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Factors shaping regional integration in Europe, Asia, and Africa: the validity of competing theories

Chen, Jie

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FACTORS SHAPING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE, ASIA, AND AFRICA:

THE VALIDITY OF COMPETING THEORIES

CHEN, JIE

Bachelor of Jurisprudence, Peking University, 2005-2009

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Abstract

This research summarizes, compares and analyzes the origins and developments of integration in Europe, Asia and Africa since World War Two. There have been some interesting findings. Europe has been the most successful region, having realized free movements of people, goods, services and money in several countries within the European Union (EU). Africa has been more advanced in institutional integration than Asia, although its level of economic development, constrained by instability, corruption, and poor socio-economic conditions, has hindered integration; meanwhile, its regional economic communities (RECs) have been more successful than the continental organization. Despite the improved economic conditions, Asia has been experiencing difficulties in community building due to lack of consensus and a partnership among major powers. There has not been any continental organization in Asia; nor has the subregional grouping, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), progressed far in economic and political integration.
Acknowledgements

I give thanks to Prof. Alan Siaroff for his support along the way and guidance in the independent study, Prof. Geoffrey Hale for his vigorous discussions with me in the independent study and his painstaking comments on my thesis, and Prof. Alexander Darku for his encouragement and enthusiastic help in improving my language and research on African integration. I also thank Prof. Christopher Kukucha and Jeff Coffman for their kind help in my first year of this program, and Prof. Peter McCormick to chair my defense. The Graduate School of University of Lethbridge and the International Center for Students must also be acknowledged for their assistance during various stages of this program.

Without your help, I would not have done this. Thank you all.
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<tr>
<td>AAPO</td>
<td>All African Peoples’ Organization</td>
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<td>AATPO</td>
<td>Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABMI</td>
<td>Asian Bond Markets Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACJ</td>
<td>African Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ACU</td>
<td>Asian Currency Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community or ASEAN Economic Community</td>
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<td>AEM</td>
<td>ASEAN Economic Ministers</td>
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<td>AFREC</td>
<td>African Energy Commission</td>
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<td>AFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>AIPO</td>
<td>ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>Asian Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>APPER</td>
<td>Africa’s Priority Program for Economic Recovery</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>ASEAN Security Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN 5</td>
<td>Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCSA</td>
<td>bilateral currency swap agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benelux</td>
<td>Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<td>CEPT</td>
<td>Common Effective Preferential Tariff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahelo-Saharan States</td>
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<td>CET</td>
<td>Common External Tariff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFEI</td>
<td>strategy for Collective FDI-dependent and Export-oriented Industrialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAS</td>
<td>Conference of Independent African States</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CISI</td>
<td>Strategy for Collective Import Substituting Industrialization</td>
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<td>CLMV</td>
<td>Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
<td>Chiang Mai Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community or East Asian Community</td>
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<td>EAEC</td>
<td>East Asian Economic Caucus or Eurasian Economic Community</td>
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<td>EAEG</td>
<td>East Asian Economic Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAFTA</td>
<td>East Asian Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>EAS</td>
<td>East Asian Summit which includes ASEAN Plus Three, Australia, New Zealand, and India</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>EID</td>
<td>Emerging Infectious Diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>European Monetary System</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPU</td>
<td>European Political Union</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area or Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPA</td>
<td>Hanoi Plan of Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAP</td>
<td>Individual Action Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCPMR</td>
<td>Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDB</td>
<td>Multilateral Development Banks</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEAT</td>
<td>Network of East Asian Think-tanks</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>NMI</td>
<td>New Miyazawa Initiative</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAFMECA</td>
<td>Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAFMECSA</td>
<td>Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan-African Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>+ 3 countries</td>
<td>China, Japan and South Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trading Arrangement</td>
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<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>SEOM</td>
<td>Senior Economic Officials Meeting</td>
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<td>SLOM</td>
<td>Senior Labor Officials Meeting</td>
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<td>SOM</td>
<td>Meetings of Senior Officials</td>
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<td>SU</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPP or P4</td>
<td>Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership</td>
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<td>UAMS</td>
<td>Union of African and Malagasy States</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UMA</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Since World War Two, one of the major trends in world politics has been regional integration, or regionalism. While the modern communication and transportation technologies have greatly advanced the process of globalization, geographically proximate countries have also been intensifying their linkages in the form of intergovernmental arrangements. They coordinate in economic and social policies, set up common institutions, and occasionally cooperate in security issues. The first wave of this trend emerged during the 1940s and 1960s.

Numerous regional organizations and institutions have been established among different regional groups. In Europe, there were the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the European Defence Community (EDC), and the European Community (EC) (Urwin, 1995, pp. 35-79). In Asia, there was the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In Africa, there were the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), the Front-Line States, the All African Peoples’ Organization (AAPO), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

The origins and development of integration in different regions were driven by different sets of forces which may have common subsets. European integration emerged out of the original six countries’ concerns of a rising Germany, the Soviet threat, and their need for economic recovery after World War Two (Urwin, 1995, p. 1). The ASEAN was established due to the communist threat of the Soviet Union.
(Takeshi, 1999, p. 17), internal and regional instability, and the common need to
develop economies. The African movements of integration were mainly driven by the
desire of newly independent governments to end colonialism and maintain stability.
Beside those forces, many other factors promoted or hindered the process towards
regional integration, such as the attitudes of political elites, the influence or lack of
domestic interest groups, the continuing or resolution of conflicts among major
powers, and nation states’ concerns for policy autonomy and national security.

During the late 1960s and the 1980s, European integration advanced despite
difficulties, while progress towards Asian and African integration was moderate. With
the growing interdependence between the EFTA countries and the EC countries,
EFTA countries, notably Britain, started to seek for EC membership in the 1960s. In
the 1970s, the progress towards economic and monetary union within the EC
stagnated due to the two oil crises that led to protectionism and the end of the Bretton
Woods monetary system that caused turbulence in international monetary system
(Ginsberg, 2007, pp. 77-79). In the late 1970s and the 1980s, several achievements
were notable: the beginning of elections for the European Parliament, the
establishment of the Economic and Monetary System (EMS), and the signing of the
160).

During the same period, the progress of Asian integration was slow and limited.
China and Japan remained outside of the processes of regionalism, and the ASEAN
Five admitted only one new member, Brunei, in 1984 (Shimizu, 2009, p. 3). The main
achievement within the ASEAN was the adoption of three agreements for enhancing
security. During the mid-1970s and 1980s, ASEAN made two strategies for economic
cooperation, but no concrete measures were taken before the end of the Cold War.
African integration was similarly slow due to the nation states’ priority given to obtaining independence and maintaining stability. The OAU began to set up institutions and make plans for economic cooperation in the mid-1970s, but no concrete measures were taken. A few conventions were signed to deal with direct needs, such as the refugee problems. The OAU studied the feasibility to establish an economic community in the 1980s, but it did not execute any plans for economic integration in this stage (Khamis, 2008, p. 28). Meanwhile, several regional groupings were formed: the East African Community (EAC) in 1967 (EastAfricanCommunity, 1999), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 (AFRICANUNION, 2010b), the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 (SADC, 2010b), the Preferential Trading Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa (forerunner of COMESA) in 1981 (COMESA, 2010), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in 1983 (AU, 2010), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1986 (IGAD, 2010). Their achievements were limited. None of the groupings realized FTA before the 1990s.

During the 1990s, the regionalism movements in Europe continued and those in Asia and Africa were accelerated, due to the need to advance economic development in light of increasing competition from other emerging economies. The Cold War ended in 1991, and the post-war security threats had greatly reduced, while the United States and some East Asian economies posed a rising challenge to the rest of the world. All the major regional organizations began to intensify their efforts towards integration while their economies became increasingly interdependent. In Europe, the EC and other European institutions were integrated into the single framework of European Union (EU) and the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) was implemented
(Nicoll & Salmon, 1994, pp. 279-280). In East Asia, the ASEAN made its first steps towards closer economic integration. In Africa, the sub-regional economic communities (RECs) claimed the success of de-colonialization, and initiated their attempts towards free trade areas, customs unions and common markets.

**Aims and Methods of the Research**

Besides those basic forces, there are many other factors that shape the processes of integration in those regions; they differ from region to region due to divergent historical and cultural backgrounds. This research aims at explaining the origins and developments of integration in three regions, namely, Europe, Asia and Africa. A set of factors will be summarized for each region. Many of the factors come from the application of the theories of international relations to the three cases. This research chooses three theoretical approaches, realism, functionalism and neofunctionalism, with each stressing different sets of factors. It should be noted that they are not the only theoretical approaches.

Some of the forces that influenced the integration processes may not be stressed by any theoretical approach. Some factors that dominate one case may not be applicable in another. Therefore, a close observation of the historical processes in the three regions is conducted following the theoretical review. Specifically, this research looks into the beginnings and backgrounds in the post-war era. It answers how the process of integration was initiated, what difficulties the nation states met, what achievements they had, and what further attempts they made. Then, it compares the outcomes of integration in each region. As is found in this research, the processes of integration in different regions were initiated in distinct backgrounds, driven or restrained by various and partly overlapping forces, and led to varied outcomes.
The developments of integration not only include the establishment of organizations, institutions and the implementation of regional plans, but also cover the enlargement of membership accompanying a transformation of social identities. After examining the historical facts, this research analyzes the fragmenting and integrating factors in the process in each region that the theoretical approaches may not specify. It also applies the theoretical accounts to the three cases. The last task of this research is to specify the factors that are proven by the facts in the regionalism processes, and to make clear which theoretical approach best explains the process of integration in each region. As the theoretical analysis turns out, none of them is perfect and universally applicable. Neofunctionalism offers the best, though not perfect, accounts to the European experience and, perhaps, African integration, while realism has been the better approach to explaining Asian regionalism.

To sum up, this research goes through a theoretical review on three theoretical approaches in international relations, examines the historical developments and failures of integration in each region, applies the theoretical approaches to each case and summarizes a set of factors for each case. The primary methods in this research include collecting historical facts from selected library resources, online journal articles, and official websites of regional organizations. To compare the developments and economic features of some regions, data, such as those of international trade and tariff, are collected. The data sources are from academic books, journals, and, most importantly, online databases such as the FreedomHouse, the CIA World Fact-book, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook Database.

There is possibly one problem in this research: the limited literature of integration-related theoretical approaches. As the research went on, it was noticed that there has been a limited theoretical literature on Asian regionalism, and little on
African integration. The main approaches on integration, functionalism and, especially, neo-functionalism, were not generally applicable to the Asian and African cases. They were developed based on the European experience of integration. Due to the very different historical, cultural, economic and political backgrounds, some factors that two approaches stress have not been found in Asia and Africa. Some explanation has simply been not applicable to the latter two regions. Therefore, the theoretical analysis may not be perfectly sound.

Many scholars have been conscious of the overwhelming Euro-centrism in the contemporary comparative regionalism studies: they searched in other cases for the background conditions, functional equivalents and spill-over effects that were derived from the study of Europe, and they used the European experience to develop generalizations about the prospects for regional integration elsewhere (Soderbaum, 2009, p. 481). This research tries to analyze the three cases independently and compare them in a balanced and objective way. It investigates into the origins of Asian and African integration not by searching for the conditions found in Europe, but by objectively examining the historical facts in the two regions. This research has found that in different contexts, the origins and processes in the two cases show distinctive features.

**Terminology: Region, Integration and Regionalism**

Before the discussion on integration of three regions begins, it is necessary to define three key concepts: region, integration, and regionalism. The concept of region is elusive. Since World War Two, some regions have been defined not only by geographical terms, but also by the increasing regional institutions, economic linkages, cultures, and regional policy entrepreneurs as catalysts for changes. It must be noted
that geographical proximity creates more chances of linking countries together and forming a region; however, it is no longer the only defining factor as advanced transportation and communication technologies are developed and diverse economic, social and political linkages intensify.

In the postwar era, the linkages constructed by security arrangements emerged, such as those within the ASEAN in the 1960s and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, as a result of diminishing security threats and the attraction of economic interests, economic linkages became more important over time. Most of the regional policies, mechanisms and institutions have been to facilitate increasing economic linkages. Between the 1960s and 1990s, regions in the politico-economic sense emerged in the form of free trade areas, customs unions and common markets, involving countries that are geographically close to one another, such as those in East Asia, West Europe, and Africa.

In a word, those newly-formed regions not only develop closer economic relationships but also make political arrangements, but the economic interests are the way towards and the driving force for political arrangements. Joseph Nye (1971) provided a minimum classical definition for the concept of region that “a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence” (Soderbaum, 2009, p. 478).

Besides the economic and political linkages and institutions, a region may also be defined by similar cultures (languages, religions, etc.), levels of economic development, political systems, and geographical lines. Regional identity gets clearer when the linkages and the level of homogeneity in those aspects increase. Homogeneity in those elements might facilitate the integration and harmonization of
policies. However, they are not necessary for defining and integrating a region. For example, few of the EU’s member states are culturally homogeneous and there is no such thing as a European race. Besides, residents of the EU speak more than forty languages, which are defended as symbols of national identity and act as “a constant reminder of the differences among Europeans”. Further, Europe could not be divided properly by the Urals, the conventional geographical line, considering that they are deep in the heart of Russia which has been excluded from the integration process of Europe (McCormick, 2005, p. 36). In this thesis, we define a region according to Clive Archer’s (1992) citation of Karl Kaiser: a subsystem is “a partial international system whose members exist in geographical propinquity” and have “a particular degree of regularity and intensity of relations as well as awareness of interdependence” (Archer, 1992, p. 46).

Interdependence may be induced by their geographic locations, common national interests, common economic, social and political policies, and the transactions and linkages among the peoples. As the intensity of linkages among states may vary, different groups of countries may have different levels of solidarity or common identity. Therefore, The occurrence and evolution of a regional identity is a multi-dimensional and multi-level phenomenon (Caporaso, 2005, p. 65). The cultural, social and ethnic bonds as forms of interdependence are undeniable; however, based on the fact that the main forms of interdependence are security and economic arrangements, this research concentrates on regional organizations and regional economic frameworks, or security complexes/communities (Soderbaum, 2009, pp. 478-479).

“Regional Integration” has more than one definition. Some definitions are derived from the European experience of integration, and are therefore not as relevant
as in other regions. Roy Ginsberg (2007) defined “integration” as “interstate reconciliation”: a process by which several states, (which might have been) previously engaged in conflict (political, military or economic), engage with one another in order to come to terms with the past, work through differences, negotiate and make amends and restitutions as needed, and agree to establish a new relationship based on structural (institutionalized) peace and mutual respect (Ginsberg, 2007, p. 1). His definition describes the process towards the Franco-German partnership and the establishment of the ECSC.

Hass (1958) defined (political) integration as the process whereby political actors are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end of a process of political integration is a new political community (Haas, 1958, p. 16). His definition focuses on the political institutions and supranational developments which are present in Europe rather than Asia and Africa. In this definition, independent states may eventually join together into a federation, which is defined as an institutional arrangement involving two or more levels of government, with a formal division of authority specifying the powers and sources of revenue. Both levels of governments act directly in some ways on the citizens. An alternative to federation is confederation, defined as an institutional arrangement where a group of sovereign entities form a common government for limited purposes. The common government has no independent sovereignty and does not act directly on citizens. The EU is a mixture of federation and confederation, but not fully one or the other (Siaroff, 2009, pp. 166-170).

Federalism is the original and persistent driving force of federation. The role of
federalism in European integration was established during 1930s and 1940s, but it was underestimated by British political elites and in the defeat of some supranational projects. The most famous federalist document was the Ventotene Manifesto of 1941 written by Italian federalists led by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi. Spinelli was instrumental in channeling Italian government’s support toward a federal solution for the European Political Community. His strategy was democratic radicalism, stressing the major role of a parliamentary assembly in drafting a new treaty for Europe. This became known as the constitutional method, whereby the assembly shall serve to mobilize a dynamic European public opinion to establish a popular European federation (Burgess, 2004, pp. 29-31). Another strand of federalism, according to Michael Burgess was advocated by Jean Monnet. He believed the political strategy of small, concrete, economic steps would culminate in a federal Europe. The latter became known as neofunctionalism. In this research, Spinelli’s strategy is referred to as “federalism”, while the other strand is called neofunctionalism. The ideas about federalism are also Eurocentric. The forming of a federation either in Spinelli’s or Monnet’s approach is not discussed widely in Asia and Africa.

There are also some non-Eurocentric definitions. The literature of East Asian integration has mostly ignored theory building, but Shaun Breslin (2007) concluded that the New Regionalism is a new framework to analyze non-European cases and add to literatures on European case. He indicated that this approach has much in common with earlier theories and approaches, such as liberal institutionalism and Walter Mattili’s neo-functionalism developed in the 1990s (Breslin, 2007, pp. 28-29).
As Breslin (2007) concluded, the main contention of the New Regionalism is the relationship between regionalism and regionalization. Regionalism as the form refers to formalized regions with officially agreed membership and boundaries as a result of intergovernmental dialogues and treaties. Regionalization refers to the process by which societies and economies become integrated, particularly but not only in the economic sphere. The process of regionalization fills the region with substance such as economic interdependence, institutional ties, political trust, and cultural belonging, which promote the emergence of regionalism (Breslin, 2007, p. 29). Soderbaum (2009) provided a similar definition: regionalism represents a state-centered activity which usually leads to institution building and formal policies; regionalization refers to a society-centered process which leads to the concentration of activity of trade, peoples, ideas and even conflicts (Soderbaum, 2009, p. 479).

The literatures on African integration generally lay importance on historical facts and practical problems, and have not produced a major theoretical literature. While Asian Regionalism is occasionally used by some scholars as a proto-approach to East Asian integration, Pan-Africanism is less a theoretical approach than a practical project for the colonized and underdeveloped countries. It represents a regionalism process aiming at continental unity. It is different from federalism. African countries have not agreed on the final objective of Pan-Africanism. The goals in the current stage are to maintain independence and stability, to set up an economic and monetary union, and to make a common defence policy. Whether the AU will develop into a federation is uncertain. The regionalism process is happening mainly within the regional economic communities (RECs).
Based on the above definitions, this research defines “regional integration” as a multi-dimensional, multi-level and multi-stage process leading to the intensification of inter-state links, the increase of regional arrangements, and the formation and evolvement of a region. It may be brought about by force, the need for security in the face of a common external threat, common values and goals, and the desire to promote peace and improve their quality of life more quickly by working together (McCormick, 2005, p. 12). It may also be pushed by the globalization of economic activity, the production and marketing of goods and services (Coleman & Underhill, 2002, p. 93), and efforts to adapt to globalization. It includes both informal and formal reconciliation among states (national and sub-national governments), government officials, and private actors in developing institutions, policies, day-by-day coordination, and cooperation in various issues which may differ from region to region. As a multi-level process, it could be top-down negotiations among states leading to formal projects, and also could be bottom-up processes originating from economies and societies leading to increasing interdependence.

In theory, a complete process of regional integration is a continuum from regionalization, to regionalism, and eventually to federalism. The majority of studies in the field of political science continue to focus on the policies of formal and largely state-led regionalism as opposed to the processes of regionalization (Soderbaum, 2009, p. 481), although regionalization is one of the forces that may lead to regionalism. Inasmuch as "coming-together" federal integration or political union has not occurred in the postwar world (as opposed to earlier eras), it will be beyond the scope of this analysis.

In between the two ends of the spectrum, there are several stages of regionalism.
Joseph Nye (1968) indicated that integration can be broken down into economic integration leading to the formation of a transnational economy, social integration leading to the formation of a transnational society, and political integration leading to the formation of transnational political interdependence (Nye, 1968, p. 859). This research lays importance on economic integration and sometimes refers to political integration.

Bela Balassa (1961) defined a free trade area as a region where tariffs and quantitative restrictions between the participating countries are abolished, but each member retains its own tariffs against nonmembers. Establishing a customs union involves suppression of discrimination and the equalization of tariffs in trade with nonmember countries. A higher form, a common market, requires that both trade restrictions and restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An economic union combines the suppression of restrictions on commodity and factor movements with some degree of harmonization of national economic policies. Belassa’s final stage of total economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and counter-cyclical policies, and requires the setting-up of a supranational authority whose decisions are binding for the member states (Balassa, 1961, p. 2). However, one should separate out monetary integration from these other factors. The following table shows the consequent six stages.
Table 1.1

Stages of Economic Integration By Belassa, 1961 as shown in (Nye, 1968); with Addition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of Integration</th>
<th>No tariff or quotas</th>
<th>Common external tariff</th>
<th>Free flow of factors</th>
<th>Harmonization of economic policies</th>
<th>Harmonization of economic &amp; monetary policies</th>
<th>Unification of policies, political institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Customs Union</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common market</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Union</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total economic integration</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Balassa’s definition on “some degree of harmonization of national economic policies” within the economic union is vague: it may comprise different degrees of policy harmonization, varying from consultation in making economic policy to a common economic policy. Further, on the way towards the final stage of economic integration, various stages may appear. European Union, for example, is an economic and monetary union. Besides, the popular usage of the terms can be misleading. For example, the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is not the common market defined by Balassa.

Nye (1968) distinguished four different types of political integration: institutional (PI1), policy interactional (PI2), attitudinal (PI3), and the security community (PI4). PI1 and PI3 are the most important. Nye (1968) made a figure showing the scale of institutional integration.
Figure 1.1 Institutional Integration (Nye, 1968, p. 866)

This figure gives a crude intuitive order of institutional integration, ranging from cooperation within weak intergovernmental institutions, the occurrence and increase of supranational features, confederation, federation and eventually unitary strong central institutions. Some regional communities do not necessarily start from the weakest end. For example, the ECSC had a supranational authority in the beginning. Furthermore, supranationality and confederation may reverse. In regions where supranationality is far from realistic, the institutional integration may remain intergovernmental. Besides, there may be a stage without formal institutions at all. Ultimately, a continuum of institutional integration can be divided into four stages: 1) non-institutionalized cooperation; 2) confederation; 3) a hybrid of intergovernmental and supranational institutions; and 4) federation. A hybrid is not necessarily beyond confederation, but may mean a certain arrangement with some features of both stage two and stage four. The EU is a hybrid of federation and confederation (Siaroff, 2009, p. 170).

When formal institutions are established, one indicator of the strength of central institutions is the size and growth of bureaucratic resources of budget and administrative staff as a percentage of total government budgets and all the
administrative staff of member states. Jurisdictional integration can be measured by supranationality of decision-making and scope of legal powers (Nye, 1968, p. 867).

Attitudinal integration or the concept of political integration is associated with the extent to which people develop a sense of common identity and mutual obligation across national boundaries. It can be measured by elite interviews, content analysis of periodicals or statements by leaders, and public opinion polls. There can be a gap between attitudes and actions (Nye, 1968, pp. 868-874).

Membership in the regional communities and a sense of community reflect the attitudes, and are two important factors defining regional identities; however, a considerable level of interdependence evident in inter-state economic frameworks and implemented integration policies is also important. As Nye (1968) stressed, we need a behavioral check on attitudes of community (Nye, 1968, p. 873). This analysis can be applied to the definition of region. In Europe, the six-country communities during the 1950s and the 1960s were a region. With the increasing interdependence and integration policies between the original six and other European countries, the six-country region has gradually been enlarged to cover 27 countries. In Asia, the ASEAN is a region: it is constructing a FTA and aims at a closer region in the form of an economic union. Given the signing of bilateral FTAs between ASEAN and +3 countries (China, Japan, and South Korea) respectively and the proposal in the ASEAN +3 (APT) summits to set up an East Asian Community (EAC), a larger region is being formed. However, APT is not a region yet: no consensus is achieved regarding the community and its goals, and there is no overall FTA covering the 13 countries. In Africa, some pro-integration political leaders and scholars have been advocating for continental unity since the 1950s, and all the 53 countries are members
in the AU. Therefore, Africa can be seen as an attitudinally integrated region.

However, AU has not realized a FTA yet, and other continental policies are limited. Meanwhile, the RECs have progressed further than the AU in economic integration. As the inter-REC linkages are limited, the RECs are separate regions in reality, while Africa is a collection of regions rather than a genuine region.

Policy integration is measured by three indicators: the scope (how many policy sectors are treated in common), the extent (how much of a sector is treated in common), and the salience (how important they are). The scope can be measured by using the list of governmental ministries as the percentage of ministries directly involved in the integration process. The importance of various ministries is related to the salience of various policy sectors. A Security Community could be measured by the number of hostile incidents (Nye, 1968, p. 875).

According to the stages of economic and political integration, regionalism is found in many regions and is unevenly developed. European countries have established an economic and monetary union within the EU; the African countries have set up the OAU which was then replaced by the AU, and RECs, three of which have realized FTAs; however, Asia does not have any region-wide FTA, and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) does not involve major regional powers. In terms of stages of institutional integration, the ASEAN with some intergovernmental institutions is currently between the first two stages, the AU and the three main RECs with intergovernmental executive organs, courts and parliaments are at stage two, and the EU is at stage three. It is uncertain to what degree the EU will realize political integration, and what kind of regional arrangements Asia and Africa will accomplish
after the establishment of FTAs. Over time, regional integration may expand from less controversial areas to more important policy areas. Meanwhile, in some less controversial areas, supranational mechanisms may replace intergovernmental decision-making measures. Supranational elements are found in a few institutions of Europe, but it is uncertain whether they will appear in Asia and Africa.

If the need for enhanced credibility and dispute resolution should lead states to transfer authority to formal institutions and, especially, supranational agents, why the functions and delegated authority of regional institutions have not uniformly increased outside the EU? Miles Kahler and David Lake (2009) explained this puzzle by introducing two alternative modes of governance that substitute for both national governance and supranationalism. One is hierarchy, whereby subordinate states shifts authority to a dominant state that provides a social order to the former. There is a fear of the subordinates that the dominant state may renegotiate the contract in its favor. The other one is networks, whereby multiple actors such as government units, officials and private sectors work across the border and pursue a reciprocal relationship without a legitimate authority. The modes of governance permit hybrid forms. The existing modes of governance can be portrayed with a triangle with supranationalism, hierarchy, and networks in pure form at each apex (Kahler & Lake, 2009, pp. 242-248). The ultimate causes of the lack of supranationalism will be explained in following chapters.
Observed modes of governance combine elements of each form but in different proportions (Kahler & Lake, 2009, p. 249). In International Monetary Fund (IMF), there may be a network of trans-governmental ties among national finance ministries, but the density of those network ties are likely to vary among groups, with the major industrialized countries more networked than the developing countries. The degree of hierarchy is reflected in the voting rules, and the United States has an important role within IMF. However, the actual influence of the US is bigger than indicated by the formal voting rules (Kahler & Lake, 2009, p. 250). Within the EU, besides the supranational elements, networks of regulators in industries such as telecommunications, energy and transport have been established, although with a limited influence (Coen & Thatcher, 2008, p. 1). Meanwhile, the American authority, especially in the early years during the Cold War, has been established through the NATO hierarchy, whereby the US has provided security to its subordinates in Western Europe (Lake, 2009, pp. 41-22).

Three distinctions should be noted. Compared to multilateralism that refers to interstate (mostly economic and diplomatic) links contributing to economic
liberalization and peace, regionalism is combined with geographical and political terms, and reveals a deeper level of collaborative relationship within which countries attempts to build regional unity in economic policies, decision-making mechanisms in social and economic policies, identity, markets, and probably in diplomacy and security. Besides, regional integration is different from regional cooperation: cooperation is an open-ended process whereby states act together for mutual benefit and to solve common tasks in a wide range of fields, while integration refers to a process leading to certain regional arrangements, whereby autonomous units are merged into a whole (Soderbaum, 2009, p. 479). Regionalism also implies the emergence of a regional identity from the intense links among states. Lastly, Asian “regionalism” is widely used in the literature on Asian integration. Regionalism after World War Two is different from the regionalism of Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere of the 1930s and the 1940s. “While the old regionalism emphasized autarchy and direct rule, the new one relies on interdependence and indirect rule” (Katzenstein, 2000, p. 1). Therefore, Asian regional integration is also called “Asia’s new regionalism”.

Chapter Outline

This thesis is organized in seven chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the selected theoretical approaches, realism, functionalism and neofunctionalism, which will be applied to explain the European, Asian, and African experiences. In particular, the three approaches stress different sets of factors that shape states’ behavior and the process of integration. Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examine the origins and developments of integration in each region respectively. Each chapter starts by
discussing the controversial regional identity and its changes since World War Two. Then, it states how regional integration started in each region under what conditions in what background, and following the inception, what developments the countries achieved and what difficulties they met up to the 1990s.

Chapter 3 describes how Franco-German partnership and six-country communities were established in the context of the end of World War Two and Cold War, how the EC membership was expanded to 27 countries, and how SEA was signed and implemented in the 1980s and the 1990s. Chapter 4 identifies several groups in Asia, and summarizes how the ASEAN was established in the Cold War, and how the regionalism processes within ASEAN and among other main powers were accelerated or hindered after the 1997 Financial Crisis. Chapter 5 states how African integration was advocated to end colonialism in the first half of the 20th century, and how continental and regional integration have been advanced for economic development or hindered by various problems since the 1980s.

Chapter 6 applies the three theoretical approaches to each case, critiques explanations that do not match the facts, and summarizes all the factors that are reflected in the processes of integration in each case. In the conclusion of each section in Chapter 6, a table lists all factors as well as their relevancy in different stages. According to those tables, it can be seen that some factors were temporally specific while others have been consistently present and strongly relevant. When the tables are compared, it can be seen that each region has several most consequential factors: some factors evidenced in Europe are absent in Asia and Africa, while others proven
important in Europe and Africa are absent in Asia. Following each table, two questions are answered: what are the main reasons for the development or difficulty in integration in each region; which theoretical approach best explains each case.

Chapter 7 summarizes the major findings of this research, regarding the features of regional identities in the context of regional integration, the different origins and processes of integration in the three regions, the factors, and the application of theoretical approaches to the three cases.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction

As functionalism and neofunctionalism are both developed from the European experience of integration, they may only be applicable in the distinctive conditions of Europe. To make a more sound analysis on integration in the three regions, this research chooses realism, the widely-applied, though not perfect, theory in international relations, as one of the theoretical approaches. Thus, three lenses, realism, functionalism and neofunctionalism, are chosen to look into the logic of integration. Each theoretical approach stresses a different set of factors in explaining nation states’ behavior and the processes of integration.

Some other competing or supplementary approaches have also emerged. As Thomas Diez and Antje Wiener (2004) summarized, the development of integration theory can be divided into three main phases following a pre-cursor period: explanatory, analytical and constructive, respectively. The normative proto-integration phase was during the 1930s and early 1950s, when functionalism, developed mainly by David Mitrany, and early federalism were popular (Wiener & Diez, 2004, pp. 6-7).

The first phase lasted from 1957 until the early 1980s, when the realists and neofunctionalists dominated the debate on the early success and the stagnation in the 1970s. Intergovernmentalists sought a compromise combining the two groups of
arguments. They explained supranational institution-building as the result of rational decision-making in line with clearly defined national interests. The liberal intergovernmentalism focuses on governmental actors whose capacity for decisions are enhanced by supranational institutions, but not constrained by them. Institutions are designed for nation states’ purposes under control of the actors who created them (Wiener & Diez, 2004, p. 8).

The second phase during 1980s and early 1990s marked the starting point for a shift of focus of integration theories away from International Relations Theory towards Comparative politics. It focused on the nature of the European Union (EU): what kind of political polity it was. EU was defined by neo-institutionalists as a system of multi-level or network governance, or as a multi-perspectival polity. The key process analyzed was the Europeanization of governance rules and institution, including legitimacy, democracy, and transparency (Wiener & Diez, 2004, p. 9).

The third phase is marked by the return of International Relations Theory of a different kind. A variety of critical and constructivist approaches emerged. Social constructivists demonstrated the relevance of ideas, norms, institutions and identities for international politics. Post-structuralists drew attention to the construction of our understanding of international politics. These theories faced the task of theorizing the finality of European integration, and focused on our understanding of integration and the Europeanization of identities rather than institutions and policies (Wiener & Diez, 2004, pp. 9-10).
In explaining the process of European integration, realism and neofunctionalism as well as its perceived precursor functionalism are the dominating approaches. Although the neofunctionalist arguments have been proved applicable to the general processes of European integration, it may not predict EU’s final developments precisely. Further, it may not be applicable to the Asian and African experiences where the contexts are much different. This research does not assume neofunctionalism as the primary model for integration, but examines the three cases from the perspectives of each approach and asks: which approach provides the best explanation for the logic of integration in each case? This chapter reviews the three theoretical approaches, and brings up critiques if any. They will be applied to the three cases in Chapter 6, where some of their points may be validated, and others may not.

**Realism**

There are many schools of international relations theories. Idealism and realism are two main and competing schools. The idealist school of international relations is also known as liberalism or liberal internationalism. The liberal thinking can be traced back to the Grotian or Kantian tradition. The work of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), *The Rights of War and Peace Including the Law of Nature and of Nations*, represents one main strand of liberalism. Grotius used natural law as his starting point and emphasized that there is a law of war and law of peace. Another strand was developed from Immanuel Kant’s ideas. His work provided arguments for the idea of liberal peace, the notion that liberal democratic states are unlikely to fight other liberal
democracies. The state of perpetual peace, as Kant envisaged, is possible if based on “a cosmopolitan law to operate with the pacific union”. Between the two world wars, studies of international relations were predominantly prescriptive pieces aiming to reform the international system and to avoid wars. The starting point for most liberals in the interwar era was the notion that human society and political institutions could be perfected. They believed there were solutions to wars. In contrast with them, Hedley Bull recognized the anarchic forces, and claimed that they could be contained rather than abolished (Williams, Goldstein, & Shafritz, 2006, pp. 6-10).

To sum up, the liberal school acknowledges that nation-states sometimes seek to protect or expand their relative power positions, but they hope and predict that nation-states can improve their mutual well-being over the longer run by burying their short-term differences. They insist that the temptation to go to war will be held in check through international cooperation, democratization and the spread of the rule of law. Anarchy can be replaced, and over efforts on building collective security, nation states will not be the ultimate form of human governance (Rosamond, 2000, p. 21).

The realist tradition can be traced back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau. Thucydides portrayed the roots of conflict: the growth of one power and the fear of another. He believed that insecurity and the quest for power led to wars. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) emphasized the use of force to obtain desired goals in his work, The Prince (1532). He explained “power” as the capacity to make someone do something he would not otherwise do, and advised that princes should endeavor to be feared rather than loved. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) shared
Machiavelli’s pessimistic thinking about human nature. In his work, *Leviathan (1651)*, he contended that in a system without a central overriding authority, sovereigns are in continual suspicion and sense of insecurity (Williams, et al., 2006, pp. 10-11).

One of the most influential contemporary realists is Hans Morgenthau, who summarized six principles of realism in his work *Politics among Nations*: the laws of politics have their roots in human nature since statesmen are the ones making decisions; the statesmen choose rational alternatives to meet problems in the actual circumstances; the core concept in realism is interest defined in terms of power, which depends upon the political and cultural context and may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man (therefore, it covers a wide range of social relationships from physical violence to psychological ties); political ethics judge action by its political consequences; political realism rejects the idea that the moral laws govern the universe. The political realist asks: “How does this policy affect the power of the nation?” (Morgenthau, 2006, pp. 58-62).

Critics argue that Morgenthau’s concept of human nature was elusive, and his definition on power and interest were vague. The subsequent theorists focused less on the inherent lust for power and human nature, and more on the anarchical nature of the international system as the basic determinant. Kenneth Waltz, a leading neo-realist or structural realist theorist, placed emphasis on the structure of the system, which is characterized by anarchy (the absence of an overriding authority) and the distribution of power or capabilities among powers. While Morgenthau saw states as striving for power, Waltz laid importance on their need to search for security in the fear of the
anarchic and unbalanced structure (Williams, et al., 2006, pp. 12-13). Waltz’s argument is quite logical. Survival is the first goal that all nation states pursue, so the means that threaten others’ survival and maintain one’s own security are the most important interests. Military power is one of the most important powers. To achieve the goals of survival and security in an environment where nation states take autonomous actions, nation states do not necessarily obey moral principles but the principle of pursuing the best outcomes.

Despite the differences among realists, they share several similar principles. The core idea of the realists is that international politics is about the interaction of self-interested nation states in an anarchic environment. The most important actors are the rational and unitary states. Their policies are outcomes of minimizing risk and maximizing benefits. In classical realism, national interests are defined in terms of survival and any means that influence security. Military capabilities are thus a key factor for national security. The quest of one state leaves others less secure; therefore, they cooperate in various ways to solve this security dilemma and enhance national interests. However, the anarchic feature will not diminish and the state system can not be replaced by one with a world government (Rosamond, 2000, pp. 131-132).

Critiques argue that realism can not predict all the changes simply by analyzing the needs of nation states as a unitary actor. There are internal attributes of nation states that make them complex. There are domestic governmental officials and interest groups who try to realize their own interests in the context of the government’s decision-making mechanisms. The policies are not the results of a single rational
political leader’s thinking, but that of the interaction of multiple actors within certain mechanisms, not to mention that political leaders can make miscalculations. One important factor that influences the interactions of interest groups and governmental officials is the economic processes that connect sub-national actors, national governments and their equivalent actors in other countries.

Intergovernmentalism is a theoretical approach of integration based on realist underpinnings and complemented with arguments about domestic politics. Stanley Hoffmann laid the foundations of the intergovernmentalist approach as a critique of neofunctionalist theory in the 1960s. It is characterized by its state-centrism; therefore, integration is limited to policy areas that do not touch on fundamental issues of national sovereignty. Regional integration is driven by the interests and actions of nation states. Despite the promise of international cooperation, states have their own distinctive problems and concerns, and they face different internal circumstances; therefore, any attempt to build a community beyond the state will be fraught of difficulties. A more important factor is the conception of sovereignty of nation states. Sovereignty is associated with “the notions of power, independence and the exercise of will”. According to Intergovernmentalists, nation states manage to involve themselves in regional integration without compromising sovereignty. Sovereignty might be shared rather than transferred to supranational level. The “supranational” institutions are servants of member states rather than independent roles. A difference between realism and Hoffmann’s intergovernmentalism lies in the concept of nation states. To Hoffmann, nation states are not monolithic: their interests are shaped by
domestic politics (Cini, 2003, pp. 94-99).

Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism emphasizes the importance of the preferences and power of nation states, and combines liberal arguments. First, the formation of national preference is shaped by domestic pressures and interactions that are associated with economic interdependence. Second, the interstate negotiations are characterized by the centrality of asymmetrical interdependence among states and the governmental elites. Nation states are unitary actors in this stage. Their power determines whose interest matter. Third, the delegated institutions reflect the preferences of national governments rather than the supranational organizations. National governments ensure the adherence of commitments through institutions. Moravcsik is criticized for focusing mainly on treaty changes and ignoring day-to-day politics and the multi-level character of some regional organizations (Cini, 2003, pp. 103-107).

As a critic, Edward Hallett Carr argued for a compromise between realism and idealism. He pointed out that “we can not find a resting place in pure realism”; realism, though logically overwhelming, can not soundly explain everything in reality, which is true. He criticized that the notion of perpetual anarchy merely reflects a lack of desire or interest to change it (Carr, 2006, p. 56). It is both logical and true that both utopia and reality are elements of the world: despite the conflicts and tension in the current anarchic political world, nation states have also been constructing an international order in various ways. Integration is one of the ways both to pursue national interests and to create a perceived better regional system where rules are
made to enhance mutual trust and order. Power, therefore, is not the only factor that
determines whose interests matter. Other factors include historical experiences, public
sentiments, and a sense of distinctive or similar identity.

**Functionalism**

Functionalism and Neofunctionalism are two distinctive approaches. They do not
belong to the idealist school or the realist school, but they embrace the idealist goals
and pragmatic and rational approaches. They were developed out of the European
experience of integration. Functionalism was developed primarily as a strategy to
build peace. It proposes that common needs can unite people across state borders.
Form is supposed to follow function, and nation state should be bypassed (Soderbaum,
2009, p. 480).

Functionalists reject bold federalist plans for political integration. They were
pragmatists, concentrating on the immediate needs of the survivors of World War Two.
The concept of functionalism came from its idea that all actors’ activities would be
performed as functions of social systems based on the demands of individuals, society,
and the whole international system. David Mitrany, the leading functionalist theorist
in the postwar era, was interested not in the functional integration of European states,
but in the creation of international organizations to fulfill certain specific needs, such
as settling war refugees and regulating air traffic (Wood & Yesilada, 2002, p. 12). His
work, *A Working Peace System*, appeared towards the end of World War Two. He was
cconcerned to recommend strategies for achieving peace, and in the meantime avoided
to be an idealist. His starting point is not the ideal form of the international system, but its essential functions that serve human needs (Rosamond, 2000, p. 32).

Each of such functions would require a certain amount of powers transferred from states to the international system. Mitrany considered that some requirements of human beings might best be served by ignoring the conventions of national territory, which makes him distinctive from realists. Transnational institutions might be more efficient providers of welfare (Rosamond, 2000, p. 33). However, it does not suggest any particular institutional goal but focus on the flexible means that could satisfy human needs. Functionalists assume that states serve for human needs without their own preferences.

After several functions are put into use, each is left to generate others gradually. In every case the appropriate authority is left to grow and develop out of actual performance. Sovereignty is thus transferred through the growing functions piece by piece. The divisions that cause conflict can be transcended gradually by seeking a web of international functional institutions managed by technical elites, and areas of functional cooperation are likely to be found in the areas of economic and social life (Mattli, 1999b, pp. 21-22).

The degree to which nation states transfer powers to international institutions is not only determined by human needs, but also by the sense of solidarity. Schuman insisted from the start that Europe had to be built by practical actions whose first result would be to create a de facto solidarity (Schuman, 1999, p. 76). There are two
types of solidarity. A sense of positive solidarity comes from various bonds and linkages among nation states and societies, such as geographical proximity, some social and historical bonds, intensifying economic interactions, common languages and religions, similar levels of economic development, similar political structures, and political amity among nation states. A sense of negative solidarity stems from common threats and challenges which nation states and societies are faced with.

One claim about the importance of functionalism is that it is an innovative approach to the study of international relations, especially in relation to integration, and it laid the foundations for neofunctionalism. However, Mitrany objected to the association between neofunctionalism and the construction of new political communities (Rosamond, 2000, p. 39). His idea is Darwinian, insisting on flexible forms adapting to the changing needs, rather than a fixed ideal form of governance such as a new political community. While neofunctionalism is an approach of integration, functionalism is an approach of functions. Due to its flexible principle, functionalism does not give many predictions about the changes of international systems.

The idea of its rational thinking suffers from the same criticism as realism. Functionalism assumes that determination of needs is an objective exercise, but it overlooks that some self-interested actors, although disciplined by governments, may make decisions not according to human needs of the society, but to satisfy their perceived interests. The decision-making mechanism in national legislatures, democratic or autocratic, does not guarantee the best outcomes.
In the context of a market economy, coordination in spheres, such as production, trade and distribution, is more complex because of their competitive nature (Rosamond, 2000, p. 40). Some policies liberating the markets may be constructive for the country on the whole, but may be destructive to some interest groups. The perception of interests within a country may therefore be controversial. The outcome of policy-making is sometimes the result of the interactions between the private sectors and national governments.

The contention that form follows functions is criticized by realists. In practice, nation states and their preferences should override the needs of some domestic groups, according to realists. Some regional arrangements, especially those integrating defence and foreign policies, may meet the need for collective security according to functionalists. However, in the anarchic system, fear and suspicion usually prevent nation states from cooperating in high politics and developing supranational measures.

**Neofunctionalism**

Neofunctionalism shares the common ground with functionalism in that it rejects the idealism of the federalist movement: it contends that any outcome would not be achieved through the pursuit of rational and forward-thinking constitutional design, but through activities based on direct needs. However, its main contention is more suggestive than Mitraniian functionalism. Ernst Haas is the central figure who theorized the community method pioneered by Jean Monnet. It argues that states
should begin integration modestly in areas of low politics, and a high authority should be set up as a sponsor of further integration; the first steps will create functional pressures for integration of related sectors and the momentum would gradually entangle national economies and social interests; deepening economic integration will create the need for further institutionalization, making political integration and a long-term system of peace inevitable (Rosamond, 2000, p. 52). According to neofunctionalists, the processes of integration will in the end induce a federal unity; therefore, federal functionalism is occasionally used as an alternate title for neofunctionalism (Rosamond, 2000, p. 49).

Spillover is a way of describing the central dynamic of that process where successful integration in an area of lesser salience leads to a series of further integrative measures in linked areas so that the process becomes increasingly involved with issues of greater political importance. Integration would be led closer to sovereignty and to involvement with such high political questions as the defence policy and foreign policy (Taylor, 1983, p. 9). As integrated production and distributing networks grow in different areas, involved countries have more and more common interests, which contribute to further integration.

In this argument, areas of low politics refer to economic and social life (Mattli, 1999b, p. 23), such as coal and steel industry and agricultural policies. Because of the development of international trade and related technologies, countries set up trading relationships in those sectors. Since cooperation in those sectors does not influence the security and survival substantially, it is less controversial. On the contrary, areas of
high politics refer to those concerning national defence and governmental structures, and are highly related to the security and survival of a nation state. Therefore, integration in those areas is controversial and highly sensitive. Realists believe that supranationalism in high politics will threat national security and harm national interest greatly; therefore it is not possible. However, according to neo-functionalists, nation states’ perception on national interest in high or low politics can change over time.

Besides functional spillover, there are another two kinds of spillovers. Cultivated spillover refers to the situation that the achievement of new policies is not because of functional pressure or package deals, but cultivated by leaders representing the international institutions (Cini, 2003, p. 86). The upgrading of member states’ common interests relies on the services of an institutionalized autonomous mediator (Mattli, 1999b, p. 26). Political spillover is not necessarily about political integration, but refers to political linkage of package deals that can be very complex. The emphasis is on actors and their (often haphazard) interaction. The process emerges from a complex web of actors pursuing their interests within a pluralist political environment (Rosamond, 2000, p. 55). Thus, the concepts of cultivated spillover and political spillover bring in new factors that shape the process of integration: the institutionalized autonomous mediator (EU elites) and a complex web of interest groups.

Walter Mattli (1999) illustrated the neofunctionalist account further by bridging political science and economics. He analyzed the interaction between political leaders
and market players, and thus explained how the interest groups rather than the government or nation state (as an independent and monolithic actor) could shape national interests and policy outcomes. He has also solved the problem about legitimacy by stressing the role of national leaders (rather than EU elites). He specified two types of necessary conditions for successful integration. First, the potential for economic gains from market exchange within a region must be significant. When regional economies are complementary and of large sizes, the gains from important economies of scale will be considerable. When the gains are considerable, the market players have a strong incentive to organize interest groups to lobby for regional institutional arrangements. Second, there should be considerable payoff for political leaders so that they are willing to deepen integration. For example, they are willing to deepen integration if such a move is expected to improve their chances of retaining power. If these leaders value political autonomy and political power, they are unlikely to seek deep levels of integration as long as their economies are relatively prosperous. Economically successful leaders are unlikely to pursue deeper integration because they expect marginal benefit from integration. Political leaders value relative independence and support from organized groups that are against integration. However, in times of economic difficulties, the leaders are likely to pursue to enhance the overall efficiency of the economy (Mattli, 1999b, p. 52). Economic difficulties thus become a condition of integration. Another supply condition is the presence of a benevolent leading country pursuing integration. Such a
country serves as a focal point in the coordination of rules, regulations, and policies (Mattli, 1999b, p. 101).

