2013

Bilateral aid in Canada's foreign policy: the human rights rhetoric-practice gap

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Lethbridge, Alta. : University of Lethbridge, Dept. of Political Science, c2013

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BILATERAL AID IN CANADA’S FOREIGN POLICY: 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS RHETORIC-PRACTICE GAP

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Bachelor of Commerce, University of British Columbia, 1979

A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies 
of the University of Lethbridge
in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS, POLITICAL SCIENCE

Political Science
University of Lethbridge
LETHBRIDGE, ALBERTA, CANADA

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To my wife Deb – without whose love, patience and understanding my pursuit of life-long learning would not have been possible.
Successive Canadian federal governments have officially indicated their support of human rights in foreign policy, including as they relate to aid-giving. This thesis quantitatively tests this rhetoric with the actual practice of bilateral aid-giving in two time periods – 1998-2000 and 2007-2009. This, however, revealed that Canada has actually tended to give more bilateral aid to countries with poorer human rights records. A deeper quantitative analysis identifies certain multilateral memberships – notably with the Commonwealth, NATO, and OECD – and the geopolitical and domestic considerations of Haiti as significant and confirms a recipient state’s human rights performance is not a consideration. These multilateral relationships reflect state self-interests, historical connections, security, and a normative commitment to poverty reduction. It is these factors that those promoting a human rights agenda need to contemplate if recipient state performance is to become relevant in bilateral aid decisions. Thus, it is necessary to turn to international relations theory, in particular liberal institutionalism, to explain Canada’s bilateral aid-giving in these periods.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis searches to find correlation between Canada’s development assistance and human rights performance in two three-year periods – 1998-2000 and 2007-2009. These periods represent the direction of a Liberal government and a Conservative minority government respectively. However, bivariate correlation analyses do not yield results where more Canadian bilateral aid is given to recipient states with better human rights records. In fact, the opposite outcome occurred; more bilateral aid has been given to more repressive states. When multivariate regression models are used, still no significant correlations emerge with the human rights variable. Therefore, no empirical evidence is found to support the government’s often cited commitment to human rights in development assistance programs, and most notably with respect to bilateral aid. However, the regression models reveal connections between bilateral aid and certain multilateral organizations. These specific variables do explain some of the bilateral aid direction, but multilateralism as a whole is not an independent variable. A theoretical examination is necessary to determine the independent variable that conditions bilateral aid. Applying Liberal Institutionalism (LI) theory, it can be demonstrated that bilateral aid has been guided by the pursuit of Canada’s self-interests and power, its commitment to multilateralism, and its dedication to the advancement of liberal democracies. While human rights are normative values that are aligned with liberal principles, they are not primary or dominate motivations for Canada’s development assistance. Consequently, there is a disconnect between the government rhetoric on the importance of human rights and its practices.

Examining the relationship between aid and human rights is predicated on two important considerations. First, successive Canadian governments have claimed human rights
are vital to development assistance decisions. This has been confirmed by successive policy statements since the late 1980s. This, in conjunction with the 1982 adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, has contributed to the development of a Canadian self-image as a domestic and international champion of human rights. Second, and more importantly, ignoring human rights violations by recipient states not only supports abusive regimes but essentially undermines Canada’s commitment to international human rights. Aid is a limited resource. Given that there is greater need in the world for aid than there is available assistance, aid to repressive states simply supports oppressive governments and prevents aid from reaching where help is also needed, and human rights are violated to a lesser extent. In other words, there is an opportunity cost to providing aid – which is a scarce resource – to repressive states.

This normative argument has been expressed by many academics. T.A. Keenleyside, for example, has argued that development assistance must improve the “human condition in all its aspects – as “empowering” the oppressed and disadvantaged.” Katarina Tomasevski also argued that aid to repressive regimes only “contributes to the perpetuation of violations.” Thus, a donor state has at minimum an obligation to ensure aid is not used to repress the basic rights of citizens in the recipient state. Because human rights violations are notionally within the control of the governing regime, bilateral aid is seen as direct support of that regime’s human rights record. As Tomasevski makes clear the “denial of human rights is incompatible with

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... countries cannot achieve sustainable economic development without the recognition and protection of human rights."

This thesis was thus expanded to include analyses of additional variables in an effort to identity and explain influences on Canada’s development assistance allocation. These multivariate analyses demonstrated there was one broad factor that had some statistical significance with Canada’s bilateral aid decisions; this is Canada’s commitment to multilateral institutions. However, this finding was limited to Canada’s memberships in the Commonwealth and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Commonwealth membership identifies a preference for Canada to give bilateral aid to developing Commonwealth members. The OECD variable is based on the degree to which Canada directs bilateral aid to states based on the need for poverty reduction. This variable was assessed by utilizing the income levels established by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, of which Canada is a member. The results show Canada provided more bilateral aid to poorer states, which is consistent with the OECD’s emphasis on poverty reduction.

In addition, aid to the ex-Yugoslavian states and Afghanistan in the first and second study periods respectively is also inferred to support Canada’s membership in another multilateral organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). No such correlation was found to exist for the G-8, la Francophonie, and the Organization of American States (OAS). Consequently, commitment to, and participation in, multilateral institutions is not an independent variable as it does not apply to all the major organizations to which Canada has membership. While this does indicate multilateralism sometimes is correlated to bilateral aid, it is not in all cases. Further, no quantitative evidence was found connecting any multilateral

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4 Tomasevski, *Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited*, 173.
memberships and human rights records the allocation of bilateral aid. Thus, this thesis seeks explanations based on qualitative considerations.

For these reasons, Canada’s development assistance practices can perhaps be better understood in the context of International Relations (IR) theory. Specifically, the connection between the direction of some multilateral institutions and Canada’s bilateral aid decisions point to the validity of LI, with its focus on regimes and institutions, the management of anarchy, rules and norms, and in many cases the pursuit of Canada’s own self-interest in its foreign aid policy. This has direct implications for the study of Canadian foreign policy (CFP) as it re-enforces the utility of traditional middle power and multilateral frameworks used to understand and interpret Canada’s foreign relations. And it is in LI theory that the independent variables of self-interest and power are found and qualitatively explains Canada’s development assistance policies and practices.

The structure of this thesis begins with a review of earlier, pertinent quantitative studies that have either focused on or included human rights considerations. Specifically, this chapter focuses on empirical analyses that have attempted to examine Canada’s consistency between aid-giving and recipient states human rights records. There are very few empirical studies that have examined CFP in this context. Those that have considered human rights and aid have typically done so within broader studies collapsing decades of data into single assessments. Further, some of these studies have only peripherally considered human rights in studies principally focused on other hypotheses. Consequently, human rights have been defined in many as part of other variables and have suffered from inconsistencies in definition. A single
study, also done as an M.A. thesis, focused directly on bilateral aid and human rights performance. That study examined CFP aid-giving in the period 1984-87.\(^5\)

The second chapter positions development assistance and human rights in IR theory. International human rights are fundamentally founded in liberal theory, yet realism and neo-realism has historically dominated discussions of global international relations.\(^6\) Realism offers little in the way of explaining and understanding individual state actions outside the rational self-interest of atomized states. However, it is apparent that not all developed states make development assistance decisions on this singular motivation.\(^7\) A liberal analysis accounts for more variables, such as multilateralism, economics and normative considerations, in a state’s decision-making. It is from within the liberal context that the influence of international institutions and other non-state actors on individual states can be considered. This thesis will argue LI provides a more comprehensive understanding of the recent development of international interests with regards to human rights concerns and development assistance.

Chapter three focuses on the evolution of development assistance and human rights in CFP. Canada’s foreign policy has consistently supported liberal tenets through international institutions and regimes, and the development of multilateral treaties. And while the federal state is the primary foreign affairs actor, its commitment to multilateral organizations, such as United Nations (UN), NATO, G-7/8, the Commonwealth, La Francophonie, and OAS, foster international liberalism. Further, Canada’s foreign policies are influenced by domestic views and non-state actors, such as provinces, various bureaucratic departments and civil society, further

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demonstrating that foreign relations have not simply been based on relative international state power. Human rights have been discussed relative to development assistance at least since the 1980s, but there have been competing factors which have brought these into conflict with human rights views.

The next two chapters establish the parameters used in the quantitative analyses and the actual findings. This study initially intended to evaluate Canada’s foreign policy commitment by empirically testing for correlations between human rights and development assistance to determine whether human rights are a deciding factor in the allocation of bilateral aid. These quantitative analyses examine Canada’s bilateral aid over two discrete three-year periods; these encompass the periods of 1998-2000 under a Chrétien Liberal government which at the time had a strong focus on human security issues and a human rights, democracy and good governance (HRDGG) agenda; and of 2007-2009 under a Harper Conservative minority government which, similar to past governments, declared human rights to be a key pillar of its foreign policy. Based on a positive view of human rights, it was expected there would be a correlation between human rights records and bilateral aid that indicates a greater commitment to recipient states that have relatively better human rights performance. By considering these periods, two additional decades of data are provided in a bivariate analysis of foreign aid relative to recipient state human rights performance. But, neither Serkasevich’s earlier quantitative study nor the two periods in this study support this hypothesis, thus confirming the

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existence of a ‘rhetoric-practice’ gap. Consequently, it was necessary to explore other explanations.

Yet, it was anticipated that because there are other competing and conflicting factors in foreign affairs decisions, inconsistencies in the relationship between bilateral aid and the human rights of some recipient states would exist. Therefore, by using regression models, this study goes on to test other variables with implications for bilateral aid in conjunction with human rights. Specifically, these other variables are Canada’s commitment to multilateral organizations and specific temporal political events, such as its involvement in the Afghanistan war and Balkans conflict. Thus, the study was modified to include the premise that if the Canadian government has given some serious consideration to human rights in their decision-making on bilateral aid, then a statistically significant correlation should exist in a multivariate regression model that included these additional explanatory variables and controls for specific events. In addition to the multilateral organizations noted above, a dummy variable was included for Haiti. A logged variable was used to account for the vast population variance. Only Canada’s membership in the Commonwealth, NATO and the OECD were significant. Thus, multilateralism is identified as of some importance but not as an independent variable to explain Canada’s bilateral aid decisions.

Neither quantitative period confirms a statistically significant relationship between human rights and bilateral aid decisions. Consequently, while specific references directly to human rights, and also within the context of good governance, have been frequently made by Canadian governments and their agencies, these are not substantiated in practice. However,

\[10\] Barratt, *Human Rights and Foreign Aid*, 121.
what is reinforced by this study is that variables related to Canada’s historical commitment to multilateralism are pertinent to how bilateral aid has been distributed.

Not surprisingly, Canada has been criticized for inconsistently granting foreign aid to recipient states with questionable human rights performance. In Bethany Barratt’s assessment, Canada’s policy on “[h]uman rights may be the most laudable goals of foreign policy...” but then adds “...it is also the most inconsistently pursued.” Foreign policy decisions are complex, involving commercial and political factors in addition to human rights concerns, which are often viewed as being of lesser importance. This has given rise to a number of critical qualitative academic studies highlighting inconsistencies between foreign aid and human rights. The assessments have typically considered specific incidents and not encompassed bilateral aid with the totality of recipient states. The multivariate regression identifies multilateral relationships that have promoted historical relationships, poverty reduction, and security. What becomes apparent is that Canada pursues multilateralism to enhance its international power, image, and its self-interest. Canada’s development assistance practices are best seen through a LI lens. The view that many critics have expressed that development assistance has been inconsistent with respect to human rights is a reflection of what they view ‘ought’ to be. By seeing multilateralism through LI as motivating Canadian development assistance, a more fruitful discussion regarding how to influence policy is perhaps possible.

CHAPTER 1

METHODOLOGY LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to review key quantitative studies to glean significant findings related to human rights performance and Canadian bilateral aid, and to also inform on key methodological design considerations. However, in contrast to the numerous critical books and academic articles commenting on Canada’s bilateral aid practices, there are only a few quantitative studies relating aid and the human rights records of recipient states. In the majority of these, Canada is one of several donor states whose development assistance is evaluated relative to human rights and other variables. There is only one study that actually directly addresses bilateral aid and human rights performance of recipient states, and that was almost twenty-five years ago. With one exception, these quantitative studies are longitudinal covering one or more decades and include several donor states.

This most ‘on point’ study by Nola Serkasevich actually provided the initial motivation for this thesis. Her MA thesis reviewed Canada’s bilateral aid-giving relative to recipient states’ human rights records for the period 1984-87.¹ Serkasevich used government reports to identify bilateral aid provided to sovereign states in this period. Bilateral aid is focused on because it most directly supports the recipient government, and by extension its policies and practices.

To assess human rights records, Serkasevich used Amnesty International (AI) narratives and assigned ratings based on a modified five point political violence and terror scale. Category 1 provides for a secure rule of law where people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture,

¹ Serkasevich, "The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations."
extrajudicial killings and disappearances and forced migration are extremely rare. Category 5 reflects a state where the public in general are widely subjected to incarceration for their views; torture, extra-judicial killings and disappearances common and forced migration or expulsion is routine; and leaders pursue personal or ideological goals. \(^2\) This scale shows progressive improvement from 5 through 1, but broadly it was argued that categories 1 and 2 are preferred or acceptable scores, whereas 3 through 5 were declining degrees of unacceptable scores. To validate these scores a second rater was also used. \(^3\) However, the score results were specific to the time frame of this study. Fortunately, these five narrative anchor points are similar to those used in the Political Terror Scale (PTS), which has provided consistent score methodology from 1976 to present. A more significant shortcoming to this study, however, was the lack of AI narratives for 30 recipient states. \(^4\) This resulted in more than 25 per cent of recipient states being unrated and therefore not included in the analysis. Fortunately, since Serkasevich’s study, several scales have improved on the number of countries rated.

However, Serkasevich’s findings do identify some interesting outcomes. The study did not find a statistically significant correlation where recipient states with better human rights records received a greater share of Canadian bilateral aid. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia (in descending order) were the largest Canadian aid recipient states based on total dollars, even though all committed serious human rights abuses and had category 4 ratings. Looking at aid in total dollars it was concluded Canada favoured states which had committed serious human rights violations in preference to those with satisfactory records during the

\(^2\) Ibid., 53. These five categories are essentially the same as the Political Terror Scale defined in Appendix I, which is used in the methodology for this thesis. The wording varies slightly but the categories essentially represent the same differentiations.

\(^3\) Ibid., 53-55.

period of study.\(^5\) It is also worth noting that the top three were Commonwealth states and had continuously received aid from Canada as far back as the 1950s. Although not explored in Serkasevich’s study, it appears Canada’s multilateral obligations stemming from membership in the Commonwealth may have taken precedence over human rights considerations.\(^6\) The ties created by the Colombo plan and the reluctance of governments to discontinue relations may have contributed to this result.

Serkasevich also presents results based on a per capita approach, and by this examination Dominica, Grenada, Anguilla, and Belize were the top four ranked recipient states. The first two states were rated as category 1 and the latter two states were not rated due to a lack of AI data.\(^7\) Of the worst human rights abusers only Bangladesh was in the top 45 recipient states using the per capita method. To further clarify, Serkasevich’s statistics show Bangladesh receiving $109 million on average over the three years (highest among all states), while Dominica received only $6.2 million (31\(^{st}\)). However, when considered on a per capita basis, Dominica topped the list with bilateral aid equalling $81.89 per capita and Bangladesh was 44\(^{th}\) at $1.08 per capita; demonstrating that when per capita aid is considered a very different outcome is apparent.\(^8\) Clearly, the vast range in population distribution has a significant impact on the results. Serkasevich reported the per capita measure showed a statistically significant

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\(^5\) Serkasevich, "The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations," 67. Serkasevich found fifty of the recipient states had ratings of 3, 4 or 5, while only 32 of the recipient states were in categories 1 and 2. The remaining states were unrated.

\(^6\) The top three bilateral aid recipients in this study were Commonwealth members.

\(^7\) Serkasevich, "The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations," 61, 63. Serkasevich observes that the states without ratings are generally considered to have good human rights records. It would seem likely these states have not been assessed because of their size or their positive human rights records or both.

\(^8\) Ibid., 63-64.
Pearson $r$ of -0.3218, demonstrating more Canadian bilateral aid per capita was provided to recipient states with better human rights records.\(^9\)

Yet, Serkasevich rejects a per capita approach based on the logic that the total amount given to these top per capita aid countries made up only a small per cent of the total aid Canada distributed in those years. She points out that almost two-thirds of total bilateral aid during the study period had gone to the top 15 recipient states. In contrast, roughly 7 per cent of total bilateral aid had been given to the top 15 per capita recipients. Only Jamaica was on both lists.\(^10\) On the assumption the largest donation amounts were reflective of government policy, Serkasevich’s analysis emphasized total dollars to major recipients.

Despite the lack of complete data, this study provides a basis from which to build. Given the availability of human rights ratings as a result of the increase in country narratives today, it is possible to develop more complete human rights data, allowing for more accurate information and analysis.

With a broader and more comprehensive approach, Eric Neumayer conducted two overlapping empirical studies focused on bilateral and multilateral aid from 21 states – including Canada - based on a wide number of variables, with a primary focus on correlating human rights and aid.\(^11\) The first period addressed 1985-1997 while the second period spanned 1991-2000. In both he identifies Canada as one of the ‘like-minded’ countries, which, among other things, have been characterized as having publicly stated policy positions connecting good governance (GG) –

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\(^{9}\) Ibid., 60.

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 62. Noting Jamaica as an exception, Serkasevich quite rightly points out that at the time these countries had such small populations, with modest economies, that they had limited ability to effectively absorb any larger amounts of aid.

including human rights – with aid-giving. In using GG as his main focus, Neumayer also includes political, civil and human rights of the citizenry protected by the rule of law through a non-corrupted public service and delivered in a transparent and accountable way. GG has broad international appeal as it was adopted as an objective by the United Nations (UN) and has been included in Canada’s policy statements since 1995. However, this term lacks clarity, is overly broad and is prone to subjective considerations. It particularly focuses on democratic progress which can overshadow the narrower human rights concerns of personal security and safety. GG is also open to criticism for imposing a Western democratic culture on developing states.

However, Neumayer’s study overcame the broad GG term by also providing a more detailed analysis using a subcategory of personal integrity rights, which he measures using the human rights PTS ratings. This scale is a physical integrity rights measure where ratings are determined by the political imprisonment, torture and murder perpetrated or allowed by the state against its citizens (See Appendix I). Category 1 is reserved for countries that have a well-established rule of law where citizens are not imprisoned and only rarely might be tortured as a result of their political views. Political murders are extremely rare. In category 2 there would be a limited few people imprisoned over nonviolent political activities with only exceptional cases

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12 Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway are identified as the other like-minded countries. The inclusion of Canada in this category is based on common rhetoric regarding human rights and aid that stemmed from the 1980s. However, while the rhetoric has remained somewhat consistent, the commitment to the level of aid giving has not. Canada’s aid level has reduced to roughly half the target of 0.7% of GNI on average through the 1990s while the other like-minded states have each exceeded this target. For this reason, I am reluctant to use this term.


14 Neumayer, “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation?”

15 Both the current PTS scale and the scale Serkasevich has modified are based on the original political terror scale by Purdue University scholars, which was developed from the ‘political terror’ scale published by Freedom House in 1980. For further explanation, see: Reed M. Wood and Mark Gibney, “The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and Comparison,” Human Rights Quarterly 32 No. 2 (May 2010): 367-400.
of torture and political murder is rare. While this category leaves room for improvement, it is markedly superior to the remaining categories. Category 3 is characterized by the acceptance of, or a history of, ongoing imprisonment over political views, with or without legal due process. Executions, political murders and brutality are common. Category 4 affects the civil and political rights of a broader range of the population where murders, disappearances, and torture become common place. The state terrorizes those who are politically active or show political interest. Category 5 expands the level of torture to the whole population with no restraints placed on the leaders in the actions taken to maintain control.16

The ratings on this five-point anchored scale are based on independent codification by project teams analyzing the narratives provided by Amnesty International (AI) and the US Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, resulting in two ratings per state (where narratives are available from both sources). Neumayer asserts this dual scale more accurately reflects the core of human rights and is not subject to cultural relativism criticisms. 17 In this study the scores from the two coded narratives are averaged, and where one or the other rating was missing, the single score was used.18 This presents two problems. First, the anchor scale does not have half points so the five anchors are no longer reflected by these scores. Second, there were still countries with no scores because neither source had reviewed the country. Nevertheless, Neumayer’s approach represents an improvement over that used by Serkasevich, both in process and by the simple fact data was available for many more countries.

17 Neumayer, “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation?,” 652. This is consistent with the human rights definition discussed the next chapter.
18 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 54.
In comparing this personal integrity rights measure to aid, Neumayer’s results are inconclusive. In the first study, Neumayer reports that Canada provided more aid to countries with better records on personal integrity rights, but this connection did not materialize at the much broader measure of GG or civil and political rights. However in the second study, Neumayer is unable to find a similar empirical evidence of correlation between aid and respect for human rights.

Besides considering more factors in a multivariate regression analysis, Neumayer’s study also differentiates between what he perceives to be a two-step decision-making process. The selection of recipient states is a separate decision from that of how much is allocated to each chosen recipient state. He asserts these decisions have slightly differing criteria. The first decision he refers to as the ‘eligibility stage’ and the latter as the ‘level stage’.

While his second empirical results do not statistically show Canada as taking human rights into consideration at either stage, he does conclude recipient state population, actual Canadian trade exports, low corruption, low regulatory burden and the percentage of Christianity in the recipient state as being significant at the eligibility stage. At the level stage, population and low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) became most significant, with Canadian exports and low regulatory burden also being statistically important. These statistically significant variables suggest some interesting but contradictory motivations. On the one hand, low GDP and high population variables indicate a humanitarian commitment to poverty

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19 Neumayer, “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation?,” 663. Denmark had a similar result as Canada, while the only countries to give more aid under both of these human rights measures were Japan and the United Kingdom.
21 Ibid. These two stages are also referred to as the gate-keeping stage and the allocation stage by others, in particular Bethany Barratt and Michelle Allendoerfer.
22 Ibid., 62-63. However, population and exports were only statistically significant to the 0.1 level.
23 Ibid., 63-64.
reduction, while increased Canadian exports suggest self-interested commercial preferences. Neumayer does not explain the connection with exports, but it is most likely a result of the high percentage of tied aid Canada required at the time. Tied aid describes the conditions donor states place on the recipient to use the aid to purchase goods and services from the donor state. Such requirements frequently result in less effective use of aid, but tied aid supports the donor state’s self-interest by promoting its domestic economy.  

