaties. This chronology appears on the Indian & Northern Affairs Canada website. It presents a rather distorted and partial view of events, completely omitting the promises made in 1867 and the proclamations and orders-in-council of the British Cabinet issued during annexation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map Date/ Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1867</strong> Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 449 kb)</td>
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<td><strong>1870</strong> Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 1567 kb)</td>
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<td><strong>1871</strong> Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 1622 kb)</td>
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<td><strong>1873</strong> Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 1630 kb)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1874</strong> Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 1646 kb)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **1875** Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 1651 kb) | Treaty No. 5. This treaty originated in two historical processes. The southern part, negotiated in 1875, was one of the southern Prairie treaties, and was in large part a result
of the insistence of the Native people of that region that their aboriginal rights be recognized by the Canadian government, which had recently acquired title to their lands. The northern part of Treaty 5 was negotiated in 1908.

1876 Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 1665 kb)
Treaty No. 6 - The negotiation of this treaty took place during a difficult period for the Plains Cree, who were suffering from the rapid decline of the buffalo. The documents indicate that their concerns included medical care and relief in case of need.

1877 Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 1662 kb)
Treaty No. 7. The last of the numbered treaties negotiated and signed during the 1870s. The treaty covers the southern part of present-day Alberta. Addition of Arctic Islands. British rights to these islands pass to Canada.

1881 Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 1956 kb)
Addition to Manitoba. The boundaries of Manitoba are extended to include substantially all the area covered by Treaties One, Two and Three.

1889 Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 1962 kb)
Treaty No. 6 Adhesion (Montreal Lake). Addition to Ontario (Kenora District)

1898 Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 1984 kb)
Creation of the Yukon. The Yukon becomes a Territory separate from the North-West Territories. The boundaries of Quebec are extended north, almost complementing the revised northern boundary of Ontario.

1899 Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 2057 kb)
Treaty No. 8. The first of the northern treaties covered an area of 324,900 sq miles and represents the most geographically extensive treaty activity undertaken. It comprises what is now the northern half of Alberta, the northeast quarter of British Columbia, the northwest corner of Saskatchewan, and the area south of Hay River and Great Slave Lake in the Northwest Territories.

1905 Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 2048 kb)
Treaty No. 9. In response to continuous petitions from the Cree and Ojibwa people of northern Ontario, and in keeping with its policy of paving the way for settlement and development, the federal government in 1905-1906 negotiated Treaty 9, also known as the James Bay Treaty. For the first and only time, a provincial government took an active role in negotiations. Together with the area acquired by adhesions in 1929-1930, Treaty 9 covers almost two-thirds of the area that became northern Ontario. In 1905, the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan are created.

1906 Canada - Territorial Evolution Map (PDF 2028 kb)
Treaty No. 10. Covers 220,000 square kilometres of northern Saskatchewan and Alberta. Unlike the land in southern Saskatchewan, the Treaty 10 lands were deemed unsuitable for agriculture and so the federal government did not respond to demands from the region’s Native people for a treaty until the early 20th century, when the mixed-blood people of northern Saskatchewan began to demand compensation for loss of aboriginal rights and the Provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta had been created.
Adhesion to Treaty No. 5. Though requested for many years by the Native people, this adhesion was the result of government initiative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Treaty No. 5. Though requested for many years by the Native people, this adhesion was the result of government initiative. Ontario and Manitoba attain their present boundaries. Quebec extends northward to absorb the Ungava District and agrees to negotiate surrender of the Indian title to the territory; the Quebec-Labrador boundary remains in contention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Treaty No. 11. The last of the numbered treaties covers most of the Mackenzie District. The land in the area was deemed unsuitable for agriculture, so the federal government was reluctant to conclude treaties. Immediately following the discovery of oil at Fort Norman in 1920, however, the government moved to begin treaty negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Williams Treaties. Treaty-making activities along the north shore of Lake Ontario in 1783-84, variously known as the Toronto Purchase, the Carrying Place Purchase, the Crawford Purchases and the Gunshot Treaty, produced lingering uncertainties that are resolved in large part by the Chippewa and Mississauga Agreements negotiated in 1923.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Newfoundland and Labrador enter Confederation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Creation of Nunavut.</td>
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</tbody>
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Historical Treaties of Canada (PDF 1615 kb)
Historical Treaties of Canada
Regulation for the Definition of the Term "Jew"
in the Government-General
July 24, 1940

§ 1
Where the word "Jew" is used in Legal and Administrative Provisions in the Government-General, it is to be interpreted as follows:
1) Anyone who is a Jew, or is considered a Jew, in accordance with the Legal Provisions in the Reich,
2) Anyone who is a Jew, or is considered a Jew, and is a former Polish citizen or stateless person, under § 2 of this Regulation.

§ 2
1) A Jew is a person descended from at least three fully Jewish grandparents by race.
2) A person is considered a Jew:
   a) if he is descended from two grandparents who are full Jews by race and if he was a member of the Jewish Religious Community on September 1, 1939, or joined such a community subsequently;
   b) if he was married to a Jew on the date on which this Regulation came into force, or married a Jew subsequently;
   c) if he is the product of extra-marital intercourse with a Jew in accordance with para. I and was born after May 31, 1941.
3) A grandparent is automatically considered a full Jew if he was a member of a Jewish community.

§ 3
1) Where the concept [person of] Jewish Mischling is used in Legal and Administrative Provisions of the Government-General, it is to be interpreted as follows:
   a) a person who is a Jewish Mischling in accordance with the Reich Legal Provisions,-
   b) any person who is a former Polish citizen or stateless, and is descended from one or two grandparents who are full Jews by race, unless he is considered a Jew under § 2, para. 2. 2) The provisions under § 2, para. 3 apply similarly.
§ 4
1) A business enterprise is considered Jewish if the owner is a Jew in accordance with § 1.
2) A business enterprise which is owned by a Limited Company is considered Jewish if one or more members who are personally responsible are Jews....
3) A place of business is also considered Jewish if it is in practice under the dominant influence of Jews.
4) The provisions under para. 1-4 also apply to Associations, Endowments, Institutions and other organizations which are not business enterprises.

§ 5
Legal and Administrative Provisions issued for Jews apply to Jewish Mischling only where this is expressly stated.

§ 6
This Regulation comes into effect on August 1, 1940.

Cracow, July 24, 1940

The Governor General for the Occupied Polish Territories
Frank

Provided from the archives of the Simon Wiesenthal Center http://motlc.wiesenthal.com
The text is reproduced from an actual edict issued under the authority of the Nuremberg Laws of Nazi Germany, 1935
APPENDIX G

Common Law Application of British Imperial & Hudson’s Bay Company Policy

Campbell v. Hall, [1774] 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045

Lord Mansfield

Cited from the Supreme Court of Canada in:


In Re Southern Rhodesia, [1919] A.C. 211, Lord Sumner said at pp. 233-4:

In any case it was necessary that the argument should go the length of showing that the rights, whatever they exactly were, belonged to the category of rights of private property, such that upon a conquest it is to be presumed, in the absence of express confiscation or of subsequent expropriatory legislation, that the conqueror has respected them and forborne to diminish or modify them.