On the international level, the timing of outsiders to seek for integration is a result of their reactions to negative effects of being outsiders and the insiders’ attitudes. Negative effects of being outsiders led the domestic interest groups to urge the government to protect or increase their interests from market exchange (Mattli, 1999b, p. 43). Beside the interactions between interest groups and national leaders in the context of market relationships, Mattli’s account also incorporates other factors such as new technologies (Mattli, 1999b, p. 11).

In another book, Mattli and Ngaire Woods (2009) discussed the roles of interest groups and elites in shaping policy outcomes. It should be noted that interest groups do not only include commercial groups, but also civil society groups within Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The industrial groups are powerful ones, while the civil society groups frequently lack resources and formal authority of public officials. Political elites do not only include political leaders, but also public officials. Some public officials have the resources, expertise and authority to influence policy changes. National judges have often been effective actors influencing policy changes. They may be passive actors as oversight mechanisms, or activist. The public officials of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Mechanism have shaped trade rules by interpreting ambiguities in formal agreements such as in widening the territorial area over which states can claim action to conserve exhaustible natural resources (Mattli & Woods, 2009, pp. 28-31).
Although neo-functionalism provides a more predictable approach than functionalism and it analyzes the actual policy-making process, realists criticize that it underestimates the importance of nation states and, to a certain degree, the legitimacy of policies. It seems to stress too much on the sub-national and international actors. The influence of interest groups is evident in the practice of many European and North American countries, but in countries where interest groups play a very limited role in policy making, Mattli’s contention is less valid. The legitimacy and power of international actors or the institutional mediators are doubtful, since they are mostly not elected by people universally.

Mattli (1999) addressed the interactions between interest groups and governments, the concerns of political leaders, and the governments adapting to the changing needs. His contention that a leading country helps the forming of a regional community is also fair. However, nation states’ preferences and the anarchic feature are both overlooked. Even when regional integration is gainful, the lack of trust may still prevent nation states from cooperation in high politics.

After reviewing the three theoretical approaches, it seems that each suffers from criticisms. Without referring to any specific case, it could be concluded that each approach makes some fair arguments, and the factors that they bring up may all be found in empirical facts. The anarchic feature of the international system is undeniable; however, the emergence of regional institutions, hence the rules and order, is also a fact. The determining role of nation states and their attempts to rationalize policies are true; however, the interactions of interest groups, political leaders and
national legislatures are also influencing the outcomes of decision-making. Lack of trust and the concerns about sovereignty in the anarchic system are preventing nation states from giving up means of sovereignty; however, the potential gains from giving up some sovereign measures have indeed brought about some supranational developments in the emerging regional communities.

Which approach provides a sound explanation for the phenomenon of integration? It may be more constructive if they are applied to the three cases. The following chapters analyze the changes of regional identities in Europe, Asia and Africa, and examine the origins, developments and failures in the three regions. It then can be seen whether the factors that the three approaches claim can be found in those processes of integration.
Introduction

Among the major regions involved in integration, Europe is the most successful one. The direct catalyst that led to European integration was the diminishing prosperity and influence of European industrial countries after World War Two. The Cold War was another catalyst: the communist Soviet Union was deemed as a security threat, and the U.S. sought to support closer cooperation among West European countries as its allies. From the inception of European integration in the 1950s, the two major powers, France and Germany, had resolved their historical conflicts and maintained a strong partnership, which became one of the major factors that led to the cooperation among the Six.

The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 marked for the official commencement of European integration. Following that, a number of treaties were signed to set up the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the European Communities (EC), and the European Union (EU). Some 60 years after the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC), integration in security and foreign affairs is still a controversial matter. The accession of Turkey and some other Balkan countries is another question in doubt. How has the identity of Europe evolved? What
developments and failures has Europe gone through? At which stage is European integration? This chapter discusses two major questions: the identity of Europe after World War Two, and the major developments of European integration since the 1940s.

**Whose Europe?**

As aforementioned, membership in the regional community is not identical with a regional identity. The European identity may require not only some initial common affinity and a strong feeling of common identity reflected in the EU membership, but also the increasing interdependence evident in the completion of the single market and the European Monetary Union (EMU) along with numerous other policies, which can strengthen the connections of both countries and peoples. In John McCormick’s (2005) definition, it means not only a geographical, but also an economic and political region with a large measure of political, economic and social cohesion (McCormick, 2005, p. 39).

The policies linking peoples together not only include those related to economic transactions, but also those intended to democratize the EU institutions and policies. James Caporaso (2005) argued that democratic practices within some collective institutions might strengthen the European identity of citizens greatly. Within the European Council, there are directly elected representatives, so it can be seen as the most democratic EU institution. The European identity of EU citizens is also strengthened in their rights established by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (Caporaso, 2005, pp. 66-70). The democratic practices within the EU are distinctive since other regional communities do not have the equivalent institutions and policies. The sense of identity may also derive from common national
interests, which, in the case of Europe, is reflected in the postwar era and in the Cold War. “Sixty years ago, a common European identity was the stuff of dreams. Twenty years ago, a united Europe was thought to be dependent on the cold war struggle” (Caporaso, 2005, p. 74).

According to the definitions above, the region of Europe does not only include the Western Europe and Nordic countries that are highly homogenous in terms of levels of economic development and political traditions, but also include some of the Southern and Eastern European countries that have been involved within the EU institutions or have the potential to join EU based on their linkages with the EU countries and their domestic reforms. However, the area of the new Europe has not been fixed; rather, it has evolved over time, especially after the Cold War when the Iron Curtain faded away.

If the EU members are grouped according to the levels of their European identity and the time they entered the EC/EU, a concentric-circle structure could be seen. The Franco-German partnership was the core engine in the initial stage; the six-country communities were the second circle; Britain, Denmark and Ireland came in after the first enlargement, Greece, Portugal and Spain joined in the second enlargement, and Austria, Finland and Sweden (the Nordic three) were brought in after the third enlargement; and the 12 of the central and eastern European members joined after 2002 in the fourth enlargement to become the outer most circle.

Several questions are now outstanding. Why did the countries join the regional

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1 The new Europe refers to the new situation concerned with integration after World War Two. It is defined as the region of Europe where the old and greatly separated European countries began to cooperate more closely and to build a closer European bloc by joining regional arrangements. It is different from the geographical definition, since the East European countries changed and got closer to Western Europe rather than Russia after the Cold War. It is also different from the region governed by regional arrangements cover, since it also includes those countries who are still outside EC/EU.
organizations after World War Two or why not? To what extent are the Southern and Eastern members or non-members part of the integrating Europe? Where is the boundary of the new Europe, especially in the East?

**The forming of Franco-German partnership: beginning a new identity.**

At the initial stage of integration after World War Two, several sub-regions could be identified in Europe: the capitalist west, the socialist east, the Mediterranean south and the Nordic north. These sub-regions began to take part in European integration in different historical periods and they were involved to different degrees. The capitalist west was where it began. The Franco-German partnership was the key to initiating the process of European integration. In Churchill’s Zurich speech in September 1946, he indicated that the essential beginning was reconciliation between France and Germany, while Britain would not necessarily be part of the new Europe. The main reason behind this stance was that Britain had its own dream and its own task as it still had the ambition of remaining a world hegemon (Urwin, 1995, pp. 30-31), while France and Germany, as the rest of the Big Three, were more likely than Britain to cooperate in integration. Churchill’s idea turned out the reality. Britain did not participate in the ECSC in 1950, while Franco-German partnership became the motor of setting up the six-country communities.

The Franco-German partnership was formed due to several factors. In the postwar world, there was a common feeling of exhaustion of war and worries of recovering Germany. It was the common concern of European powers to restrict the excessive development of German heavy industry to avoid wars and to protect Europe from the Soviet threat. Robert Schuman, French foreign minister from 1948-1952, was an enthusiastic Europeanist, and he agreed that the logical starting point should
be the resolution of the perennial problem of Franco-German relations (McCormick, 2005, p. 60). In May 1950, Schuman made an announcement advocating for the Franco-German cooperation in the West European Heavy industry community “to make war politically unthinkable and economically impossible”. By this Schuman Plan, he aimed not at ordinary coal-steel deal but a proposal to end an ancient rivalry between two big countries, to prevent war and to build a coal and steel community with a new supranational authority. It was open to other European nations (Gillingham, 1991, p. 231).

It seemed unacceptable for Britain to give up a means of national sovereignty in the 1950s, since this state still considered itself as a major power. However, this idea was supported by Germany, which was crucial to the forming of the ECSC. Several factors rendered Germany involved in the negotiations on the Schuman Plan. In the early 1950s, West Germany was still under occupation, and it was not yet strong enough. The negotiations on setting up the ECSC would probably be their first opportunity to participate as a sovereign member at a diplomatic conference, and it expected to end the occupation soon. Further, they were confident of the recovering of Germany’s economy even under the conditions set by the proposed High Authority (Gillingham, 1991, pp. 233-236). Although some questioned the economic advantages of the Schuman Plan and regarded it as a French ruse to maintain a stranglehold on German resources after the occupation ended, Germany accepted this chance and tried to construct the plans for the ECSC differently and yet “more properly” (Willis, 1968, p. 104).

Besides the common will to advance mutual trust and maintain regional stability, some other factors underlay the Franco-German partnership. First, they are contiguous and both of them were strong enough to threaten each other’s security or
independence. This mutual threat between the contiguous powers brought them into an interdependent situation, and made it possible for both to compromise and be involved in the international institutions. Based on this interdependence, an intensive bilateral relationship between these two countries at political and official levels and in the wider society had developed. This relationship had been reflected in the joint political initiatives in the ECSC fashioned by the two countries and in their bilateral dispute settlements. Especially, it was greatly promoted by the close relationship between French and German leaders. In 1963, de Gaulle (who was fluent in German) outlined a framework for political union at his meeting with Adenauer. The proposal included regular meetings of government heads of the Six, coordinated action in cultural, economic, foreign, and defence policy, periodic meetings of relevant ministers, and referendums in all the members. During the negotiations over the specific provisions of the proposal (also called the Fouchet Plan), the most notable thing was Adenauer’s enthusiastic reception of de Gaulle’s initiative and his consistent support for it (Kocs, 1995, p. 39). During the 1970s, the Paris-Bonn axis was cemented by a very close personal relationship between President Giscard d’Estaing of France and Chancellor Schmidt of Germany. Major policy initiatives in the 1980s, such as the signing and ratification of the Single European Act (SEA), came partly out of the close relations between President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl (Laffan, 1992, p. 182).

Franco-German partnership was the key to the beginning of a new Europe. It was crucial because that France and Germany had been two big powers that had considerable influence in Western Europe. Because of their strength and potential, especially Germany, their weaker neighbors, the Benelux and Italy, were willing to join the international institutions in order to balance the two big powers. Thus,
without the willingness of France and Germany to build their partnership, there
seemed no stronger power or international actor that could bring them into
cooperation and ensure peace in Western Europe.

However, there is no consensus that France and Germany together have played
an engine role in the whole process of integration. For the Treaty of Rome, the initial
impetus was supplied by the Benelux states. Besides, in the day-to-day politics of the
union, the member states are cooperating on an equal basis (Webber, 1999, p. 3).

It is only fair to contend that the Franco-German partnership has been important
for the success of EC/EU. European initiatives favored by one but opposed by the
other have nearly always failed. Considering their geographical locations, France and
Germany are indeed at the heart of Western Europe. Further, together they accounted
for two-fifths of the EU’s population and half of its economic products and defence
spending in the 1980s. Considering the sizes of the two powers, it is even impossible
to imagine the emergence of a self-reliant European defence system without the active
participation of both countries (Kocs, 1995, p. 11).

**The original six.**

In the 1950s, Italy and the Benelux countries joined France and Germany in
setting up the ECSC, the EEC and the EURATOM. Italy’s membership was seen as a
stabilizing factor for its own democracy considering its characteristic governmental
instability and the strong structural differences between north and south. Italian
political actors could justify internal reforms or unpopular decisions with the demands
from European level and as necessary for keeping Italy in the heart of Europe. Further,
its membership was also seen as essential for the development of Italian economic
welfare and its social system. On the whole, Italy had traditionally preferred federalist
designs for the future of Europe, as a way to strengthen its own power, stability and its consequent influence over the development of Europe (Gallo & Hanny, 2003, p. 271). However, its actual influence in the actual policy-making process has not made it the real heart of Europe.

Belgium had different reasons for its participation. Security was its first concern. After the World War One, Belgium had returned to neutrality to avoid being involved in a new war caused by the rivalry of its big neighbors. However, it learned a historical lesson that neutrality could still lead to turmoil. After World War Two, it learned that security was to be ensured through collective defence, hence its active commitment to the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The proposed ECSC was another form of collective security. Further, Belgium had been searching for a voice through multilateralism and through participation in a decision-making process which rested not on dictation by the great powers but on institutional rules. Thus, measures leading to European integration, such as the creation of the Council of Europe and the ECSC, were Belgium’s focus in foreign policy in the 1950s. Despite the Belgian defenders of national sovereignty, supranationalists led by Paul-Henri Spaak played a greater role in shaping Belgian European policy. The ECSC gained the favor of Belgian supranationalist elites, as a way to put France and Germany under international institutions and also to guarantee all members’ voices in the supranationalist decision-making and administration (Franck, Leclercq, & Vandevievere, 2003, p. 70).

The Netherlands and Luxemburg had similar attitudes with Belgium. European integration, institutionally initiated by the Council of Europe and the ECSC, was seen as a way of strengthening peace and contributing to their oft-challenged national autonomy. Within the principle of supranationality in the ECSC, they would have an
influence disproportionate to their sizes. Further, it would compensate for the
disadvantages of their own small market (Bossaert, 2003a, p. 298).

Besides their national concerns, the Six were linked together in several other
ways. The six are geographically close to one another on the continent, while Britain
is separated from the continent, and the Nordic countries spread further north.
Denmark, though close to the original six, has been traditionally more closely
associated with the Scandinavian neighbors to the north than with the adjacent
continent (Parker, 1983, p. 21). To a great degree, geographical proximity determines
the levels of inter-state interaction. Further, the six were not traditionally dependent
on the United Kingdom (UK) or other countries as Ireland was. Nor did they have a
strong tradition as neutrals. Besides, unlike Britain, none of them had ever been a
world hegemon.

Another similarity was that their leaders actively supported European integration.
Besides the outstanding French and German leaders, the Italian Prime Minister Craxi
skillfully managed the agenda of the Milan European Council (1985) and led to a
favorable vote on the modifications of the Rome Treaty. The Italian Foreign Minister,
Emilio Colombo, and his German counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, started with
the Genscher/Colombo Plan, promoting the Draft European Act. Leo Tindemans, a
former Belgian Prime Minister, said that the best Belgian policy was European
(Laffan, 1992, p. 190). The leading politicians of Luxembourg, such as Pierre Werner,
Jacques Santer, Jean-Claude Juncker and Gaston Thorn, were clearly pro-European,
and the governments under their leadership contributed considerably to strengthening
and promoting further integration. Joseph Bech was another politician who made
great contributions as an active co-developer and discrete mediators (Bossaert, 2003a,
p. 300).
In the Netherlands, the trio of Kok, van Mierlo, and Patijn, who were the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and State Secretary for European Affairs respectively, made contributions to the diplomatic side of EU work. Being on close personal terms with Helmut Kohl, Kok managed to improve Dutch-German relations in the 1980s. The Queen and Prince Claus von Amsberg contributed further to the Dutch commitment to the Union and to close relations with Germany (Hoetjes, 2003, p. 316). In a word, the original Six were a geopolitical unit which was quite homogenous.

For the first time, the coming together of the six countries made Europe different from what it was. It meant a common identity substantiated by the increasing inter-governmental or supranational institutions and the willingness of members to build a secure and prosperous regional bloc. However, there was no strong feeling of European identity in the 1950s and the 1960s: Britain, one of the Big Three, did not become a member; ECSC only included six states; the integration policies covered very limited areas; there were only a few international institutions; and in the early years of the little Europe (it refers to the Inner Six), people needed a much longer time to develop a sense of common identity.

Nevertheless, the Six initiated the process of integration and further set up more international institutions. Their continuing support for the European Communities in the 1960s was rather important to sustain and strengthen their partnership. It was less because of their concerns of wars and the Soviet threat than ensuring the economic development and influence of their foreign policies (George, 1991, p. 16). Thanks to the organizations and their policies, trade within the EC increased, and the increase of trade stimulated the establishment of international organizations for the different industries, such as COLIME (Comite de Liaison des Industries Metalliques
Europeennes) for the mechanical and electrical engineering and metal-working industries, COMITEX (Comite de Coordination des Industries Textiles Europeennes) for the textile industry, and SIIC (Secretariat International des Groupements Professionnels des Industries Chimiques des Pays de la Communaute Economique Europeenne) for the chemical industry. Those groups set up offices for EC officials to study joint solutions to problems facing their industry (Willis, 1968, p. 282). As the level of interdependence increased, a feeling of mutual trust and common identity among the societies had also been growing more deeply and widely.

The expansion of the new Europe.

Western and Northern Europe were not monolithic in their attitudes and behaviors regarding regional integration. Only six countries of Western Europe were included in the beginning, while others confronted or hesitated to join. Britain acted as a leader confronting the envisaged European customs union in the early 1960s. With its historical position as a world hegemon and its postwar efforts to maintain the Atlantic alliance, Britain had a vested interest in the maintenance of a world order of free trade. Meanwhile, it took the lead in constructing a post-war Western Europe without supranationalism (George, 1991, p. 37). When the little Europe of the Six set up the EEC, Britain did not participate because it aimed at a looser and bigger free trade area rather than a closer and smaller customs union that the EEC envisaged.

To a certain degree, the establishment of the EEC without the support of Britain meant the failure of Britain in shaping and leading European integration. To confront the continental Europeans’ idea of the new Europe as “a new nation, a third super-state, and new allegiances”, Britain and like-minded countries set up the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) (Camps, 1967, p. 43). Its members, Austria,
Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland, with Finland as an associate, were not physically contiguous. Besides, they formed a varied group: four were Protestant, two were Catholic, and Switzerland was both; four were members of NATO, while three were neutral; five were traditional democracies, while Portugal was a rightwing dictatorship.

The EFTA was much looser than the EEC, with its moderate policies on tariffs and quotas. From 1958 to 1963, intra-EFTA trade increased by 4% of their total trade. Ironically, the EEC was EFTA’s main trading partner, taking 24% of EFTA’s exports and providing 29% of its imports. Since the formation of the two groups, EFTA’s exports to the Six had grown more quickly than trade in EFTA itself. It can be seen that the EEC policies had adversely affected the trade of the EFTA countries (Curtis, 1965, p. 245). EFTA, which was designed to confront the EEC members’ idea of a closer Europe, was in close cooperation with the EEC members, and it became more and more attractive for the EFTA countries to join the EEC.

In the 1960s, the British applied twice for membership of the EEC. As a matter of fact, in 1961, only two years after Britain’s own brainchild, the EFTA, the Conservative government under Harold Macmillan announced its intention to apply for admission into the EEC. One reason for the reversal of British policy was stated above that EFTA had been living up to its limited expectations. A second reason was the continuing assessment by the British government of its diminished role and influence in world politics. As decolonization went on and the Commonwealth expanded, Britain gradually lost its dominating role in its ex-colonies. The Commonwealth states wished to develop themselves and to diversify their own
trading patterns. A third factor lay in the American vision of the relationship between the United States and Western Europe. The United States tended to give support to the idea of European integration rather than the division of Western Europe into the Six and Seven. Britain would have no special favors if it persisted in remaining outside the EEC. A further motive was Britain’s economic performance in the 1950s. West Germany was the market leader throughout the 1950s; by contrast, Britain persistently lagged behind that of its major competitors. Entry into the EEC was seen as a possible way of changing the economic agenda without destroying political consensus (Urwin, 1995, pp. 117-120).

In 1973, Britain, Denmark, and Ireland joined the EC, and the Outer Seven were no longer a bigger “Europe” competing with the little Europe of the Six. On the contrary, it disintegrated and part of it melted into the EEC.

Following the first enlargement into nine members in 1973, a second enlargement towards the southern Europe was completed by 1986, despite the considerable heterogeneity between the Western and Southern Europe. Different from the case of Britain, Denmark, and Ireland, the accession of the Southern European countries brought about more problems because of their limited levels of economic development and different economic structure. Agriculture was very contentious among those problems in the enlargement. France especially feared the consequences of competition with another agricultural, Mediterranean member state, Greece. However, Greek accession came into effect in 1981. Its application for full membership followed its restoration of democracy (Dinan, 1999, p. 83). In 1981, Portugal signed a pre-accession agreement with the EC which would facilitate Portugal’s eventual integration by providing funds to help modernize its economy.
After concluding their negotiations on disputatious agriculture and fisheries aspects, there was a decisive breakthrough: the settlement of the British budgetary question at the Fontainebleau summit in 1984 removed the biggest obstacle to enlargement. January 1, 1986 was set as the date for Spanish and Portuguese accession (Dinan, 1999, p. 108).

After the second enlargement was completed by 1986, the remaining Western and Northern European states, probably except Austria, still appeared to be quite content with their involvement in the EFTA. The countries of Eastern Europe were still firmly within “the Soviet orbit and under Soviet tutelage”. Therefore, the second enlargement to the south seemed to mark an end to the enlargement of the EC (Urwin, 1995, p. 195).

However, the collapse of the Soviet empire in the late 1980s and disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed the situation drastically. The European neutrals were no longer constrained by the Cold War. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU in 1995; thus, the former Outer Seven of EFTA (with Finland as a former associate with EFTA) disintegrated further. Their accession process was easier than the second enlargement: they were affluent countries with strong traditions of democracy, participation and openness of government, and they also had administrative structures capable of understanding and implementing the EU legislation. Because the three countries were all EFTA members or close associate, this enlargement was also known as the Eftan enlargement (Dinan, 1999, p. 160).

By 1995, EU had 15 members, covering almost all the North, West and South European countries. If the Soviet Union had continued its tutelage of East Europe, the new boundary of the politico-economic Europe should have been settled. However,
Eastern Europe went through drastic changes as the Soviet Union collapsed. The fear of Soviet expansion no longer existed, so the iron curtain was no longer the eastern boundary of the EU. Now the new question rises: what would be the new boundary in the east?

Since 1998, the EU has initiated accession negotiations with Eastern European countries. In 2002, the EU Council agreed to conclude negotiations with 10 aspirants: Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, as well as Malta and Cyprus in the Mediterranean. In 2007, the EU Council held out membership to Bulgaria and Romania. Negotiations with Turkey are ongoing (Ginsberg, 2007, p. 84). Thus, the EU has covered a wide area of 27 countries by 2007.

There were undoubtedly more difficulties for the Eastern countries to be qualified for the EU membership. To be harmonized with the EU policies and institutions, they had to reform their domestic economic structures. Many West European states were predominantly free-market capitalist systems, meaning that governments limited their intervention in the market place. However, the levels of economic development differed from the heartland, the Rhineland, around northern Italian cities and around Paris, Rotterdam and London, to the depressed industrial regions of Europe, such as most of Eastern Europe which was still suffering the effects of Soviet-style central planning (McCormick, 2005, pp. 47-48).

Further, their entry requires the institutional reforms of the EU itself. Those institutional changes would require considerable time and attention, and it was likely to slow down the process of accession. For example, the EU governmental decision-making needed reforms for a union of 27 to act efficiently and effectively.
This challenge prompted the European Council to draft a new treaty in 2003. This treaty would have created a unified organization with a single legal personality and reformed the use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council (Ginsberg, 2007, p. 84).

Despite those difficulties, the 12 Eastern European and Mediterranean countries joined the EU, which was considered to have great prospect for advancing their economic development. They would receive substantial sums of aid to finance their pre-accession strategies to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. As for Eastern European countries, EU membership is helpful not only for their economic wellbeing, but also for political reforms. From the perspective of the EU, enlargement towards the east helps expanding the zone of cooperation in the fight against terrorism and its cognates: organized crime, drug smuggling, and proliferation of weapons of massive destruction (Ginsberg, 2007, p. 305).

In 2011, eight countries (Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Iceland) have formally submitted applications for the EU membership. They have begun to apply EU policies, and mostly have been confirmed as candidates by the EU. Some of them, such as Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, have started accession negotiations and signed Stability and Association Agreements with the EU (BBCNewsEurope, 2010). However, it remains to be seen whether and when they could gain accession, especially when they have outstanding problems, such as organized crimes, democratic deficits, weak border controls and corruption. In 2006, the French and Dutch voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty in part because of public objection to the impact of enlargement. It was emphasized that the EU needed to strengthen its capacity of absorption. This will put brakes on further enlargement (Ginsberg, 2007, p.
Combining the geographical criteria and political conditions, McCormick (1999) defined Europe as expanding to the East Europe with the borders of Turkey and Russia as its eastern boundary. He considered that the new Europe consists of 38 countries: the 27 EU members, three other Western European states (Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland), and eight other Eastern European countries (McCormick, 2005, p. 39). His conclusion about the northern, western and southern boundaries is fair. However, another five small Western European states (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican) should be included.

The eastern boundary is fairly debatable. According to the EU official website, besides the 27 EU members and the three other Western European states mentioned above, there are additional 19 European countries – Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, San Marino, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the Vatican (EuropeanUnion, 2011). This grouping is partly fair in that it includes the few small countries in Western Europe that McCormick excluded, and in that it includes more potential Eastern countries in the post-Soviet era.

However, those Eastern countries, despite their candidacy or potential to be candidates, may be rejected by the EU because of their domestic problems. The real list of European countries is actually shorter than what EU suggests. The instability and uncertainty in most remaining East European countries render their eligibility unlikely in the short term. Turkey’s candidacy is one of the pending questions. Turkey became a member of the Customs Union in 1996, and was accepted as a candidate at the Helsinki summit of 1999. Although EU norms create major avenues for change in
economic and political realms, a powerful nationalist bloc in the Turkish political system opposes the wider democratization agenda. Despite the economic benefits of integration for the Turkish society, the privileged positions and interests of some groups are likely to be undermined in the process of political decentralization from central authority to local authorities (Onis, 2003, p. 10). Meanwhile, the proponents for EU membership have also been deeply committed to establishing a government under law and making democracy work (Gillingham, 2006, p. 104).

Besides Turkey’s own problems concerning domestic interest groups and democratic reforms, EU members’ attitudes also affect the process of accession to a great degree. Both the French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, and the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, expressed their opposition to Turkish membership and their support for the “privileged partnership” in the past (Stephens, 2009). Although Portugal and Finland expressed their support for full Turkish membership, Merkel and Sarkozy insisted that any misguided expansion might endanger EU’s operational efficiency (Kardas, 2009). There has also been general suspicion on the eligibility of Turkey for a long list of reasons: Turkey’s relative poverty (hence the size of aid it needs from the EU), its population size (hence its political weight and number of migrants), Muslim population, limits on democracy, human rights issues, the Armenian problem, the Cyprus problem, its conflicts with Greece and the structure of economy (Rubin, 2003, p. 2). Especially, many believe that the EU is a normally Christian club that would never accept a country of 65 million Muslims (Avci, 2003, p. 150).

Since 1991, Ukraine has tried to “return to Europe” and pursued the aim of being seen as a European state. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EC members and Ukraine was signed in June 1994 and entered into force in March 1998 (Svyetlov, 2007, p. 529). In 1998, then-President Leonid Kuchma proposed a
strategy for Ukraine to join the EU. After Viktor Yushchenko became President in
2005, joining the EU became a priority in foreign policy and Ukraine petitioned the
EU for accession status (Lane, 2007, p. 495).

However, the EU membership requires stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy and a functioning market economy. EU leaders have carefully watched
political realities in Ukraine. Ukraine’s internal instability, potential security risks,
and stagnating democratization process have hindered the process of accession
(Svyetlov, 2007, p. 534). The widespread existence of political violence, electoral
fraud, and hostile rhetoric exemplified the lack of democracy during the 2004
elections. In November 2000, a damaging audiotape implicating Kuchma in the
kidnapping and murder of a Kuchma critic, Heorhii Gongadze, triggered
“Kuchmagate”. Kuchma was also implicated in other tapes of authorizing the sale of
military radars to Iraq in 2000. Domestic and international scandals coupled with
Kuchma’s dependency on the oligarchs led to Ukraine’s increasing isolation from the
West, despite Ukraine’s rhetoric which continued to promote integration (Kuzio,
2006). In 2010, the pro-Western Yushchenko was succeeded as president by Viktor
Yanukovych, who shifted certain policies closer to Russia. Meanwhile, journalists
complained of greater censorship, the administration began selective prosecutions
against its political opponents, and corruption remained a major concern
(FreedomHouse, 2011).

For Ukraine, greater marketisation, privatization and lower state budgets can lead
to greater unemployment and hence destabilizing effects on the population. Further, it
would also alienate its previous trade partners, such as Russia. However, requirements
of EU membership can legitimate Ukraine’s reforms. As Ukraine’s Western neighbors
joined the EU, it is now confronted by a common EU economic tariff with its old trade
partners, and the citizens are subjected to the common EU border visa regime to enter the former Warsaw Pact countries (Lane, 2007, pp. 497-498). Ukraine managed to acquire a free economy status from the EU, with a rapid intensification of cooperation at top political level, and the EU continued to promote democratization through political dialogue. However, any definite promises on the EU side concerning the possibility of Ukraine’s full membership are absent from EU executives (Svyetlov, 2007). In 2009, Ukraine along with five other countries joined an Eastern partnership with the EU, which importantly made no further promise of admission and indeed put Ukraine together with other countries that have even less prospect of joining the EU (EuropeanUnion, 2009).

EU expansion to include Russia is also difficult, since it has no willingness to take up domestic reforms and join the EU, although some of its elites consider Russia as European. Throughout the 1990s, Russian-European relations were characterized by a series of fundamental disagreements that affected Russia’s perception of the EU enlargement. At that time, nearly all of the EU countries backed the NATO’s operation in former Yugoslavia (which Russia opposed) and later strongly condemned the Kremlin’s assault on Chechnya. Besides, as some Russian observers admit even today, Moscow has always viewed the EU as being on a par with other international organizations—the Council of Europe, NATO and the United Nations (UN)—in which national governments play a defining role in all issues. Russian foreign policy has inherited this particular attitude to the EU from the Soviet Union, which essentially refused to do business with the EC as a supranational organization and regarded it on a superficial level as an economic appendage to NATO (Pinnick, 2005, p. 52).

Belarus is not likely to be admitted by the EU in the near future, considering its authoritarian government and command economy that can not be changed soon. Since
1994, however, it has become increasingly apparent that Belarus is not, politically or economically, a post-communist transition country. Politically, Belarus is still characterized by Communist Party monopoly. President Aleksander Lukashenko, democratically elected in 1994, broadened his powers following a 1996 referendum, prolonged his term by two years to 2001, and dissolved Belarus’s parliament, replacing it with a co-opted assembly. Economically, Belarus is a command economy without central planning. State enterprises are predominant. There are widespread administrative controls on output and employment, on prices, and on exchange rates (Nuti, 2001, p. 327). In the meantime, the EU has been busy dealing with the negotiations with other Eastern European countries, leaving little time for negotiating with the state that used to be a big threat for Europe and expands too far east from Europe.

Thus, although the other boundaries are fixed, the eastern boundary still greatly depends on how political and economic changes will go in the Eastern and Balkan countries. Some countries will continue to be left outside of the EU because of their lack of democracy.

**The new Europe today.**

Now the answer to “where is Europe” is clear. Several features of the new European identity can be concluded. First, it is hard to define the new Europe by historical trajectories, economic conditions, political structures, people’s identities, languages or religions, since European countries are rather diverse in those respects. They have been EU members for different lengths of time, so it is simply inevitable that citizens of newer members, especially the eastern ones, might be less European-oriented. They might also be less attuned to the need to accept a certain loss
of national independence with the implied diminution of national prestige and
government authority (Urwin, 1995, p. 195), but their countries are still considered as
part of the new Europe. Besides, the members may support and implement EU
policies and initiatives to different degrees, and may stick to national policies rather
than EU policies as well. For example, Britain, Sweden, and Denmark opted out of
the Euro Zone. Further, they have many kinds of languages, different religions, and
diverse cultural traditions, which have not prevented them to be part of the new
Europe.

Second, the region of Europe as a regional bloc is different from the fragmented
one that included separate countries in the past. The EC or EU has brought more and
more countries within its institutional and policy framework, starting from six
countries, the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands), France,
Germany and Italy, to three more, Britain, Denmark and Ireland in the 1973.
Following that, Greece became a member in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986. In
1995, the EU gained three more new members, Austria, Finland and Sweden. In 2004,
eight countries of central and eastern Europe — the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia — joined the EU, finally ending
the division of Europe decided by the Great Powers 60 years earlier at Yalta. Cyprus
and Malta also became members in 2004. In 2007, two more countries from East
Europe, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the EU, bringing the number of member states
to 27. Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey are also
candidates for future membership. Meanwhile, the policies facilitating integration
developed from those focusing on coal and steel markets to monetary policies, social
policies, border policies (free movement) within the EU, and agricultural policies, and
the institutions of integration also flourished. The interactions among all the European
countries including those Eastern European ones have been intensified.

As of now, the Inner Six plus Portugal and Spain are the core area (the most European-oriented area within which all members are more closely linked than other members) of the new Europe. They are all in or around the heart land of Western Europe, and they are contiguous. Above that, they are non-neutrals and therefore more active supporters for EU policies, including foreign affairs and defence. For example, they have been supportive in implementing the Euro and in joining the Schengen Agreement, while the Nordic countries, other neutrals, as well as the UK have not been as supportive. Therefore, the common currency and free movement of people make this contiguous heart land increasingly monolithic. Their people are likely to feel much fewer barriers across the borders and much less geographical space from another country; therefore, the linkages among them are bound to be more intensive.

Compared to Eastern European countries, Portugal and Spain are relatively more developed and older democracies with a greater harmony economically and politically with and geographically situated close to the Inner Six. While the members in the east (including Greece closer to the east) remain centralist and struggling between Europeanization and state centrism (Frangakis & Papayannides, 2003, p. 169), the Inner Six, Portugal and Spain have more democratic political structures and are much more Europeanization-oriented.

The Portuguese and their three major political parties have been strongly pro-European. The former President Mario Soares took part in the EP election in 1999 as the leading candidate of the socialist party, and this led to more attention to the EP. Soares’ choice to lead the socialist team reflected his will to upgrade the political
importance of the EP. Former Prime Minister Antonio Guterres had a high profile in the EC/EU dossiers, and this had a bearing in enhancing the role of Portugal. Besides, during Portugal’s transitional period, it made several constitutional reforms and almost all its ministries had to create or adapt their services to Europeanization. So far, Portugal has been progressively evolving and adapting to Europeanization politically, socially and administratively (Seabra, 2003, p. 365).

Spain traditionally adopted a very integrationist negotiating stance and tried to cope with the requirements (such as its democratic reform) imposed during its transitional period leading to its full participation in all Community policies (Llorens, 2003, p. 185). Spanish leaders such as Prime Minister Felipe González and Jose Maria Aznar were highly supportive of Spanish integration. Former Prime Minister González was a passionate Europhile whose primary political objective was to bring Spain into the EC. He embarked on a series of visits to EC capitals to make the accession (Dinan, 1999, p. 107). Prompting a continued, limited NATO membership was another of his efforts to facilitate Spain’s accession to the EC. Although there were considerable doubts regarding Spanish membership in NATO, Prime Minister González changed his position of anti-NATO membership, and engaged in a vigorous campaign for Spain to stay in NATO, arguing that NATO membership would be an asset to EC membership. At last, the government secured a clear margin of victory by 52.6 percent of voters supporting while 39.8 percent opposing it (Solsten & Meditz, 1988, p. 88). Spain’s entry into the third stage of EMU was the focal point of Prime Minister Aznar’s electoral program and fundamental motivation for his parliamentary alliance with the nationalist parties (Llorens, 2003, p. 186).

While the political structures, economic conditions and policies could be chosen and constructed, there are some inherent common grounds of the eight countries. The
Holy Roman Empire set up by the king of the Franks, Charlemagne, in the eighth century, overlapped with almost all of the original six of the EU. Spain’s Charles V was selected Holy Roman Emperor in 1519. Charlemagne’s capital, Aachen, is not far from Brussels, the capital of today’s EU. Besides, in terms of religion, the Catholic Church expanded its authority over large portions of this core area. Therefore, given their geography, history, religion, economy and civilization, it is not an accident of history that this area is united again to a great degree within the EU (Ginsberg, 2007, p. 18).

**European Integration: the Successful and Failed Experiences**

Since the end of World War Two, European countries have made numerous achievements in integration: they reconciled the longstanding conflicts between France and Germany within the framework of the ECSC; they set up the EC that lowered or eliminated some trade barriers and established bold plans for further economic integration; since the 1980s, they have gradually realized the free movement of people in 25 countries; and since 2002, 12 countries have been using a common currency. Although there were failed experiences such as the defeat of the EDC and the empty-chair crisis, the achievement of European integration has been outstanding: nowhere else has accomplished integration of the same level. The following sections summarize how European integration was initiated and developed.

**The origin of European integration and the Council of Europe.**

During the inter-war years, there was a first wave of European integration. The destruction of World War One and the growth of American power, as well as the
resolution in Russia, shook European confidence to an unprecedented degree. To maintain peace and to rebuild European confidence, the idea of European unification appeared. The flourishing notion of European unity was reflected in a list of documents, such as European Federation or League of Nations by Giovanni Agnelli and Attilio Cabiati (1925), Three years of Pan-Europe by Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (1926), Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union by Aristide Briand (1930), and The Problem of Europe’s Legal Unity by Hans-Helmut Dietze (1938) (Weigall & Stirk, 1992, pp. 5-17).

However, no substantial institutional arrangement was achieved.

The outbreak of World War Two implied that anarchy surpassed, and yet strengthened the idea of European unification. The story of European integration is essentially dated as beginning in 1945, when there were widespread feelings of exhaustion after war and the European economies were severely disrupted (Urwin, 1995, p. 1). A wider context for European integration was the Cold War. Under the pressure from Western Europe which was fearful of Soviet Union that was believed to have embarked upon a Communist expansion, the United States was involved in reconstructing the European allies. The Truman Doctrine, outlined by then-President Harry Truman in 1947, was a pledge of American support for “free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”. The Marshall Plan which was announced later in the same year linked Western Europe more firmly with the United States, and also advanced closer collaboration among Western European countries. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was
established in 1948 as a method of allocating American aid among the recipients. In 1949, the United States and Canada signed the Atlantic Pact and entered into a military arrangement (NATO) for the collective defence of Western Europe (Urwin, 1995, pp. 16-24). However, neither OEEC nor NATO originated from inside; nor did they provide a solid institutional foundation for a federalist or functionalist process of integration in Europe.

The endogenous efforts towards integration worked better. As early as October 1942, Winston Churchill wrote to the War Cabinet:

“It would be measureless disaster if Russian barbarism overlaid the culture and independence of the ancient States of Europe. Hard as it is to say now I trust that the European family may act unitedly as one under a Council of Europe. I look forward to a United States of Europe in which barriers between the nations will be greatly minimized and unrestricted travel will be possible. I hope to see a (the) Council of Europe perhaps 10 units, including the former great powers”. (Robertson, 1961, p. 1)

Some six months later, he stated again for the necessity of setting up the Council of Europe among strong powers and expanding it to all over Europe. His Zurich speech in 1946 drew attention to the desolation after the war and a remedy of building a United States of Europe. His idea was shared by many other elites and spurred the emergence of international organizations. Clement Attlee, later Prime Minister, stated in 1939 that Europe must federate or perish. Churchill was chairman of the United Europe Movement in Britain. M. van Zeeland’s Economic League for European Cooperation gathered economists, industrialists and trade union leaders. M. Raoul Dautry led the French Council for United Europe in French. Dr. H. Brugmans, a then-Dutch minister, chaired the European Union of Federalists. In 1947, those groups
united to form the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity, which proceeded to organize a Congress of Europe at The Hague in 1948. This activity was supported by many political elites, such as Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of Britain, Paul-Henri Spaak, the then Prime Minister of Belgium, and the French and Italian Foreign Ministers, M. Bidault and Count Sforza (Robertson, 1961, pp. 1-3).

However, the 1945 British general election removed Churchill and his Conservatives from power. The British Labour government was not supportive of British participation. The prime minister, Clement Attlee, and his colleagues were opposed to any kind of integration. The Congress of Europe was held at The Hague in May 1948. 713 delegates, mostly prime ministers and foreign ministers, parliamentarians, and civic leaders, from 16 countries and observers from 10 others attended. However, there was no strong British Labour presence. As Churchill summed up, Britain was with Europe, but not of it; it was associated, but not absorbed. British political leaders gave priority to their own task, committing to the Commonwealth and a special Anglo-American relationship. It was contended that the British leadership began to disappear from the unity movement at the 1948 Congress (Urwin, 1995, pp. 29-31).

The purpose of the Congress was to support European unity by providing impetus to the movements and practical recommendations. Following the Hague Congress, the International Committee created the European Movement as an unofficial organization to promote the goal of the Congress. It came into being in
October 1948. The governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK signed the Brussels Treaty in the same year, for economic and social collaboration and collective self-defence. It set up the Consultative Council to exercise its functions. Meanwhile, the United States State Department declared that its government strongly favored the progressively closer integration of the free nations of Western Europe. A Committee was appointed to study the feasibility of European unity (Robertson, 1961, pp. 3-5).

In November 1948, a Franco-Belgian proposal was brought up for a parliamentary European Assembly, while the UK made a counter-proposal for a European Council of Ministers excluding ministers in charge of defence and economic issues. The establishment of a Council of Europe was agreed on, and a conference of ambassadors was convened to work out the functions and organization of this new institution. According to the Brussels Treaty, Britain had to agree to establish a study commission on the feasibility of an assembly. The Labour government sent only a low-grade delegation, and supporters of union accepted an intergovernmental structure alongside an assembly (Urwin, 1995, p. 34).

In May 1949, the Statute establishing the Council of Europe was signed as the Treaty of Westminster by 10 countries, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. It entered into force on the deposit of the 7th instruments of ratification. It is composed of a Committee of Ministers and a Consultative Assembly. The Committee provides for cooperation between governments, while the Assembly provides a means for peoples to express
their ideas (Robertson, 1961, p. 6). Before the 1990s, the Council of Europe remained
the largest organization. By the mid-1970s, its membership had grown to 20 to
include Greece, Turkey, Iceland, the East Germany, Austria, Cyprus, Switzerland,
Malta, Spain and Portugal (Urwin, 1995, p. 35).

The Committee is in principle composed of foreign ministers and works as the
executive organ of the Council. Its main function is to decide what actions shall
further the aim of the Council of greater unity. It may conclude international
agreements or adopt common policies in any of the following fields: economic, social,
cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and the maintenance of human
rights. However, its effect is limited, since the result of its decision will only be to
make recommendations to member governments, rather than to implement them. The
Committee set up several sub-committees to exercise its functions, including the
Cultural Experts, the Social Committee, the Committee of Experts on Social Security,
the Committee of Experts on Public Health, the European Committee on Crime
Problems, etc (Robertson, 1961, pp. 24-32).

In 1949, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe held the first
session in Strasbourg. It expressed two primary objectives: to develop some
semblance of supranational authority and to strengthen the Assembly vis-à-vis the
Committee of Ministers. However, the Council of Europe had not diminished national
sovereignty as represented by ministers. While France, Italy, and the Benelux
countries were interested in developing common political institutions with a
supranational flavor, Britain and its Nordic supporters wanted only intergovernmental
collaboration. Therefore, no consensus on supranational developments was agreed on. Further, defence was excluded because of its controversial nature, given Sweden and Ireland, professing a policy of neutrality, as founder members. Because of the sharp cleavage regarding the shape of the Council of Europe, it turned out intergovernmental. After its establishment, the Council continued to work to achieve integration in less controversial fields, such as its sponsorship for the European Cultural Convention of 1954 and a European Social Charter in 1961 (Urwin, 1995, p. 35). In a word, the Council of Europe started the process of integration in the social and cultural areas, but did not make remarkable progress towards supranationalism.

It was assessed that the Council of Europe made “no progress towards the objective proclaimed by the Hague Congress that the nations of Europe must create an economic and political union”; it was true. If judging by the criterion of its effectiveness in bringing about some sort of federal structure in Europe, the Council must be considered a failure. However, when the majority of European countries are willing to surrender sovereign powers, no organization can force to achieve the goal. The Council “had a good record as an instrument of European cooperation in the social, cultural, and legal fields, but this was insufficient to achieve the aim of unity”. The driving force towards integration had shifted to the three six-power communities that were established in the 1950s (Robertson, 1961, p. 255).

With the emergence of other communities, the Council retained value as a forum where a wide range of ideas could be discussed. Another major significance is perhaps that it was the first European organization with a political flavor. Britain effectively
limited its scope, at the cost of destroying its potential powerful role in integration (Urwin, 1995, pp. 38-39). Further attempts towards integration went on without British participation, and led to several achievements, both inter-governmental and supranational.

**The six-power communities.**

As a major initiating step in the functionalist process, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman suggested starting with the resolution of the perennial problem of Franco-German relations and focusing on cooperation on the coal and steel industries (McCormick, 2005, pp. 60-61). According to the Schuman Plan, the ECSC came into effect in 1952 based on the Treaty of Paris (1951). According to Schuman, a functionalist organization should be the first step towards a federal Europe (Ham, 1993, p. 26). The treaty establishing the ECSC created an institutional framework to manage the integration of the coal and steel markets of the six member states (the Benelux countries, France, Germany, and Italy).

The coal and steel industries were not the most tractable ones to start the experiment of freeing trade and prices, because that high freight costs and the structure of ownership tended to create separate markets. Nevertheless, the ECSC brought about sectoral integration and advanced mutual trust in Western Europe to a certain degree. Further, it provided chances for national representatives to make common decisions together where there were wide areas of agreement. Thus, it led the way for other experiments, such as the EEC and the EURATOM (Martin, 2006, pp.
It is noteworthy that the ECSC was a supranational body, but not identical with a sectoral federal agency. The high authority, as the originator of almost all decisions, plans and forecasts, greatly determined the characteristics of the ECSC. It was composed of nine persons, with eight of them designated by the common consent of all member governments and one elected by the majority vote of the eight already chosen members. An indefinite right of veto was denied to national governments in the electoral mechanism. In its decision-making mechanism, a simple majority vote was applied. As regards many of its powers, independence and majority voting principle, the High Authority was a supranational body. The ECSC had the ability to control the production, pricing, marketing and distribution of coal and steel.

However, the ECSC acted within the framework set by an international conference, and it did not have the power to control the economic conditions under which coal and steel were produced and sold, those being the monetary, fiscal, foreign economic, wage and social welfare policies. Therefore, the ECSC showed the characteristic of supranationality, but fell short of the powers of a federal agency (Haas, 1958, p. 59). To sum up, it failed to provide an adequate framework for genuine supranational administration, and did little to harmonize economic conditions. Its effective actions, despite with some supranational characteristics, depended on the collective aims and willingness of its member states to give up a means of sovereignty, as well as on the willingness of West German industry to make short-term concessions. Despite its inadequacy, it ended the competitive bids for heavy industry domination,
led to Western European integration and the Franco-German partnership (Gillingham, 1991, p. 364).

The road to integration in politics and defence was nonetheless not as smooth as that to economic integration. In 1950, the French Prime Minister Rene Pleven outlined a proposal for a European army, which then turned out to be the EDC (Camps, 1964, p. 12). In 1951, five of the six nations negotiating a treaty to establish the ECSC simultaneously participated in discussions to form an EDC as a supranational body. After complex and hard bargaining, the EDC treaty was signed in 1952 in Paris. The EDC was to be a military organization, with a supranational executive, a Board of Commissioners. It aimed to set up a common army, a common budget and common institutions. Article 38 of the Paris Treaty called on the Six to entrust a parliamentary body with the task of implementing Article 38 by drafting the statute for the supranational European Political Community (Urwin, 1995, p. 62).