Unlike Serkasevich, Neumayer places an emphasis on the density of the recipient state’s population. Neumayer makes the argument that “[i]f total aid is taken to be the dependent variable, then at the least population size must be one of the explanatory variables to account for the fact that, all other things equal, China [or Bangladesh, as in Serkasevich’s study] is more likely to receive more aid than, say, Dominica.” Yet he points out that for countries to allocate funds based on per capita would be cumbersome and it is more probable aid is distributed based on total dollars available in limited and fixed budgets. Per capita is, thus, an outcome rather than a consideration. Therefore, at the level stage Neumayer opted to focus on the percentage of the total aid committed by the donor state.

Neumayer also provided an assessment of aid strategies relative to GG objectives that offers a sound basis for determining recipient states eligibility. He asserts a primary preference for a selective strategy with secondary consideration for a capacity-building strategy. He rejects the persuasion and conditional strategies as ineffective and as yielding inconsistent results.

25 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 42.
26 Ibid., 42.
27 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 11-15. Selective strategy has the donor state provide more aid to states that have demonstrated a commitment and improvement in GG. Capacity build strategy involves
More importantly, he alleges these inferior strategies convey an incoherent foreign policy message with respect to the human rights expectations of the donor states. The premise is that by adhering to a selectivity strategy a donor state should provide more aid to recipients that have demonstrated improvements in GG. However, Neumayer also believes a capacity-building strategy – which is based on the willingness of the state to improve GG except that the state does not have the infrastructure to do so – should also be pursued. Aid in this case would be directed to such developments as building a quality police force or independent court system. However, critical to applying a capacity-building strategy is the existence of obvious evidence of support from the state’s political leadership for these changes, which is often not the case.

While Neumayer has used these strategies to examine governance commitment, they just as easily apply to personal integrity rights. In fact, it can be argued personal integrity rights provide an even more straightforward application. The actions of governing regimes that commit serious human rights violation and receive bilateral aid are in effect being supported by the donor country. Therefore, a selective strategy approach would dictate more aid be given to states with proven positive human rights records. A capacity-building strategy would see bilateral aid provided to develop the infrastructure to reform the actions of the regime. This can only occur in instances where the regime is actually committed to such reforms, which would seem to be highly unlikely. An argument for more multilateral and direct aid that bypasses the regime would seem to be warranted in such cases.

In an even longer period of study (1980-2004), Bethany Barratt examines aid from the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia relative to a number of economic, historic, geopolitical, providing aid where the state is committed to improving its GG but does not have the necessary infrastructure. Persuasion strategy involves diplomatic efforts to convince a state to change. This is the least effective strategy. Conditional strategy involves setting targets to be met in exchange for upfront aid and tied to future aid. This strategy has typically failed because the donor states have not consistently followed through when the conditions have not been met or only partially met.
strategic, and human rights variables. In identifying the human rights variable, Barratt uses the US Department of State’s Country Reports on PTS scores. She opts for the scores from the US assessments because there were marginally more countries covered by these reports compared to the AI narratives. However, she acknowledges there has been a tendency for the AI ratings to be more critical, although discrepancies were reduced in later years. Similar to Neumayer, Barratt separates aid decisions based on gatekeeping and allocation stages. With respect to Canada, she does not find a significant correlation for human rights at either stage. However, Barratt does report a marginal, but not statistically significant, increase in aid-giving by Canada to countries where human rights abuses have gone up. She speculates this may be because Canada has provided capacity-building aid or conditional aid but acknowledges the study does not provide the detailed breakdown necessary to determine this.

Where Barratt does find a human rights connection to aid-giving is when there has been human rights activism critical of a recipient or potential recipient state. In such instances, the recipient state is less likely to receive aid, or to receive less aid. From this, Barratt concludes it may be possible for non-government organizations (NGOs) to play an important role in shaping aid decisions. Theoretically, in such cases NGOs inform civil society and thereby promote domestic awareness and action which may actually influence government decision-making. However, this connection is not tested in the study.

Barratt concludes domestic economic considerations form self-interests, which are superior to and dominate human rights considerations. Barratt goes as far as to suggest that consideration should be given to potential trade because for many developing countries existing

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28 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid.
29 Ibid., 42.
30 Neumayer referred to these as the ‘eligibility’ and ‘level’ stages.
31 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid, 155.
32 Ibid., 154.
trade with Canada is negligible.33 This reference to potential aid seems to be speculative at best. Such a concept might have credence if there was evidence provided where burgeoning trade relations have evolved over time with a substantial number of developing states to which Canada has provided aid, but this was not the case. It would seem more likely there are both economic (for example, in the case of China) and humanitarian motives – such as a commitment to poverty reduction – at work in aid decisions. Nevertheless, Canada has benefited economically from the high level of tied aid that has been provided; but this is an issue as to the effectiveness of the aid as opposed to an economic motive based on potential future opportunities.

Further, Barratt finds a strong correlation based on whether or not aid was given in the previous year and concludes “[p]ast aid is a significant determinant of present aid”.34 This leads to the speculative conclusion that there is a certain degree of inertia which occurs once a recipient state is allocated aid; thus, surmising that getting on the recipient list for aid is more difficult than receiving ongoing aid. Since there are very few ‘aid eligible’ states that do not receive at least some bilateral aid from Canada, this observation is of limited value.35 Getting on the Canadian list seems to be the easy part given the few states that do not receive any aid. But looking at aid on a year-to-year basis does not contemplate that aid-giving decisions may be made with the long term in mind. Many situations that attract bilateral and multilateral aid span longer periods of time and therefore this finding should be expected. In fact, inconsistency and uncertainty in aid commitments would have a deleterious effect on the recipient state. Neumayer also noted in reference to using a selectivity strategy it is important to be consistent

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33 Ibid., 124.
34 Ibid., 45.
35 The use of the term ‘aid eligible’ states is meant to exclude other OECD states that also provide aid to assist developing states. When Canada provides aid to about 150 states, this only leaves roughly 20 states that Canada does not provide any assistance to.
in aid-giving otherwise a donor state’s credibility and commitment to the strategy would be brought into question.\textsuperscript{36}

Barratt’s time frame for looking at Canadian aid-giving covers more than two decades and spans several governments. Additionally, it includes both the Cold War and post-Cold War years and pools many significant events that had major effects on the international environment. Clearly, foreign policy changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Canada’s fiscal crisis throughout the 1990s also was a major factor as it resulted in severe reductions in aid-giving. Further, the aid policy of the Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien, and Martin governments were substantively different. Aggregating these periods assumes the federal bureaucracy largely controls Canadian foreign policy. While it is possible this may have been the case, there was no evidence presented to this effect.

One of Barratt’s main findings is that Canada’s aid program has been incoherent due to competing policy imperatives. While Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has focused on poverty reduction, other government department priorities have included geopolitical considerations – such as, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and Canada’s relationship with the US – and, as mentioned earlier, potential export trade opportunities. It is the ‘push and pull’ of these competing imperatives that leads Barratt to conclude that after almost sixty years “… Canada’s aid program is still searching for a focus and a distinct identity in the donor community.”\textsuperscript{37} Canada has often been criticized for vacillating between contradictory goals. This demonstrates the conflicting priorities between objectives based on realist geopolitical power, economic self-interest, and liberal humane international considerations. This incoherence may also stem from the long time horizon used in the study. A shorter time frame

\textsuperscript{36} Neumayer, \textit{The Pattern of Aid Giving}, 16.
\textsuperscript{37} Barratt, \textit{Human Rights and Foreign Aid}, 160.
may be necessary to test for consistency between government rhetoric and practice on bilateral aid.

Jean-Sébastien Rioux, drawing on the results of a broader comparative foreign policy study, reported on the relationship between GG in recipient states and the level of Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA). Relying on the Freedom House Political Freedom Index (including political rights and civil liberties) the research group had concluded Canada tends to give less support to politically free states relative to not-free states. An underlying premise of this study was that not-free states are more likely to misuse or divert aid. While human rights are a subset consideration in the Freedom House index, this index is much broader and is not limited to gross violations of personal integrity rights. These results would actually seem to be more accurately a measure of corruption, and therefore the study is more relevant to the efficient and effective use of aid.

What is of interest in this research project was the examination of the impact media coverage had on Canada’s aid-giving from 1985 to 1995. By using media coverage – specifically the Globe and Mail – as an independent variable, the authors concluded there were significant decreases in aid for each negative newspaper article reporting on political unrest (which did include human rights issues). Conversely, there was an increase in aid-giving with reports of humanitarian disasters. The media connection is an attractive thesis but the independent variable was limited to a single English-only newspaper source (the Globe and Mail). Despite this

38 Jean-Sébastien Rioux, "Canadian Official Development Assistance: Juggling the National Interest and Humanitarian Impulses," in Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc O'Reilly (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006). Rioux reports a summary of the findings he, Douglas Van Belle and David Potter had reached based on a larger study reported in Douglas A. Van Belle, Jean-Sébastien Rioux, and David M. Potter, Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Japan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
39 Ibid., 223.
40 Van Belle et al, Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid, 224-5.
limitation, the premise that aid-giving is influenced by the views of civil society provides some optimism that government foreign aid decisions can be altered by NGOs and societal pressure. This outcome is similar to Barratt’s findings correlating aid with the level of human rights activism.

Rioux separately examines aid for the period 1950 to 1999 correlating the dollar amount of aid with the recipient state’s membership in the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and other ODA recipient countries. His analysis identifies a Canadian bias toward Commonwealth states over others, with la Francophonie states receiving the least mean contribution.41 This period covers many different governments and many different views on aid-giving, government policies, and geo-political conditions, which greatly diminishes the value of the results. As a glaring example, the value of the aggregated la Francophonie aid-giving data is questionable as this organization did not exist until 1971; yet the period of study started in 1950. Further, there is significant evidence that Canada’s entrance into development assistance and at least the first two decades were strongly linked to its involvement in the Commonwealth.42 Thus, Rioux’s observation by itself is somewhat suspect. However, in a similar, but more recent, examination Canada’s aid preference for member countries of these two organizations for the period 1985 to 1995 was tested. These results partially reflected those of Rioux showing a preference for the Commonwealth, but found neither a positive or negative bias toward la Francophonie countries.43 Certainly membership in the Commonwealth has created enduring obligations and responsibilities for Canada and this does suggest a potential connection between multilateral membership and aid-giving.

43 Van Belle et al, Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid.
Canada is also a member of several other multilateral organizations, many of which promote development assistance responsibilities. Despite the fact there was no correlation with la Francophonie member states, these other memberships warrant some consideration as contributing factors in how Canada distributes aid. If these memberships are correlative, they may also provide some explanation for Barratt’s observation that once a state is approved by Canada to receive aid there appears to be great reluctance to curtail the aid relationship.

Lastly, in a recent PhD dissertation, Michelle Allendoerfer examined the impact of several variables on the allocation of aid by donor countries aggregated from the 1980s to the 2000s. She considers worldwide aid donation – rather than by individual donor state – to create an assessment of how states have performed collectively based on a wide range of variables. In this global study, Allendoerfer tests for a relationship between human rights, foreign aid, and a number of other explanatory variables including geographic proximity, colonial status, NGO publicity, and oil producing countries. Consistent with Neumayer and Barratt, Allendoerfer considers aid decisions at the gate-keeping and allocation stages, and concludes decisions are affected differently at the two levels. Her main salient finding is a conclusion human rights do have some slight influence on aid and more so where there has been NGO pressure, but that colonial affiliation and geographic proximity have greater influence, particularly at the gatekeeping level. By approaching donors as a collective, Allendoerfer makes the assumption states act as consistent, rationale actors with common motivations. This is not supported by Neumayer’s studies where a variety of states made significantly different aid decisions.

44 Michelle Giacobbe Allendoerfer, "When Do Human Rights Matter? Finding a Place For Human Rights In Foreign Policy" (PhD diss., Deep Blue University of Michigan, 2010).
46 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving.
Allendoerfer uses yet another index to measure human rights by employing a subset of the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI). It provides a numerical score between 0 and 8 as a physical integrity rights measure (where an 8 is considered the best score). This score is derived from a 0-2 rating of four specific questions. The ratings, however, are based on two vague categories (frequent and occasional violations) and one absolute category (no violations). Scale ambiguity creates significant year-to-year fluctuation in state ratings.\textsuperscript{47} While it can be anticipated there will be changes in a state’s rating, frequent variance swings because of definition vagueness cannot be expected to be reflected in aid-giving. Further, these scores are not anchored to specific descriptors resulting in the middle scores being difficult to compare because they can be achieved in many different ways. For these two reasons, CIRI does not provide a satisfactory scale.

Allendoerfer assumes human rights considerations will be subjugated to state self-interest based on economic, security, and policy concession considerations.\textsuperscript{48} Yet, one interesting findings is that donor states are likely to give greater aid to more needy states, which suggests poverty reduction is a significant consideration.\textsuperscript{49} While self-interest is likely significant, poverty reduction has not been factored into these premises. This study approaches aid strictly from a realist perspective.

Another key consideration of this study contemplates the mediating role of NGOs at the gatekeeping and allocation levels. The explanatory variable used is based only on Al news releases, which certainly is a limiting factor. Nevertheless, the study concludes there is a causal

\textsuperscript{47} CIRI Human Rights Data Project, http://www.humanrightsdata.org/ (accessed December 2, 2012). Canada in the period 2007 to 2009 was rated twice a 6 and once at 8. In the years 1998 to 2000 Canada was twice a 7 and once rated an 8. While changes in ratings should be expected, the frequency with which they do, indicate issues with using this scale.

\textsuperscript{48} A policy concession is non-economic right such as agreement to allow military fly-overs or bases on foreign soil.

\textsuperscript{49} Allendoerfer, "When Do Human Rights Matter?," 65.
relationship for human rights influence on aid where AI has mobilized its efforts. Allendoerfer argues: “... leaders act primarily to avoid the appearance of complicity with violators.”\textsuperscript{50} This finding, on a broader scale, is consistent with the views of the Barratt and Van Belle et al studies that governments respond to negative publicity.

While Allendoerfer’s dissertation provides an interesting approach it has limited value because it covers over 20 years of aid-giving and, more importantly, it aggregates all donor states and their aid-giving. The studies by Neumayer and Barratt show there are different motivations by different states, as does the David Gillies’ comparative study.\textsuperscript{51} Allendoerfer’s aggregation suggests all states are similarly motivated. On the other hand, this study does point to the role NGOs and public awareness play in effecting state policy as states act to minimize negative images.

Comparing all these studies is difficult for a number of reasons. They have not had a consistent approach to defining the human rights variable and several different human rights scales have been used. A further complicating factor is that studies have addressed different time periods, both in duration and time frame, which have obscured the effects of distinct political environments. With one exception, these studies have looked at spans of ten or more years. While this gives a longitudinal look at aid-giving, it does not consider the impact changes in policies and international political events can have on policy coherence. Not only do these studies include several different governments and policy directives, but there are also issues with the time periods spanning Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and periods where Canada was engaged in conflicts.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{51} Gillies, \textit{Between Principle and Practice}. 
There are, however, several key observations that arise from these studies that are pertinent to this thesis. First, it is not sufficient to simply define human rights in a general manner; it is necessary to determine an appropriate scale of measurement. The fact that existing empirical studies used no less than four different scales speaks to a lack of consensus on how to measure human rights. This is possibly because these studies have had different objectives. However, Serkasevich, Neumayer and Barratt used variants of the PTS anchored ratings. Only Serkasevich’s study strictly focused on correlating human rights with bilateral aid. Based on these three studies, a variation of the PTS ratings are used in this thesis.

Second, the vast difference in population of recipient states has some bearing on aid. But, per capita measures do not focus on the vast majority of bilateral aid. Yet, it is intuitive that there will be major differences in the amount of aid committed to a country of over 1 billion people relative to a country of under 100,000. As Neumayer has pointed out, population is necessarily an explanatory variable in a multivariate analysis. Therefore, the multivariate regression models in this thesis incorporate recipient state population by using logarithms.

Third, Canada’s membership in multilateral organizations appears to have influence on its aid-giving. In particular, the connection to the Commonwealth was found to have relevance in the Van Belle et al studies. The Serkasevich research also implies a strong connection with Commonwealth developing countries, although this was not specifically tested. Similarly, the Neumayer studies have shown a connection between the amount of aid provided and the level of income in the recipient state. His findings revealed that countries with lower GDP were likely to receive more Canadian aid. Put another way, this is a focus on poverty reduction which has been a long held commitment by CIDA. But, it was originally driven multilaterally by the UN and the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This thesis, therefore, tests for the
influence of certain multilateral relations using multivariate regression models. These are reflective of Canada’s membership in the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the Organization of America States (OAS), and the OECD. The first three are simply represented by membership. The latter organization is represented by correlating DAC income level designations with bilateral aid. States eligible for official development assistance are categorized as least developed, low income, lower middle income or upper middle income countries based on gross national income (GNI) per capita.\(^{52}\) All other states that received bilateral aid were above the top GNI threshold and have been identified as ‘Other.’ This variable thus imputes a degree of influence to the OECD and at the same time recognizes the GDP variable used by Neumayer.

Additional multilateral-based variables are included in this thesis to consider Canada’s membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the G-8. These relationships have particular bearing on the time frames examined by this thesis. The NATO obligations associated with Canada’s involvement in the Balkans and the Afghan war in the first and second periods respectively were significant. Ex-Yugoslavia and Afghanistan were respectively the top recipient states in the first and second periods addressed in this thesis. Thus, these states are accounted for as dummy variables. The G-8 placed an emphasis on alleviating poverty in the African Union (AU) states from the turn of the century. Consequently, this thesis will also test to see if AU membership influences Canada’s allocation of bilateral aid.

Fourth, the concept of evaluating aid decisions based on gatekeeping and allocation, while interesting, has minimal applicability given the fact Canada provides aid to all but a small number of countries. Canada’s aid-giving has a unique global reach for a country of its economic size and population. Perhaps this is caused by the many organizations to which Canada is

committed. Or perhaps this outcome results from the fact Canada is a wealthy middle power committed to multilateralism, but lacks the specific focus of a colonial past. This question is well beyond the scope of this thesis. But the fact remains the gatekeeping stage does not have the same importance that it may have with other donor states. As in the Serkasevich study, the real focus here is on the allocation to recipient states and whether human rights are considered. Therefore, a single level approach is more appropriate for evaluating Canadian bilateral aid.

And finally, in only one of two periods was Neumayer able to detect a statistically significance between positive human rights records by recipient states and Canada providing higher levels of aid. Serkasevich’s work suggests the opposite where a weak correlation between more human rights abuses and increased levels of aid was found in the 1984-87 period. Yet, human rights remain a prominent consideration in government documents and statements. In several of the studies, some connection appears to occur between human rights activism and the level of aid. While this finding is also beyond the scope of this study, it does suggest there may be merit in raising awareness with civil society as a means of prodding the government to close the ‘rhetoric-practice’ gap.

This thesis looks to add to the existing body of work in two key ways. First, two additional periods of data will be added to the Serkasevich study, thereby providing analyses spanning over three decades. Bivariate correlations will have been completed on three different governments under substantively different political environments. The failure to uncover a negative correlation in these two most recent periods confirms the findings in Serkasevich’s work and the accusations by several qualitative studies that human rights records have not been a consistent factor in Canada’s bilateral aid decisions. More importantly, this thesis goes further by including variables representing Canada’s multilateral affiliations along with human rights
using multivariate regression models. Although the human rights hypothesis is still not aided by these models, affiliations with the Commonwealth and the OECD provide statistically significance correlation and point to international relations theory – and particularly liberal institutionalism – to explain Canada’s bilateral aid decision making.
CHAPTER 2

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

International Relations (IR) theory is pertinent to this thesis because development assistance is a function of foreign policy and relations between sovereign states. Applying these theories, scholars have endeavoured to inform and make more intelligible the actions of states and international institutions and organizations as they interact.1 The quantitative part of this thesis focuses on ascertaining a statistical connection between Canada’s development assistance and specific variables – and in particular, human rights performance – but it is IR theory that becomes integral to understanding Canada’s actions.

Human rights have gained international attention in the latter half of the 20th Century. These are rooted in liberalism and have been supported through the evolution of the United Nations (UN) and a myriad of multilateral institutions and regimes, and, to varying degrees, by individual states. Human rights are central to the UN Charter and are frequently invoked in any call for international intervention. Yet, it is widely acknowledged that human rights, when compared to national security, territorial advantage, and economic competitiveness, are near the bottom in relative foreign policy importance for most states.2 Despite this, they continue to be cited by governments as a key foreign policy consideration. Concerns over human rights often create tension with other foreign policy priorities and are often seen as a direct challenge

2 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid, 9-10; Gillies, Between Principle and Practice, 5, 13; Allendoerfer, “When Do Human Rights Matter?”. 
to another state’s sovereignty. The result is “inescapable tension between human rights and foreign policy.”

Adherents of competing international relations theories provide substantially different interpretations as to the value human rights do – and should – play in foreign relations. Traditional realism leave little room to consider aid-giving and human rights concerns other than as tools to be used by states in support of their pursuit of military power. However, this chapter argues that a liberal institutional approach to foreign relations best explains the evolved role human rights have in international relations discourse, and elevates human rights to at least a level of dialogue with some commitment to action. Thus, while the focus in this thesis flows from the view Canada may contemplate human rights records of recipient states; it does so within the context of certain multilateral organizations and institutions.