The estimation of the rights of aboriginal tribes is always inherently difficult. Some tribes are so low in the scale of social organization that their usages and conceptions of rights and duties are not to be reconciled with the institutions or the legal ideas of civilized society. Such a gulf cannot be bridged. It would be idle to impute to such people some shadow of the rights known to our law and then to transmute it into the substance of transferable rights of property as we know them. In the present case it would make each and every person by a fictional inheritance a landed proprietor "richer than all his tribe." On the other hand, there are indigenous peoples whose legal conceptions, though differently developed, are hardly less precise than our own. When once they have been studied and understood they are no less enforceable than rights arising under English law.

(Emphasis added.)

Chief Justice Marshall in his judgment in Johnson v. M'Intosh referred to the English case of Campbell v. Hall (1774), 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045. This case was an important and decisive one which has been regarded as authoritative throughout the Commonwealth and the United States. It involved the rights and status of residents of the Island of Grenada which had recently been taken by British arms in open war with France. The judgment was given by Lord Mansfield. In his reasons he said at pp. 208-9:
A great deal has been said, and many authorities cited relative to propositions, in which both sides seem to be perfectly agreed; and which, indeed are too clear to be controverted. The stating some of those propositions which we think quite clear, will lead us to see with greater perspicuity, what is the question upon the first point, and upon what hinge it turns. I will state the propositions at large, and the first is this:

A country conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion of the King in the right of his Crown; and, therefore, necessarily subject to the Legislature, and Parliament of Great Britain.

The 2d is, that the conquered inhabitants once received under the King's protection, become subjects, and are to be universally considered in that light, not as enemies or aliens.

The 3d, that the articles of capitulation upon which the country is surrendered, and the articles of peace by which it is ceded, are sacred and inviolable according to their true intent and meaning.

The 4th, that the law and legislative government of every dominion, equally affects all persons and all property within the limits thereof; and is the rule of decision for all questions which arise there. Whoever purchases, lives, or sues there, puts himself under the law of the place. An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the plantations, has no privilege distinct from the natives.

The 5th, that the laws of a conquered country continue in force, until they are altered by the conqueror: the absurd exception as to pagans, mentioned in Calvin's case [(1608), 7 Co. Rep. 1a, Moore (K.B.) 790 sub nom. Case del Union, del Realm, D'Escose, ove Angleterre, 72 E.R. 908], shews the universality and antiquity of the maxim. For that distinction could not exist before the Christian era; and in all probability arose from the mad enthusiasm of the Croisades. In the present case the capitulation expressly provides and agrees, that they shall continue to be governed by their own laws, until His Majesty's further pleasure be known.

The 6th, and last proposition is, that if the King (and when I say the King, I always mean the King without the concurrence of Parliament,) has a power to alter the old and to introduce new laws in a conquered country, this legislation being subordinate, that is, subordinate to his own authority in Parliament, he cannot make any new change contrary to fundamental principles: he cannot exempt an inhabitant from that particular dominion; as for instance, from the laws of trade, or from the power of Parliament, or

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give him privileges exclusive of his other subjects; and so in many other instances which might be put.

* A fortiori * the same principles, particularly Nos. 5 and 6, must apply to lands which become subject to British sovereignty by discovery or by declaration.

It is of importance that in all those areas where Indian lands were being taken by the Crown treaties were negotiated and entered into between the Crown and the Indian tribe on land then in occupation. The effect of these treaties was discussed by Davey, J.A. (as he then was), for the majority in *White and Bob* as follows at pp. 617-8:

It was also the long standing policy of the Imperial Government and of the Hudson's Bay Co. that the Crown or the company should buy from the Indians their land for settlement by white colonists. In pursuance of that policy many agreements, some very formal, others informal, were made with various bands and tribes of Indians for the purchase of their lands. These agreements frequently conferred upon the grantors hunting rights over the unoccupied lands so sold. Considering the relationship between the Crown and the Hudson's Bay Co. in the colonization of this country, and the Imperial and corporate policies reflected in those agreements, I cannot regard ex. 8 as a mere agreement for the sale of land made between a private vendor and a private purchaser. In view of the notoriety of these facts, I entertain no doubt that Parliament intended the word "Treaty" in s. 87 [Indian Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 149] to include all such agreements, and to except their provisions from the operative part of the section.

**Judgments Where Campbell v. Hall Was Used to Interpret:**

- Connolly v. Woolrich & Johnson et al. [1867], 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (also reported: 11 L.C.Jur. 197)
- St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577
- St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46
- R. v. White and Bob, [1964], 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613 (also reported: 52 W.W.R. 193)

**NOTE:** During recent years, most uses of the *Royal Proclamation 1763* are in BC or Federal courtrooms; however, no use of *Campbell v. Hall* was made in more than 142 actions since the Royal Proclamation appeared in the *Constitution Act, 1982*
Nomads in Canadian Courts

In Reference to Cultural Behaviour of Aboriginals (44 cases):

- Beattie v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2002 FCA 105 (CanLII)
- Beattie v. Canada, 2001 CanLII 22180 (F.C.)
- Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada ( Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development ) ( C.A. ), [1993] 3 F.C. 28, 1993 CanLII 2932 (F.C.A.)
- Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344
- Buffalo v. Canada, 2005 FC 1622 (CanLII)
- Constant c. Québec (Procureur général), 2003 IIJCan 47824 (QC C.A.)
- Dans la situation de K.(M.-K.), 2002 IIJCan 38040 (QC C.Q.)
- Goulet c. Québec (Procureur général), 2003 IIJCan 42450 (QC C.A.)
- HMTQ v. Chief Jules et al., 2005 BCSC 1312 (CanLII)
- Jeddore v. The Queen, 2001 CanLII 917 (T.C.C.)
- Kadiak v. Nunavut (Minister of Sustainable Development), 2001 NUCJ 1 (CanLII)
- Lac La Ronge Indian Band v. Canada, 1999 SKQB 218 (CanLII)
- Lac La Ronge Indian Band v. Canada, 2001 SKCA 109 (CanLII)
- Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 (CanLII)
- Montana Band v. Canada, 2006 FC 261 (CanLII)
- N.T.I. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 NUCJ 1 (CanLII)
- Papaschase Indian Band (Descendants of) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 ABQB 655 (CanLII)
- Première Nation de Betsiamites c. Canada (Procureur général), 2005 IIJCan 21668 (QC C.S.)
- Québec (Procureur général) c. Young, 2003 IIJCan 47908 (QC C.A.)
- R. v. Billy and Johnny, 2006 BCPC 48 (CanLII)
- R. v. Marshall (S.F.), 2002 NSSC 57 (CanLII)
In Reference to a Criminal Organization, a Biker Gang (31 cases):

- Regina v. Campbell, 2000 BCSC 956 (CanLII)
- Regina v. Gregory Willison, 2005 BCPC 131 (CanLII)
- Regina v. Howse, 2002 BCSC 235 (CanLII)
- Snake v. The Queen, 2001 FCT 858 (CanLII)
- Young c. Québec (Procureur général), 2003 IIJCan 47909 (QC C.A.)