However, these efforts towards a political community turned out to be failures. The Gaullist opposition to sharing sovereignty over sacrosanct national defence policy, coupled with implacable Communist opposition to German rearmament, resulted in defeat of the EDC treaty in the French parliament in August 1954. In the interim, Stalin’s death and the end of hostilities in Korea had lessened Cold War tensions and made the issue of German remilitarization far less urgent. Thus, as the collapse of the EDC, the proposed European Political Community withered away (Dinan, 1999, p. 27).
As Desmond Dinan (1999) concluded, it was no historical accident that the EDC fell at the final hurdle of French ratification or that the political community languished in the wings. The inner Six confronted the question of a defence community and the equally daunting challenge of a supranational political community with great reluctance. The outcome of both issues allowed them to concentrate instead on the kind of integration that was politically possible in the 1950s and for many years thereafter: functional economic integration (Dinan, 1999, p. 28).

In 1957, the Treaties of Rome created the EEC and the EURATOM, which stood for important progress among the Six. Thus, the cooperation of the Six expanded from the coal and steel industries to trade and energy. The EEC Treaty stipulated that customs duties and other non-tariff trade barriers among the member states would be abolished and a customs union would be formed. Its objectives were “to establish a Common Market, to promote developments of economic activities, to raise the living standard, and to increase stability and closer relations between member states” (Urwin, 1995, p. 79). In addition to the provisions in intra-regional trade, the member countries were to transfer to the EEC the power to conclude treaties with third countries or international organizations in matters for which the EEC had competence. Those provisions went beyond the trade liberalization measures provided in OEEC. In 1962, the common agricultural policy was introduced. In a word, the provisions of the EEC Treaty stood for a bold step towards closer economic integration (Nicoll & Salmon, 1994, pp. 20-22).

The EURATOM treaty proclaimed to guide the Six into the atomic age and
provide supplies of energy, to create the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries. EURATOM was to help the modernization of technical processes through encouraging nuclear investments and coordinating nuclear research programs. It would also supervise the regular and equitable supply of all users in the Six to guarantee proper use of nuclear materials (EU, 1957).

In 1967, the Merger Treaty was signed to integrate the ECSC, the EEC, and EURATOM into the EC. It is noteworthy that the agenda of the EC shrank from an ambitious one to a limited one. The pro-European elites envisaged an evolution from an economic community to a political union with a common transportation policy, a common monetary policy, and a common social policy. They acknowledged that the Soviet Union and the United States were two world hegemons, and what they were motivated to do was to make their economic and ultimately their political development less dependent upon the United States. The creation of the EEC was the first step towards the ultimate goal of the EC. Some decisions of the EEC Council of Ministers were officially being taken by QMV. However, after de Gaulle entered into power in 1958, he successfully put on a moderate agenda for political cooperation. The French proposals envisaged that major political decisions were to be taken unanimously by heads of state and government meetings. Hallstein proposed to require a two-thirds majority vote or a simple majority vote to the decision-making of European Parliament (EP), which meant that West Germany and France could be outvoted by less powerful members (Wood & Yesilada, 2002, pp. 33-37). This
proposal was refused by de Gaulle who insisted on the dominant role for France. The more intergovernmental mode of decision-making limited what the EC could achieve.

Over the establishment of the customs union and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), there were disagreements among France, West Germany and Italy. In 1965, Commission president Hallstein reckoned proposals to enhance political and economic integration, and yet without de Gaulle’s commitment. Therefore, the proposals received an angry reaction from the French government: the French ministers left their seat on the Council of Ministers meeting before June 30. This is referred to as the Empty-Chair Crisis. Those difficulties partly resulted from the inter-governmental characteristics of the EEC, and partly from the low level of economic integration and consequent low level of trust and interdependence in Europe during the 1960s (Wood & Yesilada, 2002, pp. 29-30).

Further, the establishment and operation of the customs union within the EEC lacked the participation of an important country, Britain. Britain had been reluctant in participating in regional integration, especially in those experiments that would require giving up measures of national sovereignty. Especially, the British Problem stood out among all the problems caused by concerns of sovereignty. Winston Churchill had argued in his Zurich speech that France and Germany must take the lead together, while Britain would not necessarily be part of the new Europe (Urwin, 1995, p. 31). As the only major European power to escape defeat and occupation and as a member of Big Three, Britain enjoyed a position of influence beyond what was warranted by its underlying economic strength. Though it was often supportive of
integration, Britain saw itself as primarily a global, rather than a regional power; therefore, it tended to go against any proposals that impinged upon British sovereignty (Weigall & Stirk, 1992, p. 39). The concerns about national sovereignty were one of the main factors which constrained the levels of integration in those early years, and which was not only reflected in Britain’s behavior but also in the generally less developed political institutions and policies within the EC/EU.

**From 1970s to 1993: the progresses and crises within the EC and EU.**

By and large, the EC entered a new period of growth and expansion by the end of 1960s, although the process of European integration during the 1960s went through crises caused by disagreements and reluctance of some countries (especially Britain) to participate. The 1969 Hague Summit of the EC Heads of Government and State (HOGS) reached three path-breaking agreements: the leaders approved in principle the opening of accession negotiations with the British and other applications (commenced in 1970), committed to the establishment of economic and monetary union by 1980, and established the means to cooperate in foreign policy (known as European Political Co-operation or EPC) (Ginsberg, 2007, p. 74).

The following stage during the 1970s and 1990s further exemplified what Jean Monnet warned: the process of European integration would be progressing through crises. At the beginning of the 1970s, the first enlargement was achieved, and consideration of industrial policy marked the achievement of the customs union. However, the efforts towards the goals of the 1972 Paris Summit of the EC stagnated
due to the recession of the 1970s and the adjustment to the problems of enlargement.

In 1973, the Arab-Israeli war broke out, and it caused a steep increase in oil prices. Almost 80 percent of Western Europe’s oil supplies came from the Middle East and North Africa, so the oil crisis caused a deep recession. The second oil shock of 1979 further exacerbated their economic problems. However, the oil crises led to no consensus among the EC members. France and Britain remained outside the International Energy Agency in 1974. Faced with the crises, there was low level of coordination and interdependence among the Western European countries. Another shock to the international monetary system was the US decision to suspend dollar convertibility and break with fixed exchange rates. Therefore, the Bretton Woods monetary system ended. Consequently, progress towards economic and monetary union was hindered by turbulence in the international monetary system and domestic protectionism (Ginsberg, 2007, pp. 77-78).

Although stagnation characterized the integration process in the 1970s, several important developments towards European integration, both economic and political, should be noted. First, European political cooperation had become a cornerstone of the member states’ foreign policies by 1979. The first direct elections to the European Parliament by EC citizens in 1979 increased the parliamentary institution’s legitimacy for demanding greater powers. Second, the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 was a response to the instability of the dollar. The EMS was a voluntary accord of member states and established exchange-rate fluctuation bands to avoid monetary shocks. Other achievements included the establishment of the
Common Fisheries Policy in 1983, and the increase of national Value Added Tax (VAT) contributions to the EC from 1 percent to 1.4 percent (Ginsberg, 2007, p. 78).

The late 1970s and the early 1980s was known as the era of Eurosclerosis. Due to the economic crises and stagnation in the 1970s, the EC economic competitiveness was weakened, especially in light of the rise of other economies. The EC responded by quickening its pace towards integration. One of the attempts was to complete the goal of single market, or internal market. The White Paper on Completing the Internal Market was adopted by the European Council in 1985 (Ginsberg, 2007, p. 79).

In 1985, the EC held an intergovernmental conference, where the governments agreed to put the common market in the treaty framework. This led to one of the most important achievements in the 1980s, the signing (1986) and ratification (1987) of SEA, the first major modification of the Rome Treaty (EEC). In the 1980s, the single market initiative was attractive to the heads of state and government because of increasing Japanese and American competition in international markets and in the EC market. At its Brussels summit in 1985, the European Council agreed that it was time to refocus on the completion of a single market where the freedom of access and movement of people, money, goods and services could be guaranteed. In 1984, France and Germany decided to accelerate the reduction of border checks, and in 1985 they joined the Benelux countries in signing the Schengen Agreement, which would allow free movement of people (McCormick, 2005, p. 160).

The strong push by the Commission to promote single-market legislation after
French finance minister Jacques Delors became president in January 1985 has been cited as a crucial step in the eventual achievement of the SEA. He was known as the Jean Monnet of the 1980s. Although Britain opted out of the Schengen Agreement and the Euro Zone, the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher supported Delors in his efforts to liberalize the internal market (Ginsberg, 2007, p. 79). Delors assigned Lord Cockfield, a British colleague, the commissioner for the Internal Market, the task of preparing a white paper that included a list of 300 measures needed for achieving a true common market. He also laid out a timetable to complete those measures by 1992 (Wood & Yesilada, 2002, p. 61). On the whole, the eventual achievement of SEA was the outcome of coalition-building and package deals fashioned from the varying interests of the member states. As Emile Noel, former Sectary-General of the Commission, argued, the SEA represented the outcome of a synergy between different facets of integration. The major synergy in the SEA was the establishment of a link between the completion of the internal market and institutional reform, notably with respect to majority voting and an enhanced role for the EP (Laffan, 1992, pp. 53-58).

The SEA prefigured two further developments: it inserted into the EEC Treaty a new article 102 A, providing that if institutional changes were needed for further development, there would be a new inter-governmental conference to determine necessary changes; it also stipulated in Title 3 that five years after the entry into force of the SEA, the parties would examine whether a revision was needed. In 1988, a conference negotiating steps towards EMU was held. It proposed the setting-up of a
European system of central banks, which would manage a single monetary policy with a common currency as a natural extension of the monetary union. In 1991, the EMU conference and European Political Union (EPU) conference were concluded at the Maastricht meeting, and the Treaty of Maastricht, also referred to as Treaty on European Union (TEU), was signed on 7 February 1992 (Nicoll & Salmon, 1994, pp. 279-280).

The 1990s was featured with great progresses towards economic integration. In 1993, the single market and its four freedoms were established: the free movement of goods, services, people and money. In 1995, the Schengen Agreement took effect in seven countries: Benelux, Germany, France, Spain and Portugal. Travelers of any nationality could now travel without passport control. The primary institutional development was the creation of European Central Bank (ECB) which was to be independent of political controls and to develop a single currency. The third stage of the EMU, which included mainly the creation of ECB and conversion from a country’s national currency to the single currency, began on January 1, 1999. Twelve participating countries began to use the euro on January 1, 2002 (EU, 2010a). Britain has not been one of them. Margaret Thatcher opposed proposals about EMU and the Social Charter from 1988 to 1990. Her opposition to EMU was based on an unwillingness to see an EC central bank and single currency that would take away Britain’s capacity to conduct its own monetary policy (Wood & Yesilada, 2002, p. 72). Later on a British Labour government would sign on to the Social Charter, though.

The Political Union initiative was designed to strengthen the powers of the EP, to
improve decision-making efficiency in the EC, and to move towards a common foreign policy. Its proposals would make the EC more supranational; however, they would also require the states to give up substantial measures of sovereignty. Therefore, the implementation of this initiative stagnated. To adapt to the Political Union initiative, the Maastricht Treaty created two distinct pillars: the Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. Compared to the EC pillar, the CFSP and JHA pillars had a more intergovernmental structure of decision making and implementation, wherein the Commission and the European Parliament played very limited roles (Wood & Yesilada, 2002, p. 81). The Treaty of Lisbon signed in 2007 would later end this pillar structure.

**Conclusion: “Fragmegration”**

Looking back at the history of European integration after World War Two, it is evident that two sets of factors, fragmenting and integrating ones, shaped the process. Therefore, fragmegration, defined by Rosenau as a complicated process with “fragmentation and integration coexisting in a set of dynamic, pervasive interactions” (Urry, 2003), characterized the phenomenon of European integration.

First, wars and threat of wars were the main catalysts for integration in the 1950s, while long peace until the 1970s lessened the importance of international collaboration to a certain degree and made domestic preferences a higher priority. Two world wars caused mass destruction in the Western European economies and it invoked wide awareness of the importance of intra-regional peace and recovery of
economies. Besides, as opposed to the Soviet threat from the east, the U.S. was prompted to provide economic and military support to the Western Europe, which became an external force supporting closer collaboration in Western Europe. However, Europe had enjoyed peace for about 30 years by the early 1970s, and meanwhile the tension in the Cold War had declined. Faced with the oil crises, Western European countries followed a protectionist, non-cooperative approach. The stagnation in the early 1970s proved that Western European countries might tend to pursue diverging domestic goals when they were free of military threats and were not at a high level of interdependence.

Second, states’ concerns about national sovereignty have been a longstanding fragmenting factor; in contradiction with that, the need for economic development and maintaining regional influence has been a main integrating factor. When it comes to sovereignty, intergovernmental and supranational procedures should be distinguished. If states make a decision only when they all agree, by a rule of unanimity, the procedure is intergovernmental. On the contrary, if a state agrees to carry out decisions to which it is opposed, the procedure is supranational which means abdicating part of national sovereignty (also referred to as policy autonomy) (Kitzinger, 1963, p. 61). Losing policy autonomy is dangerous because that the alliance of other states might pursue their own interest under the supranational framework and thus hurt some states’ interests. Weaker states may worry that the stronger states can hurt their interests by performing greater influence over the supranational organization, while stronger countries are concerned that their influence
may be constrained by a supranational organization.

Despite the concerns of sovereignty, economic forces can be so strong that the concerns about sovereignty might give way to other national goals, particularly in light of rising economic competition. In the 1960s, British economy developed more slowly than EEC economies and especially, the rising West German economy had posed a threat for its position as a regional power. Therefore, Britain applied twice for membership of EEC even if it did not agree with the idea of developing a Customs Union. Evidences about the influence of economic forces could also be found in the 1980s, when the European countries signed the Single European Act.

Third, the importance of political elites should not be ignored, with some of them acting as driving forces towards integration and others as the opposite side. Winston Churchill was one of the greatest inspiring forces of European integration. In his speeches, he called for building a partnership between France and Germany, and a kind of United States of Europe (Knapp, 1969, p. 31). The innovative design from Robert Schuman led to the establishment of the ECSC. In his capacity as the President of the ECSC, Jean Monnet was both the driving force of the experiment in creating a common market for coal and steel and, more important, the philosopher of the movement for creating a unity according to the Schuman Plan (Camps, 1964, p. 12). In 1950, the French Prime Minister Rene Pleven outlined a proposal for a European army, which then turned out to be the EDC (signed in 1952, but refused by the French Assembly in 1954) (Camps, 1964, p. 12). During Jacques Delors’ decade (1985-1995) as President of EC, he acquired celebrity and notoriety for his association with many
of the developments of this decade, such as treaty revision, institutional change, budgetary reform, policy deepening, completion and innovation, two rounds of enlargement, and the beginnings of common policies in European security and defence. For his contributions, he was referred to by the world’s media as Mr. Europe and Czar of Europe (Drake, 2000).

On the other hand, there were some other political elites opposed to closer European integration. De Gaulle was an exponent of French nationalism. In the Gaullist view, nation states have certain permanent and enduring interests (Knapp, 1969, p. 97). Another opponent was the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher who was known to be cool about Foreign Office briefings and who did not always trust her Foreign Secretaries to advance British interests. In her view, the foreign secretaries were inclined to sell Britain short. On the issues of European integration during the 1980s, she had none of Edward Heath’s sympathy with the European ideal. Nor did she share his view that Britain’s future lay in ever closer contacts with the EEC (Evans, 2004, pp. 80-82).

Driven by the integrating factors, West European countries made a lot of achievements towards integration in the latter half of the twentieth century, namely the establishment of the Council of Europe (1949), the ECSC (1952), the EEC and EURATOM (1958), the EC (1967), the directly-elected EP with increasing powers, the EMS (1979), the SEA (1986), and the TEU (1992). The single market with four freedoms was achieved in 1993, the Schengen Agreement freed people’s movement across borders in 1995 among the signatories, and the Euro has been in use since 2002.
There have also been failures, namely the lack of federalism in the Council of Europe, the defeat of the EDC (1952-1954), the EFTA group’s opposition to the EEC’s goal to establish a Customs Union, the Empty Chair Crisis (1965), the stagnation during the oil crises in the 1970s, and the Gaullist and British leaders’ opposition to deeper integration.

**Postscript: Developments after the Treaty on European Union**

As part of the CFSP, the EU took on peace-keeping operations in the Balkans, firstly in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003. The EU-led forces replaced NATO units. The Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001) were approved. Enlargement led to 25 members in 2004 and 27 in 2007, including most of post-communist Europe. In October 2004, the then-25 EU members signed the Treaty Establishing a European Constitution. This treaty was to streamline democratic decision-making and management in 25 member states and perhaps more. It created the post of a European Foreign Minister. However, the citizens in France and the Netherlands voted No to the Constitution in referendums in 2005, and the EU declared a period of reflection (EU, 2010b).

In December 2007, the 27 EU countries signed the Treaty of Lisbon, to make the EU more democratic, efficient and transparent by introducing new elements to the institutions and their decision-making methods. It came into force in December 2009. The EP shall be represented according to proportionality. For example, MEPs from more populous countries represent more people. The European Council shall have a
president who is not elected for any national position to prepare the Council’s work and to ensure consensus among members. The EU Council shall implement the QMV method, except where the treaties require another procedure. The QMV method has been extended to some new policy areas, such as immigration and culture. In 2014, double majority voting shall apply: the proposed EU laws will require a majority of the EU members (55%) and of the EU population (65%). The President of European Commission shall have the power to dismiss fellow commissioners. A high representative for foreign and security policy shall be chosen to chair foreign ministers’ meetings and represent the EU foreign and security policy internationally. The Lisbon Treaty again protects the powers of nation states by ensuring that national parliaments’ right to take a legislative initiative at a local or national level rather than at the EU level (EU, 2009). After the Treaty of Lisbon, there are still controversies unresolved, namely those regarding the membership of Turkey and other Balkan countries, the foreign and security policy and decision-making mechanisms in the EU institutions.
Chapter 4

New Regionalism in Asia: The Vague Identity and Slow Developments

Introduction

The developments of regionalism in Asia have been the most limited among those in the three regions. The Middle East is excluded from the regionalism process, given that there is no formal economic community. Central Asia and Russia have established a small community in recent years, but the leading country, Russia, has not been able to resolve the controversies regarding its identity, regional policies, and its other foreign policy principles. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a loose forum with a large membership, and therefore has little prospect to form a free trade area (FTA). The genuine regionalism process in Asia is happening only in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Established in the Cold War, ASEAN was initially a five-country anti-communist group. It focused on maintaining stability before 1990, and started economic integration afterwards. In 2007, ASEAN claimed to have realized a FTA.

One of the most distinctive features of Asian regionalism is that the big powers, namely China and Japan, have not been included in any formal regional community. The ASEAN Plus China, Japan and South Korea (ASEAN Plus Three, or APT) grouping has started to build bilateral FTAs between ASEAN and the +3 countries respectively; however, there is no consensus on an overall community or FTA among
the 13 countries. Which countries have been involved in regional groupings in Asia?
In what context were regionalism initiated and developed? What developments have they achieved? What obstacles are in the way? This chapter discusses two issues: the main groupings in Asia, and the major regionalism developments as well as problems since the 1960s.

**Redefining Asia**

Before making clear the major developments in Asian regionalism, the identity of the changing Asia should be discussed. Has Asia developed into a coherent region as has Europe? What factors have shaped the forming of an Asian identity? When Ellen Frost (2008) wrote about Asia’s new momentum, she described two simultaneous processes: the uneven progress of societal bottom-up integration in the Maritime Asia, the vast area around the coast line of Southeast Asia, China, the Korean Peninsula, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand; and the governmentally driven top-down integration in the ASEAN 10 and the circles around ASEAN 10, including APT, ASEAN Plus Six, and an outermost circle including but not limited to the dialogue partnership with Russia (Frost, 2008, p. 2). In both processes, her discussions on Asian regionalism include only East Asia, India, Australia and New Zealand. She is not alone; most of other books on Asian regionalism focus on the same area. In this research, the discussions on Asian regionalism are focused on those in Maritime East Asia (China, Japan, and South Korea) and Southeast Asia. It excludes the developments in Central Asia, Russia, Mongolia, and most countries in
South Asia. The role of the United States, India, and Australia will also be briefly discussed.

Readers from Central Asia and Middle East, who also identify themselves as Asians, might feel marginalized. If Turkey is more European-oriented, other countries in the Central Asia and Middle East, such as Nepal, Turkmenistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, are Asian countries geographically and traditionally. However, the Middle East and Central Asia are excluded for a reason. The Middle Eastern countries have the weakest regional organizations and the fewest attempts to create regional communities. Due to their oil-dependent, inefficient economies and security-minded state structure, with the ongoing or prolonged conflicts together with the over-centralization of power in the hands of state elites, a scheme of regional integration like a free trade area is far from being realistic (Carkoglu, 1998, p. 227).

The Arab League (or the League of Arab States), created by 21 member states in 1945, was a manifestation of Arab unity and a means of collective security against great powers. Led by its council composed of foreign ministers and periodic summits of heads of states and serving as an important forum in the conflict with Israel, its effect on advancing regional unity has been limited. It excludes important regional powers such as Turkey and Iran, and its members lack consensus on important security issues, such as the wars with Israel in 1948, 1967 or 1973, Yemen’s civil war or the Iran-Iraq War, and the war between the United States and Iraq in 2003. The Gulf Cooperation Council, created by six Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), is also weak institutionally because of its unanimous
decision-making principle. It has also relied on the United States for defence rather than any internal security cooperation. Its members were ineffective in responding to Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Karns & Mingst, 2004, p. 207).

The five Central Asian countries have only set up weak organizations recently. They have been members of the Commonwealth of Independent States since 1991, and before that were part of the Soviet Union. Their endogenous efforts began in the beginning of 2000s. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan founded the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) in 2000 (with Uzbekistan joining in 2005 and withdrawing at the end of 2008). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan created the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) in 2002 (with Russia joining in 2004), while Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and Uzbekistan have been members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Thomas, 2009a, p. 138). The EAEC’s main objective is to develop a full-scale customs union and common economic space, and collaboration in admission into the WTO and development of common guidelines on border security (EAEC). In 2005, the St. Petersburg summit decided to merge the CACO with the EAEC. In 2007, the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus and the EAEC common energy market were adopted. A supranational body, the Customs Union Committee, was made to form the Customs Union in three years (EAEC).

EAEC meets several conditions for furthering integration specified by neo-functionalists: a leading country (Russia), a supranational body that ensures the realization of their plan, and an incremental functional approach seeking for a smooth
beginning in key economic sectors. However, it is less a regional community than a Russian club with Russia dominating the processes. It is not involved in other major processes of integration in the East Asia; nor does it include other major powers, such as Japan and China. It has a limited number of members and economic size. Its potential to include other major Asian powers and compete with other major regions, such as the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), is therefore limited.

Although Russia is the major power in EAEC, it can not be seen as a Central Asian power. Its identity and regional policies remain uncertain. When it comes to the identity of Europe and Asia in the context of regional integration, Russia is a unique case. It is not a typical European or Asian power, but it has been seeking to strengthen its interests in the Asia Pacific. In the 1990s, Russia obtained the APEC membership, envisaging the formation of more favorable conditions for access to Asia-Pacific markets and the facilitation of the development of Siberian economy. It sought to integrate into the Asia-Pacific economy, but with APEC’s limited progress, Russia has not been part of the FTA of ASEAN or the further progress among the proposed East Asian Community group. However, the value of Russia’s accession is rather symbolic of its role as a great power to influence the processes in Asia Pacific. As European and Asian integration furthers, Russia’s main reaction is not to melt into Asia or Europe, but to focus on the land-bridge policy, which implies its Eurasian dualist identity. It envisages deriving economic benefits from transiting goods between Europe and Asia, and it will be in a unique Eurasian position to integrate into
both European and Asian economies (Rangsimaporn, 2009, pp. 134-139). This view is known as Pragmatic Eurasianism.

Besides, the Neo-Eurasianists reject the West but do not embrace the East. They see some East Asian states as the Eurasian Russia’s allies in opposing Western hegemony, and in the meantime, they do not emphasize its Asian identity. Some pro-Western elites reject Eurasianism and see Russia a natural part of European civilization which should return to Europe. Some other pro-Western elites deem Russia as a New West possessing Western values but not necessarily being a member of European institutions (Rangsimaporn, 2009, pp. 50-57).

The unique identity of Russia renders this big power outside either EU or ASEAN institutions. One policy implication of its complex identity is that it has been seeking for a balanced foreign policy: as a land bridge, it seeks to maintain and develop relationships with countries not only in ASEAN, but also in Central Asia as well as the wide Asia-Pacific area. It has led the EAEC processes, but to gain access to a greater market, it will have to engage the big powers in East Asia. Whether it should choose China or the Western countries as allies is in controversy, but it has not been one of the core players in the current East Asian regionalism processes.

In a word, due to the lack of enough ties and the considerable heterogeneity between Middle East, Central Asia and East Asia, and the controversial identity of Russia, they are unlikely to lead the East Asian regionalism processes. It remains to be seen whether the Middle East will develop some effective regional organizations to
deal with its security problems and to handle its oil economies. If an East Asian Community is to be established in future, it is also uncertain whether the EAEC will be combined with the East Asian Community (EAC), since neither China nor Japan deems Russia as a key actor in the EAC project. Therefore, the main regional developments are in East Asia. Because the genuine bilateral ties go beyond the geographic region, a few other powers with intensified interactions with East Asian countries are also included, that is, the United States, India, Australia and New Zealand.

The main groupings of regionalism and multilateralism include the APEC, ASEAN, the APT, and the East Asian Summit (EAS). The factors that both contribute to and hinder a common identity among those groups are complicated. Historical conflicts, ideologies, governmental structures, sovereignty, and national policy goals are all important factors that hinder the process of coming-together, not to mention diverse languages and nationalities that constantly remind people of the division among them. While those factors hinder regionalism processes, reversing and changing those factors can be constructive for a closer relationship among East Asian powers.

Two main controversies on the main groupings of Asian regionalism remain: 1) whether Anglo-American members should be included; 2) whether the APT or EAS should serve as the primary engine. The first controversy rises from the attempt of the United States to maintain influence and pursue geopolitical balance of power, the efforts of East Asian countries to strengthen political and economic orders in the
Pacific Rim area, and the irony that the goal of liberalizing regional economy in a wider area has to be achieved by narrowing down the players first. It will be discussed in the case of APEC. Behind the second controversy, the real competition is between China and Japan for influence in this region, with a certain scale of interactions between the United States and its East Asian allies. Their cross-cutting conflicts will be discussed in the cases of APT and EAS.

**APEC: a meaningful try**

The APEC stands for a major attempt of East Asian countries to construct a new region that includes both East Asia and major Anglo-American countries. It was preceded by a number of organizations in effort of establishing economic and political order in Asia Pacific since the 1960s. One of the most important ones was the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD). Established in 1968, it was a Japanese initiative to support the idea of Pacific Free Trade Area. Like-minded economists and policy entrepreneurs coalesced and played an important role in pioneering both the idea of trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific and institution-building. Similar attempts included the establishment of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1967 and the suggestion of Kojima and Australian economist Peter Drysdale to establish the Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD). Such communities seemed as if it would come to have an influence on both the content of regional public policy and on the definition of the region itself (Beeson, 2009, pp. 38-39).
A more tangible manifestation of the idea of constructing a new Asia-Pacific region came in the form of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). Founded in 1980, the PECC styled itself as a unique tripartite partnership of senior individuals from business and industry, government, academic and other intellectual circles. Much of this style and many concerns of PECC was incorporated in the APEC when the latter was launched by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke in 1989 (Beeson, 2009, p. 39).

Besides Bob Hawke’s role in pushing the actual realization of the APEC, Australian academics like Drysdale were also promoting the idea of an Asia-Pacific organization. Australian policymakers realized the increasing importance of industrializing economies of East Asia and the necessity for some form of institutional engagement with the region to ensure its status as an insider. Another supporter of the idea of Asia-Pacific order was Japan, namely the officials at Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). They had to make sure it had continuing access to North American markets while developing its export-oriented economy in East Asia. Therefore, Hawke’s original proposal that excluded the United States did not interest Japan much. Despite the competing pressures on the APEC’s membership, it has one noticeable feature. It is the first multilateral institution to contain the three Chinas: the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. It also provides a forum in which Japan can improve its relations with both China and Korea (Beeson, 2009, pp. 40-42).
When the APEC was inaugurated, it included the most powerful countries at the Pacific Rim area: the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea and the ASEAN Countries. As the Cold War ended and geo-economics became more important, the APEC caught more and more attention. In 1991, China, Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei joined as three economies rather than countries. In 1993, Mexico and Papua New Guinea joined. Following that, Chile joined in 1994. In 1998, Peru, Russia, and Viet Nam joined (Beeson, 2009, pp. 40-42).

The establishment of the APEC was the culmination of the process of constructing institutional order in East Asian and Pacific area. It was promoted by Japan and Australia, and was joined by the major powers in Asia, Russia, South Korea, and China. The most powerful country in the era, the United States and several other North American and South American countries were also included. As it contained the major players in this region, the establishment of the APEC was the beginning of the realization of the original idea of strengthening political and economic order in the Asia-Pacific region and, perhaps, forming a new identity. However, the operation of APEC did not continue to support, but challenged the original idea.

The challenge came from the very beginning: how could an effective regional order be established to promote close economic cooperation among countries of vastly different levels of economic development and political systems and, in the mean time, of few significant historical, cultural, and geographic connections? As Beeson (2009) stated, “(the) U.S. and UK financial firms know they can beat all
comers in an institutional context of arms-length relations, stock markets, open capital accounts and new financial instruments. Therefore, the Asian system must be changed to more closely resemble theirs”. Consequently, there has been an inherent tension among members about what form its policy agenda should take and the degree of enforcement capacity it should have. As APEC covers a wide area of East Asia where many members are preoccupied with protecting national sovereignty, its operational style can not be “terribly effective”. Thus, the need for compromise between members with distinct histories, capacities, and expectations has restricted the pace at which the APEC should go from the outset. APEC replicated the ASEAN way of voluntarism and consensus (Beeson, 2009, pp. 42-43). Given the varied levels of economic development and hence the varied ability to adapt to free competition, consensus regarding trade liberalization is difficult to achieve. The diminished government intervention in the economy makes this process harder, especially for some East Asian countries where the government has a strong hold on its economy. Resistance from interest groups that benefit the most from the old government-controlled economy is inevitable.

Besides the huge gap between members and the domestic pressures, this group also includes several pairs of rivals who will not compromise and agree to be contained, such as China vis-à-vis Japan and the United States vis-à-vis China. While the success of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the following European Communities (EC)/EU was largely based on the Franco-German partnership, the APEC was not built upon the close partnership of the major powers
who used to be enemies, such as China and Japan, Russia and the United States, and China and the United States. If the loose cooperation in the APEC could be gradually transformed into a deeper level of trade liberalization and political cooperation, the lack of mutual trust and partnership among major powers would not have been the bottleneck towards consensus.

The overlapping memberships of member states are another problem. Not only are they scattered in three continents, but they are also involved in other regional organizations such as ASEAN and NAFTA. While the regional organizations push forward their agenda of trade liberalization, the resulting customs unions will exclude the countries outside. Therefore, the countries with multiple memberships in different organizations will have a dilemma. This dilemma has not been stressed yet, since APEC members has not agreed on furthering trade liberalization to a customs union. Rather than protectionist trade blocs like the EU, APEC is predicated upon a form of non-discriminatory open regionalism, which treats members and non-members in an even-handed manner. This logic has been criticized as naïve. Beeson (2009) questioned if the merits of trade liberalization were so blindingly obvious for any liberalizing economies, what need was there for the APEC? One of the main problems is the lack of forces pushing the APEC members to implement the trade reform agenda. While they make decisions on voluntary basis, some hostile and adversely affected indigenous economic actors shall try to influence domestic policies. The United States, for example, may not be willing to open up its domestic market to East Asian economies that enjoy massive trade surpluses (Beeson, 2009, pp. 44-45), since
the Congress which has little party discipline are mainly responsible for constituencies and related interest groups.

Further, the North American and South American countries have been mostly involved in their own regional agreements to facilitate their intra-regional trade and also to protect members’ economic interests. The major power, the United States, has been involved within NAFTA whereby it is hard to progress further than a certain degree of free trade in the context of interest group politics and the decision-making mechanisms in the legislature; therefore, it will be more complicated to negotiate a wider free trade area with a large number of Asian countries. Although some sub-national groups of the APEC countries are interconnected by their economic interests and security concerns, the ties are not enough for them to overcome the complicated national interests, huge differences and distances among nations. The big powers that are involved in real tensions in trade relations, the United States, Japan and China, participate to make sure their national interests are taken into account (Camroux, 2007, p. 16).

After its inception, how has the APEC been working? It claims two main goals: to advance Asia-Pacific economic cooperation and to develop a sense a community in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite the skepticism on its effect, the Bogor meeting (APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, aka AELM) in 1994 proclaimed 2010 and 2020 as finish lines that advanced and developing member economies, respectively, would reach lower barriers to trade. Following the Bogor meeting, the APEC was fairly active. Out of the Osaka Action Agenda in 1995 came a Manila Action Plan in 1996,
including Individual Action Plans and Collective Action Plans, and the designation of 1997 as APEC’s Year of Action. In 1998 and 1999, the AELM called for tangible progress rather than mere discussion; however, it still insisted on individual actions by economies as the principal means to attain APEC’s goals. As APEC is a forum rather than an agency, it is indirectly accountable for accomplishments or failures (Emmerson, 2002, pp. 2-4).

The Individual Action Plans are mainly self-reporting documents on tariff reductions and non-tariff commitments. As APEC members can not achieve consensus on publishing their data of achievements on tariff reduction, it is difficult to ascertain how well members have exceeded their obligations in their IAPs within the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to an incomplete table of WTO-Plus 1996 IAP tariff reductions, there may be marginal improvements over WTO Uruguay Round obligations on the tariff rates of some developing countries of APEC, and the achievements overall have been negligible. As is assessed in a paper prepared for Canada’s Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, the tariff reductions in the IAPs of Canada, the United States, and Japan fall well short of the Bogor targets. The Commitments of the China, Chile, and ASEAN members meet Bogor targets, but those of Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico also fall short (Hart & Weiler, 1997, pp. 20-23).

Despite the limited progress on IAPs, as Hart and Weiler (1997) noted, “APEC made notable contributions to the generation of rules-based regimes leading to more stable and predictable trading conditions”, and it may be seen successful if it significantly helped maintain a friendly political climate among the economies and
the momentum toward freer trade and strengthened rule of law, and contributed to the building of a community based on shared values, interests and commitment to the regional order. The recipients of economic and technical cooperation initiatives will benefit from the shared experience to avoid some of the pitfalls that developed members had to confront. The APEC operates as a forum for the development of interpersonal relationships and networks at ministerial, official and private sectors, which should facilitate community building and trade flows (Hart & Weiler, 1997, pp. 38-40).

Despite the few concrete achievements, heavy criticism and the development of other sub-regional arrangements, APEC is still holding its summits yearly. Its value can be seen in the crisscross public networks built among governmental officials, businessman and academic intellectuals. What are the prospects for APEC’s future development? As a loose networking forum that helps advance common norms and order, APEC’s institutions and mechanisms are still too weak to develop a regional community with a certain sense of common identity equivalent to the European Community. The difficulties in achieving consensus and pursing projects of depth stem from its diverse membership and, consequently, considerable heterogeneity among members in their levels of economic development and political structures, and lack of geographic proximity. Therefore, the APEC will not become the major institution leading towards an EAC.

However, the idea of advancing economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific area has not vanished. It has been backed up by the United States which seeks to maintain
its influence in East Asia, as well as the economic links among East Asian, American, and Oceania countries. Although the APEC as a forum has not evolved into a formal organization, it did spur some developments among some of its members, such as some bilateral arrangements and perhaps multilateral ones. The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP, or P4) Agreement was signed by governments of Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore in 2005 and entered into force in 2006. It was developed to create a platform for economic integration across the Asia Pacific region. Other APEC economies or other states can join the TPP Agreement. In September 2008, the United States launched negotiations with the P4 countries. During the November 2008 APEC Summit, Australia, Peru and Viet Nam expressed their interest in joining the TPP agreement. The P4 countries initiated negotiations with the United States, Peru, Australia, and Viet Nam in March 2010. During the third round of TPP negotiations among the eight countries, Malaysia joined (ForeignTradeInformationSystem(SICE), 2010b).

The TPP Agreement covers economic, financial, scientific and technological fields. The P4 countries agree to establish an FTA, eliminating all customs duties, non-tariff measures except in accordance with the WTO Agreement on the day of entry into force. It aims to realize free movement of goods and services, but does not have provisions for further developments regarding free movement of people and exchange of capital (ForeignTradeInformationSystem(SICE), 2010a). The limited measures of cooperation in TPP agreement are deemed an effective and practical form of cooperation; however, without further provisions, it is not likely to generate a sense
of community and provide grounds for stronger economic and political orders. It is pending whether the five negotiating countries and more APEC economies will obtain membership of the TPP. In the meanwhile, the P4 countries are involved in other negotiations, such as the ones that led to the Agreement establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) in 2009 (ASEAN, 2010a). None of the current agreements aims to establish a common market or a customs union.

Now that the APEC that includes Anglo-American countries is excluded from the core force towards the EAC, the next problem arises: which sub-regional group in East Asia will become the main vehicle, APT or EAS? A further question is: which countries will be the major powers leading the regionalism process? The core group in the two groupings is the ASEAN, an organization that was established in the wake of World War Two and the Cold War and developed the most intensified regionalism processes. The roles of other countries, especially Japan, China, India, the United States, and Australia, are uncertain. The membership of the proposed EAC is shaped by crisscross interstate relations and values behind the state behaviors.

**ASEAN: a primary, but deficient organization**

The ASEAN is the only group that has developed formal institutions and specified its plans for constructing a community. After more than 40 years’ development, it has successfully transformed its priority from anti-communism to a comprehensive partnership regardless of ideologies and historical conflicts. With the
considerable progress that the ASEAN members have made in economic integration especially after 1997 and the detailed plans of action towards an ASEAN community, it has become the primary part of the future processes of East Asian regionalism. Although ASEAN has put geographical limits on its membership, the EAC might be the extension of membership of the ASEAN Community. The plans of action for constructing an ASEAN Community may lead to a regional community equivalent to the EC.

The ASEAN was formed in a small geographical area due to the historical ideological divisions in Asia in the Cold War. The Bangkok Declaration in 1967 stipulated that ASEAN is open for participation to all states in the Southeast Asian Region subscribing to its aims, principles and purposes: to accelerate economic growth, social progress, cultural development (such as collaborate in developing agriculture and industries, expansion of trade, and improvement of infrastructure), to promote regional peace and stability and adherence to the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter, to promote mutual assistance in economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific fields in the form of training and research facilities (ASEAN).

Thus, the major powers in Northeast and South Asia were not included at the beginning, and therefore the major organization did not have powerful leaders to direct their actions. China, Japan and South Korea lacked the formal regionalism experiences until the 1990s when the momentum brought by World War Two and the Cold War had dissipated. Therefore, the integration project with a benevolent leading country helping in Asia is decades later than that in Europe. Due to the different
historical context and national features of the + 3 countries, the outcome of East Asian integration is uncertain.

Although ASEAN declarations and treaties did not mention its ideological stance, its own members had a natural division along the ideological line. Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos were then-neutral states, and South Vietnam was once denounced as a political enemy in the communist camp until North Vietnam’s conquest of the South in 1975. In January 1988, Vietnamese Foreign Minister unofficially spoke of Vietnam’s aspiration to join ASEAN. At the third ASEAN summit, Hanoi extended an amicable message that it no longer regarded ASEAN as an adversary and it appreciated the achievements of ASEAN. Vietnam’s armed forces withdrew from Cambodia in September 1989. It was attracted by the developing economies in ASEAN and a common security concern about China’s military buildup. Although ASEAN Six and Vietnam increased mutual understanding, the historical antagonism and distrust that ASEAN members felt toward Vietnam were still present (Takeshi, 1999, pp. 17-18). Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War greatly weakened the ideological rivalry, and changes to Vietnam’s economic policy and military actions earned it the ASEAN membership.

Besides its limits on membership and historical ideological division, the gap between and CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) makes another problem for further integration. ASEAN’s aims and principles suggest that the candidates should “be exposed to modern governance, market-oriented economies and outward-looking peaceful policies”, but the CLMV countries “drag down the
integration movements and Myanmar hurts its reputation”. They are moving so slowly that they are not prepared for new initiatives. The core process is among the ASEAN Five, and after 1997, the + 3 countries, Australia and New Zealand (Frost, 2008, p. 222).

There is no overwhelming leader in the ASEAN Five, although Indonesia seems the most influential player. The leadership and strength of the ASEAN Five can be seen not only in their original membership and implementation of regional policies, but also in their GDP and population, as shown in Table 4.1 to Table 4.3 (International Monetary Fund, 2010).

Table 4.1

ASEAN countries by GDP and GDP Per Capita, 2008-2009 (Units: US dollars, Scale: Billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>14.417</td>
<td>10.405</td>
<td>36,223.354</td>
<td>25,385.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>11.277</td>
<td>10.871</td>
<td>805.078</td>
<td>768.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>511.489</td>
<td>539.377</td>
<td>2,237.724</td>
<td>2,329.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao People's Democratic Republic</td>
<td>5.313</td>
<td>5.598</td>
<td>856.177</td>
<td>885.706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>222.272</td>
<td>192.955</td>
<td>8,142.616</td>
<td>6,950.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>31.367</td>
<td>34.262</td>
<td>533.454</td>
<td>571.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>167.167</td>
<td>161.196</td>
<td>1,848.018</td>
<td>1,747.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>272.429</td>
<td>263.979</td>
<td>4,107.788</td>
<td>3,940.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>90.274</td>
<td>93.164</td>
<td>1,047.542</td>
<td>1,068.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>193.332</td>
<td>182.231</td>
<td>39,266.249</td>
<td>36,378.740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among the five leading countries, Indonesia stands out in its ranks in GDP and population, but its GDP per capita is lower than Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Brunei. Ellen Frost (2008) observed that Indonesia was recapturing its diplomatic leadership. It was once the anchor of ASEAN, a champion of APEC, an oil exporter, and an influential voice in the region. In the 1990s, it was a rickety tower of crony capitalism and corruption, but the country has been on the move again afterwards. It was elected to both the revamped UN Human Rights Council and the UN Security Council (Frost, 2008, pp. 116-117). However, Frost (2008) did not indicate Indonesia as a constantly recognized ASEAN leader.

In 2007/8, the ASEAN Charter stipulated the criteria of membership: 1) location in the recognized geographical region of Southeast Asia; 2) recognition by all

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>14.008</td>
<td>14.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>228.575</td>
<td>231.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao People's Democratic Republic</td>
<td>6.205</td>
<td>6.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>27.297</td>
<td>27.761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>58.799</td>
<td>59.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>90.457</td>
<td>92.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>66.320</td>
<td>66.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>86.177</td>
<td>87.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4.924</td>
<td>5.009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.2**

*ASEAN Countries by Population, 2008-2009 (Unit: Persons, Scale: Millions)*
ASEAN Member States; 3) agreement to be bound and to abide by the Charter; and 4) ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of membership (ASEAN, 2008). Thus, its criteria did not change much from what the Bangkok Declaration stipulated. According to the criteria, two countries are potential candidates. East Timor expressed its intention to join ASEAN in 2006, and it might take 5 years or longer for it to enter ASEAN (ASEAN, 2006). Papua New Guinea has been a Special Observer at ASEAN ministerial meetings since 1981, and its government has been seeking to expand its ties with ASEAN (ASEAN, 1999). Since 2008, Papua New Guinea has been ready to bid for a full membership in ASEAN (GMANews, 2009). Due to the geographical proximity of the two countries and their ties to ASEAN countries, ASEAN may include the two and develop into ASEAN 12.

It is doubtful whether the ASEAN Community will develop some of the supranational features as the EU did, such as a supranational council monitoring the market of certain industries, a regional parliament, and a decision-making mechanism that embraces not only unanimous voting but also QMV and Majority Voting in certain issues. As the ASEAN has been making progress on an intergovernmental and voluntary basis, its grand designs in the ASEAN Vision 2020 remain to be tested. If it extends to APT countries or EAS countries, those supranational features are hard to accept due to the security concerns of the Northeast Asian countries.

**APT or EAS: crisscross international relations and diverse national preferences**
The APT countries that have developed several initiatives and included main big powers in East Asia are widely considered as the newly defined “East Asia”. As the weak countries join this grouping, they expect assistance for their own development; therefore, in order to attract support and advance regionalism, one or several big countries, namely China and Japan, must be involved to contribute to the community programs. “This group of countries, all of them geographically located either in Southeast or Northeast Asia, constitutes the core of cooperation and integration process in the whole (of) Asia” (Dieter, 2007, p. 5).

However, the major Asian powers did not play a leading role in regional integration before the 1990s, and, to a certain degree, that led to the weakest form of regional governance, “pre-governance”, in East Asia (Yoshimatsu, 2009, p. 66). Today, the basic issues of the proposed EAC, such as the original membership and the plans of action, are still in debate. Neither Japan nor China has been the leading power in Asian regionalism.

**Japan.**

It was in the late 1990s that Japan first tried to lead East Asian integration. In the efforts towards closer cooperation in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crises, Japan used to act as the regional leader that proposed constructive schemes and volunteered as a major contributor for program funding. It has also been an active supporter for the making of the EAC. Its keenness for regionalism is due to its asymmetric “reliance on an open international economic order”. It can not make its economy
continuously prosperous without foreign raw materials and overseas markets (Kato, 2000, p. 44). In its reliance on foreign economies, its links with ASEAN and other Asian economies are the most intensified. Its growing role in nine of the ASEAN members can be traced in trade, aid, investment and technology transfer. In the two decades prior to 1985, Japan accounted for close to half of the total aid and direct foreign investment in the region. Between 1985 and 1989 the total was twice as large as that between 1951 and 1984. There was widespread unease about the political consequences of intensifying economic relations with Japan in the ASEAN area, although this fear declined after the rise of China (Katzenstein, 2000, p. 2). Compared to other bigger Asian powers, Japan is more vulnerable because its competitiveness in world markets is threatened by malfunctions of interdependent processes (Kato, 2000, p. 44). Within this asymmetric interdependence, an institutionalized partnership with those Asian countries will secure the networks that Japan relies on.

Besides, Japan, which still accounts for two-thirds of the entire gross domestic product (GDP) in East Asia, retains significant capabilities to promote institution building and to mobilize resources for this objective (Yoshimatsu, 2009, p. 70). The APT cooperation began formally in 1997. In addition to the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), Japan was deeply involved in the development of other forms of financial architecture in East Asia. It concluded Bilateral Swap Agreements (BSA) with South Korea and Malaysia as a part of the New Miyazawa Initiative, and proposed to expand and combine agreements among East Asian Countries (Yoshimatsu, 2009, p. 72).
Besides financial cooperation, Japan has also contributed to regional cooperation in agriculture. Consultation for the rice reserve system in East Asia was conducted under Japan’s strategic initiative. In Japan, a study group of the international food stockholding framework was established in April 2001 as an advisory body to the head of the Food Agency. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) conducted the Development Study on an East Asia/ASEAN Rice Reserve System from May to November 2002. The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries funded the ASEAN Food Security Information System (AFSIS) project. It also funded an FAO regional project, Strengthening Regional Data Exchange System on Food and Agricultural Statistics in Asia and Pacific Countries and a JICA project, Agricultural Statistics and Economic Analysis Development (Yoshimatsu, 2009, p. 74).