This liberal view is in contrast to the historical global dominance of IR theory by realism and neo-realism. Consequently, realism/neo-realism will be examined first with a particular emphasis on how human rights fail to be a motivating consideration in realist foreign policy decisions. Liberalism and liberal institutionalism (LI) are examined in the same context and contrasted with realism. Finally, this chapter will discuss the human rights and development assistance in international relations.

Realism

Realism has evolved from the writings of Thucydides, Niccollo Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes and focuses on the state as a rational unitary actor principally concerned with power

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and the survival of the state within an anarchical society. The state is rationally motivated by maximizing its power relative to other states. This results in states behaving and acting in predictably consistent, but conflicting, ways. More recently, Hans Morgenthau has defined state interest as national power, with moral and legal principles being subordinate to state political interests and aspirations. Moral justness and ‘right and wrong’ do not have relevance in realist international relations. Robert Gilpin captures this concept with the statement ‘... the final arbiter of things political is power ...’ Thus, the sovereign state functions solely in its own self-interest and efforts to enhance its relative position vis-à-vis other states in a ‘zero-sum’ approach measured by relative gains. International cooperation is motivated solely by the atomized self-interests of individual states where international organizations and institutions are seen as tools to be used by the state to further its own goals in the pursuit of an advantageous balance of power. Economic and social (including human rights) factors are secondary and constitute ‘low politics.’

Where there is no power benefit to the state then there is no motivation for the rational realist state to intervene. While morality is discussed by both Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, neither gives it more than subordinate consideration. Carr is clear that state morality is distinct from individual morality and that ultimately ‘[i]n the international order, the role of power is greater

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6 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42 No. 3 (Summer 1988), 488. Grieco provides a five point definition of realism declaring: states as the major actor in world affairs; behave as unitary, rational agents; states respond to anarchy as the principal force in developing and taking action; and states are pre-occupied with power and security which inhibits their willingness to cooperate. These four points result in his final position that institutions have only a marginal effect on cooperation.
and that of morality is less.”

In a realist or neo-realist world, human rights and aid-giving are not principle based. These are not priorities. Any concerns about the plight of individuals are immaterial in state-to-state relations. Consequently, this would exclude consideration of human rights except when human rights could be used to enhance the state’s power. Thus, these are circumstantial and subject to the reality of the state’s pursuit of power.

Realism does not provide for the potential of states cooperating except if it is in support of self-interest. Multilateral institutions do not influence the decisions of states, but rather institutions are reflections of powerful states and their interests. International organizations, like the United Nations (UN), serve as tools for states to use in the pursuit of self-interests. Where such advantage cannot be gained realist states refuse to participate or agree.

Similarly, neo-realists view the state as the unitary actor within an anarchical structure, but see the structure – rather than human nature – as the driver behind the principal focus on security. Balance of power is sought to create stability. Neo-realists stress the need for the dominance played by hegemonic states in achieving this balance. Nevertheless, this emphasis on conflict between states leads to the same conclusion; states are seen as unitary actors rationally focused on state self-interest. All other issues are subordinate to and in support of the existence of the state and its relative power to all other states. Realism and neo-realism focus on security,

war and survival of the state but do not provide much insight into economic interdependence or the roles of international institutions and regimes.\textsuperscript{11}

Both realism and neo-realism are dominated by concerns as to which state has the greater gain in any interaction because they focus on relative position to determine power, and ultimately winners and losers. Conflicts between states are based on individual self-interests and inevitably lead to war. Peace is temporary and achieved as a result of a balance of power. However, power changes, and hence peace is impermanent.

It is thus apparent that in a realist world, human rights – especially those in another state – are secondary considerations unless they support the state’s self-interest. Consequently, at best human rights considerations become a means of complementing state power and security objectives. At worst, they are dismissed as insignificant. Accordingly, states are more likely to apply human rights standards selectively and thus inconsistently, ignoring transgressions by allied states while acting against ‘unfriendly’ states for similar human rights violations.\textsuperscript{12} Likewise, even positive interventions, such as aid-giving, are driven by the self-interest of the intervening state, and not out of mutual benefit or a sense of humanitarianism toward the recipient state. This is not to say realist states do not provide aid-giving, but they do so strictly as a means of enhancing their power.


Liberalism

Liberalism has had a long history but realism and neo-realism have dominated international relations. However, it is the liberal/neo-liberal views in the 20th century that have broadened the international relations agenda extending it beyond state security to include economic, social issues and the role of non-state actors. An ideal liberalism was fostered by the rise of the League of Nations and faltered in the lead up to the Second World War. Yet, liberal approaches have gained traction with the post-war evolution of multilateral organizations, regimes and institutions, and with the development of global economic interdependence.

Liberalism has emerged from the idealism of the Greek and Roman Stoics with their individual-based moral concept of natural law and universal applicability. In this view, man is governed by a principle of rationality where reason dictates living by moral and social precepts. While this embraced living within, and having obligations to, the state, it also applies to all mankind in the broader cosmopolitan community. Religion has contributed to the development of idealism consistent with these natural laws. In fact, as they specifically pertain to human rights, all religions perceive they have contributed to the development of idealism and human rights. Religious writings have typically called for moral treatment of individuals while promoting the idea of individual duty.

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13 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939.
14 Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, 21.
In early liberal thought, Hugo Grotius presented the concepts of the Westphalian state and international law in the 17th Century. He proposed international law and natural law as a means of facilitating interaction, and particularly economic exchange, between states to facilitate management of global anarchy. The need to develop rules and norms by which sovereign states would interact has in effect established international cooperation as a means to manage the global anarchy. His work led to the notion natural law includes respect for the rights of others – both of states and individuals. While Grotius believed citizens were subject to the command of the sovereign state and therefore were required to conform to the will of the state, he did accept external intervention into domestic affairs where the state has mistreated its citizens.

In the next century, Emmerich de Vattel more clearly recognized the existence of individual rights relative to the state emanating from natural law. He extrapolated from the concept that men are equal to reach the conclusion that states are also equal since they are composed of individuals. Vattel also recognized the independence of states to manage their internal affairs, but acknowledges there is a point at which “All nations have therefore a right to resort to forcible means for the purpose of repressing any one particular nation who openly violates the laws of the society which Nature has established between them, or who directly attacks the welfare and safety of that society.” So while the state is sovereign, it has an

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19 Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order*, 23. Grotius expresses the appropriateness of an external state coming to the aid of another country’s citizens in the following statement: “If the individual is as much a subject of international law as is a state, and if in any dispute his cause can be regarded as a just one the service rendered on his behalf ‘is not only permissible, it is also honorable’.” 24
21 Ibid., Preliminary Section 20.
obligation to observe certain universal laws. Where a state has grossly violated these norms, other states may intercede.

Liberalism, and LI in particular, finds roots in the writings of Immanuel Kant. His *Perpetual Peace* provides the underpinnings of a republican and pacific based international environment.\(^{22}\) The growth of liberal states would lead to closer economic relations, a stronger commitment to peace, a pacific union, and ultimately to an international recognition of cosmopolitan law based on natural law and universal hospitality.\(^{23}\) Kant also based his theory on autonomous individuals and individual rights.\(^{24}\) The development of the UN Charter and subsequent UN international human rights documents were significantly influenced by Kant.

Contemporary liberalism, however, is difficult to define as it has been used to include a broad spectrum of thought, ranging from cosmopolitan idealism to a Grotian liberalism.\(^{25}\) That said, there are common liberal themes; one being that the state is a central actor but that international cooperation can be facilitated by multilateral institutions and regimes. These, with the support of states, have emerged, evolved and grown to support the orderly management of global anarchy.\(^{26}\) Rather than focusing on the realist’s relative gains strategy, liberal theory


\(^{23}\) Doyle, “Kant’s Perpetual Peace.”


\(^{26}\) This is generally true, however, as an exception Moraviscik actually claims the primacy of societal actors and considers states and political institutions as subsets of domestic society. Andrew Moraviscik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization* 51, No.4
considers absolute gains as a desirable objective. Unlike realism, liberalism places importance on the role of the international economy. And economic development is connected with the promotion of basic rights internationally.\(^\text{27}\)

What is also of great importance in the context of human rights is the emphasis placed on individual rights and the state’s normative obligation to uphold these rights. Liberalism identifies individuals as having certain basic rights stemming from natural law and that the state’s authority evolves from its citizenry; thereby supporting democratic rule and the associated rights and freedoms.\(^\text{28}\) State documents, such as the English Bill of Rights, the US Constitution, and the French Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen, were influenced by John Locke’s assertions that natural rights of the individual preceded the existence of the state and that a primary purpose of the state is to protect these rights.\(^\text{29}\) His emphasis on rights to life, liberty, and property, are key underpinnings of the individualism that exists in today’s liberalism and reflected by human rights. While there are differences in how states have pursued these, human rights are strongly rooted in republican liberalism and democratic processes.\(^\text{30}\) And it is believed democratic states are less likely to engage in war with each other.\(^\text{31}\)

\(^\text{30}\) Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe,” 139-170. For example, Sikkink contrasts the human rights policies of the United States with those pursued by the European community during the cold war period.
It is the connection between economic development and social concerns that this thesis draws upon. Human rights are clearly a secondary concern and as a consequence it can be expected that there will be conflicts between the pursuit of economic goals and human rights progress. In addition, there have been accusations leveled against the West that the developed states are attempting to impose western cultural beliefs on rest of the world. While this will be discussed under human rights, it has applicability in a broader liberal context. Liberal theory does recognize the individual, not just in terms of rights but in the pursuit of a democratic republic. For many leaders, this is not a welcome objective.

LI, as part of an emerging “neo-liberal” tradition in the 1980s, explored international institutions, regimes and conventions pointing to the significant roles these non-state actors had in facilitating international relations through multilateralism. Unlike realists who see such organizations as being of minor importance and resulting in constraints on the state, LI see them as allowing states to accomplish what they could not otherwise do on their own. Based on mutual interests, states may cooperate as part of various regimes that operate within some level of agreed upon rules and norms.\textsuperscript{32} Regimes allow states to share the international burden, but also to create obligations based on these agreed to standards.\textsuperscript{33} Follow through is prompted by self-interest, concerns over international image, and the expectations of reciprocity.\textsuperscript{34} Clearly, LI is not based on altruism. States engage in multilateral relationships to pursue self-interests, directly or indirectly, but also consider normative values.

LI, similar to realism, acknowledges the state as the central actor, which acts rationally. However, LI sees regimes as a means of managing the anarchical society and rejects that this

\textsuperscript{33} Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., \textit{Power and Interdependence}, 4\textsuperscript{th} ed. (Boston: Longman, 2012), 285.
\textsuperscript{34} Viotti and Kauppi, \textit{International Relations Theory}, 135.
anarchy must lead to war. Instead LI identifies absolute gains, rather than relative gains, as being key to pursuing a common good as regimes encourage economic globalization and liberal world order.\textsuperscript{35} States collaborate on a wide range of areas from economic to social agendas, as well as security issues, and thereby facilitate a more peaceful international environment.

Important to this thesis is the fact regimes can influence and even direct state policy through the world views and beliefs that become embedded in the institutions.\textsuperscript{36} Oran Young points out that once these institutions are created, they can take on identities separate from the original intent contemplated by the member states.\textsuperscript{37} These beliefs can translate into direction within the regime and become policy for member states. An obvious example has been the broad adoption of international human rights by UN member states.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye assert that regimes help a great power bring pressure to bear on lesser powers to ensure compliance by relying on the rules and standards set within the regime. But regimes also provide assurances that other member states are also committed.\textsuperscript{38} Of equal importance, regimes give lesser states forums to promote self-interests and beliefs with the support of like states.

Regimes have wide application ranging from the World Trade Organization (WTO), the UN, and multilateral organizations such as the Commonwealth, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, la Francophonie, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Each regime has a different mandate and varying degrees of standardized rules

\textsuperscript{36} Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 135.
\textsuperscript{37} Oran Young, “The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” International Organization 36 No. 2 (Spring 1982): 277-297.
\textsuperscript{38} Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 285.
based on their individual purpose and level of collaboration. For example, development assistance does not have the same structured level of commitment that is apparent in the WTO. However, less structured regimes do provide mutual commitments that morally bind states to objectives that could not be accomplished independently.

As the world has become more interconnected and interdependent, states rely more and more on regimes to facilitate the pursuit of their self-interests. Keohane points out that these many institutions have led to “a world of thick networks of interdependence.”\(^{39}\) It is this that LI predicts facilitates a world order. Development assistance and international human rights have both evolved under the influence of such regimes. Canada has been called an “inveterate joiner” of multilateral organizations.\(^{40}\) This makes the LI perspective appropriate to the theoretical aspect of this thesis.

**Human Rights and Development Assistance**

This thesis supports the liberal view that there are universal human rights, which stem from the notion of natural rights. It is important to understand what is meant when the term ‘human rights’ is used. To many, this means the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). But when a state, institution or individual calls for action to be taken because of human rights violations, a much narrower definition is typically used. This begs the question that if states are expected to give or not give aid to motivate actions by the recipient state, then what human rights are being referenced? As was seen in the previous chapter, there are a number of

\(^{39}\) Keohane, “From Interdependence to Institutions,” 169.
\(^{40}\) Denis Stairs, *Confusing The Innocent with Numbers and Categories: The International Policy Statement and The Concentration of Development Assistance* (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2005), 9.
human rights measurement scales used by different studies. This thesis favours a minimalist view of human rights that encompass universal personal integrity rights.

Human rights are widely regarded as rights that a human has purely by virtue of being a human being.\textsuperscript{41} Despite the vagueness of this definition, it does provide that human rights are inherent and apply universally to all people equally. Human rights of this kind are inalienable or immutable, and are limited in number and scope.\textsuperscript{42} These are often referred to as ‘basic rights’ or ‘fundamental rights’. Although there are varying views as to what constitutes these rights, basis rights most appropriately relate to the protection of individual personal security including protection from physical harm and, as a minimum, the right to subsistence conditions, consistent with the views of Henry Shue, Diana Meyers, and Michael Ignatieff.\textsuperscript{43}

Henry Shue has asserted that basic rights are hierarchically more important than other rights. Security rights focus on the right to life, protection from physical harm and restraint, and certain related liberties, while subsistence refers to the right to a minimal level of nourishment and physical care. No other right can be enjoyed if the person’s life and personal security are at risk, or under the threat of death or torture. But correctly so, he also noted that living without sufficient food, shelter or basic medical care also make it impossible to enjoy any other right.\textsuperscript{44} It is these basic rights that all people arguably should reasonably expect, and for Shue form some degree of duty on others. In the context of this thesis the responsibility to provide subsistence is

\textsuperscript{44} Shue, \textit{Basic Rights}. 
assisted by the developed states through development assistance while the security rights must be directly protected by the recipient state.

Similarly, Diana Meyers makes a distinction between inalienable rights and other rights. She identifies four inalienable rights: the right to life, the right to personal liberty – protection from slavery and servitude, the right not to be tortured or to suffer gratuitous acute pain, and the right to basic needs of food, shelter, medical care in order to survive.\textsuperscript{45} Other rights may exist but they are based on specific circumstances and are not applicable to all people. In other words, this would mean these other rights are subject to cultural nuances.

In a more simplified approach, Ignatieff poses the simple question as to whether other humans would want to be on the receiving end of certain actions as a means of establishing what constitutes a human right.\textsuperscript{46} Literally no one wants ‘to be abused in mind or body,’ which provides the basis for universal rights. Such rights essentially represent the minimum condition necessary for life.\textsuperscript{47} This is a basic minimalist approach to human rights that supersedes relativism.

These narrow views of human rights are consistent with the personal integrity rights envisioned in the Political Terror Scale measure used in some of the quantitative studies in the previous chapter. These rights do not include the right to subsistence and basic material needs identified above, but these are issues that development assistance normally is targeted at. It is difficult to argue personal integrity rights are not claimed by all individuals. Eric Neumayer quite

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{45} Meyers, \textit{Inalienable Rights}.
\item\textsuperscript{46} Ignatieff, \textit{Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry}, 88-9.
\item\textsuperscript{47} Ignatieff, \textit{The Rights Revolution};, 22.
\end{itemize}
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rightly asserts: “... personal integrity rights violations are without doubt nonexcusable and are not subject to relativist challenges.”

The notion of one state having concerns about the human rights performance of another state has liberal roots but can be viewed both from idealist and pragmatic perspectives. Katarina Tomasevski asserts: “[t]he legitimacy of promoting human rights in other countries derives from their universality ... rights of people anywhere represent a legitimate concern for people everywhere.” But on the pragmatic side, states that commit severe human rights violations are unstable and threaten regional and, in some cases, global stability. Refugee crises, violent oppression, lack of individual freedom and equality are disruptive to peace and economic prosperity.

Aid can be used as a ‘carrot or stick’ to foster specific actions by recipient states. But aid also places obligations on the donor state. Aid, particularly bilateral aid, provides support to the government of the recipient state. Therefore, aid provided to a government that, as a policy, perpetrates violations of human rights directly or indirectly contributes to that state’s repression. In what is basically a normative argument, Tomasevski states: “… people are the centre of development, and the aim of development is to improve the enjoyment of human rights and to enlarge human freedom.” Logically then aid that does not contribute to this outcome should be questioned. And aid that may have the opposite impact should be stopped or discontinued. Thus, states, acting collectively or alone, must consider the ramification of the aid they provide.

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49 Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited, 153
50 Gillies, Between Principle and Practice, 6.
51 Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited, 97. Tomasevski cited this as one of three points drawn from a UN study on the previous Apartheid policies of South Africa.
52 Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited, 46.
The intent of this chapter is to explain the evolution of and motives underlying Canada’s commitments to development assistance. Canadian foreign policy (CFP) will be considered in the context of the earlier International Relations (IR) theory discussion. This will be followed by a chronological historical account of how Canadian aid has evolved and the relevance given to human rights. This includes a review of the more recent policy statements of significance from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Key within Canada’s foreign affairs policies and decision-making has been its membership in various multilateral organizations, and thus its pursuit of a liberal agenda. Canada has been prepared to voice opinions on international direction but it has done so within the mainstream of international direction. For this reason attention will be paid to Canada’s multilateral memberships. Emphasis will be placed on the most recent two decades and in particular the period including the Chrétien and Harper governments, as these are pertinent to the quantitative analysis.

Canada and International Relations

Prior to the Second World War, Canada’s foreign relations were largely dominated by its subordinate relationship with Great Britain. However, post-war, Canada – like other middle and smaller powers, such as Australia and New Zealand – endeavoured to develop its role within the
evolving international social order.¹ With the economies of all European states in ruins and
global economic power being dominated by the United States, Canada was in a position to
leverage the importance of its relatively superior manufacturing and technological power and its
geopolitical advantage. Canada also believed it had earned a greater voice given its
contributions and sacrifices during the war.

There has been a number of theories put forward attempting to explain Canada’s
approach to foreign policy. David Dewitt and John Kirton offer that Canada has acted, since the
late 1960s, as a principal power driven by realism’s self-interest; yet not as a dominant military
power, but rather as a resource and technology power with an adequate military presence.²
Kirton has further posited Canada’s position in the world has been determined by a changing
world order as hegemons and superpowers have declined. As a leading political power, Canada
predictably has exerted its self-interests and values on a bilateral basis in a complex neo-realist
approach.³ Consistent with this theory, it should be expected that Canada would focus
development assistance where it would primarily benefit Canada’s political and security
interests, irrespective of recipient states’ needs. Development assistance would be focused on
current Canadian economic gains and further trade opportunities.

However, this does not account for the greater emphasis Canada has on many of the
poorest states. While there have been periods where Canada’s foreign policy has increased
emphasis on trade opportunities, including those generated through development assistance
projects, Canada’s aid has been dominated by poverty reduction efforts in numerous least

¹ Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights.
² Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 75. Political challenges and actions by both Quebec and France to orchestra
support for French-speaking countries prompted Canada to expand its aid program, specifically to French-
speaking African states. Ultimately this resulted in Canada joining la Francophonie in an effort to limit
Quebec’s involvement internationally.
³ John Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Toronto: Nelson, 2007), 80-84.
developed countries that present little, if any, enduring economic benefit for Canada. Further, realist theory is amoral, whereas the emphasis Canada has placed on poverty reduction, human rights, democracy, and good governance speaks to a more complex foreign policy driven by normative views and not solely based on self-interest. This realist view also understates the substantial role Canada has played within multilateral organizations and the internal domestic dynamics that are at work in formulating CFP.4

In an alternate view, Stephen Clarkson claims Canada is a subordinate partner to the US from whom it has simply taken its foreign policy cues. Clarkson postulates that due to Canada’s dependence on this superpower, CFP decisions have been subject to the direction and approval of the US in a form of peripheral dependence. Thus, he asserts Canada has deferred to the US without formulating its own identity and policies.5 While this certainly was the case previously with regards to Canada’s relationship with Great Britain during Canada’s long transition from a colony to a completely sovereign state, its relationship with the US is more complex and nuanced. Prime Ministers John Diefenbaker, Pierre Trudeau and, to a lesser extent, Jean Chrétien were politically detached from the US, whereas Prime Ministers Lester Pearson, Brian Mulroney, and, to some degree, Stephen Harper moved to create closer relations with the US. But none of these Prime Ministers have strictly conformed to a US direction in the face of contradictory domestic political sentiments. Canada’s interests are also reflected in the interests and obligations resulting from its role in multilateral organizations – such as the Commonwealth and la Francophonie – in which the US does not have membership. In addition, Canada has on

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4 For example, immigrant voices, such as those from the Haitian diaspora, in some cases have been influential in the government’s response to international issues and the development of CFP. Similarly, the role Quebec has taken in international la Francophonie forums has had significant influence in shaping foreign policy.

numerous situations taken positions counter to the US – most recently on the Iraq war and earlier in its resistance to becoming a full member of the Organization of American States (OAS) despite US urgings – and consequently has not demonstrated a consistent dependency on the superpower.