- Beauchamp v. R., 2005 QCCA 580 (CanLII)
- Etats-Unis d'Amérique c. Le Page, 2002 IIJCan 41974 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Auger, 2002 IIJCan 24374 (QC C.Q.)
- R. c. Avenire, 2001 IIJCan 16944 (QC C.Q.)
- R. c. Beauchamp, 2002 IIJCan 29128 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Beauchamp, 2002 IIJCan 39853 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Beauchamp, 2004 IIJCan 26645 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Bédard, 2002 IIJCan 29251 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Bordeleau, 2002 IIJCan 27908 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Bordeleau, 2002 IIJCan 28300 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Bordeleau, 2002 IIJCan 39080 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Boucher, 2000 IIJCan 6087 (QC C.A.)
- R. c. Boucher, 2002 IIJCan 24850 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Boucher, 2002 IIJCan 6092 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Couture, 2002 IIJCan 24750 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Duguay, 2004 IIJCan 50577 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Faucher, 2002 IIJCan 12137 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Faucher, 2004 IIJCan 40612 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Mayrand, 2002 IIJCan 35588 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Robitaille, 2005 IIJCan 8540 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Rose, 2004 IIJCan 19428 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Wooley, 2002 IIJCan 42038 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Wooley, 2004 IIJCan 46744 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Woolley, 2004 IIJCan 46948 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Wooley, 2004 IIJCan 46952 (QC C.S.)
- R. c. Wooley, 2004 IIJCan 47475 (QC C.S.)
- R. v. Lindsay, 2005 CanLII 24240 (ON S.C.)
- R. v. Lindsay, 2005 CanLII 479 (ON S.C.)
• R. v. McCurrach, 2000 ABPC 127 (CanLII)
• R. v. Stadnick, 2004 CanLII 2116 (QC C.S.)
• R. v. Stadnick, 2004 CanLII 31543 (QC C.S.)
• R. v. Stadnick, 2004 CanLII 32952 (QC C.S.)
• Stockford v. R., 2001 CanLII 17962 (QC C.S.)
• Syndicat de la fonction publique du Québec c. Sûreté du Québec, 2001 IIJCan 18121 (QC A.G.)

In Reference to Transient Individuals (28 cases):

• A.M.-J., Re, 2005 IIJCan 50973 (QC C.Q.)
  *son mode de vie nomade, la mère a peu de capacités d’implication et sa collaboration est minimale.*

• Allahi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 271 (CanLII)
  *he was unwilling to return to live with nomadic family*

• Beson v. Director of Child Welfare (NFLD.), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 71
  *a boy who has lived up to this time what he described as “a nomadic existence”*

• C. H. v. T. C., 2004 CanLII 53142 (NL P.C.)
  The real problem, as the Court sees it, lies with the nomadic lifestyle of the birth mother which results in her staying at C.H.’s residence from time to time when she is encountering difficulties in her relationship with her partner.

• C. M. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SKQB 174 (CanLII)
  *C.M. testifies to a nomadic lifestyle during her adolescent years after leaving Gordon’s.*

• Cannaday v. Desmond, 1999 CanLII 6047 (BC S.C.)
  The parties, after sale of the Westsyde home in August 1994, followed a somewhat nomadic life.

• Cesari c. Très-Saint-Rédempteur (Municipalité), 2004 IIJCan 12185 (QC C.S.)
  *Personne sans domicile fixe. - clochard, vagabond; nomade, squatteur. Ellipt Les sans domicile fixe. - S. D. F. Violation de domicile*

• Damer-Basso v. Basso, 2003 CanLII 2055 (ON S.C.)
  *He would feel like a nomad, evicted from his home right before Christmas.*

• Durham Children's Aid Society v. D. W., 2003 CanLII 2105 (ON S.C.)
  *She has for at least two years led her children on a chaotic, nomadic and desperate life where moves were sometimes a weekly*
• Eland v. Yellowhead Helicopters Ltd., 1997 CanLII 3156 (BC S.C.)
The life of a young helicopter pilot was nomadic

• F. C. c. J. R., 2004 IIJCan 6439 (QC C.S.)
un nomade, de sorte que lorsqu'il n'est pas sur la route c'est son véhicule qui lui sert d'habitation, dans le garage où il le gare et fait l'entretien

• Fisher v. Fisher, 1995 CanLII 2718 (BC S.C.)
she is not the nomad the respondent considers her to be.

• Goodwin v. Goodwin, 2004 YKSC 84 (CanLII)
While I recognize that this is simply the opinion of the mother, there is some support for her belief in the results of the father’s psychological assessment, in particular the MCMI, which put the father in the category of "nomadic antisocials”.

• Hallett v. Hallett, 1993 CanLII 3049 (ON C.J.)
A two-week alternating residence would continue these children’s existence as nomads

• Harmon v. Nishikawara, 1993 CanLII 267 (BC S.C.)
It was a nomadic existence from job to job and place to place.

Ms M. has led a more nomadic existence than Mr. L. and presently resides in Kelowna

• M.L. c. É.M., 2005 IIJCan 29866 (QC C.S.)
le travail «nomade» de chauffeur de camion longue distance

• Molson v. Molson, 1998 ABQB 476 (CanLII)
she has, in fact, led a nomadic lifestyle that would make it difficult to assert that she has established residence in Alberta even today.

• Nistor v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1467 (CanLII)
Many have forgone the more traditional nomadic lifestyle under duress rather than by choice.

• Norman v. R, 2005 NBC A 33 (CanLII)
Beginning in mid-adolescence, his existence became rather nomadic except for periods of incarceration

• Pearse v. Pearson, 2000 BCSC 715 (CanLII)
When the parties first came together they lived a nomadic lifestyle.

- PJ v. Nova Scotia (Director of Victim Services), 2001 NSUARB 67 (CanLII)
  In the winter, Mr. J followed a nomadic lifestyle in southern Canada, living in various places.

- R. v. Bourgeois, 2003 NBPC 1 (CanLII)
  He was born and raised in Ontario and I'm told that in recent years he started to live somewhat of a nomadic lifestyle.

- R. v. Buckley, 2000 BCPC 84 (CanLII)
  Over the years Mr. Buckley moved back and forth between his father's residence and his mother's, resulting in him leading a somewhat nomadic lifestyle.

  The term gypsy in its broadest sense is often used to refer to people who lead a nomadic life, and for many Roma, the term gypsy conjures up unflattering or stereotypical images.

- R.R. c. L.C., 2006 QCCS 428 (IIJCan)
  Les parents ont su jusqu'à présent simplifier les déplacements de l'enfant qui s'adapte assez bien à la vie de nomade.

- Robinson v. Williams (Estate of), 2005 ABQB 659 (CanLII)
  His essentially nomadic lifestyle undermines his evidence on those issues.

- S.A.D. v. E.E.P. Estate, 2003 BCSC 1535 (CanLII)
  She has lived a nomadic life, moving from women's shelter to women's shelter.

Alexander Von Gernet's Effect
on Fact Finding & Judgment

1996
Doctor Von Gernet's report in Part 6 is most pertinent. It is replete with end-noted references to various authorities, as is the rest of his report. Here are some persuasive passages (with end-note references deleted) which the Court finds convincing......

... On all of this evidence, including Doctor Von Gernet's opinion, this Court finds that there was no "aboriginal", (and certainly no treaty) "right of members of the said bands [or camps or chiefs' peoples], under their respective customary laws, to determine membership in the bands [camps, chiefs' peoples] and to veto the admission of any persons to membership in...
the said bands [camps, chiefs' peoples]". The Court holds that there were no such rights and no such customary laws as pleaded by the plaintiffs in the particulars given by virtue of Mr. Justice Strayer's order dated October 31, 1986. Those particulars express a fictitious revisionism.