Japan elucidated concrete ideas on the EAC, the EAS and functional cooperation in its issue papers in 2004 APT meeting. In seeking to promote the EAC, the Japanese government identified several criteria: the need to increase functional cooperation, to secure openness, inclusiveness and transparency as open regionalism, and to promote regional cooperation along universal rules and values such as democracy, human rights, market economy and WTO rules. Those criteria were largely incorporated in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration issued at the 2005 EAS. However, its criteria will reduce the influence of China which has difficulty in realizing those values. To maintain its influence with ASEAN against a rising China, Japan tried to form a
closer relationship with the ASEAN than China and South Korea (Yoshimatsu, 2009, pp. 84-85).

**China.**

The rise of China has challenged Japan’s leading role considerably. Deng’s ‘southern trip’ in 1992, sharp increases in the flow of direct foreign investment, high rates of economic growth, and the government’s determined efforts to join General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO all focused attention on China as a conceivable rival of the United States. China’s alleged pursuit of reputation as a regional hegemon status does not only rest on its changed economic policy and the economic growth, but also on its control of access to the largest untapped market in the world, possession of nuclear weapons, and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Katzenstein, 2000, pp. 2-3). Its rise has also been related to its increasing interdependence with other Asian Countries. In 2004, the ASEAN countries’ export to China increased by 25 per cent (Camroux, 2007, p. 21).

Since the 1997 economic crisis, China revealed increasing willingness to engage in constructive cooperation with other APT partners. Besides its economic growth, China has also emerged as an aid giver, and China’s way of distributing its aid is more strategic than that of Japan in realizing its national interests; for example, curtailing some nations’ diplomatic ties with Taiwan or securing oil supplies (Terada, 2007, pp. 72-73).

Besides those national activities, the private sector and civil society
organizations are also expanding. China increased trade in some smaller states and became their leading trade partner. Its efforts in social development could be seen in its aid in Indonesia and Thailand. In addition, the Chinese culture and language are promoted throughout surrounding regions and internationally. By mid 2008, 238 Confucius Institutes had been opened around the world in 69 countries. All those activities reflected China’s soft power (Thomas, 2009a, p. 119).

However, China’s role in regionalism is uncertain due to its concerns of sovereignty and uncertainty of its domestic reforms. While China and Japan are both important in community-building, their historical rivalry and contemporary conflicts over territory of the South China Sea become one of the main obstacles to the growth of the EAC. China faces problems in its relations with Taiwan, Tibet, Japan and the United States. Thus, despite its multilateral stance in many issues, China has a strong unilateralist stance on issues perceived to be of great national importance and a weaker multilateralist stance on diplomatic and economic relations. Meanwhile, it is going through a large-scale of domestic reform in major institutions such as ‘inefficient state-owned enterprises, an oversized central bureaucracy, and financial institutions crippled by a mountain of bad debt’. The uncertainties in the dual-track foreign policy intersect with the uncertainties of large-scale domestic reform, and thus make China’s regional role uncertain.” (Katzenstein, 2000, pp. 2-3)

Further, China’s increasing participation in East Asian integration is only part of its actions to normalize its behavior as an international actor and to strengthen its soft power to balance the United States. Besides its involvement in the APT and EAS
processes, it initiated the Shanghai Five grouping in 1996 (which was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001) to strengthen its linkage with the Central Asia, entered into the WTO in 2001, engaged in the Boao Forum on Asia, and hosted the China-Africa Cooperation Summit in 2006 (Camroux, 2007, pp. 21-23), not to mention its participation in the Asia-Pacific initiatives. To a certain degree, those global-wide actions distracted China’s attention on Asian regionalism. China is not leading the formation of the EAC, but trying to be involved in the external relations of ASEAN and Central Asia, as well as the bilateral agreements with other countries. As Thomas (2009) concluded, China may be best characterized as a “peripheral hub” (Thomas, 2009a, p. 137).

The United States.

The United States is not an Asian country and is excluded from the major Asian regionalism processes. However, as the only global military superpower, it has considerably intensified linkages with East Asia, reflected not only in its economic relations with China and political influence on Japan and Taiwan, but also in its active role in the APEC. To retain its influence in East Asia, it sought to block East Asian regionalism and to promote the Asia-Pacific group as an alternative. For example, Washington was concerned the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) would undermine the multilateral competence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and hence indirectly lead to a loss of American structural power and influence over the international financial system. As a result, the proposal failed to gain sufficient support and was dropped (Dent, 2008, p. 155).
Nevertheless, US’ concerns for its influence in East Asia are alleviated by Japan’s policy that tries to balance China’s power in Asian regionalism. In the balance between China and Japan with other partners (India and Australia) that have a close relationship with the US, neither side could become a leading power that dominates East Asia. Besides, the United States has developed close relationships with Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India in security cooperation. The US-Japan relationship is particularly noteworthy. Beginning with their 1996 Joint Declaration and 1997 Revised Defence Guidelines, Washington and Tokyo embarked on a strengthening and expansion of the bilateral alliance. This process, which included an agreement on the realignment of US forces in Japan as part of a broader US-Japan Defence Policy Review Initiative launched in 2002, culminated with President Bush and former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi heralding a new US-Japan Alliance of Global Cooperation for the 21st Century at their final meeting in 2006. Further, both the US and Japan established a Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Australia. Australia and Japan signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007 that facilitated intelligence sharing and defence cooperation. Besides, the US and South Korea negotiated the Future of the Alliance and the US-Republic of Korea Security Policy Initiative. With India, the US signed a ten-year defence agreement in 2005 to enhance military cooperation through joint weapons production, technology transfer, maritime patrols and collaboration on missile defence. They also signed a landmark agreement on nuclear energy cooperation, the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative (Moore, 2009, pp. 204-206).
Furthermore, the US signed or negotiated FTAs with Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Australia. It signed an Enhanced Partnership Plan of Action with ASEAN in 2006 (Moore, 2009, p. 207). Through those agreements and the international organizations such as WTO, IMF and APEC, the U.S. intensifies the mutual dependence with East Asia, and thus secures its economic interests in East Asia. Although the U.S. still supports Asia-Pacific or wider multilateralism for East Asia, it has reduced direct challenges to Asian regionalism projects after 1997 and changed its approach to maintaining influence by networking with Asian countries as well as Australia.

**India and Australia.**

India, a strategic partner with Japan and the United States, is welcomed by ASEAN nations as a balancing power to China’s growing influence. It has been developing closer relationships with ASEAN recently. As Saint-Mezard (2009) observed, India tends to emulate China’s initiatives towards the region. It offered an FTA with ASEAN in 2002 after China signed its FTA with ASEAN. At the 2003 ASEAN summit, India consented to the ASEAN TAC at the same time as China. Both China and India were among the very first countries to sign overarching strategic partnerships with ASEAN. In 2004, India signed an ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity after one year ASEAN and China signed a similar agreement. While Singapore, Indonesia and Japan strongly advocated the participation of India, Malaysia and China opposed it as they did in the debate on the participation of Australia (Saint-Mezard, 2009, p. 184).
Besides those activities to intensify linkages with the ASEAN, India is currently lobbying for a broadening of regional integration, involving ASEAN, Plus Three and India (JICAK) (Saint-Mezard, 2009, p. 189). Besides, as an Asian country, although not in East Asia, it has the same identity with the APT countries. With its own efforts, the support of ASEAN and Japan, and its traditional identity as an Asian country, India might be accepted by APT countries as one of the founding countries for EAC.

Australia is a developed country close to but outside Asia. It was one of the founders of APEC and it welcomed the cooperation under ARF and EAS, since it had a close relationship with East Asia. Of all Australian merchandise exports, 53% go to East and Southeast Asia, and by 2006 China had displaced the United States to become Australia’s second-largest merchandise trading partner. China overtook the US to become its largest merchandise trading partner in 2007 (Cotton, 2009, p. 162). However, it is reluctant to become a major role in the formation of EAC, due to its strong preference for trade and security ties with the US (Cotton, 2009, p. 168). Further, China and Malaysia oppose the inclusion of Australia in the EAC. Therefore, whether the new Asia would include this Oceania country depends on their two-way choice.

The relations among big powers within East Asia.

The nature and importance of Sino-Japanese relationship in Asian regionalism appear similar to the Franco-German relationship in the European case, but it is uncertain whether China and Japan can form a comprehensive partnership. France and
German overcame their long-standing rivalry and established a partnership reflected in the close contacts between political leaders and comprehensive cooperation in the institutional developments within EC/EU. The Franco-German partnership served as a key to initiating and advancing European integration.

However, the situation in Asia is different, in terms of the historical context and the ideological conflicts. First, while the United States supported Europe as a whole (including all major powers) in their closer collaboration, it preferred to support Japan, Australia, and India to balance the influence of China. To a certain degree, the attitude of the US split East Asia into two competing groups. It hinders political cooperation and consensus between two important powers, China and Japan.

Second, Asian regionalism did not begin with the establishment of Sino-Japan partnership; it did not even include the two powers in the major process until the 1990s. On one hand, while Nazism was liquidated in Germany after World War Two, militarism still “has some currency with a tiny portion of the population even today” in Japan. While German leaders have apologized for the wars, some Japanese conservatives frequently deny Japan's aggression against Asian countries and that is interpreted by China as proof of Japan's failure to provide a correct view of history to its people. Japan is thus considered as “a country of uncertainties” (Wu, 2000). With Japan's denial of past responsibility for its atrocities and the US support for Japan, both ASEAN and China aim to balance Japan in the process towards EAC. On the other hand, China was seen a communist threat during the Cold War by the ASEAN in its early age.
Since the 1990s, Japan and China have been in competition for regional leadership, but neither has been able to be the leader or involve the other in a strategic partnership. On one hand, Japan has played an important role in advancing Asian regionalism in terms of its proposing regionalism schemes and its economic strength after the 1997 economic crisis, when China had just begun its efforts to participate in the multilateral organizations. Although China’s GDP ($8.75 trillion in 2009) has surpassed Japan ($4.15 trillion in 2009) by a considerable difference, Japan’s GDP per capita ($32,700 in 2009, rank 40 in the world) has been much higher than China’s ($6,600 in 2009, rank 128 in the world) (CIA, 2010b). Despite the considerable power and efforts to be a regional leader, Japan’s regional influence was reduced by its decade-long recession in the 1990s and its political instability caused by frequent changes of prime ministers (Yoshimatsu, 2009, p. 81). The rise of China and the suspicion of Japan’s intention in East Asian regionalism activities have weakened the influence of Japan.

On the other, China has been an increasingly important role in East Asian economic cooperation, in terms of its population and economic sizes, military powers, and its growing trade with East Asian Countries that has surpassed Japan slightly since 2007. In 2009, ASEAN’s import from Japan was $81.86 billion, 11.18% of its total import, while its import from China was $ 98.25, 13.4% of its total import (InternationalTradeCenter, 2010b). Contemporarily, ASEAN’s exports to Japan were $79.05 billion, 9.73% of its total exports, while its export to China was $82.04 billion, 10.10% of its total export (InternationalTradeCenter, 2010a). With South Korea
(ROK), Japan used to be a bigger trade partner between 1992 and 2001: ROK export to Japan has been slightly higher than to China until 2000, and its import from Japan has been much higher than from China (Lee, 2005, p. 286). In 2009, China was its biggest export partner (21.5% of its total export) and its biggest import partner (17.7% of its total import) (CIA, 2010c).

Despite the increasing interdependence of China and other East Asian countries, the influence of China in this region has been constantly challenged by other East Asian powers. First, as aforementioned, Japan is the biggest balancing power, and it has been actively supporting regionalism activities. Besides, the US has been establishing strategic partnerships with Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand, in order to balance China’s influence.

Third, Indonesia, the biggest country within ASEAN, has been in conflicts with China regarding ethnic Chinese issues and regional security issues since the 1950s. In the 1950s, Chinese ambassador Wang Renshu’s effort to influence the ethnic-Chinese minority in Indonesia caused Indonesian government’s concerns about their loyalty and nationality. In 1951, Sukiman Cabinet ordered the arrest of thousands of communist suspects, and then China offered protection to the communists. President Sukarno warned the Chinese communists in Indonesia of the possible consequences. Despite the anti-imperialism cooperation between China and Indonesia from 1960 to 1965, the majority of Indonesian elites saw the Communist China and the Overseas Chinese as threats to national security. In 1965, an abortive coop was suspected to have been supported by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). PKI was declared
illegal and China was charged with supporting the coup. Consequently, a wave of anti-communist and anti-China rioting erupted. China’s embassy in Glodok was vandalized and the shops and properties of local Chinese became the targets. In 1967, Chinese demonstrators destroyed Indonesia’s embassy, and consequently, the Indonesian government recalled its diplomatic staff from Beijing. During the suspension of their diplomatic relations, China was portrayed as the main threat to the country’s national security (Sukma, 1999, pp. 25-34). As Wayne Bert (1975) indicated, the Indonesian government’s suspicion of Chinese involvement in the 1965 coup led to a massacre of former PKI members and sympathizers, Chinese residents, and numerous others. The military tacitly condoned and in some cases participated in the massacre (Bert, 1975, p. 481).

In early 1994, China justified its alleged sovereignty over the South China Sea as a historic inheritance from past dynasties, but Indonesia “countered that without continuous occupation such claims had no validity in international law”. While Beijing insisted on bilateral negotiations, Jakarta refuted that bilateral negotiations could not solve the problem since three or more parties had been frequently involved in this area. The 1995 Defence White Paper of Jakarta indicated that China would become the preeminent country in the region both economically and militarily, and its claim over some islands in the South China Sea might lead to military conflict and disturb regional stability. Former Foreign Minister Ruslan Abdulgani warned of China’s expansionist tendency, mainly southward. In 1995, Indonesia signed an Australian military agreement. In 1996, Indonesia held its first prominent military
exercises around the South-China Sea islands (Whiting, 1997, pp. 303-306). The tension in their bilateral relations was also evidenced by May 1998 riots against ethnic Chinese population. Their shops were ransacked, and burned down, many were attacked, and numerous ethnic Chinese women were raped and killed. The Habibie administration established the Joint Fact-Finding Team in August, and many evidences indicated that the military were involved (Suryadinata, 2001, pp. 506-507).

Malaysia has also been in tension with China in the local Chinese issues and security issues. The anti-Chinese sentiments in Malaysia are notable. Chinese in Malaysia have been politically weak and under-represented. In 1969, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) only won 13 seats as compared to the 27 it had held previously. The Chinese community felt that the party failed to prevent the government from introducing overwhelming pro-Malay and anti-Chinese bias as well as Malay nationalism. The MCA announced that it would not participate in the new government, and on the same day, riots broke out. Chinese were the worse sufferers in the racial violence in the name of suppressing a communist conspiracy to take over the country. A large number of Chinese were arrested. (Economic&PoliticalWeekly, 1969). As Harish Chandola (1971) commented, in the 1970s, the Malaysian government was involved in a struggle with the Malayan Communist Party which was waging an armed fight in the north and had the support of the Chinese Communist Party. The Radio Peking broadcast against the Malayan government and in praise of the Malayan Communist Party dampened the Sino-Malayan diplomatic relations despite the improvement of the Sino-Malayan trade relationship in 1971 (Chandola,
1971). Although Kuala Lumpur before 1995 claimed to see no Chinese threat, China’s occupation of Mischief Reef and PLA missile firings in the Taiwan Strait caused rethinking by Malaysian officials. Kuala Lumpur highly approved the Indonesia-Australia military agreement (Whiting, 1997, pp. 311-312).

To sum up, due to the suspicion of threats from China and Japan, ASEAN has been trying to involve and contain both powers. Despite the conflicts and rivalry between China and Japan, a Sino-Japan partnership may form and greatly contribute to the progress of East Asian regionalism due to the economic scale and comprehensive national strength of both. The intensifying economic cooperation between China and Japan serves as a basis for a more comprehensive partnership. In 2009, Japan’s imports from China were $US 122.5 billion Dollars, 22.2 % of its total imports; its contemporary exports to China were $US 109.6 billion Dollars, 18.9 % of its total exports (InternationalTradeCenter, 2010c). China was Japan’s biggest export import partner, while Japan was China’s third largest export partner, 8.32 % of China’s total export, and China’s biggest import partner, 12.27% of China’s total import (CIA, 2010a).

In their competitions in economic issues, there are also chances to advance future cooperation. Enhancing energy cooperation has been proposed by some scholars as an ice-breaking strategy. Since China surpassed Japan to be the second largest oil importer in 2003, China and Japan had an energy competition where oil was available. However, energy could also be an important field to enlarge cooperation. China and Japan can carry out consultation rather than competition. One background of
European integration is wars for resources between Germany and France. To eliminate war, European integration started in their efforts to pool coal and steel, following which was the establishment of EURATOM. Applying this approach to East Asia, China and Japan could make regional multi-lateral dialogues to construct East Asian energy community. This energy community rests on their shared interests on protecting oil route from Middle East and their common need to improve energy efficiency and explore reproducible energy. Since Japan ranks the first in its technology, it will help reduce China’s oil demand and benefit Japan itself if Japan transfers its advanced technology and experience to China (Yang, 2005, p. 280).

Besides the common economic interests, they also have common interests in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conflict on the Korean Peninsula. They share common interests in controlling transnational crime and drug trafficking (Lee, 2005, p. 287).

After the analysis of the major powers as well as their concerns and relationships, the second controversy on the roles of APT and EAS is closed to being solved. The answer lies in the Sino-Japan relationship, their relations with ASEAN countries, and how the United States networks with East Asian countries. It also lies in the actual progresses within the APT and EAS groupings, which will be summarized and compared in the following section.
ASEAN, APT and EAS: a Continuum

Three kinds of processes are concurrently going on in Asia: bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have been emerging; loose international organizations, involving big players of other regions (North America and Europe) and focusing on Asia-Pacific issues, have been contributing moderately to regional communication and mutual trust; and one sub-regional group, ASEAN plus its partners, has been evolving gradually. FTAs are practical remedies to economic developments in Asia. They are most supported by Asia-Pacific countries, due to the weakness of existing regional organizations for economic integration, APEC and ASEAN in particular. However, all the complicated and separate FTA networks are not likely to develop into one single harmonized regional framework and an Asian identity automatically. Concrete developments rely on conscious cooperation among major Asian powers under an effective overall organization.

Now that Middle East, Central Asia and the APEC have been excluded from the major process, developments by the ASEAN, APT and EAS groups will be discussed here. It should be noted that the developments in the three groups are a continuum. The developments of APT and EAS date back to the postwar era when ASEAN was set up. This section argues that the institutions of APT are moderate and the progress is slow; however, due to its limited scale, the willingness of major economies to join and cooperate, and the geographical proximity, it, rather than the EAS, is the major grouping that is most likely to establish an EAC.
The beginning during 1945 – 1987: the distinct context

In the worldwide regionalism trends, the Asian experience is primarily reflected in the processes among ASEAN and its partners after World War Two. It is similar to the European experience in a number of ways: it was launched in the wake of the end of World War Two and the beginning of the Cold War, with the establishment of a core sub-regional organization as a beginning; its priority was transformed as security threats were reduced and economic issues became more important; and it progressed with major powers’ conscious support and a strengthening but vague regional identity. However, the Asian process has different features from the Europe case. It is slower and less successful than Europe in its depth and width due to the distinct historical context, the political cultures in the major powers, the relationship between major powers and the Soviet Union, the relationship among major powers, and the considerable heterogeneity in the levels of economic development.

Although regionalism emerged in postwar Asia, the context was different from that in Europe and it led to a different outcome. In postwar Europe, all major West European countries were on the US side in the Cold War, and they were faced with the Soviet threat. France, Italy and the Benelux countries also had common concerns about the recovery of Germany. Therefore, they made concrete efforts to strengthen economic recovery and maintain peace. They were also supported by the United States, such as the Marshall Plan and the consequent establishment of the OEEC.

By contrast, the postwar Asia did not see grand and practical plans towards
regional integration; nor did it get external support that led to regionalism. The major powers in Asia lacked two important impetuses for regionalism. First, the major East Asian powers were not on the same side in the Cold War as the European powers were. China was a Communist power, an ally of the Soviet Union. Second, with the US military conquest of Japan in 1945, the Soviet support before 1960s, and the recovering economy, China and other neighbors were not threatened by Japan as much as the European countries were by Germany.

Further, as Roger Irvin (1982) suggested, the newly independent Third World countries in Asia, including China, were preoccupied by post-independence tasks, such as setting up new governmental networks, clearing old and inadaptable institutions, and recovering economy. They also needed to make some cooperative efforts, such as Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung, Indonesia, 1955), in order to strengthen their diplomatic influence on world affairs (Irvine, 1982, pp. 10-14). By contrast, the European powers in the same period had a much more stable domestic political environment, and they were pre-occupied by common tasks of enhancing security threats, advancing cooperation to recovery their economies, and regaining the European influence in world economy and politics.

It was in the 1960s that regionalism developments began in the Southeast Asia. The ASEAN was established in 1967 to secure the essential conditions of peace and stability, and it led to some speculation that it was another anti-communist grouping. The withdrawal of western powers or colonial masters left the region with a power vacuum. “The problems of internal and external instability threatened by the spread of
communism and confrontations arising from border conflicts between countries left the region susceptible to economic problems and ill equipped to remedy them” (Thanadsillapakul, 2009, p. 127). Five countries were founders of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and they were referred to as ASEAN Five. They welcomed Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. Therefore, ASEAN has 10 members throughout Southeast Asia, and it is called ASEAN 10 (Shimizu, 2009, p. 3). Due to the division in the Cold War, China, the Soviet Union, Mongolia, and North Korea were not in this anti-communist group. Thus, the major powers in Northeast Asia were not the core circle, which was another difference from the European case. Asian regionalism started among a group of weakest countries rather than major powers.

The Bangkok Declaration (1976) that established ASEAN did not set explicit and concrete security goals; it announced a comprehensive regional partnership in accelerating the economic growth and social development (especially in infrastructures and international trade), promoting regional peace and stability, and advancing active mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical, educational and scientific areas (ASEAN). However, ASEAN remained focused on security.

Up to the late 1980s, ASEAN’ main treaties and declarations were to enhance security and stability, such as Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (Kuala Lumpur Declaration, 1971), Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Bali, 1976), and Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia (Manila, 1987) (ASEAN). The formation of ASEAN could also be construed as a reconciliation process between Southeast Asian countries that had been embroiled in the aforementioned territorial and sovereignty disputes during the early post-independence period. To assist in normalizing relations amongst its member states, a proposal was introduced in 1971 through ASEAN to create a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) that envisaged the creation of a neutralized security zone. At the inaugural 1976 summit, ASEAN member states signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that stipulated signatory countries must not use violence against their signatory members. The second summit held in August 1977 in Kuala Lumpur introduced the ASEAN’s ‘dialogue partner’ framework, which brought together foreign ministers from ASEAN, the EC, the US, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and South Korea in a forum to discuss Southeast Asian Security matters (Dent, 2008, pp. 88-89).

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord in 1976 was more comprehensive than other declarations and treaties by reaffirming the members’ commitment to the Declarations of Bandung, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and the Charter of the UN. It stressed the members’ commitment to enhancing stability, eliminating poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy, establishing the ZOPFAN, developing economy together, and settling conflicts and differences peacefully (ASEAN).

In the 1st ASEAN Summit in 1976, ASEAN began to make efforts in intra-regional economic cooperation, but it achieved little progress in economic cooperation before the end of the Cold War. The economic cooperation, based upon a
report by a UN team (‘Economic Cooperation among Member Countries of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations’), was carried out according to ASEAN’s
Strategy for Collective Import Substituting Industrialization for Heavy and Chemical
Industries (ASEAN’s strategy for CISI). This strategy was conducted through
collective self-reliance policies. However, it suffered a setback from failures, resulting
from conflicts of economic interests among the ASEAN countries, in the
implementation of three policies: ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP), ASEAN
Industrial Complementation (AIC) and the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA)
(along with the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture, AIJB, started in 1983) (Shimizu,
2009, p. 4). In this stage, they failed to create an interdependent and complementary
intra-ASEAN market.

At the 3rd ASEAN Summit in 1987, ASEAN put on a new strategy, the ASEAN
strategy for Collective FDI-dependent and Export-oriented Industrialization (CFEI). It
was intended to increase FDI to the region collectively, to promote economic
development with the FDI, to integrate the ASEAN economies, and to increase export
(Shimizu, 2009, p. 4). It was after the end of the Cold War that this new strategy came
into effect. Thus, the major developments during this stage were in enhancing security
and peace rather than economic integration.

The progress during 1988-1997: cooperation in security and economic
development

In 1991, the CFEI strategy began to be effective as the political and economic
environment changed. With the end of the Cold War and consequent political and economic reforms of the East Asian countries, international cooperation was advanced. The Communist countries began to open their economies and to reduce governmental interference in their economies. The Communism threat had disappeared, and economic cooperation regardless of ideological and historical conflicts had gained more importance. The ASEAN had stopped serving as an anti-Communist group to maintain security and stability, and it began to switch its priority to economic and diplomatic cooperation. The ASEAN members made more efforts to act as a whole to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), to develop intra-ASEAN economy, and to increase its diplomatic influence in international negotiations. However, security had still been attached considerable importance by ASEAN members at this stage.

Before the 1997 economic crisis, ASEAN had numerous institutionalized meetings, including the ASEAN summits, the annual and ad hoc meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers (AMM), the meetings of ASEAN economic ministers, the meetings of other ministers, and the meetings of senior officials (SOM), directors-general and expert groups. Those meetings generated declarations, agreements and treaties for functional cooperation in many areas: ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (1992), ASEAN Free Trade Area (1992), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept paper (1995). Those declarations and agreements provided a comprehensive framework for promoting closer political and economic cooperation (Caballebo-Anthony, 2009, p. 38).

The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was established in January 1992 to
eliminate tariff barriers among the ASEAN members to integrate their economies into a single production base and market. Thereafter, the AFTA Council Ministerial Meeting became the main instrument for the implementation of the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme. The CEPT scheme required that tariff rates should be reduced to no more than 5 percent. Quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers were to be eliminated. As the implementation of the CEPT scheme, intra-ASEAN trade grew from US 44.2 billion in 1993 to US 95.2 billion in 2000, representing an average annual increase of 11.6 percent. Before mid-1997, intra-ASEAN exports had been increased by 29.6 percent, while total ASEAN export of the same period increased by 18.8 percent (ASEAN, p. 7).

During the same period, ASEAN made many efforts to enhance security. The ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (1992) emphasized the necessity to solve the sovereignty and jurisdictional issues in the South China Sea by peaceful means, to cooperate in strengthen safety, communication and environmental protection in this area, and to reduce crimes (ASEAN). Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok, 1995) recalled the ZOPFAN (1971) and affirmed the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone as essential to realize ZOPFAN. This treaty developed detailed rules for concrete actions to realize complete disarmament of nuclear weapons and to reduce the pollution and hazards from radioactive wastes (ASEAN). The Concept Paper for ARF indicated that ASEAN would be the primary driving force of the ARF, aiming at enhancing the peace and prosperity of the Asia-pacific region. It developed a gradual evolutionary approach including three
stages, focusing on Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures, Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanism, and Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanism respectively. No grand designs were envisaged (ASEAN).

While intra-ASEAN economic and security cooperation was advanced to a certain degree, the East Asian cooperation beyond ASEAN was at most moderate before 1997. The outcomes were limited due to the lack of support from major powers such as the U.S, Japan, and China. The Malaysian proposal on forming a trade bloc that developed concrete components in 1991 was criticized for its possibility to accelerate protectionism and to hinder the activities of APEC. Faced with those criticisms, Malaysia changed the proposal from the pursuit of a trade bloc to an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) that was consistent with GATT and APEC goals. However, the 1991 ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting at Kuala Lumpur decided to change the EAEG into East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) that would only meet when the need arises. Although the proposal shrunk from a trade bloc to a caucus only when necessary, it was criticized by then US Secretary of State that EAEC would draw a line inside the Pacific dividing Japan and the U.S.. No concrete measures were taken to realize EAEC thereafter; however, an informal lunch meeting among ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea was held in 1994 to discuss about the EAEC, which was the first meeting of foreign ministers from the group that became known as APT later (Tanaka, 2007, pp. 55-57).

When the EAEC proposal withered away, another framework, Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was proposed in 1994 by Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok
The EU-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) decided to hold the first ASEM summit in 1996. Although Japan supported the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand, only the grouping of ASEAN (7 members), China, Japan, and South Korea was to participate in the ASEM. Its first summit, including the same Asian group that EAEC envisaged, was held in February 1996. The ASEM covered political, social, and cultural issues (Tanaka, 2007, p. 58).

The meetings to discuss about EAEC and to prepare ASEM put ASEAN members and three Northeastern Asian countries together in dealing with intra-regional and inter-regional cooperation, and advanced the birth of APT. The idea about holding APT summits was brought up before the economic crisis in 1997 by Singapore and Malaysia. It was furthered when Japan proposed to hold ASEAN + Japan summits. The first APT Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur on 15 December 1997 (Tanaka, 2007, p. 59).

After 1997: the proposed ASEAN Community

The 1997 Asian economic crisis was another turning point following the end of the Cold War. In early July 1997, the mass selling of the baht by currency speculators precipitated a general loss of confidence in other Southeast Asian currencies in the money markets. This currency crisis thereafter spread across the wider East Asia region, and deepened into a full-blown financial crisis as stock markets, real estate markets and banking systems crashed in many East Asian economies (Dent, 2008, p. 155). This crisis exposed the inadequacy of the ASEAN framework: it did not have
efficient cooperation mechanism with other Asian countries; nor did it provide an emergency mechanism for economic crises in itself. Therefore, it accelerated the intra-ASEAN cooperation.

Several bold plans were signed to achieve deeper and more comprehensive integration. In the second informal ASEAN summit in December 1997, the Heads of Governments of ASEAN signed the ASEAN Vision 2020, whereby they envisioned a number of goals by 2020: the ASEAN region to be in full reality, a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia functioning fully, the ASEAN region free from all weapons of mass destruction, narrowing gap in the level of development among members, the entire Southeast Asia to be bound by a common regional identity and socially cohesive and caring, a clean and green ASEAN with sustainable development, and an outward-looking ASEAN having an intensified relationship with its Dialogue Partners and other regional organizations (ASEAN).

The ASEAN Vision 2020 envisaged the full implementation of its past treaties and agreements, but did not propose any new measures or institutions to fulfill those goals. It also envisaged an ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history and bound by a common regional identity (ASEAN). Despite those goals, no specific institutions were proposed by 1997. The goal of the proposed ASEAN community only included the construction of a regional identity, rather than concrete structures equivalent to the EC.
In 2003, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) was signed by ASEAN 10 that an ASEAN Community would be established. It called the proposed bodies “three pillars”. The ASEAN Politico-Security Community (APSC) was to uphold ASEAN’s principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision making, and respect for national sovereignty. The High Council of the TAC would be the important component of the security community, the ARF would remain the main forum for security dialogue, and other existing institutions would be utilized. The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was to improve the existing ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism and fully realize a single market and production base. The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) was to realize several goals such as communication of scholars and cooperation in public health, but no new or existing institutions were mentioned (ASEAN).

In 2004, the 10th Summit of ASEAN passed action plans for setting up two of the three pillars. The ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action was to encourage the roles of several institutions or mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO), the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), the ASEAN Institution of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), and the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ABAC). It would also establish several other mechanisms, such as an ASEAN-China Working Group on the Implementation of Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and a review mechanism, an annual ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM), an ASEAN Arms Register to be administered by the ASEAN Secretariat, an ASEAN early
warning system based on existing mechanisms to prevent conflicts, and an ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre (ASEAN, 2004b).

In the political-security pillar, five mechanisms are present. The annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) had been established in 1967, and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) functioned within the purview of AMM. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been one of the mechanisms. ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) established in 2006 meets annually. The ASEAN Law Ministers Meeting (ALAWMM) established in 1986 and meets every 36 months. The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) that was set up in 1997 meets once every two years (ASEAN, 2010c).

The 2004 ASEAN Summit also passed the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Plan of Action that decided to strengthen or implement several mechanisms or institutions, including the framework of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD), the ASEAN Heritage Parks, and the ASEAN Foundation (ASEAN, 2004c).

In the socio-cultural pillar, more than 10 branches are present. The ASEAN Committee on Culture and Information (COCI) was established in 1978. The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management (AMMDM) was established in early 2003, consisting heads of national agencies. The ASEAN Education Ministers Meeting (ASED) was established in December 2005. The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Environment (AMME) was established in 1981. The ASEAN Health
Ministers Meeting (AHMM) was established in 1980 and meets once in two years. The ASEAN Labour Ministers Meeting was first held in 1975 and thereafter every two years. The Senior Labour Officials Meeting (SLOM) Working Group on Progressive Labour Practices to Enhance the Competitiveness of ASEAN (SLOM-WG) was established in 2006 as an ad-hoc working group and was reconstituted as a permanent body in 2008. The SLOM Working Group on the HIV Prevention and Control in the Work Place was established in May 2008. The ASEAN Committee on Science and Technology (COST) was established in 1978 and worked out several action plans for developments in this area. The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting for Social Welfare and Development (AMMSWD), which meets once every three years, was established in 1989 (ASEAN, 2010d).

The development of ASEAN economic pillar dates back to 1960s, when the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) began meeting in 1969 and held annual meetings thereafter. Several sectoral bodies functions under the purview of AEM: consumer protection (since 2007), customs (since 2003), external economic relations (AEM + 3 since 2000), industry (since 1996), intellectual property, services (since 1995), small & medium enterprises, and standard & conformance (since 1987). The ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting (AMEM) began cooperation on energy since 1986. The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF) began in 1982. The ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting (AFMM) dates back to 1997. ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Minerals (AMMin) was established in 2005 and meets at least once in three years. ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC)
cooperation was established in 1996 and meets annually. ASEAN Transport Ministers Meeting (ATM) was established in 1996 and meets annually. ASEAN Telecommunications and IT Ministers Meeting (TELMIN) began in 2001 and is held annually. ASEAN Tourism Ministers Meeting started in 1998 (ASEAN, 2010b).

Besides the separate plans of action, a comprehensive action plan to realize the ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA), was signed in December 1997. It had a six-year timeframe from 1999 to 2004 and reviewed the progress of implementation every three years (ASEAN). In 2004, the 10th ASEAN Summit concluded the successful implementation of HPA. It contributed to the realization of the end-goal of ASEAN Vision 2020 and the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II leading to the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2020. The Vientiane Action Program(me), another six-year plan, was signed as the successor of the HPA to realize the end goal of the ASEAN Vision 2020 and the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II (ASEAN).

In 2007, ASEAN Charter was passed, and it entered into force in December 2008. It concluded the purposes and goals expressed in previous treaties and agreements of ASEAN, the organs such as ASEAN Summit and Coordinating Council, the ministerial bodies in each pillar, the membership criteria, and decision-making mechanisms. Although both the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II and ASEAN Charter name those ministerial bodies as three pillars, ASEAN continues take “consensus” as the basic principle and the ASEAN Summit the highest decision-making organ in all three pillars (ASEAN, 2008, p. 13).
According to Balassa’s definition on stages of economic integration, AFTA is a genuine agreement for a free trade area that only considers intra-ASEAN trade. In terms of trade, ASEAN is less than a free trade area since AFTA has not been fully implemented by weaker members, although ASEAN claims itself a virtual free trade area by the time it passed the ASEAN Charter in November 2007.

Further, ASEAN’s goals are beyond a free trade area. At the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007, ASEAN claimed in the AEC Blueprint that it would realize AEC by 2015 (ASEAN, 2007), characterized by closer consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies, integrated industries to promote regional sourcing, free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labour, and freer flow of capital (ASEAN, 2010b). That being said, AEC Blueprint included measures to suppress restrictions on trade and factor movements and some moderate measures to achieve a certain degree of harmonization of national economic policies. According to Balassa’s categorization, ASEAN aims to build a common market and then an economic union among its 10 members, but it is not clear to what degree the ASEAN members will be able to coordinate their economic policies. One on hand, it should be noted that all measures on the elimination of tariff and integration of customs structures are applied only to ASEAN 10 (nonmembers are excluded in the ASEAN Charter and AEC Blueprint), so ASEAN is not (and it has not intended to achieve) a customs union that Balassa defined as equalization of trade with both members and nonmembers. On the other, it aims to go further than a customs union. Therefore, it defines its goals as “a single market and production base” and as “an economic
community” rather than a customs union. Considering the disparity of members’
economic development and the decision-making based on consensus, it remains to be
seen whether ASEAN can build such an economic union.

In the AEC Blueprint, a strategic schedule for detailed steps towards integration
in various areas was made; no further measures towards what Balassa called the final
stage of economic integration (such as setting up a supranational body and unifying
fiscal and monetary policies) were envisaged. Its measures including dispute
settlement mechanism are to be taken by consensus. As the 10th ASEAN Summit in
2004 passed ASCC and APSC plans of action, a more comprehensive protocol on the
dispute mechanism (ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism)
was achieved to replace the 1996 Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
According to the 2004 protocol, any member state involved in a dispute can request
another party for consultations and the receiving party should reply within 10 days
after the date of receipt of the request. If the involved state does not reply in 10 days
or could not solve the dispute in their own consultations, they can request the Senior
Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) to establish a panel that shall address the
relevant provisions in any covered agreement cited by the parties to the dispute and
submit its findings and recommendations to the SEOM. The Panel has the right to
seek advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate and the involved
members shall respond fully to the requests of the panel. The Appellate Body
established by AEM (ASEAN Economic ministers) hears appeals from panel cases. It
is composed of seven persons specialized in law and international trade regardless of
their nationality. The Appellate Body’s report to SEOM shall be accepted unconditionally unless the SEOM decides not to agree with it by consensus (ASEAN, 2004a).

While ASEAN has realized AFTA to a great degree and has achieved some features of a common market, its political-security pillar is much weaker than that of the EU. The APSC Blueprint was passed in the 14th ASEAN Summit in 2009. It does not aim to set up a regional court or parliament; rather, it stresses the importance of values such as peace, democracy, and transparency, and it only includes some inter-governmental meetings or fora as its main mechanism in political and security cooperation, such as the ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Information and the ASEAN Law Ministers Meeting (ALAWMM). The ALAWMM is entrusted with the task of strengthening the rule of law, judicial systems and legal infrastructure within ASEAN Law Association (ALA). The APSC council monitors the overall implementation of the APSC Blueprint and makes reports to the AEAN Summit. Its members are foreign ministers and their representatives designated by each member country (ASEAN, 2009). Functional integration, as they name their socio-cultural pillar, progresses well and may contribute to their economic and political integration.

**After 1997: APT and the proposed EAC**

As ASEAN integration progressed in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, APT integration also gained momentum. Yunling Zhang (2005) suggested that the real East Asian cooperation process only started after the 1997 Asian financial crisis when the
APT group formed and the major powers initiated conscious efforts towards region-wide cooperation (Zhang, 2005, p. 3). The first APT Summit was held in December 1997, but it was quite informal. Regional diplomats were at a loss in the face of financial crisis. Indonesian President decided not to attend the summit because of illness and South Korean President sent Prime Minister. It ended up as a typical talk-shop meeting among leaders, without agreeing on any concrete measures (Tanaka, 2007, p. 61). No substantial agreements were achieved to solve the financial crisis in this summit, but afterwards, further developments among the APT countries were considerable.

Japan tried to play the leader’s role in face of this crisis and raised constructive programs to strengthen the APT cooperation. It proposed an AMF proposal that suggested a standby fund of US 100 billion for emergency financial assistance to East Asian countries. Japan proposed to make the majority contribution while other major economies, such as China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan would also pool their foreign exchange reserves. This constructive initiative was denied by Washington. Thereafter, Japan worked out an alternative option, the NMI that was launched in October 1998, whereby US 30 billion was available to East Asian economies in crisis, and a US 3 billion Asian Currency Crisis Support Facility was to be administered by the Asian Development Bank to help APT countries raise funds (Dent, 2008, pp. 155-156).

The Second APT Summit was more constructive, and it became an instrument for APT countries to develop initiatives as well as provide suggestions for furthering
financial cooperation. Japan introduced the launch of its new US 5 billion Special Yen Loan Facility that could offer low interest, long-term loans. APT leaders also agreed under the Hanoi Plan of Action to develop new methods for improving regional financial stability. China’s proposal for regularized APT finance meetings was accepted and operationalized in 1999. In 2000, the first APT Finance Ministers Meeting was held in Chiang Mai. A system of bilateral currency swap agreements (BCSAs) among APT countries was agreed. This CMI was an extension of NMI proposed by Japan. Thereafter, the scale of financial cooperation was expanded under the APT partnership (Dent, 2008, p. 156). The Special APT Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Phuket in February 2009 agreed to increase the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) from US 80 billion to US 120 billion. The 12th APT Finance Ministers’ Meeting in May 2009 in Bali reached an agreement on all the main components of the CMIM, including individual countries’ contribution, borrowing accessibility, and the surveillance mechanism. The Ministers agreed to implement the CMIM before the end of 2009 (ASEAN, August 2009).

The Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) was the second main structure of regional financial cooperation that emerged from the APT framework. It aimed to develop efficient and liquid bond markets in Asia and to contribute to the mitigation of currency and maturity mismatches in financing. Six working groups were established to address six different issues: new securitized debt instruments, credit guarantee mechanisms, foreign exchange transactions and settlement issues, issuance of bonds denominated in local currency by Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs),
foreign government agencies and Asian multinational corporations, local and regional rating agencies, and technical assistance coordination. The six groups met in Tokyo in 2003 and held discussions with APT officials, MDBs, government agencies, private insurers, and other market participants during the meeting. After in-depth deliberation among APT officials, a proposal was put forward to establish a mechanism for disseminating information on bond markets, which Singapore and Japan would handle. Further steps were set in details (ASEAN).

A third main scheme for advancing APT financial integration was the introduction of a basic form of Asian Currency Unit (ACU). It was recommended by hosting Philippines President Joseph Estrada at the 1999 APT Summit that the APT group should have a long-term objective of creating an East Asian common currency. In 2006, the ACU scheme was first formally proposed, but wide disagreements arose over the ACU membership and calculations of ACU weightings (Dent, 2008, p. 165).

As they made considerable progress in financial cooperation, the APT countries advanced their cooperation in trade greatly since 2004. ASEAN and Japan signed the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) in April 2008. Lao PDR, Myanmar, Singapore, Viet Nam and Japan have been implementing the agreement since December 2008, while Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia since January and February 2009, respectively. ASEAN and South Korea agreed on the timeline for their FTA: 2008 for South Korea, 2010 for ASEAN Six, 2016 for Viet Nam and 2018 for Cambodia, Laos PDR, and Myanmar. The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Agreement on Dispute Settlement
Mechanism between ASEAN and South Korea were signed in December 2005. The Agreement on Trade in Goods with South Korea was signed by nine ASEAN members and South Korea in 2006 and implemented in 2007. The Trade in Services Agreement was signed in 2007 and entered into force in May 2009. Thailand signed the accession protocols to the two agreements in 2009. The ASEAN-ROK Investment Agreement was signed in June 2009. Between ASEAN and China, the timeline for the establishment of FTA in goods was decided: 2010 for ASEAN Six and China, and 2015 for CLMV countries. The Agreements on Trade in Goods and Dispute Settlement Mechanism between ASEAN and China were signed in November 2004. The agreement on Trade in Goods has entered into force since 2005, and the Agreement on Trade in Services was signed in January 2007 and entered into force in July 2007. Negotiations on the Investment Agreement were completed and the agreement was signed in August 2009. Possible options for East Asian FTA (EAFTA) have been being studied, and Phase II has been finalized (ASEAN, August 2009).

Total ASEAN exports to the Plus Three countries increased from US$ 192.5 billion in 2007 to US$ 225.4 billion in 2008 registering a growth rate of 17.1%. This was faster than that in 2007 when ASEAN exports to these countries grew by only 10.9%. ASEAN imports of goods from the same countries continued to accelerate with a 19.5% growth in 2008, from 15.7% in 2007. Total ASEAN imports from these countries stood at US$ 254.7 billion, up from US$ 213.1 billion in 2007 (ASEAN, August 2009).

Their cooperation in other areas, such as energy, tourism, food security, public
health, and environment was advanced to a certain degree. The APT cooperation in energy sector has been strengthened in five fora: energy security, oil market, oil stockpiling, natural gas, and new renewable energy and energy efficiency. The APT Ministers on Agriculture and Food Cooperation agreed to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR) Pilot Project, and they agreed to extend the EAERR Pilot Project until February 2010. On the health sector, the APT Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID) Program aims to enhance regional preparedness and capacity to prevention, surveillance and response to infectious diseases (ASEAN, August 2009).

The progress of the APT cooperation in political-security issues and the expansion of the membership have been moderate. In November 2001, the 5th APT Summit issued the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Join Action to Counter Terrorism, and decided to hold a Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime in 2002. The 2002 APT Summit saw the willingness to explore the evolution of the APT summit into an East Asian Summit (ASEAN). In the 2004 APT Summit (November, Vientiane), the APT leaders agreed to set the establishment of an East Asian Community as a long-term objective. The APT was reaffirmed as the main vehicle for the eventual establishment of an EAC (ASEAN). The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the APT Summit in December 2005 welcomed the convening of the First East Asia Summit on 14 December 2005 (ASEAN). The ninth and 10th APT Summits in 2005 and 2007 reaffirmed the long-term goal of the establishment of EAC, with APT as the essential part of the regional architecture. However, they have not agreed on where to
start cooperation and who to include. Although the Council on the East Asian Community, a Japanese Think Tanks’ organization, provided several recommendations on community building, no detailed plans of action for EAC have been passed by the governments.

After reviewing the historical processes of integration in Asia, we can give a better answer to the second controversy. Four concentric circles of regional integration could be identified: ASEAN, APT, EAS and APEC. Deeper integration among APEC nations is not likely to happen, but the future of the rest three smaller groups is not clear. ASEAN has set up its goal of establishing an ASEAN community, for which it has worked out detailed plans of action. It remains to be seen whether the goal will be realized by 2020. As Gerald Tan (1996) suggested, whether ASEAN countries can quicken the pace of progress of integration remains to be seen. Optimists can only hope that the path towards a FTA will not be impeded by nationalistic obstacles (Tan, 1996, pp. 168-169). The future of an EAC with APT as the essential vehicle is cloudier: the APT countries have not worked out detailed and practical plans of actions; nor have they agreed on the membership of the EAC. By early 2010, EAS has only had four summits, where the progress has been more limited than that within the APT. The identity of Australia and New Zealand with other Asian countries is not widely accepted yet. Considering the intensity of interactions in the two groupings, APT, rather than EAS, may be the grouping founding the EAC.
Conclusion: the East Asian Groupings

After an overall glance on the regional developments in Middle East, Central Asia and Russia, the APEC, and East Asia, several conclusions can be achieved. First, it is widely considered that the APT group may be the major vehicle towards the EAC, since it has produced intensified projects for cooperation including the EAC proposal, and has also included the major Asian powers. The APEC has lost its momentum, due to its loose structure and huge membership. A competing view favored by Japan, Indonesia, and India is that EAS should be the main vehicle. As a young group for cooperation, it includes more powers that are not in but closely connected to East Asia. Despite the intensifying links among the EAS countries, the EAS has much fewer cooperation projects than the APT. Debates on the membership of India, Australia and New Zealand are unsolved. While APT countries are all willing to be part of EAC, Australia has been reluctant. Since India has expressed a strong willingness to be part of EAC and it is an Asian country, the group of APT plus India might gain more support than the EAS.