Cranford Pratt offers that CFP, and in particular development assistance, has been in support of the dominant class rather than to address third world needs. Pratt’s view is based on what ‘ought’ to be as he advocates a humane internationalism that places primacy on the requirements of the most needy, instead of using aid to advance the interests of capitalism.⁶ To Pratt, development assistance was borne out of support for commercial business interests. In the 1960s and 1970s the focus was also driven by Canada’s role as a middle power and expanded to support the Cold War anti-communism agenda.⁷

By the end of the 1980s Pratt differentiated motives within the dominant interest group when he acknowledged that the political elite and certain government ministers had prescribed a more forceful consideration of human rights only to be thwarted by a civil service bureaucracy that choose to apply business-friendly interpretations.⁸ The theme of Canada development assistance principally being for the benefit of the dominant class has continued through the end of the century and into the current one. The result has been human rights have only been

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⁷ Ibid., 339; 341.
considered when they have supported security or commercial considerations; otherwise they have not been emphasized.⁹

Pratt’s view that development assistance is singularly in support of the Canadian dominant class is based on a different set of interests from other Canadians. This is not clear at all. Despite pointing to examples where the bureaucracy has at times failed to act upon more humane internationalist directives from the political elite, he suggests a cohesive dominant class is at work. However, while it is the case that the state is ultimately responsible for decisions regarding development aid, the fact is every Canadian government has had conflicting factions within cabinet, and between departments and the bureaucracy. Decisions have been taken by CIDA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), as well as other departments somewhat independently. While these may all be under the same bureaucracy, they have frequently had different, conflicting motivations. DFAIT has advocated more politically strategic decisions and economic ties with development aid.¹⁰ Yet CIDA has demonstrated a strong commitment to poverty reduction in countries where there are few ongoing commercial opportunities. This conflict is also evident with other departments such as Finance and more recently Defence and Public Safety. While the observation economic and security considerations have been important self-interests and continue to be, development assistance has been provided to many states that have little to offer Canada now or in the foreseeable future.

The most commonly held theoretical view of Canada’s foreign policy has been liberal internationalism (LI), with its focus on sovereign states as dominant actors while recognizing the

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⁹ Ibid., 174.
¹⁰ See Scharfe, *Complicity*. 
role and influence of international organizations and institutions. This theory of multilateralism stems from the work of John Holmes on Canada as a middle power has leveraged its relative global economic strength as a developed state through its commitment to international institutions and organizations. This has simply been a pragmatic way for Canada to not only achieve its national interests but to demonstrate its skill at providing ideas that are also of international benefit, and thereby establishing influence and its image. Understanding the limitations of being a middle power allows a state to operate within its capabilities in a global context and to create space to allow their views and interests to be heard. This means being selective in the issues it pursues by only participating in activities for which the state has the capacity and that provide recognized value to the recipient. For Canada, this has led to an emphasis on multilateral approaches by aligning with ‘like-minded’ states, where Canada has worked cooperatively and collaboratively within global and regional systems. This multilateralism has included adopting the rules and norms of the different multilateral and global organizations.

This liberal interpretation provides the most comprehensive and consistent view when considering development assistance. In the context of LI, self-interest is an expected consideration. And it also allows for world views and principled beliefs to influence state decisions. Specifically, this view allows for the contemplation of recipient need as well as donor self-interest. If Canada made aid decisions solely or principally based on self-interest, it would not focus on the poorest countries and the normative objective of poverty reduction. It also

12 John Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle".
would not be providing assistance to virtually all of the developing countries. Canada has traditionally responded similarly to the like-minded states in placing an emphasis on recipient needs – specifically with respect to poverty alleviation – and not in a purely self-interested manner. However, Canada has also demonstrated a commitment to its own interests since it has historically conditioned a high level of tied aid. But, after international pressure from the G-8 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the early 2000s, the Chrétien and Martin governments began reducing tied aid until in 2008 the Harper government announced it would phase out the requirement for aid to be tied to Canadian providers by 2013.

**Canada’s Entrance into Development Assistance**

In 1950, Canada began providing development assistance when it committed to assist Commonwealth countries in Asia, in particular India and Pakistan, under the Colombo plan. Canada’s initial involvement was hesitant and cautious, but grew from its dual commitment to the Commonwealth and the Western powers – in particular the US – as they focused on thwarting the growth of communism in the third world. Bilateral aid was a mix of grants and loans, which were tied to the purchase of Canadian goods, technologies and services for major infrastructure projects that in the recipient states. While these projects did benefit recipient

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15 Neumayer, *The Pattern of Aid Giving*, 20. Neumayer specifically singles out France for its foreign aid being driven by self-interests and contrasts this with the actions of the like-minded states, including Canada.


states, the Canadian economy and businesses also profited. Canada’s motives for aid in this period have been described as promoting humanitarianism, political interests, and commercial interests.\textsuperscript{19} Canada’s motivation to participate in the Colombo Plan was directly tied to geopolitical and economic strategies that included both international and domestic considerations. Participation allowed Canada to be a player with multilateral influence while benefitting domestically.

From these cautious beginnings, Canada expanded its aid-giving in 1958 by committing to a modest program in support of Commonwealth Caribbean countries, followed by a similar program in Commonwealth Africa two years later. In 1961, Canada extended its development assistance program to French-speaking Africa. Depending on one’s perspective, this initiative was either as a result of pressure from Quebec or as a logical next step for a bilingual, bicultural donor country.\textsuperscript{20} Regardless, it is clear there was at least some degree of motivation created by the international interests initiated by Quebec. Thus, Canada, as a bilingual, decentralized federalist state, was obliged to consider the domestic ramifications of its development assistance policies. Canada’s commitment to French-speaking countries grew further with its membership in la Francophonie in 1970. Effectively la Francophonie has become the French equivalent of the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{21} This membership again broadened Canada’s breadth of recipient countries and created more associated commitments.

Also in 1961, Canada, as a founding nation of the OECD, took an active role in assisting developing countries. The OECD has been committed to raising the overall global standard of

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\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{20} Cermakian, "Canada’s role in the foreign aid programmes to the developing nations," 231.
\textsuperscript{21} However, unlike the Commonwealth, la Francophonie has representation from non-state actors. Consequently, Quebec and New Brunswick became members in 1971 and 1977 respectively. Quebec in particular has demonstrated a willingness to participate at the international level despite its provincial status.
living, particularly in developing states. As a liberal multilateral institution, the OECD focused on improving the economic prosperity of developing countries through development assistance and trade. It also promoted democracy and individual rights as a means to create greater global stability and discouraged communism in the developing world. Consequently, the OECD has paid special attention to the least developed countries and has promoted commitment to poverty relief and reduction. While this has some economic benefit for developed states, it has primarily aimed at improving the condition of the most in need, and aligns to some extent with Henry Shue’s normative view of ensuring at least subsistence conditions.

In 1964, Canada agreed to a limited bilateral program in Latin America. In the first 15 years of Canadian aid-giving, 50 per cent went to Commonwealth countries. Canada’s motivation at the time has been described as being based on maintaining and enhancing its perceived image with other Western states and domestic self-interest.

Such development efforts, however, were hampered by the absence of long term aid planning, and a lack of clarity and leadership within its bureaucracy. Keith Spicer reported early conflicts between External Affairs, CIDA, and the Finance department over governance, with

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22 Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development, About the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed May 19, 2012). The OECD was established in 1961 following the success of Organisation for European Economic Co-operation in the recovery of the Europe.

23 Shue, Basic Rights.

24 Cermakian, “Canada’s role in the foreign aid programmes to the developing nations: a geographical appraisal,” 225-234.

25 Spicer, A Samaritan State?, 54.

26 Kim Richard Nossal, “Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada’s Interest in Development Assistance,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 21, no. 1 (March 1988): 50. Nossal argues this pursuit of status is based on seeking prestige as a necessary requirement for a developed state to be member in good standing in the international community. However, from a LI view Canada’s actions could also be considered consistent with a growing commitment to multilateralism through international organizations.
each department wanting to dictate direction. Despite others’ interest in using development assistance to create economic opportunities, when CIDA officially became an independent agency its primary focus was on the poorest peoples in the world and embraced the values of humane internationalism, which exacerbated this internal government conflict. This struggle would be a reoccurring theme in subsequent decades.

As Canada’s foreign policy matured it embraced a broader commitment to multilateral organizations as a means of bolstering its influence and international image. These memberships have been instrumental in the formation of Canadian policy. Kim Nossal cites a myriad of organizations, coalitions, and alliances that Canada has found to be of benefit. Some relate to national security and world order, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), other military coalitions and alliances, and various UN organizations; others have focused on trade and commerce, such as the World Trade Organization, the International Labour Organization, and the World Bank; while still other inclusive organizations, such as the regional associations, the UN itself, and the Commonwealth have had broad purposes. These and other multilateral institutions have promoted aid and assistance to developing states and have had great influence over Canada’s foreign policy.

The increase in geographic breadth did result in increases in actual Canadian dollars spent on aid, although aid as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) did not increase

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27 Spicer, *A Samaritan State?*, 105-106. Spicer offers insightful comments on these departments (External Affairs, CIDA, and Finance) and difficulty in gaining commitment from the civil service on aid projects. While Canada moved ahead with broader geographic and program aid projects, the same progress did not occur on governance.


initially.\textsuperscript{30} Canada’s commitment to development assistance was tepid at best, providing just enough aid to maintain its international standing and image. But, only the major powers of the US, Great Britain, and France provided significant foreign aid, and this aid focused on the Cold War objective of thwarting the growing influence of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{31} In fact, similar to Canada’s middle power role, it has continued to maintain a position in the middle of the pack for providing development aid.

In 1968 former Prime Minister Lester Pearson, as the chair of the Commission on International Development, offered in the report, \textit{Partners in Development}, a humane international rationale for the question ‘why aid?’ with this statement: ‘the simplest answer is a moral one: that it is only right for those who have to share with those who have not.’\textsuperscript{32} This international report called for establishing a development assistance target of 0.7 per cent of GNP to be in place by 1975 and no later than 1980.\textsuperscript{33} The Canadian government of the day and subsequent governments adopted this as the goal, as did other donor states. And while Canada did increase its development assistance, this target would never be achieved (See Appendix II). But even in this Canada was following the lead of the major developed countries; only a handful of smaller countries have ever reached this 0.7 per cent target.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{30} Cranford Pratt, “Moral Vision and Foreign Policy: The Case of Canadian Development Assistance,” in \textit{Ethics and Security In Canadian Foreign Policy}, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 339. “By 1964, Canadian ODA had fallen from an already low 0.19 per cent of Canadian GNP to 0.16 per cent. In 1961, Canada’s aid as a proportion of GNP ranked 11\textsuperscript{th} of the 12 states then members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).”
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{32} Cited in: Barratt, \textit{Human Rights and Foreign Aid}, 18.
\textsuperscript{33} Morrison, \textit{Aid and Ebb Tide}, 85.
\textsuperscript{34} These were the other like-minded states: Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway. Canada has been identified as one of the like-minded states but has failed to follow the lead on the percentage target.
Development Assistance During The 1970s and Early 1980s

In 1972, Canada became an observer with OAS but did not become a full member until 1990. Canada was reluctant to fully participate in OAS because of the dominant role the US played in the organization. However, Canada already had a strong development assistance connection with the Commonwealth Caribbean countries reaching back to the 1950s fostered by Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s enthusiastic support of the Commonwealth. In addition, it already had an established relationship with Haiti stemming from Haiti’s immigrant and language connection with Quebec, Haiti’s status as the only least developed country in the Western Hemisphere, and Canada’s membership in la Francophonie. Canada’s subsequent involvement in OAS simply reinforced these existing connections. Canada has generally been seen as a wealthy, non-superpower OAS member which has been perceived to be less threatening relationship, especially with the Caribbean countries.

In 1976, Canada was invited to become a member of the G-7. Unlike the other members, Canada did not have a colonial past or an imperialist-superpower outlook. Generally, the other member states’ agendas related to their past and existing territorial interests. Yet as a member, Canada has been expected to participate in initiatives perhaps more suited to these other states. This was most apparent when, in 2002, this organization committed to address the abject poverty and starvation in Africa. While Canada’s history with Africa had been relatively limited, the European members of the G-7 had significant past colonial and

35 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 34.
36 Ibid., 16.
37 The reference to colonial ties is in the context of Canada not having been a colonial power with governance over states or territories outside its own boundaries, and therefore has no direct historical interests. The other G-7 members (Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and the United States) all have had significant colonial or imperial connections.
38 Canada, as host of the Kananaskis Summit, 2002, led this initiative. This is discussed further in the Chrétien era.
business ties. Nevertheless, Canada significantly increased its African development assistance, as did all members.

The Trudeau government pledged that development assistance would be strongly linked with commercial opportunities and political influence. Development assistance was to be based on three considerations: first, caring about international poverty creates concern about domestic poverty; second, being a good global citizen would increase support for Canada’s influence on policies with other countries and international institutions; and third, providing aid would initiate and cultivate commercial opportunities for export trade. Consistent with LI, the Trudeau government was pursuing multilateralism as a means of furthering economic self-interests, and its international and domestic image through development assistance.

Despite the emphasis on economic opportunities, CIDA increasingly shifted its aid program toward poverty reduction in the least developed countries, consistent with the focus of the OECD. This shift further alienated CIDA from other government departments’ commercial mandates. For example, at that time CIDA was under pressure from the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce (IT&C) to maximize the economic opportunities by giving IT&C greater involvement in bilateral aid decisions. In fact these kinds of tensions have grown as more departments have become interested in international development. By the latter half of the 1970s, the pendulum began to swing back in favour of self-interest. CIDA – again under new leadership – was specifically committed to the support of projects that would have economic benefit for Canada. Yet, Canada’s core aid recipients continued to be dominated by the least

39 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 92.
40 Ibid., 104; and, Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited, 31.
41 Ibid., 106.
developed countries. At the same time CIDA’s commitments expanded to include many more countries. So despite the commitment to increasing domestic economic benefit, poverty reduction continued to be considered.

Prior to the mid-1970s human rights performance was not a consideration in development assistance. Canada, with domestic pressure from church groups and NGOs, began to recognize it had a responsibility to consider human rights in its foreign policy. While this concept was acknowledged, particularly by politicians responding to public concern, human rights clearly remained subordinate to other foreign policy objectives, and were little more than talking points. Meanwhile, in 1977 CIDA set two main objectives; these were to use development to support recipient self-reliance and providing basic human needs – human rights were not included. In 1978 a committee chaired by External Affairs determined development had been overly focused on the least developed countries. The recommended and accepted formula for the distribution of aid was 40 per cent on need, 25 per cent based on political relations, 20 per cent on economic performance, and 15 per cent on commercial relations. This marked yet another shift in direction away from CIDA’s objectives.

Domestic pressure on human rights issues continued through the 1980s where several Parliamentary reports supported human rights conditionality for aid. For example, David Morrison cites a 1981 subcommittee report on Aid to Latin America and the Caribbean:

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46 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 154.
47 Ibid., 155.
Canadian development assistance should be substantially reduced, terminated or not commenced ... where gross and systemic violations of human rights make it impossible to promote the central objective of helping the poor. 48

It was recommended that where such violations existed aid be provided through NGOs rather than being provided bilaterally where it de facto would be supporting a repressive regime. This was met with general agreement that human rights were important but did not receive the necessary endorsement for action. Canada was in step with other states as this concern over human rights violations had support from the UN and numerous countries but generated ad hoc action only. While there are some selective cases where Canada reduced or eliminated aid, action was inconsistent and infrequent.49

There was reluctance within the Trudeau government to withdraw aid except in the face of the most serious violations. Allan MacEachern, External Affairs Minister, claimed such actions by Canada would do little to change the behaviour of recipient states unless there was international support and regardless the most affected would be the poor people who were already suffering under a repressive government.50 This again displays Canada’s commitment to multilateralism, but in this case it was an excuse for not acting. It also demonstrates the problem created by spreading development assistance over too many countries; giving small donations does not provide the donor with leverage.

In summary, the first 30 years of Canada’s development assistance, aid was largely promoted by membership in multilateral organizations and conditioned by commercial trade. And despite a significant increase, Canada’s development assistance only reached 0.49 per cent

48 Ibid., 202.
50 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 202.
of Gross National Income (GNI) by 1980 (See Appendix II), against a target of 0.7 per cent.\textsuperscript{51} The only normative consideration was the commitment to alleviating poverty, and was based on the influence of the UN and OECD. Human rights concerns were raised in the later years, but with little definitive action. Still, Canada’s approach was consistent with that of most other developed states.

The Mulroney Progressive Conservative Government Years

The 1986 Special Joint Committee on International Relations (Hockin-Simard report) called for the government to adopt a previous recommendation to tie official development assistance to human rights performance. It advocated Canada take a more vocal role internationally on human rights violations in a ‘constructive internationalism.’\textsuperscript{52} This report faulted CIDA for a lack of direction and raised concerns that Canada’s aid programs had been weakened by political and trade pressures.\textsuperscript{52}

A year later, the Senate report, \textit{For Whose Benefit?} (Winegard Report), also criticized CIDA’s lack of policy coherence and lack of international focus. The report recommended CIDA policies be principally based on humanitarianism. This report proposed Canada identify no more than thirty core aid partners that would be selected based on their “demonstrated capacity to use aid effectively (especially for the poor), and respect shown for human rights.”\textsuperscript{53} This essentially reinforced the Hockin-Simard recommendations. In its view good human rights should be recognized with increased aid and serious human rights violations should result in

\textsuperscript{51} The government uses GNI to calculate the percentage of development assistance. Pratt has instead referenced GNP, which is a similar calculation. This study will use GNI as this is consistent with most government reports.

\textsuperscript{52} Morrison, \textit{Aid and Ebb Tide}, 273-4.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 282.
reduced aid or even the curtailment of projects. Both of these reports cautioned that care had to be taken to ensure aid continued addressing the needs of the poorest and was not solely to be based on the actions of an abusive government. This concern about harming the poor has frequently limited action.

The government responded to these two proposals in 1987 with *Sharing our Future*, which outlined CIDA’s new vision statement on aid strategy. In addition to reiterating Canada’s commitment to address Third world poverty reduction, it also placed an emphasis on women in development, ecologically sustainable programs, food security, and programs to provide energy. Canada’s position on human rights violations was specifically addressed. Bilateral aid was to be directly linked to the cabinet’s assessment as to whether a country’s human right violations were systemic, gross and continuous. In such cases, aid could still be redirected through non-government and multilateral organizations in an effort to ensure those most in need would not be doubly penalized. Additionally, humanitarian needs would not be denied because of human rights violations, but government-to-government development assistance was to be conditioned upon human rights performance. However, this policy lacked a clear understanding of which human rights were to be considered as the policy simply offered the ubiquitous catchall of “... the principles of greater respect for human rights.” This of course left decisions subject to other political influences.

Yet, under Prime Minister Mulroney, the government became the most vocally committed to human rights of all the Canadian governments. This included Canada being the first country to place requirements on recipient countries with respect to human rights

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54 Ibid., 283.
56 Ibid., 30.
obligations. But, it generally did so in the context of a human rights discourse other developed states were also engaged in.

Canada did, in some cases, suspend or reduce development assistance over human rights abuses. Prior to 1987, Canadian bilateral assistance to Cambodia, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Guyana, Indonesia, and Vietnam were suspended for various periods. T.A. Keenleyside notes that in the remainder of the decade Canada suspended or reduced bilateral aid to Haiti, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, and threatened to take similar action with Somalia. As the Mulroney government entered the 1990s it also reduced or curtailed aid to several Africa states – Kenya, Rwanda, and Zaire – over human rights violations. None of these states had large programs nor did this represent significant commercial opportunities.

Additionally, Mulroney personally weighed in on certain international human rights issues. In 1985, he condemned South Africa on its Apartheid policy and imposed sanctions. He followed this by raising the issue at Commonwealth, la Francophonie and G-7 meetings with the intent of creating broader international action. Uncharacteristically, this was done in spite of stiff opposition from other developed states. Mulroney’s human rights commitment was again demonstrated in 1991 when he announced at the Commonwealth conference, and later with la Francophonie, that “Canada will not subsidize repression and the stifling of democracy. We shall increasingly be channeling our development assistance to those countries which show respect

57 Tomasevski, *Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited*, 89.
58 Keenleyside, “Aiding Rights,” 244-249.
59 Ibid., 255. Also see Gillies, *Between Principle and Practice*. Gillies provides case studies on Canada’s aid program responses to major violations in Sri Lanka, East Timor, and China, where he found similar inconsistencies. He also lists both negative and positive responses in select cases where Canada has responded to human rights performance in its aid decisions. 236.
60 Morrison, *Aid and Ebb Tide*, 372.
for fundamental rights and freedoms." Consistent with LI, he sought to leverage Canada’s voice through multilateralism. Partially through Mulroney’s efforts, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and OAS each adopted good governance statements that encouraged states and non-state actors to intervene in to protect economic and political standards in other member states. In this instance Canada did not look to the multilateral organizations to establish rules and standards but was actively lobbying to persuade other states to adopt a principled approach.

However, Canada did not take action in all cases where human rights violations had been viewed as severe. For example, aid was continued to such countries as Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, and aid was restarted with Indonesia despite their severe human rights violations. The most notable example was the muted response to China’s suppression of pro-democracy students at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Canada’s actions were far more diplomatic than they were substantive with only a token suspension of development assistance. David Morrison points out bilateral aid to China quickly normalized and in 1991-92 and 1992-93 China had become Canada’s second largest recipient of government-to-government assistance. Canada had cultivated relations with China over the previous 20 years and had become a major trading partner for Canada. In this case clearly economic self-interest took precedent over human rights principles.

While this government had made many rhetorical advances on linking human rights with development assistance, these had not translated into consistent, predictable practice.