1997
Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue)

Dr. Von Gernet also noted that the concurrence of voices was a weak test; hence, even when all the Mohawk witnesses "embody one truth", this does not mean that such a truth bears any relation to an actual history or that this raises a reasonable presumption that their facts are clear. In my view, Dr. Von Gernet's opinion on oral histories is contrary to the position of the Supreme Court of Canada, which has directed that oral narratives or oral histories should be accepted as any documentary evidence would in cases involving aboriginal peoples. The Supreme Court in Van der Peet, supra at paragraph 48 warned that:

[t]he courts must not undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied in, for example, a private law tort case.

I have reviewed the oral histories given by the plaintiff's witnesses in the same manner that I have reviewed documentary evidence provided by both parties. The weight that I accord to oral history and to documentary evidence does not depend on the form in which the evidence was presented to the Court. The aboriginal perspective is based on oral tradition and history, and not on belief as submitted by the defendant.

1999 R. v. Frank, 1999 ABPC 81

[52] In rebuttal the Crown called Dr. Alexander von Guernet. He was qualified as an anthropologist specializing in the use of archeological evidence, written documentation, and oral histories or traditions to reconstruct past cultures and practices of aboriginal peoples, including the Blackfoot, as well as the history of contact between aboriginal peoples and European newcomers.

[53] Dr. von Guernet prepared two reports, which were filed as exhibits 13 and 13A, together with the content of historical references on which he relied in preparing his report. These references numbered 249, in his first report, and were filed as fourteen volumes of exhibits.

[55] While I would have concluded that the other evidence did not demonstrate the pre-contact practice contended for, I had as well the expert testimony in that regard of Dr. von Guernet whose credentials to give the evidence which he did were impressive.
The Trial Judge accepted this position and specifically rejected the view of the appellant's expert, Dr. Von Gemet, on the basis that he concentrated "too much on the raiding activities" of the Mohawks and because it was inconsistent with archaeological evidence from Daniel Richter's article entitled "Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Five Nations in Early American History" in Beyond the Covenant Chain: the Iroquois and their Neighbors in Indian North America 1600-1800, D. K. Richter and J. H. Merrel eds. (Syracuse N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987).

2001
R. v. Marshall, 2001 NSPC 2
49. Dr. Von Gemet said there was no evidence family hunting territories were an ancient Mi'kmaq tradition. He said they existed in the 19th century, but could not be traced back with any degree of certainty beyond the second half of the 18th century. Based on the evidence presented in this case, Dr. Von Gemet's conclusion is accurate.

55. Mi'kmaq communities were allied with each other, with the French and with the other aboriginal groups in the Maritimes and Maine. However, as Dr. Von Gemet put it, they did not have a fully-developed sense of being a nation. None of the French missionaries who wrote about the Mi'kmaq ever mentioned seven districts, a grand council or grand chief. Biard said they had "State Councils", but did not suggest those were formalized as a kind of government. From 1749 to 1759 the missionaries Le Loutre and Maillard claimed to speak at times for all the Mi'kmaq, but the treaties of 1749, 1752 and 1760-61 were all with individual communities. They were still a collection of communities.

2001
Jeddore v. The Queen Docket: 96-2182-IT-G
[238] I was, in this difficult case, very impressed with the knowledge, quality of preparation and demeanour of the expert witnesses, the major part of whose evidence was presented by Cuff and Von Gemet. While in no way minimizing Cuff's efforts, I, as stated above, was led through my own analysis of the evidence to adopt Von Gemet's view as a logical and reasonable interpretation of the events under review.

[239] The appeal will be dismissed. There is, accordingly, no need to deal with the matter of the Appellant's investment income.


46 Consequently, while Richter's book may support the pre-contact existence of north-south trade routes, it refutes the direct involvement of the Mohawks in this trade. This is a significant fact, given the reliance by the trial judge on this evidence in concluding the aboriginal right was
established, and in rejecting the testimony of the appellant's expert witness, Dr. Von Gernet, to the effect that he had "yet to find a single archeological site anywhere in Ontario dating to the prehistoric, the protohistoric or the early historical period which has in any way ever been associated with the Mohawks" (p. 30).

2002
Benoit v. Canada, 2002 FCT 243
G. Findings respecting weight

[294] As an alternate strategy to challenging the evidence of oral tradition through cross examination, Canada and Alberta rely on other evidence to diminish its weight. In particular, Alberta relies on the evidence of Dr. Von Gernet as quoted above. For Dr. Von Gernet's general concerns about the accuracy of evidence of oral tradition to diminish the weight to be given to it as presented in the present case, I find that the concerns must be made specific to the individuals giving the evidence. That is, some proof must be found that, in some way, a witness to the oral tradition has failed to recount it accurately. I find that this has not been accomplished.

Canada AG v. Anishnabe of Wauzhushk Onigum Band

[65] The words "Saulteaux Tribe" were words used to describe signatory Bands in other treaties covering land outside the geographical territory of Treaty 3. Three different groups, all collectively described as the "Saulteaux tribe", signed 3 different treaties in 3 different parts of Canada. This strongly suggests that the term "Saulteaux Tribe" was not a description of a particular, identifiable polity, but rather a convenient synecdoche. The "Saulteaux" did not actually exist as a "tribe".[7] I accept the evidence of A. Von Gemet, a Professor of Anthropology at the University of Toronto, that the Ojibwa west of Lake Superior, unlike the Iroquoian speaking peoples, never recognized themselves as an identifiable and distinct group. The basic communal unit was comprised of a core nuclear family along with other relatives who would form relatively small winter residential groups and come together in the summer into larger groups with no sense of organization. Further, as the resources in a particular area became depleted, these groups would move to new areas so that territories and boundaries were never permanent or identifiable to any one or several groups.

R. v. Marshall, 2002 NSSC 57

[45] All of this evidence supports a finding that it was not in the contemplation of the British or Mi'kmaq that the Treaties would give the Mi'kmaq a right to commercially harvest timber. The evidence supports the Trial Judges conclusion that trade in logs or commercial
logging was not a right afforded to the Mi'kmaq under any of the known treaties of 1760-1761. If there is a right to engage in commercial logging activities it would have to be based on something other than the treaties.

I refer to other evidence which supported the Trial Judge's conclusion. Dr. Von Gemet referred to evidence Chief Augustine gave in relation to a wampum belt at the Vatican Archives. Chief Augustine suggested this was a representation of the linking of the Mi'kmaq nation with Christianity when Membertou was baptized in the early 1600's. Dr. Von Gemet went to the Vatican Archives and studied the belt, finding conclusive evidence that it had been made by Aboriginals in Quebec as a gift for the Pope more than 200 years after Membertou's baptism. It was conceded by the Appellant's counsel at trial that the belt had nothing to do with Nova Scotia or the Mi'kmaq. Dr. Von Gemet cautioned about neo-traditionalism in relation to proof of historical events. He recognized that many traditions are very important to many modern native societies. That does not necessarily mean they are rooted in history.

**Benoit v. Canada, 2003 FCA 236**

[113] I agree with Dr. Von Gemet that oral history evidence cannot be accepted, per se, as factual, unless it has undergone the critical scrutiny that courts and experts, whether they be historians, archeologists, social scientists, apply to the various types of evidence which they have to deal with. My specific purpose in referring to Dr. Von Gemet's Report is to emphasize the fact that the Trial Judge ought to have approached the oral history evidence with caution. In Mitchell, supra, for example, the Trial Judge and the Supreme Court of Canada accepted the oral history evidence of Grand Chief Mitchell which, McLachlin C.J. points out at paragraph 35 of her Reasons, was confirmed by archeological and historical evidence. In other words, depending on the nature of the oral history at issue, corroboration may well be necessary to render it reliable.