Second, ASEAN is the core area of the APT group, as it has the most intensified links among the members and it has an ambitious plan towards integration. However, whether the proposed ASEAN Community can be realized by schedule is uncertain. There is no doubt that ASEAN has been implementing comprehensive cooperation plans in various areas, notably in the functional and economic areas. It has been close to realizing a FTA fully by 2010, but the poorer members lag behind the ASEAN Five in implementing AFTA. It remains to be seen whether this region can fully establish
the proposed economic community with a single market and production base and a competitive region with equitable development by 2020. The overall principle of ASEAN is still consensus-based, without any supranational mechanisms or bodies. Whether this feature will change in future is uncertain.

Third, within the Plus Three countries, China and Japan are two competing powers that have the potential to become regional leaders; however, neither is widely accepted as the only benevolent regional leader, nor are they co-leading the formation of EAC. Some Japanese scholars asserted that Japan had become a low-key regional leader that was the biggest Asian power and had made the major contributions to Asian regionalism. Especially, Japanese scholars have been active in proposing how the EAC could be constructed under the Draft Charter of the EAC. However, its recession and the rise of China as the biggest trading partner with South Korea and ASEAN challenged Japan’s position. With the economic and military strength as well as the proactive diplomacy, China presents a considerable counterweight to Japan. Involving India and Australia in the Asian regional institutionalization is a tactic of Japan to balance China; however, no consensus has been achieved on Japan’s proposal for ASEAN plus Six. It must also be noted that China’s influence in East Asia has been challenged by Indonesia and Malaysia. Containing both Japan and China is in ASEAN’s interest. One solution to the current Sino-Japan tension and competition, as the Chinese scholar Su Hao (2005) suggested, is for China and Japan to coordinate closely to play a big role in the process of East Asian regional
cooperation (Su, 2005, p. 47), but the ongoing political tension renders it less promising.

Fourth, East Asia is not likely to develop a cohesive community equivalent to the EU or African Union (AU). The historical ideological division between ASEAN and the communist countries left China out of the original ASEAN process. Japan and South Korea are also new to Asian regionalism. Thus, the genuine beginning of Asian regionalism that involves the major powers and explicitly claims the goal of community-building dates back to the late 1990s, when the 1997/8 Asian economic crisis and global-wide regionalization provoked the Asian countries’ coming-together. It lagged behind Europe and Africa by some 50 years. In this new process, lack of trust is a problem.

Further, during 1997 and 2010, the context was much different than that of the European case and the African case. There were no common security threats or occupation in either of the big powers’ territory; therefore, it was hard for China or Japan to make compromises. The Sino-Japan rivalry is still the most outstanding feature in their relations. This rivalry makes it difficult for them to share information on security issues. Besides, nationalism and the lack of “universal values” in China renders a deeper level of integration, such as setting up a supranational body and sharing military information, unlikely to happen. Since ASEAN as a core organization is weak in the decision-making mechanism, a wider EAC involving other major powers with fundamental conflicts is not likely to develop a stronger form of
integration. It is no surprise that there has not been any continental or regional organization involving main powers in Asia.

Compared to European and African integration, the East Asian experience is different in many aspects. In the first place, the progress in East Asia has been much slower. While Western European countries set up the EC and African countries set up the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the 1960s, Asian regionalism did not really expand and start until the 1990s (although its origin dates back to the 1960s when ASEAN was set up). After the 1997 economic crisis, the Plus Three countries began to intensify cooperation with the ASEAN. Up to 2008, the EU had implemented concrete measures to realize an economic and monetary union, and three African regional economic communities (RECs) had made specific goals towards an economic union and realized FTAs, while ASEAN had not fully realized AFTA, and the major powers in East Asia could not achieve any consensus on the proposed EAC. Further, the ASEAN only includes Southeast Asian countries and excludes the three major powers, while both the EU and the AU include the major powers. The Sino-Japan relationship remains uncertain, while the Franco-German partnership served as the basis for the establishment of the ECSC and the reconciliation of two African groups in the 1960s for the establishment of the OAU. Besides, the Bali Concord II and other plans of action for building the ASEAN Community envisaged much more moderate measures than the EU and the AU did. The European countries made efforts towards political integration such as building the EDC (although failed) and setting up a regional parliament. The AU set up a continental parliament and
court, and it envisaged a common defense policy. By contrast, ASEAN and the +3 countries have not proposed any measures of close political cooperation. The proposed ASEAN Community does not include a regional court or parliament, nor has it envisaged a common currency or a single bank system as the EU did.
Chapter 5

Pan-Africanism: Struggle for Independence and Prosperity

Introduction

The case of European integration shows that regional unity can lead to prosperity; however, the contrast between Asia and Africa can prove that prosperity and unity don’t always fit together. The genuine beginning of Asian regionalism process was in the response to the 1997 financial shock, when many Asian countries had intensified informal inter-state linkages. The major powers in Asia had already been prosperous to a great degree since 1997, but they did not have a formal regional organization.

By contrast, integration has been a key strategy for Africa to develop its economies. With the rapid development and expansion of information and communications technologies as well as the reach of private sectors, weaker economies are likely to suffer the most unless integrated within these processes. To keep up with the regionalism and globalization trends and to maintain regional peace, African countries take integration as a major goal (AfricanUnion, 2008a, p. 27). They embarked on numerous activities towards regional integration since the 1950s. Some of the leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah, actively advocated for continental political unity in the 1950s and 1960s. Although they did not achieve consensus on setting up a political union, they set up the continent-wide intergovernmentalism OAU in the 1960s. During the 1970s and 1980s, the continental and regional developments were quite limited, due to the priority given to struggles for stability, and independence for
the remaining states under colonial minority rule. In the 1990s, they began to lay importance on economic integration and regional political developments by setting up regional courts, parliament, and the Peace and Security Commission. Therefore, they have gone much further than Asia in terms of symbolic continental integration. However, their levels of economic development are generally much lower than those in Asia.

Besides the contrast in the correlations between the developments of regional institutions and the levels of economic development, African integration is also distinctive in that it started continental cooperation in the beginning. Meanwhile, this process has been going on at two levels: both continental and sub-regional. The idea of African integration is widely referred to as pan-Africanism. This chapter discusses the identity of African countries first, and then summarizes the major continental pan-Africanism developments. Following that, it summarizes the sub-regional developments within three main regional economic communities (RECs).

**The Question of Identity: Africa in Pan-Africanism**

Before the investigation into the pan-Africanism developments, one big-picture question needs to be answered: how does one conceptualize Africa? In the processes of integration, regional identity has generally been changed from the geographical sense to the politico-economic sense. In terms of identity, Africa, compared to Asia, has more resemblances to Europe: it has set up a continental organization. However, it is not completely the same as Europe, where the European Union (EU) only includes
some European countries and has difficulty absorbing new members to its East. While the East Europe and Balkan countries do not share a clear identity with other EU countries, the African countries share a clear common identity within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its descendent, the African Union (AU). It should be noted that although the geographical Africa almost overlaps with the region that the AU covers, the AU has been more a political and economic, rather than merely geographical, region. Its shared new identity stems from the member countries’ common interests in the history of being colonized and the status quo of instability and generally low level of economic development.

Another difference between pan-Africanism and regionalism in other regions lies in the structures of regional institutions. European integration started from one core industrialized area, and it expanded as concentric circles. Asia also has concentric circles, which started from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and has been expanding to the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and then the East Asian Summit (EAS) grouping. Its outer relations may expand to the Asia-Pacific region. By contrast, pan-Africanism started as the desire of all African countries to be independent. It was especially promoted by a few countries in the West Africa, such as Ghana, but it was continentally accepted by political leaders in the 1960s despite some substantial constraints. The OAU was established in 1962, and it survived through the post-colonial age and the Cold War. In 2002, it was updated to the AU, which has focused more on economic integration and institutionalization. Some countries ratified more agreements than others, but there are no clear inner or outer circles.
Another feature of the structure is that several RECs co-exist with the AU. The RECs cover one sub-region each, but some of them partly overlap. They have developed their own schedule for regional integration and also some linkages, although weak, to the AU. Some of them clearly claim that their goals shall conform to the AU’s. The beginning of RECs dates back to the 1950s.

In 1953, Kwame Nkrumah became prime minister of the Gold Coast and organized a conference recommending building West African Unity for the first time. In a decade following Nkrumah’s initiative, West and North African countries convened numerous conferences discussing how the independence and integration of African states should be maintained and consolidated. They fell into three camps at first, and then were developed into two distinctive camps based on whether they pursued moderate or ambitious integration (the Monrovia and Casablanca groups).

In the meantime, East and Central Africa developed their own sub-regional group. Before the All African People’s Organization (AAPO) Conference that was to take place in December 1958, an East and Central African leaders’ conference was convened by Julius Nyerere, later president of Tanganyika, in September 1958. This conference founded the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), and approved its constitution. Its aims were centered on freedom and independence: ending colonialism and imperialism, coordinating to speed the liberation of their said territories, establishing a freedom fund, and championing non-violence in their struggles for freedom and prosperity. In 1959, a second conference of PAFMECA was held in Zanzibar and it called for universal

In October 1960, the PAFMECA’s third annual conference in Uganda comprised Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar. Ethiopia and Somalia joined PAFMECA’s movement in February 1962. There were also delegates from Basutoland (now Lesotho), Bechuanaland (now Botswana), South Africa, South West Africa (Namibia) and Swaziland. The PAFMECA became Pan African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) at this conference. It agreed that an East African Federation, proposed by Julius Nyerere, should be established when Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar became independent, and this organization would be the first logical step towards the final goal of total African unity. An administering body, the Coordinating Freedom Council, was established with two members from each member country (Ajala, 1973, pp. 42-43). The sub-regional efforts did not stop after 1963 when a continental organization was proposed and established; rather, they continued to prosper as practical steps towards a continental organization for integration.

While the OAU began to make efforts for independence and integration in 1963, sub-regional groupings continued to emerge and co-exist. Eight organizations or institutions have been recognized by the AU: the East African Community (EAC), the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS),
the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) (Kane & Mbelle, 2007, p. 25).

The emergence of sub-regional groupings is partly out of concerns for the difficulty that large membership within the OAU may cause. Most of the RECs’ memberships are open only to countries in the respective sub-region and countries directly connected to member states. However, the redundancy of membership of African states in more than two RECs, to a certain degree, reflects the weak and vague sub-regional identity. Nevertheless, as the separated RECs make progress in their sub-regional integration, they will have clearer sub-regional identities and more incompatible regulations with one another. Furthermore, the continental identity is also undermined by their languages in relating to the colonial powers that used to dominate them, military and territory conflicts, and states’ continuing concerns of sovereignty. Underdeveloped economies, lack of democracy, and corruption are also hindering closer integration and hence the forming of a continental identity.

One question can be raised: as the RECs exist, could Africa be seen as a region or a collection of regions? Early in the 1950s, some political leaders and scholars had been advocating for African unity. Although different groupings emerged, they were consolidated into a continental organization in 1963. Since then, Africa has been constantly referred to as a region. As is claimed in the Charter of the OAU, “all Africans should henceforth unite…” (Murithi, 2005, p. 7).
However, achieving continental peace and prosperity based on continental unity is an invented idea that has not been turned into full reality. As Timothy Murithi (2005) indicated, Pan-Africanism is a recognition that Africans have been divided among themselves, and it is also a recognition that the only way out of the current political, social and existential crisis is by promoting unity amongst Africans (Murithi, 2005, p. 8). The establishment of the OAU was the first step to institutionalize the idea, but the developments within the OAU and the AU have been limited. A continental FTA is still far from being realized. Therefore, the African continent is not a genuine region as defined in this research.

By contrast, the RECs that have realized FTAs can be recognized as regions. In the AU’s schedule, realizing regional integration at the sub-regional level is the first logical step towards continental unification. The major developments of economic integration at the first stage are carried out by RECs to a great degree, as is envisaged in the African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty. It is envisaged that during 1994-1999, the OAU countries were to have strengthened the existing RECs and establish RECs where they do not exist. During 2000-2008, they were expected to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, customs duties and internal taxes at the level of each REC, and strengthen sectoral integration in economic fields and coordinate policies among RECs. During 2009-2019, they intend establish a free trade area by gradually removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and establishing a customs union by adopting a common external tariff at the level of each REC. During 2020-2022, they expect to coordinate the tariff and non-tariff systems among different RECs and
establish a continental Customs Union (AFRICANUNION, 1991, pp. 10-11). Since
the RECs have not been consolidated into a single FTA, Africa remains a collection of
separate regions.

Weak governance in most of Africa has been one of the major problems that
hinder regional integration. In other words, many African countries lack effective
states. An effective state is defined by Alan Siaroff (2009, p. 50) as follows:

“[A]n effective state … controls the national territory and the borders and has
sufficient domestic penetration to ensure that national laws and policies are
in effect throughout the country. … [T]here is sufficient state capacity to
raise tax revenues and … to provide at least primary education for the vast
majority of children. … [A] weak state lacks one or more of these points
and … will generally be inadequate for economic and social development”.

According to these criteria, in 2007, 24 African countries were still weak states
(Siaroff, 2009, p. 51). As Paul Collier argues, terrible governance can be major
impediments to economic development (Collier, 2007, p. 64). Good governance is
also critical to effective capacity-building and intergovernmentalism.

It is important to review the developments of the AU and each REC in Africa, to
examine at which stage African economic integration is. It is also necessary to review
the relationships between the AU/OAU and the sub-regions, to examine to what
degree African identity or sub-regional identity exists and to what degree the RECs
advance or hinder Pan-Africanism.

**Origin and Early Developments of Pan-Africanism: 1900-1962**

The beginning of African integration was not after World War Two (as Europe
and Asia did), but during the colonial age of African countries. Attaining
independence was their initial impetus that led to the emergence of Pan-Africanism. It was not initiated by countries, but overseas Africans fighting for equal rights. When African national leaders began to lead Pan-Africanism movements, they were divided into two camps according to their approaches to integration. On the whole, political leaders’ intensified efforts towards regional integration were motivated by their common will to change the dependent status of their countries, but the outcome was weakened by their cleavage on whether to pursue minimalist or ambitious integration.

1900-1945: advocating for respect and independence abroad.

Pan-Africanism began among the exiles in Europe and the United States convening conferences and organizing cultural associations that turned to explicit political agitation for African independence. The first attempt towards the Pan-Africanist objective was in 1900, when Henry Sylvester-Williams, a West Indian barrister, organized a Pan-African conference which aimed to act as a forum of protest against the aggressiveness of white colonists. However, with the death of Henry Sylvester-Williams, Pan-Africanism as an organizational activity for African independence did not advance far (Ajala, 1973, pp. 3-4).

In the 1920s and 1930s, African intellectuals and students were advocating for African unity. Joseph Casely-Hayford founded the National Congress of British West Africa in 1920, with the goal of promoting cooperation among Africans in the four British West African colonies. After Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, the International African Friends of Abyssinia was formed in London, and it turned into
the International African Service Bureau (IASB) in 1937. This organization was to promote the unity of Africans (Ajala, 1973, p. 9).

Beginning in 1944 when the IASB and 12 other organizations formed the Pan-African Federation, their movements became more organized and intensified. When the British Trades Union Congress held a conference in 1944, the Pan-African Federation decided to seize its opportunity and organize a Pan-African Congress. A specially constituted Special International Conference Secretariat immediately began preparations. In October 1945, the Pan-African congress assembled in Manchester, with more than 200 delegates from the entire colored world. Africa was well represented for the first time, and they took a leading part in it. For the first time, Pan-Africanism and African nationalism were fully discussed. Accordingly, the congress adopted a number of resolutions, aiming at the abolition of exploitation in the colonies and injustice. The congress delivered the Declaration to the Colonial Powers, demanding for Africa autonomy and independence and expressing the conviction that all colonies must be free from foreign imperialist control. Thus, Pan-Africanism was growing from protest movements into an instrument of African nationalist movements (Ajala, 1973, pp. 10-12). Thereafter, sub-regional activities for integration, rather than continental-wide efforts, began to emerge.

1946-1962: native efforts within competing groups.

The West African national congress was called in 1946. In 1953, Kwame Nkrumah became prime minister of the Gold Coast (which became the independent
nation of Ghana in 1957) and organized a conference attended by nationalist representatives in West Africa. The conference recommended establishing a national congress of West Africa to promote West African unity. The English-speaking and French-speaking territories of West Africa were to hold conferences alternatively. However, the congress of West Africa did not actually convene conferences for unity and independence, but became a means of African leaders to keep in touch (Ajala, 1973, pp. 12-13).

At Ghana’s independence celebrations in 1957, Nkrumah spoke of his intention to convene a Conference of Independent African States (CIAS), aiming to consolidate the independence of those states and to help other Africans under colonial rule. The first CIAS was held in Accra, Ghana in 1958, marking the formal launching of the Pan-African movement on African soil. Participating countries included Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, and Ghana, who are mostly in Northwest Africa. They agreed on cooperation in foreign affairs, such as exchange of views on foreign policy (including in relation to independence) and the establishment of permanent machinery for consultation on foreign policy. Their cooperation was also to cover several economic and cultural issues, such as examination of ways to promote economic cooperation based on exchanging technical and educational information with regard to industrial planning, and formulation of concrete proposals for exchanging visiting governmental and non-governmental cultural missions (Ajala, 1973, pp. 15-16).

Before the end of 1958, Ghana acted as the host to another Pan-African
Conference of the African political parties, the AAPO Conference. Except the absence of Nigerian Northern Peoples’ Congress and the ruling political parties in French Africa excluding Guinea, other political parties attended. Nkrumah spoke of four stages towards Pan-Africanism: the attainment of freedom and independence; the consolidation of that freedom and independence; the creation of unity and community among states; and the economic and social reconstruction of Africa (Ajala, 1973, p. 18). Clearly, African unity was perceived to serve African independence and prosperity. In this regard, African countries pursued a different goal in their regionalism activities from that of European and Asian countries. Ghana served as a regional leader during the 1940s and 1950s.

In 1958, Guinea became independent with a badly affected economy. Sekou Toure of Guinea and Nkrumah of Ghana had several talks in Accra in November 1958, and they decided that the two countries would constitute themselves into a union of West African States. Although this idea was strongly criticized by Chief Anthony Enahoro of Nigeria, the constitutional commission continued its work. Membership was open to all other independent African states. The Ghana-Guinea Union was to build a free and prosperous African community, with a common economic, foreign and defence policy (Ajala, 1973, pp. 20-21).

In July 1959, a conference between the heads of Ghana, Guinea and Liberia was held in Sanniquellie, Liberia, on the initiative of President Tubman of Liberia. Tubman suggested that the conference should discuss African unity, freedom and independence, but he wanted no final decision for African unity until other African
territories had fixed dates for independence. All other independent states, he insisted, should fully participate as founding members to make sure that the unity process was satisfactory and supported by all. Although Nkrumah and Toure did not agree to postpone the establishment of West African Unity, they deferred any decision on taking concrete measures towards unity. They did agree to form a Community of Independent African States with respect to national identities, constitutional structure, and the principle of non-interference. They were to lay importance on economic and cultural affairs, and membership was to be open to all independent African states (Ajala, 1973, pp. 21-22). Thus, when Liberia joined, Ghana and Guinea compromised their original ambition. Their goal shrank from a union with common economic and foreign policies to a community with its focus on economic cooperation. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria commented in July 1959, “if for many years certain parties have fought for their sovereignty, it is unlikely that they will surrender that sovereignty to a nebulous organization” (Ajala, 1973, p. 23). His comment explained the inter-governmental approach of Nigeria and some other countries. However, the ambitious approach was not compromised totally. The Second AAPO Conference in Tunis in 1960 amended Constitution for the AAPO by defining the objectives of Pan-Africanism as “to work for the emergence of the United States of Africa (which was developed from Ghana-Guinea Union in 1959)” (Ajala, 1973, p. 24). The disagreement between the conservative and the ambitious groups continued in the second CIAS in 1960. While Ghana and Guinea supported a political union, Nigeria took the lead in opposing such suggestions. Moreover, the leaders in the
French community showed little or no interest in Pan-Africanism. Within such controversy, the second CIAS achieved little (Ajala, 1973, p. 28).

The political chaos in the former Belgian Congo, the raging Algerian war of independence, and Morocco’s claim to some territories including Mauritania made African leaders in the French community realize the need to cooperate with one another to enhance internal stability. Abbe Fulbert Youlou of Brazzaville Congo called for a meeting of the French-speaking states to discuss the Congo situation, called the Brazzaville Conference, which took place in December 1960. The heads of participating states appreciated the effort taken by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Hammarskjold, who ordered the UN forces to do nothing to end Katanga’s secession from former Belgian Congo, although some African states wanted UN action. The conference also maintained Mauritania’s right to independence, and agreed to set up a commission to study ways of facilitating economic cooperation across the region (Ajala, 1973, pp. 29-30). This conference stood for national leaders’ preferred approach of non-interference and moderate regional cooperation, but also left an unsettled controversy on UN’s actions in the Congo crisis. It supported minimalist cooperation among African states, which was merely to enhance independence, stability and economic wellbeing of individual countries, without any further moves towards unity. The 12 countries that participated in the conference, namely, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Benin, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta, became known as the Brazzaville Group, alias Union of African and
Malagasy States (UAMS) (Biswaro, 2005, p. 34).

The attitude revealed in the Brazzaville Conference was challenged by the supporters of more ambitious integration. In December 1960, the move to form the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union was announced after a series of talks at Conakry, Guinea among presidents Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Toure of Guinea and Modibo Keita of Mali. They regretted the inability of the UN to maintain the political independence of Congo. They deplored the decisions of the Brazzaville Conference, and condemned all forms of African regroupment based on languages of the departing colonial powers. After the Accra meeting of the three heads of state in April 1961, Charter for the Union of African States was published. It renamed the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union “the Union of African States”. This organization would enable them to coordinate their policies in all important problems and to promote cooperation in the economic and monetary fields (Ajala, 1973, pp. 32-33).

The countries that opposed the approval of the Brazzaville Conference on UN inaction also attended the Casablanca Conference in January 1961. King Mohammed V of Morocco stated that the failure of UN in Congo placed its future existence in doubt, and he put forward a five-point plan for restoring order and the legal authority of Patrice Lumumba’s government. The delegates decided to create an African consultative assembly, African Political Committee comprising heads of states or their representatives, African Economic Committee consisting of ministers of economic affairs who would be responsible for the establishment of postal and telecommunication links among African capitals, African Cultural Committee
composed of ministers of education, and Joint African High Command made up of chiefs and staff to ensure the common defence of Africa in case of aggression against any part of the continent (Ajala, 1973, pp. 31-32). This conference stood for the ambitious approach of some African countries, who opposed the minimalist approach of the Brazzaville Conference.

Thus, the competing approaches to Pan-Africanism were manifested in the two conferences. The opponents of African unity saw this conflict and referred them as the Casablanca and Brazzaville camps. There were also other countries which could not be labeled by either and formed a third group (Ajala, 1973, p. 32).

To resolve the competing views on UN inaction in Congo and African integration, President Senghor of Senegal recommended a conference of all independent African states and consulted with President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo, Tubman of Liberia and Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria. They agreed to have two sponsors in each group within the Pan-African movement. Because of internal disagreements and conflicts, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the Sudan and the United Arab Republic did not show up in the Monrovia Conference in May 1961. Nevertheless, this conference achieved a compromise between the two opposing camps. It passed a series of resolutions that did not support either camp fully. It advocated non-interference in the internal affairs and respect for sovereignty of other states, as it did in supporting Mauritania’s right to be independent. It also urged all states to refrain from encouraging subversion. The delegates declared that the central goal of unity at the moment was not the political integration of sovereign African
states. Rather, they focused on economic, educational, cultural, scientific cooperation as well as on improving communications and transportation among them. Regarding the inaction of the UN in Congo crisis, the conference admitted UN’s past weaknesses, but also affirmed its faith in UN’s capability (Ajala, 1973, pp. 34-38).

Although this conference made a compromise between two conflicting groups, the Casablanca group did not attend and extend their support to its resolutions. Instead, its members insisted on more ambitious integration. As the Monrovia Conference just ended, the foreign ministers of the Casablanca group met in Cairo and produced the Protocol of the African Charter, following which the Monrovia group formed the original version of the Lagos Charter and continued to prepare a second conference of all independence African states. The Casablanca group decided not to attend the Lagos Conference. In January 1962, the Lagos conference opened, and agreed to set up an inter-African and Malagasy organization. It discussed the purposes and principles brought up in the Monrovia Conference as a functional approach to African unity. Rather than seeking for political unification, members would accelerate economic and social cooperation, pool resources, provide better educational opportunities, concert political actions, and cooperate in science and technology. The proposed organization would have an assembly of heads of states and governments that would meet once every two years, the council of ministers that would meet once a year or when necessary, and a general secretariat that was to be a central administrative organ. A committee of representatives from the governments revised the draft conference charter and it became known as the Lagos Charter (Ajala, 1973,
The two groups were also divided on ideologies in the Cold War. The Casablanca group, consisting primarily of Anglophone countries and some Francophone countries, was radical because of Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure who supported Patrice Lumumba’s association with the Soviet Union, Morocco’s claim of part of Mauritania, and Algeria’s war of liberation against the French. The Monrovia Group also consisted of both Anglophone and Francophone countries and was more conservative. Its members preferred maintaining close ties to France, US and other Western powers, and also opposed to Lumumba (Abegunrin, 2009a, p. 144).

Developments within the Continental Organizations


The experts of the Casablanca group recommended the ending of customs barriers over 5 years from 1962, as well as the abolition of quota systems and preferential treatments. They also proposed the establishment of a council of African economic unity and an African development bank. The Monrovia group recommended similar goals, aiming at liberating trade and harmonizing policies (Ajala, 1973, p. 47). Those similarities served as one important condition to bring the two groups together.

Another condition for resolving their competing approaches was the support of national leaders. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia spoke at the Lagos Conference that no wide and unbridgeable gulf existed between the groupings, and Ethiopia
belonged only to the African group. Guinea and Ghana strongly supported his idea. To convene a conference to bring the two groupings together, negotiations were carried out through state visits, international conferences, and in the lobby halls of the UN.

While the two groupings used to be divided on Algerian and Congo issues, their controversies were resolved when Algeria became independent in July 1962, and Congo had a new government which was neither Antoine Gizenga’s nor Moïse Tshombe’s. The heads of the Casablanca group supported the Guinean proposal for a continental conference, the Ghanaian president, Nkrumah, called for a preparatory meeting of African foreign ministers at Addis Ababa, and the Ethiopian government continued its efforts to convene a conference of all independent African states in 1963. Ethiopia invited all those states and sent its foreign minister, Ato Ketema Yifru, to all those countries to thrash out details of the proposed conference. In May 1963, foreign ministers of all the 32 independent states met in Addis Ababa, and they submitted almost identical agendas. They requested the provisional secretariat to assemble both groups’ documents such as the African Charter of Casablanca, the Lagos Charter and the Ghanaian proposals for the Union of African States (Ajala, 1973, pp. 48-52).

The Summit Conference began in Addis Ababa following the foreign ministers’ meeting. Heads of participating states expressed their ideas and recommendations for African unity. At last, the delegates agreed to name their all-African organization the Organization of African Unity and to include a defence commission among the specialized commissions. The plea for establishing a political union was rejected. The OAU Charter described as the Covenant of Unity was signed by 31 heads of
governments on May 25, 1963. The OAU came into being. It aimed to promote unity and solidarity, coordination of cooperation, defence of the sovereignty and independence, and eradication of colonialism. The member states pledged to coordinate their policies in politics and diplomacy, economics including transport and communications, education, health, scientific activity, and defence. They declared their adherence to the principles of the sovereign equality, non-interference, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and peaceful settlement of disputes. The Organization shall include the continental African states, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa. Admission was by a simple majority vote of member states. Four principal organs were established: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government composed of heads or their representatives (highest decision-making body), the Council of Ministers composed of foreign ministers (executive branch), the Administrative Secretary-General and the Secretariat (permanent organ supervising the implementation of decisions and administrating sessions and budget), and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration chosen according to professional qualifications(settling all disputes among members). Other specialized commissions in related policy areas, such as economic and social, educational and cultural, scientific and research, and transport and communications commissions, were made up of appropriate ministers of states (Ajala, 1973, pp. 53-82). The details of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, such as the jurisdiction of the OAU under this organ, was not described in the OAU Charter, nor in its said protocol (AFRICANUNION, 1963, p. 8).
The OAU’s main goals were to obtain and maintain independence and to advance integration, but it was not completely successful in achieving these goals between 1963 and 1975. In 1963, only 31 countries were independent, and they remained vulnerable to the sustained influence of former colonial and other foreign powers. The OAU liberation committee set a fund for supporting the liberation struggle, but its work was constrained by mal-administration and a lack of financial resources. Some member states had long and fierce debate during the OAU’s sessions about the way the committee’s offices were administered. 12 states did not pay their contributions for 1964/1965, 20 for 1965/1966, 19 for 1966/1967, and 24 for 1967/1968. A further issue was some states’ reluctance to get rid of the colonial influences. Several Francophone states spoke in defence of the French government, and a group of states maintained good relations with Portugal and apartheid South Africa to the extent of establishing formal diplomatic relations against OAU’s common position (Khamis, 2008, p. 22). By the mid 1970s, more than 41 countries had attained their political independence (Biswaro, 2005, p. 47).

In its integration agenda, the OAU achieved limited genuine progress. It was weak in unifying member states’ positions in the international arena (Khamis, 2008, p. 26), and its economic integration was sluggish. The OAU’s final objective of economic integration was to create an African common market, and it made several attempts to realize it. However, the outcomes were not satisfactory. In 1965, the Economic and Social Commission failed to take on an agenda leading to the creation of a continental FTA or common market. In 1968, the council emphasized the
significance of expanding regional groupings. In 1970, the 15th ordinary session of the council in Addis Ababa decided to create a group of experts to work out modalities for the implementation of recommendations in a Memorandum on the Responsibilities and Role of the OAU in the Economic and Social Fields, which included inter-African cooperation in trade, monetary matters, market, infrastructures, education and joint industrial projects. In 1973, the OAU adopted a comprehensive program, African Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence, which numerated several areas to be worked on, such as mobilization of resources, advances in agriculture and infrastructures, trade, and tourism, etc. However, by the mid 1970s, no blueprints could be executed at all (Khamis, 2008, p. 28).

In January 1974, the OAU adopted the Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations (AATPO). The AATPO aimed to foster regular flow of information and communication among African countries in trade matters and to assist the harmonization of commercial policies. It was to have its own meetings and organs, and assist member states to establish or strengthen existing national trade promotion organizations. It would make recommendations to member states on various aspects of trade, assist sub-regional trade information centers, and organize meetings of African businessmen. Membership was open to all African states within the OAU and the UN Economic Commission in Africa. Member states of AATPO were to facilitate the collection of information, submit all necessary report and information to the competent organs, make available research facilities, and pay their contributions as assessed by the General Assembly. The organs were to be the General
Assembly and its Bureau, the Sub-regional Conferences, the Secretariat, and the National Associations. For any disputes, the General Assembly was to appoint an ad hoc committee (AFRICANUNION, 1974). It came into force in 1984 when Zambia became the 12th signatory country ratifying it (AFRICANUNION, 2010a). However, this constitution ultimately served no more than an advisory and administrative organ to promote trade, without any concrete measures for lowering tariff or non-tariff barriers.


After the mid-1970s, the OAU continued its relentless struggle for independence. In collaboration with the UN, it mobilized the international community to gather support for the action of the then Front Line States (FLS) in the struggle for majority rule of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. This joint effort made it possible for Zimbabwe to achieve majority rule in 1980, while Namibia was able to achieve self-determination from apartheid South Africa in 1990 (Biswaro, 2005, p. 48).
During 1975 and 1995, Africa had the mainland territories liberated and the apartheid regime in South Africa was dismantled in 1994. Soon after that, the OAU terminated the liberation committee, although some of the member states, who endorsed the decision to terminate it, had themselves some of their own islands under occupation. To date, eight African island territories are still under direct foreign occupation: Chagos Islands and St. Helena Island of UK, the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla of Spain, the Azores and the Madeiras of Portugal, and La Reunion and La Mayotte of France (Khamis, 2008, pp. 22-23).

Aside from the de-colonization agenda, the OAU helped to promote peace on the continent by reducing to minimal foreign intervention and solving internal conflicts (Biswaro, 2005, p. 59). The founding fathers of the OAU set up a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA) to deal with conflicts. Its jurisdiction was limited to inter-state disputes rather than intra-state ones, and it was an organ with conflict resolution rather than conflict prevention. Since member states did not use it (but resorted to the ad hoc Committee through diplomatic channels), the CMCA has remained dormant since its inception. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the OAU successfully resolved a number of border disputes, including those between Algeria-Morocco, Mali-Burkina Faso, Senegal-Gambia, Somalia-Kenya, and Ethiopia-Somalia (Biswaro, 2005, p. 50).

Despite those successes, the OAU lacked conflict management institutions, experience, and financial resources, and it was influenced by external intervention. In 1993, the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments decided to create a
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (MCPMR). They aimed to work together towards a peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts. The MCPMR was built around a central organ with the Secretary General and the Secretariat as its operational arm. Conflicts in the 1990s included those in Somalia, Liberia, Burundi, Comoro, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. Whereas the creation of the MCPMR theoretically placed the OAU at the center of the management of those conflicts, the OAU had been a peripheral actor in most cases. The UN and RECs had often taken the lead. Since member states still deemed national sovereignty as sacrosanct, MCPMR was constrained in its actions. Another constraint was the lack of funds: the OAU set up a Peace Fund to solve that problem, but it had not been sufficient for dealing with too many conflicts. Further, member states did not always meet their financial obligations (Biswaro, 2005, pp. 51-53).

Other efforts to maintain security and peace included denuclearization and elimination of mercenarism. The crime of mercenarism is committed by the individual, group or association, representative of a State and the State itself who with the aim of opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination stability or the territorial integrity of another State. In 1977, the OAU adopted the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa which entered into force in 1985 (AFRICANUNION, 1977). The OAU adopted the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) in July 1995, which entered into force in 2009 (AFRICANUNION, 1995). In 1999, it adopted the OAU Convention on the
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which entered into force in 2002 (AFRICANUNION, 1999). None of the treaties established supranational measures for security cooperation. The limitations on the conflict resolution could partly be attributed to the insufficient economic development of member states and hence the lack of fund.

Although the member states have been slow in changing their economic conditions, they made numerous efforts to strengthen economic integration. In December 1976, the 11th session of the Council of Ministers in Kinshasa, Congo, adopted the Kinshasa Declaration that laid down formal principles, objectives and strategies for the establishment of an economic community. The community shall guard against foreign influence and interests, enhance self-reliance, and strengthen inter-African cooperation at all levels. The community should be established in 15 to 25 years, beginning from sectoral integration in sub-regions. It took the OAU 15 years to get the treaty drafted. In 1979, the Monrovia strategy for establishing the AEC was approved. In 1980, the second extraordinary session of the assembly in Lagos adopted the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000. The texts of this session specified concrete ways of implementing the Monrovia strategy, covering a wide range of socio-economic issues. In 1983, the assembly stressed the importance of implementing the Lagos plan and its final act. In the twentieth ordinary session of OAU in 1984, member states decided to call a ministerial conference to review the implementation of the Lagos plan and the final act. The Africa’s Priority Program for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPET) was endorsed and it paved the

Meanwhile, studies regarding how to build the AEC were conducted. The General Secretariat since 1984 had undertaken Global Technical Studies on the Establishment of the AEC. Three comprehensive papers were prepared on Political, Social and Economic Dimensions of African Cooperation and Integration: Review and Perspective, Economic Aspects for Global Cooperation and Integration in Africa, and Legal and Institutional Aspects including a Preliminary Draft Treaty on the Establishment of the AEC. In 1985, the secretariat and the UN Development Program (UNDP) held a colloquium in Arusha, Tanzania, which brought together African experts to discuss “What type of Economic Community for Africa”. The colloquium recommended the harmonization of political and diplomatic policies of African states to promote solidarity, and social integration of people by allowing their free movement. It also recommended strengthening sub-regional groupings, allowing free trade, and promoting democratization. Those recommendations were presented to the 44th session of Council of Ministers in 1986 (Khamis, 2008, pp. 31-32).

The Permanent Steering Committee was established in 1984, and was to follow up on the implementation of APPER and the establishment of the AEC. In its 15th session in 1988, it considered recommendations from the experts, and points of view of member states. The committee explained the concept of the AEC as the creation of an economic union starting with a free trade area through a customs union to a common market. It was to have supranational powers to handle both political and
economic issues. The stages towards the final objective were to parallel those in the Lagos plan. Member states were urged to harmonize their policies with the regional ones, and to establish follow-up mechanisms for integration. There was to be records of bilateral arrangements between states to facilitate the integration of the community. At the regional level, there was to be only one grouping for each geographical region of the OAU. At the continental level, the chief executives of regional groupings were to attend deliberations of the Permanent Steering Committee to draw lessons on regional integration (Khamis, 2008, pp. 33-34).

For the agenda of economic integration, the Permanent Steering Committee recommended signing of the treaty by 1992, establishing a continental customs union between 1993 and 1997, a common market in the 1998-2007 period, and the African Economic Community (AEC) in the 2008-2027 period. Those recommendations were adopted by the 49th ordinary session of the Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa in 1989. In 1991, the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (the AEC Treaty) was signed by 51 member states in Abuja, Nigeria (Khamis, 2008, pp. 34-36). It was also called the Abuja Treaty.

This treaty claims to establish the AEC, with the objectives of integrating economies to ensure self-sustained development, establishing a framework within the continent for mobilization of human and material resources, promoting cooperation in all fields to raise the standard of living of African peoples, and coordinating policies among existing and future RECs. To realize those objectives, the community was to liberalize trade by abolishing customs duties and non-tariff barriers to establish a free
trade area at the level of each REC. Following that, it was to adopt a common external tariff. After establishing a common market, it was to rationalize existing RECs and multinational institutions (AFRICANUNION, 1991, pp. 8-9).

The treaty envisages that the AEC would be established gradually in six stages over a transitional period no more than 34 years from the date of entry into force of this treaty. Since the treaty was ratified by member states in 1994, the six stages were to be:

1. 1994-1999: the OAU countries would strengthen the existing RECs and establish RECs where there was no REC, in no more than 5 years.

2. 2000-2008: in no more than 8 years, they would stabilize tariff and non-tariff barriers, customs duties and internal taxes at the level of each REC, and prepare studies to determine the timetable for the gradual removal of those barriers in intra-regional trade and for the gradual harmonization of customs duties in relation to third states. In the meanwhile, they would strengthen sectoral integration in economic fields and coordinate policies among RECs.

3. 2009-2019: they would establish a free trade area by gradually removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and establishing a customs union by adopting a common external tariff at the level of each REC in no more than 10 years.

4. 2020-2022: they would coordinate the tariff and non-tariff systems among different RECs and establish a continental Customs Union in no more than 2 years.

5. 2023-2027: they would establish a continental common market by adopting a common policy in several economic sectors, harmonizing monetary, financial and fiscal policies, applying the principle of free movement of people, and constituting the proper resources of the Community in no more than 4 years.

6. 2028-2033: in no more than 5 years, they would consolidate the structure of the continental common market by strengthening the free movement of people, goods, capital and services, integrate all sectors, including economic, political, social and cultural sectors, establish a single market and a continental Economic and Monetary Union (including setting up a single Central Bank and a single African currency), and set up a Pan-African Parliament electing members by continental universal suffrage (AFRICANUNION, 1991, pp. 10-11).
The organs of the AEC were to be:

1. the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (the Assembly), the supreme organ that determines the main guidelines and policies of the Community and oversees the functioning of all other organs and that meets once a year and may hold extraordinary session;

2. the Council of Ministers (the Council) would be the Council of Ministers of the OAU, a secondary organ, meeting twice a year, in charge of making recommendations to the Assembly, guiding the activities of sub-ordinate organs, reporting to the Assembly regarding programs and budget;

3. the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) to ensure the involvement of peoples of Africa in economic development and integration, which did not come into force with this treaty and would be established according to a Protocol, as clarified later;

4. the Economic and Social Commission (ESC) was to be the Economic and Social Commission of the OAU, which comprises ministers in economic development and planning, prepares policies for cooperation in economic and social development, coordinates and supervises activities of the Secretariat and other subsidiary body, examines the Council’s reports to the Assembly, makes recommendations to the Assembly through the Council, and supervises the preparation of international negotiations; it has held sessions at least once a year immediately before the Council’s session preceding the Assembly session;

5. Court of Justice to ensure the adherence to this treaty and decide on disputes regarding violation of this treaty, and to give advisory opinions at the request of the Assembly or Council; its procedures and membership would be determined by the Assembly in a protocol;

6. The General Secretariat would be that of the OAU (elected by the Assembly) and shall be headed by the Secretary-General, which shall direct the activities of the Secretariat, ensure the implementation of the decisions of the Assembly and the Council, promote projects, prepare proposals concerning programs and budget, report on the activities to and prepare the meetings of the Assembly, the Council and the Commission (AFRICANUNION, 1991, pp. 12-20).

Seven specialized committees were to be established. They were the Committee on Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters, the Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs, the Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters, the
Committee on Industry, Science, and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment, the Committee on Transport, Communications, and Tourism, the Committee on Health, Labour, and Social Affairs, and the Committee on Education, Culture and Human Resources. Each of them comprised a representative of each member state and their advisors. They prepare projects of the Community and submit them to the Commission, and ensure the supervision and evaluation of the implementation of decisions taken by the organs of the Community. They ensure the coordination of projects and also submit reports to the Commission regarding the implementation of this treaty (AFRICANUNION, 1991, p. 21).

By 1999, the project had made limited headway. Twenty-nine protocols that were to have stipulated integration projects in different policy areas should have complemented the Abuja Treaty. Drafting the protocols started in 1992. By 1996, only the Draft Protocol on Relations between the AEC and the Regional Economic Communities was ready and endorsed. Other protocols, including those on transport, customs, non-tariff barriers, and trade, were at different stages of scrutiny by 1998. Their slow progress was partly due to the lack of funds and consensus on priorities (Khamis, 2008, pp. 39-42).

Between 1963 and 1999, the ratification of the AEC Treaty was the main achievement in the area of economic integration. The AEC Treaty clearly defined the procedures and goals of African Integration. Clearly, liberating trade and other elements of market takes the most important part in the first stage, and setting up a customs union and then an economic and monetary union with some degree of
political integration is the final goal. Although the treaty envisaged a PAP by continental universal suffrage and the integration of “political sectors”, it is not clear whether this goal is achievable with the importance attached to national sovereignty by most African states. It is not clear what kind of political community the OAU is intending to establish with a Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and a continental court. The EAC Treaty did not envisage a political community, considering that sovereignty and non-interference were still important principles.

To sum up, Africa had been much more organized and developed in terms of regional organizations and concrete initiatives, compared to Asia. Its AEC Treaty expressed bold goals similar to those of the EU. However, in terms of achievements in this stage (1975-1999), Africa remained the least developed continent, plagued by famine, hunger, disease, illiteracy, heavy indebtedness, poverty, high mortality rates and conflicts. Its weakness was partly derived from the lack of commitment by its member states and partly from the members’ under-developed economies and absence of stable domestic legal institutions. The OAU made numerous efforts to promote unity and solidarity. The continuing existence and efforts between 1963 and 1999 should be considered as a success (Biswaro, 2005, p. 59). Nonetheless, it had not live up to what it aimed to achieve. The limited success in dealing with regular internal conflicts was, to a great degree, due to the poor economic conditions of member states (hence lack of funds); the continuing conflicts distracted African member states from economic development to protecting sovereignty and keeping peace, and thus led to the limited economic development, which constrained all aspects of Pan-Africanism
developments.

Political development was at most moderate in the 1990s. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted by the OAU in Nairobi, Kenya in 1981. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established to undertake studies, organize seminars, and supervise human rights issues. Individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can complain to this commission about violations on human rights if all domestic means of addressing a complaint have been exhausted (Motala, 2008, p. 272). In 1997, the Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights was adopted in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in 1998, and it came into effect in 2004 (Motala, 2008, pp. 273-274). The AEC Treaty also provided for the establishment of an African Court of Justice (ACJ) which was ratified in 2003. It also provided for the establishment of a PAP which was not launched until 2004. The two provisions represented a beginning in the political integration.

In terms of national developments, the achievements were noticeable. Aside from the ending of colonialism, the 1990s also witnessed the flowering of democracy. By the end of the 1990s, multi-party elections took place in more than 30 countries in Africa. By the late 1990s, African Renaissance had become the buzzword for African leaders (Mathews, 2008, pp. 32-33). De-colonization laid a solid foundation for future Pan-African developments, and the initiation of democratization process was an insightful beginning towards the well being of African people. However, this beginning did not change the political and economic reality in the 1990s. The
multi-party elections did not mean that those countries had established democratic political systems. It represented their efforts to establish good governance, but there is a long way to go.

Compared to political developments, socio-cultural developments faced fewer impediments. Many conventions were adopted: the Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Cooperation Program at Kampala, to facilitate comparison of scientific and technological knowledge and to mobilize skilled personnel regionally (AFRICANUNION, 1975); the Cultural Charter for Africa, which aimed to restore and preserve African cultural heritage including languages and promote popular knowledge of science and technology (AFRICANUNION, 1976); the Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI) (AFRICANUNION, 1985a); the Convention for the Establishment of the African Center for Fertilizer Development (AFRICANUNION, 1985b); the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child to protect all children’s equal rights (AFRICANUNION, 1990); the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa (AFRICAUNION, 1991); and the African Maritime Transport Charter (AFRICANUNION, 1994).

1999-present: updating the OAU to African Union.

As the importance of democracy and the renaissance of Pan-Africanism drew more attention, a qualitative improvement of the old organization and mechanisms
became increasingly urgent. The most important developments for the future of Africa in the 21st century were the establishment of the AU in Durban in July 2002 and the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2001. The initiatives were to promote sustainable growth and development. After several years’ stagnation within OAU, the two developments represent a revival of Pan-Africanism. The vision of the AU is that of an “Africa integrated, prosperous, and peaceful, an Africa driven by its own citizens” (Mathews, 2008, p. 25).

In September 1999, the Assembly of the OAU held the 4th Extraordinary Session in Sirte, Libya. They adopted the Sirte Declaration, aiming to establish the AU in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the OAU Charter and the Treaty of AEC. It declared to accelerate the process of establishing the AEC, and to ensure speedy establishment of the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, the African Court of Justice and the Pan-African Parliament. It also claimed to consolidate the regional economic communities as the pillars for achieving the objectives of the AEC (Biswaro, 2005, p. 68).