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63 Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002), 174.
64 Ibid., 244-249.
65 Gillies, Between Principle and Practice, 169.
66 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 348. The government to government assistance cited here was from CIDA and the Export Development Corporation. However, 52 per cent was from CIDA grants.
Canada was more likely to respond to human rights violations in pro-Soviet states than those in ‘friendly’ states. Likewise, steps were more likely to be taken against states with little commercial significance. Economic interests on where and how aid was delivered continued to take precedence over human rights considerations with few exceptions. These inconsistencies demonstrate the glaring gap between rhetoric and practice. It is this that caused Matthews and Pratt to offer the observation:

[although claimed by the government to be a major principle of Canada’s foreign policy, human rights has never been integrated into the decision-making process. ... Canada pursues human rights when that interest coincides or overlaps with other foreign policy goals, when its interests are negligible, or when the public forces its hand.]

Consequently, when human rights are not seen by the government as an important factor in their own right, then they will always be subordinated to other superior considerations.

The Chrétien and Martin Liberal Governments Era

Budget restraints that had begun in the late 1980s and continued through the 1990s when the Chrétien government applied further budget cuts as it addressed the mounting federal deficit and debt problems. CIDA was particularly hard hit. Aid projects were eliminated, phased out, reduced in size, or not renewed. As shown in Appendix II, aid as a percent of GNI dropped from 0.45 to 0.29 through the 1990s and it remained below 0.3 per cent for the first four years of this century. Particularly hard hit by Canada’s reductions were the least developed and low income countries. Canada reduced support substantially in much of Africa by

68 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid, 126. Barratt cites David Gillies who claimed the constraints on aid began in 1986. Also Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 413. He notes ODA was reduced by 33% in real terms from 1988/9 to 1997/8, which was substantially greater than the reduction in all other government programs. This clearly demonstrates the low priority placed on development assistance as a foreign policy tool.
essentially phasing out aid to Central and East Africa, including the discontinuance of a
longstanding relationship with Tanzania. In fairness, budgetary restraint and spending
reductions were not strictly a Canadian phenomenon; generally, other OECD states reduced
their aid commitments at the same time placing further strain on already poverty-stricken
countries.

The election of the Chrétien Liberal government in 1993 marked a substantial change in
foreign policy. Andre Ouellet, as Foreign Affairs minister, was also in charge of CIDA. However,
his primary focus was trade promotion and supporting Canadian business through official
development assistance (ODA) opportunities. Ouellet had limited interest in linking economic
interests with human rights. In one speech he stated that Canada would “…vigorously pursue a
series of [trade] initiatives in a number of countries irrespective of their human rights
records.” Tom Keating, however, has argued the decline in Canada’s development aid budget
made Ouellet’s comments more ‘rhetorical rather than practical’.

During this period of austerity, Canada revised its foreign policy, including development
assistance, by adopting Canada in the World in 1995. With this policy, Canada embraced the
UN’s 1994 commitment to human security. Human security looked beyond the state and
emphasized a greater focus on individual security – security of the person and access to
necessities of life, such as food and shelter. Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, has defined
human security as encompassing education and health, democracy and human rights,

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69 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 372.
70 David R. Black, Jean-Philippe Thérien, and Andrew Clark, “Moving with the Crowd: Canadian Aid in
71 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 376-377.
72 Scharfe, Complicity, 29.
73 Keating, Canada and World Order, 202.
74 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review
protection against environmental degradation, and staunching the proliferation of deadly weapons. All are interconnected where starvation impedes peace and injustice obstructs freedom. This view was embraced in 1996 by Ouellet’s successor, Lloyd Axworthy, whose personal view strongly aligned with this new international direction. He enthusiastically championed human security, reintroducing a humane internationalist approach while downplaying the promotion of trade within his department. This, however, did not translate into broader government policy as Prime Minister Chrétien championed trade through several Team Canada trade missions.

Yet, foreign affairs under Axworthy committed to be much more responsive by providing support to the already stated poverty reduction commitment, focusing on concerns of individual security and on humanitarian aid targeted at the welfare of civil society. Foreign policy laid out six priorities, including: basic human needs; women in development; infrastructure services; human rights, democracy, good governance (HRDGG); private sector development; and the environment. The year Axworthy was appointed, CIDA also issued a policy called Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance, which revised the approach connecting aid with human rights. This policy

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77 This began with a high profile trip to China in 1994 to promote trade between the two countries. In all, Chrétien led ten such missions including trips to South America, Asia, and Europe.
reiterated objectives related to promoting economic prosperity in a secure world based on the Canadian values of democracy, rule of law and culture. New programs were to be scrutinized using the refined approach to HRDGG and aid effectiveness. While human rights had become part of this broader category, they indeed go hand-in-hand with democracy and good governance.

But, the definition of human rights did not become any clearer. These were defined as those specified in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Unfortunately, the reference to the UDHR brings little clarity on action to be taken. As Gillies had observed:

Canadian policymakers evaluating complex human rights conditions in the developing world will be paralyzed if equal attention and equal weighting is to be given to the approximately 60 separate rights entrenched in the International Bill. After a certain point, the more human rights there are to be considered, the less likely any meaningful assessment can be done. Democracy and good governance along with poverty reduction are more definable concepts. Not surprisingly, human rights received less emphasis than it had in the previous documents.

CIDA’s new focus was to encourage HRDGG programs at the civil society level in recipient states. Where serious human rights violations occurred, CIDA would work through the recipient government and where necessary escalate to multilateral organizations or the UN to coordinate actions. This again is a demonstration of Canada looking to multilateral

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83 Canadian International Development Agency, Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance, 8. An ongoing problem is that serious human rights violations are not defined.
organizations for direction where it has felt it lacked leverage. While this policy did not preclude the possibility of discontinuing aid over severe violations, it indicated a strong reluctance to do so. Effectively, the message was one of support for HRDGG and a commitment to address issues short of withdrawing all aid.

In another of its many policy proclamations, CIDA also reiterated in 1996 its position on poverty reduction.\(^\text{84}\) While positioned as a compatible objective with HRDGG, poverty reduction actually results in a focus on lower income countries, many of which have relatively poor human rights performance, are not democratic and lack good governance.\(^\text{85}\) While focusing on these countries, it should be noted that it is hard – but not impossible – not to do so at the expense of a human rights performance criterion. Consequently, the focus on poverty reduction, a noble objective, can work at cross-purposes to HRDGG.

At the turn of the century, members of the G-8 – most particularly Great Britain, France, and Canada – showed concern over the plight of African nations. At the Genoa Summit in 2001, preparations began to pave the way for a new aid relationship with Africa. Chrétien, as the next G-8 host, took the lead role in developing the diplomatic relations needed for an agreement. By the end of 2001, Canada had pledged an additional $1B in official development assistance.\(^\text{86}\) However, this commitment must be considered in light of the ‘draconian cuts’ to Canada’s African aid that had occurred in the previous decade. Chrétien further committed to double

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\(^\text{85}\) Sen, *Development as Freedom*.

African aid by 2010. It is widely viewed that this about face by Chrétien was an attempt to create a legacy as he was nearing the end of his political career.

In one sense his successful efforts marked a turning point in G-8–African relations as Africa became a G-8 agenda item for many subsequent summits. However, Chrétien was unable in 2002 to convince members to commit incremental aid over what had already been committed at a meeting some months earlier. Thus, this was only a qualified success. David Black observed that Canada had managed to maintain credibility with both its fellow G-8 members and the African leaders, but little more was accomplished. Rather than being principally focused on development aid, greater importance seems to have been on form and image for Canada in its multilateral relationship with the G-8.

Coincidental with the Kananaskis summit, Canada released another policy statement, *Canada making a difference in the world: a policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness*, which focused greater effectiveness in aid utilization. This document signalled a change in Canadian development assistance for Africa consistent with the already established UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) focusing on the needs of the recipient states – as opposed to donor self-interest – but required commitments from recipient states to the achievement of development targets. CIDA committed to select a limited number of the poorest countries for enhanced partnership programs. Selection was to be based on: the recipient state’s ability to effectively use development assistance, states committed to good

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87 David Black, “Leader or Laggard? Canada’s Enduring Engagement with Africa,” in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates & New Ideas*, eds. Duane Bratt & Christopher J. Kukucha (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2007), 387-388. Black makes the point that Canada’s minimal aid level by the early 2000s had limited its ability to pursue its human security agenda.


governance, and a willingness to engage local involvement in poverty reduction and to address corruption.\(^9\) CIDA’s approach continued to be influenced by the human security agenda with its strong emphasis on civil society within the recipient state, and assistance being conditioned by civil society’s involvement. Notionally this creates a preference for partnering with states that had already demonstrated a commitment to improving governance capacity-building and to the reduction of corruption; thus confirming a selectivity strategy.\(^{91}\) However, where a state had extremely low governance capacity, CIDA would still commit Canada’s assistance but aid would be limited to peace-building, humanitarian assistance and multilateral or NGO projects.\(^{92}\)

Therefore, bilateral aid was to be shaped to be sensitive to good and poor HRDGG performance.

Prime Minister Paul Martin (2004) stayed the course on poverty reduction and the commitment of increased support to Africa. However, he promoted the idea of a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to developing countries that was characterized by the three Ds of defence, diplomacy and development.\(^{93}\) But, this approach, especially when trade was later added, meant there were other departments besides DFAIT involved, which further eroded CIDA’s role and fragmented aid decisions. While on the face of it, a whole-of-government approach would seem to portend greater policy coherence, other states experiences have shown that development is likely to become subordinated to other interests.\(^{94}\)

This change culminated in the International Policy Statement in 2005 (IPS 2005). The new statement placed DFAIT as the lead department in developing integrated strategies, and

\(^{90}\) ibid., 11-12.

\(^{91}\) Neumayer, *The Pattern of Aid Giving*, 14. He describes a selectivity strategy as one where aid is provided based on a recipient state having already demonstrated a good record.

\(^{92}\) Canadian International Development Agency, *Canada making a difference in the World*, 10.

\(^{93}\) Smillie, “Foreign Aid and Canadian Purpose,” 200.

promoted the need to focus on Canada’s national interest. Given Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, national interest included a strong emphasis on the role of the Department of Defence (DND). Stephen Brown predicted that requiring CIDA to work closely with DFAIT and more importantly DND would most likely result in development being compromised for security and international trade objectives. This was borne out in a later study where Brown reported that Afghanistan had received $7M in Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2000 which then increased to $345M in 2007 when it comprised 8.5 per cent of all Canada ODA. The long standing philosophical disagreement as to the fundamental purpose of aid between CIDA and DFAIT was thus joined by other departments who were essentially aligned against CIDA’s humane internationalism and its normative views.

In spite of this, the stated focus for aid remained on improving aid effectiveness in poverty reduction while applying the HRDGG criteria. In IPS 2005, CIDA committed to concentrate two-thirds of its bilateral aid on 25 development partners with a narrower focus on the types of development initiatives. These partners were chosen based on their poverty level, on their ability to use aid effectively, and on Canada having sufficient presence to add value. However, as Denis Stairs notes, Canada already committed more than this amount of bilateral aid to the top 25 recipient states at the time. And although there were some changes as to which states were the top 25 partners, in Stairs’ words “... virtually any variety of development

96 Brown, “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives,” 478.
initiative can be accommodated by the framework and rationale that it has created.” Thus, this policy statement did little more than formally identify development partners based on the current aid situation.

However, the already limited value of this list was further diminished as states not on the list continued to receive major levels of Canadian bilateral aid as fragile states. Haiti, which had previously been a recognized aid partner, was removed from the list only to be identified under a category of ‘failed and fragile states’ and thereby eligible for continued bilateral aid. Haiti continues to be the second largest recipient of Canadian development assistance. Canada’s development assistance relationship with Haiti has been long and complicated. Aid to Haiti began in the early 1970s. And despite the oppressive and corrupt nature of the Haitian governments and military stemming through the Duvalier regimes and the ousting of the democratically elected President Aristide in 1991 and 2004, Canada has maintained a strong donor status with only short periods where aid was suspended or reduced. This connection has been fostered by Haiti’s geographic location, the French language, the existence of a strong Haitian diaspora in the Montréal area, and Federal-Québec relations on foreign affairs. Certainly Canada’s multilateral membership in la Francophonie has had some influence on Canada’s involvement with Haiti, but more important has been Canada’s response to Québec’s efforts to participate in foreign affairs and to the lobbying from the diaspora. In 2004 the diaspora had called for Canada to provide more aid to Haiti when President Aristide was being

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99 Stairs, Confusing The Innocent with Numbers and Categories, 5.
ousted for the second time. The Liberal government’s failure to act led, in part, to two cabinet members from Montréal losing their seats in the next election.\textsuperscript{103}

Development assistance to Haiti in the Liberal era has been less focused on poverty reduction than it has been on HRDGG. Canada has committed much aid to providing training for the Haitian National Police, establishing the rule of law, and infrastructure for democratic institutions. These support the neo-liberal framework necessary to promote stable government and for the development of economic linkages. While this approach may have an impact on the security and bring attention to human rights issues, the underlying problem of extreme poverty and severe income inequality has remained.\textsuperscript{104} This is an obvious case where Canada’s aid has been used to pursue its self-interests with minimal consideration for the most basic needs of the recipient state.

Despite commitments to improve the focus on aid to a limited number of partners, it is still almost easier to discuss who does not receive aid from Canada. In the mid-1990s, David Morrison pointed out that Canada has been unique amongst other similarly placed DAC countries. He noted:

\ldots Canada’s global reach across Asia, Africa, and the Americas has resembled that of a superpower and a major power – the United States and Germany – but without approaching either’s economic clout or international political interests.\textsuperscript{105}

The result has been that Canada’s aid is generally characterized by relatively small amounts of money spread widely over many countries with development needs. Canada had the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[103] Shamsie, "It’s Not Just Afghanistan or Darfur," 216.
\item[104] Ibid.
\item[105] Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 17.
\end{footnotes}
lowest level of concentration of any of the DAC countries in the mid-1990s.\footnote{Ibid., 17, 473.} This low concentration has continued.

By CIDA’s own admission, in 2002 they provided bilateral aid to over 100 countries and had the least concentrated assistance of all DAC countries.\footnote{Canadian International Development Agency, \textit{Canada making a difference in the world}, 9.} But, for fiscal 2003 CIDA reported it provided only 18 countries with more than $10M annually in assistance, and it provided less than $5M to each of 90 countries, with almost 60 per cent of those receiving less than $1M each.\footnote{Canadian International Development Agency, \textit{Canada’s International Policy Statement (2005)}.} Bethany Barratt counted 129 countries Canada gave development assistance to in 2004.\footnote{Barratt, \textit{Human Rights and Foreign Aid}, 147-149.} In 2005 Stairs observed Canada was providing assistance to 155 countries based on government documents. He suggests CIDA’s long standing obligations to an overly broad recipient list have embedded financial commitments limiting its ability to make short and medium term changes.\footnote{Stairs, \textit{Confusing The Innocent with Numbers and Categories}, 8.} This institutionalization of aid has essentially created an inertia that has exacerbated Canada’s problem of already being too thinly spread across too many recipient states.

In these Liberal government years, human rights were always mentioned in policy statements. However, other competing agendas were present. Trade was the dominant factor. But, national security rose in importance due to the war on terror and the Afghan war. On the other hand, CIDA’s focus remained on poverty reduction. Given these conflicting and competing agendas it is little wonder Canada’s development programs have been criticized for lacking clear direction.
The Harper Minority Conservative Governments

The release of the IPS 2005 was quickly followed by a change in government resulting in two successive Conservative minority governments. Consequently, the statement was never officially adopted, but it has remained a guiding document. Generally, the Harper minority government did not engage in a broad public discussion nor did it lay out a comprehensive position on development assistance. The Conservative Party had made little mention of aid in its election campaign except to allude to focusing on accountability for the distribution and results of aid-giving, which was to support Canada’s core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free markets and trade. The indication that an emphasis would be placed on trade relations through aid foreshadowed a stronger neo-liberal approach and commitment to self-interest. While only a vague reference to the generally accepted concepts of HRDGG was made, the Conservatives most significant proposed change was to replace the longstanding 0.7 per cent development assistance a Canadian official development assistance target equal to the OECD average. Not surprisingly, aid policymaking became more piece meal and somewhat by stealth.

In 2006, however, Josée Verner, Minister of International Cooperation, did reaffirm the Harper’s government commitment to four key pillars – freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights – in foreign policy and international aid. But, in what was a clear contradiction, she announced Canada would be focusing its efforts on Haiti and Afghanistan. Both were singled out for continued development assistance where concrete changes could be realized through

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112 Brown, “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives,” 480.
stabilizing and reconstructing these countries. Neither country had acceptable human rights records nor was either an official development partner. Both were failed or fragile states at the time. It would seem the hope that these states would pursue these pillars was enough to gain Canada’s support. In the following three years these states would receive more bilateral aid from Canada than any other state by a substantial margin. However, the preferential treatment of these two states was a consequence of the geo-political and security based self-interest driven by Foreign Affairs and DND. Stephen Brown reports that it was also the Prime Minister’s Office that was influential in this decision, introducing yet another, more powerful, bureaucratic group to development assistance decision making.

As earlier noted, the Chrétien and Martin governments had come under international pressure to reduce Canada’s conditional tied aid requirements. While both made commitments to eliminate tied aid, no timetable was set for such action. It was the Harper government, in 2008, that announced all food aid would be untied, meaning it would no longer be necessary for recipient states to use any of Canada’s aid to purchase Canadian food. This announcement was followed up a few months later with the new Minister of International Cooperation, Bev Oda, declaring all development aid would be untied by 2012-13 with the express purpose of

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114 This point is discussed at length in Chapter 5. Also see Table 2.


116 Brown, “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives,” 472. Canada had relented to pressure by G-8 and DAC members to untie some aid in 2002 and in 2005 the Martin government had committed to untie all aid as part of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, but no process or deadline was set.

making aid more effective.\textsuperscript{118} This seems to be counter to the pursuit of self-interest but in fact Canada does very little export trade with poor developing countries.\textsuperscript{119} By the end of 2008 Canadian tied aid only accounted for 9.23 per cent of aid compared to 25.4 per cent in 2007 and 43 per cent in 2004.\textsuperscript{120} The commitment to untie all aid by 2012/13 does seem to be a genuine effort to give recipient states the ability to maximize the aid provided. However, the efficiency in and effectiveness of aid is beyond the scope of analysis in this study.

Where self-interest seems to be more significant is in the selection of states to receive significant development aid. The Harper government signalled such a change in direction when it told the G-8 in 2007 that it would follow through on its existing commitments to Africa, but that it would be moving its future focus to the Americas.\textsuperscript{121} African states make up over half of the least developed countries, while Haiti is the only state from the Americas in this category. With this announcement the government effectively shifted its focus to trade opportunities in the Caribbean and South America countries where free trade agreement were being pursued.\textsuperscript{122} At the same time, CIDA issued a ten year Caribbean strategic plan focusing on assisting the region’s economic development.\textsuperscript{123} Nevertheless the Conservative government’s commitment to fulfill the Liberal’s promise to increase aid to Africa demonstrates this government’s concern

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Black, “Canada, G-8, and Africa,” 496.
\textsuperscript{122} Brown, “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives,” 481.
over maintaining its international reputation and support for multilateralism. But its willingness
to resist the G-8’s call for further commitments demonstrated a more independent Canada.

In May 2008, the minority government passed a private member’s bill creating a
legislative mandate regarding the conditions for Canadian development assistance. The act
formally acknowledged the central focus of all international aid as being poverty reduction in a
manner “that promotes international human rights standards.” 124 This bill was initiated by an
opposition Liberal member and was originally resisted by the Conservative government.
However, the other parties overwhelmingly supported it, as did the general public, and it was
passed with minor Senate amendments. Yet, notwithstanding its resistance to the bill, the
government claimed its was already in compliance and no further action was required. 125 It
would be very optimistic to suggest this was a government endorsement of poverty reduction
and human rights in Canada’s aid policy. It is necessary to look to the actions of the government
to inform its real direction.

In 2009, Oda announced the list of development partners was being reduced to
concentrate on 20 recipients, and the target allocation was increased to 80 per cent of bilateral
assistance. 126 Reintroduced to the partners list were Afghanistan and Haiti, consistent with the
2006 announcement to provide significant aid to these states. Both countries fall into the least
developed category and both have had significant governance and human rights issues, which
certainly limits the capacity-building potential to effectively utilize aid. In fairness, it should be
noted that in 2008 and 2009 Haiti was showing some improvements in its human rights scores.

Assistance Abroad (Official Development Assistance Accountability Act), Library of Parliament, October 8,
125 Brown, “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives,” 481.
126 Canadian International Development Agency, Canada Moves on Another Element of its Aid
Whereas, Afghanistan remained a war zone with the lowest human rights scores.\textsuperscript{127} With both of these countries, Canada’s aid has been focused on building infrastructure through training. Clearly, the inclusion of these two development partners demonstrates the program is not intended to address poverty reduction but principally to satisfy domestic, geo-political and security interests.

While the Conservative minority government had not developed a new aid policy statement, it did commit to making aid more effective. The reduction in the number of key development partners in 2009 would seem to be a step in that direction, except that considering failed states as preferred partners does not support greater effectiveness. The additions and deletions to the ‘partner’ countries perhaps present a much more important change of direction. This new list dramatically reduced the focus on Africa where poverty reduction is most needed.\textsuperscript{128} Where the 2005 Partners list included 14 least developed and lower income countries the new list reduced this number to seven. Also added were a collection of relatively well-off states aggregated as the Caribbean Region, as well as the perennially poverty-stricken Haiti, plus four potential free trade partners in South America. How this will actually effect the overall direction of Canada’s development assistance is unclear as it will take some years for these changes to be fully realized. However, it is apparent this government has reduced the emphasis on humane internationalism and the normative goal of poverty reduction in favour of commercial interests. Yet, in a subsequent change in direction, the Harper government began to re-engage Africa in 2010 by promoting maternal and child healthcare.\textsuperscript{129} The general consensus

\textsuperscript{127} Mark Gibney, Lynette Cornett and Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale Levels, 1976-2010, 2010, http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php (accessed November 17, 2011). Based on AI narratives Haiti received PTS scores of 4, 2, and 3 in the years 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively. Afghanistan remained at the worse level, category 5, for all these years.