**Jeddore v. The Queen, 2003 FCA 323**

[31] The Judge adopted the explanation of subsequent events offered by an expert witness for the Crown, Dr. Alexander Von Gemet. Thus, for example, Bell T.C.C.J. concluded that the protests over the activities of Lake's sawmill at the turn of the century, and the legislative response to them, probably had more to do with lumbering rights than with a desire on the part of the Government to protect an Indian reserve. Further, the Judge regarded the fact that in 1907 Chief Reuben Lewis petitioned the Government for a grant of 363 acres (lots 1-7) of the land included in the Conne River settlement as inconsistent with a widely held view that the whole of the settlement as shown on the plan constituted a reserve.
For the most part, the oral history evidence is very vague about identifying the government officials who represented to the Mi'kmaq that land would be or had been set aside for them at Conne River. In Dr. Von Gemet's opinion, which the Judge apparently accepted, the oral history evidence lacked specificity and temporal depth.

Nat'l Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation & General Workers Union of Canada, loc. 444 v. Great Blue Heron Gaming Co.

37. The Attorney General of Ontario relied on the affidavits of Alexander Von Gernet, expert anthropologist and ethno historian concerning aboriginal peoples, and Mort Mitchnick, lawyer, arbitrator, mediator and past Chair of the Board.

Canada v. Benoit, 2003 FCA 236

[113] I agree with Dr. Von Gernet that oral history evidence cannot be accepted, per se, as factual, unless it has undergone the critical scrutiny that courts and experts, whether they be historians, archeologists, social scientists, apply to the various types of evidence which they have to deal with. My specific purpose in referring to Dr. Von Gernet's Report is to emphasize the fact that the Trial Judge ought to have approached the oral history evidence with caution. In Mitchell, supra, for example, the Trial Judge and the Supreme Court of Canada accepted the oral history evidence of Grand Chief Mitchell which, McLachlin C.J. points out at paragraph 35 of her Reasons, was confirmed by archeological and historical evidence. In other words, depending on the nature of the oral history at issue, corroboration may well be necessary to render it reliable.

CONCLUSION

[117] Since there is nothing in the record which can reasonably support the conclusion reached by the Trial Judge, I am compelled to find that he made a palpable and overriding error. The Trial Judge appears to have failed to consider a sizeable portion of the evidence and to have misapprehended material evidence. Had he not made these errors, he could only have come to the conclusion that the evidence adduced by the respondents was not sufficient to allow him to reach the conclusion that he did.

[118] Consequently, I conclude that the respondents did not establish that the Aboriginal signatories of Treaty 8 understood that the Treaty Commissioners had made a promise exempting them from taxation at any time for any reason.
[92] In my opinion, the evidence supports the trial judge's conclusion that the Mi'kmaq could fairly be characterized as a moderately nomadic people. I am not persuaded that the SCAC erred in its review of that conclusion of the trial judge. In addition, the appellants' argument overlooks a clear finding of the trial judge which they do not challenge. At paras. 48 and 49 of his reasons, the judge accepted Dr. Von Gernet's opinion that there was no evidence that family hunting territories were an ancient Mi'kmaq tradition and that they could not be traced back with any degree of certainty beyond the second half of the 18th Century.

[49] Dr. Von Gernet said there was no evidence family hunting territories were an ancient Mi'kmaq tradition. He said they existed in the 19th century, but could not be traced back with any degree of certainty beyond the second half of the 18th century. Based on the evidence presented in this case, Dr. Von Gernet's conclusion is accurate.

Nat'l Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation & General Workers Union of Canada, loc. 444 v. Great Blue Heron Gaming Co.

89. Much was made by the parties about the significance or value to be attributed to the Covenant Chain. The claims of the First Nation in this regard were vigorously challenged by the trade union and the Attorneys General. Alexander Von Gernet, the expert witness retained by the Attorney General of Ontario was of the view that the Covenant Chain did not conform to what an anthropologist would consider to be a treaty. Mr. Von Gernet understood the Covenant Chain to be "...originally and principally an Iroquoian metaphor for an ill defined alliance...".

Sawridge Band v. Canada, 2004 FC 1436

113. I agree with Dr. Von Gernet that oral history evidence cannot be accepted, per se, as factual, unless it has undergone the critical scrutiny that courts and experts, whether they be historians, archeologists, social scientists, apply to the various types of evidence which they have to deal with. My specific purpose in referring to Dr. Von Gernet's Report is to emphasize the fact that the Trial Judge ought to have approached the oral history evidence with caution. In Mitchell, supra, for example, the Trial Judge and the Supreme Court of Canada accepted the oral history evidence of Grand Chief Mitchell which, McLachlin C.J. points out at paragraph 35 of her Reasons, was confirmed by archeological and historical evidence. In other words, depending on the nature of the oral history at issue, corroboration may well be necessary to render it reliable.
APPENDIX I

John A. Macdonald – Earl Granville
Correspondence on Judicial Review

Source:
Return to an Order of the House of Commons, dated the 2nd May, 1887; - For copies of all title deeds, patents, correspondence, and all documents respecting the claim of the Six Nations Indians, as set forth in their Petition presented to this House on the 18th April, 1887, Journals of the House of Commons, Sessional Papers No. 20B, 1887, page 31 and page 37

Earl Granville to the Governor General.

DOWNING STREET, 3rd May, 1886.

My Lord,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's despatch, No. 66, of the 9th of March, transmitting a copy of a letter, addressed by your direction to the chiefs of the Six Nation Indians, with one which they have addressed to me through the chief, William Smith, of Brantford, in connection with their claim to certain land on the banks of the Grand River, alleged to have been ceded to them in 1781.

Your Government will, no doubt, agree with me that it will be for the general advantage that this claim of the Indians, which, from their point of view, involves a sense of injustice at the hands of the Dominion Government, should be openly investigated, and that a decision should be arrived at upon it, in order that the matter may be finally set at rest. The Indians, in fact, desire that such an enquiry should be held, for they request that their claim may be submitted to the Privy Council.

I do not feel able to advise Her Majesty to exercise her power under the Act 3 and 4 William IV, cap. 41, and to refer this matter to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, seeing that the request is made only at the instance of one party to the dispute, and that there is no statement of ascertained facts upon which that tribunal could come to a decision. I shall, however, be prepared to advise Her Majesty so to refer the matter, if such is also the desire of the Dominion Government, and if both parties will agree upon a statement of the facts, in the form of a special case, which can be argued by counsel before the Judicial Committee.

At the same time I would suggest, for the consideration of both the Dominion Government and of the Indians, whether a decision might not be equally well obtained by the arbitration of three independent and impartial persons, of whom one might be selected by the Governor General, and one by the Indians, the third being chosen either by both parties conjointly, or if so desired, nominated by the Secretary of State; and in that case it would be possible to send some one from this country, if such a course were thought desirable and provided Her Majesty's Government were not put to expense in the matter. A board of arbitration of this nature might assemble and dispose of the matter before the end of the coming autumn and probably at less expense than would be involved in a hearing before a Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

I have, &c.,

GRANVILLE.
3rd January, 1887.