In July 2000, the OAU countries adopted the Constitutive Act of African Union at Lome, Togo. It entered into force in May 2001, and replaced the Charter of the OAU in 2002. It aims to achieve greater unity among the African states, to defend sovereignty and independence of member states, to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration, to promote peace, security, democratic principles, popular participation and god governance, to promote human and people’s rights, to
coordinate the policies among existing and future RECs, and to advance research in science and technology and public health. It shall establish a common defence policy for the whole continent. The organs of the AU were to be:

1. The Assembly of the Union, composed of Heads of States and Government or their representatives, the supreme organ, would meet at least once a year; it would take decisions by consensus or a two-thirds majority if agreed; procedural matters would be decided by a simple majority; it would determine common policies, consider recommendations and request for membership, establish organs, monitor the implementation of policies, adopt budgets, give directives regarding conflicts, war and the restoration of peace, and appoint judges of the Court of Justice and the Chairman of the Commission;

2. The Executive Council, composed of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, was to meet at least twice a year; it was to have the same decision-making mechanism as the Assembly; it would coordinate and decide policies in foreign trade, energy, industry, food, agricultural resources, water resources, environmental issues, transport, education, cultural, health, science, nationality, and African awards and medals;

3. Specialized technical committees were to be established and be responsible to the Executive Council; they included: the Committee on Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters, the Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs, the Committee on Trade, Customs, and Immigration Matters, the Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment, the Committee on Transport, Communications and Tourism, the Committee on Health, Labour and Social Affairs, and the Committee on Education, Culture and Human Resources; they were to be composed of ministers or senior officials for respective sectors;

4. The PAP and the Court of Justice would be established, and their rules would be defined in respective protocols;

5. The financial institutions, including the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, and the African Investment Bank, would be established according to respective protocols;

6. The Commission of the Union would be established as the Secretariat of the Union;

7. The Permanent Representatives Committee would be established and be in charge of preparing the work of the Executive Council and acting on the Council’s instructions;
8. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council would be established as an advisory organ composed of social and professional groups.

Any African state, supported by a simple majority of member states, could be admitted to membership (AFRICANUNION, 2000).

While stressing the old goals that the OAU had been pursuing, the Constitutive Act of the AU stressed the importance of democracy and good governance. It also began to strengthen instruments for political integration, such as a common defence policy. Non-interference is still a principle, but the Union has the right to intervene in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. By establishing the AU, African leaders sought for a qualitative transition from the OAU to AU. The main tasks have changed, and provisions that African leaders intended to realize were much more comprehensive. As Desmond Orjiako commented, “it is a political, economic and social project aiming at creating a democratic space across Africa, promoting economic development and reflecting a common African identity” (Mathews, 2008, p. 33).

The interference in grave circumstances by the AU is done by the PSC, which was inaugurated in May 2004. It is composed of 15 members, and is complemented by other institutions, the Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force (ASF), and a Peace Special Fund. It is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Its purposes are to maintain peace, security and stability. Where conflicts have happened, it is to perform peace-building functions and coordinate continental efforts in combating terrorism.
The PSC also intended to develop a common defence policy, and promote democratic practices and good governance. The PSC would meet at the level of Permanent Representatives, Ministers or Heads of State and Government (AFRICANUNION, 2002).

The PSC has been a central organ in implementing several other political developments, which, though not supranational, are notable. In 2004, the AU adopted the Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (AFRICANUNION, 2004), but it has not taken effect by 2010. In 2005, the AU adopted the Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, which entered into force in December 2009. It seeks to define a framework under which the Union may intervene or authorize intervention, in preventing or addressing situations of aggression. They shall provide mutual assistance, or respond by all available means to aggression against any other member state (AFRICANUNION, 2005).

In accordance with those provisions, the AU played a considerable role in resolving conflicts. It took the lead in Darfur, Somalia, Cote d’Ivoire and Burundi, and it was a key role to the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Besides, it deployed the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in June 2004 (Mathews, 2008, p. 34). The PSC makes it possible for the AU to interfere in the internal affairs in the event of an imminent threat to peace, security and stability. The Chair person of the Commission of the AU, Alpha Oumar Konare called it “courteous interference” (Mwanasali, 2008, p. 42).
The establishment of the PAP was also a notable step. It was formally launched in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in March 2004, as provided for in Article 17 of the Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000. It is open to all 53 member states of Africa, once they ratify the Protocol on the PAP. It has a vital role to play in the implementation of goals regarding democracy, good governance, and protection of human rights (Mathews, 2008, p. 34). The President of PAP attends summits of the Assembly of Heads of States, so that the PAP concerns can be conveyed to that level. It also has a mandate to take views on issues and to communicate them publicly. When it is fully operational, it will act as a common platform for all peoples of Africa to elect representatives to get involved in decision-making and discussions (Mbete, 2008, p. 307).

According to the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the AEC Relating to the Pan-African Parliament, the PAP may discuss its budget and the budget of the AU, make recommendations to the objectives of the OAU and AEC, and promote the coordination of policies and activities of the RECs and the parliamentary fora of Africa. At PAP’s first session in South Africa, it decided to set up 10 working committees: the Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs, the Committee on Cooperation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution, the Committee on Rural Economy, Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment, the Committee on Transport, Industry, Communications, Energy, Science and Technology, the Committee on Rules, Privileges and Discipline, the Committee on Trade, Customs, and Immigration Matters, the Committee on Health, Labour, and Social Affairs, the
Committee on Education, Culture, Tourism and Human Resources, the Committee on Gender, Family, Youth and People with Disability, and the Committee on Justice and Human Rights (Mbete, 2008, pp. 308-309).

The African Court of Justice was adopted in July 2003. It consists of 11 judges representing each region. They are elected by the Assembly by secret ballot and by two thirds majority of member states eligible to vote. State parties and authorized AU organs can submit cases to the Court in regarding to disputes relating to the interpretation of the Act, Union treaties, international law, and agreements among state parties (AFRICANUNION, 2003b, pp. 2-20).

In 2008, the AU adopted a new protocol to merge the two continental courts, the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt). The single court would be the African Court of Justice and Human Rights consisting of 16 judges. They would be elected by the Executive Council and appointed by the Assembly. The Court would have jurisdiction over all cases over which the two former courts had jurisdiction (AFRICANUNION, 2008b). In order to strengthen the rule of law within Africa, the AU adopted the Statute of the African Union Commission on International Law (AUCIL) in 2009 in Ethiopia. The AUCIL shall undertake activities relating to codification and progressive development of international law where such law has not been sufficiently developed, propose draft agreements and model regulations, and encourage the teaching, study and publication on international law (AFRICANUNION, 2009e).
In regarding to the two problems, lack of democracy and corruption, the AU adopted the New Partnership for Africa’s Development in Zambia in 2001 (NEPAD Planning & Coordinating Agency, 2001, p. 18). The Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption was adopted in 2003. To make sure member states conform to their agreed norms, codes and standards, in 2002, they created the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), an African-owned and managed process that will assess the levels of democracy and political governance, economic governance and social economic development. Twenty six countries have agreed to subject themselves voluntarily (Mathews, 2008, p. 34). In 2007, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (Charter on Democracy) was adopted (Ebobrah, 2007, p. 1). This Charter requires the state parties to conform to a number of principles that will enhance democracy and good governance, such as the separation of powers, rejection of corruption, representative government, free and transparent elections and citizens’ participation in public affairs and development processes (AFRICAN UNION, 2007, p. 4). When the PSC observes that there has been an unconstitutional change of government, and that diplomatic initiatives have failed, it has authority to suspend the said state party from the AU activities and take initiatives to restore democracy in that state (AFRICAN UNION, 2007, p. 10).

As is stipulated in the AEC and the Constitutive Act of the AU, economic integration in Africa is mainly happening at sub-regional levels at this stage, but the AU has also been making efforts at the continental level. In 2001, the OAU passed the Convention of the African Energy Commission (Lusaka, Zambia), which entered into
force in 2006. Recognizing that severe energy shortages in many countries have constrained industrial developments, the OAU committed itself to establish the African Energy Commission (AFREC). The member states would cooperate in energy resources and identification and promotion of regional projects, develop sustainable and environmentally sound energy, promote research and encourage transfer of technology in the energy sector, and harmonize standards in the energy sector. The AFREC would map out energy development policies, strategies at sub-regional, regional and continental levels, and design and create the energy continental data base for states and RECs, and mobilize financial resources to support energy technology and industries for member states and RECs. It would be composed of the Conference of Ministers or Authorities responsible for energy (the highest organ), the Executive Board (composed of senior energy experts), the Secretariat, and the Technical Advisory Body. Members of the Commission were to pay their assessed contributions regularly (AFRICANUNION, 2001).

In November 2004, the AU’s Economic Commission met in Zambia and began preparatory work on the creation of a common currency for the continent. A task force committee was formed with key stakeholders like the RECs. They were to jointly work out modalities of gradual steps towards a common currency (Murithi, 2005, p. 159).

In 2009, the AU adopted the Protocol on the African Investment Bank at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The functions of the bank are to make financing available for public and private projects of integration, to assist in the modernization of rural sector in
low-income countries, and to provide technical assistance to state parties for investment projects (AFRICANUNION, 2009d).

Numerous conventions were adopted to advance socio-cultural developments: the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (AFRICANUNION, 2003a); the Charter for African Cultural Renaissance (AFRICANUNION, 2006b); the African Youth Charter (AFRICANUNION, 2006a); the African Charter on Statistics (AFRICANUNION, 2009a); the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (AFRICANUNION, 2009b); the Constitution for the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) (AFRICANUNION, 2009c).

The Origin and Developments of the RECs

The eight RECs, namely, the EAC, the IGAD, the COMESA, the SADC, the ECOWAS, the UMA, the ECCAS, and the CEN-SAD, are on different levels of integration. Some of them do not have a sub-regional court or parliament and the original treaties establishing those RECs do not lay importance on political developments. Some of them have limited institutions and integration projects, such as the IGAD and CEN-SAD. The EAC has the boldest provision, setting up a political federation eventually, while the IGAD and CEN-SAD have the most moderate provisions and have achieved least progress. According to Bela Balassa’s sense of stages of economic integration, most of them aim at establishing a free trade area, a customs union, and a common market explicitly or implicitly, and a few of them, such
as the ECOWAS, aim to establish a monetary union. Based on research on each REC, the following table summarizes the size, organs, goals, outcomes (current stages), and economic and political diversities.

Table 5.1
Comparing African RECs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECs (number of members)</th>
<th>Organs</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Current Stages of Integration</th>
<th>Economic and Political Diversities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East African Community (5)</td>
<td>Summit of Heads; Council of Ministers; Secretariat; Coordination Committee (of secretaries); Sectoral Committees; EA Court of Justice; EA Legislative Assembly; Other regional institutions;</td>
<td>Customs union; Common market; Monetary union; Political federation (1999-);</td>
<td>Customs union (launched in 2005 and being consolidated during 2006-2010); Beginning to establish the common market (2006-2010);</td>
<td>1. 3 founding countries have almost equivalent scales (15-30 billion in 2009) of GDP and population, with Kenya ranking the highest in GDP (30.14 billion in 2009). Another two newer members, Burundi (1.33 billion in 2009) and Rwanda (5.25 billion in 2009) are much smaller. 2. Two countries in five (40%) are electoral democracies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (7)</td>
<td>Assembly of Heads; Council of Ministers (of foreign affairs); Committee of Ambassadors; Secretariat;</td>
<td>FTA; Common market; Help realize the objectives of COMESA and AEC;</td>
<td>Functional cooperation (up to 2009); Studying the feasibility of FTA</td>
<td>1. Sudan has the largest GDP of the seven countries (54.64 billion in 2009) - outstandingly bigger GDP than the 2nd biggest economy, Ethiopia (32.32 billion in 2009) and Kenya (30.14 billion in 2009). 2. One in seven (14.29%) are electoral democracies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern</td>
<td>Authority of Heads; Council (of Ministers); Secretariat;</td>
<td>FTA; Customs union; Common Market;</td>
<td>FTA (achieved in October 2000 among nine members, two more joined in 2004); Customs Union</td>
<td>1. Egypt has the biggest GDP (187.95 billion in 2009) - outstandingly bigger than...</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa (23)</td>
<td>Court of Justice; Committee of Governors of Central banks; Intergovernmental Committee; 12 Technical Committees; Consultative Committee; Common Agricultural Policy and Harmonization of monetary policies (less than economic and monetary union); Merge with AEC; (launched in June 2009); the 2nd biggest economy, Libya (60.24 billion in 2009) and Sudan (54.64 billion in 2009). There is a big gap between Egypt and the smallest countries in terms of GDP, e.g. Djibouti’s GDP was around 1 billion in 2008 and 2009. 12 of COMESA members had a GDP around 1-10 billion in 2009. 2. seven in 23 (30.43%) are electoral democracies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>South African Development Community (15)</td>
<td>Summit of Heads; Council of Ministers; Secretariat; Integrated Committee of Ministers; Standing Committee of Officials, Tribunal (functions similar to a court); Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (of ministers from high politics, functions similar to the PSC); SADC National Committees; SADC Treaty only stipulates its goal to set up a common market (1992 Treaty stipulates free movement of market and production elements, without using Balassa’s terms for describing the stages); However, it claimed to realize other goals of AEC and AU, such as FTA and customs union; FTA (launched in 2008); Planning to complete negotiations on SADC customs system by 2010; 1. South Africa is clearly a sub-regional pole, as the largest economy (GDP in 2009 was 287.22 billion), while the 2nd largest economy in SADC is Angola (GDP was 74.47 billion in 2009) and most of the rest members had a GDP less than 10 billions in 2009. 2. eight in 15 (53.33%) are electoral democracies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States (10)</td>
<td>Conference of Heads; Council of Ministers; General Secretariat; Consultative Commission; Specialized technical Committee; Court of Justice; Network of Parliamentarians (2002); FTA; Customs union; Common market; Monetary union Phasing off non-tariff barriers and obstacles for free movement of people; Starting customs cooperation, such as harmonization of common external tariff (envisaging a customs union in 2008, but no follow-up examination or conclusions up to 2010); 1. Angola is a much more bigger economy than any of the other nine ECCAS countries, with a GDP of 74.47 billions in 2009, while the 2nd biggest economy Cameroon had a GDP of 22.19 billions in 2009, and the 3rd biggest Equatorial Guinea 12.22 billions over the same period, and three ECCAS members had a</td>
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GDP around 1-2 billions in 2009. However, scales of economies in ECCAS are more balanced, with six in 10 ranking the middle place, with a GDP of 10-20 billions a year, and only three of them at the poorest extreme.

1. Among the 15 ECOWAS members, Nigeria (GDP 207.12 billions in 2008 and 168.84 billions in 2009) and Egypt (GDP 162.44 billions in 2008 and 187.95 billions in 2009) are two big powers in CEN-SAD Countries, while 12 out of 18 countries’ GDP were around 1-10 billions. Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Libya are middle powers with a GDP around 45-90 billions.

2. 3 in 18 (16.67%) are electoral democracies.

### Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (18)

| Conference of Heads; Executive Council (of ministers in foreign affairs, finance, and public security); General Secretariat; Sahel-Saharan Investment and Trade Bank; Economic Social and Cultural Council; | Common market; “Economic union” (based merely on a common market and harmonization of policies in functional areas such as education, science, and agriculture); | Before FTA stage: functional cooperation in agriculture and national resources; cooperation in resolving conflicts; | 1. Nigeria (GDP 207.12 billions in 2008 and 168.84 billions in 2009) and Egypt (GDP 162.44 billions in 2008 and 187.95 billions in 2009) are two big powers in CEN-SAD Countries, while 12 out of 18 countries’ GDP were around 1-10 billions. Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Libya are middle powers with a GDP around 45-90 billions.

2. 2 in 10 (20%) are electoral democracies. |

### Economic Community of Western African States (15)

| Authority of Heads; Council of Ministers; Executive Secretariat; Community Parliament; Community Court of Justice; Economic and Social Council; Specialized Technical Commissions; Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development; | FTA; Customs union; Common market; Economic and monetary union (common policies in economic, monetary and financial areas) | Before FTA stage: realized free movement of persons; starting cooperation in customs and monetary matters; cooperation in functional areas, conflict resolution and good governance; recommending FTA in 2009; | 1. Compared to all other RECs, |

### Arab Maghreb

| Council of Heads; | Common market; | Before FTA stage: dormant due to the | 1. Compared to all other RECs, |
Union (5)
Council of Ministers (of Foreign Affairs); Secretariat General; Consultative Assembly;
Cooperation in developing all economic sectors;
active role of COMESA and CEN-SAD in the same area;
UMA is more balanced in terms of members' economic scales. Algeria (GDP in 2009 was 139.76) is the biggest economy, while Libya, Morocco and Tunisia had a GDP around 45-90 billions in 2009. Only one member is around 1-10 billions: Mauritania with a GDP of 3.03 billion in 2009.
2. None in UMA members (0%) is electoral democracies.

Source: by author. Data are from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, 2010.

Excluding the dormant UMA, only COMESA, SADC, ECOWAS and CEN-SAD involved big powers in Africa, namely, Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria. However, as CEN-SAD only set up limited institutions and achieved little progress in a few socio-economic areas, COMESA (Egypt as the leading power), SADC (South Africa as the leading power) and ECOWAS (Nigeria as the leading power) are the most promising RECs in Africa: they involved big powers, set up several effective institutions including several committees and a regional court, envisaged goals in accordance with those of AEC, and have been actively pursuing their goals. This section will only focus on the three key RECs.

According to the member states’ GDP and the number of electoral democracies and autocracies\(^2\), the economic and political compatibility of each REC can be seen. The SADC and ECOWAS both have an unbalanced structure in terms of economic

\(^{2}\) The detailed data are in the Appendices.
sizes, with one leading power and most of the rest members rather weak (GDP were around 1-10 billion in 2009), while the COMESA is more balanced, with one leading power and only half of the rest members (12 out of 24) rather weak (GDP were around 1-10 billion in 2009) (InternationalMonetaryFund, 2010a). While having a sub-regional leading power helps integration, more and stronger partners would further support the agenda of RECs financially. South Africa has a much bigger economic size than another two sub-regional leading powers, and that made up for the big percentage of poor countries. In terms of compatibility in political systems, ECOWAS and SADC have the same percentage of electoral democracies out of the same number of member states (8 out of 15), while COMESA has a lower percentage (7 out of 23). There is no political compatibility: all three organizations are divided between democracies and autocracies, with two of them evenly divided. The African Union is likewise divided, with 31 electoral democracies and 22 autocracies (FreedomHouse, 2010).

The origins and developments of the three RECs are introduced as follows.

**COMESA.**

The COMESA covers a wide area in the east and southern Africa. In 1965, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) convened a ministerial meeting of the then newly independent states in East and Southern Africa. The meeting recommended the creation of an Economic Community of Eastern and Central African States. However, during 1970-1977, several major problems slowed down progress.
The escalation of the liberation struggle in the southern Africa had made an impression of vicious destructive engagement of outside powers, such as the Soviet Union and Cuba, and local military groups. The collapse of EAC in 1977, in the meantime, dampened the spirits of proponents of regional integration. Nevertheless, the UNECA Multinational Programming and Operational Centre (MULPOC) in Eastern and Southern Africa was launched in 1977. The primary aim of the MULPOC was to accelerate multinational cooperation by collective self-reliance and implementation of multinational projects. Preferential Trade Area was to be the first step towards an economic community (Mwale, 2001, pp. 32-36).

In 1978, a ministerial meeting of trade, finance and planning adopted the Lusaka Declaration of Intent and Commitment to the Establishment of a Preferential Trading Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa, and created an intergovernmental team to negotiate the Treaty for the establishment of the PTA. In 1981, the PTA Treaty was signed and came into force in September 1982. The PTA was established to make use of a large market size in this region and to achieve its ultimate goal of creating an economic community. In 1993, the COMESA Treaty was signed in Kampala, Uganda and was ratified in Lilongwe, Malawi in December 1994 (COMESA, 2010).

Twenty three countries in the east and southern of Africa signed the treaty, including Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Membership would be only for the 23 countries, and any country that is a direct neighbor of the COMESA members as admitted by the
Authority. It aimed to promote a harmonious development of production and market structures, to facilitate domestic and foreign investments, to promote peace and security, and to contribute the establishment of AEC. It was to establish a customs union, abolishing all non-tariff barriers to trade among members and establishing a common external tariff, cooperate in industrial development and generate a common standards and measurement system, maintain convertibility of their currencies, adopt a common agricultural policy, enhance food sufficiency, cooperate in exporting agricultural commodities, and remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, labour, services and right of residence (a common market). To realize those goals, the COMESA was to establish: the Authority (equivalent to Heads of States ad governments), the Council, the Court of Justice, the Committee of Governors of Central banks, the Intergovernmental Committee (to develop and submit action plans and programs and to monitor the current application of the treaty), 12 Technical Committees, the Secretariat, and the Consultative Committee. Besides its intra-regional integration schemes, the COMESA would also cooperate and merge with other RECs and AEC (COMESA, 1994).

The COMESA Treaty does not have provisions for concrete political integration. Despite a sub-regional court to perform functions equivalent to that in the EAC, the COMESA does not have a parliament. It was to promote security and peace; however, with its focus on economic integration, it does not have any provisions for promoting democracy and good governance. COMESA is not a supplementary organization for AEC or EAC, but it makes it clear that it shall merge with the AEC. Compared to
COMESA, EAC is smaller but bolder, with its goals towards a political federation and less salient provision of merging with the AEC.

COMESA achieved FTA in October 2000 among nine members; two more joined in 2004. Following that, it has been consolidating the FTA and preparing to launch a customs union. It envisaged launching the customs union in 2008. The Summit in June 2009 in Zimbabwe took place to launch the COMESA Customs Union. The COMESA Authority endorsed the key principles and rules for the operation of the Customs Union that were included in two legal instruments, namely, the Council Regulations Governing the COMESA Customs Union and the Common Market Customs Management Regulations. The Council Regulations cover the internal free trade area, relations with third countries, trade remedies, export promotion and dispute settlement. The Management Regulations provide for the imposition and collection of duties and taxes, the administration of customs and the conclusion of customs and trade agreements. A task force was established to review the progress in the following 3 to 5 years. The Common External Tariff (CET) would have three categories, the rates of 0%, 10% and 25%. Sensitive products would have 3-5 years to be aligned to the CET rates. A COMESA Fund has been put in place to compensate for the loss of revenue in applying the CET. The CET is harmonized with that of the EAC, so that member states would not have to choose which one to remain in. In 2008, the Summit of COMESA, EAC and SADC agreed that the three organizations should form a single FTA and, eventually, a single Customs Union (COMESA, 2011a). This measure was designed to resolve the longstanding problem
of multiple memberships.

Other programs that COMESA has initiated are mainly in functional areas. Besides the FTA and Customs Union, the major programs are: COMESA Yellow Card, a motor vehicle insurance scheme designed to facilitate border movement and people’s insurance plan when they travel across borders; Investment Promotion and Private Sector Development; Infrastructure, programs monitoring all participating countries’ policies and developments on roads, communication networks, and water; Climate Change Initiative, initiated in 2007 to integrate and promote all strategies and actions for climate change; Agricultural Programs, including several plans for agricultural market promotion, irrigation technology, and agricultural technology research; Information Technology and Education; Immigration Policy; Gender and Social Affairs, including the prevention of HIV/AIDS and female employment; and the program on Standardization, Accreditation, Metrology and Conformity Assessment, which set up several committees to enhance the mutual acceptability of products. The programs on peace and security are notable. COMESA provides several programs to address conflicts, including those on Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Resolution and post conflict reconstruction. The main approach for conflict management is to facilitate trade relations and networks among private sector and local government officials, so that both economies and security are enhanced (COMESA, 2011b).

SADC.
Southern African countries have been linked historically in a number of ways. Economically, the original development of this group largely relied on the exploitation of gold and diamonds of South Africa, and the copper mines in Zambia as well as agricultural products in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Politically, the struggle for independence during the 1960s gained momentum, and strong bonds of solidarity grew out of a sense of common purpose and collective action against colonialism and racism. Meanwhile, they were also bonded together by a common background of mass poverty, economic backwardness and the threat of hostile white minorities (especially in South Africa and Zimbabwe) (Abegunrin, 2009b, pp. 69-70).

The SADC started as Frontline States whose objective was political liberation of Southern Africa. The Frontline States was composed of South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia. It was preceded by the SADCC formed in Lusaka, Zambia in 1980 with the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration (Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation). In August 1992, at the SADCC Summit in Namibia, the Heads of State and Government signed the SADC Treaty and Declaration that transformed the SADCC into the SADC. The objective shifted to include economic integration following the independence of the rest of Southern African countries. Currently the SADC has 15 member states, namely, Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (SADC, 2010b).

The SADC Treaty stipulates that the SADC shall promote economic growth,
promote common political values and set up related institutions, achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources, and combat common threats in public health. Its membership is open to any countries that are admitted by a unanimous decision of the summit of the existing members and acceding to the treaty. It does not put geographical limits on the membership. The SADC is composed of eight organs: the Summit of Heads of State or Government, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the Council of Ministers, the Integrated Committee of Ministers, the Standing Committee of Officials, the Secretariat, the Tribunal and SADC National Committees. While the Summit, the Council, the Integrated Committee of ministers, the Committee of Officials, and the Secretariat have similar composition and functions with their counterparts in the EAC and AU, other organs are new. The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation would have a Ministerial Committee including ministers of foreign affairs, defence, and public security or state security. Its functions would be similar to the PSC and will be stipulated in a Protocol. The Tribunal would be constituted to ensure adherence to and proper interpretation of the provisions of the treaty and adjudicate upon such disputes related to the treaty. It is similar to the sub-regional courts in EAC and COMESA. SADC National Committees shall be established respectively by each member state. They would provide input at the national level in the formulation of SADC policies, strategies and programs. It would coordinate and oversee the implementation of SADC programs, initiate projects, and create national steering committees and technical committees. The areas of cooperation were to include food security, agriculture, infrastructure, trade, industry,
finance, investment, social and human development, science and technology, natural resources and environment, politics and diplomacy, and peace and security (SADC, 1992). Its goals are more comprehensive than the COMESA.

This treaty does not have any provisions regarding setting up a free trade area, customs union or political federation, but it claims that it shall contribute to the realization of the Lagos Plan of Action, the AEC Treaty and the Constitutive Act of the AU. The Sandton Summit in South Africa in 2008 stood for a milestone in economic integration within SADC. At the 2008 summit, member states signed the Protocol on Gender and Development, Protocol on Science, Technology and Innovation, Agreement Amending the Protocol on Trade, and the Agreement Amending the Protocol on the Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure. More importantly, it launched the SADC FTA. A Region-Wide SADC Customs Training Network was also established in 2009 and capacity building activities were to be undertaken in 2009 and 2010 (SADC, 2010a).

The FTA was established by the Protocol on Trade, which set up the Committee of Ministers responsible for Trade (CMT) to oversee other institutions, the Committee of Senior Officials as a technical advisory body, and the Trade Negotiation Forum to conduct trade negotiations and monitor the effects of trade liberalization. The Protocol was to eliminate all tariffs and non-tariff barriers eventually. Following the realization of FTA, the SADC would pursue more goals that were stipulated in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) approved in the 2003 Summit. It stipulated that 85% of trade in goods would be free by 2008, negotiations of the
SADC Customs Union would be completed by 2010, Negotiations on the SADC Common Market would be completed by 2015, the SADC Monetary Union and SADC Central Bank by 2016, and a regional currency should be launched by 2018 (SADC, 2011a).

The SADC has made enormous efforts on maintaining order, security and stabilization. During the time of SADCC, the member states set up the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) in 1977. The ISDSC played a crucial role in the liberation struggles. During the SADC age, member states established the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. In 2001, it signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, the Protocol against Corruption and, the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials in SADC. The Organ’s major objectives have been to protect people against instability from intra- and inter-state conflict, promote common political values and institutions, develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern, promote cooperation on matters related to security and defence, and consider the development of a collective security capacity. In 2003, the Mutual Defence Pact was signed. During the 1990s, most members adopted multi-party systems of government, and the Organ organized missions to members to monitor their elections (SADC, 2011b, p. 63).

A number of other protocols in various functional areas were signed, such as the Protocol on Combating Illicit Drugs in 1996, the Protocol on Energy in 1996, the Protocol on Mining in 1997, the Protocol on against Corruption, the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in 2005 (SADC, 2010c), the Protocol on
Education and Training in 1997, the Protocol on Health in 1999, the agreement on Cooperation in Standardization, Quality, Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology in SADC in 1999, the Declaration on Information and Communications Technology in 2001, and the Declaration on HIV and AIDS in 2003. The SADC has also set up related institutions for its goals, including the Regional Peacekeeping Training Center set up by the Directorate of Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SIPO, established in 2004), the Plant & Genetic Resources Centre, and Regional Tourism Organization.

ECOWAS.

The attempts of West African countries to develop their regional arrangements were partly spurred by the formation and success of the EEC in the 1950s (Okolo, 1989, p. 172). The idea for a West African Community goes back to President William Tubman of Liberia in 1964. An agreement was signed between Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in February 1965, but it led to no outcome. In 1972, General Gowon of Nigeria and General Eyadema of Togo re-launched the idea. A meeting was then called at Lome in December 1973, which studied a draft treaty. A meeting of experts in Accra in 1974 and a ministerial meeting in Monrovia in 1975 examined the treaty. In May 1975, 15 West African countries signed the treaty for an ECOWAS (Treaty of Lagos), and launched ECOWAS in November 1976 (AFRICANUNION, 2010b). The 15 member states are: the Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo (ECOWAS, 2010a).
The advantages of joining the ECOWAS were attractive. Given its diversity of exported products, combined GNP, the size of population, it should provide benefits to member states with a wider market, the establishment of heavy industries, mutual support against fluctuations in prices, coordinated policies to attract new investments, and reduced costs of integrated communication services, transportation systems and infrastructure. Smaller states were attracted by the ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development. With those benefits, ECOWAS members attempted to speed decolonization, reduction of inequality among member states and reduction of dependency on former colonial metropoles and multinational corporations (Yansane, 1977, p. 51).

ECOWAS countries signed a number of protocols, to promote regional cooperation in industrial development and to set up an economic community. In 1976, the ECOWAS set up the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, to provide compensation to member states that have suffered losses for the application of the ECOWAS Treaty, grants for community research activities, loans for development projects and foreign investments and loans for less developed member states. In 1979, the Protocol relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment was signed, stipulating that it shall abolish visas and entry permit. In 1982, the Convention Regulating Inter-State Road Transportation between ECOWAS Member States was signed. In 1982, the Convention for Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters was signed. In 1984, the Protocol relating to Community Enterprises was adopted (ECOWAS, 2010c).
In July 1993, a revised ECOWAS Treaty to accelerate economic integration was signed. It aims to set up an economic union in West Africa, which requires the harmonization of national policies and integration in a wide range of economic and social sectors, money and finance, taxation and policies. It shall establish a common market by liberalizing imports and exports, and eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers (a free trade area), adopting a common external tariff and a common trade policy vis-à-vis third countries (a customs union), removing obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, service, capital and the right of residence (a common market), and adopting common policies in economic, financial, social and cultural sectors (a monetary union). The institutions of ECOWAS shall be the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Community Parliament (as a consultative and advisory organ), the Economic and Social Council, the Community Court of Justice, the Executive Secretariat, the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, and Specialized Technical Commissions. The structure of ECOWAS and composition of those organs are similar to the EAC, except an extra Fund for comprehensive purposes. In respect of political integration, the treaty stipulates that member states cooperate in political matters, judicial and legal matters, and in implementing the Protocol on Non-Aggression, the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, the Community declaration of Political Principles and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ECOWAS, 1993).

In December 1999, the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security was adopted. In
2003, the ECOWAS Energy Protocol was adopted, and it established a legal framework to promote long-term cooperation in the energy sector. In accordance with the AU’s goals regarding good governance, in 2001, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security was signed (ECOWAS, 2010c). The ECOWAS had experiences of Peace Support Operation (PSO) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and established mechanisms for conflict prevention, resolution, peacekeeping, such as the Defence and Security Commission, the Security and Mediation Council, the Council of Elders, Peace and Security Observation Early Warning System, and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (Makinda & Okumu, 2008, p. 55).

A number of institutions have been set up in accordance with the goals stipulated in the ECOWAS Treaty, including the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), West African Health Organization (WAHO), West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), West African Monetary Institute (WAMI), ECOWAS Youth & Sports Development Center (EYSDC), ECOWAS Gender Development Center (EGDC), and Water Resources Coordination Unit (WRCU) (ECOWAS, 2010b). The Monetary Agency was established in 1996 as transformed from West African Clearing House which was established in 1975. This agency is compromised by eight national central banks to facilitate the use of national currencies and transactions. It is geared towards a single monetary policy and the establishment of a single currency (ECOWAS, 2011b).
ECOWAS has been designated one of the five regional pillars of AEC. Together with COMESA, ECCAS, IGAD and SADC, ECOWAS signed the Protocol on Relations Between the AEC and RECs in February 1998 (AFRICAN UNION, 2010b). However, this protocol only stipulates the participation of AEC and RECs in one another’s meetings and exchange of expertise. No concrete measures have been taken to harmonize the future trade and customs policies between ECOWAS and AU as well as other RECs.

Despite goals and institutions, a considerable gap between expectations and the outcomes exists. ECOWAS has not launched FTA. As a 2006 report shows, import calculations indicate that effective tariffs and protective rates in the region are still high, and are generally closer to 20% than to the simple mean of 15% targeted by the CET. There are still numerous non-tariff obstacles that particularly impede cross-border trade, which involves a large number of small operators, especially women (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 13; 2011a).

To fasten its pace, ECOWAS transformed its Secretariat into a Commission assisted by seven commissioners in 2007. They include the Office of the Commissioner Administration and Finance, Agriculture, Environment & Water Resources, Human Development and Gender, Infrastructure, Macro-Economic Policy, Political Affairs, peace & Security, and Trade, Customs & Free Movement (ECOWAS, 2011a). It is recognized that the difficulty of implementing ECOWAS policies is caused by multiple problems, one of which worsens one another; therefore, the current plan of action attaches importance to actions in several areas, such as conflict
management, disease control, education and infrastructure.

The relationship between the AU and the RECs: challenges ahead.

To sum up, although all three RECs are led by a major power, they have different levels of economic compatibility. In terms of political compatibility, about half of ECOWAS and SADC members and some 70% of COMESA members are autocracies. By 2008, the three main RECs are at different paces towards integration. Both COMESA and SADC have equivalent goals and have launched FTA, while ECOWAS, with higher goals than them, aiming to set up a monetary union, has not launched FTA by 2008. COMESA has gone further than both SADC and ECOWAS in terms of economic integration, since it is the only one that launched the Customs Union (in 2009). Therefore, they are far from the AU’s goals.

The AU aims to gap their differences in political systems and levels of economic development, and to consolidate them as blocs of economic integration ultimately. The Banjul summit of June/July 2006 was themed on the rationalization of RECs. The OAU’s first attempt to harmonize and rationalize RECs was in 1976: when the Council of Ministers called for a regional framework of five regions as the foundations towards continental unity. The Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 and the Abuja Treaty of 1999 called for strengthening existing RECs as a basis for integrating Africa (Makinda & Okumu, 2008, p. 53).

The Economic Affairs Department of the AU Commission coordinates the relationship between RECs and AU. RECs participate at meetings of Executive
Council and Assembly of the AU, but their participation is mostly limited to delivering a single speech and observing proceedings. REC representatives do participate in ministerial and other meetings convened ahead of summits. SADC is perhaps the best organized REC: it makes regular contributions on legal matters at the AU, including comments to the protocol establishing the AU Court of Justice, and the SADC Secretariat Gender Unit participates in the deliberations of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The AU also prepares a briefing document for the SADC Council of Ministers meeting each year, including issues relevant to the following AU summit (Kane & Mbelle, 2007, pp. 25-26).

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is in charge of developing a framework for the harmonization and coordination of policies and programs of RECs as important strategies for rationalization of the RECs. For example, the ECA shall undertake studies on the economic cost and benefits of the inter-REC FTAs. Assessment of Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA) is a major ECA project devoted to an in-depth analysis of challenges along with solutions to develop regional integration. The first ARIA project completed in 2004 focused on a comprehensive assessment of the status of regional integration in Africa. The publication was widely disseminated, and RECs have been using it extensively as a rich source of analysis and recommendations for promoting and making adjustments to their respective integration programs. Until 2009, the ECA has been working on studying the issues of intra-African trade (UNEconomic&SocialCouncil, 2008, pp. 12-13). It is not clear
whether the AU institutions can effectively coordinate to involve and rationalize the RECs within a harmonized framework. The feasibility of the first step, inter-REC FTAs, remains being studied. The COMESA and EAC are the first case in practice. After COMESA launched the Customs Union in 2009, it claimed that its CET was harmonized with that of the EAC. In 2008, the summit of the COMESA, EAC and SADC claimed to set up a single FTA and eventually a single Customs Union.

The limited coordination between AU and the RECs is perhaps partly due to the challenges that the RECs currently face. They are all at or before the stage of making efforts towards a free trade area and a customs union, and therefore their focus is currently not on merging with other RECs and the AEC, but conquering their intra-regional challenges of developing sub-regional trade and economy. Another problem is that the RECs are at different levels of integration and they may achieve progress of greater difference over a longer time. A third problem is the equivalency of their organs and hence the compatibility of their structures with the AU. Although they all have some primary organs that have equivalent composition and functions, some of them do have different structures, with some of them lacking court of justice and parliament, and some of their organs composed of staff that are not equivalent. A last, but very salient problem is the redundant membership. As aforementioned, this could create problems when the RECs establish customs unions that require a common customs system for external countries. The African States that are members of more than two RECs can be seen as both internal and external countries. Those problems have not been focused on, but they African states will have to solve them to
achieve wider unity.

A last factor that reflects the low level of intra-regional convergence/integration is the limited level of complex interdependence within Africa. In 2007, only 10% of African trade was with other African nations, while 40% of North American trade was with other North American nations and 63% of Western European trade was with other Western European nations (UNEconomic&SocialCouncil, 2008, p. 14). The low level of intra-African trade implies the low level of complex interdependence among African nations and among RECs, and hence the bottom-up pressure for integration. Although the regional and sub-regional institutions have been formed throughout Africa since the 1990s, their effective working and the forming of an integrated region with a clear identity do not solely rely on the mechanisms of institutions, but also, to a great degree, on the intensity of ties and linkages among African nations, levels of their economic development, and the evolving of their political values. Social and economic interdependence and convergence are a strong bottom-up force and also a result of integration. It remains to be seen whether AU and the RECs can develop intra-regional interdependence and bridge their divergences within a continental framework.

Conclusion: the Two-Level Struggles for Independence and Prosperity

After summarizing the history and the current stages of Pan-Africanism and RECs, several conclusions can be achieved. First, the beginning and process of
Pan-Africanism are distinctive compared to the European and Asian experiences. Pan-Africanism originated from outside Africa among non-political leaders and advocates for African independence and people’s rights. African integration was advocated for maintaining stability and obtaining independence since the 1900s, rather than for security concerns in the Cold War (as the ECSC and the ASEAN countries were). While a continental organization for integration, the OAU, came into being in 1963 and began its relentless efforts towards freedom and integration, sub-regional organizations had been emerging, with some of them resolved or hibernating (due to the lack of nation states’ commitment, political conflicts, and other priorities) and others consistently productive in integration.

When the AU replaced the OAU and took on a much more comprehensive agenda of integration, most of the RECs have also been revitalized and started their comprehensive efforts in accordance with the goals set in the Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act of the AU. The EAC has taken a bolder agenda than the AU (to achieve a political federation), most of other RECs make almost equivalent arrangements and plans for integration, and a few of them, such as the UMA, IGAD and CEN-SAD, have a more moderate agenda and limited institutions. Using RECs as building blocs for economic integration is a distinctive strategy in Africa, but advancing them into customs unions and consolidating them in future will pose difficult challenges for the AU.

Second, the AU and most of the RECs have been highly institutionalized, with explicit goals to build an economic community where there are attempts for
institutionally strengthening rule of law (with a court of justice) and harmonization of markets and policies. They have equivalent goals to those of the EU and the ASEAN. While the East Asian countries have competing views in what kind of economic community they should build, the AU and the RECs have set up clear goals and rules for membership. The AU and RECs also have strong institutional structures which involve all the countries in more than one organization, while not all East Asian countries are involved in the same organizations/institutions (such as the Central Asian countries and Russia) or not involved in any regional organizations at all.

However, one question remains: to what extent does complex interdependence exist in Africa? When examining the intra- and inter- RECs trade, we can see that they lack interdependence, partly due to the low level of economic development and hence trade, and the underdeveloped economic structure with a focus on agriculture. In some cases, such as the EAC, African states are more dependent on external countries (such as the EU) than their continental neighbors. Besides the level of interdependence, the level of economic development is also much lower in Africa than in Asia, despite the more developed institutions, treaties, protocols and goals than in Asia. It is therefore noteworthy that the level of economic development is closely inter-related with the level of interdependence and the communication and transportation technologies.
Chapter 6

Realism, Functionalism, and Neofunctionalism: Which Explains Regional Integration Well?

Introduction

Given the distinctive historical, political and economic contexts in Europe, Asia and Africa, it is not surprising that the regionalism processes in the three regions are different from one another. The beginnings and progresses of integration in the three regions were partly related to the world wars and the Cold War. Some common forces have shaped the processes. However, the outcomes have been diverse. Some forces have been defining in one region, but less important in another. Consequently, the theoretical approach that stresses those forces may be applicable to one case, but less relevant to another.

This chapter applies the three theoretical approaches to each case, and tries to answer why integration in each region is distinctive in its way, that is, why European integration is most successful, Asian regionalism is limited, and African integration is formally institutionalized but with limited effects on actual market integration and growth under cooperation. In the end, it argues that each case can be explained by a synthesized pattern which stresses some distinctive factors. Some of those factors are brought up by one theoretical approach, and others are not noted by any approach. It argues that neofunctionalism has been developed out of the European experience of integration, and therefore it is the strongest account for European integration.

However, when applying to the Asian case, realism seems more applicable. In African continental integration, realism may be a stronger account for its difficulties.

Nevertheless, neofunctionalism is more applicable to the developments of African
regional economic communities (RECs). The major difficulties in the developments of RECs are not due to states’ concerns over sovereignty or any neofunctionalist factors, but mainly due to delays in the implementation of regional organizations’ policies, domestic instability and lack of commitment to regional funding.

**The European Way: Neofunctionalism**

The genuine start of European integration was the Schuman Plan (1950) which innovated on the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) based on the Franco-German partnership. The collaborative actions were merely among six countries in the harmonization of coal and steel markets. However, in the following 50 years, their cooperation has been expanded to many other fields; further, a common currency has been put into the markets of 16 countries, and some supranational institutions such as the European Parliament have been developed. The logic of this process seems to be explained by neo-functionalism: regional integration, starting from some uncontroversial areas, can be incrementally expanded to other related areas and can be deepened to political and defence policies (Cini, 2003, p. 88).

However, a close examination is required to explain soundly the logic of European integration: why and how was it started? How has the process evolved? Will political integration (such as setting up a supranational government) occur when there is a considerable degree of economic and monetary policy integration? Does neo-functionalism or any other approach provide the best account? This section applies realism, functionalism and neofunctionalism to European integration. It argues that neofunctionalism can explain the general trends during 1952 and 2002, but at
some points, realism, if not a comprehensive one, could provide a better explanation. Realists, functionalists and neofunctionalists have stressed several important factors evident in the European experience; however, they all suffer from criticisms. A synthetic pattern can be summarized from the three approaches.

**Realism: national interests, big powers and sovereignty.**

From the view of realists, national interests fundamentally determine the development of integration. Nation states are the primary and unitary actors in the international scene, and they make rational decisions to protect national interests. Anarchy within the system of nation states characterizes international relations, despite any integration progress. Supranational schemes will not be realized in Europe, as nation states will retain the major means of sovereignty.

According to realists, the ECSC and the following European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were established not because of the community spirit, but simply because the original Six had common interests. In the postwar world, there was a common feeling of exhaustion of war and worries of the recovering Germany. It was the common concern of European powers, especially the neighboring countries around France and Germany, to restrict the excessive development of German heavy industry.

For the smaller countries, namely the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium, integration was seen as a way of strengthening peace and contributing to their oft-challenged national autonomy. As aforementioned, within the principle of
supranationality of the ECSC, they could have an influence disproportionate to their sizes. Further, it would compensate for the disadvantages of their limited national markets (Bossaert, 2003b, p. 298). As for Italy, its membership in the ECSC and then the European Community (EC) was seen as a stabilizing factor for its democracy with its characteristic governmental instability and the wide differences between its north and south. As is mentioned in Chapter 3, Italian political actors could justify internal reforms or unpopular decisions with the demands from the European level and as necessary for keeping Italy in the heart of Europe (Gallo & Hanny, 2003, p. 271).

The common interests and the consequent partnership of the big powers, namely France and Germany, were essential for the establishment of the ECSC. The Schuman Plan, designed by France to involve the two big powers in cooperation and to contain Germany, was supported by Germany. For Germany, the negotiations on setting up the ECSC would probably be its first opportunity to regain its status as a sovereign member of a diplomatic conference, and it expected to end the occupation soon (Gillingham, 1991, pp. 233-236). Further, France and Germany are contiguous and both were strong enough to threaten each other’s security. Their mutual threat made it possible for both to compromise and to seek for collective security in the international institutions.

Peace is not the only thing on the national-interest list. Economic development has been an increasingly urgent need. Historian Alan Milward (1985) emphasized that the Schuman Plan was intimately linked to Jean Monnet’s ambitious plan for French industrial recovery which, in turn, relied heavily upon continued French access to
German coal that could be obtained via the ECSC (Milward, 1985, p. 395). Further, the regionalism developments in the late 1950s and after the 1990s seemed more to serve economic purposes than to maintain peace. The entering of the Southern and Eastern European countries since the 1980s had mainly been driven by the considerable economic interests provided by the EU’s funding and access to an enlarged market.

However, not all countries have common priorities in their perceived national interests. In the 1950s, while some countries decided to promote ambitious economic integration, others preferred moderate cooperation. As Stephen Kocs (1995) remarked, the future strategic choices of all the major states in Western Europe depended on whether those states placed their highest priority on power, on peace, or on strategic independence. International structure did not, by itself, provide much insight into the future strategic policies of Germany or any other West European states (Kocs, 1995, pp. 9-10).

Britain has been an outstanding actor for protecting national sovereignty: it did not participate in establishing the ECSC; it led the Nordic countries to build up the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) (that supported a looser free trade area) and kept outside of the EEC (that advocated for a customs union) until 1972; it has not been a signatory of the Schengen Agreement; and it has not joined the Euro Zone. It must be noted that nation states might change their priorities as the contexts change. Since the formation of the EFTA and the EEC, EFTA’s exports to the Six have grown more quickly than trade in EFTA itself, when the EEC policies have adversely affected the
trade of the EFTA countries (Curtis, 1965, p. 245). Thus, negative economic effects were one of the forces pushing Britain towards entering the EEC.

The defining role of big powers was evident in the initiation of European integration. The primary role of Franco-Germany partnership reflected realists’ contention that integration programs were driven by the preferences of the big powers. The counter-balancing role of Britain before 1960s was also noticeable. It led EFTA countries to resist the ambitious plan of the EEC. The decision of Britain to join the EEC was based on its perceptions on its economic interests on one hand, and on the other hand, balance of power. Germany had been rising and possessing higher positions in the power structure of Europe in the 1960s. Especially after the U.S. expressed its support for West European solidarity, Britain applied twice for the EC membership.

It can be concluded that integration will not progress far without any stagnation considering that nation states, as masters of the whole process, do not have consistent priorities. When they decide that the closer integration could best serve their interests, they are likely to support it. On the contrary, when they decide maintaining measures of sovereignty is the highest priority or seeking protectionism best serves their interests, they tend to go against the bold initiatives towards supranationalism.

In Waltz’s view, the cause of European integration should be analyzed in the structure of the bi-polar world. In a wider context, post-war European integration was seen very much as a creature of the move to a bipolar system, responding to the
dynamics of superpowers’ rivalry. The end of superpower bipolarity and the absence of a tangible threat from the communist bloc would render European integration stagnant. International suspicion would emerge as a consequence of both lost of autonomy and imbalances in gains from cooperation (Rosamond, 2000, p. 133). The stagnation of integration in the 1970s was one example of the suspicion among the member states. To a certain degree, the difficulties of the European Union (EU) to develop some supranational mechanisms in the 1990s reflected the suspicion, too, and the lack of communist threat after the Cold War.