\textsuperscript{128} Brown, “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives,” 477.

\textsuperscript{129} Black, “Between Indifference and Idiosyncrasy.”
is that this government has shown a disinterest toward the international aid portfolio and development assistance policy has been adrift.\textsuperscript{130}

It will be interesting to see if this government’s direction will improve the fragmentation of Canada’s aid. Thus far the Harper government has actually increased the level of concentration.\textsuperscript{131} However, this is due to the significant increase in bilateral aid to Afghanistan, Haiti and by fulfilling its commitment on Africa. But, the concentration of aid will have limited effect if the total number of recipients is not reduced. The total number of recipient states in this study only declined by eight from the 1998-2000 period to the 2007-2009 period; a small reduction of five per cent.\textsuperscript{132}

This government continues to claim, albeit in a muted fashion, that it focuses on human rights.\textsuperscript{133} However, related actions are not well articulated. In addition to the earlier human rights announcements, the Harper government has linked its new thematic priorities announced in 2009 as supporting recipient states in gender equality and human rights improvements.\textsuperscript{134} However, human rights in this instance have moved from being a pre-condition for development assistance to an anticipated outcome derived from the benefits of the aid provided. This would not seem to bode well for a principled approach to addressing serious human rights violations. However, this most recent position occurred at the end of the period of this thesis study and therefore will not be reflected in the quantitative analysis.

\textsuperscript{131} Gulrajani, “Improving Canada’s Performance as a Bilateral Donor,” 62.
\textsuperscript{132} These numbers have been calculated from the aggregation of CIDA’s annual fiscal reports for the two periods of this study. In the first period Canada provided bilateral aid to 147 countries compared to 139 in the later period.
\textsuperscript{134} Brown, “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives,” 477.
With respect to the second period covered in this study, the Conservative government initially showed little interest in making changes to the direction set by the Martin government. The Conservatives’ decision to follow through on the G-8 promises already in place effectively committed Canada to increases in its aid budget particularly for poverty-stricken areas of Africa.\textsuperscript{135} In fact, Canada reached its commitment to double aid to Africa a year in advance of the target. The change in direction outlined by the 2009 announcements will not realize their full impact for some years into the future.

\textsuperscript{135} Black, “Between Indifference and Idiosyncrasy,” 251.
CHAPTER 4

QUANTITATIVE THESIS METHODOLOGY

The quantitative section of this thesis attempts to achieve two objectives in its efforts to identify correlations between Canada’s bilateral aid-giving and the human rights record of recipient states. It first looks to further the academic literature by building on the earlier work of Nola Serkasevich. This will be accomplished by adding two additional time periods of analysis. These periods focus on bilateral aid during 1998 to 2000 and 2007 to 2009.\(^1\) Three-year periods have been selected to be consistent with Serkasevich’s study and to allow for coherence in government policy. Three-year periods – as opposed to individual years – reduce distortion from any anomalies in aid as a result of short term projects. The first period was selected because it included the period where the Chrétien government was most vocally committed to the human security agenda. As well, the impacts from the reductions associated with the federal fiscal restraint program had largely been implemented. The second period is based on the most recent data of 2007-2009 under the Harper minority Conservative government. This period begins a year after the Conservatives came to power, which afforded that government some time to initiate their own direction on international assistance. But as was discussed in the previous chapter, the Harper government did little to advance its own policy, except to recommit to major aid increases for Afghanistan and Haiti and confirm the promises already made on poverty reduction in Africa. The lack of new direction by this government does not mean that this period simply reflects the previous government; the Conservatives, albeit in a

\(^1\) For ease of reading calendar years are referenced, however, Canada’s fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31. For example, this study identifies the government foreign aid report for the fiscal year 1998-99 is identified as 1998.
minority government, were in charge and the actions or inaction on this portfolio indicates its level of agreement on the existing direction, or its disinterest in development assistance. In either case, this period is reflective of the government in power.

Not only do these periods provide data points in two more decades, they also permit analyses for two additional governments formed by different political parties. The analysis first focuses on correlating Political Terror Scale (PTS) human rights scores with bilateral aid, measured as a three-year average of total aid. On the basis there is a greater need for aid than there is aid available from donor states, if human rights compliance is a meaningful commitment, human rights would be expected to be a significant factor in determining who receives bilateral aid. Also, the relationship between another stated objective, poverty reduction, and PTS scores and bilateral aid is considered. While the premise here is that human rights violations are purported to be important to Canadian bilateral aid, human rights as a factor in aid may be compromised by the commitment by donor states to address poverty.

The second objective is to consider the impact on bilateral aid, as the dependent variable, Canada’s multilateral memberships and the population of recipient states in addition to human rights ratings. Recognition is also given to certain outliers and anomalies that reflect known geo-political and security-based exceptions. These adjustments recognize there are foreign policy drivers other than human rights. The key is, however, to determine if human rights abuses by recipient states are taken into account or do these other foreign policy drivers completely overshadow human rights issues.

The following subsections define the parameters of the quantitative variables used in this study.

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2 Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, 154.
Bilateral Aid

As in Serkasevich’s study and most other studies, analysis is limited to bilateral aid on the rationale that bilateral aid is completely within the control of the Canadian government and generally provides government-to-government assistance. On the other hand, multilateral aid is excluded because there are multilateral agencies and intermediaries where the direct government relationship does not exist. Humanitarian aid targets specific catastrophic events and is generally acknowledged as not taking into account human rights considerations. Bilateral aid, in effect, represents the Canadian government directly supporting the recipient state and therefore the actions of that state. For this reason, and the acknowledged position that serious human rights violations are inconsistent with Canadian values, it is where such abuses exist that it should be anticipated the greatest negative impact on aid would occur.

The Canadian Government, through Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), publishes annual fiscal year reports on assistance provided to countries, territories, regions, and organizations. These reports provide total development assistance divided into various categories and by region, sovereign state, protectorate, or territory. With the exception of the West Bank and Gaza under the Palestinian Authority (PA), only states are included in this study. The PA is included because of its special status at the UN and the fact it was identified in 2009 as a Canadian development partner.

One adjustment has been made to the CIDA bilateral aid numbers used in this study. The period 1998-2000 included a number of countries that received official debt relief as bilateral aid. In particular, Poland was by far the greatest recipient. This was as a result of a number of developed countries, under the auspices of the Paris Club, agreeing to forgive debt in
response to Poland committing in 1991 to convert to a market economy.\textsuperscript{3} In 1998-2000, official
debt relief to Poland was nearly $525M, which accounted for more than 80 per cent of all debt
relief given by Canada during this period. Of the remaining official debt relief, more than 10 per
cent was forgiven to the Ivory Coast. The rest of the recipients were dominated by other African
countries, but at much smaller amounts.\textsuperscript{4} Unlike other bilateral aid assistance, debt relief for
past loans is explicitly predicated on economic policy commitments with no connection to good
governance or human rights performance. For this reason, and because it is such a significant
outlier with respect to Poland and the Ivory Coast, official debt relief has been excluded from
bilateral aid in the first period. However, Table 1 will show both with and without debt relief to
demonstrate the impact this had on bilateral aid.

It should be noted that Canada, with other developed countries, participates in the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. This includes funds that are administered by
the World Bank to provide debt relief in the form of forgiving full or partial debts to afford debt-
stricken states relief while they implement economic policy reforms. Unlike the official debt
relief mentioned above, HIPC is multilateral aid and temporally outside the scope of this study.
But in 1999 Canada also set up the Canada Debt Initiative (CDI), a bilateral fund, through which
Canada would stop collecting debt service payments and forgo the debt owed by eligible HIPC

\textsuperscript{3} Steven Greenhouse, “Poland is Granted Large Cut in Debt,” \textit{NY Times},
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/16/business/poland-is-granted-large-cut-in-
debt.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (accessed August 1, 2012). This debt relief was conditioned on
economic reforms and was not based on human rights performance. The Paris Club is a financial
association of 19 developed states, of which Canada is a member, that coordinates loans to developing
countries.

\textsuperscript{4} These countries and official debt relief numbers were extracted from the Statistical Reports for Official
During this three year period the following countries received official debt relief in bilateral aid: Poland
($523.31M), Ivory Coast ($85.54M), Cameroon ($34.12M), Ex-Yugoslavia ($10.72M), Senegal ($6.36M),
Zambia ($4.96M), Congo ($4M), Bangladesh ($6M), and Benin ($0.05M).
countries as they met certain conditions. The Federal Finance Department reported in January 2005 that it had completely retired official development assistance (ODA) debt for all 22 HIPCs except Myanmar. Canada, over the period of 2001 to 2004 inclusive, had forgiven over $600M in debt to HIPCs, including bilateral and multilateral debt. The remaining debt relief (nearly another $600M) was related to commitments through the Paris Club and World Bank organizations as multilateral debt. Consequently, any debt relief in the second period of this study is not identified in the CIDA annual fiscal reports as bilateral aid. Therefore, there was no need to adjust the numbers in the later period.

Human Rights Rating

The empirical studies discussed above have approached human rights ratings in a number of ways making it difficult to make comparisons. There are essentially three rating systems that have been used: Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI), Freedom House Civil Liberties, and Political Terror Scale (PTS). As was discussed in Chapter 1, CIRI is the least appropriate measure as it lacks consistency and clarity. Further, CIRI was only used in one study which was not specific to Canada. Therefore, using CIRI would fail to build on any of the pertinent work.

The other two scoring systems – PTS and Freedom House – are more common and provide anchored descriptors in their ratings. As discussed earlier, PTS provides a dual-rating system based on narrative inputs from two different sources being scored against a five point scale.


\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Also, for a detailed comparative assessment of CIRI and PTS see: Wood and Gibney, “The Political Terror Scale (PTS).”}\]
anchored scale. Therefore, PTS effectively provides two sets of scores based on Amnesty International (AI) and US Department of State narratives. Freedom House provides a two-part scale based on political rights and civil rights. The questions associated with each cover a broad spectrum of human rights encompassing democratic and political rights, freedom of speech and of the media, physical security, equality, right to due process and an impartial judiciary. The civil liberties scale provides many – but not all – of the questions that are designed to address a minimalist approach to human rights. By combining these two scales, the Freedom House scale essentially measures democratic practices, and not specifically human rights. For this reason it is not preferred.

The PTS scale, on the other hand, focuses on what is at the core of human rights as opposed to the broader scope found in the Freedom House assessments. The PTS descriptions principally consider human rights in the context of physical security and personal integrity rights. It is also comparable to the scale and scoring used by Serkasevich. This permits parallels to be drawn between her study and the two time periods of this thesis. And, by using PTS as the human rights measure, an independent rating is provided. Also because the number of narratives for countries has increased, PTS provides a more complete set of scores. Yet neither AI nor the US State department produce assessments on all countries. And scores are not necessarily the same between the two narratives. Eric Neumayer’s remedy for these problems was to average scores where two measures were available. Alternatively, Bethany Barratt chose to only use the US Department of State scores because there were fewer missing data points over the duration of her study. Serkasevich had chosen to use the AI narratives as these gave the appearance of being less biased.

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8 Neumayer, *The Pattern of Aid Giving*, 53.
9 See Appendix I.
An objective of this study was to have scores for all states in both periods based on a minimalist view of human rights. This is best accomplished by using PTS with some further inputs to fill in the few missing data points. Similar to Serkasevich, this study principally relies on scores based on AI narratives. But where AI-based scores were not available, scores from the US Department of State narratives have been utilized. While there is some variances between individual state scores where narratives from both were available, Barratt reported that the two scales had a high correlation at the 0.75 level with the correlation improving over the duration of her study (1980 to 2004).\(^{10}\) She also observed that AI tended to assess government human rights violations more severely. These differences may be construed as being politically motivated by a US bias and therefore AI is preferred.

In only a few cases were there countries with no ratings under either scale.\(^{11}\) These countries typically were sparsely populated and had no history of government oppression or abuse. In an effort to have as complete data as possible, human rights scores were assigned based on a review of Freedom House country narratives, the Freedom House civil liberties descriptions and scores, and validated with the assistance of Professor Alan Siaroff. While the preference would have been to have all scores from an independent source, the fact that all of these countries were scored in the acceptable 1 and 2 categories accounts for AI’s lack of attention to these countries. This outcome is also consistent with Serkasevich’s assertion that countries missing human rights narratives was a reflection of what was generally considered good behaviour.\(^{12}\)

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\(^{10}\) Barratt, *Human Rights and Foreign Aid*, 42.

\(^{11}\) These countries were: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, St. Kitts & Nevis, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Only Micronesia had reached a population of over 100,000 in 1997 and only Micronesia and Tonga were over this number in 2006.

\(^{12}\) Serkasevich, *The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Aid and Human Rights Violations*, 61.
In the interest of completeness, it was necessary to generate a score for the ex-Yugoslavia in the first period because Canada’s development assistance data was aggregated. For its part, PTS did provide a 1997 score for each of the reduced state of Yugoslavia, and the former states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia) that had achieved independence by that point. Using the individual PTS scores and the population of each of the states, a weighted average was established. With the exception of Slovenia, which had a PTS score of 1, all the other states were rated as 3 or 4 and thus the outcome was a weighted average score of 3.45. Slovenia’s impact was minimal because it represented only 10 per cent of the total population. While the individual score for Ex-Yugoslavia is not material to the overall project, this approach did permit completeness. The fact that Canada participated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in the Balkans during the 1998-2000 period did have some geopolitical and security implications for aid, which will be discussed in the anomalies and outliers subsection.

Lastly, twenty-three other longstanding Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states have been excluded from the study based on the view these states would not be considered candidates for development assistance.¹³ The exclusion of these states eliminates any statistical distortion their predominately better human rights records would cause.

Given the relatively short three-year periods used in this study, a one-year lag to the period was used in establishing the PTS scores. The years used are 1997 and 2006.

¹³ Despite also being OECD states, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, and South Korea did receive some bilateral aid in at least one of the periods of this study. All are relatively recent entrants to the OECD, but were included in this study.
**Multilateral Memberships**

Multilateral relationships have been integral to Canada’s involvement and shaping of its development assistance programs. Canada’s Commonwealth relationship was instrumental in Canada’s otherwise reluctant participation in the Colombo Plan. This was followed up with Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s strong commitment to development for the Caribbean Commonwealth. Canada’s membership in the OECD and active participation on its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) complemented the views held by CIDA. And while every government has had internal disagreements over trade opportunities versus humane internationalism, Canada has consistently voiced an overarching commitment to poverty reduction.

It is clear Canada’s original international development assistance commitments came from its Commonwealth ties and there has been empirical evidence that this strong connection has continued up to at least the mid-1990s. In examining Canada’s bilateral aid decisions, Van Belle et al and Jean-Sébastien Rioux, through statistical analysis, and David Morrison, through his qualitative analysis, have highlighted the potential importance of Canada’s memberships in various international organizations. ¹⁴ Canada is unique in the sense that it is a middle power without any colonial history, yet it is an active member of several multilateral groups. Membership has its obligations both in adhering to the international rules and norms established by these multilateral organizations and financially. While membership in these multilateral institutions has not established rigid rules and requirements for members to follow, they have exercised influence and generated public expectations.

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This has been apparent by the policies Canada has adopted. David Black, Jean-Philippe Thérien and Andrew Clark evaluated Canada’s development aid to Africa from the 1960s to the mid-1990s relative to direction and actions of the DAC, the World Bank and the G-7. Over two decades Canada’s bilateral aid evolved to more closely reflect the DAC priority recipients; Canada supported and adopted the World Bank structural adjustment plan recommendations and then reduced its commitment in line with other states; and when other G-7 states reduced their African aid in the early 1990s, Canada did as well. Black et al acknowledge this does not demonstrate strict causation, but assert: “... it lends credence to the idea that Canada is increasingly influenced by the principles and rules of the international aid regime.” 15 These examples are representative of the broader experience in Canada’s commitment to development assistance. The initial commitment to aid to Commonwealth Asian countries grew from Canada’s commitment to the Commonwealth and the UN; the commitment to poverty reduction is consistent with that advocated by the OECD; the 1996 commitment to human security was initiated by the United Nations (UN) in 1994; and Canada’s 2002 commitment to increase aid to address African poverty was adopted as part of a G-8 initiative. Canada has earned the reputation of being the ‘inveterate joiner’ and this is supported by its membership in the UN, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the Organization of American States (OAS), OECD, and the G-8. 16 These memberships have led into participation in a number of subordinate multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Human Rights Commission, and the Paris Club.

Another important example has been Canada’s involvement in NATO. This membership is different because it provides Canada with a level of security. Participation in operations, such

15 Black et al, “Moving with the Crowed: Canadian Aid in Africa:” 267.
16 Stairs, Confusing the Innocent with Numbers and Categories.
as has occurred in the former Yugoslavian states and Afghanistan, is critical to the integrity of the treaty. Obligations to NATO initiatives are different than to other multilateral regimes. Consequently, Canada has participated militarily in these two conflicts as part of its responsibilities to NATO. Development assistance becomes an ancillary consequence of such operations. If Canada was not a NATO member it would most likely have had little or no bilateral aid involvement in either of these countries.

Testing for a potential statistical significance of the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and the Organization of American States (OAS) is straightforward. This is accomplished by creating dummy variables based on membership/non-membership of donor eligible states for each organization.

The G-8 and OECD institutions are more difficult to quantify. Their influence needs to be measured by the commitments Canada makes relative to the stated direction advocated by each of these organizations. In the early 21st Century the G-8 committed to alleviating the plight of African poverty. Prime Minister Chrétien, as an influential voice in the G-8, confirmed Canada’s commitment to increase its financial and program support to the African Union (AU). Thus, the G-8 membership is best assessed through aid provided to AU states. Given that this commitment was made in 2002, after Canada made substantial reductions in development assistance to Africa and other developing states in the 1990s (as did all developed countries), there is no expectation this factor will show a correlation in the first period. The only mitigating factor to this expected outcome may be the result of the OECD membership.

As a founding, and committed, member of the OECD, Canada would reasonably be expected to give greater levels of aid to poorer states. DAC has categorized developing states based on per capita income as a means of establishing eligibility for official development aid.
Thus, states have been identified in one of five categories: least developed countries, low income countries, lower middle income countries, upper middle income countries, and ‘Other’ states. The least developed countries include the forty-nine states with the lowest income in the world. The next three categories are specifically defined by income thresholds. For the purposes of this variable, all remaining states have been assigned to the ‘Other’ category. Theoretically, recipient states should receive more aid based on a worse level of poverty as defined by these income levels, and conversely, those states in the highest categories should receive less aid. It should be noted, this prediction is counter to the notion that state will operate solely in its own self-interest – militarily or to benefit its economic trade.

NATO’s influence is far more specific and situational than the other multilateral organizations. NATO’s responses to the former-Yugoslavia crisis and involvement in Afghanistan as a result of the 9/11 attacks clearly are driven by security interests. While Canada was not directly threatened, NATO serves Canada’s broader security needs. Thus, Canada has an obligation to support NATO initiatives so that it may expect reciprocal support in the future. Bilateral aid was prompted by this commitment to NATO with no consideration given to the human rights performance by the states at the center of these conflicts. Both conflicts have attracted the largest amount of aid in each of the two periods. Consequently, ex-Yugoslavia and Afghanistan dummy variables are used in the first and second periods respectively to account for the security and power related motives.

Based on the analysis of the Commonwealth influence, Van Belle et al and Rioux concluded there was a correlation between aid and the Commonwealth, and it is expected this will continued in the more recent time frames of this study. Van Belle et al found there to be no

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preference given to la Francophonie countries, which makes it less likely that a correlation will exist. Canada’s commitment to aid in the Americas has not been significant, except for Haiti and a number of small Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, and therefore it is not expected a statistical significance will materialize. And based on Canada’s clearly stated commitment to poverty reduction, a correlation based on DAC income levels is anticipated.

Population

Eric Neumayer identifies the need to consider population when comparing total amounts of aid given to recipient states. It is simply intuitive that much larger states are more likely to receive larger amounts of aid; there is greater need with incrementally bigger populations and projects are simply larger. Yet, there is little evidence that would lead one to believe decisions on aid are made based strictly on population. Further, Neumayer points out that a per capita allocation would be cumbersome and unworkable from a decision-making perspective. Consequently, using a per capita measure is not an appropriate population measure.

However, the issue remains that using total dollars does not resolve the distortion created by the gross discrepancy in population. The largest developing countries, China and India, each have well over 1 billion people whereas Nauru has a population of less than 10,000 and there are numerous states with populations less than 100,000. Direct aid dollar comparisons between vastly different sized recipients provides a misleading bias in favour of larger states and does not get at the underlying human rights variable. Thus, in the regression

18 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 42.
19 Ibid., 42.
modeling, a logarithm is used to create ‘logpop’ variables (logpop1997 and logpop2006) for each study period. These factors provide a recognition of the fact more heavily populated states are more likely to receive more total aid dollars. The population figures were taken from data published by the US Census Bureau. Population figures are also based on the years 1997 and 2006.  

### Anomalies and Outliers

As discussed in chapter 2, the human rights issue is only one of several factors in foreign policy – and it does not dominate. Therefore, there should be no expectation that human rights abuses will singularly dictate who receives foreign aid. But, for the human rights rhetoric to have some valid basis, it is necessary for there to be some statistically significant influence when clear political and geopolitical factors have been accounted for. The anomalies and outliers, if not acknowledged, will distort and skew the statistical results. In order to be considered in this category the rationale for the bilateral aid had to be clearly tied to another identifiable driver, an abnormal or distinctive condition existed, and the amount of bilateral aid had to be substantial.