Memorandum.—With reference to a despatch from the Right Hon. Earl Granville, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 3rd May, 1886, on the subject of a claim preferred by the Six Nations Indians to certain lands on the banks of the Grand River, which claim they desire to be submitted by Her Majesty to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the undersigned has the honor to state that as Lord Granville had informed Your Excellency that he was not prepared to advise such submission, the Indian Department did not consider any action on the despatch necessary.

The undersigned however having had his attention called to the subject by Your Excellency begs leave to report that in his opinion,

1. It is extremely inexpedient to deal with the Indian bands in the Dominion (except those inhabiting the territories acquired from the Hudson's Bay Company) as being in any way separate nations. They are governed by Canadian statutes, and for any wrongs or grievances have the right of recourse to the legal tribunals of the country as fully and readily as their white fellow-subjects, which right they do not hesitate to exercise.

2. As Indians are inveterate grumblers, if it were once known that this application had been granted there would be no end of similar demands by other bands, a refusal of which would cause much discontent. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to make another tribe understand why it should not receive the same consideration as the Six Nations, and great consequent jealousies and heart-burnings ensue.

3. Should the Six Nations be dissatisfied with the judgment of a Canadian court, they have the right to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, according to the practice of that court.

4. As the claim of the Six Nations rests on legal considerations and affects the title to land, it can more properly be determined by a court of law than by arbitration, and they are well able to bear the expense of the necessary litigation, which need not be more costly than a reference, and would be much more satisfactory.

5. The introduction of a new practice of submitting Indian claims in the first instance to the Judicial Committee would operate as a complete change in the manner in which the Indian races have hitherto been dealt with, and would establish a distinction between them and the other inhabitants of Canada. This is very objectionable, as the great aim of our legislation has been to do away with the tribal system and assimilate the Indian people in all respects with the other inhabitants of the Dominion, as speedily as they are fit for the change.

6. The present claim of the Six Nations has no merits, and does not deserve any exceptional consideration.

All which is respectfully submitted.

J. A. MACDONALD.

To the Hon. the Privy Council of Canada.
APPENDIX J

FACTS ON INDIRECT RULE

Table 3.1 Ratio of European Officials to Estimated Local Population Direct and Indirect Rule in Africa and India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony or European Local State</th>
<th>Type of Rule</th>
<th>European Officials</th>
<th>Estimated Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ratio (nearest 100)</th>
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<tr>
<td>British Kenya</td>
<td>More Direct</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>3,100,000</td>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>1:18,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>French West Africa</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>14,500,000</td>
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<td>11,000,000</td>
<td>1936</td>
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<td>British Nigeria/Cameroons</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>1930s</td>
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<tr>
<td>India (all)</td>
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<td>253,900,000</td>
<td>1881</td>
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<td>Awadh</td>
<td>More Direct</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11,220,000</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>1:295,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Princely India</td>
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<td>94,000,000</td>
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<td>Hyderabad</td>
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<td>11,000,000</td>
<td>1856</td>
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Source:
Fisher, Michael H.

Expansion of Transport & Communications during 19th Century

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<tr>
<td>Telegraphs</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>440</td>
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Source:
Moon, Parker Thomas
# APPENDIX K

## Factual & Constitutional Basis of Sovereignty in Rupert's Land

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cree Naskapi Act, 1984</td>
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<td><strong>Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52; Schedules: #1, #3, and #,</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Supremacy of Constitution, Continuity of RL &amp; NWT Order, CLV Act</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>James Bay &amp; Northern Quebec Agreement, 1975</strong></td>
<td>Accord/Contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada, Quebec, Crees – Read as a contract as per <em>R. v. Badger</em></td>
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<td>Continuity of: BNA Act, 1867 and Rupert’s Land &amp; NWT Order</td>
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<td><strong>Quebec Boundary Extensions 1898, 1912</strong></td>
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<td>Extension of Quebec boundaries to present position</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ontario v. The Dominion of Canada and Quebec; In Re Indian Claims,</strong></td>
<td>Notorious</td>
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<td><em>[1895]</em> / 25 S. C. R. 434</td>
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<td>Judicial Committee of Privy Council UK uses Connolly v. Woolrich</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Report of the Select Committee on the Causes of the Difficulties in</strong></td>
<td>Notorious Facts</td>
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<tr>
<td>the North-West Territory in 1869-70</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM Macdonald’s Confirmation of Royal Proclamation, December 6, 1869</td>
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<td>as an Order of British Cabinet, Addressed to All Races &amp; Creeds</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Report of the Select Committee on the Causes of the Difficulties in</strong></td>
<td>Notorious Facts</td>
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<td>the North-West Territory in 1869-70</td>
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<td>Proclamation 1869, correspondence UK &amp; Canada re its distribution</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Narrative of the Red River Expedition, Blackwood’s Edinburgh</strong></td>
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<td>Magazine, 1870-1871</td>
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<tr>
<td>Described by Col. Wolseley as a police action in face of superior</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aboriginal strength, Canada claimed to have a treaty for safe passage</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Colonel Garnet Wolseley’s Proclamation, June 30, 1870</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Reassurance of inhabitants after communication with British Cabinet</td>
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<td><strong>Rupert’s Land &amp; Northwester Territory Order, June 23, 1870</strong></td>
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<td>After prearranged communications from Col. Wolseley, Port Arthur</td>
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<tr>
<td>British Cabinet Orders to Lt.-Gen. J. Lindsay &amp; Col. G. Wolseley</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Royal Proclamation, December 6, 1869</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assurance of legal rights, property, etc. – Campbell v. Hall applies</td>
<td>Constitutional</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Debates in British Parliament re-Aboriginal Rights, June 1, 1869</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>All parties ask British Cabinet to demand stronger guarantees of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Connolly v. Woolrich [1867], 11 L.C. Jur. 197 (see Appendix K)</strong></td>
<td>Notorious Facts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attest to Aboriginal rights, upheld on appeal, later used by JC PC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian House of Commons &amp; Senate Agree on Annexation Terms</td>
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<td>After an unacceptable first draft, joint address to British Cabinet sent</td>
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<td>Notorious Facts</td>
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<tr>
<th>BNA Act, 1867, s. 146 – Process for Annex of Rupert’s Land &amp; NWT</th>
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<tr>
<td>Address accepted, British Cabinet issues order – becomes constitutional</td>
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<tr>
<th>BNA Act, 1867, Federal Powers 91(24) Indians and Indian Lands</th>
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<tr>
<td>Galloway v. City of London [1866], L.R. 1 H.L. 34, at p. 43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Notorious &amp; Constitutional</td>
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<tr>
<th>Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865</th>
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<tr>
<td>Colonial statutes conflict with British orders or statutes – no legal force</td>
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<td>Constitutional</td>
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<tr>
<th>Select Committee Hearings, British Parliament February 26, 1857</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gov. G. Simpson testifies re 999 year lease, bijural sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Notorious Facts</td>
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</table>
Judge Samuel C. Monk's fact-finding and reasons for judgment were upheld on appeal in *Johnston et al v. Connolly [1869]*, 17 R.J.R.Q. 266; and, approved by the highest court in the British Empire, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of Great Britain, in its 1897 arbitration of *Ontario v. The Dominion of Canada and Quebec; In Re Indian Claims, [1895] 25 S. C. R. 434.*

*Connolly v. Woolrich* did not reach the Judicial Committee by the usual channels, an appeal from a Canadian court or legislature. Rather, as noted in *Kenward v. Kenward*, it was first reported in “Sir Eric Beckett’s valuable article in Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 48, p. 369”. No doubt, the same readers read the 1868 report that appeared in the *Canada Law Journal*, Vol. 4, p. 58. The latter report was detailed and included the remarks that:

Mr. Justice Monk, who heard the cause, gave a very elaborate judgment, which with his full statement of the case is not contained in less than 67 closely printed pages of the *Jurist*. The principal points decided by him incidental to question principally involved, were shortly these:

That though the Hudson’s Bay Company’s Charter is of doubtful validity ... that the English Common law, prevailing in the Hudson’s Bay territories, did not apply to natives who were joint occupants of the territories; nor did it supersede or abrogate, even within the limits of the Charter, the laws, usages, and customs of aborigines: (Canada Law Journal 1868:57-58)

The *Jurist*, a law journal, was published in London by S. Sweet, 1838-1867 and accordingly was readily available to not only the members of the Judicial Committee, but as to courts and lawyers throughout the British Empire. The *Law Quarterly Review* was also published in London, by Stevens & Sons from January 1885 to 1925. The *Canada Law Journal* was initially, 1867-1868, published in Montreal by J. Lovell. In 1868, it was moved to Toronto and published by W. C. Chewett & Co. from 1868 until 1922. The last volume was Volume 58, December 1922. At this point the *Canada Law Journal* was merged with the *Canadian Law Times* to become the *Canadian Bar Review*.

In addition to *Ontario v. The Dominion of Canada and Quebec; In Re Indian Claims*, and *Kenward v. Kenward*, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of Great Britain applied *Connolly v. Woolrich* at least three times outside North America: in *Re Bethel v. Hildyard 1888*, at p. 225-226, attesting that “the marriage was valid notwithstanding the assumed existence of polygamy, and divorce at will obtained”; in *Brinkley v. Attorney-General 1890*, at p. 78, attesting that “such a marriage is valid wherever celebrated, if celebrated in accordance with the forms required by lex loci [local Aboriginal laws]”; and, in *Kenward v. Kenward 1950*, at p. 145-146, attesting that “the marriage is valid by the law of her country and should also for many purposes be regarded as valid here”.

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Connolly v. Woolrich in Canadian Courts

No doubt as a result of its citation in Canadian law textbooks and scholarly journals, Connolly v. Woolrich has often been cited in the judgment reasons of Canadian courts, involving family law or spousal privileges. The following is an example taken from a 1968 article published in the *Alberta Law Review, Vol. 3, p. 278(1968) – Table of English Statutes in Force in Canada*

"It is an enlarged and updated version of one which appeared as Appendix C of Clements’ Canadian Constitution 1060 (2nd edition 1916)" ...p.285

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Court</th>
<th>Case</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Quebec Superior Court</td>
<td>Fraser v. Pouliot et al, [1884], 13 R.L.O.S. 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Supreme Court of Canada</td>
<td>Fraser v. Pouliot et al, [1885], 13 R.L.O.S. 520</td>
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<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>NWTerritorial Court</td>
<td>Regina v. Nan-e-quis-a-ka, [1889], 1 Terr.L.R. 211 (also reported: 1 (No. 2) N.W.T.R. 21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>Ontario Provincial Court</td>
<td>Robb v. Robb et al. [1891], 20 O.R. 591</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>NWTerritorial Court</td>
<td>Re Noah Estate, [1961], 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Saskatchewan, Queen’s Bench and Court of Appeal</td>
<td>Ex Parte Cote, [1971], 22 D.L.R. (3d) 353</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>BC Supreme Court</td>
<td>Prince &amp; Julian v. HMTQ et al, 2000 BCSC 1066</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>BC Supreme Court</td>
<td>Campbell et al v. AG BC/AG Cda &amp; Nisga'a Nation et al, 2000 BCSC 1123</td>
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**APPENDIX M**

**Boards, Commissions and Committees**

The following list of more than sixty public committees, boards, committees and corporations that govern the lives of the Crees of Waskaganish First Nations. These are part of the Cree government institutions. Not included, are the committees, boards, committees and corporations of the federal and provincial government. With the exception of two, the Crees of Waskaganish First Nation and Council and the parents committee, none of the boards, commissions or committees existed thirty years ago. No doubt there are more than on this list that continues to grow, which were established by Quebec or Canada, that communities will only know about in time.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3899462 &amp; Massenor (1992) Inc. Joint Venture Management Committee</td>
<td>33 Regional Childcare Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Air Creebec Inc.</td>
<td>34 Sara Stephen Memorial Arena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chief Malcolm Diamond Memorial Training Centre Inc.</td>
<td>35 Transmission Line Technical Committee Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Court Worker Program - Court of Abitibi</td>
<td>36 Waaseskun Childcare Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cree Board of Compensation</td>
<td>37 Waskaganish Business Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cree Board of Health and Social Services</td>
<td>38 Waskaganish Community Radio Board of Trustees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cree Child &amp; Family Services</td>
<td>39 Waskaganish Cultural Institute</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Cree Construction Company</td>
<td>40 Waskaganish Enterprises Development Corporation</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Cree Human Resources Development</td>
<td>41 Waskaganish Finance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Cree Income Security Board</td>
<td>42 Waskaganish First Nation Elders Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Cree Naskapi Commission</td>
<td>43 Waskaganish First Nation Firemen Volunteers</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Cree Outfitters and Tourism Association</td>
<td>44 Waskaganish First Nation Housing Committee</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Cree Regional Authority</td>
<td>45 Waskaganish First Nation Local Task Force on Eeyou Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Cree Regional Youth Committee</td>
<td>46 Waskaganish First Nation Minor Sports Association Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Cree School Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Cree School Board Vocational Training Committee</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Cree Trappers' Association</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Crees of the Waskaganish First Nation Council</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Waskaganish Diabetes Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Gathering Place Management Advisory Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Headstart Program</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>James Bay Communications Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>James Bay Cultural Education Foundation</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>James Bay Eyou Corporation</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Kanio Kashee Lodge</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Local Aboriginal Management Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Local Cree Trappers Committee</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Multiservice Day Centre</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>Natamuh Advisory Board</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Navcanada</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Niskamoone Corporation</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>NNADP</td>
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Delegation of Federal Powers

to Provincial Governments

Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act, S.C. 1984, c. 18

INCONSISTENCY WITH FEDERAL OR PROVINCIAL LAW

Provincial laws of general application do not apply to the extent that they are inconsistent or in conflict with this Act or a regulation or by-law made thereunder or to the extent that they make provision for a matter that is provided for by this Act.

INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE OF PROVINCIAL LAWS

For the purpose of applying the portion of paragraph 5.1.13 of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and of paragraph 5.1.13 of the Northeastern Quebec Agreement dealing with the leasing of lands and the granting of real rights to non-Natives, the Governor in Council may make regulations for the purpose of making provincial law in force in the Province applicable to leasehold interests or other real rights in Category IA or IA-N land granted to non-beneficiaries for periods exceeding five years, including any renewal thereof.

PART XVI: POLICING

A police force and the members thereof providing policing services pursuant to an agreement made under subsection (1) have jurisdiction over the Category IA or IA-N land of the band for the purposes of enforcing the applicable laws of Canada and Quebec and the applicable by-laws of the band.
Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5

LEGAL RIGHTS

General provincial laws applicable to Indians

88. Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with this Act or the First Nations Fiscal and Statistical Management Act, or with any order, rule, regulation or law of a band made under those Acts, and except to the extent that those provincial laws make provision for any matter for which provision is made by or under those Acts.