Although realism can explain the above developments and difficulties, critics arise that the occurrence of supranational measures in the ECSC and the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar are not in accordance with realist views. It seems that the ECSC and the CFSP are partly the outcome of some political leaders’ effort, namely Robert Schuman and Jacques Delors. In East Asia, political leaders of similar minds have not been present. It may be one of the reasons why European integration has advanced further than Asian regionalism. According to neofunctionalists, political leaders and other policy entrepreneurs are important actors in integration. The realist view focusing solely on the role of nation states seems to ignore the real politics performed by complex actors with their own preferences.

Further, the assignment of powers to the Community institutions suggests that anarchy is not the main feature of international politics. As European integration gets more institutionalized, realists may have to admit the emergence of rules in the changing international system (Rosamond, 2000, p. 134). As Carr (2006) indicated,
both anarchy and order are present in the current international system (Carr, 2006, p. 56).

How a country decides its priorities remain to be discussed. Realism assumes that the states are unitary actors that make rational calculations. However, the decision-making process is a two-level game, a rather complicated process that follows certain mechanisms and involves political elites and diverse interest groups at the domestic level, and other nation states at the international level. This argument is evident in many of the experiences, such as the influence of political elites who either support or are opposed to ambitious integration. In the defeat of the European Defence Community (EDC) in the French parliament, the decision of France was made in its domestic decision-making mechanism and reflected de Gaulle’s attitude to a certain degree.

Besides, a nation state’s preferences are shaped by a number of other factors. The historical diplomatic traditions and geographical locations shaped the attitudes of the EFTA countries to a certain degree. For example, Britain did not consider itself as a part of Europe but with Europe, and the Nordics have tended to be neutrals since the early 19th century.

Standing apart from broader European conflicts, the interactions among political leaders may also shape nation states’ policies. For example, Franco-German partnership was greatly promoted by the close relationship between French and German leaders. In 1963, de Gaulle (who was fluent in German) outlined a
framework for a political union at his meeting with Adenauer. As aforementioned, during the negotiations over the Fouchet Plan, the most notable feature was Adenauer’s “enthusiastic reception of de Gaulle’s initiative and his consistent support for it” (Kocs, 1995, p. 39).

**Functionalism: human needs and solidarity.**

Functionalism is a complementary approach to realism on one hand, in that it explains the factors that realism ignores. It is a competing approach on the other, in that it refutes the realist contention about the role of nation states. It contends that forms follow functions, and a supranational government may replace nation states if it meets the human needs for a working peace system. Further, a sense of positive solidarity among peoples with similar cultures contributes to the integrated peace system. Common needs and a number of other factors may strengthen a sense of negative regional solidarity.

Firstly, the basis for West European positive solidarity is the inheritance of distinct European values. Despite the separate national identities emphasized by frontiers, passports, languages, and national governments, the people of the European countries have a great inheritance of common values shaped by a common culture and historical heritage, such as the Greek thought, Roman law, Christianity (mainly catholic), and the Renaissance with its immense influence upon architecture, literature, the industrial revolution, imperialism, and social democracy. The West Europeans enjoy similar standards of human rights and pluralist democracy (Wistrich, 1993, p. 79). Those similar values strengthen the solidarity of the Community in its
socio-psychological sense (the community spirit): a sense among the individuals “forming it of belonging together, of having common loyalties and values, and of kinship” (Taylor, 1983, p. 3).

Their similarities in the levels of economic development and their policies demonstrating liberal democracy have been a second foundation for their positive solidarity, and have facilitated the development of regional initiatives, such as the opening up of markets, the implementing of common agriculture policy, and the setting up of the European Council and Parliament. The enlargement towards Eastern and Southern Europe has brought about more diversity both in their values and in their economies and politics, and has therefore diminished the solidarity of the EU.

The factor in the postwar era that contributed to Western European negative solidarity was the common threats and related needs. The need for enhanced peace and security and economic development contributed to their consensus on economic liberalism and political cooperation. Franco-German partnership was the first step to strengthen Western European solidarity and consequent cooperation. To substitute a sense of solidarity for the tradition of confrontation was the very essence of the enterprise launched by Schuman and Monnet. It was the conviction of a destiny hence forward shared that justified the combining of the coal and steel industries (Schoutheete, 2000, p. 61).

Besides, solidarity has been promoted by European elites and member states with cohesion policies within the framework of the EC and EU. No two member states
have the same structure of government and in some cases, notably Spain and Belgium, linguistic and cultural communities remind people of the distinctions they have. Thus, the importance of EC/EU cohesion policies has been considerable. The most significant set of policies have been those designed to create a single European market and to establish the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The establishment of the Committee of Regions was another victory for regionalization, symbolically at least. As an increasing number of lobbying offices in Brussels gather information on the EC/EU initiatives to send back to the region, regions rather than states play an increasing role in European decision-making. The buoyancy of Europe’s integrated economy affects the prospects for cohesion as well. During recessions, the resources available are likely to be limited (Mitchell & McAleavey, 1999, p. 189).

Despite these points, many developments or stagnation in European integration can not be explained by functionalism. The persistent roles of nation states are clearly overlooked in the formation of the ECSC and the EU. If nation states’ concerns over sovereignty were not a problem and human needs always determined integration programs, Britain would have signed the Schengen Agreement and entered the Euro Zone, since the two projects should have reduced the inconveniences of cross-border transactions and movements.

Further, functionalism could not explain the stagnation of integration in the 1970s. During the oil crises, closer cooperation would have met the needs of Western European countries, and therefore the crises should have led to institutional initiatives. However, they did not come up with any consensus on that, but followed protectionist
policies. Diverse self-interested domestic actors, such as interest groups, influenced
government decisions. With the multiple actors shaping policy outcomes, the national
governments do not always make the rational decisions to adapt to the human needs.

Functionalists proclaim that the human needs decide the forms of governments.
Further questions are: who determines or interprets human needs? In what direction
are the human needs changing? National governments are again overlooked in
determining human needs. In the postwar Europe, the needs for economic recovery
and regional stability were salient. However, in the context of market relationships,
especially in trade, domestic needs are usually competing. Even if the needs
consistently require regional integration, how could national governments decide to
what degree the integration should be promoted? The decision-making process is
clearly influenced by a number of factors which can lead to different outcomes in
different European countries. Britain and the Nordic countries generally preferred a
moderate degree of integration, while some others favored a deeper level of
integration. The process by which the decisions on “forms” are made is not
highlighted by functionalists.

Functionalism places importance on common cultural elements that contribute to
solidarity and hence integration. To a certain degree, cultural values, such as liberal
democracy, are institutionalized as criteria of EU membership. However,
functionalism does not predict whether and how other cultural elements will be
institutionalized, such as different forms of Christianity and the relationship between
individualist and collectivist forms of social and economic expression.
Neofunctionalism: the spillover effect, international interest politics and the market.

While functionalism stresses the changes in popular attitudes, the early neofunctionalists describe the central dynamics of integration as the spillover effect. Neofunctionalists are opponents to realists, as they predict a final outcome of the gradual spillover process: a federation. Later theorists, namely Mattli (1999), combine multiple factors in shaping integration. Mattli (1999) explains the process more as the result of the thinking and efforts of political elites and the complicated process involving diverse interest groups. When the gains from market exchange are considerable, interest groups and national leaders are proponents for integration. In the meantime, national leaders seek to retain powers and autonomy. On the international level, a leading benevolent country plays an important role in promoting regionalism progress. Factors brought up by neofunctionalists are partly summarized by Joseph Nye (1971): the economic compatibility of nation states, the extent to which elite groups that control economic policy in the member states think alike and hold the same values, the extent and nature of interest group activity, and the capacity of member states to adapt and respond to public demands (McCormick, 2005).

In the 1980s, as the North American and East Asian economies grew, the European economies had been exposed to rising challenges. Closer integration became an urging need. Cultivated and political spillover reflected the reality of European integration to a greater degree during this age. Although the EC members had not urgently needed to change their currencies into a single one, the Single
European Act (SEA) was signed and the goal towards an European Central Bank system and currency was established in the Maastricht Treaty. It was partly due to the strong push by Jacques Delors and his British colleague Lord Cockfield, and partly based on package deals (and hence the effect of political spillover) among member states. When different members brought up different issues and related proposals to the table, they obviously had different focuses and diverse interests in their negotiations. Therefore, to make their favored deals, they compromised and cooperated: they agreed on others’ proposals to win their support. The uncertainty of the EU leaders’ willingness and the autonomous sub-national interest groups increased the uncertainty of integration.

The influence of elite behavior (both national and regional elites) in the decision-making and formal structures is noteworthy. The attitudes of elites from France and Germany have been especially important. The innovative design from Robert Schuman, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, led to a functionalist organization, the ECSC, as the first step towards a federal Europe (Ham, 1993, p. 26). The ECSC took office in 1952, and Jean Monnet was the President. As aforementioned, he was both the driving force of the experiment in creating a common market for coal and steel and, more important, the philosopher of the movement towards unity. He urged the delegates from the start “not to saddle the embryonic Community with the shortcomings of traditional intergovernmental institutions” (Duchene, 1994, p. 205). When Monnet proposed to overcome the spirit of discrimination in the EC in 1951, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
immediately replied positively. He supported the Monnet declaration that remained the cornerstone of Franco-German institutional relations. In 1950, the French Prime Minister Rene Pleven outlined a proposal for a European army, which then turned out to be the EDC (signed in 1952, but refused by the French Assembly in 1954) (Camps, 1964, p. 12). During the 1970s, the Franco-German partnership was characterized by a very close personal relationship between President Giscard d’Estaing of France and Chancellor Schmidt of Germany. Major policy initiatives in the 1980s, such as the signing and ratification of the SEA, came partly out of the close relations between President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl (Laffan, 1992, p. 182). During Jacques Delors’ decade (1985-1995) as President of the EC, he acquired celebrity and notoriety for his association with many of the developments of this decade, such as treaty revision, institutional change, budgetary reform, policy deepening, completion and innovation, two rounds of enlargement, and the beginnings of common policies in European security and defence (Drake, 2000).

Besides the outstanding French and German leaders, those from other countries (the EC members or not) should also be noted. As is mentioned in Chapter 3, Winston Churchill was one of the greatest inspiring forces of European integration. In 1946 at Zurich, he called for building a partnership between France and Germany, and a kind of United States of Europe (Knapp, 1969, p. 39). The Italian Foreign Minister of the early 1980s, Emilio Colombo, and his German counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, started with the Genscher/Colombo Plan, promoting the Draft European Act. The Italian Prime Minister Craxi skillfully managed the agenda of the Milan European
Council (1985) and led to a favorable vote on the modifications of the Rome Treaty. Besides, the ECSC gained the favor of Belgian supranationalists led by Paul-Henri Spaak who had a greater role than nationalists in shaping its European policy (Franck, et al., 2003, p. 70). The leading politicians of Luxembourg, such as Pierre Werner, Jacques Santer, and Jean-Claude Juncker and Gaston Thorn, have been clearly pro-European, and the governments under their leadership contributed considerably to strengthening and promoting further integration. Joseph Bech was another politician who made great contributions to as active co-developers or discrete mediators (Bossaert, 2003a, p. 300). In the Netherlands, the trio of Kok, van Mierlo, and Patijn, who were the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and State Secretary for European Affairs respectively in the early 1990s, made contributions to the diplomatic side of EU work. Being on close personal terms with Helmut Kohl, Kok managed to improve Dutch-German relations. The Queen and Prince Claus von Amsberg contributed further to the Dutch commitment to the Union and to close relations with Germany (Hoetjes, 2003, p. 316).

When major political leaders oppose closer integration, the depth of integration is hindered to a great degree. French President de Gaulle was an exponent of French nationalism, and insisted that state cannot delegate its authority to any international organization (Knapp, 1969, p. 97). After he returned to power in 1958, he successfully resisted the start of Qualitative Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council. The summits he convened became the intergovernmental engine of European integration (Devuyst, 2006, p. 27). When Britain applied for membership of the EEC, he used his veto
(Ham, 1993, p. 67). Another opponent was a British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher who had none of Edward Heath’s sympathy with the European ideal. Nor did she share his view that Britain’s future lay in ever closer contacts with the EEC (Evans, 2004). She opposed proposals about EMU and the Social Charter from 1988 to 1990, based on an unwillingness to see an EC central bank and single currency that would take away Britain’s capacity to conduct its own monetary policy (Wood & Yesilada, 2002, p. 72).

Considering the importance of autonomous nation states, the future of an ultimate defence and political union is quite cloudy: how could EU leaders, subjective to nation states’ leaders, make major member states agree to give up substantial measures of sovereignty in high-politics areas? The legitimacy of the cultivated outcomes by leaders within regional institutions is in question. Since those leaders are elected to represent their home countries and the nation states are still the most important and autonomous actors, it is the national governments that have the political legitimacy that comes from being elected (McCormick, 2005, p. 17). For example, the EDC was refused by the French Parliament and, mainly, de Gaulle. It is therefore evident in the failure of EDC and the empty-chair crisis that national governments (and leaders representing the countries) alone have ultimate legitimacy. Unlike economic integration such as the setting up of Euro Zone, a defence and political union is likely to occur not because of its considerable economic benefits and consequent functional pressures, but due to the strong push by the EU leaders. However, such a bold proposal is hard to be considered as legitimate since it is hard to
make all EU members and national leaders agree on it, considering the diverse and complicated domestic politics.

As Mattli (1999) argued, when the gains are considerable, the market players would have a strong incentive to lobby for regional institutional arrangements. The “relaunching” of European integration in the mid-1980s is in great part attributable to pressure from the business community. European industrialists were the first to campaign for a single European market, even before the European commission (Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989b). In 1983, they formed the Round Table of European Industrialists, a group comprising Europe’s largest and most influential corporations, including Philips, Siemens, Olivetti, Daimler Benz, Volvo, Fiat, Bosch, and Ciba-Geigy. Other business groups joined in the lobbying, notably the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations in Europe, composed of over thirty industrial associations from throughout Europe (Mattli, 1999b, p. 49). In this regard, interest groups greatly shaped the national policies.

The importance of leadership at the international level is also evident in European integration, especially in the early years. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, France served as the coordinator that proposed the ECSC plan, while Germany, the regional leading country in Europe, coordinated with France and created the ECSC and the EEC. Since the 1970s, Germany’s economy exhibited greater productivity than the other European economies, and its economic preeminence was translated into political influence within the EU. It has indeed been the key policy initiator and institutional agenda setter in a wide range of issue areas. For example, the first major
act of Germany leadership in the history of the EC was in launching the European Monetary System. It introduced concepts such as subsidiary and multi-tiered governance. Another example is the widespread acceptance of the Bundesbank as the model for the European Central Bank. Its leadership is also expressed by its willingness to act as a regional paymaster. It has been the largest net contributor to the EU budget which has redistributed substantial resources through the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, and the Cohesion Fund (Mattli, 1999b, pp. 101-104). In this sense, Germany has served as a regional economic hegemon that has provided or contributed to international public goods within the EU system: peace and an open trading system, including standards of weights and measures that may include international money and exchange rates (Kindleberger, 1986, p. 7).

To a great degree, Mattli’s analysis is largely applicable to European integration. He combined the realism and neofunctionalism contentions and also brought in economic factors. He analyzed the thinking of national leaders who value their own power and autonomy. It can be criticized that he underestimated the role of nation states, the concerns of sovereignty, and the anarchic environment. Besides, with the lack of trust and information, national leaders may not make the right decisions. Further, the future of the CFSP is uncertain. Since the political union has not been realized, the neofunctionalist logic is not proved yet.

**Conclusion: the neofunctionalist model.**
It is hard to say which theory or approach provides the best explanation for the successful or failed experience in European integration. Each of them stresses certain factors that cause or constrain the progress of integration, and yet receives criticisms. A pattern composed of all the factors evident in the historical facts can be summarized.

In the context of a postwar world where countries were faced with security threats and recovery from wartime destructions, the human needs for enhancing security and developing economies (as phrased by functionalists), or the common security and economic interests (as phrased by realists), became salient. Meanwhile, a feeling of exhaustion from wars was widespread. In that context, interest groups, notably the business groups, urged the nation states to change or sustain their regional policies. Especially when the markets were large and complementary, the gains from integration were considerable and were thus likely to give a strong push on market players to lobby the legislators. Pushed by the pressure from interest groups and the responsibility for their countries or the EU, the political elites thought about how to enhance the national or European interests. National political leaders considered both independence of their countries and their gains from domestic interest groups and voters. Because of the effective push of elites and interest groups, most nation states, especially the continentals (rather than the neutrals or Britain), began to adapt to shared views of human needs, mainly in the areas of low politics.

These countries, which had similar national values and limited economic and political diversity, also had a strong sense of community spirit. A benevolent leading
country in the process could help coordinate the negotiations. As the process of integration continued, the existing institutions and policies brought about functional pressures and increased common interests, and that often pushed interest groups and elites to promote wider or deeper integration. On the international level, it was easier to get deals through when countries had consistent needs. When they had different needs, elites from different countries might make package deals to accomplish their respective favored deals, in which case skillful negotiations contributed to positive outcomes. Concurrently, the development of communication and transportation technologies have greatly influenced the width and depth of interactions among countries, hence the pace and level of integration.

In contrast, when the security threats and economic recession were solved (such as Europe in the 1980s), new challenges arrived: other rising economies had been challenging European economies. Because of the competition, cultivated spillover pushed by institutional elites, such as Jacques Delors, appeared. However, the ambition of European-oriented leaders alone was not sufficient for success. When the interest groups do not expect considerable market benefits and national political leaders expect minimal gains, they resist further integration. When the interest groups opposing integration have a stronger influence than other groups, they hinder closer integration. The opponents bring up some claims for national interest, which has sometimes turned into “a flag of convenience for those who, having been left behind, want not so much a chance to move forward as to hold others back as well” (Ohmae, 1995, p. 62). On the international level, when countries, such as those coming into the
EU from Eastern Europe, have less solidarity with the Six, the EU members might not be willing to agree on policy initiatives. Especially when the negotiations are not effectively promoted through skillful manipulation, the deals are not likely to be accomplished.

Throughout the process of integration, big powers played an important role. If the Soviet Union did not have strong military (especially the atomic technology) power and a degree of ideological appeal within the 1960s, the feeling of Soviet threat would not have been so widespread in Western Europe. The reconciliation between France and Germany was the cornerstone for the ECSC. If Germany was strong enough and did not compromise with France, the ECSC could not have been set up. Further, the U.S. greatly influenced the initiating process. If it did not support Europe with the recovery plan, or if it supported a looser relationship among Western European countries, the Six would not have been pushed together by the OEEC, and Britain would not have changed its attitude towards the EEC membership in the early 1960s.

The external threat was another important factor. If there had been no security threat and economic destruction threatening domestic political conflict, the Six would not have been pushed together within the OEEC and the ECSC. In the 1960s, a looser free trade area might have been dominant if the EFTA had a better performance than the EEC. In that case, Britain and the Nordics would not have joined the EEC. When the nation states decided that they have conflicting economic interests, protectionism rather than cooperation dominated the economic policies. If the economic recession
appeared in the 1940s and the 1950s, the possibility of close cooperation within the
ECSC and the EEC might have been eliminated. In the 1980s, if there were no other
rising economies that posed an increasing challenge to the European economies, there
would not have been competition between countries that became an incentive for
intra-regional cooperation.

Now we can summarize the above analysis in the following table. It lists all of
the factors that have been argued to favor European integration, whether these reflect
a particular theoretical framework, and the extent to which they have been present in
Europe. As can be seen, Western Europe has had most of the driving forces, at least at
times, and this relates to its relatively high level of integration.

Table 6.1
Factors Shaping European Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors/Approach</th>
<th>The 1950s</th>
<th>The 1960s</th>
<th>The 1970s</th>
<th>The 1980s-1990s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States’ priority on security and economic cooperation</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States’ calculations that favor cooperation</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Intense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from Big Powers both within and outside Europe</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functionalism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common external security threats</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic destruction</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of positive regional solidarity in national values, economics and politics</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neo-functionalism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontroversial areas in low politics</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and international interest</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Intense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Which factors are the most consequential? The European experience showed that integration has not been controlled by international institutions but mainly shaped by national and sub-national factors. Realists insist that nation states and national interests (on the national level) are the most important factors. However, the de facto domestic decision-making process proves that nation states have not been monolithic. Domestic interest groups have diverse interests in the relationships among markets;
therefore they lobby the national legislators either to hinder or to promote integration. The national legislators determine whether to support the lobbying groups or not by weighing the potential of success of policies and their own gains in chances of being re-elected. When the gains from integration are marginal, the national leaders retain measures of sovereignty.

In international negotiations, nation states are not unitary, either. The diverse domestic interest groups can network with their foreign counterparts and thus influence both domestic policies and the international negotiations. National interest has not been solely determined by the national governments, but also shaped by national elites and interest groups. In this regard, the account of interest groups and elites has been closer to reality and thus more relevant than the realist logic.

In the beginning stage of European integration, countries faced challenges, such as the security threats and economic destruction. Those challenges pushed them together to enhance security and rebuild their economies: they set up the Council of Europe, the ECSC and the EEC. However, the influence of those challenges was temporary. As the problems were solved and international cooperation intensified, the spillover effect was noticeable, although it did not always lead to further integration.

In conclusion, neofunctionalists have provided a powerful account. The dynamics of interest group politics and elite behaviors in the context of market relationships are the key to shaping the national interests and the consequent process of policy making. A benevolent leading country is another key factor that is central to
international coordination and institutionalization. Other factors such as solidarity, new technologies, and updating of common interests, though helpful for furthering the cooperation and institutionalization, are not as essential.

**Asian Regionalism: the Power Politics**

As is observed in Chapter 4, regionalism developments in Asia have been slower and less extensive than those in Europe and Africa. What factors contributed to the occurrence and developments of East Asian regionalism? What obstacles hindered the coming together of East Asian countries, especially the major powers, and the deepening of integration? Numerous theories and approaches have given thoughts to the reasons of the regional developments and the features of regional integration. Bela Balassa (1961) systematically explained the factors that can influence economic integration in *the Theory of Economic Integration*, such as competition, market size, technological change, risk in foreign transactions and related policies, and impacts on nonparticipating economies (Balassa, 1961, pp. 163-188). Despite the persuasive explanation, his theory does not explain integration as a political phenomenon where nation states, ideologies and interest groups crisscross and form intricate dynamics. For the complicated politico-economic dynamics, three approaches, realism, functionalism and neo-functionalism, give strong accounts.

The neo-functionalism account developed by Walter Mattli combines Bela Balassa’s economic explanation, interest group politics and the spillover effect, and has proved the most persuasive in explaining European integration among the three
approaches. However, functionalism and, especially, neo-functionalism, were developed directly from the European experience, while the context and actual process of Asian regionalism have been much different from those of European integration. It is thus uncertain whether those theories could explain the Asian case well.

Although the literatures on Asian regionalism have discussed little about systematic theoretical accounts, they have mostly stressed the importance of the big powers’ relations in shaping Asian integration. Thus, they reveal their realists standpoints. However, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the think tanks of East Asia clearly tend to apply the European experiences to East Asia, and they advocate for a neo-functionalist approach to overcome existing difficulties and advance regional integration. For example, ASEAN terms its socio-cultural pillar as “functional cooperation”, and the Council on East Asian Community (EAC) frequently uses “functional cooperation” in its recommendations for community building. A few scholars, such as Akiko Fukushima (2007), who did some theoretical discussions on Asian regionalism, embraced the neo-functionalist approach to start and further integration, but they did not term their explanation as neo-functionalism explicitly. As Shaun Breslin (2007) summarized, there is also a vaguely defined New Asian Regionalism as a widely-used theoretical framework to explain and predict Asian regional integration, but it falls under the neo-functionalism approach.

The debate among realists and neo-functionalists has not been concluded yet. This section respectively applies realism, functionalism and neo-functionalism
explanations to Asian integration and summarizes their critics. It then lists all the main factors that have been reflected in the Asian experience, the theoretical approaches they fall under, and whether they were present in various historical stages in a table. It then summarizes the most consequential factors.

**Realism: national interests, big powers and sovereignty.**

As aforementioned, the realist school of international relations insists that nation-states are the most important roles that decide the progress of integration. In the broadly anarchic structure of the international society, they act rationally and unitarily on behalf of their own interests or those of their citizens. Within international institutions, especially those with supranational mechanisms, several countries may gang up against a certain country’s interests. Therefore, nation states tend to retain the means of sovereignty or policy autonomy. With the above logic, realism provides a very strong account for most of the regionalism processes and related features in Asia, but it suffers from criticisms in explaining some of the developments after the 1997 financial crisis.

Without consensus among nation states, international organizations alone, especially those with a large membership, could not initiate bold plans towards supranational institutions and political integration. Nor could they generate a sense of solidarity that is strong enough to hold member countries together within supranational institutions. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN are perceived to be two main organizations in Asian regionalism. The case of
APEC has provided important insights into the difficulties of institution-building with a large membership. “The diversity of APEC’s membership and the scale of its geographic reach have proved formidable challenge to its overall coherence and effectiveness” (Beeson, 2009, p. 4). The diversity of membership could be further clarified with the divergent political systems, economies that are wildly different in size and degree of development, and consequently the “frequently conflicting and contradictory hopes from its founders” about what sort of policy frameworks might be appropriate (Beeson, 2009, p. 37). Further, since security is often the most sensitive topic in international relations, it is hard to align the Anglo-American and East Asian countries in exposing and negotiating security issues. China, notably, avoided any multilateral resolution of its claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea, recognizing that it could have far more leverage bilaterally (Beeson, 2009, p. 68). It is thus evident that nation states rather than the regional institution or organization that determines the way they work.

Compared to APEC members, ASEAN has achieved a much higher level of cohesion in their trade and financial policies. The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) group has recently been considered the main group towards an East Asian Community (EAC), but this group has great variety in the character of the countries and historical baggage defining their mutual interaction and their individual place in the region (Beeson, 2009, p. 5).

Although all participating countries’ preferences and efforts could influence the regionalism process to a certain degree, big powers and their relationships shape the
process fundamentally. Most discussions on Asian regionalism are focused on the relationships among Japan, China, and the US. One of the biggest difficulties in advancing APT cooperation has been the Sino-Japan rivalry and their hegemonic competition. The 1997 financial crisis shocked East Asian countries and made them realize their common interests in financial cooperation and regional community building. Although several financial cooperation projects were implemented and the awareness of community building arose among the APT countries, their further cooperation has been hindered by their competing geo-political interests and conflicting views on the norms and membership of the EAC.

Japan used to play the leading role in East Asian financial cooperation after the 1997 financial crisis, but its role and views were challenged by China. China has increased its power comprehensively and intensified its relationship with ASEAN countries greatly since the late 1990s. In terms of trade, China has been the biggest trade partner with South Korea and ASEAN in recent years (CIA, 2010c). They both have considerable influence in East Asia, and they both are seeking for leading the East Asian regionalism. However, they could not achieve any consensus on the membership and the core values of the EAC.

Difficulties in constructing the Sino-Japan partnership seem formidable. Japan’s brutal occupation of China before 1949 has remained one of the defining events of recent East Asian history and something neither country has been able to deal with effectively. Further, they have disputes on the territory of South China Sea. With those fundamental problems outstanding, Sino-Japan tensions have been seen as
insurmountable obstacles to closer cooperation (Beeson, 2009, p. 7).

The U.S. has been a supporter for the Asia-Pacific grouping and a wider East Asia. It aims to include more powers to balance China so that it can keep its influence in this region. The series of bilateral alliances that the U.S. established in East Asia were originally part of its effort to contain communist expansion in the region. After the 1997 financial crisis when APT countries began their cooperation, the U.S. challenged Japan’s proposal that might diminish the role of the U.S., the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) proposal. When the APT countries continued and expanded their cooperation, the U.S. focused on deepening or increasing partnerships with East Asian countries, so that it could influence those countries’ policies.

Over the last few years, Japanese foreign policy making has been moving closer to the U.S. The debate about the role of Japan’s Self Defence Forces, the desirability of rewriting its constitution to allow the deployment of its forces overseas, and the direct involvement of Japan in the U.S.’s proposed ballistic missile system are all tangible expressions of that shift (Beeson, 2009, pp. 95-96). As China’s influence grows in East Asia over time (which alarms some US strategic analysts), if it proves politically and environmentally sustainable, the rise of China will seem unstoppable and potentially good news. Millions of people are likely to be lifted out of poverty, and the increasing market in China may provide benefits for Western industries. Combining the competitive and also mutually dependent relationship between the U.S. and China, “China’s integration into an international political economy dominated by the West generally and the U.S. in particular, would represent a major geopolitical
victory for America and its allies” (Beeson, 2009, p. 100).

The nation states’ preferences in their economic and foreign policies and their inter-governmental relationships are fundamentally determined by their perceptions on their national interests. The postwar Asia (during 1940s and 1950s) did not see grand and practical plans towards regional integration; nor did it get external support that led to regionalism. One most important reason was that most of the East Asian countries, including China, just became independent or cleared foreign interference after World War Two, and their priority was to set up new governments and to stabilize their domestic environments (Irvine, 1982, pp. 10-14). Therefore, opening international negotiations for regional cooperation did not receive enough attention from the major powers, although regional cooperation might have promoted their economic development on the whole. In this regard, the history of being occupied or invaded gave East Asia different priorities in contrast with West Europe where most countries used to be colonial powers.

Another reason was the ideological division that greatly determined their conflicting security interests and hence the lack of region-wide cooperation. In the context of the Cold War, resisting the communist expansion and promoting internal and external stability were ASEAN 5’s highest priority that (was perceived to have) originally brought them together within the ASEAN (Thanadsillapakul, 2009, p. 127). Although the ASEAN 5 and other countries (China, Soviet Union, Mongolia, and North Korea) might have common economic interests in rebuilding their economies, they were on opposite sides due to their ideologies and national security interests.
While the U.S. supported a united Western Europe in the postwar era, it would not support the ASEAN 5 to unite with the Communist enemies. Meanwhile, Russia and China split after 1961.

Further, as aforementioned, compared to postwar Europe where Germany was perceived to be a major potential threat, Asia did not have the same feeling of threat from Japan. In conclusion, during the Cold War, the East Asian countries did not generally see regional cooperation as the highest priority, they did not have common security concerns for the Communist powers and Japan, and no external super powers supported region-wide cooperation. Rather, they were divided by ideological divisions and conflicting interests.

When nation states’ perceptions on their national interests change, they adjust their policies accordingly. During the earlier stage of Cold War, the priority of the weaker states in Southeast Asia was to maintain security and stabilization and to resist the Communist expansion, and the task to develop their economies fell into the second place. ASEAN’s main declarations and agreements, accordingly, were to enhance security and stability, such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (Kuala Lumpur Declaration, 1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Bali, 1976), and the Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Manila, 1987) (ASEAN).

Although ASEAN made some efforts towards economic cooperation during the Cold War, they achieved very limited progress. ASEAN began to carry out the
ASEAN’s strategy for Collective Import Substituting Industrialization (CISI) after 1976, but it suffered a setback from failures, resulting from conflicts of economic interests among the ASEAN countries (Shimizu, 2009, p. 4). In this stage, they failed to create an interdependent and complementary intra-ASEAN market. At the 3rd ASEAN Summit in 1987, ASEAN put on a new strategy, the ASEAN strategy for Collective FDI-dependent and Export-oriented Industrialization (CFEI), to increase FDI to the region collectively (Shimizu, 2009, p. 4); however, it was after the end of the Cold War that this new strategy came into effect.

In the 1990s, security threats had greatly been reduced with the radical changes of Soviet Union and the reforms and policy changes taken by other Communist powers such as China. Thus, developing economy became a higher priority for ASEAN countries. In 1991, the CFEI strategy began to be effective as the political and economic environment changed. The agreement of establishing ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was signed in January 1992 to eliminate tariff barriers among the ASEAN members to integrate their economies into a single production base and market (ASEAN, p. 7). As the ASEAN deepened its economic cooperation, it also expanded its cooperation to more Southeast Asian countries regardless of their ideologies during the Cold War. During the 1990s, although Viet Nam was once considered as a political adversary, it was accepted by the ASEAN as a member. Besides, economic interest attracted the weaker countries, the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam), to the ASEAN.

While the ASEAN switched its focus to economic cooperation, other East Asian
countries, notably China, changed their focus from post-independence tasks to economic cooperation. To recover from the 1997 financial crisis, enhancing regional financial cooperation and developing a stable economic and financial system were in the East Asian countries’ common interest; therefore, it brought the APT countries together and gave rise to several regional cooperation projects, such as the AMF, CMI, and ABMI.

Meanwhile, nation states’ concerns of sovereignty or policy autonomy have hindered their closer integration. The ASEAN way has been known as the voluntary and consensus-based way of decision making. It has been confirmed in the ASEAN Charter (2008) that the ASEAN way shall be applied to all three pillars in the proposed ASEAN Community. It is also the de facto means of decision making in the APT group. Within the ASEAN way, each member country retains its policy autonomy and all decisions and policies are all based on consensus. Since members have diverse preferences in different issues, their consensus and hence progress of integration is limited. While the ASEAN countries have achieved notable progress in liberating trade and the transactions of other elements of production and culture, they have not set up any supranational body or mechanisms, nor have they proposed any regional court or parliament in the political-security pillar.

Means of sovereignty in territorial and other security issues are seen as fundamental national interests. Among the APT group, difficulty in developing supranational institutions and political cooperation projects in the context of Sino-Japanese rivalry seems implacable. Sino-Japanese historical rivalry, their
contemporary conflicts over territory of the South China Sea, and Japan’s denial of its atrocities in China became the main obstacles to increase mutual trust and build a Sino-Japanese partnership. China has been avoiding any multilateral resolutions for its territorial disputes with Japan, since it saw multilateralism as a threat that several regional powers may gang up against its territorial interests (Goh & Acharya, 2007, p. 98).

Besides, the continuing domination of the Chinese Communist Party in Chinese politics means that some forms of political reform and regional governance initiatives may be unthinkable. Not only in China, but also in East Asia generally, the strong authoritarian states have been important in the course of national economic development, but their concerns of sovereignty and security have hindered regional cooperation. The lack or fragility of democracy in Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, and China allow the governments to dominate the political and to a lesser extent economic life, placing limits on the development of regional governance (Beeson, 2009, pp. 13-15).

It is thus evident in the Asian regionalism processes that integration progressed with numerous difficulties. When the major powers had conflicting interests, they did not advance regional integration together. Only when they have common interests could they enhance regional integration. Secondly, the regional projects have been developed according to nation states’ specific interests in certain contexts. When security threats were their main concerns, their cooperation projects were mainly be to enhance security. When security threats diminished, they attached more importance to
economic integration. However, throughout all East Asian regionalism projects, maintaining measures of sovereignty has been a consistent principle.

Realism seems very much applicable to Asian regionalism, but it suffers from several criticisms. It assumes that the states are unitary actors that make rational calculations. However, the decision-making process is a rather complicated process that follows certain mechanisms and involves political elites and diverse interest groups. In the Asian countries which lack democracy generally, national interest may be used as an excuse by some political elites to protect their particular interests in regionalism.

Besides, regionalism is influenced by nation states’ historical traditions and geographical locations. Although it is in ASEAN’s interest to deepen its cooperation with some other countries such as Russia and Australia, some countries have objected the inclusion of those non-Asian countries. ASEAN also set geographical location as part of its criteria for membership. A sense of regional identity, although vague, is reflected in those attitudes.

Lastly, realism does not provide a valid account for some developments of the ASEAN and APT after 1997. The 1997 financial crisis provided a momentum for furthering ASEAN’s and APT’s financial cooperation, but their cooperation went beyond what they needed for recovering from the crisis. The ASEAN achieved consensus on building an ASEAN Community with three pillars including a political-security pillar and a socio-cultural pillar. Among the APT group, cooperation
in other areas (than finance) was also promoted, such as the implementation of the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR) Pilot Project, the APT Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID) Program, and their cooperation in anti-terrorism. Thus, the spillover effect and the role of regional policy entrepreneurs should be addressed.

**Functionalism: human needs, structural pressure, and solidarity.**

Functionalism and neo-functionalism embrace the idealist goals and pragmatic approaches in analyzing regionalism. According to idealists, the state of anarchy in international society could be replaced by rule of law established from international cooperation and mutual trust. Nation states would not be the ultimate form of human governance (Rosamond, 2000, p. 21). The goals of enhancing peace and rule of law are seen as human needs by functionalists.

Regional integration will begin, and national powers may be transferred to international institutions, if human needs require it. This process is usually promoted by the technological and economic changes. In the 1960s, the ASEAN was established out of the ASEAN 5’s urgent need to unite and resist the Communist expansion and enhance regional stability. The main documents that ASEAN signed were to enhance regional peace and security and stability and amity. After the Cold War when ideological divisions diminished, the need to develop national economies drove ASEAN countries to enhance their economic cooperation. They began to implement the CFEI strategy, and signed the agreement of establishing AFTA in January 1992 (ASEAN, p. 7).
By contrast, the East Asian countries outside the ASEAN did not participate in the integration projects during the Cold War. They were mostly occupied by post-independence or post-war tasks. Building a new governmental system and reconstructing domestic economies were their most salient needs. Thus, regional cooperation that may threaten their independence was not supported. Rather, they mostly set up strong states that helped recover economies and maintain internal and external stability. Further, they were also faced with the need to enhance national security against their ideological enemies in the Cold War. Thus, regional norms of non-interference and the maintenance of state sovereignty were established as their primary principles (Curley & Thomas, 2007, p. 4). Those norms, to a certain degree, limited their participation in building regional governance.

After the end of the Cold War, East Asian countries had mostly established stable domestic governance and were no longer threatened by ideological enemies. In the meantime, the other regions, such as Europe and North America, established their own regional organizations to develop regional trade and enhance their competence. Faced with those challenges, the need to enhance international cooperation became increasingly urgent. China, South Korea and Japan, as well as other non-ASEAN countries began to increase their participation in regional and international organizations and fora, such as APEC, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and World Trade Organization (WTO).

As the ideological division diminished in the 1990s, the ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries also enhanced their cooperation in the 1990s. The 1997
financial crisis in East Asia “sent a message about how the financial market was interconnected and how existing regional institutions were incapable of responding to the crisis” (Fukushima, 2007, p. 105). A sense of negative solidarity stemmed from the crisis. East Asian countries realized that they were faced with a common urgent need to enhance the international financial system and financial cooperation. The crisis also woke East Asian countries up by making them realize the importance of community building. The APT group has begun their annual summits since 1997, and a number of financial cooperation projects have been put into practice. Although limited, the rising awareness of shared interests after the 1997 crisis was one of the factors driving the APT countries to begin their community-building efforts.

Other societal and functional forces have also promoted the regionalism processes. The development of technologies of communication and transportation facilitated trade and movement of people. Consequently, the increasing transactions and movements of people, as bottom-up forces, required the removal of barriers among nation states and enhanced coordination among governmental departments. Since the end of the Cold War, East Asian countries have greatly increased their international trade and movements of other production elements. Accordingly, bilateral FTAs have been developed between China, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN respectively. Within ASEAN, tariffs have also been greatly reduced after the implementation of AFTA.

When conflicts occur among nation states in the cross-national transactions and movements, there will be needs to develop dispute resolution mechanisms. As those
needs arise, relevant governmental departments will be performing their functions and increase regional cooperation. In the 10th ASEAN Summit in 2004, the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM) was signed to replace the 1996 Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism. In the EDSM, parties in dispute can require the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) to establish a panel to address their dispute. The Appellate Body established by AEM (ASEAN Economic ministers) hears appeals from panel cases. The Appellate Body’ report to SEOM shall be accepted unconditionally unless the SEOM decides not to agree with it by consensus (ASEAN, 2004a).

The ASEAN seems to have been following the functionalist logic, and it terms the socio-cultural pillar as “functional cooperation” and the economic pillar as “economic integration” (ASEAN, 2010e). It is also noteworthy that the think tank, the Network of East Asian Think-tanks (NEAT), uses “functional cooperation” as its key word to describe their practical working projects in many economic and socio-cultural issues (CouncilOnEastAsianCommunity, 2010, p. 4). Those projects were brought up out of practical issues and related needs, but they were also used to consciously promote the functionalism process of community building. However, no evidence of diminishing national sovereignty is found yet. It remains to be seen whether there will be any supranational developments in East Asia.

The degree to which nation states transfer powers to international institutions is not only determined by human needs, but also by solidarity (Taylor, 1983, p. 3). Homogeneity in several aspects, such as similar political and cultural values, political
structures, state-market relationships, common needs or concerns, and the cohesion policies, may contribute to a sense of positive solidarity. Asia has been known to be a region of considerable heterogeneity. It has “vastly different levels of development, with different versions of domestic capitalism, different domestic political structures and related values, and different religions and belief systems” (Breslin, 2007, p. 26).

Indeed, part of East Asia used to have common security concerns as they underwent the colonial age, the independence wars and the Cold War. However, this region has suffered from the expansionary military activities of one of its members and where memories of the war are still strong in the minds of many others. Many of them are also concerned with potential regional hegemons, China and Japan. Further, this region is divided by their relationship with the U.S., whether it is a partnership or a competing relationship (Breslin, 2007, p. 26). Another splitting force is the Sino-Japan rivalry: China and Japan could not resolve their territory disputes, and they have conflicting views in the membership of the proposed EAC, which is deeply entangled with their chilly historical and political rivalry and competing regional interests as two potential hegemons.

Thus, East Asian countries with conflicting values and geo-political interests could hardly find a sense of positive solidarity, except their common geographical identity. The small group of ASEAN 5 may be the group that has the highest level of solidarity in Asia, while the wider area that includes Northeast Asian countries is hard to be called a coherent region. In this regard, Asia has a much lower level of solidarity than the Western Europe, which became one of the main reasons why East Asia has
the slowest process and the weakest form of regional integration.

If there is any sense of positive solidarity in East Asia, it should be coming from their geographical locations (as ASEAN defines its membership), and from their common need not to be left out of the worldwide regionalism trends and to develop a competitive regional community, and from their enhanced community spirit in those regional institutions and related community-building projects. Thus, East Asia’s solidarity is not inherited, but constructed. In the meantime, its sense of negative solidarity faded away after East Asian countries’ economic recovery from the 1997 financial crisis.

Several other factors are important in Asian regionalism, but are underestimated by functionalists. First, solely by the concepts of “human needs” (and related functional pressure), and solidarity, functionalism could not explain some of the developments, which have been promoted by the regional institutions, the policy entrepreneurs, envisaging some community-building projects. The developments after the 1997 financial crisis, such as the proposal of the EAC, have not been the requirement of recovering economies or out of a sense of solidarity among the +3 countries, but have been constructed in light of the worldwide regionalism trends. ASEAN passed a proposal to build an ASEAN Community composed of three pillars. While the economic pillar is developed for the increasing needs for intra-regional transactions, the political-security and the socio-cultural pillar are mainly constructed by the ASEAN for the overall community-building.
Second, functionalism could not explain the lack of political-security cooperation soundly. There are some needs for political and security cooperation, such as combating transnational crimes, anti-terrorism, protecting human rights, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining peace in territorial conflicts; however, the developments in this sphere are limited. The politico-security pillar has only stressed the importance of norms such as peace, democracy and transparency, and it has only included some intergovernmental meetings or fora as its main mechanisms. By advocating those norms and the intergovernmental meetings and fora, ASEAN has been constructing a very weak political-security pillar which could not live up to what a pillar or community means in other regional contexts.

In those cases, functionalists do not see sovereignty and authoritarian states’ concerns of retaining autonomy and national power as a formidable problem, but something that will be compromised piece by piece when human needs and structural pressure push regionalism further. However, nation states’ concerns for sovereignty and their “strong state” authoritarianism do play a fundamental role in high politics in Asia. The ASEAN and the APT groups have not developed any supranational mechanisms while they try to meet the increasing needs and promote the economic and socio-cultural cooperation. Their political-security pillar has not lived up to its name yet, and the consensus-based principle has been dominating all their decision making processes. Therefore, functionalist contentions remain to be tested.

Third, while human needs arise, there may be diverse self-interested domestic actors (interest groups) raising conflicting needs, and thus making the outcomes of
national policy-making less certain. The interest groups began to play a moderate role in policy making in the context of fast economic developments after the 1980s, when the market relations and actors were more active and stronger. However, functionalism was developed in the 1940s, when World War Two just ended and the most salient need was postwar recovery in the society. Therefore, their understanding of human needs did not emphasize market elements and interest groups. The influence of interest groups in Asian regionalism may be limited, but should be noted. Newer versions of neo-functionalism clearly combined the market relations with the political analysis, which could be partly attributed to their age when economies were developing, market transactions were increasing, and the groups in the markets were also growing their influence in policy making.

**Neofunctionalism: spillover, non-state actors, and nation States.**

The old neo-functionalist arguments developed in the 1950s and 1960s stresses the spillover effect, institutional mediators, elites, and interest groups. The start and early progress of European integration followed the neo-functionalist model to a great degree. East Asia, following that model, is currently in the first stage: they agreed on a common will to build a regional community and started integration in areas of low politics. As aforementioned, the ASEAN terms the Socio-Cultural Pillar as functional cooperation. Amongst all three pillars, the economic pillar is the most developed with a number of ministerial meetings addressing issues of main industrial sectors. The socio-cultural pillar is also quickly expanding intra-regional cooperation. Only the politico-security pillar is under-developed, solely by advocating some regional norms.
and convening some loose inter-governmental meetings and fora.

Thus, it is clear that the ASEAN is starting cooperation in areas of low politics, and it envisages that integration in the politico-security pillar will occur due to the functional pressure. In terms of spillover effects, there is a certain level of functional spillover among the ASEAN and APT, as is evident in their increasing trade agreements, expanding areas of cooperation, and relevant regional bodies and meetings. Cultivated spillover is also evident in ASEAN’s and APT’s community building efforts. While the functional pressures and human needs have not reached such a level as to build a regional community with a political pillar, ASEAN countries agreed to build an ASEAN Community composed of three communities. The NEAT, as one of the policy entrepreneurs, has brought up several recommendations for building the EAC. Notably, the 2005 final report of NEAT working group stressed NEAT’s neo-functionalist logic. It indicated that various levels of functional cooperation in finance, trade and investment, IT, development assistance, energy and health have played key roles for community building in East Asia” (Council On East Asian Community, 2010, p. 1).

As neofunctionalists argue, the + 3 countries should be able to expand political-security cooperation when their cooperation in those functional areas expands and deepens. Nevertheless, the + 3 have not proved the feasibility of the neofunctionalist model yet. The spillover effects and related developments up to 2009 have been limited, especially among the + 3 countries. Despite their common will of community building, the weak forces of the regional institution (APT meetings), its
elites (notably the Japanese leaders and elites), and the interest groups have constrained the integration process.

The APT countries do not have a formal regional organization except their annual summits and ministerial meetings. Consequently, they are lack of such specialized regional elites as Jacques Delors in the EU. Due to the lack of formal and strong regional institutions, the national elites who control power and resources are less likely to be dedicated to regional governance that may weaken their power. East Asia’s national elites, notably those of China and Japan, do not have a constructive relationship. While the success of European integration could be partly attributed to the support from national elites and their partnerships, the + 3 do not see close relationships among their leaders. On the contrary, the relationship between leaders of China and their counterparts of Japan has been jeopardized greatly by the Sino-Japanese rivalry. While effective manipulation of elites and interest groups in the international negotiations contributed to European integration in the 1980s and the 1990s, it has not been evident in APT’s summits since APT cooperation has just started.