Already discussed above was the issue raised as a result of official debt relief, particularly as it pertained to Poland to the Ivory Coast. But there are other circumstances of anomalies that have created outliers, which have the effect of distorting any empirical study. Each of these two periods was subject to exceptional political circumstances that led to conditions that resulted in Canadian aid supporting governments in conflict zones. In the 1990s,

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Canada through its NATO commitment was militarily involved in the breakup of Yugoslavia. While its actual combat role was relatively minor, part of NATO’s – and therefore Canada’s – commitment included providing aid to protect human security. And, during the second period Canada was actively involved in the NATO-led war in Afghanistan.

In both of these cases, an underlying condition was the threat to civilians from the government and conflicting military forces. Yet, human rights abuses were not the reason for Canada’s involvement; Canada was pursuing a multilateral strategy to enhance and maintain its position in NATO. A strong NATO is in Canada’s self-interest. But the consequence of this foreign policy has been a significant amount of bilateral aid being provided to states that have committed serious human rights abuses. This is particularly the case in Afghanistan where in the second period of this study Canada averaged $300M annually in aid and the next closest recipient, Haiti, was almost $100M less. All other recipients received substantially less than these two states.

Haiti has also been an outlier. Canada’s relationship with Haiti has been long and at times strained, as was described in Chapter 3. Canada’s policy on Haiti has had multilateral, geopolitical and domestic drivers. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and is the only country in the Americas on the DAC list of least developed countries. But Canada’s connection has actually been defined by the fact Haiti is a French-speaking country that also has close geopolitical and domestic implications for Canada mainly through the strong political Haitian diaspora in and around the Montréal area. Not only has the federal government

21 One may suggest that based on this argument Canada should have also aligned itself with the American-led Coalition of the Willing in the more recent Iraq War. However, the Iraq War was not sanctioned by any multilateral organization (the UN or NATO) and therefore did not conform to Canada’s commitment to international norms and rules.
provided support to Haiti, but so has the Quebec government, which has brought further pressure on the federal government.

The first period reflected a return in 1994 to the democratic government of President Aristide in 1994. In fact, Haiti’s human rights record had actually reached an acceptable level suggesting some justification for the development assistance from Canada and many other states, all supported by the UN. But from a high PTS score of 2 in 1997, Haiti’s human rights record regressed to 3 and 4 ratings for the next 6 years until it received a 5 score in 2004 when a second coup occurred. Canada significantly increased its assistance in 2004 following this coup and before democratic elections were re-established in 2006. It was not until 2008, and again in 2010, that Haiti again attained acceptable PTS scores. In both periods Canada has primarily provided capacity-building aid in the form of police training. Unlike the other anomalies, the special relationship with Haiti existed in both study periods.

Level at which Aid Decision-making is to be Analysed

Lastly, both Neumayer and Bethany Barratt focused on aid as a two-step decision process where the donor state first determined whether a state would receive aid and then secondly decided as to how much they would receive. This approach may have merit in studies with other donor states, but in Canada’s case the ‘getting on the list’ stage brings little value. As was noted earlier, Canada has for many decades been criticized for spreading aid too thinly, which CIDA finally acknowledged in 2002. In the two periods of this study, 147 and 139

countries respectively received bilateral aid from Canada.23 Given that 23 other OECD countries were eliminated from the study this leaves only a small number of countries that have not received at least a 'diplomatic calling card.'24 Thus, the real issue to be addressed is not who gets aid but rather finding explanations as to the wide variance in bilateral aid received by recipient states. In the 1998-2000 period the top recipient state received an annual average of $182.1M while the lowest recipient state received an average of less than $10,000. In the 2007-09 period, the range was even greater with the highest average bilateral aid to a recipient state being $301.08M and the lowest being $10,000. Therefore, the study considers every non-OECD state eligible for aid and focuses on how much bilateral aid is distributed to eligible countries. The principal consideration is to assess whether human rights records are a statistically significant variable in this determination, and then secondarily whether there are other factors that have either mitigated the influence of human rights and whether these factors are significant by themselves.

23 These numbers are derived from CIDA’s annual reports used in the quantitative analysis.
CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Comparisons and Correlations

The 1998-2000 period provides a similar outcome as Nola Serkasevich found in her 1980s study in that the top recipients of bilateral aid tended to score relatively poorer with unacceptable human rights records. This is highlighted by Table 1, which shows the three-year average bilateral aid provided to the top 20 recipient states. These 20 recipients received 62.56 per cent of all the bilateral aid in this period when debt relief is included or 56.63 per cent when debt relief is excluded. Unlike Serkasevich’s study, the top aid recipient, Poland – by a substantial margin of more than three times the aid received by the next highest state – was ranked in category 1 on the Political Terror Scale (PTS). As discussed in the previous chapter, Poland’s bilateral aid was almost exclusively official debt relief which was driven by the Paris Club based on political and economic considerations. Without this debt forgiveness Poland would have received less than 5 per cent of its actual total amount. Similarly, Ivory Coast and Cameroon also received substantial debt relief, without which they would not have been in the top 20 recipients. The fact that the top 20 recipients received roughly 60 per cent of the bilateral aid in this time period clearly demonstrates the lack of aid concentration for which Canada has been widely criticized.

Of the top 20 recipient states, 25 per cent were scored category 4 on the PTS score, 40 per cent were in category 3, 30 per cent were in category 2 and Poland, as the single category 1, represented 5 per cent. In other words, almost two-thirds of recipients were in the
unacceptable category 3 and below. When debt relief is removed Poland, Ivory Coast and Cameroon are not rank in the top 20. The revised list then includes Ethiopia, Mozambique and Peru, which all scored in category 4. Accordingly, the distribution across the PTS categories then reflects that 75 per cent of the states were scored in categories 3 and 4, and 25 per cent in the acceptable category 2. At this aggregated level there is no indication human rights

Table 1. 1998-2000 Top Recipients of Canadian Aid Based on Average Bilateral Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank without debt relief</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Annualized Total Bilateral Aid 1998-00 (in Millions)</th>
<th>1997 PTS Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>$182.10 ($7.66)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ex-Yugoslavia</td>
<td>$60.24 ($57.67)</td>
<td>3.5** (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>$54.41</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>$50.64</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>$36.80</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>HIVI Coast (Cote d'Ivoire)</td>
<td>$34.82 ($6.31)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>$32.60</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>$25.68</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>$24.34</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>$23.56</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Vietnam, Socialist Republic of</td>
<td>$23.12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>$22.84 ($11.31)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>$22.73</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>$22.43</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>$22.42</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>$21.81 ($19.69)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>$21.48</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>$19.40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>$18.72</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>$18.69</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>$17.92</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>$17.74</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>$14.71</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Denotes Least Developed Countries
2 Denotes Low Income Countries
*Bracketed dollar figures are the amount of bilateral aid distributed by Canada to the recipient state excluding official debt relief.
** The human rights score used for Ex-Yugoslavia is the weighted average of the PTS scores.
considerations played a significant role in determining which states received Canadian bilateral aid. For the reasons stated in the previous chapter, debt relief will be excluded in ranking the recipient states in the 1998-2000 period and in comparisons to the later period.

The 2007-2009 time period yields similar results. However, Table 2 shows the total annualized bilateral aid to the top 20 recipient states accounted for 71.9 per cent of Canada’s disbursements. Overall, there was erosion of the PTS scores for this top 20 group; 25 per cent fell into category 5 (where none were in the earlier period), 30 per cent in category 4, and 25 per cent in category 3. Only 20 per cent were in category 2 and none were rated category 1. As a result, bilateral aid had become significantly more concentrated while the overall percentage of top recipients that had unacceptable category 3 to 5 ratings had increased by 5 percentage points. Five of the 16 received the worst rating, category 5.

What also stands out in comparing the recipients from Tables 1 and 2 is the increase in the number of least developed countries included on the later list. In the 1998-2000 period six of the recipient states were designated by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as least developed countries, but in the later period that number nearly doubled to eleven. The second period included all six from the 1998-2000 and then added four more African states (Sudan, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burkina Faso) plus Afghanistan. The addition of African states is consistent with the commitments made in 2002 by the Chrétien government in conjunction with the G-8 direction. The emphasis placed on Afghanistan reflects Canada’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military commitments. Perhaps of most significance, all of the top five recipient states in the later period were designated least developed states implying a decisive shift to areas of most severe poverty. But in doing so, a greater portion of bilateral aid went to states with relatively worse human rights records. In the
earlier period, two-thirds (4 of 6) of the least developed recipients were scored in categories 3 to 5; whereas, 81.8 per cent (9 of 11) were similarly rated in the 2007-2009 period.

Table 2. 2007-2009 Top Recipients of Canadian Aid Based on Average Bilateral Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Annualized Total Bilateral Aid 2007-09 (in Millions)</th>
<th>2006 PTS Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan¹</td>
<td>$ 301.08</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti¹</td>
<td>$ 204.91</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia¹</td>
<td>$ 125.67</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan¹</td>
<td>$ 102.86</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali¹</td>
<td>$ 102.48</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana²</td>
<td>$ 98.70</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique¹</td>
<td>$ 91.01</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania¹</td>
<td>$ 76.52</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh¹</td>
<td>$ 75.73</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>$ 70.08</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>$ 66.87</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal¹</td>
<td>$ 61.00</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>$ 58.37</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>$ 55.10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan²</td>
<td>$ 54.01</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>$ 39.07</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam, Socialist Republic of²</td>
<td>$ 37.11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Republic of the Congo¹</td>
<td>$ 35.96</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>$ 33.46</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso¹</td>
<td>$ 28.86</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Denotes Least Developed Countries  
² Denotes Low Income Countries

A seemingly competing agenda between poverty reduction and human rights objectives in providing bilateral aid is indicated by Tables 3 and 4. The general trend is that the lower income level countries are more likely to receive bilateral aid and generally a higher average of aid. This implies support for the multilateral-based commitment to poverty reduction. These tables also show that the lower the income level the worse, on average, the PTS score is. This, however, does not mean that human rights and poverty reduction are necessarily opposing
objectives. All categories have countries with acceptable PTS scores. Therefore, the issue then becomes to whom and how much bilateral aid is distributed.

In examining Table 3, the trend shows anomalies. The highest income group (Other) received, on average, the second largest amount of bilateral aid. This would appear to reflect Canada’s pursuit of economic opportunities. The lower average for the least developed countries reveals the reduction of development assistance to Africa because of the 1990s fiscal restraint, and was consistent with actions taken by other developed countries. However, fewer than 70 per cent of countries in the top two income categories received aid, in contrast to the 95 per cent of countries in the bottom three categories. The average PTS scores in each of these lower categories are substantially worse than the average of the higher income categories. This would suggest that, on average, the lower the income level, the worse the human rights score is likely to be.

Table 3. Distribution of Bilateral Aid in 1998-2000 Based on DAC categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Category</th>
<th>Average PTS Score</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
<th>Number of Countries Receiving Bilateral Aid</th>
<th>Average Bilateral Per Country Per Year (in Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 – Least Developed Countries</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>$6.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- low income</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>$14.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(per capita GNP &lt; $765 in 1995)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – lower middle income</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>$5.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(per capita GNP $766-$3035 in 1995)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – upper middle income</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>$2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(per capita GNP $3036-9385 in 1995)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$9.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 indicates a more definitive direction in the 2007-2009 period with respect to its commitment to addressing poverty reduction. In this case there is a clearer alignment between average bilateral aid and the DAC income categories; the lower the income level of the countries, the higher average bilateral aid is, except for a minor difference between the two highest income categories. As well, all the countries in the two lowest income levels receive some amount of aid. Most striking is the fact that there is only one country in the highest category that received any bilateral aid. Russia received an average of $66.87M, which was significant enough to place Russia on the top 20 recipients list for 2007-2009 in Table 2. Certainly bilateral aid to Russia was not motivated by poverty reduction or human rights performance, but rather economic opportunity. This example demonstrates the need to use caution when considering average statistics, as a single anomaly can distort results. The key point from Table 4 then is that 26 of 27 states in this higher income bracket did not receive bilateral aid whereas in the 1998-2000 period 18 of 26 states had. This pattern may suggest, but is not conclusive of, a Canadian commitment to a poverty reduction priority.

Again, Table 4 demonstrates an inverse trend between PTS averages and DAC income levels. Focusing bilateral aid broadly on the poorest countries is certain to result in such aid going to countries that have relatively worse human rights records. This may create a dilemma between these two worthy, but potentially conflicting, objectives. However, this need not be the case. Both periods have countries that are below the low income threshold and have acceptable PTS scores. The DAC low income level cut offs were at <$765 and <$825 per capita Gross National Income (GNI) for the respective periods. Clearly, these levels demonstrate a preponderance of abject poverty. The least developed countries simply represent the bottom of this group. Given the breadth of poverty in the developing countries it is possible to target
bilateral aid to countries with better human rights records and still address a poverty reduction objective.

Table 4. Distribution of Bilateral Aid in 2007-2009 Based on DAC categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAC Category</th>
<th>Average PTS Score</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
<th>Number of Countries Receiving Bilateral Aid</th>
<th>Average Bilateral Per Country Per Year (In Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 – Least Developed Countries</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>$29.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – low income (per capita GNI &lt;$825 in 2004)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>$19.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – lower middle income (per capita GNI $826-$3255 in 2004)</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>$10.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – upper middle income (per capita GNI $3256-$10065 in 2004)</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>$1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$2.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, given that the average PTS scores for the least developed and low income country categories are less than 3 indicates there are a number of these countries that have acceptable human rights scores. But since Canada provides bilateral aid to almost all countries in these lower income categories, Canada is in fact providing bilateral aid to countries that have poor human rights performance. As a result, Canada is actually supporting repressive regimes while publicly operating under the pretense of championing human rights. For human rights to be reflected in bilateral aid decisions more bilateral aid would have to flow to countries with better PTS scores while minimal or no bilateral aid would be allocated to countries with unacceptable ratings. This is of particular importance when development assistance is viewed as a scarce resource. Providing aid to repressive states denies the opportunity to use that aid to
help impoverished people in states with better human rights records. By using a selectivity strategy actually based on human rights, different decisions would result.²

For example, 20 African states, based on the 1997 PTS ratings, had PTS scores of category 1 or 2 and were also least developed or low income countries. Twelve of these received an average of less than $10M annually of Canadian bilateral aid during the 1998-2000 period. More than half of these countries saw their PTS ratings slip to 3 or 4 by 2006. Three countries (Ghana, Mali, and Mozambique) saw their Canadian bilateral aid increase by more than a multiple of four between the first and second period. Of these Ghana and Mali managed to maintain PTS scores of 2. At the same time, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), despite having a PTS score of 5 in both phases of this study, received an annual average $8.89M during the first period which increased to $35.96M in the second period, placing the DRC in the top 20 bilateral aid recipients. Similarly, Zimbabwe saw its PTS scores go from 2 to 4 yet its Canadian bilateral aid doubled from $11.69M to $22.13M. In contrast, Benin and Burkina Faso had PTS scores of 1 and 2 respectively in 1997. By 2006 both had scores of 3. It is only speculation but more focused development assistance may have contributed to a different outcome.

Further, the Congo improved its human rights scores from 5 to 2, but received essentially the same average dollar amount in the two periods ($2.52M and $3.57M). Meanwhile, its neighbour, the DRC, saw its bilateral aid increase fourfold, despite its continued horrendous human rights record. The Congo continues to be a low income country and without concerted development assistance to raise it out of this category, it is at risk of returning to its early level of human rights violations.

² Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving.
Sierra Leone provides an example where the PTS score has improved and Canadian bilateral aid has also increased. Its PTS scores were 4 and 2 in 1997 and 2006, and the average Canadian bilateral aid in the 1998-2000 and 2007-2009 periods were $4.94M and $17.36M, respectively. But, Sierra Leone received less than half the aid amount given to the DRC. Thus, there is no motive created for Sierra Leone to maintain or improve its human rights record. Sierra Leone continues to be a least developed country and its people would certainly benefit from more development assistance. This is not simply an aid effectiveness argument because all the states in least developed and low income levels have abject poverty issues. Concentrating Canadian bilateral aid on states that have demonstrated a willingness to address human rights issues rewards them and allows Canada to play a greater partnership role with these states. Conversely, failure to provide sufficient assistance may contribute to the erosion of human rights performance as exists in many other parts of Africa.

Canada’s announced commitment to 25 development partners in 2005 demonstrates this point. As discussed earlier, Denis Stairs was critical of this announcement because it simply committed to targets CIDA was already achieving. But, this list did point to a strong commitment to some of the poorest states in the world. Table 5 highlights this by showing that 19 of the 25 development partners were among the least developed and low income countries. Further, of this total list, 18 had PTS scores of 3-5. But six of the least developed and low income countries had acceptable scores of 1 or 2. This shows that the opportunity exists to direct bilateral aid to countries that have severe poverty issues and have acceptable human rights performance.

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2 Stairs, *Confusing The Innocent with Numbers and Categories*.
This list of development partners was replaced in 2009 with a commitment by the minority Conservative government to the shorter list of 20 countries of focus, which are found in Table 6. Similar to the 2005 commitment, the majority are countries with records of committing serious human rights violations. While the total percentage of countries with PTS scores of 3-5 remained essentially the same (72 and 70 per cents, respectively) the gravity of the scores became more severe with the total number of 4s and 5s doubling from four to eight on a smaller list. Where the 2005 partners list had only 16 per cent of states in these two categories, 40 per cent of the 2009 countries of focus had human rights scores at these levels. Besides Afghanistan, Canada identified Sudan and South Sudan, Colombia, and Pakistan as development partners. Each of these countries are rated as having the worst human rights performance (see Table 6) and only Colombia has achieved electoral democratic status. Further, 60 per cent of the states on the 2009 list were in the least developed and low income countries categories compared to

---

1 Least Developed Countries
2 Other Low Income Countries
76 per cent on the earlier list. On the face of it, it would appear the Harper government is transitioning to a focus on relatively fewer of the poorest states and at the same time supporting more states that commit serious human rights abuses. Focusing bilateral aid on so many countries with serious and extreme human rights violations is difficult to reconcile with Canadian values and the rhetoric in support of human rights. With the 2009 list, Canada has placed emphasis on a third of all countries that have received category 5 ratings. On the other hand, the Harper government virtually ended bilateral assistance to the higher income ‘Other’ category as seen in Table 4.

Table 6. Canada’s 2009 List of Countries of focus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>PTS</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>PTS</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>PTS</th>
<th>North Africa Middle East</th>
<th>PTS</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>PTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Caribbean Regional Program</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Least Developed Countries
2 Other Low Income Countries
* The Caribbean Region includes 13 countries. The overall PTS score is estimated to be category 2.

These percentages are derived from Tables 5 and 6. The Caribbean region has been treated as a single state, despite actually consisting of 13 states. Canada has considered these countries in the Caribbean basin as a region and in 2007 proposed to treat this region collectively for bilateral aid. While all except Jamaica are very small, none are low income states. Canadian International Development Agency, *Caribbean Community Strategic Programming Framework*, Canadian International Development Agency, June 2007, http://pioj.gov.jm/Portals/0/ODA/CIDA%20REGIONAL%20STRATEGY%20Caribbean%20Community%20Framework.pdf (accessed June 21, 2012).

Mark Gibney, Lynette Cornett, and Reed Wood, “Political Terror Scale 1976-2010,” 2010, http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ (accessed November 17, 2011). In 2009 there were 12 countries rated as category 5. Canada had identified 4 of these countries for preferential bilateral aid relationships in contrast to only one such country in 2005.
Serkasevich reported a positive correlation between serious human rights violations and increased levels of bilateral aid. When looking at all aid for the period 1984-87 a Pearson $r$ correlation of 0.2301 was yielded based on 82 countries. However, another 30 countries were excluded for lack of data. By limiting the sample to countries that had received a minimum threshold of an average yearly amount of $1M and $20M of bilateral aid, Pearson $r$ increased to 0.2542 and 0.5599 respectively. In sum, not only were countries with more serious human rights violations more likely to receive aid from Canada but they were likely to receive more of it.

Similar tests on all the aid eligible countries in the 1998-00 and 2007-09 periods found the same results. For the first period correlating average bilateral aid and PTS scores yielded Pearson $r$ of 0.284 $p$ 0.01 based on a sample size of 165 countries. The second period demonstrated a stronger correlation with Pearson $r$ at 0.367 $p$ 0.01 with a sample size of 171. In both cases, the trend demonstrated that more bilateral aid was allocated to countries with poorer human rights performance.

This also is consistent with the results in Tables 3 and 4, where DAC income levels had an inverse relationship with both PTS scores and average bilateral aid. In the 1998-2000 period, the Pearson $r$ correlations were -0.247 $p$ 0.01 and -0.200 $p$ 0.05, respectively. In other words, the lower the income category the more likely it was for PTS scores to be worse and for bilateral aid to be greater. In the second period, the relationship was stronger with Pearson $r$ correlations between DAC categories and PTS scores and average aid being -0.369 $p$ 0.01 and -0.306 $p$ 0.01. Clearly, these bilateral correlations do not support the thesis that human rights records are a consideration in which countries Canada chooses to deliver bilateral aid to. In fact, the statistics

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8 Serkasevich, *The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Aid and Human Rights Violations*, 57.
9 Ibid., 65-66. However, this was calculated on significantly reduced samples of 51 and 12 countries.
point to the exact opposite conclusion where Canada provides more bilateral aid to countries that engage in worse human rights practices.

However, these correlations do not contemplate the influence of the many multilateral institutions, the huge disparity in country population or the outliers discussed in the previous chapter. To account for these, it was necessary to use regression models.

**Multivariate Regression Modeling**

As previously discussed, the 1998-2000 period was marked by fiscal restraint which had been felt particularly hard by foreign aid commitments. Canada was also involved in the NATO operations in the Balkans and continued to be committed to the development of Haiti, albeit at a financially reduced level. While both countries had poor human rights records, Canada’s decision to provide bilateral aid to these states was driven by geopolitical, security and international image motives. In order to account for these, dummy variables for Haiti and Ex-Yugoslavia were created to recognize them as specific anomalies of the time.