R.S., 1985, c. I-5, s. 88; 2005, c. 9, s. 151.
Quebec

Youth Protection Act, R.S.Q. c. P-34.1

DIVISION I

COMMISSION DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DES DROITS DE
LA JEUNESSE

Duties of the Commission.

23. The Commission shall, in conformity with the other provisions of this Act, discharge the following duties:

(a) it shall ensure, by any appropriate measures, the promotion and protection of the rights of children which are recognized by this Act and the Youth Criminal Justice Act (Statutes of Canada, 2002, chapter 1);

(b) upon an application or of its own motion, it shall investigate any situation where it has reason to believe that the rights of a child or of a group of children have been encroached upon by persons, institutions or bodies, unless the tribunal is already seized of it;

(c) it shall take the legal means it considers necessary to remedy any situation where the rights of a child are being encroached upon;

(d) it shall prepare and implement information and educational programs on the rights of children for the benefit of the public in general and of children in particular;

(e) it may, at all times, make recommendations, in particular, to the Minister of Health and Social Services, the Minister of Education, Recreation and Sports and to the Minister of Justice;

(f) it may carry out or cause to be carried out studies and research on any question related to its competence, of its own motion or at the request
of the Minister of Health and Social Services and of the Minister of Justice.

1977, c. 20, s. 23; 1981, c. 2, s. 5; 1984, c. 4, s. 10; 1985, c. 21, s. 81; 1985, c. 23, s. 24; 1988, c. 21, s. 119; 1988, c. 41, s. 88; 1989, c. 53, s. 11, s. 12; 1992, c. 21, s. 375; 1993, c. 51, s. 45; 1994, c. 16, s. 50; 1995, c. 27, s. 11; 2005, c. 28, s. 195; 2006, c. 34, s. 73.

Discharge of duty.

23.1 The duty provided for in paragraph b of section 23 must be discharged by a group of not less than three members of the Commission designated by the president.

Decisions.

However, the decision to hold an investigation, to file an application for the disclosure of information under the second paragraph of section 72.5 or to disclose information under the second paragraph of section 72.6 or under section 72.7 shall be made by the president or by a person designated by the president from among the members of the Commission or its personnel.

Review.

The Commission may review the decision to hold an investigation made under the second paragraph.

1981, c. 2, s. 6; 1984, c. 4, s. 10; 1989, c. 53, s. 3; 1994, c. 35, s. 14; 1995, c. 27, s. 12; 2002, c. 34, s. 6.

Duties.

24. The duties provided for in paragraph c of section 23 and in sections 25.2 and 25.3 may be discharged, on behalf of the Commission, by a group of members designated pursuant to the first paragraph of section 23.1.

1977, c. 20, s. 24; 1984, c. 4, s. 11; 1989, c. 53, s. 12; 1995, c. 27, s. 13.
Access.

25. A member of the Commission or any person in its employment may, with the written authorization of a justice of the peace, enter premises in which he has reasonable cause to believe there is a child whose security or development is or may be considered to be in danger and where entry is necessary for the purposes of an inquiry of the Commission.

Authorization granted.

The justice of the peace may grant the authorization, subject to such conditions as he may specify therein, if he is satisfied on the basis of a sworn statement by the member of the Commission or the person in the employment of the Commission that there is reasonable cause to believe that there is therein a child whose security or development is or may be considered to be in danger and if entry therein is necessary for the purposes of an inquiry. The authorization, whether acted upon or not, shall be returned to the justice of the peace who granted it, within 15 days after its issue.

No authorization required.

No authorization is required, however, if the conditions for obtaining it exist and if, owing to exigent circumstances, the time necessary to obtain the authorization may result in danger to the security of a child.

1977, c. 20, s. 25; 1984, c. 4, s. 12; 1986, c. 95, s. 246; 1989, c. 53, s. 12; 1999, c. 40, s. 226.
Children and adolescents affected by an intervention under the Youth Protection Act or the Youth Criminal Justice Act have specific rights. These include:

- the right to be informed of their rights and to know what is going to happen to them
- the right to consult an advocate
- the right to make their views known concerning the measures to be taken
- the right to be informed and prepared before being transferred from one facility to another
- the right to receive adequate health, social and educational services while under protection
- the right to communicate confidentially with family members while housed in a facility
- the right to be informed of the rules applicable in a rehabilitation center
- the right to be protected against arbitrary disciplinary measures
- the right to be housed in an appropriate facility and the right to respect for their rights, when removed from their family environment
- the right to confidentiality
- the right to receive regular communications from the DYP

The mandate of the Commission

The mandate of the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse is to ensure that those rights are respected. The Commission intervenes in or investigates any case when it considers that the rights of a child or a group of children are being, or have been, infringed.
The Commission intervenes to
* stop situations that may threaten the rights of children and adolescents
* prevent the reoccurrence of such situations

When can I file a complaint?

You can file a complaint with the Commission when
* you are not satisfied with the services you are receiving under the Youth Protection Act or the Youth Criminal Justice Act
* you know of a child who is not receiving the services to which he or she is entitled
* you know of a child who is receiving inadequate services, and whose rights are violated or encroached

Who can file a complaint for intervention by the Commission?

Any person who believes that the rights of a child are being, or have been, violated may bring the situation to the attention of the Commission.

A child who has been taken in charge under the Youth Protection Act or the Youth Criminal Justice Act may contact the Commission directly to complain about the services he or she is receiving. The child may also ask a lawyer to file the complaint.

Any adult who comes into contact with and knows about the situation of a child (parents, family members, friends, service providers, professionals, etc.) can use the Commission's services at any time.

Procedure

You can choose the best way to ask the Commission to intervene – by phone, in writing, or in person at one of the Commission's offices. You will not need to fill out any forms, and all the Commission's services are free.

All complaints for intervention are treated as confidential. When dealing with the Commission, you can bring another person along for support or appoint a representative.

The Commission personnel can help make your complaint and to clarify the problem affecting you or a child.
Where to file a complaint

Complaints can be filed at one of the Commission's offices:

Offices / Investigation and regional representation

* Gatineau
* Longueuil
* Montréal métropolitain
* Québec
* Rimouski
* Saguenay
* Saint-Jérôme
* Sept-Iles
* Sherbrooke
* Trois-Rivières
* Val-d'Or
The Violence
Family Tree

Source:
Arun Gandhi
1995 Nonviolence and Us, Business
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>COURT CASES CITED</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>• Adeyinka Oyekan et al v. Musendiku Adele, [26 June 1957]</td>
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<td>• Angu v. Atta [1916] Gold Coast Privy Council Judgments, 1874-1928, 43</td>
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<td>• Attorney-General of Ontario v. Attorney-General of Canada, [1912] A.C. 571</td>
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<td>• Benoit v. Canada, [2002] FCT 243</td>
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<td>• Bethel v. Hildyard [1888]</td>
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<td>• Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000], 2 S.C.R. 307</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Bongay v. Macauley, 1 W.A.C.A.,</td>
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<td>• Brinkley v. Attorney-General [1890]</td>
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<td>• Calder v. British Columbia Attorney General [1973], S.C.R. 313</td>
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<td>• Campbell et al v. AG BC/AG Canada &amp; Nisga'a Nation et al, 2000 BCSC 1123</td>
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<td>• Campbell v. Hall, [1774], 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Case of Proclamations [1611], 77 E.R. 1352</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203</td>
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