The influence of interest groups is actively reflected in European and North American politics, but it is often overridden by central governments in East Asian politics. This is partly related to the domestic decision-making mechanisms of a strong-state style. The governments in East Asia generally have a strong grasp on domestic economies and politics, due to their positions as post-colonial or newly-established regimes. Over-promotion of sovereignty is part of the normative
behavior of the states in East Asia (Thomas, 2009b, p. 19). These norms, on one hand, make the states less willing to transfer powers to regional organizations, and on the other, enable national governments to override the preferences of other sub-national actors, such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and firms. Besides, many of them lack democracy, and have thus reduced the direct input of interest groups. The conflicting geo-political interests in this region and lack of trust among nation states have further reduced the influence of interest groups in international politics.

The old neo-functionalist arguments were developed directly out of the postwar European experience which placed great emphasis on institutional arrangements; therefore, it may not be sound in explaining the distinctive Asian regionalism that occurred often without the need for the creation of formal regional organizations in the 1990s. Further, the role of states has been essential in East Asian regionalism. Walter Mattli (1999) improved neofunctionalism arguments by adding some factors related to states: the interaction between political leaders and market players (interest groups), a benevolent leading country, and the negative effects of integration on outsiders (Mattli, 1999b, pp. 43-52).

The interaction between market relationships and governments is true in Asian integration. The prospect of economic prosperity within a regional FTA has been great, so it has led to the implementation of AFTA and other bilateral FTAs. Economic difficulty does serve a catalyst for integration, which is usually in the form of informal inter-governmental arrangements. It is evidenced by the financial integration projects in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis. When the + 3 countries
recovered from the crisis, no bold regional developments were achieved among them. By contrast, the APT cooperation has been characterized by their conflicting interests, especially between China and Japan, and their reluctance to give up means of sovereignty.

Mattli (1999) brought in the collective action problems among nation states, and thus explained the salient difficulty in the current APT cooperation: the Sino-Japan rivalry and their competition for regional leadership. He contended that the presence of a benevolent leading country seeking integration is a key for regional institutionalization. Contested leadership or the absence of leadership makes coordination games very difficulty to resolve (Mattli, 1999a, p. 42). This is evident in European integration where German serves as a benevolent leading country. In the case of the ASEAN, Indonesia seems to serve as a regional leader, but the original ASEAN 5 countries have also been co-leading the developments of ASEAN, without contests for anyone’s leadership. However, in the case of APT cooperation, the contested leadership between Japan and China is one of the main difficulties for community building. Their conflicting interests have led to their competing views on the norms and membership of EAC.

Driven by potential gains in the regionalism process, the CLMV has entered the ASEAN, and another two countries in Southeast Asia, East Timor and Papua New Guinea, have been seeking for membership in ASEAN. Due to the geographical limit that ASEAN Charter stipulates, other countries in East Asia and the Oceania seek for regional cooperation in the framework of the APT and EAS group.
Neofunctionalism which has been proved a strong account on European integration suffer from a number of critics in the Asian case. Firstly, the interaction between interest groups and the government has been more evident in European integration than in Asian regionalism. The “relaunching” of European integration in the mid-1980s was in great part attributable to pressure from the business community. European industrialists were the first to campaign for a single European market, even before the European commission (Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989a, pp. 95-128). However, interest groups have not had such influence on East Asian governments due to the lack of democracy in the making of economic policies. Accordingly, leaders in East Asia are mostly not concerned of the relationship between election results and national economic development within regional integration policies. Therefore, the ASEAN and APT cooperation have been lack of social input. Although interest groups do play a key role in regionalization, closer collaboration is not seen as their interests but as national interest collectively. Therefore, the role of nation states in East Asia is underestimated by neofunctionalism to a certain degree.

Further, the influence of regional identity that is less noted by neofunctionalists has been evident in some regional developments in East Asia. The ASEAN sets geographical limits on its membership, allowing only Southeast Asian countries from joining. Therefore, the + 3 countries have not sought to join it, but formed a concurrent grouping. The countries from Oceania, Australia and New Zealand, have been excluded from some processes. Russia and some central Asian countries form their own small group rather than joining ASEAN or East Asian Summit (EAS).
Lastly, the logic of neofunctionalism is not proved in Asia yet. While the supranational developments within the EC/EU have proved the effect of the neofunctionalist model, ASEAN has not set up any equivalent regional bodies in the Political-Security Community or applied any supranational mechanisms of decision making. The ASEAN Charter clearly states that their decision-making obeys the consensus-based principle.

**Conclusion: no plan, no supranationalism.**

All three approaches have given reasonable accounts for Asian regionalism, and yet all of them suffer from some critics. The bulk of literature on Asian regionalism attaches much importance on the relationship among big powers in and outside East Asia. Thus, it reflects the important influence of national interest and big powers in East Asian integration. Due to their distinctive history, political norms and consequent political structures, the influence of interest groups is compromised to a certain degree, and thus neofunctionalism becomes less relevant to Asian regionalism. However, the spillover logic of functionalism and neofunctionalism has been proved evident in the European case, and has been drawn by ASEAN and APT’s think tanks to East Asia’s community-building efforts. Since no deepening political integration and supranational measures appear in East Asia, the feasibility of the neofunctionalist model remains to be tested. The factors that influenced the Asian regionalism are summarized as follows.

In the context of a postwar world where countries were faced with security
threats and ideological divisions, the human needs of enhancing security became urgent for the ASEAN 5. Due to their common security and economic interests in that context, they set up ASEAN which mainly served security interests in the Cold War. In the meantime, overcoming economic and other post-colonial tasks was the most salient challenge for most of the East Asian countries, and therefore they did not give much attention to economic integration.

After the end of the Cold War, ASEAN’s common economic interests became salient, and consequently projects for economic integration evoked. Their main achievement was the implementation of AFTA. The AFTA has side-effects on outsiders, the CLMV countries and other East Asian countries. Out of their economic interests (or the need to promote economic development), the CLMV all became members of ASEAN by the 1990s, and the + 3 countries began to intensify their economic cooperation with other East Asian economies. In this process, interest groups, notably business groups, promoted the process of regionalization, but it was nation states that saw their common interests and played a fundamental role.

The 1997 financial crisis was another turning point in the history of Asian regionalism. ASEAN and other East Asian countries realized the inability of their national governments to deal with financial instability without international cooperation. To strengthen economic stability, the ASEAN quickened its pace towards integration and worked out detailed plans for building an ASEAN Community. Common economic and geo-political interests from the realist perspective, and human needs from the functionalist perspective, served as a direct cause for this step. Further,
the regional identity or “community spirit” could not be ignored in their integration. Meanwhile, ASEAN and its national leaders served as the institutional mediators. Since there was no contested leadership within the ASEAN, their community-building efforts worked out well. However, their concerns over sovereignty have constantly hindered politico-security integration.

The +3 countries merged with the ASEAN group by forming the APT group, but after they recovered from the crisis, their cooperation stagnated. Due to a certain degree of community spirit, the EAC was proposed. However, contested leadership between Japan and China has been another obstacle. Besides, their concerns of sovereignty in the context of conflicting security and territorial interests have been a major obstacle for closer cooperation. Due to the political rivalry and lack of trust, the national leaders of China and Japan have not formed constructive partnerships.

On the whole, the influence of regional elites in East Asia is much weaker than in Europe where there is a formal and strong regional organization. However, Japanese elites have been fairly active in furthering regional cooperation. The efforts of Japan’s think tanks, such as NEAT, supported by their government, have been noteworthy. Nevertheless, the regional norms brought up by Japanese scholars clearly discriminate China who lacks those political values. They have not been accepted by China yet.

Since the 1990s, ASEAN and APT have intensified their cooperation in trade, but functional spillover has not been so widespread. Since they just began practical cooperation in a number of areas of low politics, they have not achieved deeper
political integration. On their way towards closer integration, the lack of solidarity, contested leadership, concerns of sovereignty, lack of democracy, and conflicting geo-political interests among big powers have been the main obstacles. Therefore, it remains to be tested whether the neo-functionalist model works for East Asia.

Combining all those factors, a pattern could be summarized in the following table.

Table 6.2
Factors Shaping East Asian Regionalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors/Approach</th>
<th>The 1950-1960s</th>
<th>The 1960s-1980s</th>
<th>The 1990s</th>
<th>After the 1990s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States’ priority on security or economic cooperation</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States’ calculations that favor cooperation</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from Big Powers both within and outside Asia</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functionalism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security threats</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-independence tasks</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of positive solidarity in national values, economics and politics</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural pressure</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neo-functionalism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontroversial areas in low politics</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and international interest groups favoring integration</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Rare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from national and regional elites</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skillful manipulation and negotiation of interest groups and elites</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States’ ability to adapt to integration</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Which factors have been the most consequential? While the European experience showed that integration has not been controlled by international institutions but mainly shaped by national and sub-national factors, the Asian experience showed the defining roles of nation states and the peripheral roles of international institutions and sub-national factors. In the European case, national interest has not been solely determined by national governments but also shaped by national elites and interest groups. However, in East Asian regionalism, elites and interest groups have not been so influential. The Cold War and the 1997 financial crisis were two turning points where East Asian countries’ geo-political and economic interests, and consequently regional policies, changed greatly.
Despite the less relevance of interest groups, Mattli’s neofunctionalism is still fairly persuasive. The contested regional leadership, the lack of support from national elites, and limited scale of functional spillover effects are three main fragmenting forces in the Asian case. However, the contested regional leadership and lack of support from elites are also closely related to realists’ contentions about big powers and their national interests. The big powers have determined the process to a great degree. As concerns of sovereignty play an important role in East Asian politics, a political union is not likely to occur. Therefore, the general trends of Asian regionalism have reflected the realist account. Meanwhile, it must be noted that the ASEAN and the main think tanks on the EAC project have been seeking for a neofunctionalist solution for the current difficulties, and that East Asian countries are slowly transforming their political values and regimes. Therefore, the situation may change in the long run.

**Pan-Africanism: the Impeded Political Project**

The context of the beginning and progress of African integration is different from that of European and Asian integration. The origin of Pan-Africanism was related less to World War Two than to the struggle for African independence. While European and Asian integration before the 1960s were driven mainly by post-war security threats and the need for economic recovery, Pan-Africanism originated out of the common desire to resist and end colonialism and for some neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism is an economic concept, to which the competing idea is socialism. In the 1990s, the situation has been much different in Africa. While both Europe and East Asia have
generally recovered and developed their economies considerably and maintained regional peace for years, African states have been still mostly underdeveloped and unstable.

Within Africa’s distinctive context, the defining factors shaping integration are likely to be different from those in Europe and Asia. This section of the chapter applies the theories of realism, functionalism and neofunctionalism to African integration. It argues that realist accounts are valid in explaining the general trends in the history of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU). However, functionalism and neofunctionalism are both more applicable to sub-regional developments and, probably, future trends. Some defining factors are not addressed in the literature discussing the three theories, but they fall under the neo-functionalism approach.

**Realism: nation states, national interests, and sovereignty.**

In the 1950s, big powers played an important role in determining what kind of integration African countries were to pursue. The influence of colonial countries was noticeable in the early Pan-Africanist developments. Britain and France imposed colonial experiments such as the Central African and French West African Federations. They did contribute to integration among their colonies to a certain degree, for example by imposing a common language for purposes of social advancement. France and the UK maintained bilateral agreements with their former colonies (Yansane, 1977, p. 59).
The balance of regional powers is another concern of nation states. Although the primary objective of the founding fathers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was regional integration, the community’s emergence reflected Nigeria’s pervasive concern of stabilizing and controlling its external environment. In 1973, the creation of the Communaute Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) was an attempt by the six Francophone countries (the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta, Mali and Mauritania), with the support of France, to counterbalance the Nigerian influence in West Africa (Bach, 1983, p. 605).

In general, national interests greatly shaped the outcomes of African integration during the post-colonial era. The main interest when the OAU was established was to end colonialism and consolidate independence or majority rule. After 1963, 21 African states became independent or obtained majority rule, as is shown in Table 6.3. Even in the already-independent majority of African states, there was often a desire to end economic “neo-colonialism”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of Independence</th>
<th>Colonization Status</th>
<th>Territory Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>Never effectively colonized</td>
<td>Gabon 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Gabon 1960</td>
<td>Senegal 1960, Swaziland 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Gabon 1960</td>
<td>Angora 1960, Cape Verde 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Gabon 1960</td>
<td>Sierra Leone 1961, Sao Tome/Prinipe 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Gabon 1960</td>
<td>Chad 1960, Uganda 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote D’Ivoire</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Gabon 1960</td>
<td>Malawi 1964, Eritrea (from Ethiopia) 1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Economic integration in much of this stage stagnated. When the priority of nation states was switched from securing and consolidating independence or majority rule to national development in the 1990s, they began to focus on economic integration programs. The AU and the RECs specified their goals of economic integration in several stages. They also addressed good governance. However, as regional conflicts broke out occasionally and national economies were mostly underdeveloped, the AU did not make much progress in promoting economic integration and good governance. Before 1994, the achievements of RECs were also limited. Many of the RECs were not established until the late 1980s. Their early developments were focused on maintaining independence and regional stability. Economic integration was slow in the early 1990s.

Sovereignty is an important concern of nation states. In the 1950s, African countries were divided into two competing groups debating whether African integration should be “ambitious” or “moderate”. While Ghana and Guinea agreed to set up a political union of West African states, Liberia opposed this ambition. All three states established the Community of Independent African States, which respected national identities, constitutional structures, and the principle of non-interference in domestic policies. As Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria commented in July 1959, “if for many years certain parties have fought for their sovereignty, it is unlikely that they will surrender that sovereignty to a nebulous organization” (Ajala, 1973, p. 23).
Most of the conservative countries were Francophone. The competing Casablanca group agreed to set up a political committee to ensure common defence of Africa, while the Brazzaville group insisted on moderate cooperation in socio-economic issues. To solve the disagreements between the two groups, some Anglophone and Francophone countries held the 1961 Monrovia conference, but the views of the Brazzaville group prevailed.

At the creation of the OAU, the importance of sovereignty was especially highlighted. During the launching of the OAU, a military coup in Togo and the subsequent death of its first president, Sylvanus Olympio, slowed down Nkrumah’s campaign, and focused attention on the fear of political assassinations. Due to this instability, the OAU sought to emphasize three issues: preservation of state boundaries established by colonial power; territorial integrity and sovereignty of each state (non-interference in other states’ internal affairs); and security of heads of states who felt threatened by internal insurgencies or non-violent opposition groups (Makinda & Okumu, 2008, pp. 11-12)

Historically, the preservation of sovereignty has been a persistent fragmenting factor. Especially when regional conflicts are reoccurring in Africa, non-interference has been a major principle in the AU and the RECs’ decision making mechanism (hence the priority to protect national sovereignty). The AU can intervene in the restoration of order only in grave circumstances that may include war crimes and unconstitutional changes of government. Nation states, rather than the AU, have always been the major actors that govern both domestic and international affairs.
Anarchy characterizes the continental relationships in Africa. As is evident in the developments within the AU, many of the conventions and agreements are signed within the AU, but not ratified at the national level. The AU institutions can not enforce continental projects.

The RECs, although involving much fewer players, have not achieved any concrete supranational outcomes, either. Most of the RECs have set up regional or sub-regional parliaments which have no supranational powers. Of the eight RECs that the AU recognized, none has set up any supranational institutions or a common political and defence policy. None of the three major RECs seeks to set up a federation. Although they all set up FTAs, the REC institutions do not have the power over nation states. Lack of funding is recognized by many as one major impediment for REC development; however, none of the regional institutions has been entitled to enforce nation states’ financial obligations. “Due to the reluctance of member states to surrender a measure of their national sovereignty, it has been difficult for the community to enforce its decisions. In the ECOWAS, where the Treaty, Protocols and Conventions have to be ratified by member states before they enter into force, it has been an uphill task getting these legal instruments ratified. Before 1989, fewer than 50% of the Protocols were in force” (ECOWASExecutiveSecretariat, 1996, p. 15). Today, 17 out of 43 important treaties, protocols and agreements are not in force (AFRICANUNION, 2011b).

In light of the fundamental importance of sovereignty in the AU and, to a lesser degree, the RECs, as well as the limited progress in integration, realism seems to be
applicable to the general trends in African integration. However, many notable developments and processes, especially at the sub-regional level, could not be explained by realism. For example, in 1958, newly liberated Ghana and Guinea decided to set up a union of West African states to be characterized by a common economic, foreign and defence policy. According to Ghana’s first president, Nkrumah, sovereignty, although newly attained, was transferrable to the regional organization (Ajala, 1973, p. 18).

Although they failed to gain Liberia’s support, their ambitious approach did not end. The spirit of close integration was continually supported by a number of conferences and agreements. The second All African People’s Organization (AAPO) Conference in 1960 defined the final objective of Pan-Africanism as “the United States of Africa”. The Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union was established in 1961 to coordinate their policies for all important problems, including economic and monetary fields (Ajala, 1973, pp. 21-22). In the African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty ratified in 1994, the OAU envisaged establishing a FTA, a Customs Union, and finally an Economic and Monetary Union with a certain degree of political integration. In the final stage, the integration of some economic and monetary policies equivalent to those in the EU would be realized (AFRICANUNION, 1991, pp. 12-20). The Constitutive Act of the AU adopted in 2000 stipulated that the AU should establish a common defence policy for the whole continent (AFRICANUNION, 2000). At the sub-regional level, regionalism developments have been more considerable. The East African Community aims to set up a political federation, as stipulated in its charter.
The three main RECs all envisage a customs union and an economic union in the near future.

Further, despite the feature of anarchy within both the AU and the RECs, rules have been emerging since the 1990s. Regional and sub-regional courts and parliaments have been set up as important institutions. Although they do not have supranational mechanisms, it is likely that rules and political stability are strengthened through member states’ cooperation within those institutions. In light of those ambitious goals and emerging rules, realism is not as relevant as it is to Asian regionalism. Nation states’ concerns for sovereignty seem solvable in Africa.

**Functionalism: human needs and solidarity.**

The origin and early developments of Pan-Africanism reflected the functionalist logic to a great degree. Out of the human needs for freedom and respect for African nations, African intellectuals and students began to advocate for African unity. Between 1945 and 1963, two conflicting groups emerged with their different views on integration. The “ambitious” group, namely the Casablanca group, led by Ghana, insisted on a federalism approach. The “cautious” group, namely the Brazzaville group, insisted on a minimalist approach, which merely aimed at inter-governmental socio-economic cooperation (Ajala, 1973, pp. 20-30). Despite the different approaches, both groups were trying to meet their common need of ending colonialism.

The Brazzaville group was formed out of a common need for independence and
economic well-being, but it did not support any form of unity. The Casablanca group made several attempts for a union, but they all failed. Several reasons led to the failure, as Donald Rothchild (1968) listed, the lack of a favorable ethos, a climate of political tolerance, a sense of transnational community and a myth of potential benefit. The federalists had a weak point from which to convince their counterparts in other territories to surrender some sovereign powers (Rothchild, 1968, p. 7). Continental solidarity was not strong enough to involve all African states within a federation.

In 1961, a refined approach in the Monrovia conference embraced the functionalist approach. The Monrovia conference advocated for non-interference and respect for sovereignty, and achieved the agreement among delegates that “the unity at the moment is not the political integration of sovereign African states, but focused on economic, educational, cultural, scientific cooperation as well as communications and transportation among them” (Ajala, 1973, pp. 34-38). The spirit of focusing on the direct needs formed the basis of the Lagos Charter and the OAU Charter.

In 1963, some political leaders’ plea for establishing a political union was rejected. During discussions on East African unity in 1963 and 1964, it was increasingly common to see African diplomats working to achieve less formidable objectives at the outset. Consequently, functionalism in the form of technical and economic coordination was frequently spoken of as the practical step. Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny told at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference in 1963 that their quest for unity must be dealt with discretion, and the practical way would be to implement positive solutions to concrete problems in the current stage (Rothchild,
Rothchild (1968) indicated that the functionalist approach remained to be tested in future, and the final stage of pan-Africanism was not certain. In the following 40 years, the RECs and the AU pursued practical solutions to their common problems. In the AU’s history, numerous protocols and agreements on functional projects were concluded although not implemented fully. The technical commissions in the RECs and the AU have been the main functional agencies. The establishment of the RECs was itself part of the functionalist approach, achieving integration at the practical level first. By the early 2000s, most of the RECs were at the stage of economic and functional cooperation.

The lack of economic integration in the 1990s was partly due to the priority given to a more urgent need, solving sub-regional political and military conflicts. Conflicts in the Horn, the Great Lakes and Angola have been a direct threat to economic development, as they have taken the funding and labour that could have been used in regional integration. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has also been challenged by the difficulties brought by instability. It has been threatened by illegal and unlicensed weapons, drug trafficking, and competition among drug traffickers and other criminals. The regional order has been worsened by refugees, irregular movers, illegal migrants and internally displaced persons (SADC, 2011b, p. 77). International crimes such as smuggling and black market activities have rendered the opening of borders less possible (Yansane, 1977, p. 56).
The lack of solidarity is another factor that has limited the progress. Due to regional conflicts, fear and lack of trust among African states have weakened their sense of positive solidarity. The 1970s and 1980s saw a multitude of unconstitutional changes due to the intervention of domestic and sometimes external military forces. In 1985, more than half of the 72 military regimes in Africa were ruling in West Africa. The new military leaders generally feared retaliation from other military officers, so they tended to delay the free cross-border movements. They tended to resort to border closure to gain time to secure their control over the country (Edi, 2007, pp. 30-32).

Some other factors have also influenced the level of positive solidarity. The levels of economic development in the RECs, as observed in Chapter 5, have been widely different. Politically, about half of the member states in the AU and the three RECs are autocracies. Cultural differences should also be noted. The SADC members, for example, have quite distinct histories and cultures. They may be grouped into three broad categories. The first are the former British High Commission territories and colonies which achieved bloodless independence from Britain in the 1960s. They had been mostly by one-party rule until the 1990 democratic wave which led to multiparty systems in many of them. The second are the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola which achieved independence under Marxist regimes in 1974. They endured brutal counter-revolutionary civil wars. The third are Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa where white minorities held on power and finally there were settlements leading to democratic governments (Abegunrin, 2009b, p. 77). In the meantime, the OAU member states lacked a common security threat or economic
challenge after the 1990s, so the sense of negative solidarity was weak.

Although the functionalist approach that focuses on the direct practical problems has been widely applied to the AU and the RECs since the 1960s, it must be noted that functionalism has overlooked several other important factors and trends. The design of Ghana-led communities in the late 1950s was federalist. Although most achievements within the AU were to address the direct and technical problems, the charters of the AU and the RECs, especially the EAC, prescribed the stages of integration from a FTA to an economic and monetary union. As aforementioned, the AU envisages a common defence policy, which is not in accordance with the flexible principle of functionalism.

The nation states’ concerns of sovereignty have hindered regional integration since the beginning. Many projects within the AU and the RECs have not been ratified and implemented at the national level. Therefore, policy outcomes have not been effectively addressed. If forms follow functions, Africa should have developed a political federation in the 1960s so that they could pool national resources to resist colonialism.

**Neofunctionalism: spillover, elites, leadership, and the national inability.**

Many evidences in African integration have reflected the cultivated spillover effect. The AU and several RECs envisage the gradual process evolving from a FTA to an economic and monetary union. To a great degree, the path that the AU plans resembles the process that the EU has been through. The goals and institutions within
the AU and the RECs are also similar to those in the EU.

However, the spillover logic is not enough to soundly explain all the complicated dynamics in African integration. Some important factors brought up by Mattli (1999) should be noted. In the 1950s and 1960s, political leaders played a key role in initiating African integration. It was quite similar to the European case where political leaders and their partnerships contributed to regional developments. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was one of the most outstanding pro-integration leaders. In 1958, Nkrumah and Sekou Toure of Guinea set up the Ghana-Guinea Union with a common economic, foreign and defence policy. Julius Nyerere, president of Tanzania, convened an East and Central African leaders’ conference in September 1958. This conference founded the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA). It was agreed that an East African Federation, proposed by Julius Nyerere, should be established when Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar became independent, and that this organization would be the first logical step towards the final goal of total African unity (Ajala, 1973, pp. 41-42). Nyerere’s spirit was realized partly in the EAC which envisages a political federation as its final goal.

Interest groups have also shaped African integration, but in a way different from those in Europe. Political interest groups are the groups that have played the primary role. The interests of some political groups have been closely vested in domestic developments and processes. Samuel Makinda and Wafula Okumu (2008) noted that administrative corruption was widespread, and had harmed African economies and rendered integration difficult. In a report presented in September 2002, the AU
estimated that corruption costs African economies in excess of 148 billion dollars a year. The direct and indirect costs of corruption have represented 25% of Africa’s GDP and often increased the cost of goods by as much as 20% (Makinda & Okumu, 2008, p. 65).

Lack of democracy and rule of law have rendered eliminating corruption and hence promoting economic development and integration difficult. Many critics suggest that parliaments served merely as rubber stamps for despotic leaders. No distinction was made between the interests of the political, leader, the ruling party, and the state (Makinda & Okumu, 2008, p. 12). Colonialism often laid the infrastructure for dictatorship and authoritarian rule in post-colonial Africa. To a certain degree, most of the security problems, including border disputes, ethnic tensions, and the marginalization of some groups, emanated from the colonial structures (Makinda & Okumu, 2008, p. 18). Lack of democracy, corruption, and those security problems are linked together to a certain degree, and have harmed regional developments.

The top-down approach of combating corruption within the AU has not been efficient. It does not take into account the possibility that in some cases, the state has become a vehicle for organized criminal activity. Some leaders who benefit from corruption are required to spearhead the fight against corruption. Corruption is so hard to control in Africa not only due to lack of democracy and the wrong approach, but also because of personal greed, the misperception that politics is the road to prosperity, weak government structure, and poor remuneration of civil servants. As Makinda and Okuma observed, since independence, some politicians and civil servants have
regarded the African state as a cash cow. The desire to exploit the state for personal
gain has led to corruption in the recruitment process, and that has been seen by many
the right thing. Some Western companies have not only continued to bribe African
public officials, but also deducted those bribes from their taxes (Makinda & Okumu,
2008, pp. 66-67). Resources lost in corruption partly account for the lack of funding
in the AU and the RECs.

Most interest groups involved in corruption are not likely to support integration
and good governance in the RECs and the AU. As Mattli (1999) argued, the political
leaders tend to retain their powers when their gains can be ensured without integration,
not to mention when their gains are harmed by integration (Mattli, 1999b, p. 52).
Especially, about half of the AU member states are the autocracies, in which case
political leaders’ powers are not related to people’s satisfaction in governance and
economic performance. To a certain degree, this explains the lack of push from
leaders and political groups in the AU and the RECs.

However, it must be noted that some supportive interest groups, although weak,
have contributed to integration. Siteke Mwale (2001) noted that the Common Market
of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) is rich in water, fisheries, hydro-electric
power. It produces a significant proportion of the world’s gold, diamonds, platinum,
chrome and manganese. The growing private sector agents constitute the main drivers
of economic growth and potentially a strong force for integration policies (Mwale,
2001, pp. 210-211).
On the international level, the gains from integration are not considerable for many African states. It is due to the competitive feature and small sizes of markets. Throughout the ECOWAS, for example, economic activity relies heavily on primary production. The contribution of their manufacturing sectors was less than 10% in 1978. The economies of member-states are structurally competitive rather than complementary (ECOWAS, 2006, p. 2).

Several inter-related problems have undermined nation states’ abilities to participate in integration. HIV/AIDS has been one of the biggest threats. The COMESA region has one of the highest rates of infection. Consequently, life expectancy in many countries had dropped by 30% between 1995 and 2000. In the SADC, approximately 14 million people were HIV positive (Mwale, 2001, pp. 208-210). The high rate of AIDS infection has caused the lack of sufficient skilled human resources, which has further hindered economic development and consequently the lack of states’ ability to provide sufficient funding for regional integration. It has also led to the lack of governments’ ability to improve the poor and inadequate education infrastructure. Thus, they have been short of skilled labours for national development and regional initiatives.

The poverty of nation states has been another main problem, which is related to several other problems. In the SADC, about 40% percent of the region’s population has lived in extreme poverty, reflected in high levels of unemployment and unsatisfactory access to basic services and infrastructures (SADC, 2011b, pp. 73-75). This situation has been worsened by the low rates of education and the
aforementioned HIV/AIDS infection. A large proportion of GDP has to be invested to change people’s living conditions, and therefore it has become one of the main burdens of the governments. Some of them still suffered from unstable domestic politics in the 1990s. Opposing military groups, illegal weapons and drug trafficking have been threatening regional stability and, consequently, economic development.

There is a huge gap between mini-states, such as Cape Verde and Guinea, and big powers, such as Nigeria. There has been unexpressed fear of domination by the bigger and more wealthy member countries.(ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, 1996, p. 14). Besides, it implies different levels of abilities of members to adapt to the regional changes. As they can not pursue integration policies at the same pace, they may have difficulties in achieving consensus within the regional institutions.

The role of big powers has been important in pushing forward regional projects. Nigeria, for example, has been the leading power in ECOWAS that has contributed to regional integration. Despite the infancy of its democracy, Nigeria has been both a military and a financial power in West Africa. It played an important role in the border disputes between Mali and Burkina Faso. It helped ease the cold relations between President Rawlings of Ghana and President Eyadema of Togo in 1993. In 1980s, Nigeria contributed 33.3% of ECOWAS’ budget and accepted repeatedly to host its summits. It also benevolently supported the 1990 reformation of the ECOWAS’ system. Besides, it was believed that Nigeria contributed large sums of money to the intervention in Liberia, despite objections of Nigerians (Edi, 2007, p. 165).
To sum up, the main regionalism developments can be attributed to the leadership of some political leaders in the beginning stage, the leading country in each of the three main RECs, and the cultivated regional projects. The major difficulties of African integration are the poor economic conditions, which worsen and are worsened by high rates of AIDS infection, poor education and infrastructure conditions, and low income and employment. Those problems have rendered many countries unable to provide sufficient financial support for the AU and the RECs. Corruption and lack of democracy also worsen the situation. If the economic conditions as well as related socio-economic conditions are improved, the RECs are likely to push further the regionalism plans. According to neofunctionalists, the three main RECs with one leading country in each should be able to realize an economic and monetary union eventually.

In 2008, the Economic Commission for Africa began a study on the potential benefits and costs of inter-REC FTAs, in order to assess the feasibility of consolidating RECs in the following stage (UNEconomic&SocialCouncil, 2008, pp. 12-13). It remains to be seen whether the RECs and the AU can bring the current integration further by consolidating sub-regional groups and expanding FTAs.

The main problem here is that the context in Africa has been much different from that of postwar Europe. Neofunctionalism was developed to the background of European integration, and “in theory and practice, the OAU falls far short of orthodox functionalist’s model of a working peace system, and of a neofunctionalist supranational body” at the outset (Nweke, 1987, p. 134). The main goal of the OAU
was not for collective security, but for independence and collective self-reliance. Besides, they have lacked democratic regimes which could have allowed the free participation of people, civil society, and other interest groups. By 2010, 22 out of 53 countries have been autocracies. Further, due to the different historical experiences, respect for non-interference and sovereignty has been given fundamental importance in the current stage. That is one of the most important reasons for the lack of supranational institutions or mechanisms in the OAU and AU. To sum up, it is doubtful whether Africa would go through the same trajectory as Europe.

Further, the AU plans to go through a gradual process of integration, starting from regionalism in several RECs. According to neofunctionalism, as the inter-state and inter-regional linkages intensify, the increasing spillover effect will combine the separate FTAs into a continental FTA. However, it is uncertain whether it is feasible to combine all the regions into one, given that there are 53 countries in total, with most of them underdeveloped.

**Conclusion: copying the European model.**

The widely recognized problems in African integration are mostly not analyzed with any theoretical approach. However, it can be seen that most of them can be related to the neofunctionalist explanation: those problems limit nation states’ ability to adapt to and promote integration plans. Some other factors are not relevant to any approach above. It has been noted in the Pan-Africanist literatures that the multiple memberships of African states are a potential problem. For example, the COMESA
covers a region where the SADC, East African Community (EAC), Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) also operate. Those RECs include similar aims, such as promotion of free trade and a common internal customs. The multiple memberships pose challenges in terms of simultaneous compliance of their respective arrangements (Gibson & COMESA, 2004, pp. 26-27).

If combining all the factors that shaped the Pan-Africanism process, all three approaches are involved. During the 1900s and 1950s, Pan-Africanism activities started as a reaction to the human need for independence and economic development. They could also be seen as an outcome of nation states’ cooperation out of their common interests. Two opposing groups appeared, with one seeking for a federalist solution, and the other advocating for a minimalist approach. The former was a result of a sense of solidarity, urging human needs, supportive political leaders, and common interests. The latter was out of the concerns of sovereignty, the lack of mutual trust, and insufficient solidarity.

Concerns of sovereignty continue to be a fragmenting factor today, as is evident in the lack of supranational institutions and outcomes. Meanwhile, rules in the form of regional institutions and policies emerged in the 1990s. However, many problems caused member states’ inability to promote integration aggressively: corruption, poverty, lack of democracy, high rates of HIV infection, poor infrastructure and education conditions, instability, and organized crimes. Difficulty of advancing economic integration in the current stage is because of the nation states’ priority on
maintaining stability and solving those domestic problems. The factors can be summarized in the following table.

Table 6.4
Factors Shaping African Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors/Approach</th>
<th>The 1900s-1940s</th>
<th>The 1950s</th>
<th>The 1960s-1980s</th>
<th>The 1990s-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States’ priority on security and economic cooperation</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Intense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States’ calculations that favor cooperation</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Intense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from Big Powers both within and outside (in RECs)</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functionalism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A common security threat</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic destruction and related human needs</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate struggles for independent governance</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-independence tasks</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of positive solidarity in national values, economics and politics (mainly in RECs)</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neofunctionalism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontroversial areas in low politics (mainly in RECs)</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and international interest groups favoring integration</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from elites (in RECs)</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasiona l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skillful manipulation and negotiation of interest groups and elites</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasiona l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States’ ability to overcome domestic problems and adapt to integration</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasiona l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Spillover (in RECs)</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Occasiona l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and Cultivated Spillover (mainly in RECs)</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>Intense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External challenges from other national and integrated economies</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Intense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Which factors have been the most consequential in African integration? When we look at the European case, most neofunctionalist factors are intensely evident. When it comes to Asian regionalism, big powers and national interests have been addressed by many scholars. Now we have gone through the process of African integration, and it can be concluded that the desire for unity was constantly evident from 1950s through the 1990s. Pan-Africanism has been a political project that African states used to resist colonialism, to maintain stability, and to develop their economies. However, they achieved little concrete progress at the continental level. The AU has set up the goal towards an economic and monetary union, but after more than a decade, it has not set up a FTA. No supranational institutions or policies have been achieved, and many agreements have not been ratified by nation states. Therefore, continental integration has mainly been shaped by nation states’ concerns.
of sovereignty and the lack of influential big powers.

None of the theoretical approaches is widely discussed in the context of African integration, but the functionalist approach (to focus on practical and technical problems) was reflected in the efforts during the 1960s and the 1980s. In the 1990s, the three main RECs all followed the neofunctionalist approach that includes several steps. Unlike the APT group, all member states in the three RECs have agreed on the specific steps to build a sub-regional union. The role of political elites and the common need to end colonialism were two keys in the beginning of African integration.

The major inhibiting factor in the current stage is the inability of African states to promote regional integration, which is caused by several inter-related problems, especially financial difficulties. Despite the difficulties, all the three main RECs have realized their FTAs. Four major driving forces are evident in their achievements: the common need to eliminate poverty and maintain stability, the political elites, a leading power, and the cultivated integration plans that follow the neo-functionalist gradualist logic. The latter three factors are mainly reflected at the sub-regional level rather than the continental level.

In conclusion, the integration process at the sub-regional level can be explained better by neo-functionalism than the other two approaches, while the continental process mainly reflects the realist logic. If the AU is able to combine the separate RECs into a continent FTA in future, neofunctionalism may be a better approach then.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

After the research and analysis on regional integration in the three regions, several findings can be concluded regarding the features of regional identities in light of integration, the different origins and processes of integration in the three regions, and the factors that have shaped the processes.

Firstly, the identity of each region is distinctive, and has been evolving. The new Europe referred to the core six in the age of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and then it had been enlarged to contain most Western and Northern European countries by the 1980s. By 2007, 27 European countries, and especially all main European powers, have been involved in the same continental organization, the European Union (EU), but there have been controversies over the memberships of some Eastern European and Balkan countries. The Eastern European countries used to be in alliance with the Soviet Union. As both the external and internal identity of Eastern European countries has been being Europeanized, the membership of Balkan countries has become one of the most controversial issues.

In contrast to Europe, only 13 Asian countries have been involved in the major process towards regional community building, namely that within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT). The identity of Asia has been much more complicated. Due to diverse historical trajectories, cultures, economic and political backgrounds, it is divided into several sub-regions, that is, the
Middle East, the Central Asia and Russia, the ASEAN, the East Asia, and the Asia Pacific, some of which may overlap with one another and may include some countries outside Asia. Each sub-region has developed some regional institutions for furthering economic cooperation, which have turned into different outcomes. After excluding the Middle East and the Central Asia from the major regionalism process, the main controversies are on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN plus its partners.

The APEC stands for a quest for strengthened order in this region and a new Asia-Pacific identity, but the analysis indicates that it has failed in constructing a new identity. Its main value has been as a forum for networking and conversations, the “soft” ways to generate norms and strengthen political and economic order. After carefully comparing the developments and nation states’ concerns as well as their interactions within the APT and East Asian Summit (EAS), it is concluded that the APT is more likely to be the founding group for the East Asian Community (EAC); however, nothing has been settled, as competitions among a few big powers go on. In fact, the big powers, namely China and Japan, have not been involved in any formal regional organization. Therefore, the APT is not a region yet.

In Africa, the identity is not controversial at the continental level. All 53 African states have been involved in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) between 1994 and 2002 and the African Union (AU) since 2002. Meanwhile, they have been divided into several regional economic communities (RECs) which usually have overlapping memberships. However, as aforementioned, the African continent as a united region is
an invented notion that has not been realized fully, given that it has not established functioning institutions for effective cooperation and that the RECs remains largely separate. On the contrary, the RECs that have realized FTAs can be deemed as regions defined in this research. It can be concluded that Africa is a collection of regions that are partly overlapping.

Secondly, regional integration in the three cases were initiated in different contexts and therefore led to different outcomes. European integration was initiated in the context of the end of World War Two and the Cold War. The European economies suffered from two world wars and declined considerably, while the United States and the Soviet Union replaced the big European powers and became two poles of the world. Germany was seen as a threat to its neighbors, and the Soviet Union as an external security threat to west Europe. With the push of several European political elites, the ECSC was established to constrain Germany, to resist the Soviet threat, and to develop economies. A supranational authority was established within the ECSC, and it turned out constructive. Following the ECSC, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), were established in the 1950s.

Asian regionalism started in the Cold War among small anti-communist nations in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN was established as an anti-communist grouping, so the big communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, were excluded. Meanwhile, most East Asian countries were preoccupied by post-independence tasks, and non-interference had been one of their important diplomatic principles. Guided by that
principle, the decision-making mechanism in the ASEAN has been consensus-based. Another grouping in East Asia, the APEC, has been a loose forum with a big and diverse membership. Neither of them achieved considerable economic integration before 1990s.

In Africa, African unity was advocated widely by a number of countries in order to end colonialism. Those countries were roughly divided into two groups, the Casablanca group supporting ambitious integration and the Monrovia group insisting on moderate cooperation. Some political elites such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana were noteworthy in initiating integration. In the initiating stage, African states and political leaders were much more active in integration efforts than those in Asia. Because of their same interest in ending colonialism, all independent states became members in the OAU when it was established in 1963. However, before the 1990s, the OAU did not achieve much in economic integration mainly due to nation states’ priority on attaining independence.

After the initiation, European, Asian and African integration followed divergent trajectories, and the outcomes have been different. European integration has been the most successful. European countries consolidated the three six-country communities into a single organization, the EC, in 1967. Britain led the Nordic countries in setting up the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) to counter-balance the influence of the EEC, but they failed and began to seek EEC/EC membership in the 1960s. In the late 1980s, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed. The 1990s and the first decade of 2000s witnessed a number of great achievements, such as the establishment of the EU, the
implementation of the Schengen Agreement, the implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and the enlargement to 27 members of the EU.

By contrast, Asian regionalism developments have been limited. Before 1990, the ASEAN did not realize any concrete economic integration. Its main agreements were focused on enhancing regional security. It began to set up the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) since 1992, and has quickened its pace towards an economic union since the 1997 financial crisis. In 2003, it set up the ASEAN Community composed of three pillars. However, its institutions, achievements, and membership have all been limited. The three pillars have not included a regional court or parliament. The decision-making method has been consensus-based. The AFTA has not been implemented fully in all the 10 members. It remains to be seen whether the ASEAN would realize its goals towards an economic union and the third pillar, the political community. Meanwhile, the 1997 financial crisis has advanced the APT cooperation in financial issues and trade; however, the big powers, namely China and Japan, have not been involved in any formal integration organization. They have not achieved any consensus regarding the proposed EAC.

Compared to Asian regionalism, African integration has been more institutionalized and more successful, although it has been hindered by a number of interrelated problems. While Asian regionalism has never involved all countries on the continent, an African continental organization has existed since the 1960s. In 1994, the African Economic Community (AEC) was launched, aiming to realize a FTA, a Customs Union and then an Economic Union of Africa, while the integration policies
of the ASEAN have been applied only to the 10 members. When the AU replaced the OAU, it aimed to realize all the goals of the AEC and to have a common defence policy, while the goals of the ASEAN have not included any policies in high politics. While the ASEAN Community has set up very limited institutions, the institutions of the AU have included a regional court and parliament which are intergovernmental rather than supranational. Although the continental achievements have been limited, the achievements and prospects of the three main RECs have been noteworthy. The Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) all have one leading country in each. They aim to realize an economic union eventually, and they have all realized FTAs by 2010. In terms of institutions, the three RECs have a regional court and parliament in each.

Fourthly, the mixed outcomes in each region have been shaped by diverse integrating and fragmenting factors. How can we explain the absence of supranationalism in Asia and Africa? As is summarized in chapter 6, none of the theoretical approaches provides a sound account for regional integration, and the regionalism process in each region can be explained by a synthesized pattern. However, neofunctionalism has been proved to be a strong account in explaining European integration and African sub-regional integration, while realism has been proved more relevant than others in explaining Asian regionalism process and the African continental integration.

In European integration, the dynamics of interest group politics and elite
behaviors in the context of market relationships are the keys to shaping the national interests and the consequent processes of policy making. The benevolent leading country or the partnership between big powers is another key factor. In the developments of the African RECs, the roles of political leaders and leading countries are the most consequential. Their major difficulty is the lack of funding for implementing regional projects. The lack of national abilities to promote regionalism is the main problem of Africa, but not of Europe and Asia.

In Asian regionalism, the defining factor has been the competitive relationship between big powers, China, Japan and, to a lesser degree, the United States. National interests and concerns of sovereignty determine their interactions and hence their integration policies. Because of the lack of pro-integration leaders, the lack of a leading country or partnership between big powers, and the weak interest groups, Asian regionalism progress is the most constrained among those in the three regions. African continental integration has also reflected the logic of realism. Concerns over sovereignty and lack of compliance of nation states together with corresponding problems of domestic governance are main problems that have hindered continental development.

Lastly, when we compare the patterns of integration in the three regions, it can be seen that the African and European integration have something in common. In Africa, realism is better for explaining the lack of continent-wide integration and neo-functionalism for sub-regional integration. In Europe, it began this way, too. In the 1950s and the early 1960s, the EEC and the EFTA could be seen as two
sub-regions and the Europe as the whole. The EEC that supported closer integration was successful in implementing its policies, and ultimately proved more attractive to new members, including the EFTA countries. The whole continent, however, did not have common policy goals. However, this situation has changed over time. Now in the EU, there are no sub-regional communities. The EU as a whole has developed some supranational features, such as the QMV, while the AU has not.

The distinction between the continent and the sub-regions in Africa does not apply to Asia and the ASEAN. The ASEAN did not have any ambitious integration plans in the beginning, while some sub-regional communities in another two regions, such as the Ghana-Guinean Union in Africa and the ECSC in Europe, had supranational elements in the beginning stage. The lack of ambitious developments in the ASEAN can be explained by the absence of several key factors which were or have been present in the sub-regions in Africa and Europe. First, the big powers have been excluded from the ASEAN since the beginning, and no other country within it has been playing the benevolent leading role. There have not been strong political leaders who have been supportive for ambitious integration. The big powers in East Asia have not been involved in any formal regionalism organization, and they have not formed a strategic partnership as France and Germany have. While the United States has supported a closer Europe, it has opposed a close East Asian community dominated by China and Japan.

To sum up, in East Asia, several key factors were missing that would have led to more progress in integration: a benevolent leading country or Sino-Japan partnership,
pro-integration political leaders, a lasting context where closer cooperation is in nation states’ common interest, and the declining importance of sovereignty. The sub-regional integration in Africa should have been advanced further, if African states could improve their abilities to promote regional integration by improving the levels of economic development and solving a number of problems in related to economic development.
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Appendices

Compatibility (in size and political systems) of African RECs

Table A.1

COMESA Countries by GDP (Unit: US dollars, Scale: Billions)  
(Interational Monetary Fund, 2010b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1.165</td>
<td>1.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
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<td>0.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
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<td>1.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>26.675</td>
<td>32.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>26.620</td>
<td>30.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>9.424</td>
<td>8.589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>4.073</td>
<td>4.723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>9.303</td>
<td>8.589</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>4.620</td>
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<td>Djibouti</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>162.435</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>54.644</td>
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Table A.2

COMESA Countries by Population (Unit: Persons, Scale: Millions) 2008-2009  
(Interational Monetary Fund, 2010b)

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
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<td>Comoros</td>
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<td>0.666</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Angola</td>
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<td>Botswana</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4.723</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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Table A.3

SADC Countries by GDP (Unit: US dollars, Scale: Billions) 2008-2009
(International Monetary Fund, 2010b)

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<td>Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1.272</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Seychelles</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>Djibouti</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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Table A.4

SADC Countries by Population (Unit: Persons, Scale: Millions) 2008-2009
(International Monetary Fund, 2010b)
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<th>Country</th>
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<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>11.732</td>
<td>11.732</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Table A.5**

ECOWAS Countries by GDP (Unit: US dollars, Scale: Billions) 2008-2009
(InternationalMonetaryFund, 2010b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
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<tr>
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<td>The Gambia</td>
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<td>Togo</td>
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### Table A.6

**ECOWAS Countries by Population (Unit: Persons, Scale: Millions) 2008-2009**

*International Monetary Fund, 2010b*

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
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<th>2009</th>
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<td>21.385</td>
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<td>1.610</td>
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<td>12.820</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Togo</td>
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<td>Cape Verde</td>
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### Table A.7

**Comparing Political Systems of REC Member States, 2010 (FreedomHouse, 2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECs (number of members)</th>
<th>Number of Electoral Democracies</th>
<th>Number of Autocracies</th>
<th>Percentage of Electoral Democracies</th>
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<td>COMESA (23)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC (15)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>53.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS (15)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>53.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU (53)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>58.49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3 Data about Cape Verde is not available at IMF Economic Outlook Database; all data here about Cape Verde is from CIA World Factbook, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cv.html.