Likewise, dummy variables have been introduced to account for the influence multilateral memberships have had in the support of regional and cultural, historical relationships. These included memberships in the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and the Organization of American States (OAS). A similar variable for the African Union (AU) was introduced, although it was not expected to be relevant in this period because it was not until 2001-2002 the G-8 formally supported increasing aid relief to Africa. The last, and potentially most important, membership was Canada’s role in the OECD. The variable for this was the DAC income categorization which was discussed in the correlation analysis. In completing the
variables, population was represented by logpop1997 while human rights records were accounted for by PTS ratings in 1997.

This nine variable model (Table 7) accounts for half of the variance in the level of bilateral aid and has an adjusted $r^2$ of 0.508. However, not surprisingly, the AU was not statistically significant; but neither was la Francophonie nor OAS. The AU is more easily explained by the reduction of Canada’s foreign aid as a consequence of its fiscal restraint. Poorer states, of which many are African, were most severely impacted. The insignificance of the la Francophonie variable is consistent with the findings in the Van Belle et al study.\(^\text{10}\) The Commonwealth was statistically significant, which suggests the historical roots of British colonialism have continued to be strong while the more recent association with la Francophonie has not developed a similar bond. With regards to the OAS, Haiti was the only state that received sufficient aid to place it in the top 20 recipients (Table 1) and it is the only country in the Western hemisphere included on the least developed list. Much of the Canadian aid directed to OAS states are to small states in the Caribbean that receive large per capita disbursements but relatively small total aid amounts. Therefore, OAS was expected to be of less importance, which is confirmed in this model.

As was anticipated, the Commonwealth and the DAC income categories are significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively. The income categories have a negative relationship with average total aid, indicating that within this model more aid is going to less developed states. This is consistent with the Pearson correlation reported for this time period above. As expected, the Ex-Yugoslavia and Haiti dummy variables are statistically significant. However, the PTS scale, while not statistically significant (0.162), also shows a negative correlation with average total

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\(^{10}\) Van Belle et al, Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid.
aid. This is the opposite of what was reported for the Pearson correlation but is consistent with a thesis of more aid to states with better human rights practices. Additionally, the logged population is statistically significant and is consistent with Neumayer’s findings.

Table 7. Regressions on Total Bilateral Aid 1998-2000 (Nine explanatory variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-32.121</td>
<td>4.684</td>
<td>-6.857</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti dummy</td>
<td>22.732</td>
<td>7.171</td>
<td>3.170</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Yugoslavia dummy</td>
<td>50.266</td>
<td>6.924</td>
<td>7.260</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth dummy</td>
<td>3.798</td>
<td>1.300</td>
<td>2.921</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>la Francophonie dummy</td>
<td>1.432</td>
<td>1.425</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC list 1997-1999</td>
<td>-0.983</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>-2.162</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logpop1997</td>
<td>6.196</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>8.620</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS dummy</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>1.469</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU dummy</td>
<td>-0.996</td>
<td>1.517</td>
<td>-0.656</td>
<td>0.513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political terror scale 1997</td>
<td>-0.855</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>-1.404</td>
<td>0.162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This model is refined in Table 8 with the variables that are not statistically significant being removed except for the PTS scores. PTS is left in as it is the principal variable being tested against bilateral aid in this study. The resulting multivariate regression shows a very minor improvement in adjusted $r^2$ to 0.513. All of the variables are now statistically significant except PTS, which is better but still marginally above the 0.1 level. It is during this period that the governing politicians were most strongly and vocally committed to human security. While this is closely linked to human rights, committing to the principle of human security means dealing with countries where human rights are being or have been violated. The issue then is should this be done through government-to-government bilateral aid or through other multilateral links?
Generally, Canadian governments and academics have been reluctant to suggest withdrawal of aid on the premise that the people who need it the most will be the ones punished for the poor behaviour of their government. This model shows that as a factor, human rights are subordinated to these other considerations.

Table 8. Regressions on Total Bilateral Aid 1998-2000 (Six explanatory variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-30.977</td>
<td>4.317</td>
<td>-7.175</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti dummy</td>
<td>24.520</td>
<td>6.905</td>
<td>3.551</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Yugoslavia dummy</td>
<td>50.140</td>
<td>6.863</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>7.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth dummy</td>
<td>3.452</td>
<td>1.238</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>2.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC list 1997-1999</td>
<td>-0.935</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-2.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logpop1997</td>
<td>6.060</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>8.649</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political terror scale 1997</td>
<td>-0.905</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>-1.509</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=173                 Adjusted $r^2$=0.513

Finally, Table 9 shows the regression model without PTS which still provides a strong explanation for the distribution of total bilateral aid in the 1998-2000 period with an adjusted $r^2$ of 0.509. All independent variables are statistically significant at the 0.01 level except the DAC income variable which is at the 0.05 level. Despite the fact Canada had greatly reduced its aid to African states – many of which are in the least developed category – the income levels were still statistically significant.

Thus, the human rights based thesis is not supported in this period, despite the Chrétien government’s emphasis on human security. Multilateralism shows some promise as an
independent variable but it provides inconsistent correlations as only certain institutions demonstrate statistical significance relative to the dependent bilateral aid variable.

Table 9. Regressions on Total Bilateral Aid 1998-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-29.668</td>
<td>4.246</td>
<td>-6.987</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti dummy</td>
<td>25.429</td>
<td>6.906</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>3.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Yugoslavia dummy</td>
<td>49.662</td>
<td>6.883</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>7.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth dummy</td>
<td>3.720</td>
<td>1.230</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>3.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC list 1997-1999</td>
<td>-0.770</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>-2.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logpop1997</td>
<td>5.452</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>9.471</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The same multivariate regression process was applied to the 2007-2009 period, shown in Tables 10 and 11. The membership variables remain the same for the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, AU and OAS. The DAC income, PTS scale and logpop factors were revised to reflect this time period. The dummy variable for Ex-Yugoslavia was removed because the NATO military intervention had ended. However, a new dummy variable was added to reflect Canada’s military involvement in the Afghanistan war. The Haiti dummy variable remained as Canada’s involvement in Haiti actually increased as a result of domestic imperatives and further political unrest in this impoverished Western hemisphere state. These variables assessed against the dependent variable, bilateral aid, provide a substantially higher adjusted $r^2=0.685$. As in the earlier period, only the Commonwealth and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) multilateral memberships achieve statistical significance. However, the AU is much closer at 0.154 significance, which is not surprising since there had been an
emphasis placed on alleviating poverty in Africa by the G-8. But, even by removing la Francophonie and OAS, AU did not reach significance at least to the 0.1 level and consequently all three were dropped as the model was refined.

Table 10. Regressions for Total Bilateral Aid 2007-2009 (Nine explanatory variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-48.697</td>
<td>13.386</td>
<td>-3.638</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logpop2006</td>
<td>9.575</td>
<td>2.116</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>4.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti dummy</td>
<td>191.160</td>
<td>20.431</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>9.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan dummy</td>
<td>280.751</td>
<td>20.053</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>14.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU dummy</td>
<td>6.081</td>
<td>4.248</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>1.432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth dummy</td>
<td>7.075</td>
<td>3.610</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>1.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS dummy</td>
<td>-0.990</td>
<td>4.144</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>la Francophonie dummy</td>
<td>-1.060</td>
<td>3.973</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC list 2007</td>
<td>-2.647</td>
<td>1.313</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>-2.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political terror scale 2006</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>1.949</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=173 Adjusted \( r^2 = 0.685 \)

The membership organizations that were not significant have been removed in Table 11 but the PTS scale is kept despite its lack of significance, as was done in previous period. This revised model further improved with an adjusted \( r^2 \) of 0.686 with only the PTS scale not being statistically significant. The Commonwealth has improved to the 0.05 level with all remaining variables being significant to the 0.01 level.

What is strikingly different in this model is the fact there is absolutely no relevance provided by the PTS variable with a significance value of 0.939. While PTS did not reach a statistically significant level in the 1998-2000 period, it was marginal at the 0.113 level and was
negatively correlated with increased levels in bilateral aid received. The 2007-2009 period provides no indication that human rights considerations was a factor at all.

**Table 11. Regressions for Total Bilateral Aid 2007-2009 (Six explanatory variables)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients^a</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Constant)</td>
<td>-46.344</td>
<td>12.579</td>
<td>0.7684</td>
<td>3.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logpop2006</td>
<td>9.804</td>
<td>2.081</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>4.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti dummy</td>
<td>185.936</td>
<td>19.684</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>9.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan dummy</td>
<td>277.421</td>
<td>19.856</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td>13.972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth dummy</td>
<td>7.694</td>
<td>3.449</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>2.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC list 2007</td>
<td>-3.624</td>
<td>1.134</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>-3.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political terror scale 2006</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>1.942</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


N=173  Adjusted $r^2=0.686$

Finally, Table 12 presents only statistically significant variables after the PTS variable has been removed. An adjusted $r^2$ of 0.688 provides a substantial explanation. Again the DAC list has a negative coefficient confirming that the lower the income level of the recipient country is, the more likely it is to receive a greater level of aid. This is consistent with the results in Table 4 which revealed a clear preference toward providing bilateral aid to low income states in the 2007-09 period. Not only have all the states in the lowest two categories received some bilateral aid, but the average amounts are substantially higher in the lower three categories. However, aid to both Afghanistan and Haiti were driven by other factors, although they are also in the least developed categories. Both received substantially more aid than other states; these two states together averaged $505M in bilateral aid while the next five recipients collectively received $520M. Yet, Table 2 also shows that eight of the top 10 benefactors of Canadian bilateral aid were least developed countries, suggesting there has been a specific effort made to
direct aid to this category irrespective of Canada’s self-interests and security concerns.

Consequently, the DAC income levels are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

**Table 12. Regressions on Total Bilateral Aid 2007-2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-46.543</td>
<td>12.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log population 2006</td>
<td>9.902</td>
<td>1.631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti dummy</td>
<td>186.069</td>
<td>19.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan dummy</td>
<td>277.657</td>
<td>19.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth dummy</td>
<td>7.696</td>
<td>3.439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC list 2007</td>
<td>-3.650</td>
<td>1.076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


N=173          Adjusted $r^2$=0.688

Tables 9 and 12 indicate Canada has made poverty reduction a priority in selecting countries for bilateral aid and that this commitment has become sharper in the most recent period of time. These regression models also show that Canada continues to demonstrate a bias toward Commonwealth countries. There is also a strong indication of support for NATO initiatives.

Despite the ongoing references to human rights in discussions about foreign aid, these do not factor into the decision-making process in allocating bilateral aid. There continues to be a disconnect between the government rhetoric on human rights issues with actual aid-giving practices. If there is no meaningful requirement to have improved the human rights of a recipient state in order to receive more funding, then there is no international pressure for that recipient state to actually make serious efforts to improve its human rights performance.
Consequently, Canadian bilateral aid is supporting regimes that are violating the rights of its citizens.

Worse still, by supporting such regimes Canada loses the opportunity to provide greater aid to other states that have demonstrated good human rights stewardship. Many of these states have significant poverty issues too. Aid is a finite resource and when it is spent on states that routinely violate human rights, other opportunities are lost. While it is clear from the correlations between PTS scores and the DAC income categories that a poverty reduction agenda will inevitably result in greater support for restrictive and oppressive regimes, there are varying degrees to which this may be the case. Table 5 showed the government’s commitment to support poverty reduction in a group of development partner states. Only one of the states was scored as a category 5 and three were rated in category 4. This is in contrast with the results in Table 6 where the minority Conservative government, in 2009, declared it will focus on four countries with brutal human rights records scored as category 5 and four more in the very serious category 4, making up 40 per cent of the list of twenty states.
CONCLUSIONS

This thesis set out to confirm a correlation between Canada’s bilateral aid and the human rights records of recipient states in two specific periods. Given the rhetoric and policy statements of all governments since the 1980s it was hypothesized that a statistical significance would be evident such that relatively more aid would be given to states with better human rights scores assuming government actions were consistent with the rhetorical commitment to human rights and good governance. But no such bivariate correlation was found for either of the periods, 1998-2000 or 2007-2009. In fact, the findings in both cases were the opposite as Canada tended to give more bilateral aid to countries with worse human rights scores. These findings and trends are consistent with the outcomes from an earlier 1984-1987 study. The fact that three discrete periods in a twenty-five year span representing the policies and practices of three different governments have confirmed the same result provides some degree of confidence to conclude Canada has not included negative human rights performance in its decisions on which countries it will allocate bilateral aid, nor is there any quantitative evidence Canada factors human rights in its determination as to the individual amounts for its aid-giving.

However, this thesis anticipated there would be other, competing drivers that mitigated a correlation between human rights records and the level of aid-giving. Canada’s strong commitment to multilateralism has been an underlying motive for government foreign policy and action. Canadian governments have long considered its image as a good international
citizen a priority and have strove to maintain its status amongst the major developed countries.\(^1\)

To test the effects of these key relationships, multilateral memberships were introduced in a regression model along with the human rights variable to determine their effect on bilateral aid. The variables included were based on Canada’s historical and geographic memberships in the Commonwealth, la Francophonie and the Organization of American States (OAS), security—represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—and normative values evaluated through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) income levels, and were tested in these same specific periods.

The regression model results, however, again failed to identify a statistically significant connection for human rights records. Despite the emphasis placed on the related human security agenda by the Chrétien government, the 1998-2000 period showed only a marginal, but not statistically significant, correlation. However, the second period showed no connection at all as the Harper minority government significantly increased its commitment to states with some of the worst human rights scores. Consequently, no evidence was found connecting human rights to bilateral aid decision-making. To many this may seem to be unsurprising, as this quantitative analysis simply confirms the existence of a ‘rhetoric-practice’ gap in the government’s actions. But this leaves unanswered the question ‘if human rights are not a factor, then what does affect the government bilateral aid decisions?’ The regression models do provide some insights. Some multilateral relations were statistically significant, while others were not. Why was the Commonwealth significant, but not la Francophonie and the OAS? Why the OECD, but not the G-8? And, why was there support for Afghanistan and not for African

nations? Obviously international institutions are important but not consistently so and thus are not the independent variable.

The underlying motives are best considered in the qualitative context of international relations theory. Liberal institutionalism (LI) provides insight into Canada’s enthusiasm for multilateralism as a means of pursuing power and self-interests, yet still subscribing to certain normative values. Security for Canada is enhanced by its membership in NATO. Compared to other multilateral institutions, NATO membership entails clearer commitments and obligations. Canada’s military involvement in the former-Yugoslavia and Afghanistan were direct results of threats made to other NATO members. While the degree to which Canada commits to support the action taken in such situations may be a point of discussion, choosing to not participate would have drawn heavy criticism, loss of political influence and placed reciprocal support for Canada in jeopardy. Military involvement invariably leads to bilateral aid outlays, as occurred in both of these examples. Aid support for these two initiatives was not driven by humane internationalism. It was responding to Canada’s self-interests, its own military security, and the preservation of its international image among peers.

The Commonwealth membership initiated Canada into the development assistance field some six decades ago. There has been an even longer relationship with Great Britain and with individual Commonwealth members. The other two regional organizations have not had the same sense of community or presented the same opportunities. La Francophonie is based more on bilateral arrangements with France than relations amongst members. And this connection has been driven more by the domestic pressures from Québec. Canada’s involvement with OAS members has primarily been in the Caribbean, which largely overlaps with the Commonwealth, and with Haiti, which is motivated by domestic self-interest driven by attention to the Haitian
diaspora and Québec’s international involvement. Otherwise, the relationship with OAS has been hesitant. While a more in depth analysis of Canada’s role in these organizations may produce further insight, it is clear Canada has has conferred a preferred status on its Commonwealth role.

Canada’s commitment to the OECD is based on alignment with its own long held normative views and the preservation of its international image. The OECD’s focus has been on alleviating poverty in developing countries and promoting liberal principles of democracy and good governance. These precepts align with Canada’s humane internationalism. Active participation in the OECD has allowed Canada to promote itself internationally as a middle power and good global citizen. At the same time, it has aligned its economic interests with its development assistance. The commitment to humane internationalism and economic self-interest has played out through conflicts between government departments from the beginning of Canada’s development assistance program. Canada also values the OECD because this organization also supports the neo-liberal views Canada subscribes to which tie economics, democracy and good governance to development assistance. In contrast, the G-8 has become committed to a region of the world, Africa, that has held little opportunity for Canada. In this case, participation has been driven more by the opportunity to demonstrate itself as a significant actor on an important international stage. Here, self-interest was related more to image and less to the economics.

Canada’s early development assistance efforts were driven by economic self-interest and its interest to be seen as a middle power. There has been a push-pull between humane internationalism and economic opportunities, but self-interest has been ever present. Stephen

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2 Despite Canada’s earlier commitment to untie all aid by 2013, the Harper government is now considering providing aid through Canadian private industry initiatives in developing countries. This is a clear example of pursuing economic self-interest and neo-liberalism through aid.
Brown and Rosalind Raddatz point out that the government’s approach to foreign aid has oscillated between altruistic concerns and commercial and national self-interest. The question becomes which interests will dominate at any particular point in time and why? Examples of how this conflict has played out within the government bureaucracy and cabinet have been shown to go back to the very beginning of Canada’s involvement in development assistance. Certainly this balance has changed with different governments and different Prime Ministers. The Mulroney government was the most direct on human rights issues, although this did not translate into a consistent pattern of action. The Chrétien government, with Lloyd Axworthy was Foreign Affairs minister, took an aggressive position on the human security agenda, but this too did not translate into a cogent approach to development assistance based on human rights violations. And again, Jean Chrétien’s support in of poverty reduction in Africa did not address human rights issues. These three examples, where normative values have been prominent, have resulted in little headway on the human rights agenda. All governments, including the current one, have played the human rights card in support of decisions made for self-interest or security reasons, but with little evidence of actual commitment to human rights. Little more than hand-wringing and inconsistent action has taken place regardless of the government in power.

So what does this mean for the human rights agenda? Canada’s rhetorical commitment to human rights reflects Canadian values. Yet, in bilateral aid decisions Canada has demonstrably failed to act on some of the most egregious human rights violators. Human rights concerns are not integrated in Canada’s development assistance processes. Nor will they likely be unless these issues rise to a level of significant self-interest for the government. This will only happen if pressure is placed on the government; otherwise, economic, security and power factors will

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continue to dominate. Altruistic motives have not been persuasive to any of the Canadian governments, which is consistent with an LI theory.

But some of the quantitative studies cited here have suggested a connection between negative media publicity and the reduction of aid. While this variable was not within the scope of this thesis, it may warrant further study as this is an appeal to state self-interest. No government wants to be publicly linked with atrocities or serious human rights violations. For this reason, connecting Canada’s bilateral aid as support for a regime that commits serious human rights abuses has the potential to bring pressure to bear on the Canadian government to reduce bilateral aid to that state. This, however, requires a broad domestic response. To reduce aid to countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo in favour of more aid to the Congo or Sierra Leone, as was previously discussed, would require a communications campaign aimed at the atrocities of Canada’s aid partner and an increased awareness of the conditions in these other African states. However, this would place the plight of two groups of African people at odds over the same money. This would be a difficult argument to make.

The Harper government has instead signalled a shift of bilateral aid from Africa to the Americas. From these American countries of focus only Bolivia and the Caribbean region have acceptable human rights records. Rather than states like Nicaragua, Guyana or Costa Rica, which have good PTS scores, the Americas focus will continue to be on Haiti, with the addition of Columbia, Peru and Honduras. While there is some hope Haiti has returned to an acceptable human rights level, none of these additional states have acceptable human rights records. Of the 20 countries of focus, the government has only identified Bolivia and the Caribbean region from the Americas, along with Ghana, Tanzania and Vietnam as countries that have acceptable PTS scores. There is nothing that leads one to expect that these five are going to received
preferential treatment because of their human rights as this government’s actions clearly support an economic agenda.

Approaching the issue from a multilateral perspective, raising awareness of the human rights agenda through multilateral institutions, particularly the Commonwealth, the OECD and NATO, may have some potential. Canada has responded over time in varying degrees to its perceived international image. But, this would be a long-term enterprise based on the hope these institutions would become more receptive to a human rights priority than they have previously demonstrated and that Canada would eventually embrace such views as these became dominant internationally. There is little reason to believe this will occur.

What is perhaps more actionable is for the government to finally act upon the promise to reduce the total number of countries to which it provides aid. While Canada has made positive strides to direct the majority of bilateral aid to first the 2005 Partners list and the countries, it has not made much progress on reducing the total number of recipients. With the Harper government’s shift in focus from Africa to the Americas, a strategy that would encourage selectively ending aid relationships with some of the least developed and lower income recipients could reduce the number of regimes with serious human rights violations. The freed up bilateral aid might then be redirected to equally needy states that have demonstrated positive human rights performance but lack the capacity to improve their condition. Consolidating bilateral aid would allow Canada to exercise greater influence and it would most likely find it is actually in its self-interest to do so. Countries that are able to raise their standard of living and achieve good governance, have a better chance of being economic trading partners with a country that has established bilateral relations. However, this again requires that the government include human rights in the decision-making process for bilateral aid, which it has
consistently shown an unwillingness to do. Even under the most favourable conditions during the Mulroney government when human rights were topical and the government made explicit commitments to address human rights violations, action was inconsistent at best. The Harper government has given muted support to human rights in connection with development assistance and its actions indicate a different set of priorities. At the same time, the humane internationalism supported by many scholars and much of civil society has lost its vigour.

Unfortunately, without some motivation for the government to act there will not be a focus on human rights. What has not and will not work is for critics to simply focus on human rights from an ‘ought to’ moral perspective, without addressing the self-interest, security and power motives that drive Canada’s international relations.
APPENDIX I – POLITICAL TERROR SCALE LEVELS

5 : Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

4 : Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

3 : There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

2 : There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

1 : Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

## APPENDIX II – CANADIAN HISTORICAL ODA ($ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Total bilateral</th>
<th>Total multilateral</th>
<th>Total ODA</th>
<th>ODA:GNI (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-1950</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.99</td>
<td>12.99</td>
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